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The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s To-day the sway of large-scale production and of relatively large establishments is well-nigh absolute in the Sieg district. Rhenish-Westphalian furnaces have also entered this section, some with the assistance of the banks. Here, too, the activity of the coal syndicate has led to the establishment of larger and larger furnaces in combination with mines. The same tendency resulted also in the formation on October 27, 1894, of the association for the sale of Siegerland pig iron (Verein fur den Verkauf von Siegerldnder Roheisen), which in the very same year established secure relations to the Rhenish-Westphalian Pig Iron Syndicate.18 In other districts, the small blast furnaces and rolling mills were more and more consoli dated with the help of the banks, and transformed into “ mixed” works. The small concerns in the Sieg district which did not follow their example, and still survive as “ pure” works, are engaged in a desperate struggle for mere existence, hovering between life and death. Similar conditions are found in the Eahn and Dill district con sisting of parts of Upper Hessia, the administrative dis tricts of Wiesbaden, and the circuit of Wetzlar.1 9 The large coal production of the Aix-la-Chapelle region affords a strong basis for the iron furnaces of this region. These, however, draw part of their coal supply also from the Ruhr district. Adjoining the Aix-la-Chapelle district on the east is the Eschweiler coal district, and on the north the Wurm district, the latter, however, presenting less advantages for furnaces. The adoption of the Bessemer process at the close of the seventies led to the rapid development of the Aachener Hiltten-Aktienverein Rote Erde into a powerful “ mixed” 733 National M o n et a r y Commission steel-making establishment. On the other hand the Hoesch Iron and Steel Company of Dortmund abandoned its plants in the district almost entirely and transferred the main part of its works to Dortmund. In the same way the Phoenix made no progress with its furnace in the Aix-la-Chapelle district. Under the direction of the A. Schaaffhausen’seller Bankverein both works were amal gamated into one establishment in 1903.2 0 With the continuous assistance of the banks, coal mining in the Ruhr district has developed from small beginnings to a dominant industry in the Rhenish-Westphalian territory, a section well provided both with industrial establishments and banks. Here, as elsewhere, the higher prices, established by the coal and coke syndi cates and particularly by the Rhenish-Westphalian coal syndicate founded March 1, 1893, were the immediate occasion for the furnaces to acquire their own coal mines, a movement which won for them their increasing su premacy over the concerns which have remained “ pure” iron works. In 1896 the Phoenix acquired the Westende mine; the Dortmunder Union— the Adolf von Hansemann mine (Mengeder Bergwerksgesellschajt); in 1897 the Gelsenkirchener Bergwerksaktiengesellschaft, the leader of the coal syndicate, acquired the Westhausen mine; the Aktiengesellschaft Kannengiesser— the Roland mine. All these mines had been independent of the syndicate. Hoesch, Krupp, and the Rhenish Steel Works followed suit by buying up syndicate mines, a movement in which the banks were often the intermediaries. At first they attempted to secure through legal proceedings the right to divert the coal production of their newly acquired 734 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s properties for their own use. When this proved inef fective they were soon able to secure this right by agree ment. The syndicate had to yield, for these works were in a position to cause it great annoyance. When the coal syndicate agreement was renewed in 1903— a result brought about largely by the activity of the banks in the open and behind the scenes— all the mines owned by the iron and steel works, except those belonging to the Government, joined the syndicate. The former, however, arranged it so that under the new agreement the syndicate provisions did not apply to their entire output but only to the portion over and above that which was consumed in their own works. On the other hand, however, the owners of the coal mines were prohibited from selling coal fields or pits to other than members of the syndicate without first securing permission from the general convention of coal mine owners. There remained, however, a point in dispute as to what should be done in the case of the sale of coal mines to fur nace owners, for the purpose of supplementing the inade quate supply of coal for use of their own furnaces. The contention of the syndicate was that in such cases the entire output of the newly purchased mines was to be subject to the regulations of the syndicate. The GermanTuxemburg Mine and Smelting Stock Company, having bought the Kaiser Friedrich mine for its own use, brought suit against the coal syndicate, and the contention of the syndicate was not upheld by the imperial supreme court. The court took the position of the company, namely, that as much of the output of the newly acquired mine as was needed by the furnace proper might be used without 735 restriction. Another case, not regulated directly, is that of a mining company erecting a furnace “ in order to find a more profitable use for its coal in the manufacture of pig iron or steel than in the sale of its product to the syndicate.” 2 1 It should be mentioned, however, that when the syndi cate was extended it itself included among its purposes the acquisition of coal fields and mining shares. On the other hand, the syndicate was protected against the sale of coal fields or mining shares to outsiders by the International Exploration Company, through the “ benevolent neutral ity ” of the A. Schaaffhausen’scher Bankverein, which con trolled this corporation, a policy which the bank had to adopt, on account of its relations to the companies which dominated the syndicate. There are no coal deposits of any importance in the district which are not held by the International Exploration Company, nor any sites to be had for new plants or for extensions, not even at fanciful prices. Furthermore, for a long time most of the ore has had to be imported from abroad. Here, again, the Ger man banks have repeatedly tried to procure for friendly industrial interests ore mines or ore deliveries at reasonable prices, as, for example, from Sweden. In the same fashion the banks were active in many ways in the consolidations, out of which sprang the great “ mixed” works that to-day dominate the Ruhr district, though some of these, such as Krupp, Bochumer Verein, Phoenix, Horder Bergwerks-und-Hiittenverein, and the Gute Hoffnungshiitte, were founded as early as the fifties. In the early seventies the Dortmunder Union, which enjoyed the patronage of the Disconto-Gesellschaft, absorbed the 736 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s Heinrichshiitte and the Neu-Schottland works, which even then were mixed works. Similarly, it absorbed the Strousberg Works, in which the Disconto-Gesellschaft was likewise interested. In the same way the Westjdlische Union and the Westjalischer Drahtindustrie-Verein ab sorbed a number of wire works of this district. The part played by the banks in these consolidations had not been unimportant, but around the middle and toward the end of the seventies their services were called in on a much larger scale. The iron industry was then in a state of prostration, and for years not even the Phoenix and the Bochumer Union paid dividends. The Horder Verein became involved in great difficulties, and both the Gute Hoffnungshiitte and the Rheinische Stahlwerke had to resort to a heavy reduction of their capital. The Westfalische Union was saved from extinction only by the assistance of banks and a reorganization. In Upper Silesia capitalist production did not begin to make progress before the fifties, and even then its advance was slow. For the most part the land and the iron ores were in the hands of the large feudal landowners. Here Borsig was the pioneer in evolving a machine factory into enormous mixed steel works by acquiring or erect ing blast furnaces and rolling mills. This example was followed later by the machine factory of Hendschel & Son, in Kassel. In the seventies the Vereinigte Konigs-und Laurahutte and the Donnersmarck-Hiitte passed out of the ownership of the magnates, who continued, however, to hold by far the larger proportion of the iron furnaces and coal mines. With the aid of the banks, the newly ac quired furnace works were organized as stock companies. 9 0 3 1 1 ° — i i ------ 48 737 I National Monetary Commission In the same manner “ pure ” rolling mills were started, as, for instance, the Bismarckhutte. A t present the center of gravity of the industry in Upper Silesia is not in its iron production, but in its output of coal and coke.2 This is regulated by the Upper Silesian 2 Coal Convention of 1890. Of the total product approxi mately two-thirds is sold by two Berlin firms, Caesar Wollheim, intimately connected with the Dresdner Bank, and Emanuel Friedlander & Co., closely allied with the Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft. In this district, too, it is scarcely possible to-day to acquire coal mines or coal fields. Free competition has been well-nigh “ banished from Upper Silesia.” 2 Here 3 the mining and metallurgical concerns have always been mixed works. It is therefore only in the works recently established that the movement toward concentration and combination has been closely interwoven with the cartel movement. The concentration and cartel movements have been on a smaller scale in this region than in the Rhenish-Westphalian district, but here, too, the stimulus has come from the banks, which are behind the different establishments. Of these the Borsig Works is the only undertaking still owned privately. Of the concerns established in recent times the one deserving special mention is the Upper Silesian Iron Manufacturing Stock Company (Caro Hegenscheidt). This company developed in 1887 out of the Caro Works, and is closely related to the Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft. In 1899 it absorbed the Upper Silesian Wire Manufacturing Stock Company, from which it had hitherto been obliged to purchase 25,000 tons of pig iron. Thereafter it was 738 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s able to obtain its pig iron more cheaply, for the wire com pany had in 1888 contracted for the entire output of the Count Henckel-Siemianowitz Works for a period of twenty years. Since 1889 the Upper Silesian Iron Manufacturing Company has been closely allied by contract with the Oberschlesische Eisenbahnbedarfs-Gesellschaft (Upper Sile sian Railroad Equipment Company), which is on intimate terms with the Breslauer Disconto-Bank, and through it with the Darmstadter Bank. This equipment company (the so-called Oberbedarfs-Gesellschaft) in turn united in 1904 with the Huldchinsky furnaces. To all appearances the alliance was made for purely business and technical reasons, and did not call for any significant help from the banks. Similar business policies and technical reasons seem to have been the determining factors in bringing about the community of interest in 1903 between the Bismarckhiitte and the Upper Silesian Iron Manufacturing Company, extended in 1904 so as to include the Donnersmarck Bethlen-Falva Hiitte. The same may be said of the community of interest founded in 1904 between the Konigs-und Eaurahiitte (with which are affiliated the banking house of S. Bleichroder and the Dresdner Bank), the Upper Silesian Railway Equipment Company (Friedenshutte) (closely related to the Breslauer Disconto-Bank and the Darmstadter Bank), and the Kattowitzer (Tiele-Winckler'sche) Aktiengesellschajt fur Bergbau- und Hilttenbetrieb (Marthahiitte). In such cases the services of the friendly banks often take but the form of removing obstacles and hindrances, or refrain ing from interference when the interests of other clients might call for such interference. 739 N a t io n a l M on e t a r y Commission Occurrences of this kind are, however, to be regarded as exceptional. Moreover, it is not a matter of chance that they have happened in the district of Upper Silesia. For here there was little room for banks or their initiative and assistance, for the reason that the land, the coal mines, and the ore rights were in the hands of feudal owners, and that from early times mixed works predominated. The conditions in the Saar district are similar. There the family ownership of the iron furnaces by the Stumm, the de Wendel, and the Rochling families held back bank domination, which usually asserts itself in connection with stock companies. Furthermore, here the Govern ment was in control of the coal, and the entire district gradually became dependent on Lorraine for its coke and ore. More and more it is becoming clear, in all essentials, that the fate of the mining and metallurgical industries as a whole will be decided not in Upper Silesia or on the, Saar, but in the two districts in which primarily the great banks are contending .for financial control— the Rhenish-West phalian and the Uorraine-Luxemburg districts. Between the latter and the former there are close connections. Largely through the help of the banks the LorraineLuxemburg district has recently attained a position of more dominating importance, its extensive ownership of mines in the Ruhr section giving it large influence also in the Rhenish-Westphalian territory. In the main it was the mixed iron works of the two districts which were able to impose their will upon and have their interests taken care of by a syndicate primarily devoted to the interests of coal at the time when the second coal syndicate was formed (in September, 1903). Coal had to yield to iron. 740 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s These two districts, which may be regarded the cap ital seats of the mining and iron industries, witness at present the great struggle for industrial supremacy between the leading mining concerns and for financial supremacy between the leading banks. It is highly interesting to watch the turns in this battle, the numer ous ups and downs, surprises, and combinations which present themselves in varied and exciting array to the attentive observer as the contending parties maneuver and clash in the combat. There is no lack of either large and comprehensive plans or of scenes of petty jealousy in these campaigns. Here a great part is played by two captains of industry whose power is constantly growing in the two opposing camps contending for mas tery— August Thyssen, of the firm of Thyssen & Co., in Mulheim on-the-Rhine, and Hugo Stinnes, of the firm of Mathias Stinnes, of Mulheim on-the-Rhine. Thus far both have, as far as possible, pursued the policy of maintaining the friendliest relations with a number of banks without wedding themselves to any one. It is not, however, the first time that such captains of industry have played the leading role in the indus trial evolution of Germany. One need only recall the names of Strousberg and Friedrich Grillo, whose enter prises either failed or were dispersed on their death and were liquidated or sold by the Disconto-Gesellschaft. Part of the Grillo works passed into the hands of August Thyssen, of whom we shall have more to say here. The modest steel and rolling mill of Thyssen & Co., in Mulheim on-the-Rhine, founded in the early seventies, has gradually grown into the very important Thomas and Martin Steel 741 r T " ''' National Monetary Commission and Rolling Mills of that firm. It annexed first the Gewerkschajt Deutscher Kaiser, a mine and furnace company in Bruckhausen-Hamborn, and developed it into powerful mixed steel works especially noteworthy for its highly effi cient blast furnaces. In 1903 the latter works joined the Rhenish-Westphalian Pig Iron Syndicate. The two es tablishments employ more than 17,000 men and insure Thyssen an important place both in the pig iron syn dicate and in the Steel Works Union. Thyssen has also a controlling interest in the Schalker Gruben-und Huttenverein, which owns large coal mines and blast furnaces and operates the largest iron foundry in ex istence in Germany. He also controls the Victor Mining Company, which was organized by the former concern. In Lorraine he owns the Minette mines and holds a con siderable interest in the mixed steel works of the Sambre et Moselle Mining Corporation. In the coal territory his control is even wider than in the iron region. This is due as much to the extensive coal properties of the Gewerkschaft Deutscher Kaiser as to his large interests in the Mulheim Coal Company which is jointly controlled by him and Stinnes. With Stinnes he shares also in the control of the Friedlicher Nachbar Mining Company. Early in 1904 he joined the supervisory board of the Gelsenkirchner Bergwerksgesellschaft, the coal properties of which adjoin those of the Schalker Gruben-und Hiittenverein, having acquired a large part, perhaps a majority, of the shares of that company, either individually or through the Miilheimer Bergwerksverein (3,000,000 marks). Finally, in 1903, he acquired the development company Bohrge742 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s sellschaft Lippermulde and thereby extended and rounded out his coal properties, until they reached on the east of the Rhine as far as the government mines and on the south as far as the properties of the Gewerkschajt Deutscher Kaiser and Gute-Hoffnungshutte. After the pur chase of the development company Tiefbohrgesellschaft Lubisch his holdings extended east of the Rhine as far north as the Dutch border. His present ownership of coal properties is about twice as large as that of the Government in the same region. While Stinnes is closely allied with Thyssen, as is evident from the above, and owns jointly with him the Mulheimer and the Sambre et Mosselle mining compa nies, he owns also in his own right the coal mines Ma thias Stinnes, Victoria Mathias, Graf Beust, Carolus Magnus, Friedrich, and Ernestine. He owned also the Friedlicher Nachbar mine (transferred in 1904 to the Deutsch-Luxemburgische Bergwerks-und Hiittenaktiengesellschaft). In the southern part of the Ruhr district he is almost in sole control; in the rest of this territory he shares control with Thyssen. Stinnes likewise joined the supervisory board of the Gelsenkirchener Bergwerksgesellschaft. In addition he is on the board of the Nordstern and of the Mittelrheinische Bank in Koblenz and Duisburg. The latter is closely related to Spaeter & Co., in Koblenz. The supremacy of Thyssen and Stinnes in the Ruhr district is disputed in the main only by the Haniel family and by Karl Funke, of Essen. The Haniel family owns the Rheinpreussen Mines and the Gute Hoffnungs Mines, adjoining the Thyssen coal mines. Karl Funke owns the 743 t N at ion a l M on e t a r y Commission Konig Ludwig mines. The Haniel family is allied with the Duisburg-Ruhrorter Bank, and Funke with the Essener Bankverein. As both of these banks have communities of interest with the Deutsche Bank, both Haniel and Funke are now in close touch with the Deutsche Bank. Stinnes’s relations with the firm of Spaeter & Co., of Koblenz, are particularly close through their common shipping interests on the Rhine, both of them being large river carriers of coal. In some cases both Thyssen and Stinnes have been fighting the syndicates. In the majority of cases, how ever, their attitude toward them was more friendly, resembling their attitude toward the banks, maintained successfully for a number of years. From the beginning the Schalker Gruben-und Hiittenverein controlled by Thyssen, was a member of the Rhenish-Westphalian Pig Iron Syndicate, while his Gewerkschaft Deutscher Kaiser with its blast furnaces did not join this syndicate until 1903. The Schalker Verein with its Pluto mines, and its subsidiary company Victor, as well as the Mulheimer Bergwerksverein, in which Stinnes was also interested, were members of the coal syndicate, while at the same time Thyssen’s Deut scher Kaiser mines were most active in fighting the syndicate. Stinnes, on the contrary, joined the coal syndicate with nearly all his mines. However, he kept outside of the syndicate his Friedlicher Nachbar mines. The intoler able conditions thus produced have, however, in the main, been ended by the syndicate regulations. 744 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s Their relations to the banks we have characterized before. Thus Thyssen was at first on close terms with the Disconto-Gesellschaft. Particularly in the eighties and nineties it was this bank which floated the securities of the Schalker Gruben- und Hiittenverein and of the Gewerkschajt Deutscher Kaiser. Later his relations be came intimate with the Dresdner Bank, after it had reorganized in 1902 and entered into a community of interest with the Rheinische Bank in Miilheim, an insti tution with which Thyssen was affiliated. Hugo Stinnes had some relations with the Dresdner Bank, having participated with it in the reorganization of the Saar- und Moselle Mining Company. He estab lished relations also with the A. Schaaffhausen’scher Bankverein, after the latter had founded a community of in terest with the Mittelrheinische Bank in Koblenz, of which Stinnes was a board member. In 1901 Stinnes established relations also with the Darmstadter Bank, when he became vice-president of the board of the Deutsch-Luxemburgische Bergwerks- und Hutten-AktienGesellschaft, which owes its financial strength and high technical standing to the Darmstadter Bank. The con cern combined both mining and smelting operations after the acquisition in 1904 of the Stinnes mines, Friedlicher Nachbar. On January 1, 1905, a community of interest was entered into between the Gelsenkirchener BergwerksAktiengesellschaft, the Aachener Hiittenverein Rote Erde and the Thyssen concern Schalker Gruben- und Hiittenverein. By this step a group of competing banks, viz, 745 N ational M on et a r y Commission the Disconto-Gesellschaft, the Deutsche Bank, the Dresdner Bank and the A. Schaaffhausen’scher Bankverein were brought together in a joint undertaking, This event served also to enhance the power of Hugo Stinnes and August Thyssen, who became members of the “ joint committee” of this community of interests. This combination seems to have brought about some sort of equilibrium in the Rhenish-Westphalian indus trial territory, and simplified certain complex relation ships in the banking and industrial field. On the other hand, there are already evident the beginnings of new conflicts in another field. As we saw, the Lorraine-Tuxemburg iron industry has in recent times been coming to the front more and more and is beginning to overshadow even the Rhenish-West phalian industry. One reason of this development is the far lower cost at which it can produce pig iron as com pared with the Rhenish-Westphalian district. Another reason is that owing to the electrical process recently introduced in the manufacture of steel the value of Luxemburg-Lorraine ores, which formerly were hard to work, because they were rich in phosphorus, has been greatly enhanced. These can be utilized most cheaply and advantageously by the works located close to the ore beds.2 The quantity of such ore is estimated at about 4 2,000,000,000 tons. Realizing that a serious movement of the German pig iron industry toward the southwest has set in, the leading captains of industry and the leading banks alike have felt obliged to increase their influence in the LorraineLuxemburg region. 74 6 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s In this territory the position of the firm,Spaeter & Co., in Koblenz, is very powerful. It is the founder of the Rombacher Hilttenwerke, which have bought up the Moselhuttenwerke and dominate the blast furnaces in Rodingen, Rumelingen, and the Eisenhiittenaktienverein Diidelingen. In this district Thyssen has thus far gained a foothold practically only through his interest in the Hiittenverein Sambre et Moselle, while Stinnes’s hold in this territory is only through his membership in the Supervisory board of what is now a very important company— the DeutschLuxemburgische Bergwerks- und Hutten-Aktiengesellschaft, and his rather unimportant connection with Spaeter & Co.2 5 As recently as April, 1909, a step was taken which is certain to affect deeply the relations of the different industrial groups and their relative positions. In all likelihood it will also exert a powerful influence on the relations of the different bank groups which are dependent on these industrial groupings, and on the general movement toward concentration. An enormous increase was made in the capitalization of the Gelsenkirchener BergwerksGesellschaft. Its capital stock was increased by 26.000. 000 marks to a nominal amount of 156,000,000 marks, and its bonded debt by 20,000,000 marks to 70.000.000 marks. The latter increase was made in spite of the fact that there was still available an unissued amount of 9,325,000 marks in 4 per cent bonds authorized in 1906. This move attracted attention not only by the size of the capital increase but also because it was made at a time of money stringency and unfavorable market condi tions. The company justified this step on the ground that 747 % National Monetary Commission the additional resources were indispensable for the erection of new blast furnaces and steel works in Esch and in Deutsch-Oth. It was also given out officially that the measure was necessary to insure an “ adequate position” for the company in case the Steel Works’ Union, which ter.minates June 30, 1912, were not renewed. Doubtless this had reference to an increase of its quota in the syndi cate. The Gelsenkirchener Bergwerksgesellschaft had originally been a producer of coal and coke only. After it had entered into a community of interest with the Rote Erde and the Schalke Works it became also a pro ducer of pig iron, steel, semimanufactures of iron and steel, beams and rails, but it nevertheless continued to hold the largest production quota in the coal syndicate. Through its action of April, 1909, however, it entirely shifted its center of gravity away from the production of coal to that of iron and steel. This step was in keeping with the movement of the iron industry to the southwest. The new resources were to be expended for the purpose of operating its steel and rolling mills in combination with its blast furnaces, where conditions made possible the cheapest cost of production, i. e., in the heart of the Lorraine-Luxemburg Minette district, where it owned extensive ore beds. Through this action, however, the Gelsenkirchener Bergwerksgesellschaft became a direct competitor of August Thyssen, who had been a member of its board. He at once accepted the logical consequence of the situa tion and resigned from the board. Earlier he had with drawn also from the board of the Phoenix. The Thyssen 748 Th e G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s concern Deutscher Kaiser owns very important ore rights in the Lorraine-Luxemburg district, and he himself, as was shown above,is interested in the Saar-und Moselbergwerksgesellschaft in Karlingen. Moreover, early in 1909 he invested several million marks in land in this section and acquired the oatent rights to produce electro-steel in all his works. In the near future the struggle for supremacy is likely to be fought out in the Lorraine-Luxemburg district. The trial of strength between the leading interests will come as soon as negotiations begin with a view to renew ing the Steel Works’ Union at the expiration of the pres ent agreement. The progress of the conflict and its outcome and the industrial concentration that is likely to precede or follow it will undoubtedly be influenced by the banks and groups of banks that stand back of the captains of industry and their enterprises. This influence may indeed not be de cisive, but it is likely to be in the direction of new com binations and the avoidance of further conflicts which must prove harmful to all. So far as we can foresee, the important part will be taken by those banks which now possess, or by that time will have attained, a controlling influence over the industrial concerns which dominate the Lorraine-Luxemburg district. It will be of the utmost interest to watch further developments. These will reveal many different combinations and changes in indus trial and banking concentration, and new group align ments in both fields. 749 » National Monetary III. T he I nfluence centration on of I ndustry Commission and Concentration I ndustrial Con in B anking . A detailed account of the tremendous effects which industrial development and concentration have exerted on the growth of the great banks and on concentration in banking would involve a repetition of practically every thing discussed in previous chapters of this book. At every step in the development of the banks and at every stage of their growth the mighty influence of industrial progress may be seen. We showed this connection par ticularly in discussing the current business of the banks as well as their activity in the field of floating securities, forming new corporations, and converting firms into corporations. This influence is equally apparent in the activities of the banks both at home and abroad. The far-reaching influence of the cartel movement in industry and of the national export policy on the extent and the rapidity of the movement of concentration in banking, also the ways in which concentration in banking was brought about and the forms it assumed, have been shown in great detail. The reader is therefore referred to the previous chapters for an account of these subjects. 75 ° PART VI. THE SITUATION RESULTING FROM CONCENTRATION; ADVANTAGES AND DAN GERS OF CONCENTRATION— THE OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE. By far the most serviceable of the tools employed by modern capitalism have been first the machine and second the corporation. Machinery made possible the elimina tion of the personal element of labor and the utmost con centration of mechanical forces. The corporation elimi nated the personal element of the entrepreneur, and led to the utmost concentration of the forces of capital. The cooperation of these two factors, i. e., machine pro duction and the corporation, has made possible the culmination of capitalist development in the shape of cen tralized management of combined forces and enterprises. The abundance and variety of detail revealed in the history of the development of concentration may, on superficial observation, fill one with dismay. On closer inspection we find, however, that the successive stages of this development are subject to remarkable regularity, partaking almost of the character of natural law. At first sight there is a confused mass of complicated events, so intricately interlaced that it seems impossible to grasp them in their entirety. Upon closer examination three stages of development become discernible. In the first stage we find a large number of weak, independent enterprises, incapable of much resistance. In the second stage we notice the transition to a large number of far 7Si National Monetary Commission more complicated enterprises, better organized and capable of greater resistance. In the third stage we have the situation again simplified by the formation of a small number of powerful groups of enterprises. In the economic struggle for existence, as shown in the movement toward industrial concentration, we see first a large number of weak individual establishments. Out of these by a thousand devices and in seemingly roundabout ways, and through as many types and forms, there emerges gradually the fewest practicable number of strong and unified groups of enterprises, i. e., increasingly simple industrial formations. This process of evolution can be traced in every domain of industry. In the most modern of industries, the electrical industry, the process is revealed most clearly. At the outset numerous companies wrere organ ized in feverish haste. By 1900, as we saw (p. 715 et seq.), there had developed out of them seven groups, which dominated the field, comprising in all 28 allied companies. After some of these groups had lost much of their power and others had been absorbed, two groups remained more powerful than the others— the Siemens-Schuckert group and the General Electric (A. E. G.). From present indi cations these will be able to ally with themselves the re maining groups or companies either through price agree ments or by more efficient means. They will also be in a position to hold in check international competition by means of mutual understandings, the beginnings of which may be seen even at present. In the chemical industry we see the same development. There is on the one side the union of the Hochst Dye 75 2 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s Works and the firm of Leopold Cassella & Co. in the form of a community of interest, and on the other a similar community of interest among the Badische Anilin-und Sodafabrik, the dye works formerly Friedrich Bayer & Co., and the Aktiengesellschaft fiir Anilinfabrikation. These are in a position to bring about a consolidation of all the remaining dye works, as far as it may become neces sary, and to enable the German aniline dye industry to meet successfully foreign competition. In the mining and metallurgical industry a light has ap peared in the darkness of the “ cartel chaos” since the organization of the Steel Works’ Union. The latter com bines establishments engaged in every stage of the process of production. It is, therefore, in a better position to carry out a sound cartel policy at home and to arrange for the elimination of international competition by bringing about agreements for a division of the export trade to im portant foreign markets among the competing countries on the basis of the amount of their past sales in these markets. Meanwhile, more rapidly than ever, there is going on in the mining and iron industries a movement of concentration and consolidation among the different groups of enterprises, and in this process the weaker and smaller establishments are being absorbed or eliminated. The shipping industry is dominated by two companies, the Hamburg-American Packet Line Company and the North German Lloyd. These are united by agreement between themselves and also with a British - American combination. Finally, in banking, out of a large number of independ ent banks, there have been developed five powerful groups, 903 i i °— i i ------49 "I 753 National Monetary Commission comprising, in all, 41 “ concern” banks (Konzernbankeri). In this field, however, the process of concentration has byno means yet ended. It will, in all probability, not stop until it has come nearer its goal than to-day, by develop ing the smallest number of bank groups practicable, each embracing the largest possible number of “ concern” banks, under centralized management. Until the groups of banks shall have reached a point of fairly equal strength, so that each one will respect the other’s domain, we can not look to a halt in the movement of concentration. However, even now it is possible to realize many of its advantages and dangers. To begin with the advantages of concentration. Un questionably the business policy of a great bank, and not ably of one standing at the head of a chain of banks (Konzernbanken) , can and will be carried out more in accordance with a uniform program, which takes into account the gen eral economic interests including those of the nation and of the Government. Such a business policy can be pursued by it much more readily than by a moderate-size or small bank or by a large number of small scattered banks, which are compelled by the increasing struggle for existence to shape their policy merely with a view to dividends. E x perience has taught that the great German banks realized the necessity of supporting a vigorous policy in encourag ing the exports of manufactures (see p. 527 et seq.). They accepted the logical demands of the situation and acted accordingly, as shown by their attitude toward industry and the export trade, the investment of German capital in foreign commercial and industrial enterprises and securi ties1, and in promoting actively the national policies in 754 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s regard to shipping, colonies, the building of canals, and the laying of cables. Neither will it be denied that the administration of the great German banks is far more subject to control by the special press and the public than a large number of isolated small or moderately large banks. Furthermore, it is clear that powerful banks and groups of banks of this kind, under centralized control, can serve the German Em pire as one of its most potent agencies in both its economic and world policies. This is true, at least so long as the leaders of the banks continue, as they have done, to regard their duty to the state as one of their important obligations. The Government and its various organs, moreover,regard it as a great help to carry on negotiations with a few great banks, having their center in Berlin, when it is a question of measures the execution of which is to be intrusted to private capital, or such as require haste or confidential treatment, or, as in the case of cable lines or colonial en terprises, such as necessitate the tying up of large amounts of capital for a considerable period. Greater concentration of banking capital facilitates a more elastic extension of credit by eliminating to a large extent reckless granting of credit, on the one hand, and “ panic sales’’ (Angstverkaufe), on the other. Through their better knowledge of the general economic and financial situation the great banks are often able to prognosticate the approach of industrial, commercial, and bourse crises. While powerless to ward off such crises, they may, by timely warnings and preventive measures, lessen the effects and duration of the calamity. Concentration of banking carries with it also the 755 National Monetary Commission extension of check, giro, and clearing operations— i. i., those factors which lessen the need of cash for payments, and thus broaden the basis for credit transactions. In turn, concentration results in a number of important advantages to the private economic interests of the banks. This is true alike of that form of concentration which is attained through control of other enterprises or the creation of communities of interest (through the acqui sition of stock, the establishment of subsidiary companies, and trust companies, through agreement or the inter change of stock), as of the other form attained by means of decentralization of operations through the establishment of commandites, branches, agencies, and deposit offices. All these, forms of concentration of capital and power secure to the central institution a more complete view of the general industrial situation and of the varying needs and conditions in the different branches of industry, and a detailed knowledge of the financial standing of a large number of clients, their trustworthiness in general, and with regard to credit in particular. This information is based on the objective expert advices of reporting agen cies which are thoroughly familiar with local conditions and, on the other hand, intimately related to the central institution and acting in its interests. From such a com prehensive and accurate survey of the general situation and the detailed information, the central institution derives in an ever-increasing manner the following advantages: (a) It is able to find a wider and safer market for the sale of securities which it proposes to float. It can, there fore, acquire such securities on a larger scale and with greater confidence, knowing beforehand that such securi ties will go into good hands as permanent investments, 756 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s and not be thrown back at once upon the market, to be taken up again by the bank. (6) Its current banking business is extended. This extension usually means increased dividends. This leads to the enhancing of its own credit both at home and abroad, particularly of its acceptance credit. It also means greater power of intervention in critical times and larger freedom of action in the money market. (c) Its deposit business is increased in proportion as those of its clients, who belong to the class of small capi talists and tradesmen, are becoming accustomed to leave on deposit with the bank even small amounts of available funds to be applied to productive uses. In this way a stimulus is afforded to such clients to save and accumulate reserves— which is highly desirable from the point of view of business— and to turn over to the bank the receiv ing and making of payments on their account (geordnete Kassenfilhrung). The effect of this development is an improvement of conditions attending settlements by the more extensive and intensive use of checks. Credit transactions are facilitated, the circulation of cash is diminished, the bank’s freedom of action is increased, and its dividends become more stable. (d) The bank is enabled to furnish its clients with reliable information and to help them in every way in their business undertakings, especially with regard to bills, foreign exchange, and payments. As against these advantages, the movement of concentra tion in Germany2 has thus far not brought with it a reduc tion of the cost of conducting business or of the expenses of administration, such as was often the case when foreign trusts and analogous combinations were formed. 757 National Monetary Commission One reason for this lies in the fact that, unlike the situation produced where trusts were formed, the inde pendence of the original establishments was maintained, except in case of mergers. As a result, there could hardly be any saving in the cost of operation or administration. On the contrary, we were able to show (on p. 467 et seq.) that as a general rule both the absolute amounts of expenses of operation and the percentage of expenses to gross profits have steadily risen among the banks that have been in the forefront in the movement toward concentration.3 Jorgens has pointed out the increase in taxes, due to the per manent ownership of stock in one corporation by another.4 Attention has also been called to the various dangers arising from concentration in banking. With reference to this subject the following points may be made: Thus far there has been no manifestation of a monopolistic ten dency, as regards the treatment of the public in the so-called current business, and this in spite of what would seem to be the natural tendency in view of the extent to which concentration has gone. On the contrary, in their competi tion the banks have undertaken the greatest services and responsibilities for the lowest commissions ever known in German banking, commissions so slight as to fall below the point of fair remuneration. On the other hand, there are unmistakable signs of such tendencies in the com petitive struggle against private bankers; also within the domain of underwriting and of tenders for the taking over of public loans or of securities of public or private under takings. As we saw before (p. 407 et seq.), outside compe tition in this field may occasionally underbid the tenders of large banks or groups of banks, but must fail in the long 758 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s run unless it is in a position to offer the same security for making payment, for taking over the securities, or for carry ing out the undertaking. Many of the syndicates in this field have been in the nature of price conventions and have often assumed a monopolistic character. It is, furthermore, undeniable that concentration in German banking has been accompanied by marked injury to the sound and vigorous elements among the class of the smaller private bankers. I am convinced that even to day, as I shall show further on, this class performs eco nomically useful and even necessary functions, and that the decline of the private banker class represents one of the dark sides of the progress of concentration. As we saw (p. 618 et seq.), the decline of this class was hastened and intensified by faulty stock exchange and stamp-tax legislation; essentially, however, it was due to the movement of concentration. It may, indeed, be said that the decline of private bank ing, which showed itself in very acute form before the passing of the supplementary bourse act, is only one phase of the modern struggle for existence, which had its origin in the capitalist system, and will come to an end only with the triumph of large-scale enterprise and concentration. It is part of the same conflict in which, it seems, the small farmer and the small miller are succumbing before the large landowner and large miller, the craftsmen and the home in dustries before the factory, the retail store before the large dealer and particularly before the department store. How ever, in the other branches of industrial life it has been policy to protect the middle class in every possible way the and to prevent its decline. Where this was manifestly 75 9 t N at ion a l M o n et a r y Commission unavoidable, the effort has been to retard it and to miti gate its effects, so as to allow those injured gradually to change their economic position and to prepare them to face the new problems presented by the altered situation. In the attitude taken toward the middle class and small banker an opposite policy was apparently followed both in the various provisions of the bank-deposit law and in the stock exchange and the imperial stamp-tax legislation. (See p. 618 et seq.) As a result of these measures the rapidity of the concentration movement was greatly enhanced and the situation resulting from this tendency was made much harder for the private banker. What is even worse, the vitality of this class was regrettably low ered. There seems, however, to be no good reason why the decline of private banking should have been permitted to assume the proportions that it really did. There are to-day, as much as ever, certain necessary and legitimate economic functions for the smaller banker, and there is still a broad field of profitable activity open to him.5 The situation here is similar to that among the handicrafts, where the reasons for the decay are similar.6 The latter can maintain themselves where the bond between producer and consumer is not dis solved and where local or individual adaptation is still necessary.7 In the same way the small banker can hope to compete successfully wherever he may operate, if he will adopt from the outset as his motto in business specialization and adaptation to local conditions and needs. He has here an advantage over the decentralized banks in the fact that his expenses of operation are rela tively smaller. Such specialization has already set in 760 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s in several fields, although it is not of a kind altogether desirable, in case, for instance, the smaller bankers devote themselves particularly to the purchase and sale of mining stocks or unlisted securities. The primary and normal function of the small banker will always continue to be that of adviser to the large public in their financial affairs in general, and more par ticularly in the matter of investments. This, of course, presupposes that he will continue to give the necessary time and study to this function. In his capacity of gen eral adviser he may be able to carry on dealings in securi ties for customers’ account, where the latter give special security, in accordance with the provisions of the stockexchange law. On the other hand, in view of the low commissions and the taxes imposed on the contango business, it would be better policy for the small bankers to engage less in security business on own account, to which they seem to have been giving special attention during recent years. Knowing intimately the personal standing of his clients, the smaller banker will always be professionally best fitted to foster personal credit, and more particularly blank credit a field of banking that calls for specialization, based on knowledge of individual conditions. Where there are no deposit offices or general banks, the smaller banker is in a position to carry on success fully also a general banking business with the smaller tradesmen, extending to them the facilities of check accounts, current accounts, and bill discounting. On the bourse his legitimate functions are trading in unlisted securities (Kulisse), the arbitrage business, and 761 National Monetary Commission profiting by the fluctuation of daily quotations on the different exchanges whenever bid and ask prices do not accord. He is in a position best to understand the needs of small manufacturers and to know thoroughly the intrinsic value of solid securities, both stocks and bonds, issued by them, and to find a wide market for them. Under this head belong also debentures of smaller industrial estab lishments, which, while of undoubted solidity, are issued in amounts too small to be listed on German exchanges (in case the amount is less than 1,000,000 or 500,000 marks, respectively).8 On the other hand the recent practice, due to the faults of the stock exchange legislation, of the smaller banker assuming the functions of industrial entrepreneur by means of permanent acquisitions on a large scale of stock or of other participations, seems to us of rather doubtful wisdom. Finally there is no reason why the development toward more powerful enterprises in the shape of joint-stock or limited liability companies, large beginnings of which may be seen even at present by cooperation with the great banks, and even independently of them, should not prove successful on an equally large scale in the case of other provincial banking concerns either singly or in combina tion with others of the same class. A few recent examples of this development are the following: Thus with the assistance of the Hannoversche Bank and its subsidiaries, the Osnabriicker and Hildesheimer banks, the private banking firm of Ludwig Peters Nachfolger was transformed in 1905 into the Braunschweiger Privatbank •4 762 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s Aktiengesellschaft (with a total capital of 6,000,000 marks). In the same way, with the cooperation of the DiscontoGesellschaft and the Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft, the banking firm of Peris & Co. in Breslau was transformed into the Schlesische Handelsbank Aktiengesellschaft, Bres lau, which in 1909 opened in turn a branch in Beuthen and one in Striegau. In 1906 the banking house Johann Ohligschlaeger of Aix-la-Chapelle, of the Rheinisch-Westfalische Disconto-Gesellschaft group, was converted into a limited liability association, with a capital of 5,500,000 marks. In 1908 the banking house of Doertenbach & Co., Stuttgart, was changed to a limited liability association with a capital of 4,000,000 marks. In 1908 the Hessischer Bankverein Aktiengesellschaft in Kassel was organized through the merger of the banking firm of Leopold Plaut & Co., of Kassel, and J. C. Plaut & Co. in Eschwege. In 1907 the Berlin banking firm Carl Neuburger was transformed into a stock company en commandite, and by the end of 1908 the latter had established eight branches m different localities besides five deposit offices. In addition it had absorbed two banking firms (C. Fahndrich & Co. in Fiirstenwalde and the Westfalische Bank M. Hirschfeld in Iserlohn). Early in 1909 it added a branch in Deutsch-Krone. I he banking house of L. & E. Wertheimber, of Frankforton the Main, adopted an original procedure. It founded a separate enterprise under the name of Bank- und Wechselstuben-Gesellschaft m. b. H ., to operate exchange offices in Frankfort. The entire capital stock of the con cern, 2,000,000 marks, was retained by the banking house of L. & E. Wertheimber, which continued operations as before. 76 3 National Monetary Commission Finally there is no doubt that what has been done successfully in other countries is also possible in Ger many (9 viz: To unite smaller bankers into syndicates ), or groups which will act not only without any antagonism toward the great banks, but rather enter into definite agreements and thus act in concert with them. The future activity of private bankers in receiving deposits is indeed threatened by the voluntary publica tion of periodic financial statements by the joint-stock banks since 1909. In order to save this branch of business for the private banker, we might well resort to the joint liability idea of the Roman societas argentariorum, i. e., bankers’ associations with unlimited liability, adapting, of course, the principle to present day conditions.® So much for the effect of concentration on the smaller banker. We have repeatedly called attention to certain disad vantages of concentration for the central banks. There is on the one hand danger that their ability to maintain their assets in liquid form may be impaired particularly at critical times by excessive demands for credit and funds, on the part of subsidiary companies, trust companies, branches, commandites, agencies, and institutions joined with them in a community of interest. It was also pointed out that it is becoming increasingly more difficult for the central banks to control the proper use of their credit and funds. As we saw, with the progress of concentration the condition of the banks from the point of view of the liquidity of their assets has steadily grown worse to an extent that can no “ There are some indications that since the enactm ent of the supple mentary bourse law (May 8, 1908) an improvement in the condition of private banking has set in, which finds expression also in a considerable increase in the number of n ew ly founded private banking firms. 