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U A-. 12'*
Labor and M anagem ent
Bulletin 1715

Bureau of Labor Statistics

Dalton & Montgomery Co.
Public Library




Labor and M anagem ent
Bulletin 1715

Prepared for the
National Commission
on Productivity
by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics
U. S. Department of Labor
September 1971

J. D. Hodgson, Secretary
Geoffrey H. Moore, Commissioner

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price 45 cents

The National Commission on Productivity was established by President Richard
Nixon in June 1970 to develop recommendations for programs and policies to improve
the productivity o f the U.S. economy. The Commission is composed o f top-level repre­
sentatives o f business, labor, government, and the public. In order to aid the members in
their consideration o f various topics, staff papers will be prepared by government or
private industry experts in different subject matter fields. These papers serve as back­
ground material for the members but do not necessarily represent their views.
This bulletin presents examples o f formal efforts by labor and management to improve
productivity. The focus is on plant level practices that are within the control of
management or unions, leaving broad economic, technological, institutional, and other
factors that affect productivity change for examination in other studies.
Most o f the examples in the report involve measures developed through collective
bargaining or in special arrangements between unions and management outside the
bargaining table. A few examples lie primarily within the scope o f personnel administra­
tion or industrial engineering, in which unions play a less active role. They are included
because they represent new directions that may become future issues for labor and
The study is based mainly on information available from secondary sources, supple­
mented in a few cases by current data obtained through personal communication with
labor and management officials. A few examples, however, were based on previous field
investigations by the staff of the Bureau itself. A selected bibliography is appended to the
Nineteen examples were prepared in the Bureau of Labor Statistics under the direction
o f Edgar Weinberg, Deputy Assistant Commissioner for Productivity and Technology, by
the staff o f the Division of Technological Studies. Most of the material on work rule set­
tlements and methods o f adjusting to change was prepared under the direction of Harry P.
Cohany, Chief, Division of Industrial Realtions, by the Division staff. Material on improv­
ing productivity in dentistry is based on information furnished by the Public Health



Chapter I. In trod u ction ............................................................................................................................................


Chapter II. Retraining programs



Retraining o f plumbers ...................................................................................................................................
Union sponsored retraining for printers ...................................................................................................
Upgrading hospital employees ......................................................................................................................
Training and retraining in the maritime industry ...................................................................................
Improving basic education of steelworkers ..............................................................................................
Chapter III. Work rules settlements ...................................................................................................................
The music performance trust funds ..............................................................................................................
Centralized meat cutting and the Butchers’ Union ................................................................................
The International Typographical Union and “Bogus” T y p esettin g ......................................................
Union and management accommodation in prefabricated housing co n stru ctio n ..............................
Mechanization and modernization agreement in west coast longshoring ...........................................
Chapter IV. Methods o f adjusting to technological change


Attrition arrangements in the railroad industry ......................................................................................
Aid to railroad workers under AMTRAK ................................................................................................
Interplant transfer arrangements in the Ford-UAW agreement ...........................................................
Relocation allowances in auto and steel industries ................................................................................
Early retirement plans ...................................................................................................................................
The guaranteed annual wage in New York L ongshoring........................................................................
Armour and Co. plant closings and the automation fund committee ................................................
Chapter V. Manpower planning






Manpower planning in the telephone industry ........................................................................................
Manpower planning in the Internal Revenue Service ..............................................................................


Chapter VI. Plantwide productivity incentive plans




A Profit-sharing plan in textiles ................................................................................................................... 23
The Scanlon p l a n .............................................................................................................................................. 23
The Kaiser-Steelworkers long range sharing plan ................................................................................... 24
Chapter VII. Formal union-management cooperative programs ...................................................................


Union-management cooperation at the TV A ...........................................................................................
Cooperative program for worker safety in the paper industry ..............................................................
Union-management cooperation in the needles trades ...........................................................................


Contents— Continued
Chapter VIII. Job red esig n ...................................................................................................................................


Fitting jobs to men: Human Engineering ................................................................................................
Job redesign for older workers ...................................................................................................................
Job enlargement to reduce costs ................................................................................................................
Improving productivity among dentists ...................................................................................................


Chapter IX. Absenteeism and hours of work ...................................................................................................


Control o f absenteeism ................................................................................................................................
The 4-day 40-hour week ...........................................................................................................................


Appendix: Selected bibliography...........................................................................................................................




Chapter I. Introduction
human factor of production often contribute to
advances in productivity.
Special attention has been given to several out­
standing collective bargained settlements of problems of
work rules and job security. These issues arise in the
everyday conduct of collective bargaining and usually
are settled, though at times only after considerable
turmoil. Productivity is generally not an explicit issue in
negotiation, but both sides realize that cust increases
must be matched by efforts to improve efficiency.
The examples in this study are drawn from a wide
range of industries. Each case reflects efforts to meet the
special circumstances of an industry or plant and may
not be directly applicable to others. Moreover, as in
labor-management relations generally, the settlement of
a particular problem does not necessarily guarantee long
lasting industrial peace. New problems are arising con­
stantly to test the ingenuity of labor and management in
resolving them. Nevertheless, the experiences of the
plants and industries recorded in the report will assist
others who are seeking ways of improving productivity.

Improvements in productivity are the result of many
factors. Technological innovations, greater investment in
capital equipment per worker, and improved managerial
techniques are critical. But researchers on the sources of
productivity growth also stress the great importance of
human factors: for example, improved skills and educa­
tion of the work force; wider acceptance o f change; and
greater flexibility and mobility. Although the influence
of these factors cannot be measured, undoubtedly their
interaction creates a climate favorable to the growth in
output per man-hour.
This bulletin describes efforts by labor and manage­
ment to provide training and promotional opportunities,
to make greater use o f workers’ know how, and to
establish more satisfactory work schedules, greater job
security, and more effective work incentives. Success in
improving working conditions could contribute to
reducing excessive absenteeism, tardiness, and turnover.
It could lead to greater motivation on the job, higher
quality o f workmanship, and less resistance to techno­
logical change. These improvements in dealing with the


Chapter II. Retraining Programs
classes at Purdue University to learn new training
requirements created by changes in technology. The
same agreement and administrative arrangements are
used to upgrade local apprenticeship but the retraining
program for journeymen is a separate operation.
An example of a formal retraining program supported
by ITF but run locally is the National Pipeline Welding
School in Tulsa, Okla. Founded in 1965 by the local
union and contractors association, the school was
organized to retrain skilled plumbers to work on the
expanding pipeline systems in the region without the
special onsite training that had been needed previously.
A small staff of full-time instructors give classroom
training to upgrade the skills o f helper trainees and
The ITF program has expanded from 32 programs for
about 1,000 journeymen in 1956 to 397 with an
enrollment of over 18,000 in 1967, the latest year for
which data are available. Since its inception, over 80,000
union journeymen have taken some training. Financial
assistance to local programs for journeymen and appren­
tices averaged roughly $1 million annually in recent
years. This covered the cost of instruction, equipment,
classrooms, etc. The program is entirely privately sup­

Retraining programs contribute to improving produc­
tivity in several different ways. Well trained workers
need a shorter time period for starting up, produce less
scrap material and cause fewer delays. Also, techno­
logical changes often modify the skills needed by
workers and require retraining which also contributes to
reducing resistance to change. Finally, training programs
lessen worker discontent by providing opportunities to
advance to jobs o f higher skill and pay and of greater
The following five examples describe retraining pro­
grams for journeymen and other workers. Although
retraining of workers on the job often is regarded as
primarily management’s duty, the prominent role played
by unions in these five programs is one of the most
significant features o f the cases. In three examples, the
unions initiated training to update skills of craftsmenplumbers, printers and seamen. The unions in each of
these cases have long had a leading role in apprenticeship
training. In the other two cases, unions, in cooperation
with management and government manpower agencies,
set up programs to raise the skills and knowledge of less
skilled workers—hospital workers and steelworkers.
Retraining o f plumbers

A national program for updating the skills of journey­
men plumbers and steamfitters was established in 1956
by agreement between the United Association of
Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and
Pipefitters Industry of the United States and Canada
(AFL-CIO) and the National Constructors Association.
Union leaders and contractors both recognized that
retraining would be necessary to meet the skill require­
ments of technological advances such as automation, use
of atomic energy, and the changes in space and
petrochemical industries.
The agreement set up an “International Training
Fund” financed by contributions from union con­
tractors based on manhours paid for. Administered by a
joint board o f trustees, the fund assists local committees
in purchasing equipment and in improving local training
programs under national standards. A national staff of
training coordinators is employed to assist local in­
structors. Each year a number o f instructors attend

Union sponsored retraining fo r printers

A national training center, established by the Inter­
national Typographical Union, provides its members
with new skills required to operate modern composing
equipment. Similar centers have been established by
other unions in the printing industry, notably the
pressmen and lithographers.
The ITU Training Center is an outgrowth of the
union’s longstanding policy of training printing crafts­
men to operate the latest machinery so that it can assure
union employers an adequate supply of skilled craftsmen
and thereby maintain its jurisdiction. This was the policy
followed in the introduction o f the linotype machine 80
years ago. In recent years, radically different
technologies—for example, phototypesetting, and the
application of computers to perform justification and
hyphenation operations—aroused the union’s interest in
expanding retraining o f craftsmen.


The ITU school began operations at Colorado
Springs, Colo., in January 1962 with 15 ITU members in
training. The training school cost about $2 million to
construct and equip and is financed entirely by contribu­
tions from a union fund. No funds are received from
employers. Today about 100 students are enrolled in
each class. The center offers 28 separate courses,
including electronics, photocomposition, and others. In
addition, some ITU members who have been trained at
the Colorado center, provide instruction on the latest
methods at about 100 local centers throughout the
Any member o f the ITU in good standing is eligible
to attend the training center. A member may register for
one or more o f the 28 courses. Most courses are 3 weeks
in duration and trainees attend classes full time. Most
employees attend the school during their scheduled paid
vacation period and pay for their own room and board;
financial assistance sometimes is provided by the local
union and by the employer.
More than 2,000 ITU printers have completed train­
ing at the center. Additional thousands have received
instruction at their locals. One interesting byproduct of
the program has been the development by ITU Center
instructors o f several new types o f cost saving equipment
which are rented to union employers.

some received tutoring under a program funded by
District Council 37.
Altogether 422 nures’s aides graduated from the
work-study program and returned to their hospitals as
practical nurses; 91 percent of those originally enrolled
passed the licensing examination. Many of the aides were
disadvantaged minority workers, with limited education.
Although the training and services proved to be rela­
tively costly, the project demonstrated the feasibility of
a career ladder for low-paid workers in a shortage
The technique o f upgrading o f nurse’s aides to meet
skill shortages also has been adopted by private hospitals
in New York City. Under an agreement effective July
1969, between the National Union o f Hospital and
Nursing Home Employees (a Local of the Retail Whole­
sale and Department Union, AFL-CIO) a jointly admin­
istered fund of about $1 million is setup for training and
upgrading union represented workers. The fund is based
on 1 percent of gross payrolls. No government contribu­
tion is involved. The agreement covers over 20,000
workers in 17 private institutions.
These upgrading programs are welcomed by many
medical care experts who believe that hospital efficiency
can be enhanced through greater use of paramedical
personnel who can be trained in a relatively short period
of time.

Upgrading hospital employees
Training and retraining in the M aritim e Industry

An experimental project initiated by a union in 1967
demonstrated how low paid nurse’s aides can be trained
to take over routine nursing duties. Both registered and
practical nurses are in extremely short supply in New
York City and elsewhere.
The project was cosponsored by District Council 37,
American Federation o f State, County and Municipal
Employees (AFL-CIO) and New York City’s Department
of Hospitals; training allowances were paid by the U.S.
Department of Labor’s Manpower Administration. The
project was focused on training nurse’s aides who needed
to maintain their income while in training and who
could not qualify for existing training programs for
licensed practical nurses under current educational
standards and tests for admission. Trainees worked 20
hours a week at their regular hospital jobs and attended
school about 25 hours a week; their combined salary and
training allowances about equaled their regular pay as
nurse’s aides.
The work-study program lasted 14 months. The
number o f instruction hours totaled 1,500 per trainee—
about 300 more than the minimum required by the basic
curriculum for licensed practical nurses. Trainees also
received counseling and remedial social services, and

Training schools for seamen typically are financed by
shipping firms but operated by maritime trade unions
who contract to supply employers with an adequate
number of trained workers. As shipping activity and
shipboard modernization are accelerated, there is great
interest in expanding training and upgrading at every
level. Recent progress is exemplified by three formal
The Seafarers’ International Union (SIU) (covering
unlicensed maritime personnel) conducts, with employer
funding, the Harry Lundeberg School o f Seamanship for
the Atlantic and Gulf Ports. The school conducts
advanced courses in deck, steward, and engineroom skills
for upgrading experienced seamen. About 1,500 men
also are trained annually for entry into the merchant
marines. The complete 30-day course is free. Trainees
attend classes conducted by experienced seamen and
undertake practical on-the-job training on vessels in port.
Faced with a shortage of engineroom officers, District
2 of the Marine Engineers’ Beneficial Association
(MEBA) (covering licensed merchant seamen) set up the
School of Marine Engineering in New York in 1965. The
School is employer-financed. While in training, MEBA

members receive, in addition to meals and lodging, a
weekly subsistence allowance. Courses cover the mathe­
matical and practical knowledge required for advance­
ment. As of early 1971, the school had qualified a total
of 390 MEBA licensed engineers for higher ratings. Also,
since 1966, MEBA District 2 and SIU have jointly
operated a 30- to 90-day training program to upgrade
unlicensed SIU members to licensed engineers ratings.
The National Maritime Union, with 45,000 members,
initiated a comprehensive retraining and upgrading pro­
gram in May 1966 in New York City. The program is
financed under a jointly administered pension and
welfare plan. Every year since 1966, roughly 1,000 men,
on the average, have been qualified for higher classifica­
tions. Unlike the Seafarers’ program for entrants, the
NMU program gives instruction in the most advanced
unlicensed skills in the deck, stewards, and engine
departments in both cargo and passenger vessels. A
curriculum o f 22 courses, varying in length from 3 to 12
weeks, are offered to NMU members with at least 6
months o f seatime. Trainees receive a subsistence allow­
ance in addition to meals and living quarters. A part of
the training costs are financed by grants from the U.S.
Department of Labor’s Manpower Administration under
the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962
(MDTA), and from the Military Sea Transport Service.

tunities for steelworkers to improve their skills in
reading and arithmetic. The lack o f these basic educa­
tional skills prevents many steelworkers from entering
apprenticeship and other upgrading programs and
hampers them in retraining for new opportunities
opened by technological change.
The Board for Fundamental Education, a nonprofit
agency, was chosen by the union and steel companies to
provide experimental basic education classes after work
hours to steelworkers in the Baltimore and Chicago-Gary
areas. The Federal Government pays the salaries of
instructors and other costs from an allocation o f funds
under MDTA. The Cooperative Steel Industry Basic
Education Program provides three levels of instruction: A
basic level for employees testing below grade 4.5 in both
word meaning and arithmetic; an advanced level for
employees testing between 4.5 and 8.0; and a special
mathematics class for employees with deficiencies in
arithmetic only. Each course is given for 20 weeks.
A total o f over 2,700 workers attended at least one
class in the first year; 62 percent completed the course.
Most o f the participants were men in the 35- to 54-year
age group. The courses were repeated several times and
high school level courses were begun. By February 1971,
a total of 3,300 workers had participated and graduated.
Steel plant management considers the program a
useful contribution to greater efficiency because it
improves communication, encourages workers to have an
interest in their jobs, and increases understanding of
instructions. The 1968 collective bargaining contract
renewed the program for 3 years.