764 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s longer be lightly passed over. Unless an improvement is brought about by natural causes or by criticism either from within or by the general public, a situation might be created in which the banks’ freedom of action would be impaired in critical periods, particularly in the event of war, and the institutions placed in a perilous condition at a most critical moment. Public attention has been drawn to this situation particularly since 1908, when the great banks of their own accord began the publication of bi monthly financial statements which indicate but a slow improvement in this regard. Furthermore, it must be admitted that with the growth and decentralization of the operations of the great banks and their groups it becomes increasingly difficult to gain an adequate com prehension of the financial reports and balance sheets issued, as these no longer represent a clear and full picture of the condition of the banks. The effects of concentration on the bank employees may be summed up as follows: It goes without saying that in the course of the concentration movement both the abso lute number of employees in the large banks as well as their proportion to those in the smaller establishments has increased greatly— a tendency which is, however, common to other branches of business. According to the census of 1882, there were 28 banks employing 50 or more persons, with a total number of 2,697 employed by them. Thir teen years later the census of 1895 showed 66 banks em ploying each 50 or more persons, with a total force of 7,802. In the thirteen years the number of employees in the large banks had increased 189.3 Per cent. On the other hand the number employed in banking establishments 765 with less than 5 employees had increased only 59.9 per cent, and in middle-sized institutions, with 6 to 50 employees, only 34.5 per cent.1 0 The data of the 1907 census are not yet available on this point, but it is probable that the number employed in the large banks in 1907 represented one-third of all gainfully employed in “ financial and credit’’ institutions, while in 1895 this number still constituted but a little over onefifth (21.60 per cent), and in 1882 only a little over onetenth (11.8 per cent) of the persons so employed. From these figures we may conclude that with the progress of concentration there has been a great increase in the number of persons who have but slight prospects of ever being able to start an independent banking business of their own. With the increasing domination of banks with huge capital on the one hand and the diminishing power and sphere of activity of the private banker, the opportunities of building up a private banking business have now become considerably smaller. In many respects the standing of the bank employee, as such, has not improved with the growth of concentration. This is true particularly of his position within the bank. The number of employees in the large banks is steadily growing. Thus, for instance, at the close of 1908 the Deutsche Bank had a force of 4,860 as compared with 4,439 at the end of 1907. As the number of bank clerks increases and the bank’s duties become more manifold, there is naturally introduced a greater specialization in the work of each employee. As a result there is no chance for a rounded development or a general training in the pro fession. This involves a twofold danger. The situation Th e G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s may result in a gradual loss of interest in the work, and may also rob the employee of the broader view of things which in turn makes it harder for him to enter another department or profession. It is only a relatively small number of banks which have introduced a periodic change of work for their employees, a practice highly desirable not only in the interest of the employees, but also of the banks themselves. Furthermore, whenever an employee is discharged it is harder for him to find employment in another bank, particularly in one of the ever-increasing number be longing to the same group. This is in the nature of things, and not due to any mutual agreement among the banks. This does not apply, however, to the free dom of bank officials of voluntarily changing employ ment from one bank to another. After the removal of temporary doubts and objections this freedom has been generally conceded, though even at present it is subject to certain limitations in the interests of both parties. It was feared that the numerous bank mergers and absorptions of private banks would make it possible to dispense with the services of many employees and lead to their discharge. This fear has fortunately proved unfounded, there having been no reduction of the force worth mentioning. This I can say on reliable authority, having made inquiry also of the leaders of the associa tions of bank employees. On the contrary, in all such cases the common rule has been to take over undiminished the entire available force. Where mergers took place or where branches were established in place of absorbed pri vate banks, there was usually an extension of the business 767 » National Monetary Commission which made it necessary to increase rather than to reduce the existing personnel. As the power and capital of the banks have grown, the cases have become increasingly rare where a com plete prostration of business or a crisis has resulted in the discharge of employees. Moreover, in the course of the concentration movement more and more attention is paid by the banks to the social obligations toward their employees. The measures taken in this field are due to the common labors of banks, bankers, and the Central Federation of German Banks and Bankers (Centraherband des Deutschen Bank-und Bankier-gewerbes). The federation began an extensive and laborious investigation of the question of pensions and death benefits11 for bank employees as early as 1903, i. e., before the Imperial Government undertook a similar inquiry with regard to all salaried persons in private employ. Through the cooperation of many persons in banking circles and among the bank employees them selves there was organized in Berlin, on July 11, 1909, the Beamtenversickerungsverein des deutschen Bank- und Bankiergewerbes (a. G.) (Insurance Association of the employees of German Banks and Bankers). The asso ciation assures to all employees, members of the asso ciation, a pension in case they become incapacitated after ten years’ service, and provides benefits for widows and pensions for orphans in case of death. This asso ciation is the first of its kind in Germany, and on its board of honorary directors there are both the heads of banks and bank employees. The author of this book is chairman of the supervisory board. In the case of the German great banks such insurance had been instituted 768 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s even before, in the form of independent funds, funds controlled by the bank, or special insurance. The same is true also of many other credit banks and likewise of a number of the larger private banking houses. On the subject of salaries authentic data have been collected for the first time in a paper of the business manager of the Centralverband Wittner, so far as it was possible to secure this information through the inquiry instituted by the Centralverband. For a proper appre ciation of the following figures it is well to bear in mind that they refer only to the regular salaries and do not include the customary incidental income of the employees, such as Christmas’, or New Year’s bonuses, which usually amount to several times the monthly salary. In the following table there are given the average salaries of bank employees, exclusive of minor employees, according to the investigation of the Central Federation of German Banks and Bankers, of March, 1906. For the sake of comparison, there are shown also the corre sponding average yearly incomes of all salaried employ ees in private employment. Age. Under 20 . . . 20— 24........ 2S-29................... 3 0 - 3 4 .................... 3 5 - 3 9 ...................... 40-44...................... 4 5 - 4 9 .......................... 5 0 - 5 4 .......................... 5 5 - 5 9 ........................ 60-64........ 65-69........................ 70 and over.. . Average an Average sal nual income ary of bank for all employees. salaried employees. M a r k s. x. 4 5 9 2, 085 2. 783 3 .35* 3. 638 3 . 746 4 , 044 3 .8 9 9 3 ,806 M arks. 1.467 1 .9 5 4 2, 265 2,380 2,413 2,404 2,358 2, 264 2, 175 3 .5 2 5 2. 5 9 2 1 ,8 7 9 National Monetary Commi ssi on The salaries here shown are higher throughout (except for the age group 20-24), and in part very much higher than the average salaries as given in the report of the Department of the Interior of March 14, 1907,1 for 2 salaries in all private establishments. Their present level was reached gradually during the progress of concentra tion. On the average they are also higher than the salaries paid to the clerical help in the smaller private banks. Whether the increase in salaries has only kept pace with the increased cost of living and expenditures of the employees of the banks, or whether it has gone beyond this point and means a real improvement in their con ditions, this question can not be answered even with an approximate degree of assurance. So far as my experience and knowledge go, there has never been among the German credit banks any exploitation of unpaid help through the use of appren tices, as the Berlin great banks take in apprentices only in exceptional cases. As in all large establishments advancement of em ployees to independent positions within the bank has on the whole been slow. In this respect, however, concen tration has brought about a marked improvement. The establishment of numerous branches, commandites, de posit offices, agencies, and subsidiary banks at home and abroad has created opportunities for the promotion of efficient employees more numerous than before. The Central Federation of German Banks and Bankers has ever been in sympathy with the efforts to bring about certain improvements in the conditions of the working 770 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s staff, as, for example, the extension of Sunday rest, early closing on Saturday, and better regulation of vacations. The reforms proposed, while not yet commonly adopted, are, however, nearer realization, as the result of progressive concentration and the introduction of greater uniformity in the internal management of banks. The part of the heads and leading personalities in the banks has now become much more important, since the former under certain circumstances are called upon to determine uniform business policies for entire groups of banks. It is primarily they who must decide whether the banks entrusted to their management shall pursue other and higher aims than merely those of large dividends. With the growth of the large establishments on the one hand and the disappearance of so many important pri vate banking houses, it will be increasingly difficult to fill these positions with men who possess the necessary breadth of view, the powerful initiative, and the organizmg ability to which Germany’s great enterprises in trade, industry and banking are so greatly indebted. Failure to find and recognize the work of such men would involve serious consequences not only for the concentration move ment, but for our entire economic development.1 3 It remains now to consider the effect of concentration on the development of the stock exchange. There is a large number of buying and selling orders coming to the great banks which they can offset against each other, thus taking over the function of the exchange. Only such orders as can not be offset are taken to the stock ex change. This applies equally to the business in securities, 771 Commission i. e., the capital market and to the discount business, i. e., the money market. The result has been that the bourse, in addition to the disorganizing effects of the stock exchange legislation, has suffered also the loss of ever increasing amounts of busi ness. This impaired its most vital function, that of proper price determination, and led to most serious con sequences, especially during critical times, as may be proved by very lamentable examples. There is danger that the bourse may gradually cease to serve as the most sensitive instrument for measuring the movements of trade or to act as “ the almost automatic regulator of the economic currents converging toward it.” 1 It is also becoming evident that more and more 5 it is losing its capacity by means of its quotations to reflect or influence public opinion as regards the credit and man agement of the large majority of States, communes, stock companies, and other corporations, all of which functions were regarded as indispensable for the business community as a whole and the trade in securities in particular. The system of price determinations and quotations pre vailing at the bourses, which in former years represented the fullest and truest possible reflex of existing supply and demand as well as other “ economic factors, which nowhere else were subject to such comprehensive perception and accurate measurement,” is bound to lose much of its former accuracy, steadiness, and reliability, all of which is highly regrettable from the point of view ol public in terests. There is furthermore ground for apprehension that this movement which also involves the elimination of iniddle772 . The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s men (brokers, etc.) may develop a state of constantly growing differences between bank and bourse. These dif ferences may express themselves in more than a certain tension between banking and bourse interests, which is frequently noticeable even at present. They may also come to affect the most characteristic function of the bourse, the determination of prices. As a matter of fact, in the opinion of some recent writers, there is a direct antithesis between bank and bourse.1 I regard this view 6 as erroneous, but not more so than that of other writers, who seem to regard the two as practically identical.1 7 Certain socialists contend that the inevitable result of the concentration movement now manifest in all branches of trade and industry will be to cumulate in an increasing volume on one side all the capital and income and on the other all the misery and poverty. Such has not been the outcome, nor is it likely to be. On the contrary, the social istic theory of the progressive impoverishment of the masses has been completely refuted by the progress of concentration in industry and banking. The purchasing power and the standard of living of the laboring classes have improved, the income of the middle and of the lower classes has risen relatively more than that of the upper classes, and to an increasing extent members of the lower classes have joined the ranks of the upper classes.1 8 We have now a valuable work on the “ Development of wages in industry since the establishment of the German Empire. Under this title R. Kuczynski, the director of the statistical bureau of the city of Schoneberg (Berlin, George Reiner, 1909), presents an extremely valuable col lection of comprehensive and reliable data covering wages 773 mm i s s ton paid during this period in Germany in mining (coal, lig nite, salt, and ore), in the building trades (masons, carpen ters, painters, fitters), in the stone and woodworking trades (joiners, cabinet makers, pattern makers, and makers of window blinds), in the metal trades, the book trade, and finally in transportation (vehicular, railroad, and sea transportation). It is impracticable here to reproduce even the leading features of a work which is bound to retain a permanent place in the literature of the subject. Suffice it to say, that the movement of all wages paid during the second period shows a strong upward tendency, more or less marked according to the branch of industry, the state of general prosperity, the location of the enterprise, the dif ference between city and country, the kind of product, and the hours of work. In the case of corporate undertakings the movement of wages manifestly is also influenced by the variations in dividends. A tabular statement show ing the influence of the last named factor in each particu lar instance would be of special interest. I therefore re frain from citing typical instances from the mass of mate rial presented, since it might always be objected that they had been chosen arbitrarily. Even more important would be complementary tables on the movement of prices of necessaries of life during the same period. For one thing this would serve to test the theory, which I believe to be correct, that “ every increase in the prices of the necessaries of life gives rise to an effort on the part of the workers to secure higher wages.” 1 9 To be sure these efforts do not always overcome the just or unjust opposition offered, and hence it may be 774 u * The Ge r man Gr e at Banks difficult to prove the theory satisfactorily by statistical evidence.2 0 Such complementary tables would also enable us to answer the further question whether and to what extent the gain to the workmen through higher wages has been offset by the simultaneous or preceding rise in the cost of living. This much is certain, that the increase of wages in general and in most trades has been greater than the increase since 1879 in the prices of necessaries caused by the import duties on foodstuffs, such as cereals, flour, animals, meat, bacon, and lard. In the absence of such parallel investigations, the con clusions drawn from the wage statistics must necessarily be incomplete and open to attack. They have to be sup plemented by reliable investigations of the growth of prosperity and of the changes in the condition of the working classes. On this point valuable information is available in the shape of the Materialien zur Beurteilung der Wohlstandsentwicklung Deutschlands im letzten Menschenalter (materials for estimating the growth of prosperity in Germany during the past generation), constituting Part III of the appendices to the draft of the imperial financial reforms act of 1908. Evidence in the same direction is furnished by Troeltsch.2 Taking the contributions due from those 1 who come under the old-age and disability insurance pro visions, he points out that there has been a relative decrease in the contributions collected from the lowest wage classes. This is especially noteworthy in view of the fact that any wage increases within the lowest wage groups do not at all affect the rate of contribution, while wage 775 National Monetary Commission increases in the higher wage groups either do not result in correspondingly larger contributions or do so only after some delay. It is noteworthy, moreover, that the lowest wage group has grown by the accession of a large number of low-paid home workers who during that period first became liable to insurance contributions. Another fact of some importance is cited by Troeltsch,2 2 viz, that 25 per cent of all workmen have deposits in the Wurttemberg district savings banks, the average deposits for each depositor belonging to that class amounting to 525.1 marks in 1892 and 571.7 marks in 1896. Another prediction made by socialists is that the final outcome of concentration will be the socialization of the means of production, for which they are striving and which is to be consummated in the “ state of the future.” This prediction has not been realized in Germany, nor is it likely to be realized, if only for the one reason that individual independence still constitutes a cherished ideal in the minds of most Germans. It was this sentiment chiefly which prevented German cartels from assuming the form of trusts proper, despite the great technical advantages which go with this type of organization. Finally, the movement of concentration has thus far not resulted in a comprehensive system of state-owned industries, a policy regarded by many as necessary and highly desirable; nor is this likely to happen unless wholly unforeseen developments take place. Nationalization of industry is practicable only in case of industries in which operation is more or less automatic. Unless demanded by imperative reasons in some special branch of industry in the interests of national self-preservation, or of the safety, 776 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s rapidity, and extension of traffic, such nationalization represents but a backward step from the economic point of view. Government operation does not leave adequate scope for personal initiative, which is indispensable for general economic progress, nor for the needful spirit of enterprise on the part of the managers. The taking over by the Government of private enterprises beyond the bounds mentioned above is in keeping with the tenets of collectiv ist industrial organization advocated by social democracy. It would tend to weaken the motive of private gain, the most powerful stimulus of all economic progress. More over, it would make impossible the free development of the enterprising, efficient, and far-sighted personalities to whose energetic and untrammeled initiative Germany owes so much. The tendency toward state socialism, represented par ticularly by Adolph Wagner, which advocates state mo nopolies and the tightening of the screws of taxation to the point of expropriation, in my opinion is likely to do more harm to Germany than could ever be done by the purely individualistic tendency, little as I am disposed to favor the latter. In Germany, particularly, where the mere possibility of danger or of excesses2 is sufficient to create a demand 3 for state interference, one thing above all should be borne in mind. What holds good for the cartels is also true of all movements toward concentration— all of them are, if not the products of distress, at any rate products of neces sity. It is the general opinion in industrial circles that they are the most effective weapons in the struggle for 777 N at ion a l M on e t a r y Commission existence, especially in competition with foreign countries. The coincidence of similar movements in nearly all civil ized countries on the same level of economic development of itself makes it probable that this view is correct and that legislative interference, which is urged at times with out any definite purpose in view, merely to impede the movement toward concentration, represents a one-sided economic disarmament, a policy highly profitable— to other countries. In Germany we have special cause for holding our weap ons ready. We know that our agriculture is far from able to supply our rapidly growing population with the necessary food. This remains true even after allowance is made for the improvement in its position through the recent commeicial treaties and for a considerable increase both of the pro ductivity of the land and of the area under cultivation. We know, further, that we depend at present and shall de pend in the future on importation for a large part of our raw material, both in the shape of tropical products and of iron ore, lumber, fodder, and fertilizers.2 Finally, 4 we know that in many branches of industry our exports have declined, though only temporarily, let us hope, and that the general field for export is seriously threatened, one example being our sugar exports, in which agriculture is directly interested. Some foreign countries which here tofore were among our best customers are developing indus tries of their own, which make them more and more inde pendent of our manufactures. Again, w have to reckon re with the possible introduction of high import duties or preferential duties in favor of the mother country, or, 778 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s finally, with more intense and dangerous competition on the part of other countries, such as the United States in the South American markets. Meanwhile the growth of our investments of capital abroad, with the income from which we have to pay an important part of our unfavor able trade balance, has not kept pace with that of the ex cess of our imports over exports. In view of these facts, and of the greater extent and strength of concentration abroad, I do not believe that we in Germany are as yet justified in putting a check on the further progress of con centration, except so far as relates to measures aiming merely at greater publicity2 in the case of cartels, or such 5 as are dictated by considerations of social policy under conditions mentioned above. The view expressed is confirmed by another considera tion. Up to 1907 the movement of concentration in Ger man industry and banking was continuously upward. We must, however, reckon also with unfavorable conditions in German trade and industry. Reasonable dividends on the greatly increased capital of the banks depend on gen eral prosperity in trade and industry, and it is inevitable that the banks will suffer from adverse conditions in the branches of industries with which they are allied. Unfa vorable trade conditions must result in bringing concen tration to a standstill. This happened, indeed, in 1907 and 1908 in the case of the great banks for this and other reasons. The movement may even be reversed, as hap pened more than once in the history of banking, a recent example being the dissolution of the community of interest between the Dresdner Bank and the A. Schaaffhausen’scher Bankverein.2 0 779 Exceptional legislation of the kind mentioned can best be avoided if the leaders of our great enterprises will keep more and more in close touch with the active social con science of our people. At a general meeting of the Verein fur Sozialpolitik2 7 Brentano reported that when in December, 1903, one of the largest English mine owners proposed to consoli date all English coal mines into a single trust he accom panied this plan with the proposal that representatives of the labor organizations should be called in and given a place not merely in the discussion of wages and condi tions of labor, but even as regular members of the board of directors. This idea was certainly in accord with the true conception that such a policy would not only confer rights but also impose duties on the workmen, and that we cannot justly hold anyone responsible for his conduct in economic matters so long as we have not given him an opportunity to develop a sense of personal responsi bility. This proposal was expressive alike of business shrewd ness and socio-political insight, and represents an attitude from which we are still far removed in Germany. Ger man employers still largely cling to the belief that they can indefinitely postpone the recognition of the right of workmen to combine and to bargain with them through representatives, whereas a more liberal policy is called for in view of the combinations that have taken place among the employers. It is my conviction that even mere passive resistance to these demands tends both to sharpen the antagonism and to increase the number and vehemence of the demands. Th e G e r m a n Gr e at Banks Our economic development in many respects will depend on the degree of socio-political insight possessed by the leaders of our great enterprises, the extent to which they appreciate the social duties and obligations that devolve upon them, and the economic self-restraint which they will impose upon themselves. A state within the state can not and will not be tolerated. The future of German banking will depend essentially on the character of the men at the head of the leading enterprises. All will be well if these leaders possess the necessary caution, knowing that it is not safe to over strain the bow or overheat the boilers. I feel confident that German banking by its own efforts will prove strong enough to keep out of leading positions men who have what W aentig2 calls “ robust con 8 sciences,” and who cast overboard, as useless ballast, all ethical and social considerations. Should, however, the contrary come to pass, in spite of our hopes and expecta tions, public opinion watching, as it does, our largest enterprises with the greatest attention, will surely react more quickly and effectively than it ever did in any other period of our economic development. One of the most hopeful features characteristic of our economic development has been a growth of public senti ment and sensitiveness against encroachments of any kind, a growth which in extent and rapidity has equaled, nay, exceeded, the movement of concentration. 781 http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ L Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis NOTES. 7 83 N O TES. Part I. 1. “ Capitalistic economics,” in the popular sense of the expression, sig nifies not only production tending toward the formation of capital goods, but also production “ carried on under the rule and direction of the owner of the capital, or the capitalist” (E. von Bohm-Bawerk, “ K apital,” in the Handworterbuch der Staatswissenschaften, 2d ed., vol. 5, p .,25). Ruhland, it is true, in his “ System der Politischen Okonomie ” (Berlin, 1908), Vol. I l l , p.302, ventures to say that “ the word capitalism denotes to-day a social sys tem in which the liberty to practice usury is more or less completely legalized.” Capitalists are to him “ usurers in the widest sense of the word,” and b y usury he, like Franz Schaub, understands “ every contractual appropria tion of an evident surplus value.” The symptoms of such capitalism, according to Ruhland, are “ that money interests predominate, and that trade and robbery, gain, usury, and extortion merge into each other” (ibid., p. n 6 , No. 7aa). 2. Carl Menger: Contribution to the theory of capital. (Jahrblicher fur Nationalokonomie und Statistik, 2d series, Vol. X V II, pp. 1-49 ) 3- I h a v e u s e d th e e x p r e s s io n “ to tu r n to g o o d a c c o u n t ” in p la c e o f “ to d is tr ib u te ” on b e c o m in g (“ B e te ilig u n g s - u n d a c q u a in te d I 909 , P - 4 7 6 ) t h a t i t i s b e t t e r tr ib u te .” to good I am su re a c c o u n t,” w ith Rob. F in a n z ie r u n g s g e s e lls c h a f te n ;” I Jena, s u g g e s tio n G u s ta v to s a y “ to p la c e a t d is p o s a l” t h a n L ie fm a n n w ill w h ic h L ie fm a n n ’ s am F is c h e r , “ to d is n o t o b je c t to th e e x p r e s s io n “ to tu r n now u s in g , e s p e c ia lly s in c e “ to p la c e at d is p o s a l” o n ly r e p r e s e n ts o n e w a y o f tu r n in g t o g o o d a c c o u n t. 4 - See especially Rich. Ehrenberg: Der Handel. Seine wirtscliaftliche Bedeutung, seine nationalen Pflichten und sein Verhaltnis zum Staate, Jena, G. Fischer, 1887. 5. See Ad. Wagner, Beitrage zur Lehre von den Banken, Leipzig, Leop. Voss, 1857, p. 7o. 6. See Heinr. Rauchberg: Der Clearing- u. Giro-Verkehr in OesterreichUngarn u. ini Auslande (Vienna, Alfred Holder, 1897), especially: Die Bedeutung der geldlosen Ausgleichungen fiir die Abwicklung des volkswirtschaftlichen Zahlungsprozesses u. Zahlungsverkehrs, p. 180 seq. die Reform des osterreichischen 7- See Heinrich Rauchberg, loc. cit., p. 204. 8. I b is is expressly attested for Saxony b y Rud. Banck (Geschichte der Saclisisclien Banken, p. 5). It was, however, in nowise peculiar of that country. 9 0 3 i i °— 11 5i 78s N ationa l M on et a r y Commission 9. T he names and years of foundation of the German note-issuing banks existing up to 1859 were as follows: 1765, the Preussische Bank; 1824, the Ritterschaftliche Privatbank of Pomerania, at Stettin; 1835, the Bayerische H ypotheken- und Wechselbank at Munich; 1839, the Leipziger Bank; 1847, the Anhalt-Dessauische Landesbank; 1850, the Bank of the Berliner Kassenverein; 1853, the Weimarische Bank; 1854, the Frankfurter Bank at Frankfort-on-the-Main; 1855, the Bank fur Sxiddeutschland, at Darmstadt; the Thiiringische Bank, at Sondershausen; the Kolnische Privatbank, at Cologne and the Landgraflich Hessische Konzessionierte Landesbank at Homburg v. d. Hohe; bank, at Meiningen; the Bremer 1856, the Mitteldeutsche Kredit- Bank, the Hannoversche Bank, the Gothaer Privatbank, the Magdeburger Privatbank, the Liibecker Privat bank; 1859, the Niedersachsische Bank, at Bueckeburg, and the Commerz bank, a t Liibeck. 10. See Alfr. Lansburgh in “ Die Bank,” November, 1908, pp. 1079 and 1083, and in a special work bearing the (much too comprehensive) title of Das deutsche Bankwesen, Charlottenburg, 1909, pp. 48, 49, and 52. He draws attention to the fact that Krupp acquired the name of a “ cannon kin g ” without having required the help of an industrial and credit bank. T he fact is that the development of the Krupp works proceeded with extreme slowness in the early days, when there was no banking assistance. See O tto Jeidels “ Das Verhaltnis der deutschen Grossbanken zur Industrie,” Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot, p. 2. 11. Rud. Banck, loc. cit., pp. 5-6. See Herm. Schumacher: Die Ursa- chen und Wirkungen der Konzentration im deutschen Bankwesen, in Schmollers Jahrb., x x x , No. 3, p. 5. For the particular reasons w h y the establishment of the Credit Mobilier in France was at that time welcomed and promoted far and wide and even b y the Government, see text, p. 50. 12. Thus for Saxony b y Rud. Banck, loc. cit., p. 6. 13. For instance, in the petition for the concession of the Frankfurter Vereinsbank in 1864 (Geschichte der Handelskammer zu Frankfurt a. M., 1707-1908, p. 669); see sec. 1 of the statutes of the Bank fur Handel und Industrie (Darmstadter Bank) in Darmstadt, 1853. 14. Das heutige Aktienwesen im Zusammenhang mit der neueren Entwicklung der Volkswirtschaft (Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift, H eft 3, ,1856, J. G. Cotta, pp. 296-297). 15. In th is m a tte r s u p e r v is o r y b o a r d s ; sch au er (Z u r X X V II, pp. W arsch auer th e r e is p e r m a n e n t c o o p e r a tio n A u fs ic h ts r a ts fr a g e in 7 9 4 -7 9 5 ) re fe r s on th e part of th e a f a c t w h ic h h a s , b y th e w a y , b e e n q u e s tio n e d b y W a r - to The sh o w C on rad ’s “ great th e Jah rbuch er, b a n k s ,” c o m p le te th e very im p o te n c e of III s e r ie s , ones th e to V o l. w h ic h s u p e r v is o r y b o a r d a s r e g a r d s th e d r a w in g u p o f in v e n to r ie s , m a k e i t a p r a c tic e to s u b m i t a t e a c h m e e t in g (h e ld n e a r ly e v e r y m o n t h ) a g e n e r a l in v e n t o r y , w h ic h is not o n ly e x a m in e d , but if n ecessary m e e tin g . 786 d is c u s s e d in d e ta il d u r in g th e The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s 16. See below Part I I I , chap. I l l , sec. 2, sub. IA : The deposit business, p. 191. 17. To propound a theory of crises does not lie within the scope of this work. On this subject the following works should be consulted: Michael von Tugan-Baranowsky, Studien zur Theorie und Geschichte der Handelskrisen in England (Jena, 1901, G ustav Fischer), and Ludw ig Pohle, Bevolkerungsbewegung, Kapitalbildung und periodische Wirtschaftskrisen (Goet tingen, 1902, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht), as well as the criticism of both theories b y Arthur Spiethoff (Schmoller’s Jahrbiicher fur Gesetzgebung, etc., Vol. X X V I I , No. 2, p. 331 et seq.). For a very detailed list of works published up to 1899 on the subject of crises, see Theodore E- Burton, Financial Crises and Periods of Industrial and Commercial Depression (New York, 1902, D. Appleton & Co.), pp. 3 4 7377. Unfortunately that list includes a number of perfectly worthless works. 18. See the very instructive book b y J. W. Gilbart (a former director of the London and Westminster Bank): “ The History, Principles, and Prac tice of Banking ” (ed. 1901, London, George Bell & Sons); concerning the crisis of 1825, ibid., 1, pp. 310 -3 11; the crisis of 1836, ibid., I, p. 311 seq.; the crisis of 1857, ibid., II, p. 361, seq., and the crisis of 1866, ibid., II, p. 342 seq. In 1836 over 70 new companies of every possible description were founded in three months, in Liverpool and Manchester alone. T he facility with which credit was obtained, and the encouragement thus given to specula tion, led to increases of from 25 to 100 per cent in the prices of all the chief articles of consumption, and of the raw materials of industry. In July, 1836, the Bank of England raised its rate of discount to \]/2 per cent and in September to 5 per cent. Simultaneously it refused to discount a large number of American bills on first-rate houses, a proceeding that caused some excitement. houses, failed. crisis. Prices fell, and a number of firms, m ostly second-class T he banks withheld their resources, and thus increased the The joint stock banks had increased enormously, had raised their capitals considerably, and promoted speculation. This was referred to in very harsh terms in a “ Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons,” which, in conjunction with the prevalent depression, awakened the suspicion of the general public. and Commercial Bank of In November, 1836, the Agricultural Ireland suspended payments, which caused restrictive measures to be taken against the jo:nt stock banks, which were accustomed to rediscount their bills in London. In December, 1836, the Northern and Central Bank of Manchester, with a paid-up capital of £800,000, had to apply to the Bank of England for assistance. One London private bank, three large branches of American firms, and m any respectable trading firms followed suit. In 1857 (ibid., II, p. 361), 30 houses failed in England •with liabilities of about £9,080,000. First of all the Borough Bank at Liverpool (October, 1857), with deposits amounting to £1,200,000, whereof £800,000 were at 787 n etary mmission call; then on November 9, 1857, the Western Bank of Scotland, a very important Scotch deposit bank with 161 branches in Scotland, which had paid a dividend of 9 per cent in 1856. I t had claims of £1,603,000 on 4 trading firms that had become insolvent, whereas its entire nominal capital amounted to £1,500,000 only, and an item of £260,000 had figured in its published balance sheet under “ good assets,” which the managers them selves, according to notes found afterwards, had described as bad. T he bills of one of the 4 insolvent firms had been accepted b y 124 different persons; inquiries had been made b y the bank only concerning 37 of these persons, and of these latter 21 had been found either unsatisfactory or positively bad. In 1864, that is to say, shortly before the credit and speculation crisis of 1866 (ibid., II, pp. 3 4 2 - 3 5 7 ). 263 companies with a nominal capital of £78,135,000 had been formed in England, including 27 banks and 15 “ discount companies.” The rate of bank discount, which up to the middle of 1865 stood at 3 per cent, went up on October 2, 1865, to 5 per cent and on October 7, 1865, to 7 per cent, the Bank of France at the same time raising its discount rate from 4 per cent to 5 per cent. The Joint Stock Discount Company failed in the beginning of 1866; in April, 1866, B am ed’s Bank at Liverpool, with liabilities amounting to £3,500,000, a failure that caused a panic. The Bank of England raised its discount rate on M ay 8, 1866, to 8 per cent, and on the 9th to 9 per cent. On M ay 10, 1866, the great discount house of Messrs. Overend, Gurney & Co. failed with liabilities amounting to £10,000,000; the bank rate was raised to 10 per cent. Then, in rapid succession, came the failures of the Bank of London, the Con solidated Bank, the Agrar and Masterman’s Bank— all deposit banks; further, the English Joint-Stock Bank, the Imperial Mercantile Credit Company, the European Bank, etc. Within a period of ten days the Bank of England had granted advances on bills and discounted bills to the extent of £12,225,000; permission was granted to it to issue notes in excess of the legal limit. The doors of the most respectable banking firms were besieged, and the reports circulating did not stop at the most respectable names, and augmented the evil. Credit had been granted without discrimination, and the banks had either favored or themselves carried on speculation in every direction. “ Men are in haste to become rich. it has been so at all times and in all countries. now than ever. p. 356). This is no new thing; But the fact is more patent Men live as they journey— at railroad p ace” (ibid., II, See also M ax Wirth, Frankfort-on-the-Main, 1874. Geschichte der Handelskrisen, 2d ed., For the crisis of 1857, see O tto Michaelis, Volkswirtschaftliche Fragen, vol. 1 (Berlin, F. A. Herbig, 1873), pp. 237372; and Die Handelkrisis von 1857 (this last article was written between March, 1858, and May, 1859). The similarity with corresponding German crises is evident. Recollec tions of such crises, however, seem to disappear more rapidly than the in juries they inflict. This remarkable but firmly established fact, however, should not apply to the directors of banks, who should and must gain experience from every crisis. 788 T h e G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s 19. This was especially noticeable in the German crisis of 1900, and in the German and American crises of 1873. E. Burton Regarding the latter, Theodore (loc. cit., p. 287) remarks: “ There was sorption of circulating capital in fixed capital. an enormous ab Railw ays as well as docks, buildings, factories, had been constructed on an unprecedented scale. All the equipment for future production was increasing at a more rapid pace than ever before. In these expenditures we have the effect of capital in vested for objects not immediately remunerative.” 20. Der deutsche Geldmarkt, 1895-1902, in the Schriften des Vereins fur Sozialpolitik, Vol. C X (Die Storungen im deutschen Wirtschaftsleben wiihrend der Jahre 1900, ff., Vol. V I; Geldmarkt, Kreditbanken) pp. 3-80. 21. See especially the fundamental essay, Die Krisis auf dem Arbeitsmarkt (Vol. C I X of the Schriften des Vereins fiir Sozialpolitik, and Vol. V of the exceedingly valuable inquiry b y this society regarding Die Storungen in deutschen Wirtschaftsleben wahrend der Jahre 1900 ff.) with contribu tions by J. Jastrow, A. Heinecke, R. Calwer, K. Singer, L. Cohn, Landsberg, and W. Bloch. See also diagram on page 140 of the above-cited (note 17) work by Theodore Burton (according to George H. Wood in the Journal of the R oyal Statistical Society, 1899) for the employment statistics in the United Kingdom for 1860-1900, as well as the Annual E xtracts of Labor Statistics, official documents compiled by the Labor Department of the Board of Trade. 22. See Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street, ed. 1896, p. 199: “ W hat is wanted, and what is necessary to stop a panic is to diffuse the opinion that, though money m ay be dear, still money is to be had.” 23. See Ernst Kritzler, Preussische H ypotheken-Aktien-Bank, Deutsche Grundschuld-Bank, Sanierung. Ponnnersche H ypotheken-Aktien-Bank, Krisis und Schriften des Vereins fiir Sozialpolitik, Vol. C X I; Krisen- enquete, Vol. II; Storungen im deutschen Wirtschaftsleben, Vol. V II, I9° 3 » PP- i~ 8224. See Kreuzzeitung of June 30, 1901, No. 301 (1st Supplem ent): “ It can not be denied that the H aute banque through its speedy and ener getic protection of the legitimate commercial credit, especially in Saxony, greatly lessened the consequences of the Leipzig catastrophe. For this action it should be accorded all thanks and recognition.” 25. See Moritz Stroll Uber das deutsche Geldwesen im Kriegsfalle (Schinoller’s Jahrbuch, Vol. X X I I I , 1899, pp. 173-195 and pp. 197-226). also Die finanzielle Mobilmachung der deutschen Wehrkraft, b y Col. Dr. R itter v. Renauld (Leipzig, 1901, Duncker & Humblot), and the article Finanzielle Mobilmachung b y the same author in the Bank-Archiv, fourth year, No. 3, of December, 1904, together with the objections in the Deutscher Okonomist of January 14, 1903 (twenty-third year, No. 1151); Karl Helfferich, Das Geld im russisch-japanischen Kriege (Ernst Siegfried Mittler & Sohn, Berlin, 1906) and Die finanzielle Seite des russisch-japa nischen Krieges (Marine-Rundschau, Oct. 1904); Max Schinckel, Nationale Pflicliten der Banken und Kapitalisten im Kriegsfalle (Bank-Archiv, fifth 7S9 . N a t io n a l M on et a r y Commission year, No. 4, p. 41 et seq., Nov. 15, 1905); General v. Blume, Militarpolitische Aufsatze (Berlin, 1906, Ernst Siegfr. Mittler & Sohn), Chapter I, 4: Mobilmachung. Soziale und wirtschaftliche Folgen, pp. 14-30; M ax War burg, Finanzielle Kriegsbereitschaft u. Borsengesetz, paper read at the 3d General Congress of German Bankers at Hamburg, Sept. 7, 1907); and Riesser, Finanzielle Kriegsbereitschaft und Kriegsfiihrung, Jena, Gust. Fischer, 1909. 26. See Riesser, ibidem, p. 54. 27. See, among others, M ax Schinckel: Nationale Pflichten der Banken und Kapitalisten im Kriegsfall (Bankarchiv, Vol. V , No. 4, Nov. 15, 1905), pp. 42-43; Riesser, loc. cit., pp. 25-26, and the discussion in Part III, chapter I II, Gd, of this book. 28. See Moritz Stroll, Uber das deutsche Geldwesen im Kriegsfall. (Schmoller’s Jahrbuch fiir Gesetzgebung, etc., X X I I I , p. 176); Riesser, loc. cit., pp. 2-4 and p. 41. 29. Riesser, Finanzielle Kriegsbereitschaft und Kriegsfiihrung, 1909, pp. 55 - 7 5 30. R ie s s e r , lo c . c it ., p p . 4 5 - 5 5 . 31. Immediately after the declaration of war, this war treasure is to be delivered to the Reichsbank, which, according to section 17 of the bank law of March 14, 1876, m ay issue the threefold amount in bank notes— namely, 360,000,000 marks. As an increase of this war treasure in gold is scarcely feasible at present, I have broached the question (loc. cit., p. 45, note 1) whether a further war reserve fund of 120,000,000 marks might not be accumulated in silver. 32. Riesser, loc. cit., pp. 41-42. 33. Riesser, loc. cit., pp. 49-50. 34. In contrast with Japan, which endeavored at the very outset “ to raise as large a possible share of the necessary money for the war by means of increased taxation ” (Helfferich, Das Geld im russisch-japanischen Kriege, Berlin, Siegfr. Mittler & Sohn, 1906, p. 143), Russia limited her self to loans, to drawing on the considerable resources available in her treasury, and to diminishing her expenditure, resorting to increased tax a tion only in order to cover the interest on the war loans. See also Riesser, loc. cit., pp. 96-101. 35. See Riesser, loc. cit., pp. 5 -1 1 , especially p. 10. 36. In this matter the correct determination of the type and issue price of the loan is of the greatest importance. pp. 98-99, pp. 77-92.) (See Riesser, loc. cit., In Germany, unfortunately, even in normal and prosperous times, the success of a loan subscription has frequently been jeopardized, to the detriment of government credit, by the failure “ to make momentary sacrifices in order to secure permanent advantages,” as Russia has frequently done to her own advantage during times of peace and war (Helfferich, loc. cit., p. 89). The failure of the 5 per cent war loan of 100,000,000 marks in July, 1870, was due as much to the time of issue as to the injudicious selection of the type and issue price of the loan (the . 79 ° The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s latter against the emphatic advice of the representatives of (he banking world consulted); further, it was ill advised not to make the banks sub scription offices, although they only represented a t that time a relatively small financial power. (See Riesser, loc. cit., 102-103.) 37. See Riesser, loc. cit., p. 28. 38. Important conclusions in all these respects may be drawn from the financial policy pursued b y England during the Boer war (October, 1899, to May, 1902), and b y Russia and Japan during the Russo-Japanese war (February, 1904, to the end of August, 1905). (See Riesser, loc. cit., pp. 75-79, and p. 79, 2, to p. 93.) I refer here especially to the “ system skil fully adopted b y the Russian financial administration of procuring at home the money required for war expenses at home and at the scene of war, and of procuring b y foreign loans the money necessary for payments abroad, thus neither depriving the internal commerce of Russia of its necessary currency b y sending money abroad, nor menacing the foreign money mar ket on whose good feeling she depended, b y drawing on it for large amounts of gold. (Helfferich, loc. cit., p. 219.) 39. The note banks, mortgage banks (including the “ m ixed ” mort gage banks), the building, brokers’, and insurance banks, also establish ments exclusively devoted to the promotion of industrial undertakings are not included in this discussion. As regards the remaining “ banks” quite a variety of designations have been applied to them. The most customary term is probably “ credit b an k,” a name which I shall, as a rule, adhere to in the following pages. Other names have been used, however, such as: “ industrial” banks (a name largely used during the last century); “ investm ent” banks “ security ” banks (Schmoller and Sat tier); “ banks of em ission” “ enterprise” banks (Schaffle); “ speculation” mobilier” banks (Max Wirth). banks (Plenge); (Loeb); (Weber); “ credit Knies (in “ Geld und K redit,” 2nd part, 1879, p. 223) enumerates still more specialised designations: “ I t has be come customary to classify the banks themselves as ‘loan’ banks, ‘giro’ banks, ‘ b ill’ or ‘ discount’ banks, ‘ deposit’, ‘ account current’ ,an d ‘ cheque* banks” , etc. T o m y mind, however, none of these designations can lay claim to a complete characterisation of the activity of German banks as historically developed. The one or the other designation applies to a bank only in as far as the activity implied b y the title (speculation, investment, emission, or security transactions) predominates in the total range of its business. E ven this, however, does not generally apply to the whole devel opment of each individual bank, for not only has each bank developed quite differently, but within one and the same bank the character and ten dency of its activity during the different phases of its development, consti tuted sometimes a radical departure from that pursued b y the former man agement according to the business policy pursued b y the new management. If we proceed from the distinction between simple deposit banks and the German banks which b y reason of their historical development are of a different nature, that is to say, if we desire to emphasise that the latter are 79 x National Monetary Commission not simply deposit banks (as is A. Weber’s evident intention in his com parison between “ deposit” and “ speculation” banks), it would seem more appropriate to do as has been done in the case of the mortgage banks, for which, since the mortgage bank law of July 13, 1899, a distinction is drawn between mortgage banks proper, and those carrying on miscellaneous transactions, which latter, in virtue of article 46, section 1, are exempt from the restrictive regulations of article 5. From this standpoint, therefore, the existing German credit banks might be designated also as banks transacting miscellaneous business (“ combined ” or “ m ixed ” banks). More important, however, than the mere formal question of definition, is the conclusion resulting from the above, that the general opinions and deductions expressed in the following pages regarding German banks, particularly German great banks, are invariably given with the tacit understanding that the general description, when applied in detail, i. e., with regard to each individual bank, m ay be subject to extensive modi fications. 40. This has been the case hitherto only with the Disconto-Gesellschaft. See Die Disconto Gesellschaft, 1851-1901, Denkschrift zum 50 jahrigen Jubilaum, Berlin, 1901. Part II. 1. See (in addition to other works cited): Werner Sombart, Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft im neunzehnten Jahrhundert, 7th ed. (Berlin, Georg Bondi), 1909, and Ludw ig Pohle, Die Entwicklung des deutschen Wirtschaftslebens im letzten Jahrhundert, 2nd ed. (Leipzig, B. G. Teubner), 1908. 2. G ustav Schmoller, Grundriss der allgemeinen Volkswirtscliaftslehre, Bd. II (1st to 6th edition, Leipzig, 1904, Duncker & Humblot), pp. 182 and 183. Schmoller thinks, however, that this estimate of Prussia’s capital is too low. 3. In Frankfort-on-the-Main for home-manufactured goods, notions, and hardware, according to an interesting book b y Hugo Kan ter: Die E ntw ick lung des Handels mit gebrauchsfertigen Waren von der Mitte Jahrhunderts bis 1866 zu Frankfurt a. M. J. des 18. (Tubingen and Leipzig, 1902, C. B. Mohr), p. 125. 4. Werner Sombart, Der moderne Kapitalismus, I, pp. 429, 424-425. 585,815 looms were used in the home-weaving industry, and only 217,388 in factories. 5. Von Reden, Erwerbs- u. Verkehrsstatistik (1853), p. 281, and Som bart, Der mod. Kapitalismus, I, pp. 424-425. 6. In the weaving trade 754,735 workmen were employed in home indus try, 325,277 in factories. (W. Sombart, Der moderne Kapitalismus, I, pp. 424-425.) 7. W. Oechelhauser, Vergleichende Statistik der Eisenindustrie aller Lander u. Erorterung ihrer okonomischen Lage im Zollverein, 1852, pp. 124 and 128. 792 The German Great Banks 8. W. Sombart, Der mod. Kapitalismus, vol. I, p. 462. 9. E. Engel, Das Zeitalter des Dampfes, 2 ed., 1881, p. 130. 10. Karl Lamprecht, Zur jiingsten deutschen Vergangenheit, (Vol. I, 1st half of his Deutsche Geschichte, Freiburg i. B., Herm. Heyfelder, 1903), P- 1 5 3 11. Von Reden, loc. cit., p. 281. 12. W. Oechelhauser, loc. cit. 13. W ith regard to the following remarks see M ax Sering, Geschichte der preuss.- deutschen Eisenzolle von 1818 bis zur Gegenwart, in Schmoller’s Staats u. Sozialwissenschaftl. Forschungen, vol. I l l (1882), pp. 53-62. On pp. 94-95 he points out the interesting fact that the financial crisis of 1847 interrupted the transition to coke fuel. 14. According to Lurmann in Die Fortschritte im Hochofenbetrieb seit 50 Jahren, Dusseldorf, 1902, the output of blasting furnaces has increased sevenfold since 1852 (in capacity expressed in tons). According to Peter Mischler, Das deutsche Eisenhiittengewerbe, vol. I (1852), p. 150, the average English blasting furnace produced in the middle of the nine teenth century 70,000 quintals annually, whereas German blasting fur naces only averaged 7,000 quintals annually, as compared with 618,000 in 1899. 15. W. Sombart, Der mod. Kapitalismus, II, pp. 13-14. 16. “ In the district of Siegen, therefore, the iron ore production has in 50 years increased twenty-five-fold in quantity, thirty-one-fold in value.” (See Mollat, Zur Wiirdigung der Siegerlander Industrie, Siegen, September, 1908.) 17. Von Reden: Vergleichende Kulturstatistik, 1848, p. 412, seq. 18. W. Sombart, Der mod. Kapitalismus, vol. II, pp. 176-7. 19. See Ludw ig Geiger, Berlin, 1688-1840. (Berlin, Gebr. Paetel, 1903), Vol. 1 (1903), p. 463, N o te *. 20. See Beitrage zur Geschichte des Berliner Handels- und Gewerbe- . fleisses aus der altesten Zeit bis auf unsere Tage. A memorial in com memoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the corporation of the Berlin Merchants on March 2, 1870, p. 83. In December, 1908, the number of persons contributing to sickness insurance funds in Berlin was 738,858. 21. W. Sombart: Der mod. Kapitalismus, II, pp. 176 -177. 22. W. Sombart, II, p. 214. pp. 90 and 91. Concerning the population of to-day see 23. Matches were introduced only in 1834, and sewing machines were first used in Germany at the beginning of the sixties. 24. M ax Wirth, Geschichte der Handelskrisen, (2nd ed.), 1874, p. 292. 25. See Sombart: D. mod. K ap. II. pp. 284-7, and O tto Bahr Eine deutsche Stadt (Kassel) vor 60 Jahren, Leipzig, Fr. Wilh. Grunow, 1884, p. 64 and following. 26. See K . et seq. Knies: Der Telegraph als Verkelirsmittel, 793 1857, p. 161, r N at i on a l M on e t a r y Commission 27. Geschichte der Frankfurter Zeitung 1856-1906, p. 17. 28. See Th. Bauer: Die Aktienunternehmungen in Baden (Karls ruhe, 1903, Macklotsche Buchhandlung), pp. 14 and 15, for the conditions prevailing in Baden, where there was a law concerning stock companies already at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It appears that the number of joint-stock companies in Baden before the middle of the nine teenth century was very limited. T hey were the following: The spinning and weaving mills, at Ettlingen, founded in 1835; the Badische Gesellschaft f. Zuckerfabrikation in Waghausel founded in 1836; the Mechanische W eberei,” at Thiengen, founded in 1843; the Badische Gasaktiengesellschaft, founded founded in 1848. schaft in 1845, and the Karlsruher Gasgesellschaft, Beginning with 1853 came the following: Aktiengesell- fur Uhrenfabrikation, at Lenzkirch, founded in 1853; Verein chemischer Fabriken, at Mannheim, founded in 1854; the French Compagnie de Manufactures de Glaces, etc., founded in 1854, for the manufac ture of plate-glass; the Badische Zinkgesellschaft, at Mannheim, founded in 1855; the wire and screw factory, of Falkau, founded in 1856; the Badische Gesellschaft fur Tabakproduktion und Handel, at Karls ruhe, founded in 1857; and some other companies of minor importance. Bauer only mentions one large concern converted into a joint-stock company, namely the Maschinenbaugesellschaft Karlsruhe, founded in 1848 and con verted in 1852. T he formation of companies became more active after the introduction of the industrial law of 1862, which was based on freedom of trade and freedom to move about from place to place. The well-known Badische Anilin-und Sodafabrik, at Mannheim-Ludwigshafen, was founded about this period (1865). 29. Engel, Die erwerbstatigen juristischen Personen, etc. Berlin, pub lished b y the R oyal Statistical Bureau, 1876, pp. 10 -11. 30. See Geschichte der Frankfurter Zeitung, 1856-1906, p. 15. 31. Karl Helfferich, Geschichte der Deutschen Geldreform (Leipzig, 1898, T''uncker & Humblot), p. 6 seq., and also his Beitrage zur Geschichte der Deutschen Geldreform, p. 78 seq. 32. Hugo Kanter, loc. cit., pp. 1x2 -113 . 33. Hugo Kanter, loc. cit., p. 41. 34. Rud. Kaulla, Die Organisation des Bankwesens im Konigreich Wurttemberg, 1908, p. 6. 35. W. Sombart, Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, 2d ed., pp. 190-191. 36. “ Geschichte d. Handelskammer zu Frankfurt a. M .,” (1767-1908). Jos. Baer & Co., Frankfort-on-the-Main, 1908, p. 659. 37. W. Sombart, “ Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft,” 2. Aufl., p. 196. 38. On October 1, 1851, even the Prussian Bank gave notice to de positors to withdraw their deposits, because, according to W. Sombart (Deutsche Volksw., 2d ed., p. 85), “ it did not know what to do with the money.” A t the commencement of the second period (1870) the deposits 794 T h e G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s at the Prussian Bank amounted to only 15,770,000 th alers= 4 7,310,000 marks. 39. See Lexis, “ B an ken ” (in Handworterbuch der Staatswissenschaften, I 9°3i 3d ed., Vol. II, p. 400). 40. Karl Lamprecht, loc. cit., p. 183. 41. Walter Troeltsch, Uber die neuesten Veranderungen im deutschen Wirtschaftsleben. Stuttgart, W. Kohlhammer, 1899, pp. 32 and 45. 42. New investigations, and the remarks made b y Ludw ig Pohle, loc. cit., p. 23, suggested this modified statement as compared with the one in the second edition. 43. Vide K arl Lamprecht loc. cit., p. 43. 44. W. Sombart, Der mod. Kapitalismus, II, pp. 148-151. 45. Ludw ig Pohle, loc. cit., p. 27. 46. “ In the coal and iron deposits of Germany lies * * * the explanation why the German economic world turned so decisively to industrial ac tiv ity during the latter half of last century, as well as of the intensity of Germ any’s capitalistic development.” (W. Sombart, Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, 2d ed., p. 103). 47. See Hans Gideon Heymann, Die gemischten Werke im deutschen Grosseisengewerbe. Ein Beitrag zur Frage der Konzentration der Indus trie, Stuttgart & Berlin, 1904, J. G. C otta Nachf. (Miinchener Volksw. Studien, edited b y Brentano and Lotz, 65. Stuck), p. 4: “ I t was the employment of mineral coal for smelting and as a source of power that paved the w ay for capitalism and large industry.” (See also p. 62.) 48. See M ax Wirth, Geschichte der Handelskrisen, 2d ed., p. 292. 49. Engel, Die erwerbstatigen juristischen Personen, insbesondere die Aktiengesellschaften im Preussischen Staate. (Berlin, Verlag des kgl. statist. Bureaus, 1876), pp. 10 -11. 50. It can not be proved that the Credit Mobilier participated financially in the founding of the Darmstadter Bank. 51. See Geschaftsbericht der Darmstadter Bank for 1853, page 9. For tunately the idea was never carried into practice. 52. Anonymous article: “ Die modernen Kreditbanken,” published in 1856 in the Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift, No. 3 (Stuttgart and Augsburg, J. G. Cotta), page 255 seq. 53. Conrad: Grundriss zum Studium der politischen Oekonomie. (4th ed., Jena, Gust. Fischer, 1902), part 1, section 72 (p. 229 seq.): “ Die Cr6ditMobilier-oder Emissions- und Industriebanken.” 54. In the main, the theme seems to have been furnished b y the Union gen6rale (Bontoux). 55. While following a hearse one should neither philosophise nor try to make laws. H ad Ihering taken this to heart he certainly would not have marred hic great work “ Der Zweck im R e c h t” b y the following gener alisation written immediately after the crisis of 1873: “ T he devastations which they (the joint-stock companies) caused among private property are 795 n eta ry mm i s s i o n worse than if fire and famine, failure of crops, earthquake, war, hostile occu pation had combined to ruin the national prosperity.” (Vol. i, p. 223.) It is both surprising and regrettable that Ruhland quotes m y words in his ‘‘ System der polit. O ekonom ie” (Vol. I l l , p. 8) in quotation marks in the following manner: “ Riesser’s desire” * * * ‘‘ not to phi losophise, nor to try to make laws when following a hearse, and not to select the effect of a stock exchange panic as the starting point of a reforma tory actional) ” etc. M y words are simply a warning not to criticise, to draw philosophical conclusions, or to take legal action immediately after a crisis; that is to say, while one is “ following the hearse.” The italicized passage is not only not to be found in the paragraph quoted b y Ruhland (footnote 3 on p. 38 of the second— German— edition of this book), but it does not even remotely represent what was written there— a fact which will be clear to every careful reader of m y book. Keeping the above-mentioned facts in view, we can correctly estimate the scientific basis of R uhland’s deduction found in the following sentence: “ The political economist whose d u ty as a ‘ physician ’ is to cure the diseased ‘ body-economic ’ would be guilty of the most criminal neglect if (in accordance with Professor Riesser’s wishes) he would conceal or overlook its worst and most threatening sym ptom s!” He evidently forgets that it is one of the first elements of scientific polemics not to construct an argument on absolutely false citations and then pro ceed to combat it. 56. M. Aycard, “ Histoire du Credit Mobilier,” 1852-1867, Bruxelles, 1867. 57. Joh. Plenge, Griindung und Geschichte des Credit Mobilier. Zwei Kapitel aus Anlagebanken, eine Einleitung in die Theorie des Anlagebankgeschaftes (Tubingen, H. Laupp, 1903). This treatise, intended to be the precursor of a larger unpublished work treating the latter theme (theory of the investment bank business) in dfci.au, oners far more than the title would lead one to infer, and is characterised b y an abundance of interesting material and keen observation. 58. The increase took place when it was too late (1866); the capital was then doubled, being raised to 120,000,000 francs. only to 4,000,000 francs. The reserves amounted 59. As early as March 9, 1856, the Government felt obliged to prohibit any further issue of securities on the Paris Bourse. According to Plenge (loc. cit., p. 91), no less than 45-------- 1;mited liability companies with a combined capital of 1,000,000,000 francs (not 100,000,000) were founded in France from July 1, 1854, to July 1, 1855. Among these companies there were 227 joint-stock companies en commandite, with a capital of 968,000,000 francs. The fusion policy in the field of industry, announced in the 1854 report of the Credit Mobilier in correct anticipation of the concentrative tendencies inseperable from large-scale industry, was only carried out to a limited extent b y the company. On the ether hand, several important railways were consolidated by its assistance. (See Plenge, loc. cit., p. 104.) 796 I / The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s 60. See Plenge’s list of bourse quotations, loc. cit., p. i n . 61. As early as 1859 the Credit Mobilier had about 77,000,000 francs of securities of all descriptions in its possession, while its capital was 60000,000 francs, and its reserves 2,000,000 francs. In 1862 the total of these holdings (among which “ rentes” occupied but a modest place) had grown to 148,000,000 francs. The advances to subsidiary companies amounted to 29,500,000 francs in 1858, and to nearly 73,000,000 francs in 1866. 62. Aycard, who has a keen instinct in such matters, believes that 11,000,000 francs represented the profits solely from speculation during 1856. This sum certainly did not include the profit on issues, such as Plenge mentions (loc. cit., p. 150). 63. 3,910 kilometres had been authorized up to 1851 and 14,227 kilo metres up to 1857. (Plenge, loc. cit., p. 91 ) 64. See Plenge’s list, p. 59 seq., and p. 62. For instance: In 1852-1854 French Southern Railw ay; 1854, Austrian State Railway, Paris-Miilhausen, D 61e-Salins; 1857, Hungarian Franz-Joseph Railway, Swiss Central R ailw ay, and West Swiss Railway, Dauphine Railways, Russian Railway, Cordova-Sevilla, Spanish Northern Railway, etc. 65. Ad. Wagner, Bankbriiche u. Bankkontrollen, in the Deutsche Monatsschrift fur das gesamte Leben der Gegenwart (ed. Jul., Lohmeyer), 1st year, No. 1. (October, 1901), pp. 74-85, and No. 2. 1901), pp. 248-258, especially p. 255. (November, For the contrary view, see, amongst other material, the Deutscher Oekonomist of October 19, 1901, and Feb ruary 1, 1902; also Richard Rosendorff, Bankbriiche und Bankkontrollen, in H irth’s Annalen des Deutschen Reiches, 1902, No. 3, pp. 182-197. 66. See Plenge, loc. cit., p. 14. As a matter of fact the French Govern ment frequently adopted a rigorous attitude towards the Credit Mobilier. It prevented the issue (announced first for the middle of September, and subsequently for October 5, 1855) of 240,000 bonds at 500 francs, nine days before subscription; on March 9, 1856, it prohibited the issue of any fur ther securities on the Paris Bourse; in its charter the Credit Mobilier was even forbidden to subscribe to foreign public loans without the consent of the Government. 67. Loc. cit., pp. 71-98, sec. 10: Der Pariser Credit Mobilier von 18521867. In criticizing this description and criticism it seems to me that Plenge (V II, and 17) is rather too severe. 68. Loc. cit., pp. 249-267. 69. M ax Wirth in his Geschichte der Handels-Krisen (published in *8 5 7 ) shows by his strong prejudice against the German Credit Mobilier Banks (which is conspicuous in some chapters on almost every page) that the book was written whilst the author was completely under the influence of the serious crisis of ’57 and the speculative excesses preceding it. 70. Section 10 as well as sections 8, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 30, 32, 36, and 40 were formulated somewhat differently b y resolution of the general meeting of M ay 31, i860. 797 71. This is expressly referred to in the following passage of the programlike business report of the Darmstadter Bank for 1853 (reprinted above, p. 48): “ and to lend its cooperation in order to lead enterprise and capital into the proper channels, corresponding with the requirements of the moment.” I t is obvious that the wording of this clause is too restrictive and, taken literally, is economically incorrect. 72. See especially article 5 of the statutes of the Credit Mobilier. 73. In section 2 of the statutes of the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft, dated Ju ly 2, 1856, which in this respect were far more comprehensive, the object of the company was stated to be “ the carrying on of banking, com mercial, and industrial business of every description.” particular, is to extend to Its activity, in “ industrial and agricultural undertakings, mining, foundries, canal, road, and railway building, as well as to the for mation, combination, and consolidation of joint-stock companies, and to the issue of shares and bonds of such companies.” 74. In i860 the entire wording of section 10 was partly changed and partly supplemented. In m y text, following a well-founded criticism by Warschauer (in Conrad’s Jahrbiicher, 3d series, vol. xxxi, p. 705), I have made considerable abbreviations. 75. I t must be remembered that up to the introduction of the “ Allg. Deutsch. Handelsgesetzbuch” (1862), that is to say, during the first decade of the ac tiv ity of the Darmstadter Bank, the management was not in the hands of the directorate, which was merely an executive organ, but solely in the hands of the “ bank administration,” consisting of 18 members. 76. M ax Wirth, “ Geschichte der Handelskrisen,” 2d ed., pp. 244 and 295. 77. M ax Wirth, loc. cit., p. 296. 78. A few years later, in 1866, as already noted, similar conditions pre vailed in England, which, after having passed through the crises of 1825, 1836, 1839, and 1847, underwent another serious crisis in 1866. 79. Business report for 1853 (program), pp. 7 and 10. 80. I t is therefore incorrect to state that the bank was “ compelled” to establish branches and limited liability companies “ merely in order to invest its capital profitably” (Max Wirth, loc. cit., p. 272). The “ half bankrupt calico factory at Heidenheim,” with the transformation of which into a joint-stock company M ax Wirth reproaches the bank, remarking that “ nothing has been heard of its profits as y e t,” is the present'flourishing and highly respected Wurtteinberg Calico Joint Stock Company (Aktiengesellschaft Wiirttembergische Kattunm anufaktur) at Heidenheim (W iirttemberg). 81. See Felix Hecht, Bankwesen und Bankpolitik in den siiddeutschen Staaten, etc., pp. 166-167. 82. Others were planned in St. Petersburg, London, Constantinople, Smyrna, and Prague. 83. Most of the other banks participated herein, or they acted inde pendently, although the latter case occurred only to a small extent during this period. For details see p. 71 et seq. 798 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s 84. On one occasion, it is true (1859), the Darmstadter Bank was induced to make long-term advances amounting to 4,500,000 florins to industrial concerns and railways, sustaining great losses thereby. In this case, however, it obtained securities the value of which fell to an extent not anticipated, and it was unable to obtain supplementary security. (See Model, Die grossen Berliner Effektenbanken— ed. Ernst Eoeb— Gust. Fischer, Jena, 1896, pp. 60-61.) 85. The real increase amounted merely to 46,000 florins, so that the capital from 1856 on was 25,046,000 florins=42,936,ooo marks; the cer tificates (Berechtigungsscheine) which had been issued beyond that amount had to be gradually withdrawn. The issue of these certificates was accom panied b y rather unpleasant occurrences. (See Model, loc. cit., p. 58.) 86. I t reduced its “ lombard and covered credits” from 1,400,000 florins in 1859 to 90,000 florins in 1864; its loans and mortgages from 4,710,000 florins in 1859 to 400,000 florins in 1864, and its “ illiquid claim s” from 910,000 florins in 1859 to 114,000 florins in 1864. 87. See the interesting report: Die Disconto-Gesellschaft, 1851-1901, Denkschrift zum fiinfzigjahrigen Jubilaum ” (Berlin, 1901, J. Guttentag), p. 15 (quoted hereafter as “ Jubilaumsbericht” ). 88. The dividends which the Darmstadter Bank and the DiscontoGesellschaft distributed during 1856-1900 have been compiled in a table by Ad. Weber, Depositenbanken und Spekulationsbanken, Duncker & Humblot, Leipzig, 1902, pp. 209-210, those of the Disconto-Gesellschaft also in its Jubilee Report, p. 261. 89. During the first fifty years of its existence (1853-1903) 7 ^ per cent. 90. For the period from April 1, 1856, to December 31, 1900, 9.51 per cent; from April 1, 1856, to 1904, 9.42 per cent. 91. Model, loc. cit., p. 68, gives a table of the current business of the Darmstadter Bank during 1859-1864 and emphasizes that the management attached the greatest value to “ fostering and extending the current account business, and to carrying out long engagements.” This table, however, appears to me to prove the latter tendency rather than the former, although the former also existed. The current business of the Darmstadter Bank yielded, in 1856, 8 per cent of the total profit of 15 per cent. 92. O f the other banks Model only mentions the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft. I profit by the opportunity to express m y best thanks to these banks for supplying me with their business reports for the earlier period, of which reports in most cases only few copies are in existence, and these in some instances only in manuscript form. 93. The item “ debits” (Debitoren), which decreased in 1867 and still further in 1868 and 1869, rose to 30,526,471 marks in 1870 and to 62,771,967 marks in 1871. 94. The deposits, which rose to 7,466,212 marks in 1867 (as against 2,716,187 in 1866) fell in 1868 to 4,384,850 marks and in 1869 as low as the amount given above (2,274,228 marks). T h ey increased again in 1870 to 3,676,343 marks, rose in 1871 suddenly to 14,779,269 marks, and in 1873 799 Monetary Commission as high as 64,788,366 marks without, however, being able to maintain that level during the following years. 95. A t its very first meeting (30 October, 1848) the supervisory council, at the suggestion of the board of directors of the bank, had fixed 4,000,000 thalers as the limit for individual credit, 2,000,000 thalers for deposits to be accepted, 1,000,000 thalers for its own securities (eigene Effekten), and 1,000,000 thalers for its own bills (Geldamveisungen) (see Ernst Koenig’s Erinnerungsschrift zum 50-jahrigen Bestehen des A. Schaaffhausen’schen Bankvereins vom Oktober 1898, p. 26). 96. On this point the board of directors remarks in its business report for 1852, page 1: “ We heartily welcome every new and large establishment in this town and country, being convinced that in the course of years the prosperity of the Bankverein will become inseparable from the growth and and rise of the Rhenish industry in all its branches.” (See business report 1853. P- 3 ) 97. “ For the exploitation of the rich coal mines of the Essen field.” (Business report for 1852, p. 3.) 98. From 1864 onward only the total sums are given, the number of accounts being omitted. 99. No details can be found for the earlier years. In 1852 the average debit on current account was 6,804 thalers and the average credit account, 5,255 thalers. 100. The business report of that year (the one preceding the crisis of 1857) mentions that at the end of September “ the Prussian Bank for several days refused to discount anything.” 101. As far as balancing the accounts is concerned, section 57 of the statutes deserves special attention. I t provided that “ the inventory to be compiled annually shall represent the capital of the society according t o , its true value; the capital, if anything, should be underestimated rather than overestimated.” 102. This is shown in the business report of i860, page 2. 103. One noteworthy fact disclosed b y the business reports of the bank is that during the whole of the first period a 10 per cent share in the net profits was paid to its founders. Another circumstance worth recording is that at the ordinary general meeting held in i860 a shareholder expressed the desire that (p. 3 of the minutes) “ in the future the dividends of the bank should be determined by the board of management, and not by the general meeting.” 104. For the other reductions and increases, see the Jubilee Business Report of the Mitteldeutsche Credit-Bank for 1905 (1856-1906), page 2. 105. Syndicates of private bankers existed earlier. 106. A syndicate under the leadership of the Disconto-Gesellschaft was formed among the Berlin bankers and banking firms during the same year (1859) in order to take over a part of the 30,000,000-thaler loan necessary for the mobilization of the Prussian arm y; this was the first step toward 800 —— The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s the formation of the so-called “ Prussian Syndicate.” (See Jubilee Report of the Disconto-Gesellschaft, p. 29.) (See above, p. 62.) 107. Nevertheless the business report of the Darmstadter Bank as early as 1862 (pp. 11-12 ), and the reports following, contained a list of the classes of securities and their amounts, the amounts of former years being added for comparison. The list comprised (1) American bonds, (2) government securities and lottery tickets, (3) preference bonds, (4) railway bonds, (5) note-issuing banks’ stock, (6) credit and discount banks’ shares, (7) stock in shipping companies, (8) municipal and mortgage bonds. 108. See, for example, the business report of the Darmstadter Bank for 1855, page 6: “ We can not, however, promise rapid successes in this direction (industry) * * * and can not satisfy oversanguine views.” Business report for 1857, page 2: “ The excessive expectations which swindlers have based on these new developments (the ‘ Industrial B an ks’) will certainly not be fulfilled.” 109. Felix Hecht, Bankwesen und Bankpolitik in den siiddeutschen Staaten, 1819-1875 (Jena, G ustav Fischer, 1880), page 172 n o . Particularly through the revolution of 1848, the war with Den mark in 1849, the Russian-Turkish war of 1853, the Crimean war of 1854, the Austrian war against Italy of 1859, the American war of secession, 1861-1865, the French-Mexican war of 1861-1867, the Austrian-Prussian campaign against Denmark, 1864, and the Prussian war against Austria and her allies in 1866. h i . Especially through the crises of 1856, 1857, and 1866. Part III. 1. Law relating to the coining of imperial gold coins, December 4, 1871; coinage law of July 9, 1873, with additions of July 9, 1873, January 6, 1876, and June 1, 1900; law relating to the issue of imperial treasury notes of April 30, 1874; supplementary law of June 5, 1906 (section relating to 10-mark and 5-mark notes); and decree concerning the introduction of the imperial gold standard of September 22, 1875. 2. Law relating to the constitution of law courts of January 27, 1877, and M ay 17, 1898; civil procedure law of January 30, 1877, and M ay 17, 1898; criminal procedure law of February 1, 1877; bankruptcy law of February 10, 1877, and May 17, 1898, law concerning matters of voluntary jurisdiction (freiwillige Gerichtsbarkeit) of M ay 17, 1898. 3. Military service law of November 9, 1867, with supplementary laws of February 11, 1888, February 8, 1890, and April 15, 1905; military law of M ay 2, 1874, amended b y the laws of M ay 6, 1880, March 11, 1887, January 27, 1890, M ay 26, 1893, March 25, 1899, and partly through the code of civil law; the control law of February 15, 1875, law concerning voluntary jurisdiction (freiwillige Gerichtsbarkeit) in the army and navy of M ay 28, 1901, and decree of February 20, 1890, military penal code of June 20, 1872; military criminal procedure law of December 1, 1898. 90311 11------ 52 801 N at ion a l M on e t a r y Commission 4. Bank law of March 14, 1875, with amendments of December 18, 1889, June 7, 1899, and June 1, 1909; statutes of the Reichsbank, M ay 21, 1875, with decree of September 3, 1900; law concerning the issuing of bank notes of December 21, 1874, law of February 20, 1906, regardingthe issue of bank notes in denominations of 20 and 50 marks. 5. Section 125 et seq. of the constitution of law courts act, and act as to seat of the supreme court (Reichsgericht) dating n t h April, 1877. 6. The words which were here added in the second edition, “ combined with the victorious advance of large-scale manufacture in almost all branches of industry,” had to be struck out after the publication of the statistical material in the essay of A. Saucke: “ H at neuerdings der Grossbetrieb auf Kosten des Kleinbetriebs in der deutschen Industrie zugenommen?” (Has large-scale industry recently increased in Germany at the expense of small-scale industry ?) (Conrad’s Jahrbucher, III series, vol. 31, pp. 222223); for although in certain branches large-scale production doubtless increased greatly at the cost of small-scale production even during the second period, y et these statistics prove that in German industry (subject to accident insurance) as a whole, an increase of large-scale production at the expense of small-scale production has not taken place, “ at least not during the fifteen years from 1888-1903,” that is to say, during a consider able part of the second period. In agriculture, it is true, the number and area of the great landed properties have greatly increased, especially in E ast Prussia; the small and middle sized farms, however, show the greatest increase. 7. See Ludw ig Pohle, loc. cit., pp. 140-141, and the table printed there. 8. See Ernst von Halle, Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft an der Jahrhundertwende (Berlin, Ernst Siegfr. Mittler & Sohn, 1902), p. 73. According to the statistical annual for the German Empire (twenty-ninth year, 1908), p. 26, Tab. 13 d., and p. 25, note i, the oversea emigration of Germans via German and foreign ports in 1907 amounted to 31,696 persons, whereas the immigration v ia German ports into Germany amounted to 217,812 persons. 9. See table in Ludwig Pohle, loc. cit., p. 146, under II. 10. See Materialien zur Beurteilung der Wohlstandsentwicklung Deutschlands im letzten Menschenalter (supplementary Volume III of the German Finance Reform Bills of 1908), p. 50. 11. See W. Sombart, Der moderne Kapitalismus. II, p. 214. 12. In the Palatinate (Bavarian), according to Emil Herz, loc. cit., p. 44, the development proceeded on the same lines. Thus the number of inhabitants of Kaiserslautern was 48,306 in 1900, as compared to 8,250 in 1842; that of Pirmasens was 30,194 in 1900, as compared to 6,410 in 1842. 13. See report of Die Aeltesten der Kaufmannschaft in the Berliner Jahrbuch fiir Handel und Industrie for 1904, I, p. 26. 14. Ad. Wagner, Zur Methodik der Statistik des Volkseinkommens und Volksvermogens (in the Zeitschrift des Kgl. Preuss. Statist. Bureaus, forty-fourth year, 1904, p. 41-122 ), and in his expert report to the Imperial 802 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s Treasury, published on the occasion of the German Finance Reform Bills of November, 1908 (No. 1043), in the “ Materialien zur Beurteilung der Wohlstandsentwicklung Deutschlands im letzten Menschenalter,” under II, pp. 122-132. 15. A calculation of this kind made solely on the basis of population is, open to objection, however, because different conditions prevail in different parts of Germany. 16. In the Grenzboten, No. 28, of July 9, 1908, pp. 55-57. 17. In the “ W oche” of August 23, 1906, No. 34 (also in the Konservative Monatsschrift of October, 1908). 18. In the “ Tagliche Rundschau” of 1908, No. 541 Individual incomes are computed in this case on the basis of insurance statistics. 19. “ Zur Reichsfinanzreform,’’ Berlin (October), 1908. Here, too, insurance statistics are made the starting point for the estimate of the value of various kinds of property; similarly in the essay, “ 350 Milliarden deutsches Volksvermogen” (Berlin, O tto Eisner, 1909) 20. Differences of many billions of marks are also found in examining the several items. Thus, the value of capital invested in foreign enter prises and in foreign securities during 1904-1905 is estimated at a minimum of 24,000,000,000 to 25,000,000,000 marks in the memorial of the admiralty of December, 1905, “ Die Entwicklung der deutschen Seeinteressen im letzten Jahrzehnt,” and b y Ballod likewise at 25,000,000,000 marks, whereas Steinmann-Bucher estimates the amount at 40,000,000,000 marks. It must also be borne in mind here that in 1892-93 the Prussian Finance Minister von Miquel estimated the amount of Prussian capital alone invested in foreign securities at 15,000,000,000 marks (Abgeordenten- Haus. 17 Legisl. Session, 5th sess., appendix to the stenographic reports No. 6, pp. 535-536), an amount that was excessive. The “ Deutscher Oekonomist” of June 27, 1908 places the amount of foreign securities in German hands at 10,000,000,000 to 15,000,000,000 marks, Sombart (Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, 2d ed., p. 416) at 12,500,000,000 to 13,000,000,000 marks. The value of German capital in foreign enterprises is estimated in the admir alty memorial mentioned above at 7,700,000,000 to 9,200,000,000 marks (1905), and the value of German capital invested in foreign securities at a minimum of 16,000,000,000 marks. 21. Thus it is evident, in particular, that in the income-tax laws of the various German Federal States possessing a general and direct income ta x quite different principles exist for declaration, assessment, and control of incomes, as well as for the exemption of small incomes from taxation, and that in regard to the computation of the value of property not subject to income tax, other great divergences m ay arise. It need hardly be emphasised that in this case as well, a simple calculation of the German figures on the basis of the Prussian results, and according to the propor tion of population, is open to objection. Steinmann-Bucher, in his latest work (350 Milliarden deutsches Volksvermogen, Berlin, 1909), places the German national income at not less than 35,000,000,000 marks (p. 107) 803 n et a r y mm is s i o n 22. Grundriss, 6th ed., vol. II, p. 184 (at the end). 23. This includes an amount of 150,000,000 marks for annual new deposits in cooperative banks (“ Genossenschaftsbanken” ), which, being mostly made b y owners of capital under 6,000 marks, are generally exempt from the ta x on capital. This gives for Prussia 1,850,000,000 marks, or (computed at three-fifths for the whole Empire) 3,080,000,000 marks for Germany. This amount is further increased b y the annual new deposits in the savings banks (which as a rule are also exempt from the tax on capital) of 620,000,000 marks (conservatively estimated), which, without counting property not assessed for the ta x on capital, gives the amount quoted above, of 3,700,000,000 marks T he author proves this calculation b y pointing out that there is an annual issue of stock exchange securities to the value of 3,150,000,000 to 3,200,000,000 marks. 24. This applies especially to the estimate of the French national wealth made b y Mulhall (1895) at 198,000,000,000, b y de Foville (1902) at 161,600,000 000, b y Y v e s G u yo t at 190,400,000,000 marks, b y Leroy- Beaulieu (1906) at 205,000,000,000 to 210,000,000,000 marks, and by Edmond T hery (“ Les Progr&s 6conomiques de la France,” 6th ed., Paris, 1908, p. 322 seq.) for the year 1906 at 201,000,000,000 francs, equaling 161.000. 000.000 marks. T he 20.000. French national income was estimated by Leroy-Beaulieu at 000.000 marks. The same is true of the national wealth of Great Britain and Ireland, estimated b y Sir R obt. Giffen (1885) at about 204,500,000,000 marks, b y Mulhall (1895) at about 235,000,000,000 marks, and b y L. G. Chiozza Money (in 1908 for 1902-3) at about 228,000,000,000 marks. In all probability the same is true of the official estimate (evidently very conservative) made in 1904 of the “ true v a lu e ” of the national wealth of the United States of America (with about 83,000,000 inhabitants), which is given b y the Cen sus Office of the Departm ent of Commerce and Labor as $107,000,000,000, or 430,000,000,000 marks, for 1904. Under such circumstances, owing to the complete difference of bases, principles, and statistical methods, an y comparison of these foreign esti mates with German estimates of national wealth and income would be still more objectionable, although such comparisons (with the necessary reservations) are occasionally desirable and useful in m any directions. 25. According to the above-mentioned Appendix I I I to the German finance reform bills of 1908: Materialien zur Beurteilung der Wohlstandsentwicklung Deutschlands im letzten Menschenalter, pp. 4 -1 5 ; but with the reservations mentioned above, and on pp. 2 to 4 of the “ Materialien.” 26. See especially Appendix IV, of the Reichstagsdrucksachen, No. 1887: Materialien zur Beurteilung der Zusammenhange zwischen dem offentlichen Schuldenwesen u. dem K apitalm arkt, pp. 247-249. 27. Jahrbuch fur Handel und Industrie, 1907, vol. I, p. 213. 28. See page 248 of the “ Materialien,” cited in Note 26: “ The exact amount of the very considerable capital that has migrated abroad for investment in securities can not be estimated even approxim ately.” 804 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s 29. Deutscher Oekonomist of June 27, 1908 (tw enty-sixth year), page 395, where objections are also raised against the employment of the table described in the text. 30. Appendix to the Reichstagsdrucksachen No. 1087 of 1908, pp. 247 and 248. 31. See appendix to the Bank Inquiry, 1908-9: Zur Frage der Emissionsstatistik, Berlin, 1909, pp. 6-7. 32. See inter alia: Ernst v. Halle: Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft an der Jahrhundertwende, Berlin, 1902, pp. 56-57, and Mor. Stroll, loc. cit., p. 194. 33. In the Zeitschrift des K gl. Preussischen Statistischen Bureaus, fortyfourth year, 1904, page 92. In that passage Ad. Wagner avoids the expression which he repeatedly uses in his essay: “ Die Reichsfinanznot,” Berlin, 1908 (for instance, pp. 13 -14 and 41), where he speaks of the ele ments or classes “ enriching themselves” (instead of “ the elements, or classes who have become richer” ), words which convey the idea that the very fact of growing richer is a reproach, an utterance which, while cor responding to a strong popular impression, is not on that account any more correct. It is also stated (p. 23), “ that the middle as well as the upper classes ought not only to be compelled to p ay the same amount of taxes in proportion to their capacity, especially as measured by their income, as the lower classes, bu t that they should p ay proportionately more.” This statement should be compared with the proof given (for Prussia only, and not for the whole Empire) b y the Prussian Minister of Finance Freiherr von Rheinbaben in the Prussian Lower House on January 20, 1909 (“ Reichsanzeiger,” January 21, 1909), which has been am ply con firmed b y the official verification of the results of the assessment for the Prussian income ta x of 1908 (1st suppl. of the “ Reichsanzeiger” of F e b ruary 11, 1909, No 36). According to this statement there were, in 1908, 17,957,848 persons com pletely exempt from taxation (their incomes not exceeding 900 marks), or 42.22 per cent of the population, which in 1908 numbered 38,026,556 souls. O f the balance of the population, 16,176,674, or 42.54 per cent of the Prussian population, were assessed in the lowest group of income taxpayers (with incomes over 900 and less than 3,000 m arks); this class paid a total of 83,752,973 marks, or 34.26 per cent of the whole assessed amount of income tax. Thus there remained only 2,000,000 ( i , 9 i 6 , 9 ° i ) , equal to 5.5 per cent of the population, who paid not less than 66 per cent of the entire income tax. O ut of these 2,000,000, the persons having an income of over 9,500 marks constituted only 0.87 per cent of the population, while paying 43 per cent of the entire income tax. T o this the municipal taxation must be added, so that, as far as Prussia is concerned (and similar conditions probably prevailed in other Federal States), there is no ground for W agner’s statement that it m ay be doubted, whether tax a tion according to capacity is realized in the legislation of the Empire, Fed eral States, and municipalities. Trade, commerce, and industry, which 805 « N at ion a l M onet ary Commission p ay b y far the greatest part of the taxes, are also burdened with the tremendous burden put on them b y “ social” legislation. 34. “ Die Reichsfinanznot u. die Pflichten des Deutschen Volks wie seiner politischen Parteien. E in Mahnwort eines alten Mannes” (Berlin, Puttkam m er & Miihlbrecht, 1908), p. 14. 35 See inter alia the minutes of the meetings of the Bank Inquiry Commission, concerning points I I I - V of the list of questions; 1909, p. 86. 36. T hus in Prussia, according to the Reichsanzeiger of February 11, 1909, from 1907 to 1908 alone the incom e-tax-paying population increased in the proportion of 4,445 to 4,758. 37. According to the calculations of R . E . M ay (in Schmoller’s Jahrb. f. Gesetzgebung u. Verwaltung, 1899, pp. 271-3 14 ) the following condi tions prevailed in the German Empire at the end of the nineties: About one-half of the total national income, or 12,750,000,000 marks, belonged to that part of the earning population (18y$ millions) possessing incomes below 900 marks; a little more than one-fourth of the total national income, or 6.500.000. 000 marks, belonged to that part of the earning population (3% millions) possessing incomes from 900 to 3,000 marks; and not quite a quarter of the total national income, or 5,750,000,000 marks, belonged to that part of the earning population (one-third million) pos sessing incomes exceeding 3,000 marks. 38. Grundriss, II, pp. 460-461. 39. Volume II I of the Appendix to the German finance reform bills of 1908: Materialien zur Beurteilung der Wohlstandsentwicklung Deutschlands im letzten Menschenalter (No. 1043 of the Parliamentary publica tions of 1908), pp. 1 4 -15 ; according to the Reichsanzeiger of February 11, 1909, the assessed taxable income of this group amounted to 5.450,975.235 marks. 40. Ibid. 41. Walter Troeltsch, Uber die neuesten Veranderungen im deutschen Wirtschaftsleben, p. 144. A t the same time it remains true that, as already mentioned (footnote 33) in Prussia in 1908 there were still about 18.000. 000 souls, or 47.22 per cent of the population of about 38,000,000, exempt from taxation, and that of the balance, 16,000,000, or 42.54 per cent, were assessed in the lowest income ta x group (with incomes exceeding 900 marks and below 3,000 marks). 42. W ith the (rather unimportant) reservations made on p. 17 of the Materialien zur Beurteilung der Wohlstandsentwicklung Deutschlands im letzten Menschenalter, already cited several times. 43. Allowance has to be made, of course, for the fact that one person m ay have several savings bank books. 44. For the period between die neuesten Veranderungen 1891-1897 see Walter Troeltsch, Ueber im Deutschen Wirtschaftsleben, p. 197; for 1904 and 1906, Statistisches Jahrbuch f. d. Preuss. Staat fur 1908 (Berlin, 1909), p. 144; for 1907 the “ Materialien” quoted in note 42. 806 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s 45. In 1908 there were 169 credit banks with a capital of a t least 1,000,000 marks each. 46. See p. 21 of the “ Materialien,” quoted in note 42. 47. T h at is, from 1880 till the end of 1905. 48. Statist. Jahrbuch. f. d. Deutsche Reich (twenty-ninth year, 1908), pp. 46-47, and H. v. Scheel, Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft am Schlusse des 19. Jahrhunderts (Berlin, 1900, Puttkam m er & Miihlbrecht), p. 91. 49. Materialien zur Beurteilung der Wohlstandsentwicklung Deutschlands, pp. 46-47. According to Von Halle (loc. cit., pp. 48-49) the total amount of power developed b y engines in all the works in Germany in 1895 was only about 3,500,000 horsepower. 50. For 1843 see above, p. 33, for 1895 and 1907 see the Statist. Korrespondenz of February 3, 1909 (Year X X X V ) , p. 2. 51. For the census of occupations of 1895 see Paul Voigt, Deutschland u. der Weltmarkt, Preussische Jahrbiicher, vol. 91 (January and April, 1898), p. 271. 52. Geh. O ber.-R eg.-R at Dr. Trau gott Muller, Industriestaat oder Agrarstaat? E in Beitrag zur wirtschaftlichen Wertschatzung der deutschen Landwirtschaft (in Mentzel and von Eengerke’s Landwirtschaftlicher Hiilfs- und Schreibkalender, 55th year, 1902, Part II, pp. 55-85). 53. See Statistisches Jahrbuch f. d. Deutsche Reich (29th year), 1908, p. 27: 5»558,3i7 agricultural establishments in 1895 (last census published), as compared to 5,276,344 in 1882. 54. Ibid., 43,243,742 hectares (1 ha = about 2 % acres) in 1895 as com pared to 40,178,681 in 1882. 55. Ibid., p. 39, tab. IV : Live stock in the Federal States according to the census of 1907. The figures show th at the number of sheep de creased from 24,999,406 at the beginning of 1873, to 9,692,501 at the end of 1900, and 7,681,072 at the end of 1907, whereas the number of horses increased from 3,352,231 at the beginning of 1873 to 4,195,361 a t the end o f 1900, and to 4,337,263 at the end of 1907; cattle increased from 15,776,702 to 18,939,692 at the end of 1900, and 20,589,856 at the end of 1907; pigs from 7,124,088 to 16,807,014 at the end of 1900, and to 22,080,008 at the end of 1907, or more than threefold. 56. While the average prices of wheat rose about 60 per cent, of rye about 69 per cent, and of barley about 90 per cent in the old provinces of Prussia in the periods 1831-1840 to 1871-1880, they fell again (seeTroeltsch, loc. cit., pp. 32 and 36) despite high corn duties, which were introduced in 1879, raised in 1887, but reduced again b y the commercial treaties of 1892 and 1894. Compared to the prices of 1876-1880 the prices of wheat in Prussia fell during 1881-1885 10 per cent, 1886-1890 20 per cent, 1896 36 p ercen t; the prices of rye, 1881-1885 4 Per cent, 1886-1890 15 per cent, 1896 29 per cent; the prices of barley, 1881-1885 7 per cent, 1886-1890 17 per cent, 1896 21 per cent 57. According to Troeltsch (loc. cit., p. 44), in the agricultural com munes of Prussia there was an increase of registered mortgages amounting 807 N a t io n a l M onetary Commission to 190,000,000 marks per annum, or a total increase of 2,100,000,000 marks, between 1896 and 1907. T he indebtedness of the farmers of 126 Wurttemberg rural communities increased 40 per cent between 1874 and 1894. In this connection Troeltsch establishes the fact, frequently cor roborated elsewhere, th at 80-90 per cent of the mortgage debts were due to the fact that persons acquiring an estate (by purchase or inherit ance) were compelled, either b y insufficiency of capital or b y excessive demands of co-heirs to incur excessive obligations. T his evil was aug mented b y overestimation of land values, due to an unhealthy develop ment in the prices of land. 58. Much can and must y e t be done to increase agricultural production; on the one hand, b y the agricultural exploitation of the heaths that still exist in considerable size, especially in the northwest of Germany; and on the other hand, b y the drainage and cultivation of the moors that cover some 500 German square miles, 400 of which could be reclaimed for purposes of agricultural cultivation. T his work, however, can not be carried out without a considerable extension of the present railways and canals. Unfortunately, however, the building of the latter is often opposed b y agriculturists themselves. (See M ax Schinkel in the steno graphic reports of the Bank Inquiry Commission, points I I I - V of the question sheet, p. 77.) 59. This, of course, ought not to be carried too far, as it m ay lead to endless sophistries in favour of agriculture, such as are presented b y some authors (see Trau gott Muller, loc. cit., p. 61), who include even railway, postal, and telegraph enterprises under agricultural undertakings, the em ployees consequently being classified under the heading of “ those engaged in agriculture as a secondary occupation.” 60. In direct contrast to trade, industry, etc., in which the number of independent persons decreased 12.6 per 1,000 during the same period, and the number of persons in a dependent position increased 30.5 per 1,000. 61. See Ludw ig Pohle, loc. cit., p. 22; also his Deutschland am Scheidewege (Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1902), p. 43 seq. 62. T h e statement frequently made, that agriculture, and agriculture only, creates new values, is incorrect. “ V alues” that are completely new can not be produced b y agriculture either, since at any rate such seed as is not produced b y national agriculture forms the basis of that a c tiv ity to the same degree that raw materials form the basis of industrial activity. Thus in agricultural as well as in industrial activ ity (different as they m ay be in detail), the process is always one of transformation or refinement, which in both cases merely increases the value of preexisting material. If, therefore, agriculture and industry are included in the “ productive occupations,” trade should be included therein b y the same right, since its value-increasing a c tiv ity consists in the transfer of goods from dis tricts where the supply is great to districts where the demand is great, independent of whether the goods meanwhile undergo additional manu facture or not. (See, among other authors: Richard 808 Ehrenberg, Der The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s Handel, seine wirtschaftliche Bedeutung, seine nationalen Pflichten und sein Verhaltnis zum Staate, Jena, G ustav Fischer, 1887.) 63. Ludw. Pohle, loc. cit., p. 23. M ax Sering, Handels- und Machtpo- litik, Stuttgart, 1900 (J. G. C otta Nachflg., vol. II, p. 5), does not go nearly so far, when he points out that “ as early as the beginning of the fifties, Germ any imported more rye, and since the middle of the seventies more wheat, than she supplied to foreign countries.” In i860 the excess of rye imports amounted to some 259,000 tons. 64. Werner Sombart, Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, 2nd ed., p. 411. 65. Huber is right when he says (loc. cit., p. 109), regarding the German textile industry, that the whole export trade depends on the oversea supply of wool and cotton. 66. See Werner Sombart, Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, 2nd ed., p. 447: “ The piece de resistance of the German exports consists to-day of high-class manufactured goods, containing great labor value (Arbeitswert) and little land value (Bodenwert). Germany, consequently, pays in an increasing measure for foreign soil with home labour.” 67. Statist. Jahrb. f. d. Deutsche Reich of 1909, Appendix, page 153. The special trade exports comprise, since March 1, 1906, the exports from the customs area (W irtschaftsgebiet), including domestic produce (exported under the supervision of the customs authorities and subject to excise or stamp duties), such as beer, spirits, salt, sparkling wines, playing-cards tobacco, and sugar; as well as the exports from the customs area, after further manufacture for home account. The customs area in the sense of these new statistics comprises the German Empire (without Heligoland and some communes in Baden), the Grand D uchy of Luxemburg, and the Austrian communes of Jungholz and Mittelberg. The imports for home consumption comprise, on the one hand, the imports into the free commerce of this customs area, directly or with cockets, including imports from free districts, bonded warehouses, etc., as well as the imports of goods for shipbuilding, etc., and the supplies of foreign goods for German ships outward bound; on the other hand, merchandise imported into the customs area for the purpose of being further manufactured for home account (ibid., p. 124). 68. If it were possible to compare the figures given b y R au with the present-day official import and export statistics (which in the absence of agreement of geographic areas, of bases and methods of calculation is impossible) it would appear that German export trade, as well as German import trade, had increased between 1842 and 1907 thirteenfold, while the population of Germany has not even doubled during the same period. 69. See Appendix, Volume III, to the Imperial finance reform bill of 1908: Materialien zur Beurteilung der Wohlstandsentwicklung Deutschlands im letzten Menschenalter (p. 52). 70. O nly in the case of food and cattle was there a decrease in exports, namely, b y 20.2 per cent, while the imports increased 131.7 per cent (ibid.). 809 National Monetary Commission 7 1 . F o r d etails, see p age 43 of th e A p p en d ix , V o lu m e I I I , to th e Im p e rial finance reform bill of 1908. 72. Ib id ., pages 3 7 -3 8 an d 53. 73. A p erm an en t ad verse b ala n ce of p a y m e n t is a lto ge th er im possible— th a t is to say, it w ou ld m ean b a n k r u p tc y . 74. In th a t case, and in th a t case only, w ill L u d w ig P o h le’ s fears p rove un foun ded (loc. cit., p. 26), th a t “ the increase in the a b so rp tiv e c a p a c ity of the hom e m ark e t denotes a c o n sta n t gro w th of G e r m a n y ’ s d epen dence on foreign countries, in stea d of an increase in her econ om ic independence. 75. E n ge l, in Z e itsch rift des S ta tis t. B ureaus, Berlin, 1875, vol. 4, p. 356. 76. W . So m b art, D e r m oderne K a p ita lism u s, II, p. 16. 7 7 . E n ge l, loc. cit., p. 457 e t seq. 78. D e u tsch e r O ekon om ist, 1885, 2 1st F e b ., p. 72. 79. V a n der B o r g h t’ s e ssay: “ A k tie n g e se lls c h a fte n ” in th e H an d w o rterb uch der S ta a tsw issen sch a ften (Jena, 1899, G u st. Fischer), V o l. I, pp. 1 9 2 -19 3 . 80. W ith reference to th e d istrib u tio n b y th e d ifferent branches, see p ar tic u la rly Ed. W agon , “ D ie finanzielle E n tw ic k lu n g deu tsch er A k tie n gesellsch aften v o n 1 8 7 0 -1 9 0 0 ” (Jena, 1903, G u st. Fisch er), esp e cia lly pp. 41 e t seq., 56 e t seq., 62 e t seq., 73 e t seq., 107 set seq. 81. A s la te as 1883 there were o n ly 104 m achin e b u ild in g com panies, w ith 193,240,000 m arks ca p ita l. 82. F ro m 18 7 0 -18 7 4 , fifty -n in e b rew ery com panies, w ith a c a p ita l of 72,000,000 m arks, w ere found ed (E d . W agon , loc. c it., p. 107). 83. D e u tsch e r O ek o n o m ist, 1901, 26th Ja n u a ry, p. 45. 84. S e e v . H alle, loc. cit., p. 94. 85. See D e u tsch e r O ek o n o m ist for 7 th Jan ., 1905; 6th Jan ., 1906; and 18th Jan ., 1908. 86. A c c o rd in g to in form atio n co lle cte d b y th e Im p erial S ta tis tic a l Office the figures w ere 2 17 com panies, w ith a c a p ita l o f 260,700,000 m arks. 87. T h e se figures are b ased on m aterial co lle cte d b y th e Im perial S t a tistic a l Office. 88. E d . W a go n , loc. cit., pp. 1 6 6 -1 6 7 . (T h e rate o f d iv id en d , how ever, is reduced in case th e sto ck w a s b o u g h t a b o v e par.) 89. F o r the in te rp re ta tio n of “ n et in com e,” see E d . W agon , loc. c it., p. 12; D iv id e n d incom e, m inus the losses g iv e n in the b ala n ce sheets, or those arising from liq u id a tio n s an d failures. 90. F ro m 18 72-19 0 0 , e x c lu siv e of m achin e facto ries an d r a ilw a y -su p p ly factories. 91. See L . G lier, Z u r neuesten E n tw ic k e lu n g der am erik an isch en E ise n in dustrie, in S ch m oller’s Ja h rb u ch fur G e setzge b u n g, e tc., 2 7 th yea r, N o. 3, p. 229-230. 92. S ta tis t. Jahrb. f. d. d eu tsch e R eich , 29th P- 3° * . tab le 19. year, 1908. A p p en d ix, In 1908 the G erm an o u tp u t o f p ig iron am o u n ted to o n ly 11,805,000 ton s (ibid., 30th year, 1909, A p p e n d ix , p. 28*, tab . 20). 810 T h e G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s 93. L . G lier, Z u r gege n w artigen L a g e der am erikan isch en E ise n in d u strie, in C o n ra d ’s Jahrbiicher, 3d series, vol. 31, p. 591 (F eb ., 1908). 94. H e n ry V oelcker, E ise n u. S tah l, in th e m aga zin e “ D ie W e ltw ir t- s c h a ft,” ed. b y v . H alle, Y e a r I I I , 1908, P a r t II , p. 78. A cco rd in g to the Im perial s ta tistic s th e co n su m p tio n am ou n ted in 1904 to 166.1 kilogram s, an d in 1906 to 197.8 kilogram s per c a p ita . T h e se sta tistics, in c a lc u la t in g th e consum ption , s u b tr a c t th e ex p o rts of p ig iron, b u t n o t th e ex p o rts o f iron m an u factu res, an d thus arrive a t a larger co n su m p tio n figure per c a p ita . 95. See L u d w ig Pohle, D ie E n tw ic k e lu n g des deu tsch en W irtsch aftsle b en s im le tzte n Jahrhun dert, A p p e n d ix p. 145; S ta tis t. Jahrb. f. d. D e u ts c h e R e ic h , 29th yea r, 1908, A p p en d ix , p. 29*, ta b . 18 (for th e p eriod 1 8 8 7 1907); for v a lu e see E - Jiin gst, “ B e rg b a u ,” in th e m aga zin e “ D ie W e ltw ir ts c h a ft,” ed. v . H alle, Y e a r I I I , coal p ro d u ction in 1908, P a r t I I , p. 61. 1908 a m o u n ted to T h e G erm an 148,537,000 ton s (S ta tis t. Jah rb . f. d. D e u tsch e R e ic h , 30th year, 1909; A p p e n d ix , p. 27*, ta b . 19). 96. E . Jiin gst, loc. cit., p. 60, an d S ta tis t. Jahrb. f. d. D e u tsch e R eich , 30th year, 1909, p. 97. 97. R u d . E b e r sta d t, D e r D e u ts c h e K a p ita lm a r k t, L e ip zig , 1901, p. 64. 98. T h u s in (affiliated 1894 th e G esellsch aft fur elek tr. U n tern e h m u n gen B erlin w ith G es. fur elektr. the U n io n -E le k tr .-G e s ., A n la g e n G esellsch aft fur elektr. u. B ah n en , L o e w e -G r o u p ); 1895, D resden U n tern eh m u n gen die A k t .- (K u m m e r); K o n tin e n ta le (S c h u ck ert); B a n k U n tern eh m u n gen , Z u rich (A llgem . E le k tr.-G e s .); fur elek tr. 1896, D e u tsch e G es. f. elek tr. U n tern eh m u n gen , F r a n k fu r t a. M. (L a h m e y e r); S ch w eizerisch e G es. fu r elektr. In d u strie (Siem ens & H a ls k e ); 1897, E le k trisch e L ic h t-u n d K r a fta n la g e n A .-G . (Siem ens & H alsk e), A k tie n g e se llsch a ft fur E le k tr iz itiitsan lagen (H elios); 1898, E le k tra , D resden (S ch u ck ert). 99. O n th is an d the precedin g su bjects, see Friedr. F a so lt, D ie sieben grossten d eu tsch en E le k triz ita ts g e s e llsc h a fte n , U n te r n e h m e r ta tig k e it D resden, ihre E n tw ic k lu n g 1904; also Jos. L oew e, und D ie e lek tro tec h - nische In d u strie in : Sto ru n gen im d eu tsch en W irtsch aftsle b en , V o l. I l l , pp. 7 7 - 1 5 5 (p u blica tio n s of the V erein fur S o zia lp o litik , V o l. C V I I ) , 1903; E d . W a gon , loc. c it., p. 73 e t seq.; M a x Jorgens, F in an zie lle T ru stgesellsch a fte n (S tu ttg a r t, 1902, J. G . C o tta N a c h f.), p. 1x6 e t seq.; H . H asse, D ie A . E . G . (H eidelberg, W in ter, 1903). 100. 1896, H a lsk e ); “ S ie m e n s” 1897, g e s e llsc h a ft); 1898, d e u tsch e E le k trisch e B e trieb e G . m . b. H . E lek trizita tslieferu n gsge se llsch a ft B a yerisc h e E le k triz ita ts w e r k e E le k triz ita ts w e r k e (K u m m e r); A .-G . (Siem ens & (A llgem . E le k tr iz ita ts A .-G . (H elios); S iid - S iid d eu tsch e elek trisch e L o k a lb a h n e n (K u m m e r); 1900, E le k tr iz ita ts -W e r k e -B e tr ie b s-A k tie n g e s e ll s ch a ft (K u m m e r). bo om tim e, w h en A ll these co m pan ies (18 9 6 -19 0 0 ) w ere o rga n ized in th e general p u b lic to o k considerable in te re st in the shares o f such estab lish m en ts. 101. T h e se figures (tak en from E . B u d d e, E le k tro te ch n ik , in th e serial D ie W e ltw ir tsc h a ft, ed. v . H alle, y e a r I I I , P a r t II , 1908, p. 88). 8 11 T h e d e ta ils N at i on a l M onetary Commi s s i on here g iv e n from th e M o n atlich e N a ch rich ten iiber den au sw artigen H an del D e u tsch la n d s w ould seem to require considerable revision accord in g to the S ta tis t. J a h rb u ch f. d. D e u tsch e R eich , 29th year, 1908, pp. 1 5 7 -1 5 8 (thus, for in stan ce, th e v a lu e of th e in can d escen t lam p s ex p o rte d d u rin g 1907 a m o u n ted to 10,478,000 m arks an d n o t to 8,382,000 m arks, etc.). 102. See E d . W a gon , loc. c it., p. 62; G eh . O b e r -R e g .-R a t G u st. M uller, D ie chem isch e In dustrie, L eip zig, 1909, B . G . T eu b n er. A s far as th e fo l lo w in g sta te m e n ts h a v e been tak e n from the reports on th e ad m in istratio n of th e ch e m ica l tra d e asso cia tio n w e m u st n o t fo rge t th a t this association , w h ich w as estab lish ed on the b asis of the a c cid en t insurance a c t of the 6th of J u ly , 1884, requiring the em p loyer to insure his w orkm en a g a in st a c c i d en ts h a p p en in g to th em w h ile in his em p lo y , in cludes m a n y m inor trades w h ich are n ot, s tr ic tly speak in g, chem ical. T h e se are the illum in ant, fat, soap, an d oil trades; also the s a lt w orks, so far as th e y d o n o t belon g to m in ers’ associa tio n s (K n a p p s c h a ftsv e r b a n d e ) establish ed under the law s of th e several S ta te s. In a d d itio n to these are the roof felt an d roofing- paper factories, m an u factu rers o f rubber an d g u tta -p e rc h a goods, th e p re se rvin g w orks, w ith th e e x c e p tio n o f those ch ie fly occu p ied in p reservin g w ood; fin ally, the artificial m in eral-w ater trade. (See G u s ta v M uller, loc. c it., p. 27.) 103. S ta tis t. Jahrb. f. d . D e u tsch e R eich , 29th year, 1908, p. 47. 104. See R ic h a r d B rauer, C h em isch e In d u strie ,-in th e an n ual D ie W e ltw irtsch a ft, ed. v . H alle, Y e a r I I I , 1908, P a r t II , p. 9 1. 