Improving basic education of steelworkers

Union, management, and the Federal Government
have been cooperating since 1967 to provide oppor­


Chapter III. Work Rules Settlement
Written and unwritten work rules exist in all places of
work, whether organized or unorganized. Frequently, a
particular rule or practice may have been introduced as a
safety measure but has continued in effect even after the
reason for its adoption is hard to recall or justify. Unions
and workers are reluctant to yield work rules once they
have become the “law o f the shop” ; often they fear that
such changes, initiated by employers, are not likely to
accrue to their benefit. Thus, the modification or
elimination o f work rules presents a difficult problem to
collective bargainers.
The following five examples illustrate how work rules
issues were dealt with in such diverse industries as the
performing arts, retail trade, newspapers, construction,
and longshoring. Although the details of the settlement
fit only the needs of a particular situation, the cases
demonstrate the versatility o f collective bargaining in
solving troublesome issues and adjusting to change.

consequently President Petrillo reinstituted the record­
ing stoppage on January 1,1948.
Almost a full year later, on December 14, 1948,
agreement was reached on an independently adminis­
tered fund, the Music Performance Trust Fund (MPTF)
which basically carried forward the same objectives as
the earlier RTF. In 1950, producers of television film
sound track agreed to a parallel fund as part of the
MPTF; from 1951 to 1958 distributors of motion
pictures for television exhibition also established trust
funds, as did producers of TV films and commercial
announcements in 1954. Under all these trusts, the
MPTF receives royalties which do not accumulate, but
are spent as currently as possible to meet the goals of the
For some years, recording musicians had been dis­
contented because none of the royalties on sales were
allocated specifically to them for the contribution they
made of their talents. Following internal disputes and
the defection o f west coast musicians from the union,
the AFM worked out a new settlement with the
recording companies in 1964. Payments for free music
performances were halved, and the other half was
allocated to a special payment fund which now provides
disbursements directly to recording musicians.
Almost SI00 million has been disbursed since the
MPTF reinstituted allocations in fiscal 1950, and the
amount of allocation has grown from $900,000 in fiscal
1950 to $7,370,000 in fiscal 1970. It is estimated that
$7,310,000 will be disbursed in fiscal 1971.
In recent years, over 300,000 musicians have been
employ'd annually in free admission performances. The
highest number, 396,700, were employed in fiscal 1969
for a record 35,970 performances. The first 6 months of
fiscal 1970 showed 136,000 musicians employed in
16,224 performances. Payments are made to union and
nonunion musicians a* local union scale.

The music performance trust funds

Since the turn of the century, the demand for Ir-c
music has fallen off steadily and the numb- ; oi job
opportunities for professional musicians nas declined
sharply. The development of the phonograph record
originally for home use, and its uncontrolled use for
commercial purposes, especially by radio stations and
juke box companies, posed a particularly seri
to the livelihood of musicians. The American Federation
of Musicians (AFL) protested to no avail, and the record
manufacturers were unable, through legal means, to
restrict the use o f records once sold.
AFM President James C. Petrillo finally undertook in
1942 to stem the erosion o f opportunities by prohibiting
musicians from making any further recordings. In 1943
and 1944, the stoppages against individual recording
companies ended through a series of agreements under
which employers agreed to pay royalties on sales into a
union administered Radio and Transcription Fund
(RTF). Income was allocated to free public service
performances. In 1947, 1948, and 1949, the fund spent
approximately $4.5 million for admission-free per­
formances. The Taft-Hartley Act, however, necessitated
the suspension of payments at the end of 1947, and

Centralized meatcutting and the Butchers' Union

In the evolution of meat department operations in
retail food stores, the changeover during the 1950’s from
service to self-service is a major landmark. The butcher’s
block moved from a highly visible location behind the

counter, where custom meatcutting under the cus­
tomer’s eye took place, to the backroom where meats
are cut, packaged, and priced in a standardized opera­
tion. In this changeover, as in others, the amalgamated
Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen o f North America
(AMCBW), (AFL-CIO), bargained over the entrance of
new techniques and eventually achieved higher wages
and fringe benefits in return for greater management
The development o f the backroom operation im­
proved productivity and permitted volume sales, but
stores sought still further cost-cutting changes such as
the purchase o f certain cuts o f meat and poultry
delivered prepackaged and prepriced from packing­
houses and poultry processors. The AMCBW exercised
some measure o f control over changes by writing a list of
permitted cuts (the products clause) into the collective
bargaining agreement. These cuts were to be negotiable
and could be traded off for gains in wages and benefits.
Over the years, some cuts were allowed to come into
stores frozen, and others prepackaged but not prepriced.
In this way, the union was able to retain work for
journeymen meatcutters on fresh cut foods and for
weighers and wrappers on pricing.
Eventually, some chains moved towards centralized
meatcutting operations. As planned, cutting would be
done at a central chain-owned packinghouse that would
then prepackage and preprice meats and poultry for
delivery to chain outlet meat counters. In the 1971
chain store negotiations in the tri-State Philadelphia
area, the issue of centralized meatcutting by one chain
and by independent packers came up. The employer’s
goal was not accomplished fully, but some new cuts
were permitted in exchange for traditional trade-offs and
an employment guarantee.
For the first time boneless hind quarter and fore­
quarter cuts were allowed thus, diminishing the boning
operation ordinarily performed in the backroom. In
addition, ground meat was permitted, again lessening the
grinding operation o f the backroom; and finally pre­
packaged fresh (as against frozen) poultry was allowed
to be brought in.
These represent significant changes for one contract
term, and the tradeoff again was in wages and fringe
benefits. Journeyman meatcutters are to receive $30 a
week in 1971 and an additional $25 weekly in 1972.
Also, substantial improvements were negotiated in the
health and welfare and pension plans. Negotiators are
unable to quantify that part o f the increase due to the
changes in the permissible list, but the consensus is that
the chains were more generous, as a result, in their
The union further agreed that the chains may


introduce new methods and new products, that is, make
revisions in the contract’s products clause. In considera­
tion for this additional flexibility, the chains agreed to
notify the union in advance o f any future revision,
listing specifically all new methods and products in
writing, and in addition the companies guaranteed that
no union member’s job would be eliminated as a result
o f any revision. The Philadelphia chain stores are in a
period of expansion when journeymen meatcutters are
in short supply. However, when expansion ends and the
number o f stores stabilizes, the guarantee will take on
more significance than it presently has. Meanwhile, the
chains have gained flexibility and the union has won
major wage and fringe benefit gains, in addition to a
potentially valuable employment guarantee.
The International Typographical Union and "bogus"

In the printing industry, make-work practices were
associated for many years with “bogus,” alternatively
called “reproduction,” or “resetting,” or “dead horse.”
Under the General Laws o f the ITU, the “reproduction”
o f certain materials in the form o f type and matrices,
when they were interchanged or purchased between
newspapers or newspapers and job offices, was made
mandatory. Bogus involved the resetting o f type only for
local newspaper advertisements that had already been
printed. Although the type was reset, it was not used,
but was assigned to the “hell box” where it was melted
down into lead.
Because o f the question o f the legality o f bogus under
Taft-Hartley, the ITU conducted a questionnaire survey
of its locals in 1960 to determine their “reproduction”
practices. Of the locals that responded, 65 percent
asserted that they were no longer adhering to this
custom, 20 percent admitted that they were utilizing
bogus practices, and 15 percent stated that they had not
performed bogus work during the month under survey
although local advertisements were placed on the “bogus
This inquiry and an ensuing survey which revealed
that only 2 to 5 percent o f locals were performing bogus
work convinced IIU President Elmer Brown to seek an
amendment to the union’s constitution to shift the
“Plate Matter and Matrice Section” from the General
Laws to the Bylaws. Although the proposal was defeated
by a union referendum in October 1960, the 1967
convention did vote to endorse this proposition which
gave locals wide lattitude with publishers in the negotia­
tions of bogus clauses. One further step was taken in
August 1969 when the international union eased the
bogus rules by allowing locals to relax or eliminate this

attempted to establish a firm claim to jurisdiction in the
event factory produced homes gain wide acceptance.
In November 1969, Tri-Trade locals signed an agree­
ment with modular home producer, Prestige Structures,
Inc., of Charlotte, Mich., and requested their inter­
nationals to lend their support by guaranteeing that
units produced would be accepted by onsite craftsmen.
Subsequently, the three international unions agreed to
cooperate and to establish some uniformity in the
contracts negotiated by the locals. In addition to
Prestige Structures, 23 other prefabricated and modular
companies have signed Tri-Trades and Union Label
The most significant aspect o f the Tri-Trades agree­
ments is the cooperation by the three unions in an
industry known for its jurisdictional conflicts. Construc­
tion locals have relinquished part o f their autonomy by
accepting the internationals’ position that factory built
structures bearing a specially designed Tri-Trades label
be accepted onsite and that any onsite controversy will
be resolved by the international offices.
Among themselves the three unions agreed that
employees, depending on their jobs, would be assigned
as members o f 1 o f the 3 unions. For example, a newly
hired worker primarily performing electrical work is
assigned membership in the IBEW. Although no set
formula was established, in practice approximately
60-70 percent o f a plant’s work force are members of
the Carpenters, and between 15-20 percent each become
members of the Plumbers and the IBEW. Uniform
initiation fees and dues that conform to those estab­
lished in manufacturing rather than in construction,
were agreed upon.
Although local agreements do not conform in all
respects, the model agreements are intended to lend
uniformity at the area level. They have been patterned
after industrial agreements. These include a grievance
procedure with arbitration as a final and binding method
o f settling disputes; waiver o f the right to strike during
the term of the agreements; the right o f management to
hire from any source, as opposed to the union referral
system commonly used in the construction industry,
checkoff of initiation fees and dues, and paid holidays
and vacations. In return, the company guaranteed that
construction scales would be paid the employees
assigned to work on construction sites.
Wage rates for plant employees are to be comparable
with factory production rates rather than prevailing
construction scales. The highest paid production job in a
plant, filled by a journeyman from each trade, is termed
the “code coordinator,” who works in a supervisory
capacity. By accommodating to the new technology, the
unions have yielded on the issue o f craft jurisdiction;

right in exchange for other improvements in their
Before the 1969 convention, some locals informally
exchanged their bogus clauses for coffee breaks, over­
time, time off, sick leave, and other forms o f paid leave.
With the impetus o f the international union’s endorse­
ment of more formal “trade-offs,” many locals appar­
ently negotiated improvements in pensions and in other
economic benefits.

Union and management accommodation in prefabricated
housing construction

It is generally agreed that greater productivity could
be achieved in housing construction if industrialized
methods were adopted in place o f craft methods of
construction. New laborsaving production technology
has been adopted slowly because o f building codes,
marketing and financial considerations, and fear o f job
losses due to lower craft barriers. In recent years,the
building trades unions have reconsidered their closely
guarded position on craft jurisdictions in the light of
changing circumstances. Several events illustrate this
The Building and Construction Trades Department of
the AFL-CIO commissioned the Battelle Memorial Insti­
tute in 1968 to conduct an in-depth study o f the impact
on labor o f the prefabrication and systems concept in
the building industry. One o f the conclusions was that
the new technology would “ . . . appear to offer oppor­
tunities to half o f the affiliates and threats to the other
half.” The report indicated that all building trades-some
more than others—would be affected by the reallocation
o f work from the jobsite to the factory as prefabricated
technology expanded. Interpretation o f the specific
effects, while subject to debate, indicated that an overall
loss of onsite jobs would result.
An important collective bargaining breakthrough
occurred in September 1968 with an agreement between
the Carpenters and Stirling Homex Corp o f Avon, N. Y.,
a producer o f modular housing. The carpenters agreed to
provide journeymen for the company’s factories. In June
1969, the agreement was extended to onsite projects.
For its part, the company agreed to employ only union
building trades labor and to pay current construction
wage scales in the areas involved.
Another important step was the joint Tri-Trades
agreement by three unions-the Carpenters, Electricians,
and Plumbers—with a number o f producers o f prefabri­
cated and modular structures. These unions have


In return, management agreed to establish a $27.5
million fund over a 5%-year period to provide early
retirement benefits and a supplementary wage fund.
Entirely financed by PMA, the fund was instituted to
insure the regular work force (“A” men) against layoffs
resulting from changes in cargo handling, to establish
minimum weekly earning guarantees, to encourage early
retirement, and to augment death and disability benefits.
All fully registered longshoremen and clerks qualified for
36 monthly payments o f $220 or lump-sum payments
up to $7,920, in addition to their regular pensions upon
normal or early retirement. Provisions were included for
mandatory early retirement at $320 a month until age
65 if work opportunities declined. When hours of work
fell below 35 a week due to modernization and
mechanization—but not because of a business decline—a
weekly wage guarantee was to become operative. In
addition, the contract stipulated death payments up to
$5,000 and disability benefits up to $7,920.

Article VI o f the Tri Trades International Agieement
“Union recognizes that because of the nature of the com­
pany’s business, employees shall be expected to perform
work assigned to them, even though the work assigned may
be the work normally performed by another classification
and trade.”

Although some progress has been made in resolving
labor problems, the production o f prefabricated units
has been low. Some companies have discontinued
production because o f market conditions; others,
because o f financial difficulties.
Nevertheless, although few in number, these agree­
ments are significant because they indicate changes in
attitudes on the part o f construction craft unions, and
the acceptance of practices which may facilitate greater
productivity in construction of low and middle cost

When the original contract expired in 1966, the
parties negotiated another 5-year contract. Major modifi­
cations in the agreement included: the provision of an
additional $34.5 million for the fund, a $13,000 vested
retirement benefit; pensions up to $235 a month; up to
$5,000 in death benefits and $13,000 in disability
benefits; plus improvements in vacations and in other
benefits. Perhaps the most significant change was the
elimination of the wage guarantee at the union’s behest,
since job opportunities had not declined during the term
of the first agreement. Adopting a lump-sum scheme of
wage pay and bonus, the parties distributed the Supple­
mental Wage Fund ($12.9 million in principal, and
interest at the time), giving $1,223 to each eligible union
member. In return, PMA secured further modifications
in work rules relating to maximum availability of
registered workers, manning scales (especially in the
elimination of men under the “unnecessary man” rule),
and slingload limitations.

Mechanization and modernization agreements in west
coast longshoring

The west coast stevedoring industry was faced in
1960 with a pressing need for a new approach to
reconciling the workers’ needs for job security and
income maintenance and managements’ goals of flexi­
bility and increased productivity. The immediate issues
centered on restrictive work rules and practices. Manage­
ment asserted that the International Longshoremen’s
and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU) had gained control
over both the work force and the production process.
The principal purpose o f the restrictive rules was
maximization of employment, but the result was the
highest dock costs in the United States.
The prospective decline in job opportunities in the
late 1950’s because of impending mechanization per­
suaded ILWU leaders o f the need for longrun solutions
to job security. The union’s leadership recognized the
need for productivity improvement but felt that the
Pacific Maritime Association (PMA) should give a “quid
pro quo.”
On October 18, 1960, the ILWU and the PMA
consummated an agreement that attempted to accom­
modate their divergent goals. The union accepted the
introduction o f laborsaving devices and the extensive
relaxation o f work rules. The employers’ association
generally achieved more control over work rules dealing
with manning and gang sizes, slingload limits, place of
rest procedures, multiple cargo handling, gear priorities,
minimum work or pay guarantees, and other rules “so as
to permit them to operate efficiently, change methods
of work (and) utilize worksaving devices. . . without
incurring speedups or encouraging onerous work.”

In the opinion o f the union, it was necessary for the
successful administration o f the system to rotate hiring
of workers to provide equal “sharing” of decreased job
opportunity in combination with joint registration of
longshoremen to control the quantity of manpower
resources. The program was supported by a sufficiently
adaptable machinery to process numerous grievances and
to provide a “basis for a continuing dialogue during the
life of the agreement;” contract periods were sufficient
to stabilize the industrial relations environment by
allowing long-range planning.
Various inadequacies in the pacts also have been
noted. Some employees, such as those who pack sacks,
find their workload more onerous and mechanization,
especially relating to containerization, has resulted in

safety problems. Some younger workers, at least in the
earlier years, claimed the pact was an “old man’s
contract,” providing generous retirement and pension
benefits, but little for younger members. Smaller steve­
doring firms claim that the agreement was too expensive
and that they are unable to effectively compete with
larger companies that invest heavily in capital equip­
ment. The parties differed about productivity increases:
The association believed that the union did not recog­
nize the effect of changing capital inputs and the union
felt that the PMA was “hiding” some of the productivity
The union leadership admitted that it underestimated
the pace of containerization and that the future of the
union depends on the amount of work related to this
process. These problems relate not to loading and
unloading containers, but to “ stuffing” (placing cargo in
the container itself) and “ stripping” (taking the cargo
out of the container). When the second contract was
signed in 1966, the union did not foresee the establish­
ment of container stations located just off a dock, a
situation that led to members of another union perform­
ing “stuffing” and “stripping” duties. At various times,
jurisdictional disputes have arisen, mainly with the
In August 1969, the leadership of ILWU and PMA

signed a Container Freight Station Agreement (CFS),
supplementing the M & M agreement and providing that
“ ail CFS work will be performed by ILWU members
dispatched from ILWU-PMA hiring halls . . . (with) a
40-hour work or pay guarantee while the job lasts. . . .
The intent and purpose of this contract supplement is to
have all container work brought to Container Freight
Stations on the dock or in areas adjacent to the
dock . . . by removing the option . . . to have this type of
work done elsewhere.”
Jurisdictional disputes over containers stems from the
union’s concern with the downward trend in man-hours
and employment of longshoremen and the anticipated
further reductions in the work force in the immediate
years ahead. From 1960 to 1970, longshoring man-hours
fell from 23.5 million to 19.6 million. Longshoring
union membership (“ A” and “ B” men) also declined
significantly (15.3 percent), from 14,490 on January 1,
1960, to 12.277 on January 1, 1971.
During the 1960’s the agreement was apparently
sufficiently flexible to absorb the shocks generated by
its day-to-day administration. On July 1, 1971, the long
history of peaceful settlements was broken when the
parties were unable to reach an agreement. As of early
August 1971, the strike was still in progress.


Chapter IV. Methods of Adjustment
to Technological Change
The principle of attrition in railway mergers and
consolidations was first established by the Emergency
Railroad Act o f 1933, which was passed to facilitate
consolidations and to strengthen the depression troubled
industry. After the act expired in 1935, unions and
management, with Presidential urging, negotiated the
“Washington Job Protection Agreement,” in 1936. The
agreement provided that employees deprived o f employ­
ment due to consolidation were afforded partial wage
protection for up to 5 years, on the assumption that
normal attrition would permit their reabsorption into
the industry within this period. The agreement is still in
effect. The Federal Transportation Act o f 1940 similarly
prescribed that the ICC, in authorizing a consolidation,
require that affected employees receive full wage protec­
tion for up to 4 years.
Application of the attrition principle to jobs elimi­
nated due to technological change began in the 1950’s.
In 1958, the Railway Clerks and Union Pacific agreed to
abolish positions effected by technological change by
attrition for 4 years. Two years later, a Railroad
Telegraphers-Chicago and North Western dispute re­
sulted in a Supreme Court decision making attrition a
bargainable issue. Following the ruling, numerous attri­
tion provisions were negotiated. Many of the clauses
limited annual job elimination, even through attrition, to
a specified percentage of the work force. The largest
attrition agreement, signed in 1965 between five non­
operating employee unions and a number o f railways,
covered nearly 300,000 employees. Reduction in force
through attrition is limited to 6 percent o f the total
number o f jobs each year, although layoffs are permitted
in significant business declines.
When technological changes threaten to eliminate an
occupation entirely, as with the railroad firemen, agree­
ment is more difficult to achieve. In 1963, Congress
established a Railroad Arbitration Board in an attempt
to settle a 4-year work rules dispute between operating
unions and three railway conferences. The Board ruled
that most firemen and helpers were not needed for
freight and yard service, and that only 10 percent of
such jobs need be retained. Employees with 10 years’
service, however, were to be given job protection for life,

American unions generally accept technological
changes at the place o f work but are very much
concerned with their effects on the job security of
workers. Most issues are resolved in normal collective
bargaining and the contract clauses which can come into
play are as varied as the agreements themselves, covering
advance notice to wage setting on new equipment,
seniority rules regarding transfers, grievance and arbitra­
tion procedures, and severance pay and retirement. In
some situations, bargaining may deal simultaneously
with methods o f avoiding layoffs, easing the burden o f
unemployment, and facilitating new employment.
Various arrangements worked out by the parties are
discussed briefly in the following six examples. As
noted, attrition clauses are confined almost entirely to
the railroad industry. However, interplant transfers,
relocation allowances, and early retirement benefits are
more widespread. Two examples deal with arrangements
negotiated to cover specific problems occasioned by
technological change: the guaranteed annual wage in
New York longshoring; and the Armour and Company
Automation Fund Committee.
Attrition arrangements in the railroad industry

Mergers and consolidations, technological changes,
and the growth o f competitive means of transportation
have steadily reduced railway employment over the past
two decades. The railroad unions have been increasingly
concerned for their members’ job security and, in some
instances, for their own continued existence. Much of
the chronic conflict that characterizes railway labor
negotiations has been over work rules that protect union
members by preventing elimination o f jobs management
no longer considers necessary.
The strong resistance o f railway unions to outright
elimination o f jobs, with consequent involuntary layoffs
and terminations has contributed to a wide application
o f the attrition principle; employees already on the
payroll are assured o f continued employment, but
unneeded jobs vacated through voluntary quits, dis­
charge for cause, retirements, and deaths need not be


occasioned by the sale of his home so that he might
move to accept railroad employment elsewhere. Also, on
request, any dismissed employee would be given training
leading to reemployment, as well as priority for employ­
ment or reemployment in the railroad industry.
AMTRAK submitted its plan after the carriers and
the rail unions failed to negotiate a mutually acceptable
job protection plan. Under the law, the Secretary of
Labor has the ultimate responsibility for protecting
employees “against a worsening of their positions with
respect to their employment.”
Although the Association o f American Railroads
accepted the job protection plan, the Congress of
Railway Unions, an association o f railroad union presi­
dents, termed the layoff protection plan “completely
deficient.” The unions preferred “full attrition” which
would require that no employee could be dismissed
except for cause and that only the normal process of
death, retirement, and outmigration would be utilized in
reducing the excess work force. The railroads argued for
protection for 4 years from the date o f discontinuance
o f rail passenger service, the minimum duration accept­
able under the act. The protection, however, was
extended by the Secretary to a period o f 6 years from
the date the employee is dismissed or displaced, rather
than for merely the 4 years from the date of service
discontinuance. In the Secretary’s judgment, a “fair and
equitable” standard required “greater time protection in
order to more reasonably insure that dislocated
employees might be afforded a more reasonable oppor­
tunity for railroad employment or reemployment before
their period o f protection had run its course.” The
railroad unions are seeking “full attrition” and are
contesting the decision in the Federal courts.

and reductions were to be effected only through
attrition. Employees who had less seniority were pro­
tected for up to 5 years or provided with severance pay.
The companies, although not fully satisfied, accepted
the Board’s award, but the unions did not, claiming the
firemen positions were needed as a safety factor.
Following expiration o f the award after 2 years, the
controversy continued.
Although reduction-in-force by attrition is an effec­
tive method for coping with a surplus labor problem, it
is held to be less efficient than involuntary layoffs and
terminations, and has met with little acceptance in other
industries. The wider use o f the attrition principle in the
railroad industry is a consequence o f the industry’s
values and traditions, its older work force, and its
relatively generous retirement and early retirement
Aid to railroad workers under AMTRAK

The attrition principle has recently been extended by
the Railroad Passenger Service Act o f 1970 to cover
railroad workers affected by the discontinuance of
passenger service. Because o f specific provisions relating
to the Federal Government’s role in protecting workers,
this program is treated in detail separately from the
programs described in the previous section.
The act was adopted to relieve railroads o f the
financial burden o f running unprofitable passenger
trains. It established a national railroad passenger corpor­
ation (AMTRAK) to take over passenger train service
with train operators acting as contractors to provide
passenger service between a limited number o f cities. As
part o f agreements with railroads belonging to
AMTRAK, the act requires employee protective arrange­
ments which must be certified by the Secretary o f Labor
as “fair and equitable.”
The plan for employee protection proposed by
AMTRAK was approved by the Secretary on May 1,
1971, when AMTRAK began operation o f the Nation’s
intercity passenger trains. The plan requires railroads to
provide full wages and benefits for up to 6 years on a
monthly basis to workers displaced by AMTRAK’s
planned cut o f 114 o f the 300 passenger trains.
Estimates o f the number affected ranged from 12,000 to
25,000. Any income a worker earned from other jobs
would be subtracted from these payments. He would be
covered for up to 6 years and would qualify for any pay
increases during the “ protective” period, while still
eligible to be recalled to work. The worker also would
have the option o f receiving lump sums o f up to 1 year’s
salary, instead o f the monthly payments.
In addition, railroads are required to pay moving
expenses and to reimburse a worker for any loss

Interplant transfer arrangements in the


In recent years, major firms in the automobile
industry, including Ford, have decentralized in response
to technological change. Older plants have been replaced
by new ones located in other areas. In addition, specific
operations have been transferred from one plant to
These changes inevitably have resulted in job inse­
curity among workers and the resolution of these
problems has become a matter for collective bargaining.
The response o f the United Automobile Workers (UAW),
Ind., and Ford and other automobile companies, was to
negotiate a program o f protection including interplant
transfer arrangements. The agreements provide inter­
plant transfers in several instances. First, there may be
voluntary transfers of seniority employees (that is,


workers who have completed a 3-month probationary
period within 1 year following the date hired) between
plants with the signed consent of the employee and his
committeeman. Employees transferred on this basis are
considered seniority employees of the new plant as of
the date of transfer, and if affected by a reductionin-force in the new plant, they will be laid off or
returned to their original plant, according to their
Second, in the event of a transfer of an operation
from one plant to another, workers with 1 year or more
of seniority are allowed to follow their work and retain
their seniority rights. This provision does not apply to
partial transfers of operations incident to adjustments in
production schedules or changes in products, but to the
complete or partial transfer of an operation to a new
plant from an old plant which may be closed or
continued on a reduced employment basis.
Third, employees laid off because of permanent
discontinuance of a group, unit, or plant are granted
preferential hiring consideration at other company
plants. Fourth, any employee who has exhausted his
seniority rights within his seniority unit would be
eligible to receive an offer of any available work in any
plant in the same labor market area, and may even
displace probationary employees at these plants, if there
are no open jobs available. There is no statement
regarding the seniority status of the employee once he
moves. Conceivably, he retains seniority for benefit
purposes (that is, vacations, etc.), but loses it for
competitive purposes (that is, promotions, assignments,
etc.). Fifth, when the cause of layoff is discontinuance
or partial discontinuance of a classification or of a
seniority unit or of an operation with a seniority unit,
then the offer of available work or the right to displace
probationary employees applies to any plant under the
agreement without regard to area.

and SUB payments also are important, transfer pro­
visions can be of considerable help, as in the Dallas plant
closing. Employment was available for every Dallas
worker who wished to transfer, although some workers
took lesser paying jobs in order to move to the plant of
their choice.
Relocation allowances in autos and steel industries

Relocation allowances are an important part of the
protection offered to employees subject to technological
displacement, since their adequacy often will determine
whether an employee will accept or reject an offered
interplant transfer. Even when jobs are available in other
plants, displaced workers may find it difficult or even
impossible to pay the cost of moving. The problem of
these expenditures is compounded by the risk that the
worker may not like the new job or that he and his
family may not like the new location. Under such
circumstances, conceivably he could be forced to assume
the additional cost of a return move. The worker also
may be unwilling to chance substantial loss in the sale of
his home.
By availing themselves of moving allowances, workers
at least in part are compensated for some of the costs of
relocating. At present, relocation allowance provisions
are most prevalent in the primary metal and automobile
industries, where displacement and permanent layoff
due to plant closings and relocations have been impor­
tant since World War II, and in the transportation
(primarily trucking), utility, and communication in­
dustries where the nature of business operations, or
changes in the demand for services, make frequent
transfers of personnel necessary. Although these five
industries accounted for less than one-half the major
agreements having interplant transfer provisions, and
slightly less than seven-tenths of the workers so covered,
they accounted for more than three-fourths of all
relocation allowance clauses, and nearly nine-tenths of
the protected workers.
The Ford Motor Co.-United Automobile Workers
contract is among those agreements which provide
relocation benefits for displaced workers. As in most
agreements, the amount depends on the distance of the
move and the marital status of the employee. Lump-sum
allowances for single employees range from $220 when
the new location is 50 to 99 miles away, to $475 when
the plant is 1,000 miles or more distant. For married
employees, the amounts range from $570 to $1,020.
Other agreements provide for payments more closely
related to actual expenses incurred. The Ford agreement,
however, goes further than most in that it allows
workers to return to the city from which they trans­
ferred if they dislike the new location or the new job. In