105. T h e to ta ls g iv e n b y R ic h a r d Brauer, loc. c it., p. 9 1, are incorrect as th e y are sta te d in m etric ton s o f q u in tals o f 100 k ilogram s. 1,000 k ilogram s in stead of m etric M oreover, his im p o rt an d e x p o r t figures seem to in clud e articles w h ich are either used n o t e x c lu s iv e ly or n o t a t all in the G erm an ch em ical in d u stry. 106. Ib id ., p. 91. 107. S ee R ic h . B rauer, loc. cit., p. 92. 108. S ta tis t. Jahrb. f. d. D e u tsch e R eich , 29th year, 1908, p. 47. 109. L u d w ig Pohle, D ie E n tw ic k lu n g des d eu tsch en W irtsch aftsleben s im le tzte n Jah rh u n d ert, p. 70 seq., esp e cially pp. 7 2 -7 3 . n o . L o c. c it., p. 77. i n . S ta tis t. Jah rb . f. d. D e u tsch e R e ic h , 29th year, 1908, pp. 46 an d 4 7. 1 12 . T h is in clu d es S t a t e railw ays, ra ilw a y s ad m inistered on a c co u n t of th e S ta te , a n d p u rely p riv a te railw ays. 1 13 . S ta tis t. Jah rb . fur das D e u tsch e R e ic h , 29th yea r, 1908, p. 113 . 114 . S ta tis t. Jahrb. fiir das D e u tsch e R eich , 1906, p. 66. 1903 th is n etw o rk 949,290,000 com prised 52,814.2 kilom etres (ibid., A t th e en d of 1905, p. 62); tra ve lle rs an d 390,741,000 ton s o f goods w ere co n v e y e d on th e sta n d ard g a u g e m ain an d bran ch lines d u rin g 1903 (ibid., 1905, p. 64, ta b . 2d). 1 15 . S ta tis t. Jah rb . f. d. D e u tsch e R e ic h , 30th yea r, 1909, p. 1 15 , ta b . 2d. 116 . W . S o m b a rt, D e u tsch e V o lk sw ir tsc h a ft, 2nd ed ., p. 267. 1 1 7 . S ta tis t. Jahrb. f. d. D e u tsch e R eich , 30th year, p. 118. 812 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s 1 1 8. Ib id ., p. 1 17, tab . 3. 119 . Ib id ., p. 112 , ta b . i b. 120. Ib id ., p. x i2 , tab . i b, an d p. 1 1 1 , tab . i a. 121. Ib id ., p. h i . 122. A ccord in g to th e m em orial presented to the R e ic h s ta g on th e o cca sion o f th e n a v a l bill o f 1899, e n titled “ D ie S teige ru n g der deutschen Seeinteressen v o n 1896 bis 1898,” w h ich co n ta in s th e a b o v e estim ate, th e to ta l v a lu e o f th e G erm an m erch an t m arine h a d increased from 1896 to th e end o f 1899 b y 6 6 % per cen t. T h e sum required to replace th e G erm an m erch a n t m arin e in case o f its loss m ig h t therefore be estim ated in 1899 a t lea st a t 750,000,000 m arks (p. 147). A furth er increase o f 14 per cen t of steam sh ip s to o k place du rin g th e n e x t year, sailing vessels decreasing 3 per cen t. m ig h t therefore be estim ated a t 640,000,000 to 650,000,000 m arks. in g to by T h e v a lu e o f th e G erm an m ercan tile fleet a t th e end of 1900 th e m em orial o f th e Im perial A d m ir a lty q u o ted A c c o rd ab o v e, d a te d D ecem ber, 1905, th e v a lu e o f th e G erm an m erch an t m arine a t th e end of 1905 am o u n ted to 810,000,000 m arks, as sta te d in th e te x t, w h ile th e co st o f repla cin g it w o u ld co n sid e ra b ly ex ceed 1,000,000,000 m arks. A ccord in g to th e H a n d b u c h der d eu tsch en A ktie n ge se llsch a fte n , ed. 1904 to 1905, I an d II , th e follow in g num ber of G erm an jo in t-s to c k sh ip p in g com panies e x iste d a t th e end o f 1903: O n e hun dred an d fiv e jo in t-s to c k com panies w ith a share c a p ita l of 415,019,000 m arks, 127,824,000 s to c k to th e m arks. com panies in m em orial o f an d o u tsta n d in g bonds of T h e a m o u n t of share an d loan c a p ita l o f th e jo in tH a m b u r g an d th e alone am ou n ted, accord in g a d m ira lty (D ecem ber, 1905) q u o ted B rem en ab o v e, to 443,000,000 m arks, aga in st 273,000,000 m arks a t th e end o f 1899. 123. S ta tis t. Jahrb. f. d. D e u tsch e R eich , 1908, p. 108. 124. S ee E m il F itg e r , E in J a h rzeh n t in Sch iffsbau, R eed erei un d S eeschiffahrt, B erlin, Leon h . Sim ion N ach fo lger, p. 22. 125. See th e m em orial q u o ted , p. 94; E rn s t v o n deu tsch en R eed erei of th e H alle, a d m ira lty , D ie (H an d els- und D ecem ber, E n tw ic k lu n g und M ac h tp o litik , V o l. 1905, alrea d y B e d e u tu n g der II, pp. 1 2 9 -1 7 4 , S tu ttg a r t, J. G . C o t t a ’s N a ch f., 1900); an d R eed erei u. S ch iffah rt, in th e an n u al D ie W e ltw irtsch a ft, ed. v o n H alle, y e a r I I I , 1908, p art I, In te rn a t. U ebersich ten , p. 83 seq. 126. See E m il F itg e r , loc. cit., pp. 49, 55, an d 5 6 -6 1 . 127. S ta tis t. Jahrb. fu r d. ta b . 13. D e u tsch e R eich , 30th yea r, 1909, p. 140, 128. S ee E m il F itg e r, »oc. cit. pp. 6 1, 64-68. 129. S ee B. H u ld erm an n , S u b v e n tio n e n der auslan dischen H a n d els- flo tten (B erlin, 1900, E rn s t Siegfr. M ittler & Sohn ), p. 39. 130. I t raised its c a p ita l in 1853, 1865, 1867, 1868, 1870, 1 8 7 1, 1872, 1874, *875 ( i ° j 877 th e c a p ita l w as reduced), 1887, 1888, 1897, 1898, 1899, 1900, an d 1905. 1 3 1. R e g a r d in g th e d e ve lo p m e n t of o th er large G erm an sh ip p in g co m panies see \\ . S o m b art, D ie d e u tsch e V o lk sw irtsch a ft, 2nd ed., A p p e n d ix 8 13 N at i on a l 26, p. 544. M onet ary Commission A m o n g the oth er G erm an sh ip p in g com panies are th e follow in g: D e u tsch e D a m p fsch iffah rtsge se llsch a ft K o sm o s; D e u tsch e L e v a n te -L in ie ; D e u ts c h -O s ta fr ik a -L in ie ; H am b u rg-S u d a m erik an isch e D a m p fe rg e se llsch a ft; D e u tsch -A u stra lisch e D a m pfe rge se llsch a ft; B rem er W oerm an n A frik a -L in ie ; D a m pfsch iffsgesellsch a ft L in ie; H a m b u rg - A rg o ; D am p fsch iffsgesell- s ch a ft H a n sa ; D am pfsch iffah rtsge se llsch a ft N e p tu n ; D am pfschiffsreederei Union. 132. T h e follow in g is ta k e n from K a r l Th iess, O rga n isatio n und V e rb an d sb ild u n g in der H an d elssch iffah rt (B erlin, 1903, E rn s t Siegf. M ittler & Sohn ). 133. T h e fo llo w in g d e ta ils are ta k e n in th e m ain from E m il F itg e r, loc. cit., p. 26. 134. W . S o m b art, D ie d e u tsch e V o lk sw irtsch a ft, 2nd ed., p. 284, an d A p p e n d ix 25 (O rgan isatio n o f in lan d n a v ig a tio n in th e m ain cen tres); p. 543135. S ta tis t. Jahrb. f. d. D e u tsch e R e ic h , 30th yea r, 1909, p. 129. 136. O f th e to ta l len gth , 2,4 3 7.77 kilom etres w ere n a v ig a b le b y vessels o f 1.75 m eter d ra ft; 3.082.12 kilom etres b y vessels of 1.50 m eter d r a ft, 7,064.07 kilom etres b y vessels o f 1 m eter d r a ft; 599.40 kilom eters b y vessels o f 0.75 m eter d ra ft; draft. 1,182.83 kilom eters b y vessels of less th a n 0.75 m ete? S e e S ta tis t. Jahrb. f. d. D e u tsch e R eich , 1904, p. 74. 1905, p. 7 1 , for corrections as to vessels. in tro d u ced in th e te x t. See ib id ., T h e se corrections h a v e been S ta tis t. Jahrb. f. d. D e u tsch e R eich , 1906, p. 75 g iv e s th e sam e figures, w h ile in th e v o lu m e for 1908, p. 100, th e to ta l len gth o f th e n a v ig a b le w a ters is g iv e n for th e 3 1 s t o f D ecem ber, 1902, as 13,793.4 kilom eters. 137. v . H alle, loc. cit., p. 78. O n p ages 1 2 8 -1 2 9 ° ? th e sam e w ork are found d e ta ils on th e sta tu s of th e im perial n a v y in 1900. 138. See th e Ju bilee m em orial p ublished b y th e d irectora te o f th e R eich s b a n k : “ D ie R e ic h s b a n k 1 8 7 6 -1 9 0 0 ,” G u s ta v Fisch er, Je n a (cited below as th e ju b ile e m em orial o f th e R e ic h s b a n k ), as w ell as th e s ta tis tic a l tab les su b m itte d to th e B a n k In q u iry C om m ission o f 1908, an d th e S ta tis t. Jahrb.f. d. D e u tsch e R eich , 29 th yea r, 1908, p p. 229-234, an d In te rn atio n a le U ebersich ten , pp. 7 0 -7 5 * ; K a r l v o n L u m m , D ie S te llu n g der N o te n b a n k en in der h e u tigen V o lk sw ir tsc h a ft (B erlin, 1909, J. G u tte n ta g ) ; L o u is K a tz e n stein, D ie dreissigjahrige G e s c h a fts ta tig k e it der R eich sb a n k , Berlin, L e o n hard S im ion N a ch f., 1906. R e g a r d in g th e q u estion s su b m itte d to the B a n k In q u iry Com m ission o f 1908, see p rin cip a lly : D ie V erh a n d lu n gen der B a n k -E n q u e te -K o m m is sio n , item s I - V of th e q u e stio n sheet, Berlin, 1909. F o r th e rest, Friedr. K o ch , D er L o n d on er G o ld ve rk e h r; (S tu ttg a r t & Berlin, 1905); E . S ch m alen b ach , D er R e ic h sb a n k -A u sw e is (Zeitschr. fur hand elsw issen sch aftliche F o rsch u n g, ed. Sch m alen b ach , y e a r I, 1906, N o. 3, pp. 7 7 -9 2 ; H eiligen stad t, D e r d eu tsch e G e ld m a rk t (in S ch m o ller’s Jah rb., vol. 31, pp. 71 seq .); A rth u r Feiler, D ie P ro b le m e d e r B a n k e n q u e te (Jena, G u s ta v Fischer, 1908), F e rd in a n d B e n d ixen , D a s 814 W esen des G eld e s (L eip zig, The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s Duncker & Humblot, 1900); Magnus Biermer, Die deutsche Geldverfassung (Giessen, 1908); Hermann Schumacher, Die deutsche Geldverfas- sung u. ihre Reform (in Schmoller’s Jahrb., Vol. X X X I I , p. 1 seq; R . Koch, Der Kredit bei der Reichsbank (Zeitschrift f. Handelswissenschaft und Praxis, year I, No. 4, July, 1908, pp. 1 15 -1 1 8 ); Heymann, Reichsbank und Geldverkehr (Berlin, 1908); A. Arnold, Die Bedeutung der Giro- Guthaben fur die Bankpolitik (in Bank-Archiv, year V I, No. 5, p. 155 seq.); Edgar Jaffe, Die Ursachen der letzten Geldteuerung und die Bankenquete (Deutsche Wirtschaftszeitung, 4th year, No. 13, p. 582 seq. and No. 14, p. 626 seq.). 139. The bank notes, according to article 3 of the bank law, were issued up to 1906 in series of 1,000 marks and 100 marks, whereas under the Imperial law of February 20, 1906, series of 50 and 20 marks were allowed, the amount of which, however, according to the declaration made in the Reichstag, remains at present limited to 300,000,000 marks. 140. According to the te x t of the Supplementary Bank Law of the 1st July, 1909. (Formerly it read: “ in exchange for German legal tender m oney.” ) 141. The 19,416 private giro accounts carried on March 31, 1908, included 6,366 accounts belonging to commerce, transport, and insurance; 7,763 accounts belonging to industries and trades; 369 accounts belonging agriculture and allied trades; 936 accounts of joint-stock banks; 2,31 accounts of bankers and financial businesses of all descriptions. 142. The total turnover in 1908 amounted to 269,946,259,800 marks. 143. Exclusive of the other clearing houses existing in 113 towns, the total turnover of which amounted in 1907 to 249,258,000,000 marks. 144. T h a t is the turnover in receipts and expenditures in the giro, transfer, deposit, bill, and collateral loan business, in discounted and col lected securities, and in other business of every description transacted with authorities and private persons. 145. As far as Germany is concerned it is incorrect to speak of unsecured bank notes, for bank- notes without an y security whatever do not exist there. (Article 17 of the bank law). 146. Cash in the sense of article 9 of the bank law consists of metal (Metallvorrat, see note 147), treasury notes of the Empire, and bank notes of the four note-issuing banks. 147. ‘ Metal in han d” consists, according to articles 9 and 17 of the bank law, of current German money, gold in bars or in foreign coins, the pound fine (German) being calculated at 1,392 marks. 148. Concerning these reasons, see m y remarks before the Bank Inquiry Commission of P- 259- 1908, on points I - V of the question sheet (Berlin, 1909), 149. As a rule a continued outflow of gold into foreign countries can only take place when the balance of paym ents is unfavorable to Germ any and the quotations on foreign bills threaten to surpass the upper gold point or have surpassed it, so that the export of gold becomes remunerative. 8i 5 (Se Commission m y statements in the Proceedings of the Bank Inquiry Commission, Berlin, 1909, p. 71.) 150. See m y statements in the Proceedings of the Bank Inquiry Com mission, p. 70. 151. H ighest amount (December 31, 1907), 364,297,700 marks; lowest amount (January 23, 1907), 54,090,000 marks. The figures for December 31, 1907, include a lombard loan of 67,630,200 marks to the Preussische Zentral-Genossenschaftskasse. 152. T he quota has been exceeded in 1881-1885 five times b y a total of 92,795,000 marks; 1886-1890 ten times b y a total of 585,771,000 marks; 1891-1895 four times b y a total of 253,598,000 marks; 1896-1900 seventyone times b y a total of 8,184,274,000 marks; 1901-1905 thirty-tw o times b y a total of 4,229,393,000 marks; 1906 seventeen times b y a total of 3,547,485,000 marks. marks; and 1907 twenty-five times b y a total of 5,376,670,000 During 1907 the note circulation of the Reichsbank exceeded its quota b y more than 58,000,000 marks on an annual average; on December 31, 1907 (a very abnormal year), the excess above the quota of notes exem pt from taxation attained the record amount of 625,974,363 marks. 153. The literature of cartels is so extensive that it is almost impossible to survey it. In an appendix to the second edition (German) of this book a list of the most important cartel literature from 1883-1905 was given. 154. Menzel (Report a t the general meeting of the Verein fur Sozialpolitik, 1894, p. 31 seq., and “ Die Kartelle und die Rechtsordnung,” p. 12 seq.) shows that associations for the limiting of competition, and for the monopolizing of certain branches of trade, industry, and transportation existed as far back as mediaeval and ancient times. He refers to the two constitutions, 473 A. D. and 483 A. D., in the times of the Roman Empire (Cod. lib. 4. T it. 59) under the title “ On monopolies, and illicit agreements of traders, also on prohibited and unlicensed agreements of tradesmen, employers, and bath-keepers.” The constitution of Emperor Zeno, 483 A. D., deals wr ith monopolies not only in food (especially corn) but also in articles of common use and labor. In the legislation of the ancient German Empire, the Imperial decrees of 1512, 1524, 1530, and 1532, and the imperial police regulations of 1548 and 1577, provide severe penalties for “ Monopolia und schadlichen Furkauf,” (monopolies and harmful sale). “ However, they do not appear to have met with any notable degree of success/’ (Report, p. 34; separate edition, p. 14.) The Gewerbeordnung does not contain any clause for cartels similar to article 152 regarding labor contracts. 155. As early as 1862 the cartel of Rhenish tin-plate factories, as well as the Cologne tin-plate combine, were in existence. 1863, the German rail combine. T o them was added, in The beginning of the German salt works cartel dates from 1868, the potash syndicate from 1870 (Bucher in the Publications of the Verein fur Sozialpolitik, L X I, pp. 141-142). 816 I The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s 156. Consequently (as opposed to Sombart, Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, 2nd ed., p. 344), the fact that m any cartels were formed only after crises, and to some extent at the beginning of more prosperous times is only a seeming deviation from this rule. Brentano (Proceedings of the Verein fur Sozialpolitik, L X I , p. 176) calls the cartels “ a product of necessity.” He says: “ T he necessity of cartels is rooted to-day in the constant growth of fixed, untransferable capital in distinction to the predominant liquid capital of former times.” He does not fail to point out, however, that this, of course, refers only to the cartels of producers and not to the cartels of traders. 157. See among others Stieda, Schriften des Vereins fur Sozialpolitik, B X I, p. 5; Kleinwachter, Die Kartelle (1883), p. 126, and in the H andworterbuch der Staatswissenschaften, 2nd ed., Jena, 1900, vol. V, p. 39; Jos. Grunzel, liber Kartelle (1902, pp. 8 and 12). 158. See especially P. F . Aschrott, Die amerikanischen Trusts als W eiterbildung der Unternehmerverbande, in Braun’ s Archiv fiir soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik (1889), vol. II, p. 383-418, and Jeremiah W. Jenks, Die Trusts in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika (Conrad’s Jahrb. f. Nat.-O ek. und Stat., 3rd. series, vol. 1, p. 1 seq., 1891). 159. Tariff measures, however, in so far as they are intended to check an abusive business policy on the part of the cartels— that is, b y reducing or moderating import duties on cartel products, or b y introducing export duties on cartel products— are always a two-edged sword, since they react in other directions, and a doubtful as well as questionable weapon, because they strengthen foreign competition. Some of these objections (although not all) apply to the com bating of an incorrect cartel policy b y means of railway tariffs, i. e., through facilitating the importation of competing prod ucts through lower freight rates, and rendering the exportation of cartel-made articles more difficult through higher freight tariffs. Other restrictive means in the economic field would be the promoting of com petitive concerns, the acquisition of such undertakings b y the State, or the endeavor to obtain as decisive an influence as possible on the price policy of cartels through state participation in cartel undertakings. (This experiment was to have been made in the well-known “ H ibernia” case.) the promotion of cartels of consumers. A further means would be A “ smaller rem edy” for relieving the finishing industry (“ weiterverarbeitende Industrie” ) somewhat from the pressure of raw material cartels b y means of duty-free importation of articles destined for re-exportation after they have undergone a finishing process exem pt from customs d u ty (“ zollfreier Veredlungsverkehr” ) is of service only to export industries, and then only to an inconsiderable extent. 160. See von Halle, loc. cit., p. 47. 161. Some of these complaints can only be remedied b y combinations of consumers, which in the face of the cartels of producers are becoming more and more an urgent economic necessity, as well as b y the better organization of the distributing and commission agencies. 90311“— 11----- 53 817 162. R eichstag Publications, n t h legislative period, II session, 1905-6, No. 4. 163. Ibid., n t h legislative period, II session, 1905-6, No. 351. 164. Ibid., 12th legislative period, I session, 1907, No. 255. 165. Ibid., 12th legislative period, I session, 1907-1909, No. 1019. 166. I t is exceedingly interesting to note that these two charges have also been brought against the United States Steel Corporation founded in 1901. Lage Glier demonstrates convincingly in his treatise “ Zur gegenwartigen der amerikanischen Eisenindustrie,” written in February, 1908 (Conrad’s Jahrb., I l l series, vol. 35, p. 587 seq.), that the corporation displayed great moderation in the fixing of prices of manufactured prod ucts during the first boom (1901 to 1902-3), although the prices for foundry raw iron which the corporation neither produced, bought, nor sold, rose b y about 34 per cent (pp. 599-601); it held, however, tenaciously to its high prices (a proceeding approved of b y Glier) during the period of reaction (1903-4), for a reduction in price would not have caused a greater demand. 167. Although the United States Steel Corporation during the last crisis refrained in the main from selling to foreign countries and endeavored to bring about a recovery solely through enormous limitations of output, the chief reason for such procedure was that foreign markets at the time were not capable of absorbing goods even at the lowest prices. Subsequent events have proved, however, that this policy was not able to restore a healthy tone to the American market, so that in the event of another crisis a different policy m ay be pursued b y the Americans. 168. See the remarks of Director Mannstaedt in the “ Verbal delibera tions” (“ kontradiktorische Verhandlungen” ) concerning German cartels, Part 6, “ Verhandlungen fiber den Halbzeugverband am 2. und 3. Decem ber 1903,” p. 465. I consider these remarks to be as correct as they are important. 169. T h a t the so-called “ m ixed” (“ gem ischt” ) works suffered less than the “ p u r e ” (“ reine” ) works, and the reasons therefor, are well known. 170. The Rhenish-W estphalian and the Siegerland Pig Iron syndicates ceased to exist, for the time being at any rate, on January 1, 1909, certain difficulties preventing their prolongation; on the other hand, a plate-glass sale combine was formed among a number of Siegerland works. the Upper Silesian P ig Iron Syndicate, see note 171. A s regards The manufacturers of pig iron in Rhineland and Westphalia are therefore in the same position they w ere before the nineties, namely in a state of free competition. r Neither has a prolongation of the Lorrain-Luxemburg Pig Iron Syndicate hitherto proved feasible. 171. For what follows see Volcker, L ’ E ta t actuel de l’industrie siderurgique allemande et son organisation (Revue Economique Internationale, vol. I l l , No. 4, December 15-20, 1904, p. 727 seq.), and J. Kollmann, Der Stahlwerksverband (in the “ N atio n ” 22d year, Nos. 18-22, February 4-25, 1905). Meantime hearings (“ kontradiktorische Verhandlungen” ) have taken place in the Imperial Office of the Interior regarding the Stahl- 818 1 The G e r m a n werksverband-Akt.-Ges. G r e a t at Diisseldorf, and werksverband (Limited) in Berlin. B a n k s the Oberschlesischer Stahl- Most of the Upper Silesian Works, quitting the last-mentioned union in April, 1907, entered the Diisseldorfer Stahlwerksverband, and subsequently founded, on June 27, 1907, the Obersclilesische Stahlwerks-Gesellschaft (Limited) in Berlin for the com mon sale of the products B which had been released (freigegeben) b y the Diisseldorfer Stahlwerksverband. 172. Further, the shortening of the time of paym ent for domestic buyers to fifteen days after delivery (foreign buyers have to p ay immediately after presentation of bills of lading), and the limitation of discount for domestic buyers (no discount is allowed to foreign customers) will exercise a favor able influence if really carried out, not only on the Stahlwerksverband itself but far beyond its domain. On the other hand, a great and serious defect in the organization of the Stahlwerksverband consists in its placing on the market (at present) only 3 groups of its products, whereas the bal ance (products B), principally coarse and fine sheet iron, wire, bar iron, and pipes, are sold b y the works themselves at their own prices; the products, however, are alloted among the different works according to a fixed quota. Products B cause keen competition among the various works, with the exception of rolled wire, for which there is a special syndicate, whereas for the drawn wire manufactured from the rolled wire, a price convention has been established since the beginning of January, 1909. 173. “ Die Unzulanglichkeit der.heutigen Schutzzollgesetzgebung fur die Eisenindustrie.” 174. In the rail cartel, the English share was fixed at 53.50 per cent, the German share at 28.83 Per cent, and the Belgian at 17.67 per cent. T he accession of the French works (later on) caused the total to be raised to 104.8 per cent for the first year, to 105.8 per cent for the second year, and to 106.4 per cent for the third year, in which the French participated to the extent of 4.8, 5.8, and 6.4 per cent respectively during the three years. G erm any’s share, after the accession of the American works, amounted to 21 p ercen t. In the girder cartel (from which the English kept aloof) 73.45 per cent was allotted to the Germans, 15.05 per cent to the Belgians, and 11.50 per cent to the French; the latter, however, were to receive a larger quota were the French exports to exceed those of 1903. 175. See L. Glier: Zur neuesten Entwicklung der amerikanischen Eisenindustrie, in Schmoller’ s Jahrbuch f. Gesetzgebung u. Verwaltung, 28th year, No. x, p. 150 seq.; earlier articles see ibid., 27th year, No. 3, p. 229 seq., and No. 4, p. 43 seq. 176. Sombart (Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, 2nd ed., p. 203) also says: “ Doubtless a good share of the growth of German economic a c tiv ity m ay be ascribed to this interest taken b y banks and bankers in productive economic activity, hampering as it m ay have been for the development of the banking business proper (?). Banks have been d irectly the promoters of the spirit of enterprise in Germany; they have been pacemakers for industry and trade.” 819 National Monetary Commission 177. T he statement made b y Paul Wallich (loc. cit., pp. 6, 25) that in the beginning of 1870 the Discontogesellschaft had the largest capital and the Darmstadter Bank the next largest is thus seen to be erroneous. 178. The capital of the Mitteldeutsche Kreditbank originally (in 1856) amounted to 8,000,000 thalers, of which 3,000,000 remained in the hands of the institution, while in 1859 1,000,000 thalers’ worth of the bank’s own stock was redeemed. In 1869, that is to say, near the end of the first period, the paid-up capital of 4,000,000 thalers was increased by 1,000,000 to a total of 5,000,000 thalers, equal to 15,000,000 marks. 179. This was the last Konzession granted to a domestic bank, since the concession system was abolished soon after. 180. Compare M ax Wirth, H andbuch des Bankwesens, 3d ed. 1883, p. 377. Cologne, It m ay be noted in this connection, that this book, though frequently quoted as an authority, is in m any points superficial and unreliaable. In particular, the author’s judgments and conclusions are largely biased b y his strong prejudice against the credit banks and should there fore be accepted w ith caution. For that matter, the author’s own text under the heading “ German private ban ks” comprises, all told, about 5 pages (pp. 376-379 and 398-399); the rest is statistical material. 181. Compare, for example, Georg Schanz, article “ B an ken ” in E lster’s Worterbuch der Volkswirtschaft, Vol. I, p. 310. 182. Compare Waldemar Muller, Die Organisation des Kredit-und Zahlungsverkehrs in Deutschland, in Bankarchiv, Vol. V I I I (1909), Nos. 7, 8 and 9. 183. Ibid. 184. In English banking literature the term “ banker” is applied to a person who obtains outsiders’ funds for the purpose of circulating them for profit; in case a person loans his own capital, he is regarded as a capi talist or a merchant, but not a banker. 185. On this point see among others Ad. Wagner in Schonberg’s H and buch, I, p. 437; Adolph Neumann-Hofer, Depositengeschafte und Depositenbanken (Leipzig, C. F. Winter, 1894), p. 39 et seq.; M. Schraut, Die Organisation des Kredits (Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot, 1883), p. 32. 186. Since M ay 31, 1879, deposits at the Reichsbank, in conformity with the well-grounded practice of most other central banks of issue, no longer bear interest. As a result deposits repayable after notice have become quite insignificant. A t the end of 1900 they amounted to only 319,881 marks, as shown in T able 43, p. 337, of the jubilee memoir of the Reichs bank (1876-1900). On the contrary, the other deposits (on giro account, exclusive of giro balances of the imperial and state treasuries) at the end of 1908 amounted to 285,303,000 marks. 187. Compare Waldemar Muller, loc. cit. (Bankarchiv, 8th year, No. 8, p. 116.) 188. I t is true that, according to a statement b y an expert before the bank inquiry commission, a certain percentage of the funds deposited at the savings banks (reported to be as much as one-third of the total) likewise 820 The G e r m a n G r e a t bear the same character of temporary deposits. B a n k s But, if this be so, it means that these very depositors, who are said to belong to the middle and higher classes, b y taking these funds to the savings institutions and not to the banks, deliberately intend to give to these funds the character of saving deposits and not of bank deposits. 189. Compare Waldemar Muller. (Bankarchiv, 8th year, No. 8, p. 117.) 190. Compare Deutscher Okonomist, July 28, 1900, p. 466, and Decem ber 2, 1905 (23d year, No. 1197, article Das Depositengeschaft der deutschen Banken); also Robert Franz, “ Die deutschen Banken im Jahre 1907” (reprint from the Deutscher Oekonomist, Berlin, 1908), p. 14; and Waldemar Muller, in Proceedings of the Third General Convention of German Bankers at Hamburg, Sept. 5 and 6, 1907, p. 107. 191. Proceedings of the Third General Convention of German Bankers, pp. 107, 115; Deutscher Okonomist, July 28, 1900, and Dec. 2, 1905; Rob. Franz., Die deutschen Banken in Jahre, 1906, p. n ; also Caesar Straus, Unser Depositengeldersystem und seine Gefahren, Frankfurt, 1892, p. 5, who states that “ up to the present time it was in the main large industry and the wholesale trades which were the depositors of the German bankers,” i. e. the same classes that take part in the giro business of the Reichsbank. 192. T h ey also include the so-called hoards (see Ad. Wagner, loc. cit., p. 61, et seq.), that is to say, quantities of precious metals which have not yet found employment, and the amounts held ready for the purpose of liquidating international payments, or for the arbitrage business. 193. T he report of the A. Schaaffhausen’scher Bankverein for the fiscal year 1907 gives the total amount of deposits as 72,335,365 marks and adds that “ of these deposits invariably b y far the larger part consists of interest-bearing funds turned over to us for long terms, varying for the most part from six months to one year.” 194. O tto Warschauer in Conrad’s Jahrbiicher, 3d series, Vol. X X V I I , * p. 480 (1904). See however the correct reasoning b y the same author on P- 35 his book: Physiologie der deutschen Banken, which appeared only one year before. 195. T he total amount to the credit of clients in the check departments of the German post office was 70,955,349.88 marks on Dec. 1, 1909. 196. This explains, among other things, Lansburgh’ s discovery (Das deutsche Bankwesen, p. 8) that in the case of the smallest joint-stock banks, with a capital up to 100,000 marks per bank, the amount of out siders’ moneys, i. e., deposits and credit accounts, exceeds their own capital about thirty-one times, while in the case of the large banks, with a capital of over 10,000,000 marks each (except the large Berlin banks) the ratio is only 2 to 1. Hence he infers that it is not the larger capital, bu t publicity, that attracts deposits to the joint-stock banks, inasmuch as an increase of capital is accompanied b y a percentual decrease of outsiders’ moneys. 197. According to the “ Materials bearing on the development of pros perity in Germany during the last generation” (Appendix III to report N at ion a l M o n et a r y Commission on the imperial finance reform bill of 1908, No. 1043 of Reichstag docu ments) pp. 18 and 19. 198. Statistisches Jahrbuch fur das Deutsche Reich, 1903, p. 187. 199. Ad. Weber, Depositenbanken und Spekulationsbanken. Leipzig, Duncker und Humblot, 1902, p. 82. 200. Edgar Jaf?6, Das englische Bankwesen, 1905, p. 135. 201. Verhandlungen des III Allgemeinen Deutschen Bankiertages, p. 96. 202. On not less than 11,117,700 accounts. 203. For 1905 data see Paul Marcuse’ s Beobachtungen fiber das Notenbankwesen in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, Berlin, 1907, p. 123. 204. Frequent references are made b y German writers to these enact ments (especially regarding the cash reserve) in advocacy of laws and regulations to govern the German bank deposit business. These refer ences are entirely unwarranted, for the American regulations mentioned in the te x t (p. 204) were intended to regulate not the deposit business of the National banks, bu t solely their note operations. (See Neumann- Hofer, loc. cit., p. 35.) 205. I have no means of verifying the data of Le Figaro of M ay 20, 1906, according to which a t the end of 1905 the 25 largest credit banks held 5,000,000,000 francs of deposits (the meaning of the term is not quite clear), an increase of more than 3,500,000,000 francs over the corresponding amount in 1885, when 1,159,005,000 francs were reported. In Austria, on the other hand, no systematic fostering of the deposit business appears yet to have commenced. According to an address b y Karl Morawitz, president of the Anglo-Austrian Bank, before the Austrian Economic Society (Bank Archiv, Year VI, no. 5, p. 64) the deposits in all Austrian credit banks amounted in 1895 to only 250,000,000 kronen ($50,750,000), while the deposits in the savings banks totalled about 5,000,000,000 kronen ($1,015,000,000). 206. Joh. Fr. Schar., Die Bank im Dienste des Kaufmanns (Leipzig, 1909, G. A. Gloeckner), pp. 122-126. 207. Deposits in the Darmstadter Bank since 1894 comprise all dailydue liabilities. 208. D ata taken from Deutscher Oekonomist, which up to 1908 in cluded among the Berlin banks the following institutions: Deutsche Bank, Disconto-Gesellschaft, hausen’scher Darmstadter Bank, Bankverein, Berliner Dresdner Bank, Handelsgesellschaft, A. Schaaff- Cominerz-und Disconto-Bank, Nationalbank ffir Deutschland besides five institutions of totally different character viz: Bank des Berliner Kassenvereins, Berliner Maklerverein, Amerika Bank (now liquidated), Deutsche Ueberseeische Bank and Deutsche Treuhandgesellschaft (German Trust Company). Since 1908 the five banks last named no longer figure among the “ Berlin banks” in the compilations of the Deutscher Oekonomist. 209. D ata taken from Robert Franz, Die deutschen Banken im Jahre, 1906, p. 11, und im Jnhre, 1907, p. 14. 822 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s 210. Compare, among others, Ad. Wagner, Beitrage zur Lehre von den Banken (Leipzig, 1857, Leopold Voss), p. 70: “ The banks b y means of credit on the basis of deposits m ay raise the purchasing power of a country.” 211. Compare Rud. Eberstadt, Der deutsche K apitalm arkt (Leipzig, 1901, Duncker & Humblot), p. 117 et seq. 212. Compare Felix Hecht, Die Mannheimer Banken 1870-1900 (Leip zig, 1902, Duncker & Humblot), pp. 39, 40. 213. See Felix Hecht, loc. cit., p. 40. 214. Ad. Weber, Die Rheinisch-Westfalischen Provinzialbanken und die Krisis, loc. cit., p. 342. 215. K . v. Lumm, Die Fntwicklung des Bankwesens in Flsass-Lothringen, 1901, p. 165. 216. Joh. Fr. Schar, Die Bank im Dienste des Kaufmanns, p. 136. 217. Edgar Jaffe, Das englische Bankwesen, p. 143. 218. Alfred Lansburgh, Die Verwaltung des Volksvermogens durch die Banken. Reprint from “ Die B a n k ” (Berlin-Charlottenburg, 1908), p. 13 et seq. 219. The money circulation through the German post office, which is still carried on to a large extent b y means of cash-shipments, amounted in 1907 to 13,500,000,000 marks, i. e. to about 37,000,000 marks daily. The money required b y the mortgage business, which until recently was also on a cash basis likewise reaches enormous amounts. Thus in Prussia alone the yearly amount of mortgages recorded averages about 4.5 billion marks, while the amount of mortgages cancelled each year is about 2.3 billion marks. 220. R ecen tly m any savings banks have made efforts to extend their ac tivity along commercial banking lines b y introducing the check system (in accordance with article 2, sec. 1 of the check act). In particular the tenth assembly of the Union of Baden Savings Banks, which met at Miillheim, Baden, on November 10, 1908, adopted resolutions, recommending the use of checks in the case of saving deposits, and proposing even the establishment of regular current accounts including the granting of credit. See the order of the Prussian minister of finance, dated April 20, 1909. 221. See especially Siegfried Buff, Der gegenwartige Stand und die Zukunft des Scheckverkehrs in Deutschland (Munich, 1907, E. Reinhardt). 222. In addition, 14,497 checks were redeemed which were not booked on check account, making a total of 61,816. 223. Gamp, Der landwirtschaftliche Kredit und seine (The needs of agricultural credit and how to meet them). 224. Verhandlungen des Kgl. 1906, p. 17. Befriedigung Berlin, 1883, (Preuss.) Landes-Okonomie-Kollegiums, 225. T he most important institutions for agricultural credit are the following: T he Imperial Federation of Agricultural Cooperative Societies of Germany (Reichsverband der deutschen landwirtschaftlichen Genossenschaften in Deutschland) and its cooperative agricultural bank at Darm stadt, with about 11,896 cooperative credit societies, savings and loan N a t io n a l M o n et a r y Commission banks, belonging in 1906 to the federation and its sub-federations; the General federation of cooperative rural societies for Germany (Generalverband landlicher Genossenschaften fur Deutschland [E. V.]) at Neuwied with 4,159 cooperative credit societies, savings and loan banks belonging in 1906 to the federation and its sub-federations; the Bavarian state F ed eration of agricultural loan associations and other agricultural coopera tive societies (Bayrischer Landesverband landwirtschaftlicher Darlehnskassenvereine und sonstiger landwirtschaftlicher Genossenschaften) with unlimited liability at Munich, with 2,259 cooperative societies, savings and loan banks in 1906; the Federation of agricultural cooperative societies of the Grand D uchy of Baden at Karlsruhe (Verband landwirtschaftlicher Kreditgenossenschaften im Grossherzogtum Baden), with 384 cooperative societies, savings and loan banks in 1907; the Federation of Wurttemberg cooperative societies (Verband wiirttembergischer Kreditgenossen schaften) at Ulm, with 90 cooperative societies in 1907; the Federation of cooperative societies of the Provinces of Posen and West Prussia (Ver band der Erwerbs- und Wirtschaftsgenossenschaften in den Provinzen Posen und Westpreussen) at Posen, with 225 cooperative societies in 1907; and in part of course also the (Schulze-Delitzsch) General federation of German cooperative societies (Ltd.) founded on self help (Allgemeiner Verband der auf Selbsthilfe beruhenden deutschen Erwerbs- und Wirtschaftensgenossenschaften), with 917 cooperative societies in 1907, the members of which constitute about one-third of the total membership in all (about 16,000) cooperative credit societies. For details on the above see “ Materialien zur Beurteilung der Wohlstandsentwicklung Deutschlands im letzten Menschenalter ” (Data bearing on the progress of prosperity in Germany during the last generation), vol. I l l of the Appendices to the Imperial Finance Reform Bill, of 1908, pp. 21-27. 226. See Lansburgh, loc. cit., pp. 31-32. 227. Waldemar Muller, Die Organisation des Kredit-und-Zahlungs- verkehrs in Deutschland (The organization of the system of credit and paym ent in Germany) in Bank-Archiv, Vol. V III, 1909, No. 7, p. 99. 228. Waldemar Muller, ibid. A s regards the Reichsbank, according to the returns made to the bank inquiry commission, there were in the entire German Empire 70,480 firms and individuals entitled to credit in its bill business. O f these (o) merchants and trading companies constituted 41 per cent, or in all 29,020 firms and individuals for the entire German empire; (b) manufacturers and industrial companies constituted 31 percent or 21,887 firms and individuals in the Empire; (c) land owners and estab lishments engaged in agriculture and the manufacture of agricultural products 14 per cent, 9,589 firms and individuals in the Empire; (d) co operative societies of all kinds x per cent or 883 firms and individuals in the Empire; (e) capitalists (Rentner), artisans, and similar tradesmen 13 per cent, or 9,101 firms and individuals in the Empire. According to the same official returns, the loans on collateral security made b y the bank and outstanding on Dec. 31, 1907 (on 5,666 collateral certificates) amounted 824 Th e G e r m a n to a total of 364,297,700 marks. G r e a t B a n k s Of this total, 1,972,200 marks were loaned to agriculture and allied rural industries (on 249 collateral certificates). 229. Thus among others Lansburgh in an article in “ Die B a n k ” pub lished separately under the title “ Die Verwaltung des Volksvermogens durch die B anken” (The administration of the national wealth b y the banks), p. 26, which I shall have occasion to notice later. 230. Materialien zur Beurteilung der Zusammenhange zwischen dem offentlichen Schuldenwesen und dem K apitalm arkt (material to elucidate the connection between the public debt system and the capital market). Appendices to Imperial finance reform bill of 1908, Part IV , No. 1087 of Reichstag Documents, p. 249. 231. “ According to competent estimates,” foreign countries had absorbed b y the middle of 1908 no more than 400,000,000 marks of imperial bonds and only between 80,000,000 and 105,000,000 marks of Prussian consols. (Ibid, p. 247, II.) 232. See Felix Hecht, Die Mannheimer Banken, 1870-1900, Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot, 1902, p. 23: “ Each credit bank . . . wants to be studied b y itself.” 233. Thus Felix Hecht, Lehren der Krisis (Lessons of the Crisis) (Sept. 15, I9°3). loc. cit., p. 140. The same author asserts however in his paper before the general meeting of the Mitteleuropaischer Wirtschaftsverein, Sept. 15, 1908 (Publications of the Verein, No. 6, p. 75) that the German tendency to engage in extensive oversea commerical and industrial enter prises has “ u ndoubtedly” taken much German capital from domestic industrial enterprises and from legitimate domestic credit.” 234. Adolph Weber ju stly says: “ No country has had so rich or so bitter an experience in the results of unsound credit-granting as England.” (Depositenbanken und Spekulationsbanken, p. 109.) 235. Banken Alfred Lansburgh, Die Verwaltung des Volksvermogens durch die (reprint from “ Die Bank,” Berlin-Charlottenburg, 1908). The merit of this book is that it has facilitated the study and appreciation of the smaller banks, with a capital of less than 1,000,000 marks down to 100,000 marks, and even of the smallest banks with a capital of less than 100,000 marks, b y supplying careful statistics (Tables IV and V and explanatory notes, which in the main are to the point). It should be said, however, that in this field Der Deutsche Oekonomist (mentioned b y the author on p. 24) had already done valuable preliminary work, though limited to the capital stock and the deposits (fremde Gelder) exclusive of reserves. Adolph Weber, in Die Rheinisch-Westfalischen Provinzialbanken und die Krisis (the Rhenish-W estphalian Provincial Banks and the Crisis), 1903, P- 3 fi2_ 3 7 L which Lansburgh does not mention, was, so far as I know, the first to study the activities of the small banks of this district in detail and with valuable results. B y supplying the omissions of the Okonomist and b y analyzing the small banks of all Germany, on the basis of their balance sheets and their activity, Lansburgh has performed a valuable service, par ticularly from the social standpoint. 825 We must not forget however, that n et a r y mm i s s i o n the deposits (fremde Gelder) in all these small banks amount to no more than 4 per cent of the deposits of all credit banks. In his later work, containing about the same material, the title “ The German Banking Sy stem ” is inappropriate and misleading, for the entire text covers only 63 pages, of which 12 are devoted to the small banks (pp. 22-23). Since the author admits this in his preface, he ought to have adopted a more appropriate title. In passing I wish to note that I do not share the author’s opinion (p. 7) that there are in Germany 6,000 private bankers. According to m y estimate the (purely) private bankers number about 4,000. 236. Especially on page 55 of the reprint from the periodical “ Die B a n k ” (Berlin-Charlottenburg), mentioned in note 235. 237. The first point is not regarded b y Lansburgh as a very serious reproach, as is evident from his remarks on p. 8: “ The old controversy as to whether Germany is to be an agricultural or an industrial state, has long ago been answered b y the general development of things. upheaval can reverse this development. No political T h a t would be a misfortune.” His wish is solely that the process should go on without shock b y w ay of evolution and not of revolution, and that the available funds of the nation should not be thrust into industry b y sheer force. In this he is entirely right. 238. Die Bank, No. 6, June 1908, p. 543. 239. Riesser, Scheckverkehr und Scheckgesetz (Check Circulation and Check Legislation), No. 4 of the “ Veroffentlichungen des Mitteleuropaischen Wirtschaftsvereins in Deutschland,” Berlin, Putkammer und Miihlbrecht, 1907. 240. The causes which compel the German credit banks to extend cur rent account credit preferably to trade and industry, and only to a slight extent to craftsmen, small traders and agriculturists, have been mentioned briefly before (p. 223 and following). 241. The number of such persons would thus be counter-balanced in a remarkable w ay b y the number of persons who according to the complaints heard in savings banks circles, have been won aw ay from them b y the credit banks, one third of whose total deposits are claimed to be made up of “ saving deposits.” 242. “ Die Bank,” June, 1908, p. 544. 243. See Herman Mauer, Das landschaftliche Kreditwesen Preussens (The Prussian System of Cooperative Land Credit), (Strassburg, Karl J. Triibner, 1907); Felix Hecht, Die Landschaften und landschaftsahnlichen Kreditinstitute in Deutschland (the Agircultural Credit federations, and similar organizations in Germany), Vol. I, Statistics (Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot, 1908). 244. Die Organisation des langfristigen gewerblichen Kredits (in the Publications of the Mitteleuropaischer Wirtschaftsverein, No. 6, pp. 59-86.) 245. Die Mannheimer Banken, 1870-1900, Leipzig, Duncker und Humblot, 1902. Lehren der Krisis. Paper read at the general meeting of the 826 Verein fur Sozialpolitik, 15 September 1903 (Vol. C X I I I of the publications of the Verein fiir Sozialpolitik), and monograph on “ Die Organisation des gewerblichen langfristigen Kredits (The Organization of long-time industrial credit), 1908. 246. A larger degree of publicity, as for instance the more frequent publication of summary balance sheets (Rohbilanzen), while practicable per se, is not likely to throw much more light on the condition of the institution 247. Berlin, Puttkam m er & Miihlbrecht, 1909, p. 340-361. 248. In “ Die Lehren der Krisis,” p. 141, and in the monograph on “ Die Mannheimer B an ken /’ p. 45 249. Ad. Weber, Die rheinisch-westfalischen Provinzialbanken, in the Publications of the Verein fiir Sozialpolitik, Vol. C X , p. 344. In this monograph— long before Lansburgh,— the ac tivity of the small banks in the Rhine country and Westphalia has been treated in great detail and duly appreciated, pp. 362-371. 250. So far as we can foresee, this policy of the mortgage banks (except in a few instances where loans are made on warehouses) is not likely to be changed, even if it be true that the mortgage bank act (art. 12) does not stand in the w ay of loans on factories, as Ernst Sontag tried to prove (Die Griindung einer Industrie-Hypothekenbank— [The Establishment of a mort gage bank for Industry], K attow itz, Gebr. Bohm, 1909). The mortgage banks are not likely to regard factories as easily marketable risks nor must they underestimate the risk that the buildings m ay remain idle and yield no return. 251. Waldemar Muller (Bank-Archiv No. 7, Jan. 1, 1909, p. 98). 252. See O tto Jeidels, Das Verhaltnis der deutschen Grossbanken zur Industrie (The relation of the great German banks to industry) Leipzig, Duncker und H umblot , 1905, p 34. In just such cases however, the central institution proposed b y Hecht would not be authorized to inter vene (Veroffentlichungen des Mitteleuropaischen Wirtschaftsvereins, Berlin, 1908, vol. 6, No. 5, p. 79). 253. We m ay readily suppose, for instance, that the repayment in annuity form of long-time industrial loans granted b y the credit banks m ay be made a normal part of the contract in the same w ay as is proposed in connec tion with the central bank. 254. The question of the profitableness of the enterprise (Veroffent lichungen, p. 85) which Hecht prefers to leave untouched would of course be largely affected by the greater or smaller amount of capital stock; but on this point, too, Hecht has nothing to say. 25 5 - This is also the opinion of Karl Diehl, Der Bau einer neuen Organi sation des langfristigen industriellen Kredits (Plan for a new organization of long-time industrial credit), in the Bank-Archiv of March 15, 1909, Vol. V III, No. 12, p. 190. The article contains a number of other perti nent criticisms of the proposed central institution. See also Frankfurter Zeitung (Abendblatt) of Sept. 25, 1908, and the criticisms of Bank Director 827 m m i ss i on Freiherr von Pechmann, in the Veroffentliehungen des Mitteleuropaischen Wirtschaftsvereins, No. 6, pp. 86-95; also A. M. Ernst Sontag, op. cit 256. Eugen Lopuszanski, Einige Streiflichter auf das osterreichische Bankwesen (Some side-lights on the Austrian bank system) in Volkswirtschaftliche Wochenschrift of Al. Dorn, Vol. L, No. 1305, Dec. 31, 1908, P- 4 3 7 257. See Veroffentliehungen des Mitteleuropaischen Wirtschaftsvereins, No. 6, p. 75. 258. It is to be noted, however, that in the transactions of the Mitteleuropaische Wirtschaftskonferenz in Berlin, M ay 17 and 18, 1909, H echt himself to all appearances assumed the necessity of legislative regulation of the matter, which he evidently had not contemplated before. 259. Security in the shape of a guarantee or a life insurance policy pledged is of little practical consequence in connection with the bonds discussed above, so that we m ay safely ignore such cases here. Loew y (Rawitsch) is of a different opinion (Bank-Archiv, Vol. V III, p. 241, et seq.); on principle he is in favor of the idea of a central institution. 260. T he law (art. 1) becomes applicable the moment it is found that the object of the a c tiv ity of the enterprise is actually directed to this end. I t makes no difference whether this object of the undertaking is specifically indicated in the charter or by-law s or not; otherwise it would be very easy to make article 1 of the mortgage bank act inoperative, b y simply omitting to mention in the charter or by-law s this object of the undertaking. 261. Ernst Sontag, op. cit. 262 Veroffentliehungen des Mitteleuropaischen Wirtschaftsvereins, No. 6, p. 66. 263. See Felix Hecht, Denkschrift fiber die Organisation des gewerblichen langfristigen Kredits, p. 10. 264. See Siegfried Buff, Das Kontokorrentgeschaft im deutschen Bankgewerbe (current-account transactions in German banking). J. G. Cot- tasche Buchhandlung Nachf., Stu ttgart & Berlin 1904 (issued as No. 60 of the Volkswirtschaftliche Studien, edited b y Brentano & Lotz). 265. See Joh. Friedr. Schaer, Die Bank im Dienste des Kaufmanns (the bank and its service to the merchant), Leipzig, G. A. Gloeckner, 1909, p. 19. 266. In its very first annual report (1853) the Darmstadter Bank stated that in accordance with the instructions of the government of the Grand D uchy of Hesse, the authorities of the customs department granted credit on customs duties to all merchants on their bills provided with the guar antee (A val) of the bank. 267. We do not agree with Joh. Fr. Schaer’s view (loc. cit., pp. 23-24) that under the provisions of the law governing bank deposits, “ the bank having the care of securities, is entitled to represent the shares at ' ' gen eral meeting, unless the depositor has signified his wish to the contrary” (see Riesser, Kommentar zum Bankdepotgesetz, 2d ed., Berlin, 1906, O tto Liebmann, p. 42, sec. 3, d, /?). On the contrary the bank must not assume 828 1 ______ :_ _ T h e G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s to represent the shares unless specifically authorized b y the depositor, for such representation involves a “ disposition” of the shares, limited though it be, to which the bank taking care of the securities is not entitled. The authorization need not however be made out in this case in the form prescribed in article 2 of the bank deposit law. 268. Bank-Archiv, Jan. 15, 1909, Vol. V I I I , No. 8, pp. 114 -15 . 269. Substantially the same description is given Schaer, loc. cit., p. 46, B, a. by Joh. Friedrich 270. For the Deutsche Bank see circular (No. 4) reprinted b y Joh. Friedr. Schaer, loc. cit., p. 130. 271. The terms for current accounts of the Disconto-Gesellschaft, the Dresdner Bank, and the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft, in the form in which they were in force immediately before 1904, are reprinted in Siegfr. Buff, loc. cit., pp. 110-125. 272. See Waldemar Muller, Bankarchiv, Vol. V III, No. 8, p. 115, and Joh. Fr. Schaer, p. 74, No. 1. 273. Bank-Archiv, Vol. V I I I , No. 8 (Jan. 15, 1909), p. 115. 274. See Ad. Weber, Die rheinisch-westfalischen Provinzialbanken und die Krisis, loc. cit., p. 342. 275. See Felix Heclit, Die Katastrophe der Leipziger Bank (The col lapse of the Leipziger Bank) in “ Storungen im deutschen Wirtschaftsleben wahrend der Jahre 1900 ff.” (Disturbances in German economic life dur ing 1900 and the following years), Vol. V I, Geldmarkt-Kreditbanken, p. 384). 276. In balancing a current account the interest is figured thus: The interest-bearing amounts (the result of multiplying the capital b y the number of days and dividing b y 100) are first determined, (in Berlin the month is considered as thirty days) and entered on the credit or debit side according as the customer is to be credited with interest or to be debited therewith. The current account is usually kept b y double entry and bal anced daily as far as practicable. 277. See O tto Jeidels, loc. cit., p. 33. 278. See O tto Jeidels, loc. cit., p. 16 9 -171, for an account of the distri bution b y localities and industries of the industrial corporations with which the large banks are connected, either through the appointment of representatives on the supervisory boards of the corporations or b y serv ing as their fiscal offices for the paym ent of interest and dividends or the redemption of bonds when mature. In spite of his declaration to the contrary, Jeidels overestimates the importance of such fiscal agencies. 279. Robert Franz, Die deutschen Banken im Jahre 1908, (German banks in 1908), p. 22. 280. Even such an arrangement could but seldom be made with the German retailer. Contrary to the custom prevailing in France, he will, as a rule, not allow himself to be drawn upon nor does he give bills. Never theless he demands long terms of credit and settlement without being 829 National Monetary Commission willing to obligate himself, as in the case of bill credit, to make paym ent at the end of the period. 281. In England, too, bills of this kind drawn on foreign countries are not discounted b y the banks. (See Edgar Jaffe, Das englische Bankwesen [the English banking system] p. 142.) bill brokers. T h ey are at once sold to foreign For other particulars see Jaffe, pp. 123 and 124. 282. According to the Jubilee Report of the Reichsbank (p. 78), this practice explains w hy the average value of the bills reaching the Reichsbank rose from a minimum of 1,421 marks in 1878 to a maximum of 1,936 marks in 1900. T he amounts drawn on banks and bankers are nearly always for very large sums. However in proportion as the large banks are making their w a y into the provinces b y means of their branches, discounting there also the bills of small borrowers, the average amount of the bills discounted declines. 283. E dgar Jaff6, loc. cit., p. 124. 284. W alther Lotz, Die Technik des Emissionsgeschafts, Leipzig. Duncker & Humblot, 1890, p. 58. 285. Heiligenstadt, in the Proceedings of the Bank Inquiry Commission of 1908 on points 1-4 of the question sheet (Berlin, 1909, Imperial Printing Office'), p. 25. 