Interplant transfer rights, as in the second case were
exercised in February 1971, when Ford closed an
assembly plant at Dallas, Tex., that employed 1,600 to
1,700 workers. The plant was old, and management had
the alternatives either to modernize or close the plant.
The decision to close came in January 1971.
Of the 1,600 to 1,700 workers involved, nearly 800
initially moved to plants in Kansas City, Chicago, and
Louisville. Many chose to return to Dallas within a short
time, however, and take severance pay benefits, leaving,
as of April 1971,400-500 permanent transfers.
The union views negotiated interplant transfer pro­
visions as essential to worker security, although it
realizes that such arrangements may encounter many
practical problems. Although other benefits of the
negotiated job security program, such as early retirement


may be retired early at the employer's request oi under
“mutually satisfactory conditions.” In oihei plans,
workers whose employment is terminated because of the
closing of a department or plant or who have been on
long layoff may be eligible for special early retirement.
The minimum age and service requirements most
frequently specified are age 55 and 10, 15, or 20 years
of service. In the primary and fabricated metals in­
dustries most plans provide special early retirement if
the combination of age (55 or older) plus service equals
70, or if age (under 55) plus service equals 80.
The problems created because of changes in a firm’s
economic situation or because of the introduction of
new technology permitting sustained or higher levels of
total output with fewer workers have been resolved in
many ways. Typically, the work force is reduced by
laying off workers with least seniority and retaining
those with the greatest seniority. In other cases, how­
ever, those with high seniority, chiefly older workers, are
encouraged to retire early, thus permitting the firm to
retain its younger employees. The encouragement typi­
cally used to enhance early retirement includes benefits
larger than regular early retirement benefits, such as
special early retirement benefits, cash bonuses to those
electing early retirement, and other sweeteners to the
early retirement benefit. These extra benefits often are
made available only to those choosing to retire during a
specified period.
Supplementary benefits to early retirees for example,
were used widely during the 1950’s and 1960’s in the
petroleum industry. Many firms in this industry had
large numbers of excess workers because of techno­
logical change. The early retirement program induce­
ments used by these firms (Humble, Shell, Sinclair,
Ethyl, Phillips, and Gulf, among others) substantially
reduced—and in some cases eliminated-the need to lay
off workers. Similar techniques have been utilized also
on other industries. Kaiser Aluminum and Dow Chemi­
cal, for example, have encouraged older workers to elect
early retirement by substantially raising benefits payable
to those who retired during the period the firm was
trying to reduce employment.

this respect, the Ford-UAW clause is similar to the
provision found in the Armour Co.-Amalgamated Meat
Cutters contract. The Ford provision requires a mini­
mum of 1 year of seniority if the worker has been laid
off as a result of a discontinuance of operations, but no
minimum seniority in a transfer of operations.
Few provisions protect the worker from the risk of
loss in the sale of his home. When U.S. Steel closed an
obsolete plant at Donora, Pa., in 1962, however, it
offered to purchase the homes of employees who
transferred to jobs at other company facilities, primarily
the Joliet, 111. plant. Although most of the 5,000
displaced workers chose not to accept transfer and
accepted instead severance pay, SUB payments, or early
retirement, several hundred did transfer and took
advantage of negotiated relocation allowances. Of these,
a few accepted the company’s offer to purchase their
homes for the current appraised value, less 4 percent for
appraisal and real estate fees. The contract between
Western Electric Co. and the Communications Workers
of America contains a similar provision.
Early retirement plans

Plans containing early retirement provisions covered
about nine-tenths of all active workers who participated
in private pension plans in 1969, the latest period for
which data are available, compared with about threefourths during the early 1960’s. The prevalence of early
retirement provisions in multiemployer plans and in
noncontributory plans increased at a faster pace over the
period than in either single employer or contributory
plans, but the prevalence of early retirement provisions
is still greatest in single employer plans. A worker must
meet an age requirement, a service requirement, or both
to retire under an early retirement provision. In addi­
tion, under many plans, early retirement depends on the
employer’s approval. The most frequent service require­
ment for early retirement is 10 years; 15 years is almost
as common. Two-thirds of all workers covered by plans
with early retirement could qualify with 15 or fewer
years of service, and almost three-fourths of these after
10 years of service.
In some cases, the worker can be retired involuntarily
before reaching the normal retirement age provided
under the plan. Plans with such special early retirement
clauses typically also have regular early retirement
Special early retirement provisions are found in plans
covering about 17 percent of the workers, and are
concentrated in single-employer noncontributory plans
in the manufacturing industries. They are most common
in plans negotiated by the Auto Workers, Steelworkers,
and Meat Cutters unions. Under these plans an employee

The guaranteed annual New York longshoring

Although labor relations between the New York
Shipping Association and the International Longshore­
men’s Association (AFL-CIO) have never been charac­
terized as “ peaceful,” the parties have been able to
negotiate a historic agreement which provided for a
guaranteed annual wage and greater flexibility in man­
power utilization. The agreement evolved over many

The New York waterfront typically has had a surplus
of labor (nearly 40,000 men competing for about
17,000 jobs) which, in turn, has spawned kickbacks,
favoritism, loansharking, and many other unethical
practices. Following investigation by the New York
State Crime Commission, a Bi-State Waterfront Com­
mission of New York Harbor was set up in 1953 to
“clean up” the port by (a) registering and licensing the
entire labor force, including hiring agents, (b) eliminat­
ing the shape-up methods o f hiring and replacing it with
hiring centers, and (c) decasualizing (removing from the
register and thus from waterfront employment) those
with a marginal attachment to the industry. Despite
steady criticism by the union and shippers, the Waterfront
Commission has managed to survive and was a major
factor in achieving some stability in the port by 1960.
Its continued presence had a bearing on the bargaining
situation in the 1960’s.
The events leading to the guaranteed annual wage
originated in a prolonged stoppage in 1962-63, finally
settled by a Board of Mediation chaired by Senator
Wayne Morse. According to the “Morse Award,” the
Department o f Labor was requested to conduct an
extensive study o f “manpower utilization, job security
and all other related issues which affect the longshore
industry.” The results o f in-depth surveys in New York
(as well as in other Atlantic and Gulf ports), were
released in joint meetings with the parties during 1964.
Management’s key demand—greater flexibility in man­
power utilization—was clearly interlocked with union
demands for job security, since the former, if rapidly
and extensively implemented, could result in consid­
erable loss of jobs for longshoremen. Yet a maze of
restrictive work rules had grown up during periods of
unemployment and had become entrenched under a
“ customs and practices” clause in the agreement.
As provided by the Morse Award, the Department of
Labor made the following major recommendations to
the parties:

were unable to reach a settlement until February 1965
after the Taft-Hartley emergency procedures were
invoked. As provided in a 4-year agreement, the union
agreed to reduce the minimum gang size from 20 to 18
on April 1, 1966, and to 17 men on October 1, 1967,
and further to eliminate “frozen details.” In return, the
union obtained, in addition to liberalized pension
benefits, and hourly rate increases, unprecedented
guarantee of annual income of 1,600 hours of straighttime rates for every longshoreman who worked at least
700 hours during the year April 1, 1965 to March 31,
1966. Finally, and this was seen as an important
innovation, the contract also provided for a “Human
Relations and Implementation Committee” to address
itself to such issues as:
1. A review of existing seniority arrangements so as to
increase labor mobility.
2. A system of penalties and other methods of dealing
with absenteeism and tardiness.
3. The establishment of a variety of specific standards
necessary to implement the GAW.

Not all issues agreed to by the parties were imple­
mented peacefully. In some areas of the port, manpower
changes were, at times accompanied by wildcat strikes.
Nevertheless, the contract provisions are now a fact of
life on the New York waterfront.
Following the agreement, a computer hiring system
was instituted by the parties and the Waterfront Com­
mission that permits accurate recordkeeping to deter­
mine credits and debits for purposes of the guarantee. It
also has made possible better information on work in
other sections of the port, thus enhancing labor
Despite hopes for a new era in labor relations
following the 1964 agreement, negotiations in 1968
again broke down and a strike occurred, primarily over
the issue of containerization. Nevertheless, the guar­
anteed annual wage was firmly established; effective
April 1, 1969, the number of hours guaranteed was
increased to 2,080 per worker. Also, the agreement
provided improved pension benefits o f $300 a month,
early retirement if the employee chooses to do so within
one of two option periods at $250 a month at age 55 if
he had 20 years o f service, with the amount to be
increased to $300 at age 62.
Despite much improvement on the New York docks,
many problems remain, particularly the need for a
revised and truly port-wide seniority system to replace
the sectional priority system now in operation and an
effective program to control absenteeism.
Progress typically has been with the help of outsiders
—the Waterfront Commission, Taft-Hartley and other
Boards, arbitrators, etc. Whether the parties can come to

1. Management should have the right to reduce the
number of men in each gang from 20 to 17.
2. In addition, it should be permitted to exercise greater
flexibility in the assignment of men and the use of
equipment, particularly in transfers from gang to gang,
between hatches and between ships.
3. An end to so-called “frozen details,” that is, fixed
assignments and refusals to do other work (for example,
automobile checkers refusing to check in or out other
4. In return, the workers were to receive an income
guarantee of “no less than 75 percent of [a worker’s]
average annual gross earnings including vacation and holiday
pay in the contract years 1963-64 and 1964-65.”

The parties negotiated on the basis o f these recom­
mendations during the summer and fall o f 1964, but


terms peacefully on their own will be tested on October
1,1971, when the current contract expires.

more feasible under the circumstances, was to increase
the employability o f the displaced workers through
retraining and an active campaign to find new job
opportunities. For each plant closing, the committee
developed programs based largely on labor market
opportunities, the characteristics of the displaced
workers, and the experience gained from previous

Armour and Co. plant closings and the automation fund

As a result of changes in methods o f production,
processing, marketing, and distribution, Armour and Co.
closed nine o f its plants in the late 1950’s and was
planning to close six more. During this period, small
producers located in rural areas, who were paying
nonunion wages and using up to date production, with
transportation and marketing methods were making
noticeable inroads into the market. Large producers
reacted by closing plants in large urban areas and
opening smaller, highly automated plants in rural com­
Recognition by union and Armour and Co. officials
of the effect of these changes on workers led to an
agreement, in 1959, to seek means to assist displaced
employees. A nine-member automation fund committee
was established: four from the company, two each from
the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen
and the United Packinghouse, Food and Allied Workers,
and a neutral chairman. Broad powers to consider any
programs to aid workers affected by the plant closings
were granted. The committee’s only specific responsi­
bilities were to initiate and administer training and
interplant transfer programs. This was financed by a
$500,000 company fund.
The committee decided early on a flexible policy
since it faced the difficult task o f finding jobs for
disadvantaged workers in labor markets with high
unemployment rates. The displaced work force was
characterized by a low education level, advanced age,
and a long attachment to a particular industry and plant.
Few of the skills involved in meatpacking were trans­
ferable to other industries. The 10 percent o f the work
force that did possess identifiable skills was employed
largely in maintenance. Minority group members varied
from 5 percent at Sioux City to 75 percent o f the
company’s work force at Kansas City. Women were 12
to 15 percent of the work force and generally had a
higher average age than men.
The majority o f the plant closings involved displacing
all the employees at the same time, thereby eliminating
standard methods o f easing the effects o f change, such as
attrition. Therefore, large numbers o f workers with
similar characteristics were seeking work at the same
time in a specific labor market. Because o f the large
number involved, it was not possible to deal with all
older, high-seniority employees on a corporationwide
basis, to avoid displacement. An alternative approach,

Pre-shutdown planning, facilitated by a 90-day
advance notice of closing negotiated in the 1961
agreement, and extended to 6 months in the 1967
agreement, proved to be important to the success o f the
adjustment program. It provided time to adjust for both
the workers who are to be terminated and for those
administering the assistance programs. Adequate lead
time permitted the manpower agencies to assess the
skills and desires of the workers and the community
opportunities. Time also is provided to establish private
and Federal education programs and to arrange early
termination to accept alternative employment or to
enter training programs.
Starting in 1960, the committee became the focal
point of efforts to facilitate the adjustment process in
the city in which a major plant closure was scheduled.
Transfers of workers from plants being closed to other
company facilities were not successful when first tried in
1961. Of the 800 Fort Worth employees eligible for
transfer, only three transferred permanently when the
plant closed in 1962. A major factor limiting the number
of transfers, in this and other cases, were large lump-sum
separation payments to workers who did not transfer.
These payments ranged from an average of $2,840 at
Fort Worth to $1,800 at Omaha; the overall average was
$2,000 for employees accepting these payments. Separa­
tion pay-accepted by more than two-thirds of all
displaced workers—was offered to workers with 1 year
or more of seniority who did not transfer or were not
eligible for, or chose not to accept, a pension.
Another important hindrance to transfer was the
reluctance of people to sever their community ties and
relocate somewhere else. This was particularly true for
members of racial minorities who faced moves to
all-white rural areas.
Following the Fort Worth experience, “flowback
rights” were introduced which allowed workers to
reconsider and take separation pay and moving expenses
to their former location, if they so desired after a few
months of employment at the new plant. With this
arrangement, the transfer plan was more successful in
the 1963 Sioux City closing. In Sioux City, 183 of the
approximately 1,040 eligible employees made per­
manent transfers. After the closure of the Kansas City
plant in 1964, 229 of the 1,616 potential transferees

exercised this option; 182 of them remained at the new
location. In Omaha, following the 1968 shutdown, 215
permanent transfers out o f 1,230 eligible employees
The Omaha shutdown saw the increased use o f a
special monthly retirement payment, 50 percent larger
than the normal amount, to employees 55-62 years of
age having 20 years or more o f service. At the time of
the Omaha closing, the minimum payment under this
plan was $150 a month.
The committee’s activities and wide array of measures
significantly reduced the hardships caused by the
closings. Workers with marketable skills were helped
immediately by a good placement program, others with
limited opportunities were retrained or given early
retirement benefits, and the transfer option was available
for those who wished to stay with the company. In the
Omaha shutdown, where 1,600 workers were displaced,
approximately 500 workers accepted interplant transfers
or pensions, and another 500 made the transition into

the local labor market without filing for unemployment
compensation benefits.
Despite these efforts, many displaced workers did not
find new employment or accepted employment at wages
below those received in the meatpacking industry. This
inability to maintain the income of displaced workers is
attributable largely to factors beyond the control o f the
Recognizing that only a small proportion of the
affected workers had been protected, the union is
seeking an end to plant closures. It urges a change in
government tax policies which tend to encourage
companies to close older plants and open smaller
automated ones. The union has supported the
committee’s efforts, and endorses the advance notice
and severance pay provisions as helpful, if not always
adequate. It believes that the transfer plan has worked
“fairly well” and could be improved by liberalizing the
seniority rights offered to transferees.


Chapter V. Manpower Planning
Manpower planning, involving projections of labor
requirements and supply, is being increasingly used as a
tool to improve the development and efficient
utilization o f the labor force. BLS manpower projections
provide educators, manpower agencies, and officials with
a framework for policy development at the national and
local levels. The use o f manpower forecasts at the plant
and company levels for recruitment and training also is
becoming more widespread. A few companies use
manpower projections to facilitate adjustment to
technological change. Projections at the plant level
provide a basis for the use o f attrition as a measure of
avoiding layoffs o f workers when laborsaving changes are
planned. In this way, manpower planning helps to foster
a climate favorable to change and productivity
The following two examples illustrate the use of
manpower planning at the plant level to adjust to
productivity change. Although many o f the adjustment
methods described in the previous section are applied
here, the systematic approach to handling manpower
changes is unique. One study describes the practices used
in the telephone industry to coordinate technical and
manpower changes. Also, the long range manpower
projections o f the industry, sponsored by the
Communications Workers o f America, is illustrative of
its use in planning union policies on automation. The
second study reviews the experience o f the Internal
Revenue Service in planning large scale manpower adjust­
ments to automation without layoffs. Both studies high­
light the importance of advance notice and communica­
tion, and o f planning a variety o f adjustment measures
to meet the needs o f different groups o f workers.
Manpower planning in the telephone industry

The conversion o f the telephone system to long
distance direct dialing drastically reduced requirements
for telephone operators in local offices throughout the
country. The Bell System therefore has formulated
procedures for anticipating the manpower effects of
these changeovers and for avoiding, as far as possible, lay
off of operators whose jobs have been eliminated. This
type o f manpower planning has contributed to a general
acceptance o f changes to improve productivity.


Attrition, advance notice, and transfer—the same steps
as those used in the earlier changeover to local
dialing—are featured. Collective bargaining, however, has
modified seniority and related practices. Also, the
Communications Workers o f America, itself, sponsored a
study in 1965 by a leading management consultant of
the long range effects of automation as a basis for
planning its collective bargaining policies.
The Bell System’s general program for coordinating
technical and manpower changes has three objectives:
Retain as many permanent employees as possible;
provide suitable transfer to other offices; avoid
downgrading employees; and avoid a surplus work force.
In practice, local management must adapt the general
policy guidelines to fit local circumstances.
A BLS study o f changes at four offices found that
notice of the planned changes was given to the union
and employees many months before the change was
scheduled. Collective bargaining contracts provided for
early notice and negotiation of force reduction moves.
Also, employees were interviewed to inform them of
displacement possibilities and transfer and training
opportunities. These practices were particularly helpful
to older employees by allowing them time for
adjustment to change.
The use o f attrition was planned carefully. As early as
2 years before changeover, each office estimated the
number of operators who would be needed after
dialization and the number who would have to be
transferred to other local or nearby offices or retire. To
reach the lower employment level as much as possible
through attrition, hiring permanent employees was
stopped as early as 1-year before conversion. As losses
from quits and retirements reduced the regular work
force, temporary employees were hired, over time was
scheduled, and vacations, retirements, and leaves of
absence were postponed until after the changeover.
When the change was made, the number of regular
employees who had to be transferred or laid off was
Despite efforts to retain all employees and a relatively
high rate of voluntary turnover among women workers,
displacement o f a few employees was unavoidable.
Transfers to other offices were offered to all regular
employees. But for a few women who could not relocate

because o f family responsibilities, the only other option
was lay o ff with severance pay. These women, however,
were given preference in rehiring.
Manpower planning in the Internal Revenue Service

Manpower planning by the Internal Revenue Service
has been a key factor in the conversion over a 9-year
period to a nationwide computer system, accompanied
by a minimum o f hardships on employees. Ten percent
more tax returns can be handled and checking tax
documents can be done more completely. An estimated
15,000 additional positions would be required to do
manually the work now being accomplished by the
computer system. The jobs o f nearly 11,000 district
office employees were eliminated or shifted to seven
new regional service centers, the number o f involuntary
transfers or separations was minimal.
IRS managers began planning the manpower and
technical phase well in advance o f the change. A full
time high-level planning committee was set up at IRS
national headquarters. The IRS announced early in the
conversion that it would avoid layoffs and reductions in
Several planning steps were taken during the
conversion to carry out this job security policy. First,
the post conversion employment level and occupational
structure were projected to obtain an early estimate of
the magnitude o f the effect on employees. Such

information was essential for planning resources for
training and other adjustments. Throughout the
conversion, IRS officials kept employees informed and
maintained communication with union representatives.
The emphasis was on encouraging employees whose
jobs were to be eliminated to transfer to other work in
district offices or to new regional service centers. Those
who chose to transfer were provided liberalized travel
and moving expenses and house selling expenses, and
were given an opportunity to visit the new location to
look for housing. IRS manpower experts also made an
inventory o f each employee’s skills and tried to match
their characteristics with the requirements of job
openings. A full-time staff provided instruction for a
wide range of occupations to prepare employees for the
new positions.
Considerable attention was given to the problems of
individual employees. The Civil Service Commission
granted special authority during the changeover to relax
qualification standards for some positions and to extend
the time period for temporary appointments. This
flexibility greatly assisted manpower specialists in
making placements.
Further automation, such as elimination of
keypunching, is expected to have a significant effect on
IRS productivity. The experience with the computer
conversion is being used to deal with the personnel
problems o f clerical employees whose jobs will be


Chapter VI. Plantwide Productivity Incentive Plans
the textile industry in the past two decades have
generally been more automatic, requiring less human
attention and physical effort. In each case o f change at
American Velvet, union opposition was brief and
directed primarily at securing technical improvements to
facilitate the change.
Briefly, the profit sharing plan provides that about 30
percent o f net profits (before taxes) be paid into a fund
from which an annual bonus is distributed to all
employees who have worked at least 160 hours and had
not quit or been discharged for cause. The funds are
distributed proportionately on the basis of each
employee’s earnings during the year. The plan is
included as part o f the collective bargaining agreement.
The results o f the plan, according to a 1968 appraisal
by Professors Herbert R. Northup and Harvey A. Young,
“continue to be remarkable. Profits have been made
each year since 1939 and thus bonuses (or ‘earnings’)
have always been paid on a steady basis.” No strike or
unauthorized walkout has occurred since 1939 and no
grievance has gone to arbitration.
Company officials attribute their success in the face
o f Southern, low wage competition, to “tight”
management, the high level o f employee effort, and the
workers’ cooperative attitude. The possibility that the
plant would be relocated if unprofitable has been, in the
opinion o f Professors Northup and Young, a powerful
incentive to productivity improvement.
An important key to cooperative labor relations at
American Velvet has been the effective way the firm has
communicated its plans and prospects to its employees.
Management introduced changes only after taking care
to win local union officers over to them. Professors
Northup and Young note: “ . . . once the union is made
aware of the competitive needs for the new policy it
communicates this need to the work force and helps the
company install the changes.”

The search for a system o f wage payment at the plant
level most conducive to productivity improvement is
going on constantly. About 30 percent of all production
and maintenance workers in manufacturing are covered
by some form o f individual or small group incentive plan
relating pay to results. This proportion has remained
fairly stable in recent years. Output incentives tend to be
used in highly competitive industries, such as apparel,
where labor costs are high, technology is less advanced,
and production bottlenecks are likely to occur. They are
also widely used in the steel industry. With the trend
away from man paced toward machine tending and
service jobs, the applicability o f individual output
incentives is being questioned. Accordingly, interest is
growing in incentive plans that are based on total plant
The following examples deal with three different
approaches to plantwide incentive plans for greater
productivity. The first covers the experience of a textile
company that has operated a profit sharing plan under a
collective bargaining agreement for the past 30 years.
The second reviews the Scanlon plan type o f plant
incentive program, which also involves joint committees
to enlist employee cooperation in a search for
productivity improvements. The third example describes
the experience at the Kaiser Steel Company in revising
its incentive plan to promote greater productivity.
A profit sharing plan in textiles

The American Velvet Co., the last major velvet
producer in New England, has operated a profit sharing
plan for over 30 years. The company employs about 500
workers and has an agreement with the Textile Workers
of America (AFL-CIO). The company’s record was 1 of
the 12 cases studied by the National Planning
Association in its 1956 report, Causes o f In d u stria l Peace.
The profit sharing plan was instituted by the company
after a long strike in 1939, when the company increased
each weaver’s task from two looms to four. In 1956,
after more than 15 years o f bonus payments under
profit sharing, the weaver’s load was increased by mutual
agreement from four looms to six; in 1963, the load
went from six to eight. Although the workload has been
extended, the new looms that have been introduced in

The Scanlon Plan

The Scanlon Plan is a special type o f plant incentive
system that features cooperative relations between union
and management and employee participation in solving
problems o f efficiency. Gains in the company’s
productivity are shared by management and workers

according to a formal plan. Joe Scanlon, an official of
the Steelworkers Union who developed this approach to
greater productivity in the 1930’s, rejected individual
incentive systems on the grounds that they fostered
secrecy and internal competition and resulted in below
optimum plant efficiency.
Two o f Scanlon’s associates estimate that 120-130
companies were using the plan in 1968 and 300-500
others were using some version of the Scanlon plan. In
contrast to earlier years, large as well as small companies
are represented and participants are generally
The principal impetus for increased productivity
comes from employees’ ideas on production problems.
These suggestions are examined by joint committees of
union and management representatives, first at the
department in “production committees” and later at the
company level in a “screening committee.” Management
retains the right to reject or accept the suggestion. Also,
some Scanlon committees discuss company goals,
analyze cost factors, and review problems of the market.
Incentive payments to workers are based on the
measured productivity o f the plant as a whole. The
amount is determined by comparing the ratio o f total
payroll to sales value o f production in a current month
with the ratio in a base period. A reduction in the ratio
provides a pool for paying monthly bonuses. Part o f this
pool is set aside in a reserve for paying bonuses in deficit
months. The rest is divided: 25 percent is the company’s
share and 75 percent is paid out to employees as that
month’s performance bonus.
A 1970 case study o f the Parker Pen Co. which has
contracts with the Rubber Workers and the Machinists,
reported that bonuses have been paid for 142 out o f 168
months. The highest yearly average has been 20 percent;
the lowest 5 Vi percent. Management believes the
greatest benefit has been a willingness by workers to
accept change and increased worker efficiency.
In their 1960 assessment o f Scanlon Plans, Professor
Slichter and his associates found several administrative
problems, but concluded that the plans have produced
many useful results such as a large number o f laborsaving
suggestions; willingness o f workers
to accept
technological change; a better pace of work; greater
interest in the quality o f workmanship; and greater
cooperativeness among workers.
The Kaiser-Steelworkers Long-Range Sharing Plan

The Kaiser-Steelworkers Long Range Sharing Plan,
first established in March 1963, developed out of
complex problems that had been present since the
company’s Fontana plant opened in 1943. These

problems became critical during the late 1950’s, due to
an unsatisfactory profit position. One source o f trouble
was the incentive program, which resulted in earnings for
some relatively unskilled incentive workers that were far
above those o f skilled nonincentive workers. These
disparities caused morale problems, high labor turnover,
and many grievances and wildcat strikes. Since only 40
percent o f the work force was on incentives, compared
with an average 75 percent for the basic steel industry,
further extensions of this unsatisfactory system seemed
imminent. Kaiser also was faced with the necessity for
reducing costs to meet the industry’s growing problem
o f competition from foreign producers and substitute
metals. Modernization in turn, reduced manpower
requirements and caused union and employee concern
over job security.
During the long 1959 industry strike, Kaiser and the
union concluded that there must be a “better way” than
strikes to settle their labor problems. Consequently,
Kaiser broke with the other steel companies and signed a
separate agreement which, among other provisions,
established a 9-man tripartite committee to formulate a
long-range plan for sharing in the company’s future
progress, encouraging needed company expansion, and
protecting employee job security and income.
After more than 2 years o f study and discussion, the
committee presented a plan that provided employees
displaced by technological improvements with a virtual
guarantee o f continued employment through placement
in other jobs or in “Employment Reserve,” and
maintenance o f previous levels o f earnings. Overall
reductions in the work force were to be accomplished
through attrition. A new group incentive system
provided that participating employees would receive
32.5 percent o f any reductions in the per-unit cost of
steel production, including reductions in material and
supply costs. The 32.5 percent figure was derived from
the average proportion labor costs bore to total steel
production costs over a 10-year period. Allowance was
made for cost-of-living and material price increases. Part
of the fund was to be paid as a monthly bonus and the
remainder placed in reserve to match wage and benefit
gains negotiated by other producers. Should the reserve
prove inadequate, Kaiser Steel was obligated to make up
the difference.
In return Kaiser management was to gain greater
flexibility in introducing new cost saving machinery and
methods, and to be able to phase out gradually the
incentive system. No new individual incentives were to
be created, but employees already on incentives were
not required to participate in the sharing feature of the
plan. A lump sum bonus equal to 2 years’ incentive
payments (to be repaid from employee bonuses) was


made available for workers electing to abandon
incentives. For those electing to remain on incentives,
the maximum incentive yield was set at 135 percent of
the base rate, but differential payments protected the
earnings o f employees whose incentive levels had been
higher. Although work rules provisions in the collective
bargaining agreements were not eliminated, management
did not anticipate any serious problems in modernizing
its facilities. The plan, to run for 4 years, with annual
tripartite committee reviews, was approved by an
employee vote o f nearly 3 to 1 and placed in operation
on March 1 ,1963.
Initial results under the plan were gratifying. Unit
costs declined substantially, and during the first year
participating employees received cash distributions
averaging about 18 percent o f the standard hourly wage
rates, including sums placed in the reserve fund. Almost
30 percent o f the incentive workers elected to transfer
to the plan, raising plan coverage from 4,000 workers in
March 1963, to over 5,000 at year’s end. Most
participating workers, having a direct stake in lowering
unit costs, cooperated with management in effecting
changes and discouraging waste; many changes, in fact,
were suggested by hourly and clerical employees. Kaiser,
with a $5.2 million loss in 1962, recorded a 1963 profit
of $11.3 million. Wildcat walkouts and grievances
Despite some modification o f the plan, enthusiasm
cooled during the 1964-67 period as monthly bonuses
declined to lows o f 5.28 percent o f standard hourly rates
in 1965, and 6.56 in 1967. In part, this drop was
traceable to the departure o f senior workers on the
initial rounds o f the then newly effective extended
vacation program. In part, too, subsequent industrywide
basic steel wage and benefit settlements required Kaiser
to place larger proportions o f the employees’ share o f
cost-reduction savings in the reserve account.
As the bonuses declined, many workers who had
relinquished incentive earnings voluntarily and recently
hired workers, found themselves working side by side
with higher paid workers who had elected to remain on
incentives. Grievances multiplied, and the company was
obligated to return a substantial number o f workers to a
modified individual incentive system.
In 1967, to counter dissatisfaction with the plan the
Committee proposed major revisions, and the employees