286. Under the old stock exchange law, in case of speculation on a cash basis the following method was often resorted to among provincial banks and private bankers. T he customer engaged in speculation would make part paym ent on the securities bought for him and left on deposit with his bank or banker. The balance of the purchase price, which was to be paid at once, would be obtained b y having the bank or banking estab lishment draw on another banking institution, or else, in order to cover up the true character of the bill as a finance bill, the person on whose account the securities were bought would draw on a provincial bank or private banker, that is on his own banker, who would thereupon discount his own acceptance. See W. Prion, Das deutsche Wechseldiskontgeschaft. (Bill discounting in Germany), Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot, 1907, p. 42. 287. See among others Der Deutsche Oekonomist of Aug. 4, 1900, p. 476, July 29, 1905, p. 414, and Rob. Franz, Die deutschen Banken im Jahre, 1907, p. 15 & 16. For the Berlin banks, during 1894-1899 the amount fluctuated between one-half and two-fifths. p. 267.) (See Ernst Loeb, loc. cit., 288. Ad. Weber, Depositenbanken, etc., p. 117. 289. Schmoller, Grundriss, II, p. 493. 290. The separation of the acceptances from the avals was not practi cable because of difficulties in the technique of accounting, the two items appearing combined in the balance sheets of m any banks. 291. See W. Prion, loc. cit., p. 53. 292. Special literature: W. Prion, Das deutsche Wechseldiskontgeschaft. Mit besonderer Berucksichtigung des Berliner Geldmarktes (The German bill discounting business. W ith special reference to the Berlin money 830 The market). G e r m a n G r e a t (Leipzig, Duncker und Humblot, 1907.) und Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungen, Sering. B a n k s No. 127 of Staats- edited b y von Schmoller and An excellent work. 293. This fact, repeatedly established at the hearings of experts before the bank inquiry commission, is also affirmed b y W. Prion (loc. cit., p. 32). 294. See W. Prion, loc. cit., p. 61, where he mentions that H am burg has a quotation for the private discount of prime bills and a special quotation for commercial bills, the margin between them amounting to one-fourth to one-eighth of 1 per cent; and the same is true of London, where there is a difference of one-half of 1 per cent between the quotation of bank bills and of trade bills. 295. This device, hardly perceptible to outsiders, of raising the rate of private discount in individual cases, even though the amount be trifling, m ay thus be used b y the Bourse as a warning signal. In the case of an excessive straining of credit on the part of some bank, it m ay perform within banking circles the same functions and exert the same influence as the ruder and ostentatious means of a general raise of the official rate of bank discount, in case of a general overstraining of credit. 296. See W. Prion, loc. cit., p. 33. 297. Waldeinar Muller, loc. cit. (Bank-Archiv., Yol. 8 ) , No. 8 , p . 1 1 7 . 298. Loc. cit., p. 51. 299. W. Prion, loc. cit., p. 53. 300. T he number of note banks was as follows: 18 83-18 86,18 ; 18 8 7 ,17 ; 1888, 16; 1889, 14; 1890, 13; 1891-1893, 9; 1894-1900, 8; 1901, 7; 1902-1904, 6; 1905-1908, 5 (Reichsbank, Bayerische Notenbank, Sachsisclie Bank, Wiirttembergische Notenbank, and Badische Bank). 301. The number of mortgage banks varied between 24 in 1883, 39 in 1900-1902, and 40 in 1903-1908. 302. See Rob. Franz, Die deutschen Banken im Jahre, 1907, p. 12, and Rob. Franz, Die deutschen Banken im Jahre, 1908, p. 14 T h a t enumera tion, however, includes only credit banks having a capital each of a t least 1,000,000 marks, while in the case of mortgage banks no such restriction is made. 303. T he amounts of bills held b y the six great banks of Berlin vary somewhat from those given by W. Prion, loc. cit., p. 208 (514, 5 5 9 , 671, 697, 7 4 2, 740, 914, 1017 million marks). 304. In regard to the figures given above, it is to be noted that in conse quence of the circulation of bills between central banks and branch banks, certain items have doubtless been counted several times. 305. Edgar Jaff£, Das englische Bankwesen, p. 124 and pp. 141-144. 306. Edgar Jaffd, loc. cit., p. 125. 307. Edgar Jaff£, loc. cit., p. 145. 308. The acceptance commission at cent. the foreign banks is one-half per 309- Edgar Jaff6, loc. cit., pp. 14 8 -15 1. 831 National M on e t a r y Commission 310. It is to be noted that the official discount in London represents a minimum rate of discount, whereas the official rate of discount of the German Reichsbank has rather the meaning of a maximum rate of dis count, so that the two are not strictly comparable. Furthermore, the Bank of England, unlike the German Reichsbank, reserves the absolute right to decline to discount even “ legitim ate” bills when not convenient, so that, especially in times of overstrained credit, and when the Bank is planning a raise of discount, it does not discount all the bills presented. Finally, the Bank of England, unlike the German Reichsbank, discounts only the bills of regular customers. Nevertheless the variations in the rates of discount in Germ any and England run entirely parallel. H ow ever, the rate of discount in England has invariably been higher than in Germany during the last fifty-six years, the proportion during that time being as 100:122. (On an average the difference is 0.63 per cent.) See the exceedingly instructive work b y Joh. Fr. Schaer, Zahlungsbilanz und Discont (Berlin, 1908, S. Simon), pp. n o and i n . On pp. 101 and 102, on the basis of statements b y Karl Waidmeyer, general secretary of the Austro-Hungarian Bank, are given the average rates of official discount in England, France, Germ any and Austria-Hungary from 1852 to 1907, that is to say, for fifty-six years, the years of crisis being noted, while on p. 107 are given the averages of the official discount of the last five decades for the same countries. The differences in the figures of the rates of discount in Germ any as compared w ith those of England, France and Austriar Hungary, are due, in the foremost place, to the difference of the economic situation and of the balance of payment, as well as to the differences in the organization of the money markets and banks. 311. See W. Prion, loc. cit., pp. 74, 75. 312. Loc. cit., p. 75. 313. See m y statements before the bank inquiry commission (Trans actions of the full commission, under Numbers I - V of the question sheet, Berlin, Ernst Siegf. Mittler & Sohn, 1904), pp. 70, 71. 314. Loc. cit., p. 55. 315. See W. Prion, loc. cit., pp. 77-95. 316. M y own views, coinciding with the above, were set forth in the proceedings of the bank inquiry commission, under Numbers I - V of the question sheet (Berlin, 1909), p. 259. B y a misprint, the word nicht (not) was omitted in the phrase “ je nach den Verhaltnissen des Geld- oder Warenmarktes iiberhaupt nicht zu einer Realisierung fiih rt” (“ is not realized on, in accordance with the conditions prevailing in the money market or the commodity m arket” ). 317. See W. Prion, loc. cit. p. 93. 318. Loc. cit., p. 78. 319. Friedr. Leitner, Das Bankgeschaft und seine Technik, Frankfurtam-Main, 1903, J. D. Sauerlander, publisher, pp. 259-260. 320. Lombard loans to banks and others (bankers and other financial concerns) are greatly influenced by the demands of commerce, industry 832 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s and other lines of activity, which demands are largely concentrated in the banks, and are particularly heavy at the close of the year and at other customary dates of settlement (schwere Termine). As an illustration of this influence it m ay be mentioned that on December 31, 1907, the total amount of lombard loans of the Reichsbank (in 5,666 pledge receipts) was 364,297,700 marks, distributed as follows: T o joint-stock banks (on 497 pledge receipts) 163,100,300 marks, to other money and credit institutions (on 916 pledge receipts) 125,399,000 marks. I t is also interesting to note the proportion of lombard loans granted to joint-stock banks and those to private banks, etc., at the two dates of comparison (March 31, 1908, and December 31, 1907). Before the meeting of the bank inquiry commission and to some extent during its proceedings, there was some talk of compelling the Reichsbank to establish a certain limit which must not be exceeded in the discounting of bills and the granting of lombard loans on dates of settlement (schwere Termine), especially at the close of each quarter, the aim being to improve the condition of the bank. was dropped. In the course of the proceedings this demand In fact, the close of the quarter is precisely the time at which the most legitimate demands of commerce arise, which must be met almost entirely b y the granting of short-term credit, a task which the Reichsbank can not shirk, since the very purpose of its existence is “ to facilitate paym ents,” while another, though not equally essential part of its functions is “ to promote the utilization of available funds” (art. 12, sec. 1 of the bank act). On this point Waldemar Muller ju stly remarks: “ To grant credit and issue notes in times of business calm, no central bank of issue with the privileges of the Reichsbank is needed; even so defective a note bank system as that of the United States suffices for that purpose. It is in times of heavy demand and in times of crisis that the bank has to prove itself equal to the task assigned to it b y the bank a c t ” (Bank-Archiv, Vol. 8, No. 9, Feb. 1, 1909, p. 130). 321. Felix Hecht, Die Mannheimer Banken, p. 40. 322. A. Weber, Depositenbanken und Spekulationsbanken, p 97. 323. Waldemar Muller, Die Organisation des Kredit- und Zahlungsverkehrs in Deutschland (Bank-Archiv, 15 January, 1909, Vol. 8, No. 8, p. 116). 324. The portion of the rules and regulations of the Deutsche Bank coming under this head is reproduced in Joh. Fr. Schaer, Die Bank im Dienste des Kaufmanns, pp. 128 and 129. 325. This is the reverse, quite compatible with the principles of juris prudence, of the provision of art. 405, sec. 2 of the Commercial which, it is to be noted, is merely declaratory in its nature. Code, It declares that, when the broker announces the execution of an order without ex pressly stating that he himself is liable for it, this is equivalent to the statement that he has closed the transaction with a third party on account of his client. 90311 — 11-----54 833 mm i s s i o n 326. This is self-evident from art. 403 of the Commercial Code. 327. Until the new Bourse Law went into effect, it was customary to add the following: “ Transactions relating to securities with fixed date of delivery are subject to special provisions.” 328. This is an extension of arts. 397 and 369 of the Commercial Code. 329. T h a t is to say, not merely “ on account of all demands on current account in the brokerage business” (art 397, Commercial Code). 330. This addition corresponds to art. 8 of the bank deposit law of July 5, 1896, which requires that the broker (local banker) who transmits for safe-keeping securities, the property of a customer, to a central banker, or transmits to such banker an order, received from a customer, to purchase securities, shall declare to the central banker that the securities belong to a third party or that the purchase is to be made on account of a third party. The consequence of this is that the central banker can exercise the right of pledge and retention only in virtue of claims that have arisen in connec tion with these securities (in particular as regards any remnant of the pur chase price), but not in virtue of all claims which the central banker has against the provincial banker in connection with an y other business The latter was the case before the enactment of the Bank Deposit Law, when the provincial banker deemed himself authorized to leave the central banker in ignorance of the fact that the transmitted papers belonged to a third party or that the ordered purchase was to be made on account of a third party. If thereupon the provincial banker became bankrupt, the central banker enforced his right of pledge or retention in virtue of all his claims on the provincial banker, with the consequence that the client of the provincial banker as a rule found that his right of exemption became illusory. 331. This addition, referring to art. 2 of the imperial stamp law of June 3, 1906, is intended to exclude the joint liability of the bank for the stamp ing of the securities in accordance with the law. In virtue of this pro vision, while the pledging of foreign securities comes under the definition of a “ business” (between living persons) liable to stamp dues, the same is not true of the deposit of such securities made without any right of pledge. T h a t is the reason w hy the conditions provide that in the case of unstamped foreign securities the right of pledge and retention, which otherwise would be created, is excluded. 332. Arts. 1221 and 1235 of the Banking Code read as follows: Art. 1221: If the pledge has a bourse or market price, the holder of it m ay sell it at free sale at the current price through a broker legally authorized to make such sales, or through a person authorized to make public auction sales. Art. 1235: The sale of the pledge is to be made b y w a y of public auction. If the pledge has a bourse or market value, the provision of art 1221 applies. 333. Art. 1246 of the Banking Code says If, according to equity, the interests of the parties concerned would be better served b y a method of sale of the pledges different from that provided in arts. 1235 to 1240, either of these parties m ay demand that the sale shall take place according to this 834 The G e r m a n other method. b y the court. G r e a t B a n k s If an agreement is not reached, the decision shall be made 334. Concerning the meaning of the word “ ausdriicklich” (expressly), see Riesser, Das Bankdepotgesetz, 2d edition (Berlin, O tto Liebmann, 1906), p. 49, note 1, and pp. 26 and 27. Bruno Buchwald, on p. 172 of his exceed ingly valuable book “ Die Technik des Bankbetriebs” (5th ed., Berlin, Julius Springer, 1909, p. 172), reproduces a printed blank containing the words: “ and I confer on you the rights provided in section 1, article 2 of the deposit law of July 5, 1869.” conformable to the law. It is to be noted that this blank is not The law requires an express authorization, that is to say, the authorization itself must make it clear that the giver thereof was well aware of its contents and meaning. 335. However, to guard against an incorrect practice, such as seems to obtain in many places, it must be pointed out once more that, even where such authorization has been given to the banker, he is required to safeguard the customer’s securities in accordance with the provisions of art. 2 of the bank deposit law so long as he has not made use of the authorization (see Riesser, loc. cit., p. 33 under b). 336. See Bruno Buchwald, loc. cit., pp. 131, 149. 337. See Bruno Buchwald, loc. cit., pp. 149, 352. 338. See Rob. Franz, Die deutschen Banken im Jahre 1908, pp. 24-25. 339. See Ad. Weber, Depositenbanken und Spekulationsbanken, p. 102 340. See Rob. Liefmann, Beteiligungs- und Finanzierungsgesellschaften (Jena, 1909, Gust. Fischer), who ju stly insists that this financing business is to be sharply distinguished from the issue business (p. 84 et seq.). The former consists in procuring the funds, belonging to the bank or to the public, required for the operations of transformation or original founding, and— I may add— in assuming the functions of intermediary in these oper ations. 341- The ratio of transformations to original foundings (which are com bined in the table of companies founded, see p. 119), was stated b y van der Borght for the period 1895-1907 at about 50 per cent (Jahrbiicher fur National-Oekonomie und Statistik, 3d series, Vol. X V ). 3 4 2- See p. 115 and following of the present work for an account of the increase in the capital of stock companies founded in the four-and-a-half-year period 1870-1874, as compared with the capital of stock companies founded in the period 1851-1870. 343. Heinrich Sattler, Die Effektenbanken (Leipzig, 1890), p. 21: “ The operations of transformation m ay be briefly designated as industrial job bery (industrielle Ausschlachtungsgeschafte)." 344. Engel, in Zeitschrift des Statistischen Bureaus (Berlin, 1875), H eft 4 , p. 3 5 6 . 345. See Ad. Wagner’s preface to Heinrich Sattler’s scientifically rather unimportant work, Die Effektenbanken (Leipzig, C. F. W inter’scche Verlagshandlung, 1890). In that preface, Wagner displays with startling dis tinctness his attitude toward the credit banks, which afterward prompted his 835 National Monetary various extrem e proposals. Commission “ T h e fa t dividends,” he says in the preface, p. V III, “ m ay in some cases have been earned b y these banks honestly, but on the whole they owe their high figure principally to the exploitation of the heedlessness, inexperience and greed of that portion of the population which engages in gambling a t the bourse.” (Compare with this statement the sources of bank dividends, as stated in the present work!) Again: “ Social legislation concerns . . . all those economic relations where there is danger of exploitation, and where profits, incomes, fortunes, often of gigantic dimen sions, are developed without corresponding ‘ labor,’ at the expense of the persons exploited, though the latter m ay in many cases share in the blame.” 346. Walther Lotz, D ieT echn ik des deutschen Emissionsgeschafts (Leip zig, Duncker & Humblot, 1890). A fundamental work. 347. Art. 41, sec. 1 of the Bourse law reads as follows: “ The stock of an enterprise transformed into a stock company or into a stock company en commandite shall not be admitted to trade at the Bourse before the expira tion of one year from the date of the entry of the name of the company in the trade register and before the publication of the first annual balance sheet, with statement of profit and loss. In special cases this period m ay be abridged or dispensed with b y the government of the State (art. 1).” 348. According to the table of Der Deutsche Oekonomist, reproduced on p. 268 of Ernst Loeb’s work, Die Berliner Grossbanken in den Jahren 1895 bis 1902 etc., the premium on newly issued stock in the years 1896-1900, inclusive, was as follows: Bank stock, 35.3, 53.5, 36.7, 30.6, and 26.5 per cent, industrial stock, 36.1, 66.7, 67.7, 66.9, and 55.2 per cent. 349. A “ bonus” (Bonifikation) is the remuneration paid to a bank before or at the time of issue b y the party issuing securities solely for services in promoting the sale of the securities, that is to say, a function which has absolutely nothing to do with the quality of the bank as broker for its clients. This “ bonus” therefore represents a special remuneration fo ra special kind of banking activity, consisting in this that the banker undertakes, to the best of his ability and on the ground of his special knowledge of customers, to see that the securities issued are placed in good hands, that is to say, perma nently. This function should not be, and in fact can not be, performed by any one but a banker. Hence it is absurd to say that he is bound to pay this bonus to his clients, that is to say, the buyers of the securities, and still less, that he acts “ fraudulently” (dolos) in failing to state the fact that he received a bonus and to share it with others, as was decided b y the Imperial Court (I Civil Senate) in a judgment rendered Dec. 10, 1904. 350. How ill-advised it is to draw rash conclusions in regard to the man ner of issue from a temporary decline in quotations, is illustrated b y the table printed b y Ad. Weber (loc. d t., p. 155), in which the list of “ Stock companies of inferior q u a lity ” includes the Jura-Simplon railway, which has since then been nationalized. 351. See Walther Lotz, loc. cit., y. 71. 352. The two tables are reprinted on pp. 278 and 279 of the proceedings of the bank inquiry commission of 1908 (Proceedings of the full commis- 836 T h e G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s sion, Numbers I - V of the question sheet, Berlin, Ernst Siegfr. Mittler & Sohn, 1904), as appendix to pp. 65 et seq. 353. The Frankfurter Zeitung enumerates the bonds thus: “ German and foreign mortgage bank bonds (estimated)” and “ Other bonds;” the Deutscher Oekonomist, on the contrary, discriminates between mortgage, railway and industrial bonds, both in the case of the German and of the foreign bonds. The Frankfurter Zeitung gives railway stock and tram w ay stock in a single item, while the Deutscher Oekonomist separates them. The table of the Frankfurter Zeitung lacks the item “ Insurance stock,” which receives special notice in the Deutscher Oekonomist at least in the case of German securities. The table of the Frankfurter Zeitung contains separate statements regarding foreign securities only in the case of govern ment loans, while the table of the Deutscher Oekonomist gives these sepa rate statements throughout. amounts. Finally, there are great differences in the Thus for example the nominal amount of the foreign govern ment loan issues during 1905 given in the table of the Frankfurter Zeitung differs from that given in the Deutscher Oekonomist b y not less than 142.000. 000 marks (Frankfurter Zeitung, nominal amount 724,000,000, Deutscher Oekonomist 866,000,000 marks) in a single group of securities. In 1907 the market value of all issues, according to the Frankfurter Zeitung, was in round figures 1,842,000,000 marks, while according to the Deutscher Oekonomist it was 2,135,000,000 marks, again a difference of nearly 300.000. 000 marks. 354. Based largely on O tto Jeidels, Das Verhaltnis der deutschen Grossbanken zur Industrie, Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot, 1905. 355. Regarding positions in the supervisory councils as a “ consequence of concentration in the banking and particularly in the issuing business,” see Franz Eulenburg, Die Aufsichtsrate in den deutschen Aktiengesellschaften (Conrad’s Jahrbiicher, series 3, Vol. X X X I I , Lieferung 1, pp. 109 et seq.). 356. O tto Jeidels, loc. cit., p. h i . 357. O tto Jeidels, loc. cit., p. 44. 358. Ibid, p. 51. 359. For example, in the case of the fusion of the Huldschinsky Sm elt ing Works with the Upper Silesian R ailw ay Supply Co., 1904. 360. Loc. cit., p. 127. 361. Loc. cit., p. 55. 362. O tto Jeidels, loc. cit., p. 139. 363. Loc. cit., p. 169, Tables I and II. 364. Loc. cit., pp. 170, 171, Tables I I I and IV . 365. See Riesser, Zur Aufsichtsratsfrage (Berlin, O tto Liebmann, 1903, reprint from the Jubilee publication of the Juristische Gesellschaft zu Berlin in honor of Richard Koch), pp. 296 et seq. 366. Rud. Eberstadt, Der deutsche Kapitalm arkt (Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot, 1901). 837 367. See Ad. Weber, loc. cit., p. 171. Ruhland, indeed, continues to deem it appropriate, without an y regard to the objections raised, to say (Vol. I l l of the “ System der Politischen Oekonomie” , Berlin 1908, p. 146): “ According to an investigation b y Eberstadt, the market value of German industrial securities was enhanced by speculation during the period from January 1, 1895, to April 1, 1900, b y 75 to 100 per cent above their issue price.” 368. Ernst Loeb, (loc., cit. p. 271) assumes that one-half to three-fourths of the credits booked under loans (Debitoren) were granted in behalf of commerce and industry, a statement which it would be difficult to verify. 369. In refutation of Eberstadt see also Franz Eulenburg, Die gegenwartige Wirtschaftskrise, Sym ptom e und Ursachen, in Conrad’s Jahrb., I l l series, Vol. X X I V , p. 381; Heinemann in Conrad’s Jahrb. (1902), III series, Vol. X X , p. 128; and Ernst Loeb, in the Schriften des Vereins fur Sozialpolitik, Vol. C X (Die Storungen im deutschen Wirtschaftsleben, 1903, Vol. V I), p. 270. 370. See for instance the report of the Darmstadter Bank for 1853. 371. Page 29. 372. Jubilee report of the Disconto-Gesellschaft, p. 29. 373. Concerning other mistakes made in connection with the issue of that first war loan, see Riesser, Finanzielle Kriegsbereitschaft und Kriegsfiihrung (Jena, G u stav Fischer, 1909) p. 102 et seq. Nevertheless the blame for this poor result has until very recently been laid not on the finan cial administration, which established those conditions against the express warning of the representatives of the banking business, but on the whole body of German banks and bankers. 374. Loc. cit., Bank-Archiv, Vol. 8, No. 8 (of Jan. 15, 1909), p. 118. 375. T he compensation is effected for the most part b y exports. 376. I greatly prefer the term “ balance of claim s” (Forderungsbilanz), proposed b y Sartorius Freiherr von Waltershausen in lieu of the term ‘‘ balance of p aym en ts” (Zahlungsbilanz), on pp. 73 et seq. of his book “ Das volkswirtschaftliche System der Kapitalanlage im Auslande,” which will be discussed on a subsequent page. 377. Jubilee report of the Disconto-Gesellschaft, p. 127. 378. Bourse inquiry commission, list of proposals rejected or withdrawn, p. 21. 379. Sartorius Freiherr von Waltershausen; Das volkswirtschaftliche System der K apitalanlage im Auslande. Berlin, 1907, Georg Reimer. 380. Bank-A rchiv of Sept. 1, 1908, Vol. 7, No. 23, p. 357. 381. The issues in question were in the main Argentine, Greek, Portu guese, Chilean, and Servian Government loans, a Buenos-Aires municipal loan, Brazilian, Dutch-South-African, and Mexican railway loans, in the issue of which, in one case or another, all the great banks without exception, together with a number of other banks and banking firms, took part to a greater or less extent. Certain of these securities declined rapidly almost as soon as issued, which led to sharp criticisms of the issuing firms. 838 "ill See the The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s table of the Deutscher Oekonomist, reproduced b y Ad. Weber, loc. eit., p. 132. This table, however, should be used with caution. 382. E ven Siemens’ calculations (see Deutscher Oekonomist, Sept. 14, 1901, p. 529), correct as they are, can not be regarded as pertinent from the point of view here represented. A more important circumstance is the fact pointed out b y Rob. Liefmann (Conrad’s Jahrbiicher, series 3, Vol. X X V I I , p. 172), as well as in the present work, that a large part of the issues of foreign loans is often sold not in German but in foreign markets. 383. Ad. Weber, loc. cit., p. 134, note 3. 384. The History, Principles and Practice of Banking, London, 1901, I, p. 64 (see ibid., p. 181). 385. O nly one 5 per cent Prussian loan of £5,000,000, included in the table, dated back as far as 1818. 386. Ad. Weber, Depositenbanken und Spekulationsbanken, p. 132. In contrast with these numerical data, taken from the Deutscher Oekonomist, there isa statement, also found in the Deutscher Oekonomist (July 22, 1899, p. 527), which puts the figure as low as 1,973,000,000, a good deal less than the 2,417,000,000 mentioned in the text. 387. Ad. Weber, loc. cit., pp. 128-129. The figure given for 1900 does not quite agree with the corresponding figure given b y Ernst Loeb, Die Ber liner Grossbanken in den Jahren 1895 bis 1902, p. 121, which gives also the real estate participations (Terrainbeteiligungen). These are stated as fol lows, from 1897 to 1901: 3, 3, 8, 8, 11. 388. Ernst Loeb, loc. cit., p. 161. 389. For the tim e being the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft does not pub lish any summary balances. 390. See for example the data from the balance sheets of the Darmstadter Bank for the end of 1899 and 1900, reproduced b y Ad. Weber, loc. cit., p. 163. 391. See Ernst Loeb, loc. cit., p. 171, and for the preceding table, p. 161. 392. No figures are available for the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft, since this bank does not y e t publish an y summary reports. 393. See Jubilee report of the Disconto-Gesellschaft, pp. 29, 33, and fol lowing. 394. See Jubilee report of the Disconto-Gesellschaft, pp. 84 and 85. 395. For particulars regarding the creation and development of the firm Ludw ig Loewe & Co., and of the Loewe group, see O tto Jeidels, p. 243 and following. 396. See Richard Rosendorff, Die deutschen Banken im iiberseeischen Verkehr (in Schmoller’s Jahrb., 1904, Vol. X X V I I I , No. 4, pp. 93-134). Same author, Le d^veloppement des Banques Allemandes a L ’Etranger (Revue Economique Internationale, T . I. Sept, and Oct., 1906). Same author, Die Deutschen Ubersee-Banken und ihre Geschafte (in Blatter fur vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre, Vol. I l l , 1908, Nos. 7, 8). J. Hellauer, Die Zahlungsvermittlung der englischen Banken im Uberseehandel. Vienna, 1904. Emil Herz, Deutschlands auslandische 839 National Monetary Commission Banken (Annalen des Deutschen Reichs, Vol. 39, 1906, No. i, p. 48 and fol lowing). R . Hauser, Die deutschen Ubersee-Banken (Jena, 1906). Anton Paul Briining, Die Entwicklung des auslandischen, speciell des iiberseeischen deutschen Bankwesens (Berlin, 1907, Puttkam m er & Miihlbrecht). Andre E. Sayous, Les Banques Allemandes et le Commerce d ’outremer, in Bul letin Mensuel de la Federation des Industriels et des Commergants Frangais, 5th year, No. 52 (January, 1908, Part I). Same author, ibid., No. 70, July, 1909, p. 404 and following): Pourquoi et comment il faut former en France des Banques d ’exportation. mer. L ’exemple des banques allemandes d ’outre Georges Diouritch, L ’expansion des Banques Allemandes a E ’Etran- ger, Ses R apports avec le Ddveloppement Economique de l ’Allemange (Paris, 1909, Arthur Rousseau). 397. A n appreciation has been attem pted in m y obituary on the occasion of the untim ely death of Dr. George v. Siemens, the gifted and lamented president of the Deutsche Bank (Bank-Archiv., 1st year, No. 2, Nov., 1901). 398. For a discussion of the manner in which banks had to intervene and did intervene on behalf both of importers and exporters, see, among others, Richard Rosendorff, Die deutschen Banken im iiberseeischen Verkehr (Schmoller’s Jahrbuch fur Gesetzgebung, etc., Vol. X X V I I I , No. 14, pp. 9 3 - I 3 4 )> also P- 426 and following of this volume. 399. See Report of the Deutsche Bank for 1871, p. 3. 400. See Report of the Deutsche Bank for 1871, p. 4. 401. T he following citations are taken from Model, loc. cit., pp. 107, 109, and 117. T he above remarks are not intended as a reproach to the news paper in question; but the sentiments prevailing a t that time in banking and bourse quarters, and which are merely found reflected in that paper, are of more than purely historical interest. 402. Em il Herz, loc. cit., No. 1, p. 48 et seq. 403. The German oversea banks engaged in this line of business (the so-called “ Inkassogeschaft,” i. e. the collection of bills, bills of lading, etc.) have special so-called “ Inkasso ta riffs” See, for instance, the Inkasso tariff of the Deutsche Orient bank reproduced b y Rich. Rosen dorff, Die deutschen Ueberseebanken und ihre Geschafte, reprint, 24-46. 404. See pt. Waldemar Muller, Die Organisation des Kredit- und Zah- lungsverkehrs in Deutschland, Bank-Archiv, vol. 8, p. 115 et seq. 405. In case of the so-called “ option shipments,” b y the terms of which the article m ay be offered for sale at different places during trans portation, “ option bills of ladin g” are given. 406. Waldemar Muller, loc. cit., p. 116. 407. Thus, for instance, the banks, for the purpose of securing their advances, cause both the sender and consignee to sign declarations, accord ing to which the goods and their proceeds remain hypothecated with the bank, not only so long as the documents are in the hands of the bank, but also subsequently, so that the consignee obligates himself to hold at the disposal of the bank the documents or the goods themselves (if deliv- 840 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s ered to him), to keep separate accounts regarding the goods and their proceeds, not to merge the proceeds with other receipts and assets, and to deliver these proceeds to the bank at the earliest possible opportunity, (letter of hypothecation). The person who receives the goods, when informed of these stipulations through the bank b y the grantee of the advance must make a corresponding declaration (letter of lien), and it is only after such a declaration and the giving of the acceptance that he receives the documents 408. Waldemar Muller, Bank-Archiv, vol. 8, No. 8 (Jan 15, 1909), p. 115. 409. For particulars regarding the charter of the Deutsche Ueberseeische Bank, commercial and railroad conditions in Argentina, the achievements of the various branches of the bank, the turnover and the results attained b y these branches see Ant. Paul Briining, p. 45-80, and Georges Diouritch, loc. cit., pp. 497-549. 410. We frequently come across the erroneous view, adopted to some extent in the literature of the subject, (see for instance Georges Diouritch, loc. cit., p. 501), that, under the Argentine laws of that time, the increase of capital of the old bank (the Deutsche Ueberseebank), which was intended in 1891 because of the large growth of the business of the bank, could be affected only after its liquidation and the organization of a new bank, which was take over the assets and liabilities of its predecessor As a matter of fact, the old bank, too, was a German corporation, so that an increase of capital would have had to be effected in accordance w ith German and not with Argentine laws. The true cause, evidently, was that for various reasons it was desired to endow the bank with a large capital. According to German law this could only be done b y fully paying up the capital of the old bank, which the managers were not willing to do, preferring to found a new institution with a larger capital, of which for the time being only a part had to be paid up 411. Ad (b) and (c) see Anton Paul Briining, pp. 14, 15. 412. Report of the Deutsche Bank for 1892, p. 4. 413. Report of the Deutsche Bank for 1890, p. 4. 414. Report of the Deutsche Bank for 1872, p. 4. 415. Report for 1883, p. 11. 416. Report for 1883, pp. 3, 11. 417. For particulars see Rich. Rosendorff, Treuhandgesellschaften und ihre Funktionen, in Conrad’s Jahrbiicher, 1906, No. 5, pp. 608 et seq.; also Walter Nachod, Treuhander und Treuhandgesellschaften (Tubingen 1908, H. L a u b ’sche Buchhandlung) pp. 88 et seq. 418. Report of the Deutsche Bank for 1892, p. 4. 419. Report of the Deutsche Bank for 1901, p. 5. 420. Report of the Deutsche Bank for 1903, p. 7. 421. Report of the Deutsche Bank for 1908, p. 8. 422. Report of the Deutsche Bank for 1873, p. 10. 423. Report of the Deutsche Bank for 1883, p. 11. 424. Report of the Deutsche Bank for 1895, p. 4. 841 National Monetary Commission 425. Report of the Disconto-Gesellschaft for 1887, p. 5. For particulars regarding balance sheets of the Brasilianische Bank fur Deutschland for the years 1889 to 1905 see Rich. Rosendorff, Le developpem entetc. p. 42 and -43, also Georges Diouritch, loc. cit., pp. 550-598. 426. Report for 1889, p. 9. 427. Report for 1890, p. 8, and 1900, p. 13. 428. For particulars regarding the balance sheets of the Bank fur Chile und Deutschland for the years 1896-1904 see Rich. Rosendorff, Le developpement etc. (Oct., 1906) pp. 44, 45 and Georges Diouritch, pp. 599-621. 429. Rosendorff’s statement, loc. cit., p. 33, that the bank was founded in 1892, is a misprint. 430. For particulars regarding the a c tiv ity of the bank, see, among others Georges Diouritch, loc. cit., p. 684-690. 431. Report of the Disconto-Gesellschaft for 1900, p. 10, and 1905, pp. 13-15432. Report of the Disconto-Gesellschaft for 1888, p. 8. 433. R eport of the Dresdner Bank for 1905, p. 6. 434. Report of the Dresdner Bank for 1905, p. 6. 435. Report for 1905, j). 6. The Dresdner Bank on that occasion noted that it would during the coming years regard it as one of its principal tasks “ to enlarge and properly develop the foreign business relations, especially in oversea lands with which Germany has active trade connections. ” 436. Report of the Darmstadter Bank for 1885, p. 16. 437. Report of the Darmstadter Bank for 1871, p. 2. 438. Report for 1873, p. 16. 439. See Anton Paul Briining, pp. 32, 33. 440. Report of the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft for 1887, p. 8. 441. Report for 1889, p. n . 442. Report for 1903, p. 10. 443. For particulars see, among others, Georges Diouritch, p. 624. 444. The absolute amounts in the balance sheets of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank from 1891 to 1904 are given b y Rich. Rosendorff, Le Developpement des Banques Allemandes a l ’Etranger, pp. 38, 39. For further particulars see Georges Diouritch, pp. 669-690. 445. For particulars see Georges Diouritch, pp. 669-677. 446. For particulars see Georges Diouritch, pp. 738-753. 447. See Rich. Rosendorff, Neuordnung des Deutsch-Ostafrikanischen Miinzwesens, in Finanz-Archiv of Schanz, Vol. X X I I , No. 1, and Sehmoller’s Jahrbuch, Vol. X X X , No. 2, p. 170. 448. See art. 8 of the charter (Appendix 1 to the Deutscher Reichs-und Koniglich Preussischer Staatsanzeiger, Mar. 3, 1905, No. 54). Furthermore the bank is obliged, according to article 13 of the charter, to publish a state ment of its assets and liabilities on the last of every month, at its own cost, in a periodial designated by the governor of the German East African protectorate. 449. For particulars see Georges Diouritch, loc. cit., pp. 754-760. 842 The Ge r ma n Gr e a t Banks 450. Nevertheless, according to art. 42 of its charter, published in A ppen dix 1 of the Deutscher Reichs- und Koniglich Preussischer Staatsanzeiger, February 1, 1905, No. 28, it is obliged to publish a statement of its assets and liabilities on the last of every month, at its own cost, in the Reichsanzeiger, according to a schedule prescribed in art. 42, sec. 2. 451. Memorial of the imperial A dm iralty on “ Die Entwicklung der deutschen See-Interessen im letzten Jahrzehnt,” Dec. 1905, p. 175. In regard to France, see Rich. Rosendorff, Die franzosischen Kolonialbanken (Bank-Archiv, 1904, Vol. 3, No. 10, pp. 172-174 ). In regard to the several British colonial and foreign banks, as well as the several French and Dutch colonial banks, with their branches, capital and dividends, see Rich. RosendorfT, Be Developpement etc., pp. 4 9 -5 1, and Diouritch, loc. cit., appendix to p. 283. 452. See Deutscher Oekonomist, No. 1127, 436; No. 1179, p. 415; and Rob. Franz, Die deutschen Banken im Jahre 1908, p. 18. 453. See Robert Franz, Die deutschen Banken im Jahre, 1906 (p. 14), im Jahre 1907 (p. 21), and im Jahre 1908 (p. 26). 454. E. Wagon, Die finanzielle Entwicklung deutscher Aktiengesell- schaften von 1870-1900 (Jena, 1903, G u stav Fischer), p. 46. 455- See Vierteljahrshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, Erganzungsheft zu 1909, II: Die Geschaftsergebnisse der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften im Jahre, 1907, 1908, pp. 15, 16. Concerning the methods of cal culation, see E. Moll, Die Rentabilitat der Aktiengesellschaften (Jena, 1908, G ustav Fischer). 456. Including, in addition to the 6 great banks, the following: Nationalbank fur Deutschland, Kreditbank, B ank Amerika-Bank, Gesellschaft. Com m erz- und des Berliner Disconto-Bank, Kassenvereins, Deutsch-Ueberseeische Bank, Mitteldeutsche Berliner Maklerverein, and Deutsche Treuhand- Beginning with 1909, the Deutscher Oekonomist no longer enumerates the five last-mentioned institutions among the “ Berlin B a n k s” (Deutscher Oekonomist, Aug. 28, 1909, Yol. X X V I I , No. 1391, p. 529), a commendable change, since these institutions are managed on a totally dif ferent basis. 4 5 7 - Rud. Steinbach, Die Verwaltungskosten der Berliner Grossbanken (Schmoller’s Jahrbuch, Vol. 29, No. 2, p. 85). 458. In conformity with the new and correct practice of the Deutscher Oekonomist, only the nine credit banks properly so called are here included. 4 5 9 - Of April 3, 1904, reprinted b y O tto Jeidels, loc. cit., p. 129. 460. In 1908 the gross profits from interest, bills and commissions have been combined. 4^1. On this point see Rud. Steinbach, Die Verwaltungskosten der Berliner Grossbanken (Schmoller’ s Jahrbuch, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 7 1 -1 10 , and No. 3, pp. 14 1-17 9 ): Ad. Weber, loc. cit., p. 213; Heinemann, Die Berliner Grossbanken an der Wende des Jahrhunderts (Conrad’ s Jahrbiieher, series III, Vol. X X , p. 86 et seq.); Frankfurter Zeitung, No. 91, April 1, 1903, and No. 93, April 3, 1903 (“ Betriebskosten der B an ken ” ); 843 National Monetary Commission Deutscher Oekonomist, Aug. 2, 1902; Rob. Franz, Die deutschen Banken im Jahre 1907, p. 18, and im Jahre 1908, p. 25. If all the banks were included, the proportion of operating expenses to gross profits wr ould be still more unfavorable, since the above figures of the Deutscher Oekonomist do not include the directors’ fees (Tantiemen), which though constituting part of the cost of operation are enumerated separately. 462. In 1907 and 1908, reserves and amounts written off are combined. 463. Ed. Wagon, loc. cit., p. 146. 464. These wr ords are found in m y opening address as chairman of the First General Congress of German Bankers, in Frankfort-on-the-Main (See transactions of the Congress of Sept. 19 and 20, 1902, published b y the Centralverband des Deutschen Bank- und Bankiergewerbes, Berlin, 1902, p. 2). 465. Compare O tto Jeidels, loc. cit., p. 105. 466. It is to be noted that the surplus is here calculated not as per Decem ber 31 of the year given but as per Jan. 2 of the year following. 467. Jubilaumsbericht der Disconto-Gesellschaft, p. 172. 468. Compare Ernst Loeb, Supplement to Model, loc. cit., p. 152. 469. See O tto Jeidels, loc. cit., pp. 1 1 4 -1 1 7 . 470. See Model, loc. cit., p. 58. 471. Jubilaumsdenkschrift der Disconto-Gesellschaft, pp. 204-205. 472. “ The bank is authorized to conduct all kinds of banking business, and therefore to conduct business of such nature that it can withdraw its money from that business at any time it m ay be needful.” 473. For some unaccountable reason, Model, in his work “ Die grossen Berliner Effektenbanken” (1896) failed to mention the A. Schaaffhausen’scher Bankverein, although it ranked even then among the great Efjekten banken , and, having established its Berlin branch in 1891, might properly be numbered among the Berlin great banks. 474. Compare O tto Jeidels, loc. cit., p. 113. 475. See O tto Jeidels, loc. cit., pp. 112, 123. 476. Ibid., p. 210. 477. See O tto Jeidels, loc. cit., p. 137. 478. For the following discussion See Model, loc. cit., p. 91 et seq. 479. Report of the Berliner Handelgesellschaft for 1878, p. 2. 480. See A. Sartorius Freiherr von Waltershausen, Das volkwirtschaftliche System der Kapitalanlagen im Auslande, Berlin, Georg Reimer, 1907. 481. During the first period the Darmstadter Bank, as we learned above (p. 49), included in its program the creation of agencies both at home and abroad, whose purpose was to be to foster exportation and the innumerable relations between German industry and the money market. But for this the time was not yet ripe (partly because of the scarcity of German capital at that period), and thus the Darmstadter Bank had soon to abandon its ambitious plans (see p. 60 above and note 82 on p. 798) just as the Deutsche Bank had for a while to give up its E ast Asiatic agencies opened soon after its foundation. The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s 482. O tto Jeidels must have overlooked the close connection between this phase of banking and the so-called “ export industrialism” or, at least, he did not attach sufficient importance to it, when in his excellent book on the “ Relation between the great banks of Germany to in dustry” (p. 270), he deplores the “ lack on the part of the banks, of a general industrial policy serving the economic interests of the nation as a whole,” and con tends (p. 197) that with the further evolution of capitalism the banks are driven “ to exert their ac tivity abroad,” b y the growing necessity to find opportunities for profitable investment in foreign countries for unemployed German capital. This argument, while possessing a certain weight, is not decisive. 483. The exports b y sea constitute a large share of the total exports, amounting in the same year, according to the special report of the A d m iralty (introduction p. v), to 64 per cent of the total exports. 484. According to the report of the imperial A dm iralty of Dec. 1905 on the “ Development of the German marine interests in the last decade” (introduction, p. v), of the total imports in 1904 almost 73.9 per cent arrived b y sea. 485. See Paul Voigt, loc. cit., p. 273. 486. In the middle of the last century, as stated above (p. 44), industry w as called upon to provide sustenance and employment for the rapidly increasing population which could no longer be supported b y agriculture alone. 487. The expression “ feeding countries” (Nahrungsstaaten) is too nar row, because we are dependent upon foreign countries for other things besides food-stuffs. 488. Thus von Halle’s description (loc. cit., p. 70), “ Earnings of German capitalists from foreign securities and loans, bought and sold in G erm an y” is too narrow. 489. Paul Dehn, W eltwirtschaftliche Neubildungen Verein fur deutsche Literatur, 1904, p. 41). (Berlin, Allgem. . 490. See Journal officiel de la Republique Franfaise, X X I V e annee, Sept. 25, 1902, and the oft-mentioned Denkschrift des Reichsmarineamts of December 1905, pp. 188-222. 491. Loc. cit., p. 247. 492. Das Geld im russisch-japanischen Mittler & Sohn, 1906), p. 217. Kriege (Berlin, Ernst Siegfr. 493. See the very instructive report of Leon S a y to the French National Assembly, made on Aug. 5, 1874, translated in the publication of the Centralverband des Deutschen B a n k -u n d Bankiergewerbes: “ T he paym ent of the brench war indemnity of 1870-71 in Strassburg, A lsace” J. G uttentag, 1906, p. 83). (Berlin, 494. See report of the Reichsmarineamt of Dec. 1905, introduction, p. X I. 495. For particulars regarding the foreign business pf German private insurance companies, see th^ report just mentioned, pp. 179-187. 845 mm i s s i o n 496. Report of the Reichsmarineamt of December 1905, p. 171, note 1. 497. 2d ed., pt. II, No. 3, sec. 13: Daten zur Handelsbilanz (Vienna, 1904), p. 780, note 2. 498. The total amount of Austro-Hungarian gold claims against foreign countries was estimated b y the Neue Freie Presse of Mar. 29, 1903, at 400.000. 000 crowns. 499. T he estimates of income from these freight receipts differ greatly. According to estimates of von Halle (loc. cit., p. 201), based upon Wormann’s calculations, it amounted in 1897 to 200,000,000 marks annually, and would therefore amount at present to about 300,000,000 marks. R ud. Arnold (Die Handelsbilanz Deutschlands, Berlin, 1905, Franz Siemenroth, p. 185) estimates it at a much lower figure. W. Lo tz (Einiges fiber den Ausgleich von Soli und Haben in Weltverkehr, Bank-Archiv, Vol. 1, No. 6, p. 93) on the other hand also estimates the German freight receipts from oversea shipping at 200,000,000 to 300,000,000 marks. The freight receipts of the British merchant marine from its oversea trade alone are estimated at 1,800,000,000 marks annually. (Grunzel, System der Handels- politik, 1901, p. 584.) 500. Ad. Soetbeer, Bemerkungen fiber die Handelsbilanz Deutschlands (in H irth’s Annalen, Vol. 75, p. 731 et seq.). This is probably the work in which the expression Zahlungsbilanz (balance of payments) was first used (No. 8, p. 735) in contradistinction to Handelsbilanz (balance of trade). 501. Compare with the above the report b y Ignatz Gruber, (Vienna) on statistics of the international balance of payments, presented to the International Statistical Institute (10th session, London, July 31 to Aug. 15, 1905). 502. See Riesser, Finanzielle Kriegsbereitschaft und Kriegsffilirung, p. 2 et seq. 503. Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft im 19 Jahrhundert, 2d ed., p. 184. The amount of Russian State securities (including railway securities guar anteed b y the state) disposed of in France is estimated at 10,000,000,000 to 13.000. 000.000 francs. 504. T he table compiled b y Rud. Arnold on pages 169-171 of his book " D ie Handelsbilanz Deutschlands von menroth, 1905) is entirely incomplete, 1889-1900” (Berlin, Franz Sie- as he himself admits. Large additions m ay be made to it from the data contained in the book of Axel Preyer “ Uberseeische Aktiengesellsehaften und Grossbetriebe” Th. Grieben’s Verlag, (Leipzig, 1905), which, however, does not relate solely to German undertakings and excludes small enterprises. 505. 2d ed., part 2, No. 3, sec. 13: “ D ata on the balance of paym ent,” (Tables 224-458). Vienna, K . K. H of- und Staatsdriickerei, 1904. 506. This chapter is a summary of the views which I advocated as a member of the bank bill commission of 1908 and at the examination of experts. 846 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s 506a. See O tto Warschauer, “ Das Depositenbankwesen in Deutschland, mit besonderer Beriicksichtigung der Spareinlagen ” (Conrads “ Jahrb.” Third series, Vol. X X V I I , p. 433-487). 507. Caesar Straus, “ Unser Depositengeldersystem und seine Gefahren,” (Prankfort-on-the-Main, Carl Jiigel, 1892). 508. Loc. cit., p. 17. 509. Loc. cit., p. 26. 510. Loc. cit., pp. 38-39. 511. O tto Warschauer, “ Das Depositenbankwesen in Deutschland,” in Conrads’ Jahrbiicher,” third series, Vol. 27 (1904), p. 473 et seq., 477, 481. 512. Loc. cit., pp. 480-481. 513. Loc. cit., p. 482. 514. O tto Warschauer, pp. 483-484. 515. W ith unlimited liability. According to Warschauer, credit corpora tions with limited liability should be forbidden to accept deposits (loc. cit., p. 484). 516. See resolution of Count von Arnim in the Bourse act commission of Mar. 10, 1896, the text of which has been reproduced b y Ad. Weber loc. cit., p. 259-60 and b y others. According to that resolution, regula tions are to be issued b y which banks and business people engaged solely in the deposit business are to be prohibited from engaging in contango, speculative, founding and issuing business (except trust-fund issues) as well as from participating in such business and in any issues not expressly permitted. T h ey are moreover to be compelled to publish monthly summary statements, the form of which— set forth in the resolution— is to be legally prescribed. 517. See, among others, O tto Warschauer, loc. cit., p. 486 (Bill No. 3). 518. C. Heiligenstadt, “ Der Deutsche Geldmarkt,” in Schmoller’ s Jahrb. Vol. 31, No. 4, p. 98. 519. Loc. cit., p. 98, X . 520. Loc. cit., p. 99. 521. Reprinted in “ Handel und Gewerbe,” Mar. 24, 1906,12th year, No. 24, p. 470, and elsewhere. 522. Edgar Jaff6, in Transactions of the Third General Congress of German Bankers (Allgemeiner Deutscher Bankiertag), p. 99. 523. In such cases the bank usually assists only the stock brokers, not the joint stock banks themselves. 524. Ed. Jaffd, “ Das Englische Bankwesen,” p. 204, note 1. 525. Ed. Jaff6, in Transactions of the Third General Congress of German Bankers (Allgemeiner Deutscher Bankiertag), p. 99. 526. Caesar Straus, loc. cit., p. 31. 527. Loc. cit., p. 99. 528. According to J. W. Gilbart, “ The History, Principles and Practice of Banking,” ed. 1901, London, I, p. 310, 311, et seq.; II, p. 342, 361, et seq. 847 529. See second (German) edition of this book, pp. 12 -14 (foot-note). Thus for instance during the crisis of 1857 the first banks to fail were the Borough Bank of Liverpool with liabilities of £1,200,000, the Western Bank of Scotland, which only a year before had paid a 9 per cent dividend and which had 101 branch offices. T he last-named bank had advanced £1,603,000 to four firms which became insolvent, although its total capital only amounted to £1,500,000; furthermore, an item of £260,000 figured in its published balance sheets as good assets, which the managers themselves (according to notes discovered) had marked as irrecoverable. The Derwent Iron Co. alone owed the bank no less than £750,000 and had deposited as “ security” (in addition to a land mortgage) £250,000 of its own deben tures, which were nothing more than notes of the directors forming the company. None of these facts, of course, could be ascertained from the published statements. In 1858 occurred, among others, the failure of the Northumberland and Durham District Bank of Newcastle with £1,256,000 deposits just after it declared a 7 per cent dividend at the semiannual meeting of its shareholders; the directors pleading that, since so many of the shareholders lived on their dividends, they had not the heart “ to face the shareholders without paying a dividen d!” In 1864 no less than 27 joint stock banks failed, and another large number followed in 1866, including the Joint Stock Discount Co., the Barneds Bank of Liverpool with liabilities amounting to £3,500,000, the Bank of London, the Consolidated Bank, the Agrar and Mattermans Bank, the English Joint Stock Bank, the Imperial Mercantile Credit Co., the European Bank, etc., etc. In the crisis of 1878 the C ity of Glasgow Bank was the first of the deposit banks to fail; it had lent £4,000,000 to 4 firms, and had published false balance sheets in 1877. A series of other banks followed. Compare O. Glauert, “ Depositenbil- dung in England u. in Deutschland” (Conrad’s Jahrb. 3rd series, Vol. V II, p. 808): “ From 1814 to 1816, 240 agricultural banks suspended payment, and 70 within the first six w'eeks of 1826.” See also Edgar Jaffe, loc. cit., pp. 196-197. According to Karl Mamroth, “ Die schottischen Banken,” (Conrad’s Jahrb., 3rd series, Vol. X X I V , No. 1, p. 43, note 139) 11 banks of issue failed in Scotland between 1804 and 1842. 530. Edgar Jaff£, “ Das englische Bankwesen,” pp. 204—205, and p. 202. 531. Loc. cit., pp. 204, 205. 532. In England this “ doctoring” of the balance sheets is called “ window dressing.” Edgar Jaff6, loc. cit., p. 205. 533. Edgar Jaffe in Transactions of the Third General Congress of German Bankers (Allgemeiner Deutscher Bankiertag), p. 96. loc. cit., p. 231. Ad. Weber, T he reserve funds alone of all the 82 English deposit banks amounted to about £31,000,000=68 per cent of the paid-up capital, but only about per cent of their liabilities. 848 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s 534. The published balance sheets of the 13,912 cooperative societies connected with the Prussian Central Cooperative Society (Preussische Central Genossenschaftskasse) showed that at the end of 1905 their own resources amounted to 54,625,382 marks, the deposits to 758,514,000 marks. The proportion consequently was 93:7, i. e., the deposits were about thirteen times as much as their own means. For 1,002 cooperative societies with limited liability the proportion of deposits to own resources at that period, was 88:5. 535. Ed. Wagon, “ Die finanzielle Entwicklung der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften,” (Jena, G ustav Fischer, 1903), p. 146; see p. 470. 536. See Edgar Jaff6, p. 198. 537. See Ad. Wagner, “ Beitrage zur Lehre von den Banken,” Leipzig, l8 5 7 . PP- 166-170, and p. 61. 538. On the other hand, however, it must be remembered that if in time of crisis a demand is made on a bank for immediate paym ent of money which according to existing agreement is only due within a short time, it can not afford to refuse except in case of necessity, and even then for the most part not without risk. A different opinion, at least apparently, is expressed in Der Deutsche Oekonomist of N ov. n , 1905; 23d year, No. 1194, p. 566). 