voted, by nearly a 2-1 margin, to continue it until
February 1972. The revised plan discontinued the
reserve fund thereby making available the entire share in
unit cost savings, with minor exceptions, to the
employees. Kaiser Steel currently assumes the total
obligation to match industry gains, and charges the
added expense as a labor cost. Another revision
permitted former incentive crews participating in the
plan to transfer, for a limited period during July 1968,
to a modified individual incentive program. This feature
was designed to eliminate the discontent created by
incentive and cost-savings plan employees working
together while receiving different amounts in earnings.
Hourly bonuses at first increased as expected, to
15.27 percent o f standard hourly earnings in 1968, and
to a high o f 18.42 percent in 1969, thereby minimizing
the number o f workers choosing to return to individual
incentives. In 1970, low profit margins, rapidly rising
costs, and decreased volume reduced amounts available
for monthly bonuses, which declined to 12.31 percent
o f the standard hourly wage rates in 1970. Although no
payment was generated in February 1971, a moderate
recovery is expected for the remainder o f the year.
Despite its initial success, the LRS Plan has failed in 8
years of operation, to supplant the older incentive
systems. The proportion o f workers participating in the
plan gradually has declined from a high o f nearly 73
percent in 1965 to a little over 57 percent in 1970. One
factor working to the plan’s disadvantage is the more
direct relation between effort and increased earnings
under the older incentive programs. When cost-savings
plan bonuses deadline, despite employee effort,
participants tend to regard this as a pay cut and pressure
for return to incentives increase.
Although there have been problems, it should be
noted that earnings o f Kaiser employees over the period
generally have exceeded the steel industry average, and
through most o f the period the company has prospered.
Crisis bargaining has been avoided. The employment
reserve and displacement differential features o f the plan
have lessened resistance to modernization, particularly
among clerical and technical workers, at very modest
cost to the company. Management has achieved some
success in reducing crews on existing equipment. Despite
qualified success, the plan has not been adopted by
other major steel companies; only one other smaller
concern—Alan Wood-has established a similar plan.

Chapter VII. Formal Union-Managemant
Cooperative Programs
management, promoting education and training, etc.,
indirectly improve efficiency.
The key features o f TVA’s plan are the formal
cooperative committees to encourage, collect, and pass
on suggestions for improving operations. A central
policymaking committee o f management and union
representatives provides guidelines for the program as a
whole. The 115 local cooperative committees at the
plant, office, project, or department level meet monthly
and act on solutions proposed by employees and
supervisors. The committees do not deal with pay and
other matters subject to negotiations and they do not
handle grievances or jurisdictional disputes.
No cash awards are made for approved suggestions.
By joint agreement, employees are recognized by
publicizing their solutions to work problems throughout
the TVA. In the past 4 years, over 2,500 suggestions
were accepted, about 43 percent of the total submitted.
The largest proportion deal with improving efficiency on
the job; others concern safety and health, training,
morale, the work environment, and similar matters.
Suggestions result in savings ranging from an hour’s labor
to thousands o f dollars.
TVA’s cooperative, problem-solving approach is
supported strongly by management and labor.
Management states that the “ . . . continuous dialogue in
areas o f mutual interest. . . engenders positive attitudes
and relationships . . . (that) have a positive influence on
productivity___ ” Union officials recognize that
beyond the bargaining process there is an area o f mutual
interest in TVA’s efficiency. A 1965 study by the
University o f Michigan Institute o f Social Research
found that cooperative committees foster among
employees a strong sense of identification with TVA’s
purposes and a willingness to accept job changes, which
favors improvement in the organization’s productivity.

Although unions and management do not frequently
make formal cooperative arrangements to improve
productivity directly, many collective bargaining
agreements contain pledges by unions to assist in
achieving greater efficiency, eliminating accidents and
waste, maintaining quality, etc. Very few, however,
establish machinery to enlist the active cooperation o f
unions and their members in these production problems.
Only during World War II were joint committees set up on
a wide scale to speed defense production. This is not to
say that union and management officials do not sit
together informally at the plant level to solve production
problems that arise in daily operations. The formal
committee type o f cooperation, however, focuses
continuous attention on productivity problems and
affords workers some opportunity to participate in
The following examples describe three different
formal union-management cooperative programs at the
plant level. The first deals with the joint efforts at
Tennesse Valley Authority to make use o f the
knowledge and skill o f its employees to solve work
problems and improve efficiency. The second example
features the extensive system o f joint committees in the
Pacific Coast pulp and paper industry to improve job
safety. The unique approach taken by the needle trade
unions and employers is outlined in the third example.
Union-management cooperation at the TVA

Formal cooperation between unions and management
to improve productivity at the Tennessee Valley
Authority was developed early by local craft union
leaders who sought to win status for their organization
in a public agency. Provision for union-management
cooperation is written into agreements with the 16
unions representing construction, operating, and
maintenance men and the 5 unions representing
white-collar workers. TVA employs about 19,500
The agreements spell out several areas o f mutual
interest that bear directly on productivity improvement:
conserving manpower, materials, and supplies; improving
quality o f workmanship and services; and eliminating
waste. Other objectives such as strengthening morale,
improving communications between employees and

Cooperative program for worker safety in the paper

Joint labor-management committees have been found
to be useful in communicating safety know-how and
developing broad participation in plant safety programs.
Provision for cooperative efforts are included in many
major collective bargaining agreements. A BLS study of
contracts in effect in 1970 covering 5,000 workers or

more, reported that 71, covering a total of 1,226,250
workers, contained provisions for labor-management
safety committees. By promoting safe performance, they
contribute to increasing the efficiency o f plant
One o f the most successful cooperative programs is
one operated in paper mills belonging to the Pacific
Coast Association o f Pulp and Paper Manufacturers,
which has over 25,000 employees. These mills have
collective bargaining contracts with the Association of
Western Pulp and Paper Workers (Ind.). Between 1945
and 1968, the combined injury-frequency rate o f these
mills fell more than 86 percent to less than half the 1968
national paper industry average o f 14.0 disabling injuries
per million man-hours worked. One company in the
program reported a combined injury-frequency rate of
only 3.51 in 1969, and another mill achieved the
ultimate safety objective o f a zero disability-frequency
The program developed out o f a union proposal for a
on safety.
Union-management safety committees subsequently
were established at each participating mill. These
committees meet regularly to review reports o f plant
inspections and accident investigations; discuss unsafe
work methods and practices, safety suggestions, and
safety rules; encourage safety consciousness through
bulletins, posters, and meetings; and serve as a forum for
new ideas, complaints, and recommendations. Since
1965, about 8,000 em ployees-both labor and
management—have completed a 5-hour safety course,
developed with the assistance o f two trained consultants.
The course had first been given to over 300 management
and labor discussion leaders.
The association also has sponsored a hearing
conservation program. This has involved seminars with
noise experts, joint educational conferences, and noise
prevention devices, such as sound absorbing enclosures
on machines.
To encourage interest in safety, the Association
publishes monthly data on injury-frequency rates o f
member mills. Competition among the mills is fostered
by awards presented at annual conferences, based on the
lowest 5-year injury-frequency rate, the lowest
frequency rate for that year, and the lowest rate in each
o f the three State.
Conferences are co-chaired by a labor and a
management representative. By agreement, these
meetings are reserved for consideration o f suggestions
and ideas that can be used by individual delegates to
improve their plant safety programs.
Union-management cooperation in the needle trades

efficiency in the needle trades has contributed to the

survival of firms threatened by low wage nonunion
competition. Joint efforts have involved expert help,
either from the union or from outside consultants, to
reduce costs and safeguard jobs. The industry is made up
o f many small, owner-operated firms, operating on
narrow profit margins and subject to severe fluctuations
in activity, because o f style and market changes. Having
a broad, industry wide outlook, the International Ladies’
Garment Workers’ Union and the Amalgamated Clothing
Workers play a dominant role in stablizing economic
The best examples o f efforts to improve efficiency
come from the work o f the ILGWU’s Industrial
Engineering Department. The major function o f the
Department’s technicians is to help union representatives
handle wage rate problems. Also, since the ability of
piece work operators to earn a decent wage often
depends on management’s ability to schedule and
allocate the work, the Department has developed a
program to assist union employers, at their request, to
improve their efficiency. This aid is extended principally
to union firms in high cost markets facing competition
from nonunion low cost producers and to newly
organized firms which are not able to pay union wage
increases because o f substandard productivity. In these
cases, the union experts may advise the employer on
how to improve his plant layout, inventory and cost
controls, or work scheduling so that he can pay higher
piece rates without raising unit labor costs or reducing
employment. The experts also may advise union
members to accept certain changes in the interest of
long-term job security.
Another type o f joint approach is exemplified by the
Industry Development Fund setup in 1966 by the
ILGWU and the Knitted Outerwear Manufacturers
Association o f Pennsylvania. Financed by employer
contributions, the Fund is used to make engineering
studies o f improved methods o f space utilization,
operations, materials handling, and quality control and
to conduct training courses for upgrading workers.
Recommendations for improvements by the Fund’s
experts are made available to all members o f the
Association who may or may not adopt them. The
Union plays an advisory role, especially in training of
In these examples, the rank and file members o f the
union do not participate actively. The outside
technicians do not become an integral part o f the plant’s
organization. Nevertheless, such union-management
cooperation has proven helpful in improving
productivity at firms in the needle trades threatened by


Chapter VIII. Job Redesign
New concepts about the relation o f job design to
productivity improvement have come from recent
studies in the fields o f engineering, psychology, and
management. The traditional industrial engineering
approach features job standardization, specialization,
and simplification which result in mass production and
productivity improvement but also much repetitive work
and little job satisfaction. Human engineering, an
approach that developed out o f experience with military
equipment, seeks to relieve physical and mental stress on
the job, by giving much weight to human factors in the
design o f machinery. More recently, research on the
nature of satisfaction in work has led to reexamination
of the value o f extreme job specialization and to paying
greater attention to designing jobs with greater variety
and responsibility and chances for achievement.
Although only a few companies and unions have shown
much interest in providing motivation through the work
itself, the potential for higher productivity is believed to
be substantial.
The following four examples illustrate the application
of various approaches to job design and redesign in
different industries. The first two describe applications
of human engineering: one, a formal program by a large
company; the other, informal uses to relieve job stress
on older workers. The third example deals with job
enlargement which resulted in greater productivity as
well as greater job satisfaction. The fourth reviews the
recent changeover from the individual to the team
approach in the practice o f dentistry.
Fitting jobs to men: Human engineering

Human engineering is the study of the physical and
mental demands of jobs and the application o f this
knowledge to design jobs and machines so that the
worker is not compelled to work beyond the limits of
his capacities. This interdisciplinary field is also called,
“ergonomics.” Some large companies have set up human
engineering programs to improve worker performance
and safety. Unions rarely are involved in these efforts.
The human engineering approach assumes that the
efficiency and reliability o f machines depend not only
on built-in technical features but also on the ability of
the worker to control them easily. Such ability is
influenced by the degree o f human force and accuracy

required to operate the machines; the placement of
controls and levers to regulate them; and the extent of
heat, noise, and other stresses in the environment.
Human engineers try to adapt machines, work places,
and working conditions to the worker for maximum
productivity. More and more, knowledge of human
factors is considered essential in eliminating hazardous
conditions in the work environment for greater
occupational safety and health.
An outstanding example of this approach is the work
done by the Human Factors Group at the Eastman
Kodak Company. The group draws on experts in
medicine, psychology, physiology, safety, and industrial
engineering. It is consulted at the intial design stage of
new processes and modifications of equipment.
The Group has studied a variety of tasks in the
company, such as inspection requiring considerable
perceptual activity; operation o f complex equipment for
long periods under stress o f rapid decisionmaking; and
production o f sensitized film products demanding skilled
work in low light. Also, since many jobs involve doing
several tasks simultaneously, there is considerable
research on ways of modifying the job as far as possible
and of selecting individuals who can perform such work
with a minimum o f stress.
In jobs that place heavy physical loads on employees,
the Human Factors Group applies new techniques of
studying work physiology. The points of stress in any
job on the worker’s cardiovascular and respiratory
systems are determined, and the duration and frequency
of rest breaks and other possible improvements in the
way of accomplishing the task without such effects are
The location of instruments, work pieces, and
controls which promotes the most comfortable work
position is another subject o f investigation. Careful
measurements of the worker’s arm reach and motions
while working are made for the purpose o f designing
work places that minimize discomfort and stress. The
efforts of the Human Factors Group are said to payoff
in increased productivity as well as in reduced fatigue
and injury.
Job redesign for older workers

Redesigning a job to fit a worker’s abilities has been
recommended by manpower experts as an effective way

o f maintaining the productivity o f workers whose
physical capacities are diminished because o f age or
physical disability. Job redesign is considered more
effective than reassignment or early retirement because
it minimizes retraining and other difficult readjustments
for older workers and allows them to utilize their skills
in a familiar setting, without stress or loss o f morale.
Examples o f this practice were presented in a BLS
report on Job Redesign for Older Workers prepared in
1966 as part o f an international study conducted by the
Development (OECD). Out o f 500 large industrial
corporations canvassed by the BLS, only a handful
reported that they had redesigned jobs specifically for
older workers. Many companies, however, reported that
in the normal course o f mechanizing jobs to improve
efficiency, fatiguing tasks often are eliminated to the
benefit o f both old and young workers.
Examples o f job redesign for older workers were
found in plants, ranging widely in size in a variety of
manufacturing industries. Many o f the workers affected
were machine operators, some were highly skilled
craftsmen and a few were laborers and porters. The
typical case involved job redesign by managers on an
informal basis to improve the efficiency o f a specific
worker or group o f workers whose physical capacity was
declining or who suffered an illness. Unions typically
had a limited role in these situations. In several cases a
substantial rise in output per man-hour was recorded. In
no case did productivity decline.
One case involved 20 older women who worked as
top stitchers at a shoe factory. Before the change, their
job required frequent stooping, squatting, bending, and
stretching. When absenteeism and complaints began to
increase and productivity declined, the plant manager
decided to remove the physically demanding tasks and
assigned them to two younger service workers. The older
top stitchers continued to work at their stitching
machines uninterruptedly, absenteeism and complaints
declined, and productivity rose significantly.
Another case dealt with changes in the job o f a
56-year old skilled operator o f an electric locomotive
crane. Before job redesign, the operator had to push and
pull long handled levers manually, using arm, leg, and
back muscles constantly. On the worker’s return to this
job after a long illness which affected his strength and
ability to stand constantly, the plant manager replaced
the original brakes and controls with more easily
operated air powered levers. These improvements were
quickly installed at a total cost o f only about $500. The
new equipment enabled the operator to sit at his job
most of the day, and required much less physical
exertion. The company was able to retain an

experienced and productive operator who was difficult
to replace.
Job enlargement to reduce costs

Job enlargement—the broadening o f job skill, variety,
and responsibility—has been adopted by several
companies to counteract some o f the negative aspects of
extreme job specialization. The results generally have
been favorable for productivity as well as for employee
Job enlargement is defined as the redesign o f job
content to enlarge worker discretion over the pace,
quality, and method o f operation. Programs o f job
enlargement prior to the mid-1950’s-such as those at
IBM and Detroit Edison—were concerned primarily with
long-run improvement o f the attitude and morale of
employees in highly repetitive and specialized jobs, with
the hope that eventually productivity would be
increased. More recently, researchers have found that job
enlargement also has potential for immediate tangible
savings in manufacturing costs.
According to a 1966 University o f Michigan survey,
41 o f the 210 companies that provided information
reported some type o f job enlargement projects.
utilities, and life insurance firms reported that this
technique had been adopted primarily for the purpose of
reducing costs; other goals included improved employee
attitude and morale and better quality. A majority rated
their experience as satisfactory.
The potential for tangible cost savings was
investigated at a firm manufacturing pump assemblies
for home washing machines by Professor Maurice
Kilbridge o f the University o f Chicago School of
Business. Before job enlargement, pumps were assembled
on a six-man and later on a four-man production line
with annual labor costs (based on 1,500 pumps
assembled daily) o f about $20,000 for each line. After
pump assembly was shifted to four one-man work
stations, at which each employee did a greater variety o f
tasks, total annual costs for the same level o f output
declined by more than $2,000. Although costs of
training and facilities were higher in the one-man work
stations, direct labor costs dropped from about 1.77
minutes per pump, under each assembly line operation,
to 1.49 minutes in the one-man work stations—a decline
of 16 percent. A two-thirds reduction in nonproductive
handling time was the major source o f the labor savings.
Job enlargement appears to have applicability to
many repetitive jobs involving batch work with idle time
between operations, and material handling jobs where
costs are high. Jobs that are machine paced offer less


potential for job enlargement. Researchers recommend
careful advance planning before introduction o f job
enlargement, including advance notice and training as
essential to increasing employee and union acceptance.

Improving productivity among dentists

A change in the job structure, involving the use of
dental assistants is resulting in impressive improvements
in the productivity o f the dental profession in meeting
its rapidly increasing patient load. Until a few years ago,
the traditional practice was for the dentist, standing at
his dental chair, to work with little or no direct
assistance in the provision o f treatment services. But
studies made by the Public Health Service in the 1950’s
showed possibility o f improving productivity o f dentists
from 35 to 75 percent by the use o f one or two auxiliary
To change traditional practices, the Public Health
Service chose to train dental students in new methods o f
practice, rather than focusing on retraining practicing
dentists. First on a pilot basis in 1957, and then on a
grant’s program in 1961, the Public Health Service with
the cooperation o f the American Dental Association,
assisted dental schools to develop formal continuing
programs of classroom and clinical instruction in the
effective use o f chairside assistants. In these programs,
the new mode o f practice has come to be known as “ sit
down four handed dentistry.”

The Dental Auxiliary Utilization program has been
adopted by all dental schools. Moreover, instruction in
how to utilize auxiliary staff has become an official
requirement for dental school accreditation. About
30,000 dental graduates—nearly a third o f all dentists in
practice-have had such training. By 1975, the Public
Health Service estimates that about half o f all
professional dentists will have been trained in these
Recent Public Health Service studies suggest that
further substantial improvements in dental productivity
is possible by delegating selected additional procedures
to trained auxiliary workers. In a new program recently
started, students will be taught to work with, manage,
and supervise a team o f dental auxiliary workers trained
in additional procedures. Twenty-two States already have
liberalized their dental practice acts to permit the
broader delegation o f duties envisioned in this advanced
Although full evaluation o f this change has not yet
been completed, the experience o f the Indian Health
Service where the new system, along with other
management improvements, has been put into effect
shows impressive productivity gains. Between 1957 and
1970, dental services increased by 195 percent; at the
same time only 102 percent in dental office and staff
increased, some o f the increase in dental officers went
into administration and training. By 1970, the Indian
Health Service had achieved a ratio o f 1.4 dental
assistants per dental clinician.


Chapter IX. Absenteeism and Hours of Work
Absenteeism often has a disruptive effect on plant
productivity, especially where the production process
involves sequential work and requires the presence o f all
team members for efficiency. Although no definitive
data are available on the extent, trend, and causes, the
general impression is that absenteeism has risen in recent
years. Accordingly, there is a constant search for more
effective ways of reducing the rate. In part, growing
interest in the 4-day workweek has been stimulated
by a concern about absenteeism. Since absenteeism is to
some extent a symptom o f dissatisfaction with working
conditions, many measures discussed in other parts of
the report also have a bearing on its control.
The following two examples are concerned with two
aspects o f the absenteeism problem: a review o f methods
used by management to control excessive absenteeism,
including a recent development in collective bargaining
and a review o f the trend toward the adoption o f the
4-day week.

Another frequent approach, sometimes coupled with
the first, provides for counselling and education of
employees about the importance o f adhering to a
reasonable attendance standard. The union’s help is
sometimes enlisted to good advantage. For example, at
one company the supervisor warns and counsels the
employee in the presence o f the department manager
and the union steward. The 1970 contracts between the
General Motors Corporation and the Ford Motor
Company and the United Auto Workers provide for
union participation in orientation talks to new
employees where the importance o f regular attendance is
A few companies use incentive awards such as cash
bonuses for perfect attendance or full pay for unused
sick leave. One company paid a $10 a month perfect
attendance bonus for certain types o f unskilled labor
with good results. Another cut Monday and Friday
absenteeism substantially by having a lottery on those
days; the workers were required to be present to collect.
Finally, many companies try to show concern about
absenteeism by publishing absenteeism statistics, training
supervisors, and investigating causes of poor attendance.
One company uses closed circuit TV for training while
another applied a computer to tabulate records and
developed for supervisors a package program for control

Control of absenteeism

Many plant managers are deeply concerned about the
productivity, work scheduling, and overtime labor costs.
A reasonable amount o f absenteeism due to bona fide
illness, family emergencies, transportation breakdowns,
etc.—the major causes—generally is recognized as beyond
the employee’s control. But when absenteeism becomes
critical (for example, when sick pay is grossly misused)
many companies try to work out special control
Disciplinary measures, according to a 1969-70 survey
o f personnel directors by the Bureau o f National Affairs,
were considered by the respondents to be the most
effective. This procedure often follows a progressive
pattern: for example, oral reprimand by the employee’s
supervisor for three absences in a year; written warning
for five absences; warning and probation for seven
absences; and discharge and termination for more than
seven. Enforcement, however, requires attendance
records on each employee. Other difficult administrative
tasks are defining excessive absenteeism and applying the
formula with flexibility in regard to the reasons for

The 4-day 40-hour week

The adoption o f a 4-day workweek by a number of
companies has attracted recent attention because of its
effects on leisure time and worker productivity. A 1970
study located 27 companies on the 4-day week, mainly
in manufacturing. Only five were unionized. A July
1971 article reported 367 firms, in industries including
manufacturing, retail trade, advertising, banking,
hospitals, and government. While the typical plant is
relatively small, some large organizations, such as
Amour, IBM, and the Social Security Administration are
installing the 4-day week in some plants or studying its
Typically, this innovation means a reallocation o f 40
hours from 5 to 4 days, and no change in pay. The work
day is usually lengthened but employees enjoy a 3-day

weekend. A few companies in the 1970 study shortened
the workweek by 4 hours in lieu o f a pay raise and one
paid overtime for over 8 hours in a day.
Management usually initiated the 4-day schedule. In
some cases, however, the change was installed after a
vote o f approval by employees. The principal
management objectives were to recruit a better labor
force; to reduce absenteeism, tardiness, and turnover;
and to cut labor costs. In a few cases, the new schedule
was adopted to handle peak work loads or sales.
of a small New England
manufacturing plant illustrates some conversion
problems. Union members voted by a large margin to
adopt management’s proposed 4-day week. Factory
workers were put on a 9-hour day; office workers, on an
8 Vi hour day. Both groups were paid for 40 hours.
However, the factory workers no longer have coffee
breaks, and washup time was reduced by half.
A western, nonunion manufacturing plant instituted a
4-day week: the day shift reports a 7 a.m. and leaves at 5
p.m., Monday to Wednesday; on Thursday, 7 a.m. and 4
p.m. In weeks when a holiday falls on a Monday, the
workweeks begin Tuesday and run through Fridays.
Employees receive 40 hours’ pay plus the holiday if the
holiday is a scheduled paid one, not on a Monday. Four
formerly paid holidays have been discontinued; the

company still pays for 5 holidays.
Generally, companies reported in the 1970 study,
greater gains then originally anticipated. Many reported,
shortly after the change, lower turnover and less
absenteeism. Some reported unexpected gains in output
with fewer man-hours. An auto executive sees the 4-day
week as a possible key to improving worker motivation
and thereby quality control.
Some companies, however, discontinued their plans
because o f the inability to service customers adequately,
less time to promote sales, and employee dissatisfaction.
Also, some managers in industries that run on a
round-the-clock basis are concerned that two 10-hour
shifts would leave costly equipment idle for 4 hours a
Workers’ reactions were mixed: many valued the
longer weekend and lower commuting costs. But a few,
reported greater fatigue and
inconvenience in tending to family needs. Unions
express little interest in the 4-day week itself unless
coupled with fewer hours or more pay. Some officials
fear increased moonlighting would sharpen competition
for jobs with unemployed workers. The Chrysler
Corporation and the United Auto Workers, however,
agreed to study the feasibility of the 4-day week and to
set up pilot operations to test it.


Appendix Selected Bibliography
Retraining of Plumbers

United Association Construction Agreement. In tern ation al Training F u nd: F acing th e C raft
Challenges o f T o m o rro w , Washington, D. C., 1969.
UA J o u rn a l (United Association o f Journeymen and Apprentices o f the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting
Industry o f the United States and Canada) March 1967, pp. 9-10.
1 9 6 9 In stru ctio n Training P ro g ra m Conducted by the UA Training Department, Purdue University,

Lafayette, Ind., August 10-15,1969.
Union Sponsored Retraining for Printers

International Typographical Union, Executive Council. M odern P rin tin g . Colorado Springs, Colo.
T ypograph ical J o u rn a l Official paper o f the International Typographical Union. Various issues.

Upgrading Hospital Employees

Medical and Health Research Association o f New York City, Inc. T o w a rd A C areer in N ursing:
U pgrading N u rs e ’s A id e s to L P N ’s Through A W ork-Study Program (Final Progress Report, April
1967-May 1970). Under contract with the Manpower Administration, U.S. Department of Labor.
Rosen, Sumner. “Union Management Cooperation: Is There an Agenda for Tomorrow,” in
P roceedings o f th e T w e n ty -first A n n u a l W inter M eetin g, Industrial Relations Research Association,

December 2 9-30,1968, Chicago, 111.
Training and Retraining in the Maritime Industry

U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau o f Labor Statistics. M ajor C o llective Bargaining A g reem en ts:
Training an d R etra in in g P rovision s (BLS Bulletin 1425-7 appendix B. Washington, D.C., 1969), pp.
Improving Basic Education of Steelworkers

Doeringer, Peter B. P rogram s to E m p lo y th e D isadvantaged. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1969, pp. 130-143.
“Steelworkers Forge a Better Future ’’ M an pow er, July 1969, pp. 21-24.
The Music Performance Trust Funds

American Federation o f Musicians of the United States and Canada (AFL-CIO). M usic is Y ou r
Business. New York, 1970, pamphlet.

Music Performance Trust Funds. F o rty -th ird R e p o r t a n d S ta te m e n t, M usic P erform an ce T ru st F u n ds,
January 1 ,1 9 7 0 ; Ju ne 3 0 ,1 9 7 0 . New York, September 1970.

Music Performance Trust Funds. M usic! L iv e an d Free! New York, 1970, pamphlet.
Music Performance Trust Funds. T ru ste e ’s R egu lation s: R e co rd in g In dustries, Revised July 1, 1970,
New York, 1970.


Centralized Meat Cutting

Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America (AFL-CIO). S u m m a ry o f
S e le c te d B en efits in K ro g er C u ttin g Plants. Chicago, 111., 1971.

The International Typographical Union and "Bogus" Typesetting

Fogel, Walter and Archie Kleingartner, editors. C o n te m p o ra ry L a b o r Issues . Belmont, Calif.:
Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1966.
Jacobs, Paul. D e a d H o rse a n d th e F e a th erb e d . Santa Barbara, Calif.: Center for the Study of
Democratic Institutions, 1962.
Kelber, Harry and Carl Schlesinger. U nion P rin ters a n d C o n tro lle d A u to m a tio n . New York:
Collier-Macmillan and Free Press, 1967.
Leiter, Robert David. F e a th erb e d d in g a n d J o b S ecu rity. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1964.
Porter, Arthur. J o b P ro p e rty R ig h ts: A S tu d y o f th e J o b C o n tro ls o f th e In tern a tio n a l T ypograph ical
Union. New York: King’s Crown Press, 1954.

Union and Management Accommodation in Fabricated Housing Construction

“Developments in Industrial Relations,” M o n th ly L a b o r R e v ie w , August 1969, pp. 73-74.
“History-Making Prefabrication Study is Enthusiastically Received,” B u ild in g a n d C o n stru ctio n
Trades B u lletin , March 1968.
Joint News Release o f the United Association (Plumbers) and American Standard, Inc., February 2,
1970. (Issued by the U.S. Department o f Housing and Urban Development.)
“Modular Housing Program Fades Away,” B usiness Week, March 14,1970, pp. 55-57.
National Concrete and Building Products Agreement with the Laborers’ International Union of North
America (AFL-CIO), effective March 16,1970.
Tri-Trades Agreement with Prestige Structures, Inc., effective October 1, 1969, and Tri-Trades
Agreement with Mobile and Modular Homes Division o f Concord Homes, Inc., effective May 1, 1970.
United Brotherhood o f Carpenters and Joiners o f America, Local 1106, Agreement with Stirling
Homex corp., effective September 2 3 ,1 9 6 8 .


Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union Mechanization and Modernization

Fairley, Lincoln. “The ILW-PMA Mechanization and Modernization Agreement,” P roceedin gs o f th e
IR R A S pring M eeting, May 4 -5,1961, pp. 664-680.

Goldberg, Joseph P. “Containerization as a Force for Change on the Waterfront,” M o n th ly L a b o r
R e view , January 1968, pp. 8-13.