539. Lansburgh, loc. cit., pp. 36-38, refers to other sources of error, namely, that both the capital and cash accounts, and the other balance sheet items are considerably influenced b y the reciprocal relations of the banks, so that frequently the same amounts are necessarily counted twice, even three times. Consequently, the immediately available assets are frequently lower than they appear in the balance sheet, for instance, when according to the example given (p. 36) a provincial bank passes on its ready cash to a central bank. In this case the amount passed on figures in the balance sheet of the provincial bank as a bank credit, and in the balance sheet of the central bank as cash, and in case the central bank, as is often done, books its giro account at the Reichsbank as cash, the sum in question will figure for the third time as the central bank’ s cash balance at the Reichsbank. This inconvenience m ay in part be done aw ay with b y placing in the balance sheet of the Central Bank the amount passed on to it b y the provincial bank not only among the cash holdings, that is to say among the assets, but also among the debit items, that is to say, among the liabilities. 540. As long ago as Sept. 5, 1907, in m y report at the Third General Congress of German Bankers at Ham burg (Transactions p. 22; and re print published b y Leonh. Simion Nachfolger, Berlin, 1907, p. 32), I espe cially emphasised the fact that a permanent falling off in the liquidity of bank balances would constitute “ one of the most serious draw backs’’ of the concentration in the banking business. 541. The degree of liquidity of individual credit banks m ay of course be more or less favorable than the average for all banks, even decidedly so. 90311°—n ----- 55 849 National Monetary Commission 542. In regard to the liquidity of the Austrian joint stock banks, Dr. Eugen Lopuszanski, secretary to the Ministry, Vienna, in a treatise en titled : ‘ Einige Streiflichter auf das Oesterreichische Bankwesen,” in the Volkwirtschaftliche Wochenschrift, von H. Dorn, vol. L. No. 1305, Dec. 31, 1908, p. 442, writes as follows: “ The liquidity, in as far as it is exhibited b y the ratio of the so-called liquid assets (cash, discounts, loans on collateral, and contango) to the total of creditors, deposits and acceptances, amounted at the end of 1883 to about 65 per cent, and at the end of 1907 to about 45 per cen t.” This comparison shows a considerable decrease in the liquidity of the Austrian joint stock banks. B ut even the present percentage of 45 per cent is com paratively favorable. 543. I wish to emphasize once more that, in reference to the liquidity of the assets, the greatest difference m ay exist among different banks, without being noticeable in any balance sheet or summary statement. 544. Conrads Jahrb. I ll series. Vol. 34, No. 5, Nov. 1907, p. 588; cf. loc. cit., Vol. X X , pp. 86-97. 545. See his article in Conrads Jahrb. I l l series, Vol. X X , p. 90, in which he calculates that on Dec. 31, 1899, in 11 Berlin Banks the imme diately available assets constituted only 57 per cent of the liabilities. However, he includes neither the loans on collateral, which for those banks amounted to about 463,000,000 marks on the date mentioned, nor the securities wr hich in 1898 amounted for the same banks to 714,500,000 marks, but solely cash, specie, bank credits, bills and contango. This is not consistent, for the same objections that m ay be made against the mmediate availability of the loans on collateral (which b y the w ay at that time included also the Bourse contango) can be made against the con tango, (which was regarded b y Heinemann as immediately realisable), nay even against the bills, which likewise cannot always be realised at a moment’s notice. 546. See Robert Franz, “ Die Deutschen Banken im Jahre 1908,” p. 549. 547. Some banks, it is true, hold no doubt large amounts of bills due to industrial long-time investments. 548. See Rob. Franz, Die Deutschen Banken im Jahre 1908 (Reprint from the Deutscher Oekonomist, Berlin, 1908), p. 549. 549. Loc. cit., p. 468-470. 550. Transactions, p. 118. 551. The compilation given in the “ T a g ” of Apr. 17, 1908, entitled “ Die hauptsachlichsten Bank- und utterly unreliable. Bankierinsolvenzen 1906-1907,” is E ven the title is misleading, inasmuch as the table deals only with a single credit bank, the Marienburger Privatbank, a joint stock company with limited liability, with losses to depositors amounting to 6,600,000 marks, as already noted in the above-mentioned table b y Dr. Salomonsohn. The firm of Messrs. Haller, Sohle & Co., despite its title “ Hamburger Bank,” was no Bank, but merely a private banking establishment. On the other hand, while the list purports to be essen- 850 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s tially a statement of losses of deposits, it quite unwarrantably includes brokers’ firms, as well as a whole series of banking establishments which either had no deposits, or whose depositors sustained no losses. One firm had simply gone into liquidation because it was taken over b y a bank (without even a shadow of danger to depositors); another firm, alleged to have lost 672,000 marks, could not be traced even with the assistance of the chambers of commerce. 552. See Deutscher Oekonomist, Jan. 18, 1908, 26th year, No. 1308. 553. A t the beginning of the Bank Inquiry of 1908, the Imperial chan cellor expressly stated through Herr Wermuth, the Under Secretary of State, that no division between pure deposit banks and banks transacting miscellaneous business was contemplated. 554. See Edgar Jaff£, “ Das Englische Bankwesen,” pp. 170-178. 555. Caesar Straus, loc. cit., pp. 38-39; O tto Warschauer, loc. cit., p. 474. 556. This effectually disposes of the assertion b y the former bank official Lansburgh (loc. cit., p. 55) to the effect that the German bank managers are opposed to deposit banks solely on the ground that they are not lik e ly to yield to them (the managers) sufficient profit. This direct attack on the probity of all German bank managers does not become any more excusable b y the fact that Lansburgh (ibid.) starts with the idea “ that a deposit bank is far more profitable than a bank dealing in securities,” an idea which, in view of the present absolutely and relatively small German national wealth, is utterly erroneous. This is not and never was the attitude of the mana gers of German credit banks. T h ey are ready to establish deposit banks immediately they become convinced of the propriety of such a step, or as soon as legal enactments or the measures taken b y State institutions or deposit banks shall force them to do so. 557- See O. Glauert, loc. cit., p. 815; Reichsbank President Koch in Bank-Archiv, 4th year, No. 5, March, 1905. The statement that the tasks of the Reichsbank have of late been rendered more difficult b y the “ con centration of the credit banks influencing the open m arket” would apply in a still greater degree to the proposed Reichsdepositenbank, and to any private, or non-Federal state banks, except that the effect of the latter would be not m erely to hamper b u t even to thwart the discount policy of the Reichsbank. 558. See Edgar Jaff6 “ Das Englische Bankwesen,” pp. 170-178. See also an essay entitled “ L a haute Banque allemande,” in “ L a chronique industrielle, maritime et coloniale,” Jan. 6, 1905, p. 3: “ Thanks to the support and aid lent to it b y high finance, German industry has in a short time undergone a gigantic development. There can be no doubt that without this alliance, without this union of its industrial and financial forces, the Empire would not have achieved the wonders which we have witnessed.” See also Ad. Weber, loc. cit., p. 257, citing various opinions including those of Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu and of an English expert, who speaks of German banks as follows: “ T h ey are virtually the pioneers of the home 851 N at ion a l M on e t a r y Commission and foreign trade of the German E m pire” (see Frederick J. Fuller and H. D. Rowan, “ Foreign competition in its relation to banking” in the Journal of the Institute of Bankers, Vol. X X I, Part II, p. 55). Even Andre E. Sayous, who as a rule has little to say in favor of the manage- pp. 292, 293, goes so far as to assert that a serious panic, even one of no great severity, “ would force nearly all the German banks to suspend paym ent,” nevertheless concludes the 3d chapter of that book with the words: “ Be this as it may, while the French banks have accentuated the economic stagnation of our country, the German banks have had a con siderable share in the brilliant industrial and commercial expansion of G erm any.” 559 I pointed out there, among other things, that, so far as human foresight goes, there was no reason to expect that the Reichsdepositenbank would receive deposits to the extent of at least 1,000,000,000 marks, the amount on which Warschauer bases his calculation of the chances of profit— unless the funds collected by the postal cheque offices were assigned to it. E ven assuming this, the business expenses must be deducted from the gross profits, which at first could hardly exceed 1 per cent. A s the expenses of the German credit banks absorb 31 per cent of 78), and in the case of Berlin banks even 33 per cent, the net profits would scarcely amount to more than one-fourth to one-half of 1 per cent on the interest-bearing deposits, and the dividends would amount to about 5 to 6 per cent, according to the amount of the share capital. would only be reached gradually. Even this Further, I pointed out that the analogy with the English deposit banks, whose dividends had led Warschauer to make his estimate, did not hold. In the first place, in England the paidup share capital, on which dividends are to be paid is, in contrast to the reserves, absolutely and relatively trifling in amount (in 1904 for 87 deposit banks an average of 15,000,000 marks per bank), while the turnover and deposits are extrem ely large, 6,250,000,000 marks (see p. 202). More over, deposits accepted in London with or without the condition of two weeks’ notice bear interest only at 1 % per cent below bank discount, and this applies to only such deposits that have been at the bank’s disposal for at least one month, the minimum amount of deposit at an y time being £10. I have misgivings concerning the use to be made of “ first-class” industrial securities and bank shares for loans on collateral up to 30 per cent of their market value, a device admitted b y Warschauer manifestly to increase the lucrativeness of the proposed institution. A t his demand I will explain that these misgivings are based on the fact that dividendpaying securities are subject to great fluctuations in quotation and, in critical times, can either not be sold at all or only at a great sacrifice, while on those very occasions the margin is with difficulty kept up and the repayment of advances can not be readily expected. 8 52 Further, the msm The HT T TI1—ilTIfT I II ■■in n ■m i B ii m 'ii Ge r ma n Gr e at Banks practice which Warschauer is disposed to admit would lead to the very evil for which the English deposit banks are blamed, namely, the use of deposits for Bourse speculation. Finally, as regards the “ acquisition of first m ortgages” b y deposit banks pure and simple, which Warschauer even deems “ advisable” (geboten), I do not regard it as a desirable investment, at least to a considerable extent, since these banks have to be ready at an y time to repay call deposits or short-term deposits, and it m ay be difficult to realize even on first mortgages. 560. Nor can the advocates of this idea appeal to the fact that according to Roman law the creditors of noninterest-bearing deposits possessed a prior right in the case of bankruptcy of a banker (argentarius), which Papinian expressly states was introduced for the benefit of the whole community (U tilitate publica receptum— see 1. 17, secs. 2, 3, 8 D, 16, 3), for modern business methods allow' of no comparison with those of the argentarius. 561. Among the arguments raised against it, see Deutscher Oekonomist, 22d year, No. 1127, p. 432 (July, 1904), “ Suggestions have been made relating to the proportion between deposits and share capital. This, however, is pure word-play without an y value; for on the one hand the reserves are property of the bank, just as apt to be called upon to cover liabilities as the share capital, and on the other hand the assets are se curity for all liabilities, and not merely for the deposits. T o establish a definite proportion between share capital and deposits would have a pur pose only in case there were no other liabilities than the deposits. That is the condition of the Savings Banks, which of course is totally differ ent from that of ordinary banks.” 562. See Deutscher Oekonomist, Ju ly 13, 1904 (22d year, No. 1 1 2 7 )^ .4 3 2 . 563- This remark, though often repeated, is a gross exaggeration, to say the least, intended, or at least apt, to scare the timid. T he national wealth certainly does not consist merely of deposits, bills and current account balances, which for all those banks that had a t least 1,000,000 marks capital each amounted at the end of 1908 to about 7,250,000,000 marks. O f these banks only the largest are managed b y 10 to 12 man agers, just as State and private industrial and agricultural concerns. On the contrary the national wr ealth, estimated at present to be between 216,000,000,000 to 360,000,000,000 marks, consists of a great number of enormous items, such as the savings deposited in savings banks and coop erative societies to the amount of about of about 14,000,000,000 marks, of the vast amounts, totaling about mortgages and mortgage bonds, etc. 40,000,000,000 marks, invested in Nevertheless, I do not underrate the great power and responsibility of the heads of our great banks, as this book will show'. 564- In Schmoller’s Jahrbuch,” m arkt, ” pp. 72— 95, 565. vol. 31, No. 4, Der Deutsche Geld- Heiligenstadt very properly omits debits on current account from the list of immediately available assets. In giving his reasons for this National Monetary Commission omission, he makes, however, the surprising statement (p. 82) that “ With a view to aiding the enlargement of commercial and industrial enterprises and enabling them to complete their works, the banks grant credit to these enterprises, in the form of current account credit, quite regularly, and to an increasing degree as the money market becomes less favorable (!). This is done in the hope and with the purpose of restoring the liquidity of such loans b y the issue of shares and debentures, when the money market becomes more favorable.” It is hard to imagine howr the banks could have pursued such a business policy. W hat really occurred occasionally was that certain credits which were, originally working credits were, through the debtor’s inability to pay, gradually transformed into investment credit (Anlage-Kredit) very much against the will of the creditors; or, that credit which was really intended to be used for investment was applied for as working credit (Betriebskredit), or finally, that during good times (or such as were considered good) the long-term credit, that is to say, investment credit, necessary for finishing works already begun, or for extending existing works, so as to make them profitable even in critical times, was granted in the hope and expectation that the debtor would soon I be able to get clear of it in the form of debentures, or shares. Lansburgh probably goes too far when he says that the credit granted to industrial companies is “ distinguished” from all other credit in that it can be cast off at almost any period desired (“ Die Verwaltung des Volkvermogens durch die Banken,” [separate reprint] pp. 9-10). During m any years of practical experience in banking I have not met with a case where a bank or bank director in his sound senses granted credit regularly during bad times and even “ to an increasing degree as the market becomes more unfavorable,” with the idea of restoring its liquidity b y issuing shares and debentures at a more favorable season, and I do not believe that such banks or bank directors could remain in business very long. It m ay not be amiss to point out that credit banks have, on the other hand, been frequently reproached with the opposite policy of having constrained manufacturers to adopt the generally unsuitable and far too expensive short-term personal credit with quick and frequent renewals, although in the case of improvements, rebuilding, and the erection of new works, long term credit, irredeemable for m any years, or at least credit repayable in instalments, is more suitable. 566. See: Commission report, p. 26 “ * * * that it would be out right unbusinesslike, especially in the case of industrial companies, to oblige them to withdraw money for the reserve funds from their business and invest it independently, whereas they m ay perhaps be compelled to borrow the necessary capital at a higher rate of interest. * * *” 567. See “ Deutscher Oekonomist,” Dec. 28, 1901, (Vol. X I X , No. 993). 568. George Bernhard in “ Plutus,” Apr. 24, 1909, p. 306. 569. Reprinted among others by Ad. Weber, loc. cit., pp. 259, 260. 570. See Felix Hecht, “ Die Katastrophe der Leipziger B an k,” (Storungen im Deutschen Wirtschaftsleben wahrend der Jahre 1900 ff, published b y The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s the Verein fur Socialpolitik, Vol. 6, Geldmarkt, Kreditbanken, p. 373, et seq.): “ A t the end of 1900 the Leipziger Bank, according to its balance sheet, held bills amounting to 37,798,570.67 marks. B ut this balance sheet does not show that about 12,000,000 marks of these bills were pledged to the “ lottery loan fu n d ” (p. 384). 571. As an additional argument against the demand for a statement of the “ total of moneys employed for contango transactions and loans on collateral,” the following m ay be urged: Nothing is gained, least of all the object aimed at, b y showing the extent to which the bank has favored speculation, as the contango and loans on collateral m ay comprise quite different engagements and advances on goods. Neither can the kind, number and above all the quality of the securities deposited a t the bank as guarantees be ascertained from the statement demanded, although these are the most essential points; and matters would not be greatly altered if the “ total am ount” — nothing else is possible— of the guarantees were also published. 572. Doctor Salomonsohn in Transactions of the III General Congress of German Bankers, p. 116 . 573. In regard to this see the very appropriate remark b y Eugen Lopuszanski in his treatise “ Einige Streiflichter auf das Oesterreichische Bankwesen (In the “ Volksw. W ochenschrift” of Alex. Dorn, Vienna, Dec. 31, 1908, Vol. L X , No. 1305, p. 433): “ While banking, outwardly, forms only a limited part of the national economy, yet b y reason of its organic arrange ment and purpose it is best fitted, through its condition a t an y given moment, to exhibit the interaction of the forces and the results of the movement of the national economy, in a cross section, as it were, of the economic organism.” 5 7 4 - See the essay: “ Spargelder” in the “ Neue Politische Correspondenz” of M ay 21, 1909. 5 7 5 - Such a case is mentioned b y the “ Neue Politische Correspondenz” of M ay 2i, 1909. 576. See “ Aelteste der Berliner Kaufm annschaft” in the Berl. BorsenZeitung, No. 264, June 9, 1909; Alfred Loewenberg in the “ T a g ,” No. 198, ^ ug- 25 . i 9° 9 . and especially Koch in the “ Zeitschrift fur Handelswissenschaft und Handelspraxis,” Vol. II, p. 38 et seq., who ju stly points out, that the proposal to increase the personnel seems rather strange at a time when everbody is studying how to reduce the number of employees. 5 7 7 - In his book “ Beitrage zur Lehre von den Banken,” Leipzig, 1857 P- *5 9 578. Ad. Wagner, “ Bankbriiche u. Bankkontrollen,” in the Deutsche Monatsschrift fur das gesamte Leben der Gegenwart (ibid. Lohmeyer) Year I, No. 1 (Oct., 1901), pp. 74-85, and No. 2 (Nov., 1901), pp. 248-258, especially p. 255. See on the other hand the Deutscher Oekonomist of Oct. 19, I9° i , and N ov. 1, 1902, and R . Rosendorff, “ Bankbriiche u. BankKontrollen,” in Hirths “ Annalen des Deutschen R eichs,” 1902, No. 3, pp. 182-197. 855 n et a r y m mission 579. Paul Marcuse, loc. cit., p. 136. 580. T he fact, noted b y Obst, that, according to the report of the Comp troller of the Currency of Sept. 23, 1908, the m ajority of the presidents of the national banks have declared themselves satisfied with the supervision hitherto exercised b y the “ national bank examiners,” does not necessarily mean that this method has served its purpose; it m ay mean something totally different. Part I V . 1. See Hermann Schumacher, Die Ursachen und Wirkungen der Konzentration in deutschen Bankwesen (Causes and Effects of Concentration in German Banking) in Schmoller’s Jahrbuch, Jan. 27, 1906, Vol. X X X , No. 3, pp. 884, et seq. Paul Wallich, Konzentration in deutschen B ank wesen (Concentration in German Banking), Stuttgart and Berlin, Cotta, 1905. Julius Steinberg, Die Konzentration in Bankgewerbe (Concentra tion in Banking), Berlin, Franz Siemenroth, 1906. Adolf Weber, Die Konzentration in deutschen Bankwesen (Concentration in German B ank ing), Krit. Blatter, f. d. ges. Sozialwissenschaften, Vol. II, No. 7, pp. 299303. Edgard Depitre, Le mouvement de concentration dans les Banques Allemandes (The concentration movement among German Banks), Paris, Arthur Rousseau 1905. O tto Warschauer, Die Konzentration im deut schen Bankwesen (Concentration in German Banking), Conrad’s Jahrbiicher, 3d series, Vol. X X X I I , pp. 145-162. Andre Sayous, La concentra tion de trafic de banque en Allemagne, Journal des Economistes Jan. 15, 1899. 2. W. Sombart, Der moderne Kapitalismus, Vol. I, p. 407. 3. For a description of the movement of concentration in banking abroad see the very excellent accounts in the Vossische Zeitung of Jan. 26, 27, 28, and 31, 1905. (They cover Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, France, Belgium, and the United States.) Use has been made of these articles in various parts of the following discussion. 4. On this point the best references are the different sections (lec tures) of the classic work of Karl Bucher, Die Entstehung der Volkswirtschaft (The Evolution of Economie Society), Tubingen, Laupp’sehe Buchhandlung, 1901, and particularly the following sections; IV, Die gewerb- lichen Betriebssysteme in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, (The Indus trial System s in their Historical Evolution), pp. 175 et seq.; V, Der Niedergang des Handwerks (Decline of the Handicraft System ), pp. 215 et seq.; V II, Arbeitsvereinigung und Arbeitsgemeinschaft (The Combina tion and Concentration of Labor); IX , Arbeitsgliederung und soziale Klassenbildung, p. 283 et seq.; (The Division of Labor and the Development of Social Classes) pp. 367 et set]. 5. In order to avoid duplication we must refer to the abundant material given on this point in what is now Part III, Chap. I l l , secs. 1 and 2 (See above pp. 191 to 407). See also the valuable work of O tto Jeidels, Das Verhaltnis der deutschen Grossbanken zur Industrie, mit besonderer Beriicksichti- 856 The German Great Banks gung der Eisenindustrie” (The Relation of the German Great Banks to Industry, with special reference to the iron industry), Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot, 1905. 6. B u t this does not necessarily mean the doubling of profits. 7. See Hermann Schumacher, op. cit., pp. 5-6. The requirements of sound principle is that customers receiving large amounts of credit from a bank should be obliged to confine their entire banking business to the bank advancing its credit, in order that the bank m ay be in a position to keep posted on the business of the borrower. This requirement can not be readily enforced owing to competition, but so far as it is practicable, it is in a large measure lived up to b y the banks. Unfortunately as the Ter- linden case has proved, the observance of this obligation b y the customer can not be readily controlled. So long as there is no central credit agency, such a clause in the contract must remain a lex imperfecta. Owing to practical difficulties, such an agency has not yet been established, although a few attem pts have been made. 8. This too is a function of the bank floating securities, or of the banks interested in selling the stocks or bonds in connection with an issue of securities. For this a c tiv ity exclusively, as distinguished from the banker’s work as broker, he receives a “ bonus.” The bonus represents thus a special compensation for a special service performed b y the banker. The service consists in the obligation assumed b y the banker to make every effort, and to utilize his special knowledge of his clientele with a view to placing the securities issued in good hands, that is to say, where they will be held permanently. This is a d u ty that should be done b y no one else but the banker and can not be done b y any one else. It is therefore unreason able to require him to divide the bonus with his principal, the purchaser of the securities. Neither can it be said, as the court (Reichsgericht, I Zivilsenat) has held in a decision of Dec. 10, 1904, that he is acting with fraudulent intent, in case he fails to inform the purchaser of the bonus received b y him, or in turn fails to let the purchaser share the benefit of this bonus. 9. See K. l'leischhammer, Zentralisation im Rankwesen in Deutschland, Schmoller’s Jahrbuch f. Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft, vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 241 et seq. xo. See No. 12 of the Bestimmungen fur den Giroverkehr der Reichsbank. (Rules relating to Giro Business of the Reichsbank.) According to No. 10 of these rules money deposited for giro transactions does not bear interest. * 11. Helfferich, Der deutsche Geldmarkt 1895-1902, p. 44. 12. It seems that similar occurrences have taken place also in England, (See Edgar Jaffe, Das Englische Bankwesen, p. 190), also in Austria. In 1899 the Anglobank established a branch in Aussig, and in the same year a branch was established by the Wiener Bankverein. In 1901 the Nieder- oesterreichische Escomptegesellseliaft acquired the branch of the Bohmische Escomptebank in Trautenau, and in the same year a branch of the 857 National Monetary Anglobank was opened in that town. Commission There are m any other such exam ples which m ay be found in the Prager T ageblatt for Oct. 12, 1905, No. 281, in the article entitled “ Die Konkurrenz im Oesterreichischen Bankwesen.” 13. T he Rhenisch-W estphalian Pig Iron Syndicate came to an end on Jan. 1, 1909, as has been noted above (see note 170, p. 818) and likewise The Lorraine-Luxembourg and the Siegerland pig iron syndicates. For details consult the above discussion. 14. Am ong them are the general directors of the following mining and iron companies: Harpener Bergbau-Aktiengesellschaft, Oberschlesische Eisen- dustrie-Aktiengesellschaft, Bergwerkgesellschaft Hibernia, Konsolidation, Bergwerks-Aktiengesellschaft zu Schalke, Prager Eisenindustrie in Wien, Holienlohe Werke. 15. Among them are the general director of the Gelsenkirchener Berg werks-Aktiengesellschaft, and as representatives of shipping circles the general directors of the Hamburg-American Line, and of the North German Lloyd. 16. Among them are a former director of the firm of Friedrich Krupp, and a general director of each of the following mining and smelting com panies: Laura H iitte, Bismarkhiitte, Schlesische Aktiengesellschaft fur Bergbau und Zinkhiittenbetrieb in Lipine, and the Kattow itzer Aktien gesellschaft fur Bergbau und Eisenhuttenbetrieb. 17. See Frankfurter Zeitung of M ay 26, 1884, No. 147. 18. T h e new ta x provision was particularly oppressive for the buyer since the ta x was paid in every case on multiples of 1,000 marks. 19. See Centralverbands-Denkschrift of December, 1903, pp. 32-34 and the Verhandlungen des II Allgem. Deutsehen Bankiertages (Proceedings of the Second General Convention of German Bankers) at Berlin, M ay 16 and 17, 1904, p. 58 (Mommsen), pp. 73-74 (Arons), pp. 83-84 (Franck), and the Frankfurter Zeitung of M ay 31, 1901. 20. See Centralverbands-Denkschrift, pp. 42 et seq. and the Proceedings of the First General Convention of German Bankers at Frankfort-on-theMain, Sept. 19 and 20, 1902, pp. 58-59 (von Pflauin), and Dr. Alfred Meyer, Die deutsehen Borsensteuern 1881-1900 (German Stock Exchange Taxes), Stuttgart and Berlin, J. G. C o tta ’sche Buchhandlung Nachf. 1902, pp. 55 et seq. 21. See Riesser, Das Bankdepotgesetz vom 5, Juli 1896. Aus der Praxis und fur die Praxis, insbes. des Handelsstandes, erlautert (The Bank Deposit Law of July, 1896, based on its practical application, and explained for practical use, for special use of the commercial classes). Berlin, O tto Liebmann, 2d ed. 1906, pp. 67 et seep 22. For a discussion of the economic injury resulting from the stock exchange law, see among others, Riesser, Die Notw'endigkeit einer Revision des Borsengesetzes vom 22 Juni 1896/Jan. 1, 1897 (The Need for a Revision of the Stock Exchange Law of June 22, 1896, effective January 1, 1897), Berlin, 1902, Leonhard Simion Nachf.; and Stand und Aussichten der Borsengesetzreform (Position and Prospects of the Stock Exchange Reform 858 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s Legislation, Berlin, 1907, Leonhard Simion Nachf.) and works mentioned in note indicated b y one asterisk (*) in the aforementioned CentralverbandsDenkschrift, p. 17. Reference m ay be made to the follow ing,economic literature of more general character: Franz Eulenburg, Die gegenwartige Wirtschaftskrisis, Sym ptom e und Ursaehen, Conrad’s Jahrbiicher, 3d series, Vol. X X I V , p. 382; Helfferich, Der deutsche Geldmarkt 1895-1902, op. cit., p. 27; Ad. Weber, Depositen- banken und Spekulationsbanken, p. 7; Rud. Eberstadt, Die gegenwartige Krisis, ihre Ursaehen und die Aufgaben der Gesetzgebung, Berlin, 1902, K. Hoffmann, p. 3 3 ; v. Halle, Amerika, seine Bedeutung fiir die Weltwirt- schaft und seine wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zu Deutschland, insbesondere zu Hamburg (America, Its Significance in the Economic Life of the World, Its Economic Relations to Germany and Particularly to Hamburg), published b y the Hamburger Borsenhalle, 1905, particularly p. 31: “ Under the ill-advised stock exchange laws of the last ten years, there has been no proportionate progress even in participation in the financial operations of the various States.” See also O tto Warschauer, Die Reform des Borsen- gesetzes in Deutschland in Conrad’ s Jahrb. f. Nationalokonomie und Statistik, 3d series, Vol. X X X , No. 4, Oct. 1905, pp. 433-469. 23. These limitations became applicable to both “ legitim ate” as well as ‘ illegitimate ” dealings in futures. 24. Helfferich, op. cit., p. 27. 25. See among others the annual report of the Deutsche Bank for 1895 and that of the Dresdner Bank for 1896. 26. See the article in the Frankfurter Zeitung of Nov. 15, 1904, No. 318 entitled Borsengesetz und Bankenanschwellung (Stock Exchange Legisla tion and the Growth of the Banks). This article shows in two tables the growth that has taken place in the case of 10 Great Berlin banks and 20 provincial banks contrasting their situation in 1896 and again in 1903 with their position in 1884. 27. As early as the beginning of the seventies the “ provincial” banks established were based almost entirely on private banks which had been transformed or absorbed, as for instance the Provinzial-Disconto-Gesellsehaft, the Provinzial-Gewerbebank in Berlin, the Siiddeutsche Provinzialbank in Stuttgart, the Prov. Wechslerbank in Breslau, the Prov. Maklerbank in Berlin and the Allgemeine Deutsche Filialen-Kreditanstalt in Leipzig. I h e idea of these provincial or union central banks was ahead of its time, and for that reason failed in most instances. As regards England, see Edgar Jaff6, Das Englische Bankwesen, p. 192; 1844-1875; Gradual Consolidation of Joint Stock Banks in London and the Provinces as a result of the absorption and supplanting 01 private banking firms; 1878-1890, consolidation of the provincial banks and the formation of large institutions; some of the latter gaining a foothold in London; 1890-1896, almost total supplanting of private banking firms in London as well. The great provincial banks have become consolidated in London. J. W. Gilbart, op. cit. (ibid., 1901), p. 423 mentions the fact 859 N at i on a l M on et a r y Commission that as early as 1836 no fewer than 138 private banking establishments had merged with deposit banks. The number of private bankers in England and Wales declined from 448 in 1837 to 261 in 1858, to 226 in 1878, to 144 in 1891 and to 100 in 1896. W ith reference to Austria, the Neues Wiener T ageblatt said as far back as September 13, 1903, that the private banker “ has disappeared even more rapidly than in Germany, we have well nigh reached the final stage in that process.” According to the Berliner T ageblatt (of May 27, 1904, No. 265), not a single private banker remained in Crefeld out of 20 that had once been in business there. For the disadvantages resulting from the decline of the profession of the private banker see Frankfurter Zeitung of Jan. 11, 1905, “ Aktienbanken und Privatbankiers” and the Centralverbands-Denkschrift of 1903, pp. 39 et seq. In the United States, private bankers until quite lately were still numer ous (numbering in 1902, 4,188), in spite of the exceptional growth in number of joint-stock banks, which increased from 9,338 in 1892 to 13,684 at the close of 1903 (Vossische Zeitung, Jan. 31, 1905), and in spite of the fact that here too bank consolidations have played a great part. (In 1901, 27 national banks were absorbed by other national banks, in 1902, 46). The special report of the U. S. Monetary Commission gives under date of Apr. 28, 1909, the total number of private banks as 1,497, as compared with 6,888 national banks and 11,292 state banks on the same date. This number is exclusive of 642 mutual savings banks, 1,061 stock savings banks, and 1,079 loan and trust companies. The total number of corporate and private banks, including those which had failed to report to the Com mission, is estimated at about 25,000. 28. See below for a discussion of the question, whether the resultant severe depression and the lack of vita lity occasioned by it, was justified to the extent observed. (Part V I, p. 751). 29. As an example we m ay cite the increase in small landholdings (less than two hectares) shown by the census of 1895. of all agricultural holdings. against 3,061,831 in 1882. In These form 58 per cent 1895 they amounted to 3,236,367, as (Statist. Jahrb. f. d. Deutsche Reich fur 1904, p. 24.) 30. In consequence of mergers, the number of London banks (exclusive of colonial and so called foreign banks) decreased from 115 in 1885 to 77 in 1901. (See Schmoller, Grundriss II, p. 232.) 31. Op. cit., pp. 198-247. See, however, his study, Die Wirkungen des Borsengesetzes auf das Bank-und Borsengeschaft (Effect of the Stock Exchange Law on the Business of the Banks and Stock Exchanges) in Conrad’s Jahrb. 1897, 3d series, Vol. X I I I pp. 725 et seq. 32. Centralverbands-Denkschrift for December, 1903, p. 37, and Table X V , p. 68. 33. These were die terms used by Esehenbach at the general convention of the Verein fur Sozialpolitik in 1904 (Verhandlungen, p. 286) in con- 860 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s troverting those who held that there had been a " relative decline,” as well as an absolute diminution in the number of private bankers. Eschenbach himself seems to admit that there had been a relative decrease, but does not attribute it to the stock-exchange law. In m y opinion there is not much difference between these two views; according to the above data both views would seem sufficiently founded. 34. O p . c it., p . 248. 3 5 - Op. cit., p. 263. 36. Paul Wallich (op. cit., p. 13) calls attention to another circumstance which tended to drive private firms out of the banking business to an increasing extent— the establishment of branches of the Reichsbank in the Provinces. This caused severe competition to the private bankers along the most legitimate lines, even in such places where joint stock banks had not y et made their influence felt. This competition of the Reichsbank, it is claimed, w as particularly severe in the eastern part of the Kingdom of Prussia, for the reason that the Reichsbank rates for discount and Lombard loans, uniform for the entire Empire, were much lower than the rates charged before the advent of the Reichsbank, and thus caused an enor mous lowering of interest rates in the respective sections of the country. 3 7 - Op. cit., p. 248. The Centralverband was unable to obtain abso lutely accurate figures on this point, as the Denkschrift reports. More important, however, is the testimony of the author, who is a private banker in Berlin. A large proportion of the private firms still in existence have continued their business, in order not to deprive of a livelihood employees who had served them for many years. The business of m any of these firms, however, no longer represents any considerable amounts. Julius Steinberg (op. cit., p. 9) did not assert, as the Deutscher Oekonomist of December 23, 1905, wrongly assumed, that “ generally speaking the number of private bankers had not declined, but on the contrary had increased somewhat ” This assertion he made only for some German large cities; on the other hand, for the stock exchange centers of Berlin and Frankforton-the-Main he showed a decrease. 38. See Julius Steinberg, op. cit., p. 9. The figures reprinted here, taken from the giro-accounts of the Reichsbank and continued to 1904, do not give a clear picture, for the reason that no distinction is made between the provincial banks which had remained independent and the private banking firms. , 3 9 - I call attention here again to the fact that the decline of private banking like the concentration in banking, was, in m y opinion, only hastened by the stock-exchange law and not caused b y it. E ven without the stockexchange law, the movement toward concentration so clearly seen in en tirely different fields, and in foreign countries as well as in Germany, would have set in, though perhaps not with such intensity and rapidity. W e have here only one phase in a great and universal process of economic evolution. Concerning England, Edgar Jaffe tells us (Inaugural-Dissert, p. 33) that of the old private banking firms that belonged to the clearing house (40 in 861 Commissio 1810) only 13 retained their membership in 1873 and 3 in 1900. However, English conditions can not be used for comparison, for the reason that, as Jaffe reports, (Das Englische Bankwesen, p. 93) in the closing decades of the nineteenth century, no new members were admitted to the clearing house, not even banks. 40. According to Ad. Weber, Die rheinisch-westfalischen Provinzbanken und die Krisis (Schriften des Vereins f. Sozialpolitik C X , and Storungen im deutschen Wirtschaftsleben etc. Vol. V I, pp. 326, 327). The inference made there that the capital stock of these banks increased during this period relatively more rapidly than that of the large Berlin banks cannot be accepted as correct without further evidence. In the first place com parison is made with only 6 of the 10 great Berlin banks then in existence. As a matter of fact these banks increased their capital stock during these seven years “ o n ly ” from 428,000,000 million marks to 705,000,000 marks or “ o n ly ” about 64 per cent whereas the increase for the other banks is 226 per cent. In the second place, all these large banks had previously made large additions to their capital beginning with 1885. 41. For other calculations see the article in the Frankfurter Zeitung for M ay 6 and 7, 1903, Nos. 125 and 126, Konzentration im Bankgeschaft, and for Nov. 15, 1904, No. 318, Borsengesetz und Bankanschwellung. the period for 1890-1901 is taken, a different picture is obtained. If See W. Christians, Die Entwicklung der deutschen Aktienbanken von 18901901 in Bank-Archiv., vol. 2, No. 4 Jan. 1903, pp. 53 et seq., and particu larly p. 56. (Appeared also as reprint). 42. The Oberbergische Bank with the cooperation of the RheinischWestfalische Disconto-Gesellschaft was consolidated November 11, 1907, with the Gummersbacher Volsbank into a new corporation, the Oberber gische Kreditanstalt in Ohl (capital 2,000,000 marks, with branches in Halver and Gummersbach). 43. See Paul Wallich, op. cit., pp. 16-24. The chief example is the Provinzial-Discontogesellschaft, organized b y the Disconto-Gesselschaft in 1871 with a nominal capital of 30,000,000 marks but liquidated as early as 1878. 4 4 - Die Konzentration im deutschen Bankwesen, pp. 34-38. 4 5 - Quoted from Paul Wallich, op. cit., p. 131. 46. Die Diisseldorfer Stahlwerksverband was concluded until June 30, 1912. As to the Oberschlesischer Stahlwerksverband see note 171, pp. 818-819. 47. In alphabetic order. The share capital and reserves, unless other wise stated, are given as reported on Dec. 31, 1908. 48. N ext to it, even now, among the Berlin banks, in point of centrali zation, is the Nationalbank fur Deutschland, which has no branches nor communities of interest, but 17 deposit offices and one commandite (The Mitteldeutsche Kreditbank has no communities of interest, but has 5 branches, 3 commandites, 22 deposit offices and 2 agencies). 49. See Appendix V II, p. 982. 862 I The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s 50. As regards the calculation of the full share capital, and of the surplus, see note p. 58 below. 51. S e e S u p p l e m e n t V I I , p. 99 4 e t seq . T h e D e u ts c h -B u lg a r is c h e B a n k i n S o f i a i s n o t i n c l u d e d , b e c a u s e i t is a f o r e i g n b a n k , n o r t h e R e v i s i o n s - u n d V e r m o g e n s v e r w a lt u n g s - A k t i e n g e s e lls c h a f t , b e c a u s e i t is n o t a b a n k 52. See Supplement V II, p. 99 9 et se953. See Supplement V II, p. 1005 et seq. prop er. The Ostbank fur Handel und Gewerbe in 1905 absorbed the Ostdeutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft vormals J. Simon W ittwe & Sohne in Konigsberg, formerly one of the “ concern” banks of the A. Schaaffhausen’scher Bankverein, and thus belongs now to the Schaaffhausen group. It formerly maintained community of interest relations with the Bank fur Handel und Industrie (Darmstadter Bank), as set forth in Supplement V II, p. 984 under 2, and hence can not be here enumerated again. 54. See S u p p l e m e n t V II, p . 982 e t s e q . 55. The Bromberger Bank fur Handel und Gewerbe, formerly mentioned here as having a community of interest with the Ostbank, has meantime been absorbed by the latter. 56. See, however, note 7, p 1013. 57. It might also be proper to include the Wiirttembergische Vereinsbank (share capital 30,000,000 marks), since there is a community of interest between it and the Wiirttembergische Bankanstalt. (See Supplement V II). 58. I have here purposely left unnoticed the fact that the linking together of banks is in many cases effected b y means of an exchange of shares, rendered possible through an increase of the capital of the annexing bank. Thus where the share capital both of the annexing and the annexed bank is taken at full value, there is often, though not always, an excessive, but b y no means necessarily a double, reckoning of share capital, as a mere matter of arithmetic. There m ay also be cases in which the same capital is counted twice or even three times, to wit, when the annexation is effected not through exchange but through acquisition of stock (without increase of capital). I t m ay be that all or part of the capital of the provincial bank which is annexed b y a central bank b y the latter method is counted once more among the “ per manent participations” of the central bank. On the other hand, among the “ permanent participations” of the provincial bank there m ay be found once more the share capital, or part of it, of other banks, which the pro vincial bank in its turn has annexed b y means of acquisition of shares, if it has allowed these banks to continue as separate stock companies. This attitude, which I deliberately took in the first edition, I have decided to maintain after renewed reflection, especially since every other method of calculation would lead to errors at least equal and generally much larger in amount, which can only be avoided b y omitting the summing up of the items into a total. In case of an exchange of stock, it is generally impracticable, owing to lack of data in the reports, to ascertain how many shareholders of the 863 National Monetary Commission annexed bank have availed themselves of the offer to exchange their stock for stock of the annexing bank. This is strikingly proved b y the laborious and detailed calculation which Ernst Loeb, in his oft-cited work “ Die Berliner Grossbanken in den Jahren i ‘ 95-i90 2” had to make (pp. 101-103), 8 in order to ascertain, with only partial success, how many shareholders of the Bergisch-Markische Bank and the Schlesischer Bankverein availed themselves of the offer of exchange made in 1897 by the Deutsche Bank. S t i l l le s s is i t p o s s ib le , in m o s t c a s e s , t o a s c e r t a in h o w m a n y o f t h e s h a r e s r e c e iv e d in e x c h a n g e r e m a in e d b a n k , a n d h o w m a n y w e r e s o ld . p e r m a n e n t ly in p o s s e s s io n o f t h e a n n e x i n g T h u s a n y e s t i m a t e s t h a t m a y b e m a d e in t h is m a t t e r a r e a lm o s t e n t ir e ly b a s e le s s . Similarly, in the case of mere acquisition of shares, the balance sheets furnish no definite data for exact figures, since the “ permanent participa tions” are mostly stated merely in the aggregate. T h u s , a s id e fr o m a f e w e x c e p t io n s , i t is im p o s s ib le b y t h is m e t h o d t o a s c e r t a in t h e e x a c t s u m w h ic h w o u ld h a v e to b e d e d u c te d fr o m th e sh a r e c a p it a l o f th e a n n e x e d b a n k s , in order to o b ta in an a c c u r a t e r e s u lt. The sam e o b je c tio n , h o w e v e r , a p p lie s to th e m e th o d p r o p o s e d b y so m e , w h ic h c o n s is ts in a s c e r t a in in g t h e b o o k v a l u e s o f e x c h a n g e d s h a r e s fr o m t h e b a la n c e s h e e t s o r r e p o r t s o f t h e a n n e x i n g b a n k s , t h e r e a s o n b e i n g t h a t t h e s e b o o k v a l u e s in m o s t c a s e s c a n n o t b e a s c e r t a in e d fr o m t h e s o u r c e s in q u e s t io n , a n d i t w o u ld of cou rse be u n s c ie n t if ic a n o th e r m e th o d to adopt th is m e th o d w h ere it is p o s s ib le , a n d in o t h e r i n s t a n c e s . Moreover annexations have occurred within one and the same group either through exchange of shares or through other methods of acquisition of shares, that is to say, without any increase of capital on the part of the annexing bank. This leads to differences within the various groups, which, if taken into account in the calculation, would result in a totally false pic ture of the relative power of the several groups. Finally— and this is perhaps the most important point— the aim is not to ascertain the capital of the several groups but their capital power, and this can hardly be represented in any other w ay than b y a statement of the share capital and reserves, unless we are prepared, with O tto Jeidels, (loc. cit., pp. 91-93) to take a further step and include in the calculation the entire earning capital, that is to say, current account credits and deposits. If the object is simply to represent the capital power, which in fact is the only point of interest, the statement of the full share capital and reserves is justified b y the consideration that, from the outsider’s point of view, the sphere of influence of a bank, its credit and business power, are embodied in this share capital and reserves. Indeed, as rightly pointed out b y W. Christians (in the Deutscher Oekonomist, Dec. 2, 1905, 23d year, No. 1197, p. 597), the fact that, for example, the entire capital of the Norddeutsche Bank is held by the Disconto-Gesellschaft, which in turn has passed over to the shareholders of the Norddeutsche Bank 50,000,000 marks of its total capital of 170,000,000 marks, does not justify the statement that the total capital of the Disconto-Gesellschaft now amounts only to 864 120,000,000 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s marks, and the united capital of the two banks only to 170,000,000, not 220,000,000 marks. This would be so if we adm itted the principle that the shares of the annexing bank turned over for the purpose of exchange should not be counted together with the shares of the annexed bank. E ven after the operation of exchange, the capital power of the two banks is equal to the sum of the share capital and reserves of both, as has been admitted b y the Deutscher Oekonomist, not only in the above-cited article of Dec. 2, 1905, on the capital power of the bank groups (loc. cit., p. 597) but even earlier (in No. 1178, Ju ly 22, 1905) as well as b y Julius Steinberger (op. cit. p. 7) and O tto Jeidels (op. cit., pp. 91-92). However, the whole question becomes rather immaterial when we con sider the sums involved. The aggregate capital and reserves of the five groups of banks, as set forth above, is in round numbers 2,000,000,000 marks. The significance of this total will not be greatly changed b y adding or deducting a few million marks. For shares recurring as securities or permanent participations in the balance sheets of other institutions, Wallich (op. cit., pp. 138-139, Table X I V ) deducts 64,000,000 in the case of the Deutsche Bank group, 75,000,000 in the case of the Disconto-Gesellschaft group, 15,000,000 in the case of the Dresdner Bank group, and 22,000,000 in the case of the Darmstadter Bank group, making a total of 176,000,000. As a matter of fact, these figures represent in part arbitrary assumptions, as do those of Lansburgh (op. cit., p. 35) who assumes a like total of 500,000,000 marks for all the banks. 59. In this point I differ from O tto Jeidels, op. cit., p. 91-93. 60. One of the factors promoting the concentration of capital, as vye have seen, is the formation of syndicates or groups. However, this factor does not belong here, since its professed aim is not concentration but quite different objects, to wit, the distribution of risk on the one hand and the facilitating of the issuing function on the other. 61. In the Kritische Blatter fur die gesamten sozialen Wissenschaften, Vol. II, No. 7, p. 300. 62. See tables given b y Jeidels, op. cit., pp. 172-173. 63. According to the table given by Jeidels (p. 603 et seq.), the follow ing banks were represented during 1905 in the supervisory boards of compa nies belonging to the chemical and textile industries: Number of boards on which represented. In the chemical industry. A. Schaaffliausen’scher Bankverein.......................................... 6 In the textile industry. 6 National Monetary Commission 64. Depositenbankwesen und Scheckverkehr in England, p. 259. 65. In addition to the economic factors, there are psychologic factors that play a part in this movement, the significance and strength of which, particularly in the field of concentration, we have repeatedly pointed out in the text. Such factors are “ the craving for individual freedom” (W. Sombart, Der moderne Kapitalismus II, p. 237), ampler room for indi vidual exertion, wider aims, etc., and, later on, the attraction of a human conglomeration, of a vast traffic, of the facilities for learning the latest in economic and political matters, etc. 66. Apart from those banks which were satisfied with being repre sented in Berlin b y the inadequate method of silent partnership connections (commandites) with Berlin banking houses (see Paul Wallich, op. cit., p. 56, Table V I I I .) 67. The Breslauer Discontobank of Breslau had likewise founded a branch in Berlin in 1896, which was however taken over in 1902 b y the Bank fur Handel und Industrie. 68. This is the same process that m ay be observed in France in the case of the Paris branch of the Credit Lyonnais. 69. This is the view of Rudolf Eberstadt, Depositenbanken und Scheckverkehr in England, pp. 251 and 259, note 2. 70. For France see Andr6 Sayous, Die Konzentration des Bankverkehrs in Frankreich in the Bank-Archiv, vol. I l l , No. 8, of May 3, 1904, Table I, p. 129. 71. Edgar Jaffe, Das englische Bankwesen, p. 30. 72. Edgar Jaffe, loc. cit., p. 192. 73. Thus the capital of the Joint Stock Banks in Great Britain during the years 1900-1905, rose from £76,000,000 to £79,500,000, in round figures, while their number fell from 83 to 62. 74. See above, p. 605. 75. See p. 607 and following of the text and notes thereto. 76. The several capital increases of the Darmstadter Bank during the second epoch were as follows: U p to 1880 to 60,000,000 marks, up to 1889 to 80,000,000 marks, up to 1898 to 105,000,000 marks, up to 1902 to 132.000. 000 marks, up to 1904 to 154,000,000 marks. (The last-named figure has been maintained to date.) 77. The several capital increases of the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft during the second epoch were as follows: U p to 1880 to 30,000,000 marks (in 1882 reduced to 20,000,000 marks), up to 1886 to 30,000,000 marks, up to 1887 to 40,000,000 marks, up to 1889 to 50,000,000 marks, up to 1891 to 65.000. 000 marks, up to 1896 to 80,000,000 marks, up to 1899 to 90,000,000 marks, up to 1903 to 100,000,000 marks, up to 1908 to 110,000,000 marks. (The last-named figure has been maintained to date.) 78. The several capital increases of the Disconto-Gesellschaft during the second epoch were as follows: U p to 1880 to 60,000,000 marks, up to 1889 to 75,000,000 marks, up to 1898 to 115,000,000 marks, up to 1899 to 130,000,000 marks, up to 1902 to 150,000,000 marks, up to 1904 to 170.000. 000 marks. (The last-named figure has been maintained to date.) 86 6 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s 79. The several capital increases of the A. Schaaffhausen’scher Bankverein during the second epoch were as follows: U p to 1880 to 36,000,000 marks, up to 1891 to 48,000,000 marks, up to 1895 to 60,000,000 marks, up to 1897 to 75,000,000 marks, up to 1899 to 100,000,000 marks, up to 1904 to 130,000,000 marks, up to 1908 to 145,000,000 marks. named figure has been maintained to date.) 80. The several capital increases of the Mitteldeutsche (The lastKreditbank during the second epoch were as follows: Up to 1880 to 30,000,000 marks, up to 1897 to 36,000,000 marks, up to 1899 to 45,000,000 marks, up to 1905 to 54,000,000 marks. Assuming an original capital of 5,000,000 thalers (=15,000,000 marks) instead of 8,000,000 thalers (since 3,000,000 thalers remained in the port folio of the bank), a nearly fourfold increase within the period m ay be figured out. 81. In Austria the earning capital (share capital plus surplus, accept ances, deposits and credits on current account (Kreditoren) of all Austrian joint-stock and provincial banks (Landesbanken) at the end of 1902 was in round figures 7,500,000,000 crowns, of which, it is true, the AustroHungarian Bank was credited with about 2,432,000,000 crowns, and the Kreditanstalt with 494,000,000 crowns. O ut of 60 banks, 6 possessed in the aggregate more than 60 per cent of the total capital. A t the end of 1908, the following Austrian banks, which since 1905 have also greatly increased the number of their branches, showed the following share capitals: Capital at end of 1908. Capital in year of foundation. Year of founda tion. M illio n c ro w n s . Handel und Gewerbe. 2. K. K. Priv. Osterreichisclie Bodenkreditanstalt. 3. K. K. Privilegierte Osterreichische Banderbank. 45 130 7,200,000 crowns............ 1864 100,000,000 francs.......... 1880 V c * c t c c c c 0 c 6. Niederosterreichische E sco m tegesellschaft. 60 10,461,000 crowns.......... 