Hartman, Paul. C o llec tiv e Bargaining an d P r o d u c tiv ity : The L o n g sh o re M ech a n iza tio n A g reem en t.
Horvitz, Wayne L. “The ILWU-PMA Mechanization and Modernization Agreement,” P roceedings o f
th e T w e n ty -first A n n u a l W inter M eeting, IRRA, December 29-30,1968, pp. 144-151.

Kossoris, Max D. “ 1966 West Coast Longshore Negotiations,” M o n th ly L a b o r R eview ,, October 1966,
pp. 1067-1075.
Ross, Philip. “Distribution o f Power Within the ILWU and the ILA,” M o n th ly L a b o r R e v ie w , January
1969, pp. 1-7.


Attrition Arrangements in the Railroad Industry

Abies, Robert J. “History and Experience Under Railroad Employee Protection Plans,” in R e p o r t,
U.S. Presidential Railroad Commission, Appendix Vol. 3, Washington, D.C., 1962, pp. 107-191.
Cottrell, Fred. T echn ological Change an d L a b o r in th e R a ilro a d In d u stry. Lexington, Mass.: D.C.
Heath and Co., 1970.
Dunand, George. “Technological Progress and Job Security on the U.S. Railroads,” In tern a tio n a l
L a b o r R e view , May 1964, pp. 482-495.

Levine, Morton. “Adjusting to Technology on the Railroads,” M o n th ly L a b o r R e v ie w , November
1969, pp. 3 6 4 2 .
Aid to Railroad Workers under AMTRAK
S ta te m e n t o f th e S ecreta ry o f L a b o r on E m p lo y e e P ro te c tiv e A rra n g e m en ts u n d e r th e R a il Passenger
Service A c t o f 1 9 7 0 , before the Subcommittee on Transportation and Aeronautics of the House

Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, U.S. House o f Representatives, 93d Congress, 1st
Session, April 2 8 ,1 9 7 1 .
Railroad Passenger Service Act o f 1970. Section 405, Protective Arrangements for Employees.
Interplant Transfer Arrangements in the Ford-UAW Agreement

Killingsworth, Charles C. C o o p e ra tiv e A p p ro a ch es to P ro b lem s o f T ech n ological Change. Lansing,
Mich.: Michigan State University, School o f Labor and Industrial Relations, Reprint Series No. 59,
U.S. Department o f Labor, Bureau o f Labor Statistics. M ajor C o llec tiv e Bargaining A g reem en ts: P lan t
M o vem en t, Transfer, a n d R e lo c a tio n A llo w a n ces, (BLS Bulletin 1425-10, Washington, D.C., 1969).

Weber, Arnold. The In ter-P lan t T ransfer o f D isp la ced E m p lo y e e s . For the Armour Automation Fund
Committee, Chicago, 111., 1961.
“When an Auto Plant Closes Up: Ford’s Dallas Plant,” B u siness Week, February 14,1970, pp. 24-25.
Relocation Allowances

AFL-CIO. A d ju stin g to A u to m a tio n . AFL-CIO Publication No. 144, Washington, D.C., January 1969.
International Association o f Machinists. M e etin g th e P ro b lem s o f A u to m a tio n Through C o llective
Bargaining. Washington, D. C., December 1960.

Schnitzer, Martin. “ Relocation Allowances and Labor Mobility,” in F ed era l Program s f o r th e
D e v e lo p m e n t o f H um an R esou rces, Vol. 1. U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 90th
Congress, 1968, pp. 224-231.
Early Retirement

Davis, Harry E., and Arnold Strasser. “Private Pension Plans, 1960-69: An Overview,” M o n th ly L a b o r
R eview , July 1970, pp. 45-56.

Greene, Mark R. and others. E a rly R e tire m e n t: A S u rv ey o f C o m p a n y P olicies a n d R e tir e e s *
E xperiences. Eugene, Oreg.: University o f Oregon, College o f Business Administration, 1969.

U.S. Department o f Labor, Bureau o f Labor Statistics. R e c e n t C o llec tiv e Bargaining a n d
T echnological Change. (BLS Report 266, Washington, D.C., 1964).
New York Longshoring: The Guaranteed Annual Wage

Groom, Phyllis. “Hiring Practices for Longshoremen,” M o n th ly L a b o r R e v ie w , November 1965, pp.


Jensen, Vernon H. “Decasualization o f Employment on the New York Waterfront,” In d u stria l a n d
L a b o r R e la tio n s R e view , July 1958, pp. 534-550.

------ , -------. “Computer Hiring o f Dock Workers in the Port of New York,” In du strial a n d L a b o r
R e la tio n s R e view , April 1967, pp. 414-432.

Stowe, David H. “Problems o f Collective Bargaining and Dispute Settlement in the East and Gulf
Coast Longshore Industry,” P roceedin gs o f th e 1 9 th A n n u a l M eetin g , N a tio n a l A c a d e m y o f
A rb itra to rs, 1 9 6 6 . Washington, D.C.: Bureau o f National Affairs, 1967.







Statistics. N a tio n a l E m erg en cy D isp u tes:
(BLS Bulletin 1633, Washington, D.C.,

L abor-M anagem en t R e la tio n s (T a ft-H a rtley ) A c t, 1 9 4 7 -6 8

Waterfront Commission o f New York Harbor. A n n u a l R e p o rts, 1953-54 to 1969-70. New York.
Armour Automation Fund

Killingsworth, Charles C. C o o p e ra tiv e A p p ro a ch es to P ro b lem s o f T ech n ological Change. Lansing,
Mich.: Michigan State University, School o f Labor and Industrial Relations, Reprint Series No. 59,
Shultz, George Pratt and Arnold R. Weber. S tra teg ies f o r th e D isp la c ed Workers. New York: Harper
and Row, 1966.
Stern, James L. “Manpower Planning for Displaced Workers,” M o n th ly L a b o r R e v ie w , December
1969, pp. 21-28.
Weber, Arnold R. The In ter-P lan t Transfer o f D isp la c ed E m p lo ye es. For the Armour Automation
Fund Committee, Chicago, 111., 1961.
Manpower Planning in the Telephone Industry

The Diebold Group, Inc. A u to m a tio n : I n p u t a n d Im p lic a tio n s-F o c u s on D e v e lo p m e n ts in th e
C om m u n ication s In d u stry. For the Communications Workers o f America, April 1965.

U.S. Department o f Labor, Bureau o f Labor Statistics. M a n p o w er Planning f o r T echn ological Change:
Case S tu d ies o f T elep h o n e O p erators (BLS Bulletin 1574, Washington, D.C., 1968).
Manpower Planning in the Internal Revenue Service

Rothberg, Herman. “A Study o f the Impact of Office Automation in the IRS,” M o n th ly L a b o r
R e view , October 1969, pp. 26-30.

U.S. Department o f Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Im p a c t o f O ffic e A u to m a tio n in th e In tern a l
R e ve n u e S ervice ( BLS Bulletin 1364, Washington, D.C., 1963).
A Profit Sharing Plan

Northrup, Herbert R. and Harvey A. Young. “The Causes of Industrial Peace Revisited,” In d u stria l
an d L a b o r R e la tio n s R e v ie w , October 1968, pp. 31-47.

Paul, George S. A m erica n V elvet C o m p a n y a n d T ex tile Workers U nion o f A m erica. Case Study No.
11 in Series on Causes o f Industrial Peace under Collective Bargaining. Washington, D.C.: National
Planning Association, 1953.
Tarneja, Ram S. P ro fit Sharing a n d T ech n ological Change . Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin,
School of Commerce, Center for Productivity Motivation, 1964.
The Scanlon Plan

Lesieur, Fred G.

and Elbridge S. Puckett. “The Scanlon Plan: Past, Present, and Future,” in

P roceedings o f th e T w e n ty -first A n n u a l W inter M eeting, Industrial Relations Research Association,

December 29-30,1968, pp. 71-80.


Lesieur, Fred G. and Elbridge S. Puckett. “The Scanlon Plan Has Proved Itself,” H arvard Business
R e v ie w , September-October 1969, pp. 109-118.

McKersie, Robert B. “Wage Payment Methods of the Future,” B ritish Jou rnal o f In du strial R e la tio n s,
June 1963, pp. 191-212.
Slichter, Sumner H., James J. Healy, and E. Robert Livernash. The Im p a c t o f C o llec tiv e Bargaining on
M a n a g em en t Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1960, pp. 864-877.
Kaiser Long-range Sharing Plan

Balsley, Gerard E. “The Kaiser Steel Plan,” in C o n te m p o ra ry L a b o r Issues, Walter Fogel, ed. Belmont,
Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1966, pp. 347-352.
The L o n g R an ge Sharing Plan: K a iser S te e l Corp. a n d U n ited S te e lw o rk e rs o f A m e r ic a -E x tr a E ffo r t,
E x tra Earnings. Fontana, Calif.: Kaiser Steel Manufacturing Division, 1967.

Macllwaine, C. A. “Appraisal o f Kaiser’s Sharing Plan,” M o n th ly L a b o r R e v ie w , April 1964, pp.
Pollara, Frank. “Automation and Retraining: The Steelworkers-Kaiser Steel Experience,” in
P roceedings o f N e w Y o rk U n iv e rsity ’s 1 6 th A n n u a l C on feren ce on L abor. New York: Matthew

Bender and Co., 1963, pp. 73-80.
“ Recommendations o f Kaiser-United Steelworkers Long-Range Committee,” M o n th ly L a b o r R e view ,
February 1961, pp. 137-138.
Stieglitz, Harold. “Kaiser-Steel Union Sharing Plan,” in S tu d ies in P ersonn el P o lic y (No. 187). New
York, N. Y. National Industrial Conference Board, 1963.
Union-Management Cooperation at the TVA

Massey, John E. “A Search for Trust Within a Public Agency,” P u b lic P erson n el R e view , July 1965,
pp. 130-134.




at TVA:





A d m in istra tive S cien ce Q uarterly, September 1965, pp. 149-170.

------ , -------. P articip a tio n , A c h iev em e n t, a n d In vo lv em en t on th e J o b . Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970.
T w e n ty -sec o n d A n n u a l V alley-w ide M eetin g o f T V A U nion-M anagem ent C o o p era tive C o m m ittees.

Speeches and panel discussion. Panel members: John T. Dunlop, John McConnel, Milton Derber.
Chattanooga, Tenn., May 24-25, 1967.

Cooperative Program for Labor Safety

“Papermaking Made Safer in Pacific Coast Mills,” S a fe ty Standards, September-October 1970, pp.
U.S. Department o f Labor, Bureau o f Labor Statistics. C h aracteristics o f A g reem en ts C overing 5 ,0 0 0
W orkers o r M ore. (BLS Bulletin 1686, Washington, D.C., 1970).

Union-Management Cooperation in the Needle Trades

Braun, Kurt. U nion-M anagem ent C ooperation . Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1947.
International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union. R e p o r t o f th e G eneral E x e c u tiv e B oard. New York,
1968, pp. 85 and 170. Also see R e p o r t for 1959, pp. 65-67; 1962, pp. 161; and 1965, p. 176.
Slichter, Sumner H., James J. Healy, and E. Robert Livernash. The Im p a c t o f C o llec tiv e Bargaining on
M anagem ent. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1960, pp. 844-851.


Fitting Jobs to Men: Human Engineering

Davis, Harry L., Terrence W. Faulkner, and Charles I. Miller, M.D. “Work Physiology,” H um an
F a cto rs , April 1969, pp. 157-166.

“ Fitting Job to Man is Job o f Kodak Human Factors Group,” K o d a k H ighlights, February 1971,
Rochester, N.Y.: Eastman Kodak Company, pp. 4-5.

Job Redesign for Older Workers

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. J o b R ed esig n a n d O ccu p a tio n a l Training
f o r O lder W orkers: F inal R e p o rt. Paris, 1965.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. J o b R ed esig n a n d O ccu p a tio n a l Training
f o r O lder Workers: S u p p le m e n t to th e F in al R e p o r t Paris, 1965.

Rey. Paule. Various Cases o f J o b R ed esig n f o r O ld er W orkers, Report No. 3 of International
Management Seminar on Job Redesign and Occupational Training for Older Workers. Paris:
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1965.
U.S. Department o f Labor, Bureau o f Labor Statistics. J o b R ed esig n f o r O ld er Workers: Ten Case
S tu d ies (BLS Bulletin 1523, Washington, D.C., 1967).

Job Enlargement to Reduce Costs

Conant, Eaton H. and Maurice D. Kilbridge. “An Interdisciplinary Analysis o f Job Enlargement:
Technology, Costs, and Behavioral Implications,” In d u stria l a n d L a b o r R e la tio n s R e v ie w , April 1965,
pp. 377-395.
Kilbridge, Maurice D. “Reduced Costs through Job Enlargement: A Case,” T he Jou rnal o f Business,
July 1960, pp. 357-362.
Schoderbek, Peter P. and William E. Reif. J o b E n largem en t: K e y to I m p r o v e d P erform an ce. Ann
Arbor, Mich.: University o f Michigan, Graduate School of Business Administration, Bureau of
Industrial Relations, 1969.

Improving Productivity Among Dentists

McClellan, T. E. and J. L. Cox. “An Evaluation o f Dental Officer-Dental Assistant Team Training in
Efficient Dental Management,” A m erica n D e n ta l A sso cia tio n Journal, March 1968, pp. 548-553.
Weiss, Jeffrey H. “How Auxiliaries Increase Productivity o f Dentists,” M o n th ly L a b o r R e v ie w , April
1971, pp. 63-64.

Control of Absenteeism

Bureau o f National Affairs, Inc. A b se n te e ism a n d Its C o n tr o l Personnel Policies Forum, Survey No.
90, Washington, D.C., 1970.
Johnson, Jr., E. H. “Control o f Sick Leave,” P erson n el A d m in istra tio n , January 1969, pp. 35-39.
Kearns, J. C. “Controlling Absenteeism for Profit,” P erson n el Journal, January 1970, pp. 50-51.
Sternhagen, C. J. “Medicine’s Role in Reducing Absenteeism,” P ersonn el, November 1969, pp. 28-35.
U.S. Department o f Labor, Wage and Labor Standards Administration. F a cts A b o u t W om en's
A b se n te e ism a n d L a b o r Turnover. Washington, D.C., August 1969.


4-day 40-hour week
4 Days, 40 Hours. Edited by Riva Poor with foreword by Paul Samuelson. Cambridge, Mass.: Bursk
and Poor Publishing, 1970.
Lewis, Albert. “ The 4-Day W eek," NAM Reports, November 23,1970.
“The Leisure Class: Firms, Workers Cheer as the 4-Day Week Makes Some Inroads,” The Watt Street
Journal, October 15,1970.
Wheeler, Kenneth E. “Small Business Eyes the Four-Day Workweek,” Harvard Business Review,
May-June 1970, pp. 142-147.

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