7° a 1853 1870 Beginning with 1864 only 60,000,000 florins. The great Hungarian banks, too, have recently increased their share capitals very considerably (in part also the number of their branches), in particular the following: 1, Ungarische Allgemeine Kreditbank, capital increased to 60,000,000 crowns; 2 Osterreichisch-Ungarische Commercialbank, capital increased to 42,000,000 crowns; 3, Ungarische Escom te- und Wechslerbank, capital increased to 40,000,000 crowns. N at io n a l M o n et a r y Commission In France, the following increases of share capital took place between 1870 and the end of 1908: Credit Lyonnais (with 43 agencies in Paris, 9 in the suburbs of Paris, 174 in French provincial towns and in Algeria), from 20,000,000 to 250,000,000 francs; Comptoir national d’ Escompte de Paris (with 35 bureaux de quartiers in Paris, 14 agencies in the suburbs and 150 agencies in the provinces), from 50,000,000 to 150,000,000 francs; Credit industriel et commercial (with 30 succursales in Paris, 3 in the suburbs and 1 agency in London), from 15,000,000 to 100,000,000 francs; Soci6t6 g£n£rale pour favoriser etc. (with 88 succursales, agencies and bureaus in Paris and suburbs, 637 agencies in the provinces, and one agency each in London and Saint Sebastian, Spain), from 60,000,000 to 300.000. 000,francs. 82. The several increases of the Deutsche Bank were: Period ending 1880 to 100.000. 45,000,000, 1881 to 60,000,000, 1888 to 75,000,000, 1895 to 000, 1897 to 150,000,000, 1902 to 160,000,000, 1904 to 180,000,000, 1905 to 200,000,000 marks; amount unchanged since then. 83. The several increases of the Dresdner Bank were: Period ending 1880 to 15,000,000, 1881 to 24,000,000, 1883 to 36,000,000, 1887 to 48,000,000, 1889 to 60,000,000, 110.000. 1892 to 70,000,000, 1895 to 85,000,000, 1897 to 000, 1899 to 130,000,000, 1904 to 160,000,000, 1907 to 180,000,000 marks, 1910 to 200,000,000 marks. 84. The several increases of the Commerz- und Disconto-Bank were: Period ending 1883 to 40,000,000, 1897 to 50,000,000, 1904 to 85,000,000 marks; amount unchanged since then. 85. The several increases of the National bank fur Deutschland were: Period ending 1883 up to 24,000,000, 1899 (after reduction to 21,000,000 and to 18,000,000) to 27,000,000, 1890 to 36,000,000, 1895 to 45,000,000, 1898 to 60,000,000, 1905 to 80,000,000 marks; amount unchanged since then. 86. See also p. 629 and following for list of banks and private banking firms absorbed b y provincial banks which remained independent. For example, the Rheinisch-Westfdlische Disconto-Gesellschaft in Aachen (A ixla-Chapelle) alone absorbed a total of 7 banks and 2 private banking con cerns (4 banks and 1 private banking concern being absorbed in a single year, 1905); see p. 633 et seq. 87. In 1909 the Disconto-Gesellschaft set up a branch in Mainz, to take the place of the bankingfirm of Bamberger & Co. in Mainz, w hichit had absorbed. 88. In 1909 the Deutsche Bank, without absorbing any banking estab lishment, set up a branch in Constantinople, in order to foster and develop the manifold relations to Turkey. 89. Paul W allich (loc. cit., p. 59 et seq.) says that fusion was “ the char acteristic form of concentration” in German banking in the period 18801895. I am unable to share that view , even as regards the period named. Concerning a bank which ceased to exist not long after its establishment, it soon became a common saying at the Bourse that the shares were bought and sold “ per disappearance.” 90. Such is the case of the Berliner Bank, which had been unable fu lly to attain its purpose, nam ely to attract the credit business of the class of small traders. 88 6 Th e G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s 91. Such is, for example, the case of the Hessische Notenbank under the firm name of Bank fur Siiddeutschland, which, b y reason of the new bank ing law, was no longer able to attain its aims as fully as had been intended and was in fact requisite. Paul Wallich (loc. cit., p. 78) reports the absorp tion of six other former note banks b y credit banks. Here must also be mentioned the absorption, in 1905, of the Braunschweigische Kreditanstalt (share capital, 6,750,000 marks) b y the Braunschweigische Bank (share capital, 10,500,000 marks), the latter absorbing in 1906 also the banking firms of Hermann Schoof in Helmstedt and Hugo Rennau in Schoningen. 92. See article: “ Zwangsfusionen” in the Berliner Tageblatt (Handelszeitung) Jan. 15, 1906. 93. Thus in the case of the absorption of the Anglo-Deutsche Bank b y the Dresdner Bank in 1892. 94. Rudolf Eberstadt, Depositenbankwesen und Scheckverkehr in E n g land, op. cit., p. 249. Edgar Jafte (loc. cit., pp. 190-191) thinks on the contrary that “ the movement has been slackening since the beginning of the new century.” 95. Edgar Jaff6, loc. cit., p. 191. 96. Karl Mamroth, Die schottischen Banken, p. 10, note 38. 97. Vossische Zeitung, Jan. 31, 1905; see Charles J. Bullock, Concentra tion of Banking Interests, in A tlantic Monthly, Aug. 1903. 98. See C. Stegemann, Die Entwicklung des franzosischen Grossbankbetriebes (Munster in Westfalen, Theissing, 1908), pp. 22-23, 26, 3999. See p. 869, note 57. 100. This refers solely to the share capital, not to reserves nor to deposits of all kinds. 101. The Rheinisch-Westfalische Disconto-Gesellschaft (share capital 80,000,000 marks, 17 branches, see p. 633), which was enumerated in this connection in earlier editions, and which is particularly active in the mining region of the Rhineland and Westphalia, I no longer include in the group of the Disconto-Gesellschaft for reasons stated on p. 673. 102. T he Westdeutsche Bank vormals Jonas Cahn in Bonn, having in 1904 been absorbed b y the A. Schaaffhausen’scher Bankverein, can of course not be separately mentioned. For the same reason the Niederrhein- ische Kreditanstalt vormals Peter & Co. in Krefeld (fused in 1904) has to be omitted. 103. Georg Tischert, Filialsystem und Zentralisation im Bankwesen (Bank-Archiv M ay 1903, No. 8, pp. 119-120). 104. Paul Wallich, Die Konzentration im deutschen Bankwesen, 1905, pp. 17-24 and Table II, p. 19. 105. Jubilaumsbericht der Disconto-Gesellschaft (Jubilee report of the Disconto-Gesellschaft), p. 208. The practice of setting up independent provincial banks at the locality of the parent bank was probably prompted b y considerations similar to those which as early as 1864 had led the Darmstadter Bank to transform its branch in Mainz into a commandite, “ in order to limit the number of institutions that might directly commit the bank.” 89 6 N ationa l M on e t a r y Commission 106. See above (Part 3, chap. 2, par. 4, under II). 107. In the first period (1848-1870) and at the beginning of the second period the Darmstadter Bank took the lead in establishing subsidiary companies (Tochtergesellschaften). 108. See Supplement V II. 109. In the case of the domestic subsidiary companies (Tochtergesellschaften), which, as appears from the above remarks, have of late been established in somewhat larger number, several institutions have occa sionally established them b y joint action, in order to lessen some of the disadvantages here described. n o . T he formation of trust companies was also greatly promoted b y paragraph 39 (now 41) of the stock exchange act. i n . For details the reader is referred to M ax Jorgens, Finanzielle Trustgesellschaften (Stuttgart and Berlin, J. G. Co tta Nachfolger, 1902); Robert Liefmann, Beteiligungs- und Finanzierungsgesellschaften, (Jena, G ustav Fischer, 1909) p. 369 et seq. 112. E ven in these cases, however, the “ closer connection” means for the most part that the bank whose shares are acquired becomes more or less subject to the will and guidance of the bank acquiring them. Such connections might be more properly called “ communities of protection” (Schutzgemeinschaften) than meinschaften). “ communities of interest” (Interessenge- A very peculiar kind of com m unity of interest is represented b y the connection established in 1905 between the Imperial Bank of Agricultural Credit Societies (Landwirtschaftliche Reichsgenossenschaftsbank) in Darm stadt and the Prussian Central Bank of Credit Societies (Preussische Zentralgenossenschaftskasse). The former, which was b y far the weaker, was permitted to acquire shares of the latter to the amount of 1,000,000 marks, in exchange for which it surrendered to the latter the business with the Prussian Credit Societies (union deposit offices), this surrender being deemed an equivalent for the acquisition of the shares. 113. See Frankfurter Zeitung No. 216 (Aug. 6, 1905), where the view is expressed that the estimate of 2,000,000 marks as the amount of shares of the Rheinisch-Westfalische Disconto-Gesellschaft held b y the DiscontoGesellschaft is rather high. For details concerning the Rheinisch-Westfalische Disconto-Gesellschaft see above, p. 633. 114. A similar condition exists in the case of the Schlesische Handelsbank Aktiengesellschaft in Breslau (formerly Peris & Co.), whose share capital at its foundation or rather transformation in 1905 was acquired in part b y the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft and in part b y the Disconto-Gesellschaft. 115. See O tto Jeidels, p. 261. 116. In the first edition of the present work I had pointed out that differences regarding the business management and the common policy would be apt to arise. The Berliner Jahrbuch fur Handel und Industrie (1908, Vol. I, p. 261) states, I do not know on what grounds, that sm h 870 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s differences did manifest themselves in the classic instance of the Dresdner Bank-Schaaffhausen alliance, one case occurring as early as 1904 in regard to the Hibernia nationalization plan, another in 1908 in regard to the occurrences connected with the International Exploration Com pany Erkelenz, whose shares were owned for the most part b y the A. Schaaffhausen’ scher Bankverein. It is to be noted that industrial communities of interests, too, have sometimes been terminated, mostly through the fusion of the contracting parties. Such was the case with the community of interest entered into in 1904 for five years between the Bismarckhutte and the Oberschlesische Eisenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft in Gleiwitz; the oft-mentioned community of interest entered into in 1904 for thirty-one years between the Schalker Gruben- & Hiitten-Verein, the Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-Aktien-Gesellschaft and the Eisenhiittenwerk R ote Erde Aktiengesellschaft Aachen, which were fused in 1907; the community of interest entered into in 1905 for thirty-five years between the firm Arthur Koppel and the Aktiengesellschaft fur Feld- und Kleinbahnbedarf vormals Orenstein & Koppel in Berlin. In this case, too, the aliance terminated in fusion, the former firm being merged in the latter, and the combined enter prise assuming the firm name of Orenstein & Koppel, Arthur Koppel Aktiengesellschaft. 117. This view has been substantiated since the first edition of this book in 1905, while in industry numerous communities of interest have meantime been entered into, such as the great communities of interest in the chemical industry described on pp. 721 et seq. See H enry Volcker, Vereinigungsformen und Interessenbeteiligungen in der deutschen Grossindustrie, in Schmoller’s Jahrb. fur Gesetzebung, Band X X X I I I , H eft 4, p. 11 et seq. 118. Report of the Bergisch-Markische Bank for 1897, p. 3. 119. Paul Wallich (loc. cit., p. 102) rightly refers also to the difficulties from the standpoint of taxation, citing a passage from Jorgens, FinanzielleTrustgesellschaften, p. 75: “ Double taxation, which is likely to occur in the case of a stock company, inasmuch as the ta x is laid on the income or profits first of the company and second of the shareholder, is apt to become triple taxation when one stock company owms the other.” Again Wallich justly remarks (loc. cit., p. n o ) that “ in banking, the permanent participation represents, in principle, the same degree of improvement on the stock company as the stock company does on individual enterprise.” However, I am una.ble to agree with the argument he advances in support of the last-mentioned thesis, because, to m y mind, the modern stock com pany is characterized b y the fact that (contrary to the opinion expressed by Wallich, loc. cit., p. h i ) the stockholder (aside from exceptional cases) while possessing an “ interest in the undertaking,” does not possess an undertaker s interest, especially since it is not the individual stockholder but the aggregate of the stockholders that has to be regarded as the undertaker. Now this aggregate, though perhaps not possessing the capacity to undertake, which even the physical undertaker m ay lack, 871 National Monetary Commission certainly has the will to undertake, as appears from the very fact that it does not dissolve the enterprise but carries it on, or rather causes it to be carried on. Hence the assertion recently made (for example b y Ad. G o tt- schewsky in his interesting and stimulating work “ Ueber die Aktienform der Unternehmung,” in Schmoller’s Jahrb. 31 Jahrg. 1 Heft, p. 199 et seq.), that in the case of a stock company there is no undertaker at all, must be regarded as erroneous. 120. Towr ard the end of 1904 the number of commandites had decreased b y two (see 1st ed., p. 211). 121. See Jubilee Report of the Disconto-Gesellschaft, pp. 204-205. 122. See Report of Darmstadter Bank, 1871, pp. 12-13. 123. See Model, pp. 75-76. 124. See Loeb, cited b y Model, p. 168. 125. However, on looking into the details, we find that the conditions are entirely different. Among the great banks, the Dresdner Bank has the largest number of branches (14). 126. T o this must be added 4 branches of the Westfalisch-Lippische Vereinsbank, a subsidiary company of the A. Schaaffhausen’scher Bankverein, mentioned in Supplement V II, and 3 branches of the Bayerische Disconto- und Wechselbank, also 2 branches of the Revisions- und Vermogens-Aktien-Gesellschaft, as well as 8 branches of the Bank fur Thiiringen vormals B. M. Strupp, Aktien-Gesellschaft, making a total of 17 branches. This does not change the general statement nor the average number of branches per allied bank (Konzembank). 127. In the United States the obstacles are mainly of a legal nature. In Austria, too, with the exception of the Oesterreichisch-Ungarische Bank, which is a note bank, the great banks have hitherto had a rela tively small number of branches. T he Oesterreichische Kreditanstalt at the end of 1904 had only 7 branches, the Wiener Bankverein 4, the Oester reichische Landerbank 2. The three last named, however, had a number of exchange offices (Wechselstuben). tiply. In 1905 the branches began to mul According to the Prager T ageblatt, December 27, 1905, there were in Bohemia alone, at the end of 1905, not less than 31 branches and agencies of Bohemian banks and 27 branches and agencies of Vienna banks, besides 54 branches and sub-offices (Nebenstellen) of the note bank (OesterreichischUngarische Bank). In 1905-6 the Wiener Bankverein alone established branches in Marienbad, Karlsbad and Pilsen, which were to be followed b y others in Bozen and Meeran and in Constantinople, and this movement continued in subsequent years. 128. Depositenbanken und Spekulationsbanken (1902), p. 62 et seq. 129. R udolf Eberstadt, England, p. 248. Depositenbankwesen und Scheckverkehr in 130. In the case of England, however, it is advisable to use the term banking offices (Bankstellen) rather than the term branches, since the London “ branches” a t an y rate in m any cases resemble our deposit offices rather than our branches. 8 72 The G e r m a n G r e a t 13 1. Edgar Jaff£, Das englische Bankwesen, p. B a n k s 189. See preceding note. 132. For the period up to 1903 see Andre A. Sayous, Die Konzentration des Bankverkehrs in Frankreich, Bank-Archiv, 3 Jahrgang, No. 8, M ay 1904, pp. 129-132, especially Table I: Number of agencies and branches of French credit institutions in Paris and vicinity (p. 129); and Table II: Number of agencies and branches of the French credit institutions in the province (p. 130); also Vossische Zeitung of Jan. 28, 1905133. See Karl Mamroth, Die schottischen Banken, loc. cit., p. 20 et seq. 134. See, however, note 130 on p. 872. 135. The words “ in large p art” were added in deference to an objection raised by C. Hegemann in his paper Die Entwicklung des franzosischen Grossbankbetriebes (Munster in Westfalen, 1908, Theissing), p. 27. objection must be regarded as well-grounded. The However, he himself states (p. 94) that the French branches of the credit institutions are merely instru ments to carry out the orders of the central bank. 136. This is probably the reason why Andr6 A. Sayous, in the paper mentioned in the above note 132, combines agencies and branches. 137. Our Reichsbank, too, had at the end of 1908 487 banking offices (Stellen) (in 1903 379). Jahr 1909, page 16. See Verwaltungsbericht der Reischsbank fur das In Scotland the number of branches rose very decid edly in 1854, because the stamp ta x on bank notes was reduced from 5 pence to 1 penny (Karl Mamroth, loc. cit., pp. 19-20). 138. Quoted from Somers, The Scotch banks and system of issue, E din burgh 1873. (See Karl Mamroth, loc. cit., p. 27). 139. Die Berliner Grossbanken in den Jahren 1895-1902 etc., p. 114. 140. For details see Edgar Jaff6, Das englische Bankwesen, pp. 184-85. 141. Ad. Weber, Depositenbanken und Spekulationsbanken, p. 41. 142. The income ta x depends on the legislation of the various states. The legislation of Prussia, for example, provides that stock companies having their main office in Prussia and branches in another German state are taxed in Prussia on that part of their total income which is derived from the business operations of the establishments located in Prussia. Similarly, stock companies having their main office outside of Prussia but possessing branches in Prussia are subject to the Prussian income tax on that part of their total income which is derived from establishments located in Prussia. 143. Loc. cit., p. 112. 144. On this account, agencies, as contrasted with branches, would doubtless play a very prominent part in Germany also, but for the peculiar reasons mentioned in the text. From a business point of view it would be good p olicy to begin with the easier form, the agency, and develop it gradually, as business increases, into the more substantial and important juridical form, the branch. W ith this view some banks, for example the Pfalzische Bank, have established branches which they called “ agencies” 873 N at ion a l M on e t a r y Commission or “ deposit offices” or “ deposit and exchange offices ” (Wechselstuben), but which had to be recorded as branches. 145. O f the remaining “ agencies,” the m ajority are agencies only in name, being entered in the trade register as branches. See preceding note. 146. Most of the sums in question are in fact deposits, because in Meck lenburg, Oldenburg, Schleswig-Holstein and Alsace-Lorraine, more than elsewhere in Germany, especially so far as the rural population is con cerned, it is customary to keep available funds in the banks as deposits instead of investing them. These sums are sometimes quite large and are often kept in the bank for a long time. 147. See for example Ad. Wagner, Beitrage zur Lehre von den Banken, Leipzig, Leopold Voss, 1857, p. 164 et seq., and above, pages 189 and following, also notes thereto. 148. Grundriss zum Studium der politischen Oekonomie 4th ed., Jena, 1902, G u stav Fischer, p. 149. 149. Concerning an earlier period see Ad. Wagner, loc. cit., pp. 70-71 and others. 150. Edgar Jaff6, Das englische Bankwesen, p. 189. 151. Hans Gideon Heymann, loc. cit., p. 132. Part V. 1. For details see W. Sombart, Der modeme Kapitalismus, I, pp. 553-569; Hans Gideon Heymann, Die gemischten Gewerke im deutschen GrossEisengewerbe (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1904, J. G. C o tta’sche Buchhandlung Nachf.), pp. 211 et seq. and 280 et seq. 2. Kontradiktorische Verhandlungen iiber deutsche Kartelle, H eft 5, Supplement I, pp. 102 et seq. 3. Hans Gideon Heymann, loc. cit., p. 211. 4. From an earlier period the following example m ay be cited : The A. Borsig machine works, which as early as 1847 had built a puddling and rolling mill as an adjunct to the machine works, thereupon leased coal and ore mines and in the sixties erected in Upper Silesia other puddling and rolling mills, “ thus developing from a “ machine fa cto ry” into a great mixed steel plant, through the system atic annexation of establishments supplying the raw material and half-finished manufactures. ’ ’ loc. cit., pp. 186-187). (Hans Gideon Heymann, A multitude of other examples from recent times are found in the volume of Henry Voelcker cited on p. 871, note 117. 5. For details concerning these highly interesting developments, which however are beyond the scope of the present book, the reader is referred to the following w orks: Robert Liefmann, Die kontradiktorischen Verhandlungen uber deutsche Kartelle (Conrad’s Jahrbficher, 3 Folge, Band X X V , p. 638 et seq.), 1903. Idem, Die Verhandlungen fiber die Roheisensyndikate und den Halbzeugverband in der deutschen Kartellenqu£te (Conrad’s Jahrbficher, 3 Folge, Band X X V I I , p. 525 et seq.), 1904. 874 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s Idem, Kartelle und Trusts (Stuttgart, Ernst Heinrich Moritz), 1905; see especially p. 99 et seq.: Die Weiterbildung der Kartelle. Idem, Krisen und Kartelle (Schmoller’s Jahrb. Jahrg. 1902, p. 661 et seq. and Schriften des Vereins fur Sozialpolitik, Bd. C X III, p. 261 et seq. Idem, Die Weiterbildung der Unternehmungsformen unter dem Einfluss der Kartelle (Deutsche Wirtschaftszeitung, 1 Jahrgang, Nr. 2, 3 and 4, January and February 1905). von Landmann, Die amtlichen Erhebungen iiber das deutsche Kartellwesen (Annalen des Deutschen Reichs, 1904, Ns. 1, 2 and 4). Hans Gideon Heymann, loc. cit. See also Kontradiktorische Verhandlungen fiber deutsche Kartelle, H eft 1-8, Berlin 1903 and 1904 (Franz Siemenroth), especially the reports of Regierungsrat Voelcker on the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate, H. I (session of 26-27 Feb. 1902) pp. 25-47 and p. 275 et seq. note (Fist of syndicate coal mines acquired b y other coal mines or smelting works), and H eft 5: Report on the cartel movement in the German iron industry (also published separately), and Supplement I : Betriebsvereinigungen in der deutschen Eisenindustrie, page 102 et seq. 6. See Robert Liefmann, Die kontradiktorischen Verhandlungen etc., p. 5447. Ibidem, pp. 642-645. 8. I t is well known, of course, that some individual electrical firms, for example the A. E. G. (Allgemeine Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft) have for many years kept large balances in their banks. 9. Completely absorbed b y the Elektrizitats-Aktien-Gesellschaft vormals W. Eahmeyer & Co., the absorption taking effect on September 1, 1902. In M ay 1905 the manufacturing section of the Aktiengesellschaft vormals W. Lahmeyer & Co. was united with the firm Felten & Guilleaume Carlswerk Aktien-Gesellschaft in Miihlheim am Rhein, which for that purpose increased its share capital from 36,000,000 to 55,000,000 marks. T he united com panies bear the name “ Felten & Guilleaume-Lahmeyer Werke AktienG esellschaft.'’ 10. In 1898 the Schaaffhausen’scher Bankverein left the Schuckert group and joined the Loewe group (Union-Elektrizitatsgesellschaft). 11. Particular mention m ay be made here of the remarkable progress recently achieved in the production of dyes, perfumes, artificial silk, the extraction of nitrogen from the air, the manufacture of new explosives, of materials needed in aerial navigation, the discovery of prophylactic, anaes thetic and soporific remedies, and last but not least the transmutation of metals, and even of elements, or substances formerly regarded as elements. 12. The discussion here follows in the main L. Mueffelmann, Les ententes dans l’industrie chimique Allemande (Revue economique internationale, Vol. I l l No. 4 December 15 to 20, 1904, pp. 882-890); a few errors are here corrected. 13. Besides those enumerated in the text mention should be made of the Farbwerk Miihlheim formerly A. Leonhardt & Co. in Miihlheim; Kalle & 875 Co. in Biebrich (now part of the combined Hochster Farbwerke-Cassella); K. Oehler in Offenbach on-the-Main (now absorbed b y the Chemische Fabrik Griesheim-Elektron). 14. See O tto Jeidels, op. cit. pp. 123-125, where illustrations are also See also p. 125. Op. cit., p. 122. H ans Gideon Heymann, op. cit., p. 43. Ibid., p. 4, 62. Ibid., p. 72. Ibid., pp. 85-94. 20. Ibid., pp. 107-8 21. Ibid., p. 119. 22. Ibid., p. 199. 23. Ibid., p. 204 24. See Ludw ig Eschw’ege, Revolutionierende Tendenzen im deutschen Eisengewerbe (Revolutionizing Tendencies in the German Iron Industry) in die Bank, Apr., 1909, pp. 313-318 and “ L ad on ” in the Zukunft, Apr. 3, 1909, p. 26. 25. Thyssen keeps aloof from the great banks that have hitherto been dominant in the Lorraine-Luxemburg district, neither has he developed closer relations to the Darmstadter Bank, which founded the above mentioned works or to the A. Schaaffhausen’scher Bankverein which reorganized, financed and improved the technical outfit of the Lorraine furnace com pany Aum etz-Friede (This company was merged in 1903 with the Fentscher Huttenaktienverein and the Gewerkschaft Crone.) Stinnes too a t first had only a few minor bank connections in this dis trict, chiefly through his directorship in the Mittelrheinische Bank and his relations to Spaeter & Co. This m ay have been the reason w hy he gladly availed himself of the opportunity in 1901 to secure a strong position in this district b y entering the directorate of the Deutsch-Luxemburgische Bergwerks- und Hiitten-Aktiengesellschaft. Part V I 1. For certain reservations to be made here see above, p. 527 et seq. and particularly pp. 535 and 536. 2. For the future there is a possibility of combinations, which would at least lead to a saving of taxes. 3. Conditions in England are evidently similar. For these see John Cockburn Macdonald, T he Economic Effects, National and International, of the Concentration of Capital in Few Controlling Hands. (The Institute of Bankers, Oct., 1900, Vol. X X I , pt. V II, pp. 371-3.) 4. Finanzielle Trustgesellschaften, p. 75. 5. W ith reference to his activ ity as a curb broker (coulisse) and in the arbitrage field see above pp. 620-621. 876 The Ge r ma n Gr e a t Banks 6. Thus Karl Bucher says (Die Entstehung der Volkswirtchaft, 3d ed., 1901, p. 229): Concentrated demand cannot be met b y scattered produc tion. Progress of concentration in demand must be accompanied b y progress of concentration in industrial production, the latter causing the disappearance of the craftsman. 7. K arl Bucher, op. cit., p. 235. 8. O tto Jeidels is mistaken in his opinion with reference to these and the m ajority of listed bonds, that “ industrial bonds yield only a small return.” (Op. cit., p. 55). T he opposite is usually the case. 9. T his has happened in England, too, b u t only in a few cases. (See Barclay etc.) In France there has been formed from among the private bankers the “ Syndicat des Banquiers de la province frangaise,” and the Banque de l’Union Parisienne (Mallet frferes, Vernes et Cie., de Neuflize et Cie, etc). T he former publishes an organ of its own, “ L a France 6conomique et financi&re.” In Germany similar combinations have been proposed, among others b y Julius Kohen (Aschersleben), in the Plutus for July 1, 1904, “ A Bankers’ Association for Cooperative Buying,” and b y Ludw ig Eschwege in Die Hilfe of July 3, 1904, No. 27. 10. See W. Sombart, Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft, 2d ed., p. 191. ix. According to the excellent and exhaustive report (published also as reprint) made b y the manager of the Centralverband des Deutschen Bankund Bankiergewerbes, Wittner, Counsellor-at-law in Berlin, to the Third General Convention of German Bankers at Hamburg in September 1907, a schedule was prepared for the purpose of gathering statistics of salaries paid to German bank employees, also regarding the living conditions of these employees and their families, and 38,000 copies of this schedule were sent to about 4,000 banking institutions and firms. schedule were worked up b y the Central Verband. T h e data of these Of the total number sent out, 24,146 or about 65 per cent were returned filled out b y 1,247 establishments having 24,146 employees, distributed as follows— 264 joint stock banks with 16,391 employees, 708 private banks with 5,938 employees and 275 cooperative banking institutions with 1,817 employees. 12. Memorial on the investigation into the economic condition of salaried employees in private establishments instituted during Oct., 1903, b y the organizations of salaried employees and transmitted to the R eichstag March 14, 1907. 13. According to an article on Banking and Exchanges b y H enry Crosby Emery, professor of political economy at Y a le University there was recently established in the United States the International Banking Corporation with a capital of $7,000,000, with the intention of having a bank with American managers and employees, and American customers. I t was, how ever, impossible to find Americans trained for the positions, and “ today all the branch managers are Englishmen,” (in Ernst v. Halle, Amerika, seine Bedeutung fur die W eltwirtschaft und seine wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zu Deutschland, insbes. zu Hamburg, Verlag der Hatnb. Borsen- 877 National halle 1905, p. 344) Monetary Commission In these matters it is not always true that where there is a will, there is a way. 14. As an illustration of most recent occurrence I refer to the day of the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war. 15. This and the following quotations are from Riesser “ Die Notwendigkeit einer Revision des Borsengesetzes,” Berlin, 1901, Leonhard Simion, pp. 42, 43. • 16. See Ernst Loeb in the Nationalzeitung of Apr. 18, 1904, No. 244. 17. Thus for example Eschenbach in the Proceedings of the Verein fur Sozialpolitik of September 16, 1903, Schriften, C X III. 18. See above p. 97 et seq. The proportion of the population assessed for the income ta x was in 1904 37.1 percent of the total population; in 1903, 35.9 per cent, and in 1896 only 29.3 per cent. 19. Thus Ludw ig Pohle, Deutschland am Scheidewege (Germany at the Parting of the Roads) Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1902, p. 199, Cf. also his polemic (ibid., pp. 197-198) against Dietzel’s theory that wages and the prices of grain have a tendency to vary in opposite directions, a view7 which l a m neither able to share. 20. In his very interesting rectoral address of Jan. 26, 1910, on “ T he Development of the Iron Industry in Germany,” (p. 10) Muthesius cites the official reports of the Krupp consumers’ institution. According to these reports “ there has been no increase worth mentioning during the last tw enty years in the prices of the leading commodities entering into the cost of living.” How'ever this very gratifying statement must be used with caution, for conditions there are undoubtedly out of the ordinary. 21. Walter Troeltsch “ Uber die neuesten Veranderungen im deutschen Wirtschaftsleben” (On some recent changes in German Economic Life) Stuttgart, 1899, p. 145. 22. Ibid., p. 147-148. 23. The well-known Hibernia case has been considered as one of such excesses, for the reason that the decline of the government offer was brought about b y a coalition of banks, which bought up the stock. a one-sided and incorrect interpretation. This is however We must not forget that among those who favored the government’s offer there were tw'o great banks, viz. the Dresdner Bank, and the A. Schaaffhausen’scher Bankverein. Further more, even in the absence of the concentration movement a coalition of banks might be formed for a specific purpose. Moreover, an y one of the allied great banks was sufficientl) powerful by itself to buy up enough shares to bring about the refusal of the government’s offer. 24. M ax Sering says, “ The question of supplanting our imports by domestic production, must be answered absolutely in the negative. If this is so, we must export on a scale, that will enable us to pay for those articles r (“ Handels- und Machtpolitik, Vol. II, pp. 38-39 Stuttgart, J. G. C o tta’s Nachfolger, 1900). Sering goes somewhat too far, at least as regards tropi cal products, for these wr m ay hope to draw in increasing quantities from e 878 The our colonies. G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s It m ay also prove possible to reduce considerably our imports of agricultural products. 25. Thus the cartels m ay be required to submit their by-law s and certain kinds of resolutions (as for example those relating to export premiums) also to answer inquiries and to publish certain information. Schmoller’s proposal, that they be required to submit all of their more important reso lutions, would prove impracticable owing to the indefiniteness of his formula, if for no other reason. See paragraph 7 of the report made to the general meeting ot the Verein fur Sozialpolitik in Mannheim, Sept. 27, 1905, reprinted in Schmoller’s Jahrbuch fur Gesetzgebung etc. vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 326 et seq., and particularly p. 362). 26. On this point cfr. the very instructive section in Paul Wallich, Liquidation of Banks (“ Entgriindungen), op. cit., pp. 34-48. 27. Schriften des Vereins fiir Sozialpolitik, L X I, pp. 183-184. 28. Heinrich Waentig, Industriekartelle und Trusts und das Problem ihrer rechtlichen Regelung (Industrial Cartels and Trusts— The Problem of their legal regulation) Schmoller’s Jahrb. f Gesetzgebung etc., vol. 25 1901, No. 4, p. 19. 879 1 APPENDICES. APPENDIX I. B IB L IO G R A P H Y . A. N a t u r e a n d D e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e C r e d it B a n k s . [To page 26.] 1870. Ad. Wagner, Banken und Bankwesen in H. Rentsch, Handworterbuch 1880. der Volkswirtschaftslehre, 2. Ausgabe, p. 80-91. Felix Hecht, Bankwesen und Bankpolitik in den siiddeutschen Staaten, 1819 bis 1875 (Jena, Gust. Fischer). 1890. Walther Lotz, Die Technik des deutschen Emissionsgeschafts (Leip ------ zig, Duncker und H umblot). Heinr. Sattler, Die Effektenbanken (Leipzig, C. F. W inter’sche Verlagshandlung). 1891. K arl v. Lumm, Die E ntw icklung des Bankwesens in Elsass-Lothringen seit der Annexion (Staatsw. Studien, herausg. v. Elster, Bd. I l l , H eft 7). 1896. Paul Model, Die grossen Berliner Effektenbanken (aus dem Nachlass des Verfassers herausg. und vervollstandigt von Ernst Loeb) (Jena, Gust. Fischer). ------ B. Banck, Geschichte der sachsischen Banken mit Beriicksichtigung der W irtschaftsverhaltnisse (Berliner Diss.). 1898. Andr6 Sayous, Concentration du trafique de banque en Allemagne (Journal des Economistes, v. 15, Dec., 1898). ------ Id., Les banques allemandes en cas de crise ou de guerre (Revue d ’E c o n o m ie p o litiq u e , v. 1898). 1899. Nasse u. Lexis, article: Banken, in the Handworterbuch der Staatswissenschaften, 2d ed., Vol. II, p. 132 ff. 1900. Ernst Heinemann, Die Berliner Grossbanken an der Wende des Jahrhunderts (Conrad’s Jahrb., 3. Folge, Bd. X X , p. 86-97). 1901. Andr£ Sayous, Les banques de d£p6t, les banques de credit et les soci6t6s financi&res (Paris, 1901, L. Larose). ------ Die Disconto-Gesellschaft 1851-1901. Jubilaum (Berlin). Denkschrift zum 5ojahrigen 1901. H. Fleischhammer, Zentralisation im Bankwesen in Deutschland (Schmoller’s Jahrbuch fur Gesetzgebung, Yerwaltung u. Volkswirtschaft, 24. Jahrg., p. 241-269). 1902. Ad. Weber, Depositenhanken und Spekulationsbanken (Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot). ------- Felix Hecht, Die Mannheimer Banken 1870-1900 (Schmoller’s staatsund sozialw. Forschungen, Bd. X X , H eft 6). 883 1903. O tto Warschauer, W ilh e lm ------ Physiologic der deutschen Banken (Berlin, B a en sch ). Ernst Loeb, Die Berliner Grossbanken in den Jahren 1895-1902 und die Krisis der Jahre 1900 und 1901 (Schriften des Vereins fiir Sozialpolitik, Bd. C X , und Storungen im deutschen Wirtschaftsleben, Bd. V I, p. 81-319). ------ Joh. Plenge, Griindung und Geschichte des Credit mobilier (Tubingen, Verlag der H. Lau pp ’schen Buchhandlung). ------- Ad. Weber, Die Rhein.-W estfal. Provinzialbanken und die Krisis (Schriften des Vereins f. Sozialpolitik, Bd. C X ; Storungen im deutschen Wirtschaftsleben, Bd. V I, p. 321-372). ------ Rich. Ehrenberg, Deutsches Bankwesen. Riickblicke und Ausblicke (Deutsche Rundschau, 29. Jahrg., H eft 5, Febr. 1903, p. 295-301). 1904. Emil Herz (Ludwigshafen a. Rh.), Die Banken der Pfalz und ihre B e z ie h u n g e n z u r P fiilz e r I n d u s tr ie ( H ir t h ’s A n n a le n d e s D e u ts c h e n R e ic h s , 1904, No. 1, p. 4 3 -5 5 a n d No. 2, p. 113 -14 5). ------ Siegfried Schreiber, Schilderung des sachsischen Lokalbankwesens ------ Rich. Rosendorff, Die deutschen Banken im iiberseeischen Verkehr ------ Alfred Salzmann, Ursprung und Ziel der modernen Bankentwicklung, (Inaugural-Dissertation). Leipzig, Druck v. Oskar Brandstetter. (Schmoller’s Jahrb., Bd. X X V I I I , H eft 4, p. 93-134). D r e s d e n (D is s e r t.) . 1905. O tto Jeidels, Das Verhaltnis der deutschen Grossbanken zur Indus trie, mit besonderer Beriicksichtgung der Eisenindustrie (in den staats- und sozialwissensch. Forschungen v. Schmoller u. Sering, Bd. X X I V , H eft 2, Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot), especially Abschnitt II, Die Entwicklung der Grossbanken. ------ Albert Blumenberg, Die Konzentration im deutschen Bankwesen ------ Edgard Depitre, Le mouvement de concentration dans les banques (Inaug.-Dissert., Leipzig, Aug. Hoffmann). allemandes (Paris, Arthur Rousseau). 1905. Julius Steinberg, Die Konzentration im Bankgewerbe (Berlin, Franz Siemenroth). ------ Paul Wallich, Die Konzentration im deutschen Bankwesen (in den Munch. Volkswirtschaftl. Studien, herausg. von Lujo Brentano u. Walther Lotz, 74. Stuck), Stuttgart u. Berlin, J. G. C o tta’sche Buchhandl. Nachf. 1906. Herm. Schumacher, Die Ursachen und Wirkungen der Konzentra tio n im d e u tsc h e n H e ft 3, p. ------ B an kw esen ( in S c h m o l l e r ’ s J a h r b . , Bd. X X X , 1 -3 3 1 ). Arthur Feiler, Das Bankwesen (in v. Halle: Die Weltwirtschaft, I, Jahrg. 1906,1 . Teil, p. 116-140, und ib., Jahrg. 1907, I. Teil, p 118— 136). ------ F . von Pritzbuer, Bank-K redit- und Griindungsverhaltnisse (ib., I, Jahrg. 1906, II. Teil, p. 189-200; ib., I l l , Jahrg. 1908, II. Teil, p. 173-178). 884 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s 1906. Richard Rosendorff, Le D6veloppement des banques allemandes h 1’Stranger (Revue dconomique internationale, Sept, and Oct., 1906). ------ Georg Schanz, Banken (Worterbuch der Volkswirtschaftslehre von Ludw ig Elster, 2. Aufl., 1906, p. 309-323). 1907. Robert Franz, Die deutschen Banken im Jahre 1906 (Sonderabdruck aus dem Deutschen Oekonomist). 1908. Rudolf Kaulla, Die Organisation des Bankwesens im Konigreich Wurttemberg in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung (Stuttgart, Ferdinand Enke). ------ Robert Franz, Die deutschen Banken im Jahre 1907 (Sonderabdruck ------ Paul Wallich, Das Bankwesen (in v. Halle, Die Weltwirtschaft, III, aus dem Deutschen Oekonomist). Jahrg. 1908, I. Teil, p. 42-49). 1908-9. Andrti E. Sayous, Les banques allemandes et le commerce d’outremer in “ Bulletin mensuel de la Federation des Industriels et des Commerfants frangais, ” vol. 5, No. 52 and No. 70 (under the title: “ Pourquoi et comment il faut former en France des banques d’exportation. L ’exemple des banques allemandes d’outre-mer” ). 1908. Alfred Lansburgh, Das deutsche Bankwesen (Berlin, Bankverlag, 1909). 1909. Georges Diouritch, L ’expansion des banques allemandes h l’etranger (Paris, Arthur Rousseau). ------ Rob. Liefmann, Beteiligungs- und Finanzierungsgesellschaften (Jena, G ustav Fischer, 1909). 1909. Herm. L evy, Monopole, Kartelle und Trusts in ihren Beziehungen zur Organisation Fischer, 1909). ------ der kapitalistischen Industrie (Jena, Gustav Robert Franz, Die deutschen Banken im Jahre 1908. B. M eth o d s op B a n k in g . I. GENERAL TREATISES AND HANDBOOKS. 1871. Alois Bisehof, Das Geld-, Kredit- und Bankwesen. Lehrbueh. Kurzgefasstes Pest. 1883. M ax Wirth, Handbuch des Bankwesens, 3. Aufl., Koln. 1891. Bernhard Gerothwohl, Das Bank-Geschaft, Ein Handbuch fur Kaufleute und Kapitalisten, 2d ed. of “ Das Bankgeschaft nach Einfiihrung der Markrechnung,” Frankfurt a. M. 1894. Hans Belohlawek, Handbuch des Bank- und Borsenwesens. Lehr- und Hilfsbuch, Stuttgart. 1897. Bondi, Die Berufspfliehten des Bankiers auf Grund der neuesten Gesetzgebung. 1901. Andr6 E. Sayous, Les banques de d£p6t, les banques de credit et les socidt£s financi&res, Paris. Jacob Kautsch, Handbuch des Bank- und Borsenwesens fur Bankbeamte, Kaufleute, Kapitalisten, sowie fiir den Selbstunterricht, 2. Aufl., Berlin. 885 National Monetary Commission 1901. Henry Warren, Banks and their customers, 4th ed., London. 1903. R . Beigel, Handbuch des Bank- und Borsenwesens, Leipzig. ------- F. Leitner, Das Bankgeschaft und seine Technik, Frankfurt a. M. ------ Joh. Fr. Schar, Technik des Bankgeschafts, Berlin. 1904. Buchwald, Die Technik des Bankbetriebes. Ein H and-und Lehrbuch des praktischen Bank- und Borsenwesens, Berlin (5. Aufl., 1909b 1905. L. Voigt und A. Doerr, Handelsbetriebslehre, 2. Teil, Bankgeschaft und gewerbliche Unternehmungen, Leipzig. 1908. Georg Schweitzer, Leitfaden des Bank- und Borsenwesens, Leipzig, 1909. Bastian, Banktechnisches fur junge Juristen und Volkwirtschaftler. Bankbeamte und Kaufleute, Stuttgart. ------ Joh. Fr. Schar, Die Bank im Dienste des Kaufmanns, Leipzig. II. BOOKKEEPING, CORRESPONDENCE, INSPECTION. In addition to those mentioned under I: 1903. Brosius, Lehrbuch der Bankbuchhaltung, Leipzig. ------ Muntendorf, Defraudationsschutz, Briinn. ------ Porges, Die Kontrolle bei der Manipulation und Buchfiihrung in Banken usw., Wien. 1904. Spielmann, Lehrbuch der Bankkorrespondenz, Berlin. 1905. Romer, Die Biicherrevisionspraxis in Deutschland und England, Berlin. 1908. Julius Chenaux-Repond, Einfiihrung in die Bankbuchhaltung, Stuttgart. ------ Schmidt, Die Bucher- und Bilanzrevision, Wien. ------ Beigel, Theorie und Praxis der Buchfiihrungs- und Bilanzrevision, Dresden. 1909. Schwatzer, Lehrbuch der Bankkorrespondenz, Wien und Leipzig. III. CURRENT ACCOUNTS. 1884. J. A. L e v y , Der Kontokorrentvertrag. Herausgegeben von Riesser, Freiburg i. B. und Tubingen. 1893. Greber, Das Kontokorrentverhaltnis, Freiburg i. B. und Leipzig. 1897. Franz Kammer, Der Kontokorrentverkehr, Miinchen. 1901. A. C. Widemann, Theorie und Praxis des Bankkontokorrents (3. Aufl.), Basel. 1902. Josef Mohr, Der Kontokorrentverkehr, Berlin. 1904. Siegfried Buff, Das Kontokorrentgesehaft im deutschen Bank- gewerbe, Stuttgart. ------- J. K . Kreibig, Die Kontokorrentlehre, Wien. 1905. Karl Ziegel, Die hauptsachlichsten Methoden des Kontokorrentrechnens. 1906. A. Bergmann, Praktische Kontokorrentlehre Karlsruhe. 1907. Schmidberger, Das Kontokorrent. Bedeutung, Frankfurt a. M. 86 8 Seine Technik und seine rechtliche The G e r m a n IV. G r e a t B a n k s DEPOSITS, CHECKS, GIRO, AND CLEARING SYSTEMS, i. Descriptive literature. 1881. Carl Berger, Katechismus des Girowesens, Leipzig. 1883. Georg Siemens, Die Lage des Scheckwesens in Deutschland. Referat, Berlin. ------ R . Koch, Abrechnungsstellen in Deutschland und deren Vorganger, Stuttgart. 1884. W. Howarth, Our Clearing System and Clearing Houses, London. 1884. v . Stieglitz, Wesen und Vorziige des Depositen- und Scheckverkehrs, Berlin. 1886. Heinrich Rauchberg, Der Clearing- und Giroverkehr. E in statis- tischer Beitrag zur Kenntnis des volkswirtschaftlichen Zahlungsprozesses, Wien. 1888. Franz Bubenik, Die Technik des Giroverkehrs bei der osterreichischungarischen Bank, Wien. 1889. Hanausek, Der Scheck im Giroverkehr der osterreichisch-ungarischen Bank, Wien. 1894. Adolf Neumann-Hofer, Depositengeschafte und Depositenbanken. Theorie des Depositenbankwesens, Leipzig. 1896. J. Kanit, Die Technik des Giroverkehrs, Wien. 1897. Heinrich Rauchberg, Der Clearing- und Giroverkehr in OesterreichUngarn und im Auslande, Wien. 1898. Schinckel, Reichsbank und Giroverkehr, Hamburg 1899. Georg Obst, Theorie und Praxis des Scheckverkehrs, Stuttgart. 1900. Bank des Berliner Kassenvereins 1850-1900. Denkschrift zum 1. October 1900. 1901. Dunker, Geldersparende Zahlungsmethoden im heutigen Bank- verkehr Deutschlands, Miinchen. 1907. S. Buff, Der gegenwartige Stand und die Zukunft des Scheckverkehrs in Deutschland, Miinchen. 1908. Proebst, Die Grundlagen unseres Depositen- und Scheckwesens. 2. Literature on the subject of the German Chech bill. 1908. Riesser, Bemerkungen zum vorlaufigen Entwurf eines deutschen Scheckgesetzes, Berlin. -----3. Hoppenstedt, Der Scheckgesetzentwurf von 1907, Berlin. Commentaries and annotated editions of the text of the Chech Act of March 11, 1908. 1908. A pt., Berlin. ------ Buff, Stu ttgart und Leipzig. ------- Henschel, Berlin. ------- Kuhlenbeck, Breslau und Leipzig. ------ Lessing, Miinchen. ------- Merzbacher, Miinchen. ------ Schiebler, Leipzig. National Monetary 4. Commission Monographs on the new Check Act. 1908. Conrad, Handbuch des deutschen Scheckgesetzes, Stuttgart. ------ Breit, Pflichten und R echte des Bankiers unter dem Scheekgesetz, ------ Helbing, Der Scheckverkehr nach dem neuen Recht, Stuttgart. Leipzig. V. BILL DISCOUNTING. 1901. Eduard Deimel, Der Diskontmarkt, 2. Aufl., Leipzig. 1907. W. Prion, Das deutsche Wechseldiskontgeschaft init besonderer Beriicksichtigung des Berliner Geldmarktes, Berlin. ------ Heiligenstadt, Der deutsche Geldmarkt in Schmoller’s Jahrb., B d x x x i, p. 1539. VI. REGULAR BANK CREDIT. 1882. W. Schaefer, Der gewerbliche Kredit. Yom privatokonomischen Standpunkte fur Techniker und angehende Industrielle dargestellt. Leipzig und Heidelberg. 1883. M. Schraut, Die Organisation des Kredits, Leipzig. 1891. H. Jacoby, Die Krediterkundigung nach ihrer wirtschaftlichen und nach ihrer rechtlichen Seite, Berlin. 1895. W. Schimmelpfeng, Kaufmannische Erkundigung, Berlin. 1902. Eugen Sutro, Die kaufmannische Krediterkundigung, Leipzig. 1904. Herzfelder, Das Problem der Kreditversicherung, Leipzig. 1909. Hecht, Die Organisation des langfristigen industriellen Kredits (Veroffentlichungen des Mitteleuropaischen Wirtschaftsvereins in Deutschland, H eft 6). VII. SAFEKEEPING OF OUTSIDERS’ SECURITIES, SAFE DEPOSIT VAULT BUSINESS. 1892. Julian Goldschmidt und Lesse. Zur Reform des Bankdepotwesens. Zwei Vortrage, Berlin. 1896. F. Lusensky, Gesetz betr. die Pflichten der Kaufleute bei Aufbewahrung fremder Wertpapiere, Berlin. 1897. W. Frhr. v. Pechmann, Das Reichsgesetz iiber die Pflichten der Kaufleute bei Aufbewahrung fremder Wertpapiere etc. vom 5. Juli 1896, Erlangen. ------ Riesser, Das Bankdepotgesetz vom 5. Juli 1896. und fur die Praxis. Aus der Praxis 2. vollig umgearb, Aufl., 1906, Berlin. 1899. Franz Schweyer, Die Bankdepotgeschafte in geschichtlicher, wirtschaftlicher und rechtlicher Beziehung, Miinchen. 1903. Wettstein, Das Kassenschrankgeschiift, Bern. 1908. Gumbel, Der Stahlkammerfachvertrag der deutschen Banken, Berlin. VIII. 1895. SECURITY BROKERAGE BUSINESS. A Endemann, Das moderne Borsenkommissionsgeschaft im Effektenverkehr, Berlin. 1899. James Breit, Der Selbsteintritt des Kommissionars nach dem neuen deutschen Handelsgesetzbuch 88 8 The G e r m a n G r e a t 1908. Weidemann, Das Kommissionsgeschaft. B a n k s Systematische Darstellung der Bank- und Warenkommission, Rostock. 1909. James Breit, Das R echt der Effektenkommission (im Zentralverbandskommentar zum Borsengesetz, see under ix). IX. STOCK EXCHANGE BUSINESS. I. Descriptive literature. 1876. W illy Becker, Die praktische Arbitrage, Berlin. 1882. Alfred Junckerstorff, Die Arbitrage. nisse. Miinz- und Wahrungsverhalt- Das Pramien- und Stellagegeschaft, Berlin. 1883. Isidor Szkolny, Theorie und Praxis der Pramiengeschafte, Frankfurt a. M. 1897. Eugen Hiilsner, Die Borsengesehafte in rechtlicher und volkswirtschaftlicher Beziehung, Berlin. ------ Adolf Wachtel. Pramien-, Stellage- und Nochgeschafte, Wien. ------ Heinrich Brosius, Leipzig. ------- Andre E. Sayous, E tu de economique et juridique sur les bourses Die Geld-, Wechsel- und Effekten-Arbitrage, allemandes de valeur et de commerce, Paris. 1899. Mayer, Die Effektenborse und ihre Geschafte, Wien. ------- Georg Bernhard, Der Verkehr in Wertpapieren. Ein Handbuch fur alle Interessentenkreise, Berlin. 1901. Robert Stern, Die Arbitrage im Bank- und Borsen verkehr, Leipzig. 1903. Paul Wiener und Walter Stoerk, Praktische Arbitragerechnungen, Leipzig. 1908. M ax Fiirst, Pramien-, Stellage- und Nochgeschafte, Berlin. ------ Bronzin, Theorie der Pramiengeschafte, Leipzig und Wien. ------ Schneider-Dahlheim, Usancen der Berliner Fondsborse, 14. AufL, Berlin. 1909. Swoboda, Die Arbitrage in Wertpapieren, Wechseln, Miinzen und Edelmetallen. Handbuch des Borsen-, Miinz- und Geldwesens siimtlicher Handelsplatze der Welt, 13. Aufl., neubearbeitet und vermehrt von M ax Fiirst, Berlin. ------ Saling’s Borsen-Jahrbuch 1908-09. Ein Handbuch fiir Bankiers und Kapitalisten, 32. Aufl., Berlin, Leipzig, Hamburg. 2. Literature on stock-exchange legislation and reform. 1895. G u stav Cohn, Beitrage zur deutschen Borsenreform, Leipzig. 1896-97. F. J. Pfleger und L. Gsehwindt, Borsenreform in Deutschland, Stuttgart. 1898. Wiedenfeld, Die Borse in ihrer wirtschaftlichen Funktion und in ihrer rechtlichen Entw icklung vor und unter dem Borsengesetz, Berlin. 1900. Riesser, Die liandelsrechtlichen Lieferungsgeschafte, eine K ritik der Rechtsprecliung des Reichsgerichts, Berlin. 889 Verhandlungen des I. Allgemeinen Deutschen Bankiertags zu Frank furt a. M. Riesser, Die Frankfurt a. M. Notwendigkeit einer Revision des Borsengesetzes, Berlin. N. Muller, Differenztheorie und Borsengeschafte, Berlin. Denkschrift betr. die Wirkungen des Borsengesetzes vom 22. Juni 1896 und der durch das Reichsstempelgesetz vom 14. Juni 1900 eingefiihrten Borsensteuererhohung. Herausgegeben vom Zen- tralverband des Deutschen Bank- und Bankiergewerbes, Berlin. ------ G. Wermert, Borse, Borsengesetz und Borsengeschaft, Leipzig. 1904. Verhandlungen des II. Allgemeinen Deutschen Bankiertags zu Ber 1904. Neukamp, lin, Berlin. Differenzgeschaft und Gesetzgebung und Rechtsprechung. Borsentermingeschaft in der Herausgegeben vom Zentral- verband des Deutschen Bank- und Bankiergewerbes, Berlin. Verhandlungen des III. Allgemeinen Deutschen Bankiertages zu Hamburg, Berlin (Referate von Riesser u. Warburg). Riesser, Stand und Aussichten der Borsengesetzreform, Berlin. Commentaries and annotated text editions of the Stock-Exchange Act. 1908. A pt, Trumpler, Weissbart, 5. Aufl., Berlin. 1908. Hemptenmacher, 2. Aufl., Berlin. 1909. Rehm, Trumpler, Dove, Neukamp, Schm idt-Em sthausen, herausgegeben vom Zentralverband des Breit, Deutschen Bank- und Bankiergewerbes, mit Vorwort von Riesser, Berlin. X. THE SECURITY-ISSUING (EMISSION) AND FINANCING BUSINESS. 1890. W. Lotz, Die Technik des deutschen Emissionsgeschafts. Anleihen Konversionen und Griindungen, Leipzig. 1902. M ax Jorgens, Finanzielle Trustgesellschaften, S tu ttga rt und Berlin 1905. E. Leist, Die Sanierung von Aktiengesellschaften, Berlin. 1907. G. S. Freund, Die Rechtsverhaltnisse der offentlichen Anleihen, Berlin. 1908. E. Wolff und F. Birkenbiehl, Die Praxis der Finanzierung bei Errichtung, Erweiterung, Verbesserung, Fusionierung und Sanierung von Aktiengesellschaften, Berlin. C. P e r io d ic a l s a n d N e w s p a p e r s . Die Bank, Berlin (ed. Lansburgh). Bankarchiv, Zeitschrift fur Bank- und Borsenwesen, Berlin (ed. Riesser). Bankbeamtenzeitung, Berlin. The Bankers’, Insurance Managers’ and Agents’ Magazine, London. The Bankers’ Magazine, New York. Bankers’ Magazine and Statistical Register, New York. Berichte iiber Handel and Industrie Berlin. 890 V ■— The - ....... G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s Berliner Borsencourier. Berliner Borsenzeitung. Berliner Jahrbuch fur Handel und Industrie. Berliner Tageblatt. Blatter fur Genossenschaftswesen, Berlin. Busch’ s Archiv fur Theorie und Praxis des allgemeinen deutschen Handelsrechts. Deutsche Monatsschrift fur Handel, Schiffahrt und Verkehrswesen (Ro stock). Der Deutsche Okonomist, Berlin. Deutsche Wirtschaftszeitung, Berlin. Deutsches Handelsarchiv, Berlin. Deutsches Handelsblatt, Berlin. L ’ Economiste europeen, Paris. L ’Economiste frangais, Paris. Finanzarchiv (Schanz), Stuttgart. Frankfurter Zeitung. Hamburger Borsenhalle. Hamburger Korrespondent. Hamburger Nachrichten. Handel und Gewerbe, Berlin. Hannoverscher Kurier. Internationaler Volkswirt, Berlin. Jahrbuch fur Gesetzgebung, Yerw altung und Rechtspflege (Holtzendorff), Leipzig. Jahrbiicher fiir Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft (Schmoller), Leipzig. Jahrbiicher fiir Nationalokonomie und Statistik (Conrad), Jena. Journal des Economistes, Paris. Journal of the Institute of Bankers, London. Kolnische Zeitung. Kolnische Volkszeitung. Merkur, Berlin. Monatsschrift fiir Aktienrecht und Bankwesen, Berlin. Monatsschrift fiir Handelsrecht und Bankwesen, Berlin. Moniteur des I n te n ts mat£riels, Bruxelles. Neue Freie Presse, Wien. Pester Lloyd. Plutus, Berlin. Preussisches Handelsarchiv, Berlin. Reuter’s Finanz-Chronik, London. Die Sparkasse, Berlin. Vierteljahrshefte zur S tatistik des Deutschen Reichs, Berlin. Vierteljahrsschrift fiirStaats- und Volkswirtschaft (Frankenstein), Leipzig. Vierteljahrsschrift Berlin. fiir Volkswirtschaft, 891 Politik und Kulturgeschichte, N at i o n a l M on e t a r y Commission Volkswirtschaftliche Wochenschrift (Dorn), Wien. Vossische Zeitung. Wochenschrift fur Aktienrecht und Bankwesen, Berlin. Zeitschrift des Konigl. Statistischen Bureaus, Berlin. Zeitschrift fiir das gesamte Aktienwesen, Leipzig. Zeitschrift fur das gesamte Handelsrecht, begriindet von Goldschmidt, S tu tt gart. Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, Tubingen. Zeitschrift fiir die deutsche Volkswirtschaft (Schuck), Berlin. Zeitschrift fiir K apital und Rente, Berlin. Zeitschrift fiir Literatur und Geschichte der Staatswissenschaften, Leipzig. Zeitschrift fiir Handelswissenschaft und Handelspraxis, Leipzig. APPENDIX II. Credit banks founded during the years 1848-1856. [To page 45.] Location. Designation. Paid-up Year of share found capital at ing. end of 1857. M arks. 3 9 . 131. O O O D o....... Coburg...................... Coburg-Gothaer Credit-Gesellschaft... . Darmstadt (Berlin). . . Bank fiir Handel und Industrie.......... Dessau...................... Creditanstalt fiir Industrie und Handel. 1856 1853 1856 D o..................... Cologne..................... Leipzig...................... Miihlhausen (Alsace). . Oldenburg................. Strassburg (Alsace).. . 1856 1848 1856 1854 A. SchaafThausen’scher Bankverein . . . . Allgemeine Deutsche Creditanstalt. . . . Comptoir d’Escompte de Mulhouse. . . . Oldenburgische Spar- und Leih-Bank. . Strassburger Bank (Stahling)............. Total 14 banks . ............................. 892 184s 1852 I , 700,O O O 42.936,O O O I , 800,O O O IS. 561,000 22,292,O O O 800.O O O I, 2 0 0 , O O O 2 , 40 0 ,O O O 183,140,000 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s APPENDIX III. German credit banks in 1872 fl [To page 188.] Location. Designation. Year of founda tion. Paid-up share capital at end of 1872. 1,000 m arks. Aix-la-Chapelle Do ........... Aschaffenburg. Augsburg........ Barmen.......... Berlin............. D o........... D o........... D o ........... D o........... D o........... D o........... D o........... D o........... D o........... D o........... Do........... D o........... D o........... D o......... Do......... D o_ _ D o........... Do......... D o......... D o......... D o......... D o......... D o......... D o......... D o......... D o......... D o......... Aachener Bank fur Handel u. Industrie. . Aachener Discontogesellschaft (Rheinische). Bankverein Aschaffenburg..................... Augsburger B a n k ................................. Barmer Bankverein, Hinsberg, Fischer & Co. Allgem. Bau- u. Handelsbank................ Allgem. Dei^sche Handelsgesellschaft. . . Berliner Bank........................................ Borsenbank fur Maklergeschafte............ Berliner Bankverein.............................. Bdrsen-Handels-Verein.......................... Centralbank fur Industrie u. Handel. . . . Commissions- u. Maklerbank.................. Berliner Commerz- u. Wechselbank........ Deutsche Bank...................................... Deutsche Handelsbank.......................... Deutsche Unionbank............................. Disconto-Gesellschaft............................. Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank, Sorgel, Parrisius & Co. Gewerbebank, H. Schuster & Co............ Generalbank fur Maklergeschafte........... Hamburg-Berliner Bank........................ Berliner Handelsgesellschaft.................. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft......... Berliner Lombardbank........................... Berliner Maklerbank.............................. Maklervereinsbank................................. Preussische Creditanstalt....................... Provinzial-Disconto-Gesellschaft............ Provinzial-Gewerbebank........................ Vereinsbank, Quistorp & Co................... Wechselstuben A .-G .............................. Berliner Wechslerbank........................... 1872 1872 1872 1871 1867 1873 1871 1871 1871 1871 1872 1871 1872 1871 1870 1869 1871 2, 400 2, 400 x, 5°° 2. 400 12, 000 1,200 3.000 8, 400 1,800 18.000 3. 600 22, 500 3.000 4 . 5° 45.0 ° 00 1851 900 36, 000 60.000 1865 7.500 1863 1872 1872 18, 000 3.000 9, 000 3 I.SOO 185 6 1871 1871 1871 1871 1872 1871 1872 1870 1872 1871 5. 250 1.50 0 2, 400 2, 400 15.000 18.000 6. 000 7. 500 4. 500 15.000 “ See D e u ts c h e r O e k o n o m is t of January 27, 1906 (Vol. XXIV, No. 1205), which includes, however, note banks, mortgage banks, the so-called B a u b a n k e n , H a n d e l s and P r o d u k l e n b a n k e n , which are omitted from the above list. The latter includes, on the other hand, the so-called M a k l e r b a n k e n (brokers’ banks). This made necessary a number of changes in the table of the D e u ts c h e r O e k o n o m is t The dates printed in heavy type indicate that the respective banks were founded during the fifties of the nineteenth century. banken, 893 National Monetary Commission German credit banks in 1872— Continued. Location. Designation. Beuthen (Upper Silesia. Oberschlesische Bank fiir Handel u. Industrie. Year of founda tion. Paid-up share capital at end of 1872. 1,0 0 0 m a rks. D o....... D o.............. D o..................... D o.............. D o..................... D o..................... D o..................... 3 . 000 1868 1871 1871 1871 1870 1871 1872 1872 1871 1872 D o........... 1872 6, 000 1,800 r, 800 1856 1872 1872 3.000 1856 D o..................... D o..................... Rheinisch-Westfalische Genossenschaftsbank. 1872 i, Soo 1848 3.000 Crefeld.................... Darmstadt (Berlin).. . Dessau...................... Dresden (Berlin)....... Dresden.................... D o ..................... D o..................... D o..................... Do..................... Eisleben.................... Elberfeld................... D o..................... D o..................... Emden...................... Erfurt....................... Essen........................ Bank fiir Handel u. Industrie............. Creditanstalt fur Industrie u. Handel. . . . Dresdner Bank............................ Dresdner Handelsbank......... 1858 1856 34.000 1,800 6.000 Sachsischer Bankverein. . . . 1856 Elberfelder Disconto- u. Wechslerbank . . 1872 6, 000 Essener Creditanstalt............................. 1872 9. coo 894 ■ The ■ ft Ge r ma n Gr e a t Banks German credit banks in 1872— Continued. Location. Designation. Year of founda tion. Paid-up share capital at end of 1872. 1,000 m a rk s. Frankfurt a. M.......... D o..................... D o..................... D o..................... D o..................... D o..................... D o..................... Freiberg i. S .............. Geestemiinde............. Gera.......................... Gorlitz...................... Griinberg in Silesia . . . Halle......................... D o ..................... Hamburg.................. D o..................... D o..................... Hamburg (Berlin). . . . Hamburg................. D o..................... D o..................... D o..................... D o..................... Hanover................... Kiel.......................... Konigsberg (Prussia).. Leer.......................... Leipzig...................... D o..................... D o..................... D o..................... D o..................... Do..................... D o..................... Lixbeck...................... D o..................... Magdeburg................ D o..................... Mannheim................. D o..................... Miihlhausen i. Thurin gia. Frankfurter Bankverein......................... Deutsche Creditbank.............................. Deutsche Effekten- u. Wechselbank....... Deutsche Handels-Gesellschaft............... Deutsche Vereinsbank............................ Osterreichisch-Deutsche Bank................ Frankfurter Wechslerbank..................... Vorschussbank....................................... Geestemiinder Bank............................... Geraer Handels-Creditbank.................... Gdrlitzer Vereinsbank............................ Niederschlesischer Kassenverein............. Hallescher Bankverein........................... Hallesche Creditanstalt.......................... Waaren-Creditanstalt............................. Anglo-Deutsche Bank............................ Bankverein in Hamburg........................ Commerz- u. Disconto-Bank.................. Internationale Bank.............................. Norddeutsche Bank............................... Vereinsbank.......................................... Maklerbank........................................... Wechslerbank........................................ Hannoversche Disconto- u. Wechslerbank. Kieler Bank........................................... Konigsberger Vereinsbank..................... Ostfriesische Bank................................. Allgemeine Deutsche Creditanstalt......... Communalbank des Konigreichs Sachsen. F. Schonheimerscher Bankverein........... Leipziger Disconto-Gesellschaft............. Leipziger Vereinsbank............................ Leipziger Wechslerbank......................... Leipziger Wechsler- u. Depositenbank . . . Liibecker Bank...................................... Vorschuss- u. Sparverein........................ Magdeburger Bankverein....................... Magdeburger Wechsler- u. Discontobank . Pfalzer Bankverein................................ Rheinische Creditbank........................... Vereinsbank........................................... 895 1870 1872 1872 1872 1871 1871 1871 1870 1872 1872 1872 1868 1866 1872 1871 1871 1872 1870 1870 1856 1856 1871 1872 1872 1872 1871 1872 1856 1871 1872 1872 1871 1872 1872 1871 1864 1867 1872 1871 1870 1872 18.000 3.000 , 000 9, 000 30, 000 23,800 7, 200 240 12 750 6, 000 2, 400 3, 000 4.500 2 , IO O 3,600 24 . 000 9, 000 21.000 18, 000 45.000 9, 000 1, 200 1, 500 4, 800 2, 400 4, 200 900 30, 000 600 3.000 9, 600 8, 400 3, 1 5 0 2,400 1.500 72 3.000 2, 400 4, 800 12, 000 r, 200 Commission L o c a tio n . D e sig n a tio n . Y e a r of fo u n d a tio n . M iih lh a u se n i. A l s a c e . . B a n q u e d e M u lh o u s e ........................................... 18 7 1 P a id -u p sh are c a p :t a l a t e n d of 1872. 1,000 mrk a s. 1854 D o ............... D o ... 4, 800 800 . Do. 1845 P o s e n ................................... B a n k f iir L a n d w ir t s c h a f t u. I n d u s t r i e . . . . 1870 2, 269 P r o v in z ia l W e c h s le r - u. D is c o n t o b a n k . . . 18 71 3 .0 0 0 S t r a s s b u r g e r B a n k ( S t a h l in g ) ........................ 1852 W e m ig e r o d e r C o m m .- G e s e lls c h a ft A .- G . . 1865 D o .......................... D o ............................... D o ............................... D o ............................... S tr a s s b u r g i. A l s a c e . . . 18 72 2, 400 D o ............................... D o ............................... D o ............................... D o ............................... W e r n ig e r o d e .................... 150 1868 18 72 1 ,2 0 0 A t o t a l o f 139 b a n k s w it h a c o m b in e d c a p it a l o f 1,1 2 2 ,1 1 3 ,0 0 0 m a rk s , o f w h ic h , h o w e v e r , a c o n s id e r a b le p o rtio n d is a p p e a r e d a s h o r t t im e a fte r . 896 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s APPENDIX IV, Representation of the great banks on the supervisory boards of stock companies. [To page 367 ] BANK FUR HANDEL UND INDUSTRIE. S e a ts o n th e s u p e r v is o r y b o a rd . C la ss o f in d u s tr y . M ININ G , SM ELTIN G , AN D S A L T W O RK S. T w o ( v ic e - c h a ir m a n ) ............... D e u t s c h - L u x e m b u r g is c h e B e r g w e r k s - u. H u tte n -G e s e ll- s c h a ft in B o c h u m . O n e .................................................... H e ld b u r g , A .- G . f u r B e r g b a u , b e r g b a u lic h e u n d a n d e re O n e .................................................... H a r p e n e r B e r g b a u A .- G ., D o r tm u n d . in d u s tr ie lle E r z e u g n is s e , H ild e sh e im . O n e ( c h a ir m a n ) .......................... H o lz v e r k o h lu n g s -I n d u s tr ie , K o n s t a n z . O n e .................................................... I n t e r n a t io n a le K o h le n b e r g w e r k s - A .- G ., C o lo g n e. O n e .................................................... " P h o n i x , ” A .- G . f u r B e r g b a u u n d H iit t e n b e t r ie b , H o rd e . O n e .................................................... R h e in is c h e A .- G . f u r B r a u n k o h le n b e r g b a u u. B r ik e t t - fa b r ik a t io n , C o lo g n e . O n e .................................................... A . R ie b e c k ’sch e M o n ta n w e rk e , A .- G ., H a lle . O n e ................................................... S a a r - u. M o s e l- B e rg w e rk s -G e s e lls c h a ft, K a r lin g e n . STO N ES A N D EAR TH S. O n e ( v ic e - c h a ir m a n ) ............... A .- G . f u r G la s in d u s tr ie v o r m . F rie d r. S ie m e n s , D re sd e n . O n e ( v ic e - c h a ir m a n ) ............... A n n a w e r k e , C h a m o tte - u . T o n w a r e n , O e s la u . O n e ( c h a ir m a n ) ......................... G la s h iit t e S c h r e ib e r A .- G ., F u r s t e n b e r g a. O . O n e ................................................... S t r a la u e r G la s h iit t e A .- G .. B e rlin . M ETAL W O RK IN G . O n e ................................................... B e r lin e r M e ta llw a r e n fa b r ik H. A. J iir s t & C o. A .- G . B e rlin . O n e ( v ic e - c h a ir m a n ) ............... D e u tsch e G o ld - u . S ilb e r -S c h e id e a n s ta lt, F ra n k fo r t- o n - th e -M a in . M ACH IN E AN D IN ST R U M E N T M AKIN G. O n e ( c h a ir m a n ) .......................... A d le r w e r k e v o r m . H e in r ic h K l e y e l A .- G ., F r a n k fo r t- o n -th e O n e .................................. A .- G . M ix & M a in . G e n e s t, T e le fo n - u n d T e le g r a p h e n - W e r k e , B e rlin . O n e ............................................ A .- G ., M a s c h in e n b a u -A n s t a lt v o r m . V e n u le t h & E den- b e rg e r, D a r m s t a d t . O n e ..................................... A llg e m e in e E le k t r iz it a t s - G e s e lls c h a f t , B e rlin . O n e ............................................ D e u ts c h e N ile s , W e r k z e u g m a s c h in e n - F a b r ik , O b e rsc h o n - O n e ............................................ D e u ts c h -U b e r s e e is c h e O n e ............................................... D e u t s c h - S iid a m e r ik a n is c h e T w o ( v ic e - c h a ir m a n ) .............. E le k t r i z it a t s w e r k e H o m b u r g v . d . H . w e id e . E le k t r iz it a t s - G e s e lls c h a ft , C o lo g n e . 9 0 3 I I 0— I I ------ 5 8 897 B e r lin . T e le g r a p h e n - G e s e lls c h a ft. National Monetary Commission Representatian of the great banks on the supervisory boards of stock com panies— Continued. BANK FUR HANDEL UND INDUSTRIE—Continued. S e a t s on t h e s u p e r v is o r y b o a rd . C la s s o f in d u s t r y . m a c h in e and in s t r u m e n t m a k in g — c o n tin u e d . O n e .................................................... “ F e n s t r a ,” F a b r ik f u r E is e n k o n s t r u k t io n e n u n d B r iic k e n - O n e .................................................... A .- G . K o r t in g s E le k t r iz it a t s w e r k e , B e rlin . b a u , D iiss e ld o rf. O n e ( v ic e - c h a ir m a n ) ............... L e c h - E le k t r iz it a t s w e r k e , A u g s b u r g . O n e .................................................... L u d w . L o e w e & C o ., B e r lin . O n e .................................................... M a s c h in e n b a u -G e s e lls c h a ft, H e ilb ro n n . O n e ( c h a ir m a n ) .......................... “ P h o n i x ,” A .- G . f u r S tu h l- , H e r d - u . O fe n in d u s tr ie in O n e .................................................... V e it h w e r k e , A .- G ., S a n d b a c h , A u t o m o b il- u n d F a h r r a d - O b e rh a u s e n . fa b r ik . CH EM ICALS. O n e .................................................... B a y e r is c h e S t ic k s t o ff w e r k e in M u n ich . O n e ( v ic e - c h a ir m a n ) ............... C h e m is c h e W e r k e , v o r m . H . u n d E . A lb e r t , B ie b r ic h . O n e ( c h a ir m a n ) .......................... C h e m isc h e F a b r ik G rie s h e im , E le k t r o n , F ra n k fo rt- o n -th e -M a in . ILL U M IN A N T S, SO A PS, P A T S, O ILS, V A R N ISH E S. O n e .................................................... D e u t s c h e P e t r o le u m A .- G ., B e r lin . O n e ( v ic e - c h a ir m a n ) ............... F r a n k f u r t e r G a s g e s e lls c h a ft. T E X T IL E S A N D LE A T H E R . . O n e .................................................... I. P . B e m b e r g , O e h d e ( B u n t fa r b e r e i) . O n e ( v ic e - c h a ir m a n ) ............... G r u s c h w it z , T e x t ilw e r k e , N e u s a lz . O n e .................................................... E d u a r d L in g e l, S c h u h f a b r ik A .- G ., E r f u r t . O n e ( v ic e - c h a ir m a n ) ............... V e r e in ig t e O n e ( c h a ir m a n ) .......................... W u r t t e m b e r g is c h e K a t t u n m a n u fa k t u r , H e id e n h e im . O n e ( v ic e - c h a ir m a n ) ............... A lb r e c h t & M e is te r, A .- G ., B e r lin . O n e .................................................... A .- G . f u r B u n t p a p ie r f a b r ik a t io n . A s c h a ffe n b u r g . K u n s t s e id e fa b r ik e n , F r a n k fo r t- o n -th e -M a in . PA P E R . • W OOD A N D C A R V IN G IN D U ST R Y O n e .................................................... H o lz in d u s tr ie H e rm . S c h iit t , C ze rsk . O n e ( c h a ir m a n ) .......................... A k t ie n - Z u c k e r f a b r ik , G r.- G e ra u . O n e .................................................... A k t ie n - Z u c k e r f a b r ik W e t t e r a u , F rie d b e rg O n e ( c h a ir m a n ) .......................... A lt m iin s t e r B r a u e r e i, M a in z. O n e .................................................... C o n t in e n t a le W a s s e r w e r k s -G e s e lls c h a ft, B e r lin . FOODS AN D D RIN KS. O n e ............................................... D e u t s c h e B ie r b r a u e r e i, B e r lin . O n e ( v ic e - c h a ir m a n ) ............... G e b r . S t o llw e r c k , A .- G ., C o lo g n e -o n -th e -R h in e . O n e .................................................... K o n s e r v e n f a b r ik J o h . B r a u n , W o rm s. 898 The Ge r ma n Gr e at Banks Representation of the great banks on the supervisory boards of stock com panies— Continued. BANK Ft)R HANDEL UND INDUSTRIE—Continued. S e a t s o n th e s u p e r v is o r y b o ard . C la s s o f in d u s t r y . CO M M ERCIAL E N T E R P R ISE S. O n e .................................................... B a n k d e s B e r lin e r K a s s e n v e r e in s , B e rlin . O n e .................................................... B a n k f u r B r a u in d u s t r ie , B e r lin . O n e .................................................... B e r lin e r H y p o t h e k e n b a n k . O n e .................................................... B e r g - u. M e t a llb a n k in F ra n k fo rt- o n -th e -M a in . O n e ( c h a ir m a n ) ......................... B o d e n - A .- G . a m A m t s g e r ic h t P a n k o w . T h r e e ( c h a ir m a n ) ...................... B o d e n - A .- G . B e r lin -N o r d . O n e .................................................... B o r s ig w a ld e r T e rra in -G e s . B e r lin . T w o ( c h a ir m a n ) ......................... B r e s la u e r D is c o n t o - B a n k in B re s la u . O n e .................................................... D e u t s c h - A s ia t is c h e B a n k in B e rlin . O n e .................................................... D e u t s c h e T r e u h a n d -G e s e lls c h a ft, B e r lin . O n e .................................................... G e s e lls c h a ft f u r e le k tr is c h e U n t e m e h m u n g e n , B e r lin . T w o ................................................... I m m o b ilie n -V e r k e h r s b a n k , B e rlin . O n e .................................................... K d ln is c h e H a u s r e n te n -A .-G . O n e .................................................... N e u e B o d e n - A .- G ., B e rlin . T w o ( v ic e - c h a ir m a n ) ............... O s t b a n k f u r H a n d e l u . G e w e rb e , P o sen . O n e .................................................... P re u s s is c h e P fa n d b r ie fb a n k , B e rlin . O n e ( c h a ir m a n ) ......................... R e in ig e r , G e b b e r t & S c h a ll A .- G ., E r la n g e n . O n e .................................................... S iid d e u ts c h e B o d e n k r e d it b a n k , M u n ich . T w o ( c h a ir m a n ) ......................... S iid d e u ts c h e I m m o b ilie n -G e s e lls c h a ft, M a in z. O n e ( v ic e - c h a ir m a n ) ............... T e r r a in - A .- G . B e r lin -M a r ie n d o r f, B e rlin . O n e ( c h a ir m a n ) .......................... T e r r a in -G e s e lls c h a ft, B e r lin u. V o r o r t e , A .- G . O n e .................................................... V e r e in s b a n k , W is m a r. O n e .................................................... W e s t lic h e B o d e n - A .- G ., B e rlin . O n e ( c h a ir m a n ) ......................... W it t e n a u e r B o d e n -G e s e lls c h a ft, B e rlin . IN SU R A N C E. O n e .................................................. “ A ll ia n z ,” V e r s ic h e r u n g s -G e s e lls c h a ft, B e rlin . O n e ( c h a ir m a n ) .......................... D e u t s c h e L e b e n s v e r s ic h e r u n g s b a n k , B e rlin . O n e ..................................... “ I n d u s t r ie ,” V e r s ic h e r u n g s -A .-G ., B e r lin . T R AN SPO R T AT IO N . O n e ( c h a ir m a n ) .......................... D e s s a u e r S tr a s s e n b a h n - G e s e lls c h a ft. T w o ( c h a ir m a n ) ......................... F r a n k f u r t e r L o k a lb a h n - A k t .- G e s . O n e .......................................... G ro s s e B e r lin e r S tr a s s e n b a lin . O n e .......................................... K a m e r u n e r E is e n b a h n -G e s e lls c h a ft, B e r lin . O n e .......................................... L u ft s c h if f a h r t A .- G ., F r a n k f o r t o n th e M ain . O n e ( v ic e - c h a ir m a n ) ............... “ M id g a r d ,” D e u t s c h e S e e v e r k e h r s - A .- G ., N o rd e n h a m . O n e ( v ic e - c h a ir m a n ) ................ S a n t a C a t h a r in a -E is e n b a h n -G e s e lls c h a ft , B e rlin . O n e ( c h a ir m a n ) .......................... S iid d e u ts c h e E is e n b a h n -G e s e lls c h a ft, D a r m s t a d t . O n e ................................ W e s t d e u t s c h e E is e n b a h n -G e s e lls c h a ft, C o lo g n e . 899 N at i o n a l M on e t a r y Commissio Representation of the great banks on the supervisory boards of stock com panies— Continued. BANK FUR H AN DEL UND I N D U S T R I E — C o n tin u e d . S e a t s o n th e s u p e r v is o r y b oard . C la s s o f in d u s t r y F O R E IG N CO M PAN IES. One A m ste rd a m sch e B a n k . O ne B a n c a M a rm o ro s c h B la n c k & C o ., B u c h a r e s t. One C o n s o lid a te d M in es S e le c t io n C o m p a n y , L o n d o n . O ne G e s e lls c h a ft f u r e le k tr is c h e B e le u c h t u n g v o m J a h re 1886, One S o c ie t y G e n e r a le B e ig e d ’ E n t r e p r is e s E le c t r iq u e s , B r u s O ne K . p r iv . W e c h s e ls t u b e n - A .- G ., “ M e r c u r ,” V ie n n a . S t . P e te r s b u r g . sels. B E R L IN E R H A N D E LSG E SE L LSC H A F T . M IN IN G , SM EL TIN G , A N D S A L T W ORK S. O n e ................................... B e r g w e r k s -G e s e lls c h a ft , “ H ib e r n ia ,” H e m e . O n e ................................... “ B is m a r c k h u t t e ” in B is m a r c k h iit t e . O n e ( v ic e - c h a ir m a n ) . E is e n h u t t e S ile s ia , P a r u s c h o w it z in O b e rsc h l. O n e ................................... F r a n k f u r t , F in c k e n h e e r , B r a u n k o h le n , A .- G . C h a r lo tte n - O n e ( v ic e - c h a ir m a n ) . G e w e r k s c h a ft , “ V i k t o r i a ” L iin e n , D o r tm u n d . O n e ( d ir e c t o r ) ............ .. G e w e r k s c h a f t G iin t h e r s h a ll, G o lh n g e n . O n e ................................... H a r p e n e r B e r g b a u - G e s e lls c h a ft , D o r tm u n d . b u rg . O n e (c h a irm a n ) H o h e n lo h e -W e r k e in H o h e n lo h e h iitte , U p p e r S ile sia . O n e ..................................... K a liw e r k e S a r s t e d t . O n e .................................... K a liw e r k e F rie d r ic h s h a ll in S c h u d e . O n e (c h a irm a n ) K r a f t , B e r g b a u , A .- G ., L e ip z ig . O n e (v ic e -c h a irm a n ) O b e rs c h le s is c h e K o k s w e r k e , B e rlin . O n e .................................... P la n ia w e r k e , A .- G . f u r K o h le n f a b r ik a t io n in P la n ia b . O n e ......................... A . R ie b e c k s c h e M o n ta n w e r k e in H a lle a . S . R a t ib o r . O n e ......................... R o m b a c h e r H iit t e n w e r k e , R o m b a c h . O n e ......................... S c h a n t u n g B e r g b a u - G e s e lls c h a ft , B e r lin . O n e ......................... S c h le s is c h e K o h le n - u. K o k s w e r k e in G o t t e s b e r g i. S c h L Q n e (c h a irm a n ) V e r e in ig t e L a u s it z e r G la s w e r k e , A .- G . W e is s w a s s e r. O ne. B r e it e n b u r g e r P o r tla n d - C e m e n tw e r k e , H a m b u r g . O n e ( v ic e - c h a ir m a n ) . A lu m in iu m in d u s t r ie N e u h a u se n . ST O N E S A N D EAR TH S. M ETAL W O RK IN G . O n e ..................................... E is e n - u n d S t a h lw e r k , B e t h le n - F a lv a . O n e (v ic e -c h a ir m a n ) . O b e rs c h le s is c h e E is e n in d u s tr ie in G le iw itz . O n e ..................................... R h e n a n ia , E m a illie r w e r k e , A .- G ., D iiss e ld o rf. goo % K The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s R e p r e s e n ta tio n o f th e g rea t b a n k s o n th e s u p e r v is o r y b o a rd s o f sto c k c o m p a n ie s — C o n t i n u e d . BERLINER HANDELSGESELLSCHAFT—Continued. Seats on the supervisory board. Class of industry. m e t a l w o r k in g — c o n tin u e d . O ne, O ne, O ne, One, Rheinische Stahlwerke, M eiderich. Russische Eisenindustrie, Gleiwitz. Vereinigte Deutsche Xickelwerke, Schwerte. W estfalische Drahtindustrie, Ham in W m estphalia. One (chairm .... an) One (vice-chairm an) One.................... One.................... One (vice-chairm an) One.................... One (chairman).... One (chairman).... One (vice-chairm an) One.................... Akkum ulatorenfabrik, BerlinAllgem eine Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft, Berlin. Benrather M aschinenfabrik, Berlin. Berlin-Anhaltische M aschinenbau, Berlin. Berliner Elektrizitatswerke, Berlin. Deutsche Nileswerke, Oberschonew eide. Elektrotechnische W erke, Berlin. Kraftiibertragungs-W erke, Rheinfelden. Julius Pintsch, Berlin, Elektrizitatswerk. Stettiner M aschinenbau, “ Vulcan,” Stettin. One..................... Two (vice-chairm an) Two (vice-chairm an), Two (vice-chairm an) Bayerische Stickstoffwerke, M iinchen. Cliem ische Fabrik, Lindenhof, C Weyl, A.-G., M . annheim . Dellarocca, Chem ische Fabrik, A.-G., Berlin. Riitgerswerke, Charlottenburg. One Deutsche Continental-Gasgesellschaft, D essau. MACHINE CONSTRUCTION AND INSTRUMENT MAKING. CHEMICALS. ILLUMINANTS, SOAPS, FATS, OILS, VARNISHES. FOODS AND DRINKS. One.............................. Leipziger Bierbrauerei, Reudnitz. One (vice-chairman)......... W A. Scholten, Starke- und Syrupfabrik, A.-G., Bran . denburg. One (vice-chairman)......... Zuckerrafiinerie Tangerm iinde. BUILDING TRADES. Two (vice-chairman)......... W ilhelm Bruch, Kanalbau-A.-G., Berlin. COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES. One.................... One.................... One (chairman).... One (vice-chairm an) One.................... One.................... One.................... One.................... A.-G. fur Erwerb- u. Verwertungsindustrie, Neuhof. Bahnhof Jungfem heide, Boden-Gesellschaft, Berlin. Bank fur deutsche Eisenbahnwerte, Berlin. Bank fur elektrische Unternehm ungen, Zurich. Berliner M aklerverein, Berlin. Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, Berlin. Deutscher Eisenhandel, A.-G., Berhn. Deutsche Hypothekenbank, Berlin. 901 National Monetary Commission Representation of the great banks on the supervisory boards of stock com panies— Continued. BERLINER HANDELSGESELLSCHAFT—Continued. Seats on the supervisory board. Class of industry. c o m m e r c ia l e n t e r p r is e s —continued. One.............. Three (director) One (chairm an) One.............. One.............. Two (chairm an) One.............. One.............. Diamanten-Pacht-Ges., Berlin. Handelsgesellschaft fur Grundbesitz, Berlin. Industriegelande Schoneberg, A.-G., Berlin. Liquidationsverein fiir Zeitgeschafte, Berlin. Ostbank fiir Handel u. Gewerbe, Posen. Papierfabrik Koeslin, A.-G., Koeslin. Preussische Hypotheken-Aktienbank, Berlin. Reichsbank, Berlin. One (chairman).............. One............................. One............................. One............................. One............................. A.-G. fiir Verkehrswesen, Berlin. Braunschweig-Schoninger Eisenbahn, Braunschweig. Brohlthal Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft, Cologne. Capito & Klein, A.-G., Benrath. Deutsche Kolonial-Eisenbahn- u. Betriebs-Gesellschaft, Berlin. Kam erun-Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft, Berlin. t r a n s p o r t a t io n Two (director and chair m an). One (vice-chairman)....... Two (vice-chairman)....... One............................. e n t e r p r is e s . Leipziger elektrische Strassenbahn, Leipzig. Ostdeutsche Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft, Konigsberg. W estdeutsche Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft, Cologne. FOREIGN COMPANIES. One . One. One. A.-G. Hadeland, Bergwerk zu Grua (Norway). A.-G. “ Elektrizitat,” W arsaw. Banca M orosch, Blank & Co., Bucharest. arm Banque Andrbewitch & Co., A.-G., Belgrade. Banque Internationale de Bruxelles. Bohm ische M ontanges., vonn. fiirstlich-Furstenbergische M ontanwerke, Vienna. Gesellschaft der M etallfabriken, vorm B. Hantke, War . saw . A. Gorz & Co., London. Kraftwerk Laufenburg in Laufenburg, Switzerland. Labouch&re, Oyens & Co., Bank, Am sterdam . Norge Erz-Bergbau, Ges. zu Hakedal (Norway). Oesterreich. Alpine-M ontan-Gesellschaft, Vienna. Prager Eisenindustrie, Vienna. Schantimg-Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft, Tsingtau, China. Schweizerische M etallbank in Basle. Siiddeutsche Donau-Dam pfschiffahrts-Gesellschaft. Vi- One Ziiricher Eisenbahn-Bank, Zurich. One. One. Two One . One. One. Two One. One. One. One . One . Two The Ge r man Gr e at Banks R e p r e s e n ta tio n o f th e g rea t b a n k s a n th e s u p e r v is o r y b o a rd s o f sto c k c o m p a n ie s — C o n t in u e d . v COMMERZ- UND DISCONTO-BANK. Seats on the supervisory board. Class of industry. MINING, SMELTING, AND SALT WORKS. One M ecklenburgische Kali-Salzwerke, Jessenitz. One.................... One (vice-chairm an) Portland-Cementfabrik “ Germ ania,” A.-G. in Lehrte. “Teutonia,” M isburger Portland-Cem entfabrik, Hanover. One Stanz-u. Em aillierwerke vorm Carl Thiel & Sohne, A.-G. . in Liibeck. Berliner Gusstahl- u. Eisengiesserei, A.-G., Berlin. STONES AND EARTHS. METAL WORKING. One MACHINE AND INSTRUMENT MAKING. One.................... One.................... One.................... One.................... One (vice-chairm an) Two (chairman). . . . One.................... A.-G. Gorlitzer Maschinenbauanstalt u Eisengiesserei. . Continentale Gesellschaft fur elektrische Untemehmungen, Nurem berg. Diisseldorfer Maschinenbau-A.-G. vorm J. Lohenhausen. . Elektrizitats-A.-G. vorm Schuckert & Co., Nurem . berg. Leipziger W erkzeugm aschinenfabrik vorm W. v. Pittler. . M aschinenbauanstalt u. Eisengiesserei vorm Th. Fldther, . Gassen. M aschinenfabrik fiir M iihlenbau vorm C. G. W. Kapler . Berlin. CHEMICALS. One Chem ische Fabriken Harburg-Stassfurt, vorm Thorl & . Heidtm ann, A.-G., Harburg. TEXTILES. One Norddeutsche Jutespinnerei u. W eberei, Hamburg-Harburg. One One One Barmbecker Brauerei-A.-G., Hamburg-Barmbeck. Braucrei “ Germania,” A.-G., Berlin. Norddeutsche Zuckerraffinerie, Frellstedt. One.............. A.-G. Berliner Neustadt in Liquid, in Berlin. Two (chairm an) Two (chairm an) One.............. One.............. Credit- u. Sparbank in Leipzig. Grundstiicks-A.-G. in Berlin. Lichtenberger Terrain-A.-G. Revisions- u. Verm ogensverwaltung, A.-G., Berlin. FOODS AND DRINKS. BUILDING TRADES. COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES. 9 °3 N at io n a l M on et a r y Commission R e p r e s e n ta tio n o f th e g rea t b a n k s o n th e s u p e r v is o r y b o a rd s o f s to c k c o m p a n ie s — C o n t i n u e d . COMMERZ- UND DISCONTO-BANK— Continued. Seats on the supervisory board. Class of industry'. c o m m e r c ia l , e n t e r p r i s e s — One........................ One (vice-chairman) One....................... , Continued. Terrain-Gesellschaft am Teltowkana! Rudow-Johannisthal. Terrain-Gesellschaft Miinchen, Friedenheim. Waren-Cominissionsbank in Hamburg. INSURANCE ENTERPRISES. One One “ Industrie” -Versicherungs-A.-G., Berlin. “ Nordstern,” Unfall- u. Altersversicherungs-A.-G., Elberfeld. One.................................... One (chairman).................. One.................................... Bergische Kleinbahn-A.-G. in Elberfeld. Reinickendorf - Liebenwalde - Schonebecker EisenbahnA.-G. Vereinigte Elbschiffahrts-Gesellschaften, A.-G. in Dresden. One.................................... Kaiserkeller, A.-G., Berlin. One................................... Santa Catharina-Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft, Berlin. TRANSPORTATION ENTERPRISES. HOSTELRY AND TAVERN ENTERPRISES. FOREIGN COMPANIES. DEUTSCHE BANK. MINING, SMELTING, AND SALT WORKS. One....................... One........................ One........................ Bleichert’sche Braunkohlenwerke, Neukirchen. Bochumer Verein fur Bergbau u. Gussstahlfabrikation. Continentale Wasserwerks-Gesellschaft, Berlin. Deutsche Mineralol-Industrie, A.-G., Berlin. Essener Bergwerksverein “ Konig Wilhelm.” Essener Steinkohlenbergwerke. Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-A.-G. Gewerkschaft Wilhelmsschacht, Gnaudorf-Boma. Harpener Bergbau-A.-G., Dortmund. Konigsbom, A.-G., fiir Bergbau, Salinen- u. Solbadbetrieb. ‘ Phonix,” A.-G. fiir Bergbau und Hiittenbetrieb, Horde. Rombacher Hiittenwerke. Otavi, Minen- u. Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft, Berlin. One (vice-chairman) Steingutfabrik Somewitz, Meissen. One (chairman). . . . One (vice-chairman) One....................... One........................ One........................ One (vice-chairman) One....................... One........................ One....................... One (vice-chairman) STONES AND EARTHS. 904 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s Representation of the great banks on the supervisory boards of stock com panies— Continued. DEUTSCHE BANK— Continued. Seats on the supervisory board. Class of industry. METAL WORKING. One.................................... Aluminium-Industrie, A.-G., Neuhausen. One (vice-chairman).......... Hirsch, Kupfer- und Messingwerke, Halberstadt. One (chairman).................. Reichelt, Metallschrauben-A.-G., Fiirstenwalde. MACHINE CONSTRUCTION AND INSTRUMENT MAKING. One (vice-chairman).......... One (chairman).................. One.................................... One.................................... One.................... .. ........... One.................................... One.................................... Two (1 chairman, 1 direc One.................................... One.................................... Two................................... One.................................... One (chairman)................. Akkumulatorenfabrik Berlin-Hagen. Bayerische Elektrizitatswerke, Miinchen. Benrather Maschinenfabrik, Berlin. Bergmann, Elektrizitatswerke, Berlin. Berlin-Anhaltische Maschinenbau-Gesellschaft. Berliner Elektrizitats-Werke. Chemnitzer Werkzeugmaschinenfabrik. Deutsche Ueberseeische Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft, Ber lin. Elektrische Licht- u. Kraftanlagen, Berlin. Fabrik fur photographische Apparate, Dresden. J. Frcrichs & Co., Osterholz, Maschinenfabrik u. Schiffswerft. Carl Hamel, Schonau, Maschinenfabrik. Kraftiibertragungswerke, Rheinfelden. Mannesmannrbhren-Werke. Miirkische Maschinenbau-Anstalt, Wetter. Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Niimberg. Oberschlesische Eisenbahnbedarfs-A.-G., Friedenshiitte. Orenstein & Koppel, Berlin, A.-G. fur Feld- und Kleinbahnbedarf. Jul. Pintsch A.-G., Berlin, Maschinenfabrik u. Beleuchtungs-Gesellschaft. Rheinisch-Westfalisches Elektrizitatswerk, Essen. F. Kiippersbusch & Sohne, A.-G. Siemens & Halske, Berlin. Ernst Schiess,Werkzeugmaschinenfabrik, Diisseldorf. Voigt & Haeffner, A.-G., Frankfort on the Main. One................................... J. D. Riedel, Berlin, Chemische Fabrik. tor). Two (chairman)................. One.................................... One.................................... One.................................... One (vice-chairman).......... One (chairman).................. One.................................... One.................................... One.................................... One (vice-chairman).......... One................................... CHEMICALS. ILLUMINANTS, SOAPS, FATS, OILS, AND VARNISHES. One.................................... Deutsche Continental-Gas-Gesellschaft, Dessau. Two (chairman)................. Deutsche Petroleum-A.-G., Berlin. One (chairman).................. Europaische Petroleum-Union, Bremen. One.................................... F. Thorls, Vereinigte Harburger Olfabriken. 905 N a t io n a l M on e t a r y Commission Representation of the great banks on the supervisory boards of stock com panies— Continued. DEUTSCHE BANK— Continued. Seats on the supervisory board. Class of industry. TEXTILES. One.................................... Allgauer Baumwollspinnerei u. Weberei. One................................... Baumwollspinnerei “ Germania,” Epe. One (vice-chairman).......... Bremer Wollkammerei. One.................................... Bremer Tauwerkfabrik A.-G., vorm. C. H. Michelsen, Grohn. One................................... Schlesische Textilwaren, Methner & Frahne, Landeshut. One (vice-chairman).......... Vereinigte Glanzstoffabriken, Elberfeld. PAPER. One................................... Paul Suss, Luxuspapierfabrik, Dresden. One (chairman)................. Vereinigte Berlin-Frankfurter Gummiwaren. One................................... One................................... One................................... Aktien-Muhlenwerke Stockau-Reichertshofen-Mauching. Zuckerfabrik Frobeln. Wasserwerk fur das nordliche westfalische Kohlenrevier, Gelsenkirchen. One (chairman)................. One................................... Gesellschaft fiir den Bau von Untergrundbahnen, Berlin. Internationale Baugesellschaft, Frankfort on-the-Main. One (chairman)................. Kunstdruck- u. Verlagsanstalt, Wetzel & Naumann, Leipzig. Moritz Prescher Nachf., A.-G., Leutzsch, Kunstdruckerei. RUBBER. FOODS AND DRINKS. BUILDING TRADES. ART INDUSTRY. One (vice-chairman).......... COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES. Two (chairman)................. Bergisch-Markische Bank, Elberfeld. One.................................... Berliner Maklerverein. One (chairman)................. Bodengesellschaft am Hochbahnhof Schonhauser Allae, Berlin. One................................... Borsenhandelsverein, Berlin. One (chairman)................. Deutsche Treuhand-Gesellschaft, Berlin (RevisionsGesellschaft). One................................... Deutsche Handels- u. Plantagen-Gesellschaft, Hamburg. One (president).................. Deutsche Kolonial-Gesellschaft fiir Siidwestafrika. One................................... Deutsche Hypothekenbank, Meiningen. Six (director)..................... Deutsche Ueberseeische Bank, Berlin. One................................... Deutsche Vereinsbank, Frankfort on-the-Main. One (vice-chairman).......... Essener Bankverein. One................................... Essener Kreditanstalt. 906 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s Representation of the great banks on the supervisory boards of stock com panies— Continued. DEUTSCHE BANK—Continued. Seats on the supervisory board. Class of industry. c o m m e r c ia l e n t e r p r i s e s — continued. Hannoversche Bank. Mecklenburgische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank Schwerin. One................................... Mecklenburgische Sparbank, Schwerin. One................................... Neu-Bellevue, A.-G. fiir Grundstiicksverwertung, Berlin. One (chairman)................. Neu-Westend, A.-G. fiir Grundstiicksverwertung, Berlin. One.................................... Norddeutsche Kreditanstalt, Konigsberg. One (chairman).................. Preussische Bodenkredit-Aktienbank, Berlin. One.................................... Privatbank, Gotha. One (delegate and member Reichsbank, Berlin. of the central committee). One................................... Rheinische Kreditbank, Mannheim. One................................... Siichsische Bank, Dresden. One (chairman).................. Schlesischer Bankverein, Breslau. One.................................... Siiddeutsche Bank, Mannheim. One.................................... Schoneberg-West, A.-G. fiir Grundstiicksverwertung, Berlin. One................................... Terrain-Gesellschaft am Teltowkanal, Rudow-Johannisthal, A.-G. One.................................... Wilmersdorfer Terrain-Gesellschaft “ Rheingau,” Berlin. One................................... One (chairman).................. INSURANCE ENTERPRISES. Allgemeine Versicherungs-Gesellschaft fiir See-, Flussu. Land transport, Dresden. One (vice-chairman)........... “ Allianz,” Versicherungs-A.-G., Berlin. One.................................... “ Atlas,” Deutsche Lebensversicherungs-Gesellschaft, Ludwigshafen. One.................................... Kontinentale Versicherungs-Gesellschaft, Mannheim. One.................................... Mannheimer Versicherungs-Gesellschaft. One.................................... Sachsische Riickversicherungs-Gesellschaft in Dresden. One (vice-chairman)........... Transatlantische Giiterversicherungs-Gesellschaft in Ber lin. One................................... “ Union,” Allgemeine Versicherungs-Gesellschaft, Berlin. One................................... TRANSPORTATION ENTERPRISES. One................................... One (vice-chairman)........... One (vice-chairman)........... One.................................... One................................... One................................... A.-G. “ Weser,” Schiffswerft, Bremen. Deutsch-Australische Dampfschiffs-Gesellschaft, Ham burg. Gesellschaft fiir elektrische Hoch- und Untergrundbahnen, Berlin. Elektrische Strassenbahn, Barmen-Elberfeld. Norddeutscher Lloyd, Bremen. Ostafrikanische Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft, Berlin. Q 07 N a t io n a l M on e t a r y Commission Representation of the great banks on the supervisory boards of stock com panies— Continued. DEUTSCHE BANK— Continued. Seats on the supervisory board. Class of industry. Two (chairman)................. Two (chairman)................. Two (vice-chairman).......... One (vice-chairman).......... One (vice-chairman).......... Anatolische Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft, Constantinople. Bagdad Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft. Bank fiir elektrische Unternehmungen, Zurich. Bank fiir orientalische Eisenbahnen, Zurich. Betriebsgesellschaft der orientalischen Eisenbahnen. Vienna. Companla Barcelonesa de Electricidad. Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft Mersina-Adana. A. Goerz & Co., Ltd., London. Gesellschaft fiir elektrische Beleuchtung, St. Petersburg. National Bank of South Africa, London. Soci^te du Chemin de Fer Ottoman Salonique-Monastir. Soci£t6 du Port de Haidar-Paseha, Constantinople. Steaua Romana, A.-G. fur Petroleumindustrie, Bucharest. F O R E IG N CO M PAN IES. One................................... Two (chairman)................. One.................................... One (chairman).................. One.................................... Two (vice-chairman).......... Three (vice-chairman)......... Two (chairman)................. DIRECTION DER DISCONTO-GESELLSCHAFT. MINING, SMELTING, AND SALT WORKS. One (chairman)................. Bochumer Bergwerks-A.-G., Bochum. One.................................... Continentale Tiefbohrgesellschaft, Halle. One.................................... Deutsch-Luxemburger Bergwerks- u. Hiitten-A.-G., Bo chum. One.................................... Diamanten Regie-Gesellschaft. One.................................... Eschweiler Bergwerksverein. Two (chairman)................. Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-A.-G., Gelsenkirchen. Three................................. Gewerkschaft Braunkohlengrube, Boma. Three................................. Gewerkschaft Christoph Friedrich. One.................................... Hiistenen Gewerkschaft. Two................................... Otavi Minen- und Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft, Berlin. Two................................... “ Phonix,” A.-G. fur Bergbau u. Huttenbetrieb. Laar. One (chairman).................. “ Union,” A.-G. fiir Bergbau, Eisen- u. Stahlindustrie. Dortmund. Zinkhiitten- und Bergwerks-A.-G. vorm. Dr. A. Lowitsch & Co., Kattowitz. STONES AND EARTHS. One................................... One................................... A.-G. fiir Betonbau Diss Porzellanfabrik Kahla. One.................................... One.................................... Neuwalzwerk, A.-G., Bosperde. Rheinische Stahlwerke, Meiderich. & Co., Diisseldorf. METAL WORKING. 908 fe jg S i■ a y K iS ia a B g ifv i ‘ The Ge r ma n R ep r e s e n ta tio n o f th e grea t banks p a n ie s Gr e a t on th e s u p e r v is o r y Banks boa rd s o f sto c k com — Continued. DIRECTION DER DISCONTO-GESELLSCHAFT— Continued. Seats on the supervisory board. Class of industry. MACHINE CONSTRUCTION AND INSTRUMENT MAKING. One......................... One......................... One (vice-chairman) . One (vice-chairman). Three....................... One. One. One. Allgemeine Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft, Berlin. Bergmann, Elektrizitatswerke, Berlin. Berliner Maschinenbau-A.-G., Berlin. Deutsche Ueberseeische Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft, Berlin. Maschinenfabrik u. Miihlbau-Anstalt H. Luther, Braun schweig. Rheinisch-Westfalische Elektrizitatswerke, Essen. Sachsische Maschinenfabrik, Chemnitz. Turbinia, Deutsche Parsons Marine A.-G. CHEMICAL INDUSTRY. One................. One (chairman) Two................ Two................ Anglo - Continent, vorm. Ollendorffsche Guano-Werke, Hamburg. Berliner Benzinwerke, Lichtenberg. Dynamit-A.-G., Hamburg. Internationale Wasserstoff-Gesellschaft. Kaliwerke, Aschersleben. One (chairman) Three.............. Allgemeine Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft, Berlin. Allgemeine Petroleumindustrie, Berlin. One. Freiherrlich v. Tucher’sche Brauerei, Nuremberg. Two.............................. One............................... Two (vice-chairman)... . Two.............................. One............................... One............................... One........................... Allgemeine Deutsche Kreditanstalt, Leipzig. Bank des Berliner Kassenvereins, Berlin. Bank fur Thiiringen vorm. B. M. Strupp, Meiningen. Bank fiir Chile und Deutschland, Hamburg. Barmer Bankverein, Hinsberg, Fischer & Co., Barmen. Bayerische Disconto- und Wechselbank, Nuremberg. Bayerische Revisions- und Vermogens-A. G., Munich. Berliner Maklerverein. Brasilianische Bank fiir Deutschland, Hamburg. One (vice-chairman) ILLUMINANTS, SOAPS, FATS, OILS, VARNISHES. FOODS AND DRINKS. COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES. One............................ Four (i vice-chairman, chairman). Two (vice-chairman). .. . One............................... Four (i chairman and director). One............................... One............................... One............................... One........................ Busse & Co., Berlin, Bankgeschaft. Deutsche Afrika-Bank, Hamburg. Deutsche Asiatische Bank, Shanghai u. Berlin. Deutscher Eisenhandel, A.-G. Deutsche Grundkreditbank, Gotha. Deutsche Hypothekenbank, Meiningen. Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Bank, Berlin. 9 °9 N a t io n a l R e p r e s e n ta tio n M on e t a r y o f th e g r e a t banks p a n ie s on th e Commission s u p e r v is o ry boards o f s to c k com — Continued. DIRECTION DER DISCONTO-GESELLSCHAFT— Continued. Seats on the supervisory board. Class of industry. COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES— ontinued. One.................................... Konigsberger Terrain-A.-G. One (chairman).................. Landbank, Berlin. One.................................... Magdeburger Bankverein. Two (unlimited partners)... Norddeutsche Bank, Hamburg. One.................................... Oberlausitzer Bank, Zittau. One.................................... Preussische Zentral-Bodenkredit-A.-G., Berlin. One.................................... Preussische Hypotheken-Aktienbank, Berlin. One (member of the central Reichsbank, Berlin. committee). Three................................. Revision, Treuhand-A.-G., Berlin. One.................................... Heinrich Aug. Schulte, A.-G., Dortmund. Two (vice-chairman).......... Stahl & Federer, A.-G., Stuttgart. Two (vice-chairman)........... Siiddeutsche Disconto-Gesellschaft, Mannheim. One.................................... Terrain-Gesellschaf t B erhn-Siidwesten. PLANTATION COMPANIES. One, One, Deutsche Kolonisationsgesellschaft fiir Siidwestafrika. Neu-Guinea-Compagnie. One. Berliner Eispalast-Gesellschaft, Berlin. One, One, “ Nordstem,” Lebensversicherung in Berlin. “ Nordstem,” Unfall- und Altersversicherung in Berlin. One................. Two................ One................. One................. Brothaler Eisenbahngesellsehaft, Hennef. Deutsch-Chinesische Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft. Deutsche Ostafrika-Linie, Hamburg, DampfschiffahrtsGesellschaft. Grosse Leipziger Strassenbahn. One................. One................. One (chairman) Two................ One (chairman) One................ One................. One................. Two................ Banca Commerciale Italiana, Milan. Banque de Credit, Sofia. Banca Generala Romana. Banque Gentrale Roumaine, Bucharest. Compagnie G£n£rale des Tramways de Behire, Brussels. Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Congo. Compagnie industrielle des P^troles, Paris. Compagnie international d’Orient, Brussels. Concordia, Rumanische Petroleumindustrie, Bucharest. ENTERTAINMENT ENTERPRISES. INSURANCE ENTERPRISES. TRANSPORTATION ENTERPRISES. FOREIGN COMPANIES. 9 10 m The German Great Banks Representation of the great hanks on the supervisory boards of stock com panies— Continued. DIRECTION DER DISCONTO-GESEI.LSCHAFT— Continued. Seats on the supervisory board. Class of industry. One (chairman).................. “ Credit Petrolifer,” Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Entwicklung der rumanischen Petroleumindustrie. Deutsche Niederlassungs-Gesellschaft, Tientsin. Elektrische Strassenbahn, Valparaiso. General Mining and Finance Corporation, Johannesburg. Grosse Venezuela-Eisenbahn. Ostafrikanische Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft. Osteuropaische Telegraphen-Gesellschaft. Schantung-Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft, Tsingtau. Socidtd Financiere de Transport et d’Entreprises Industrielles, Brussels. Soci£t6 Gen^rale Beige d’Entreprises Gectriques. “ Vega,” Rumanische Petroleum-Raffinerie. Warschau-Wiener Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft. f o r e ig n c o m p a n ie s — co n tin u e d . One.................................... One.................................... One.................................... One.................................... One.................................... One.................................... Two (i chairman, i director) One................................... One................................... Two................................... One.................................... DRESDNER BANK. MINING, SMELTING, AND SALT WORKS One......................... One......................... Two (vice-chairman) One......................... One......................... One......................... One......................... Three (chairman). . . One......................... One......................... “ Bismarckhiitte” in Bismarckhiitte. Deutsch-Luxemburger Bergwerks- und Hutten-Gesellschaft in Bochum. Deutsch-Oesterreichische Bergwerks-Gesellschaft, Dres den. Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-A.-G. in Gelsenkirchen. Internationale Kohlenbergwerks-Gesellschaft, Cologne. Miilheimer Bergwerksverein in Miilheim a. R. “ Phonix,” A.-G. fur Bergbau u. Hiittenbetrieb, Horde. Saar- u. Mosel-Bergwerks-Gesellschaft zu Karlingen. Schlesische Zinkhiitten-A.-G. in Lipine. Vereinigte Konigs- u. Laurahiitte, A.-G. f. Bergbau u. Hiittenbetrieb, Berlin. STONES AND EARTHS. One One Porzellanfabrik Ph. Rosenthal & Co., A.-G. in Selb. Sachsisch-Bohmische Portland-Zementfabrik, A.-G., Dres den. m e ta l w o r k in g . One.................................... Gebr. Bohler & Co., A.-G., Berlin. One (vice-chairman).......... A.-G. Lauchhammer in Lauchhammer, Eisenwerk. One.................................... Sachsische Gussstahlfabrik in Dohlen bei Dresden. 911 N at io n a l M on e t a r y Commission Representation of the great banks on the supervisory boards of stock com panies— Continued. DRESDNER BANK— Continued. Seats on the supervisory board. Class of industry. MACHINE CONSTRUCTION AND INSTRUMENT MAKING. One One One One * One One One One One One One One One One (vice-chairman) (chairman). . . . (chairman) (vice-chairman) Allgemeine Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft zu Berlin. Ascherslebner Maschinenbau-A.-G. in Aschersleben. Balcke, Tellering & Co., A.-G. in Benrath. Deutsche Waffen- und Munitionsfabriken in Berlin. Deutsch-Uberseeische Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft in Berlin. Felten & Guilleaume-Lahmeyerwerke, A.-G., Miilheim. Kraftiibertragungswerke in Rheinfelden. Kohl, M., A.-G. in Chemnitz. Ludw. Loewe & Co., A.-G., Berlin. Maschinenbau-A.-G. Markt-Redwitz vorm. H. Rockstroh. Norddeutsche Seekabelwerke in Koln-Nordenham. Orenstein & Koppel, A.-G. fiir Kleinbahnen etc. Rheinisch-Westfalische Elektrizitats-A.-G. in Essen. Wanderer, Fahrradwerke vorm. Winkelhofer & Janicke in Schonau. CHEMICALS. One (chairman) Gehl & Co., A.-G. in Dresden. One (vice-chairman) One....................... Erdmannsdorfer A.-G. fiir Flachsgam-Maschinenspinnerei u. Weberei. Vereinigte Strohstoffabriken, Dresden. One A.-G. Kartonnagenindustrie in Loschwitz bei Dresden. One One Aktien-Bierbrauerei zu Reisewitz bei Dresden-Lobtau. Sachsische Malzfabrik in Dresden-Plauen. TEXTILES. PAPER. FOODS AND DRINKS. COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES. One.................................... Allgemeine Boden-A.-G. zu Berlin. One...............- ................... Banque de Mulhouse in Miilhausen i. Els. One.................................... Baubank fiir die Residenzstadt Dresden. One (chairman).................. Berlinische Boden-Gesellschaft, Berlin. One (chairman)...................I Berlinische Boden-Credit-A.-G. Berlin. One.................................... i Berliner Maklerverein, Berlin. Two (vice-chairman and Bodeng««ellschaft Kurfiirstendamm, Berlin. chairman). Two (chairman)...................| Centralbank fiir Eisenbahnwerte, Berlin. Two (chairman)..................• Deutsche Orientbank, A.-G., Berlin. Two (director).................... I Deutsche Siidamerikanische Bank, Berlin. One.................................... I Eisenbahnbank, Frankfort on-the-Main. 912 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s Representation of the great hanks on the supervisory boards of stock com panies— Continued. DRESDNER BANK— Continued. Seats on the supervisory board. Class of industry. commercial enterprises— continued. One................................... One (vice-chairman).......... One................................... Two (vice-chairman)......... One (chairman)................. Two (chairman)................. One.................................... One.................................... One.................................... Two................................... Two (vice-chairman and chairman). Two................................... Two (vice-chairman).......... One................................... Two (chairman)................. One................................... One................................... One................................... Eisenbahn-Rentcnbank, Frankfort on-the-Main. Gesellschaft fur elektrische Untemehinungen, Berlin. Markisehe Bank, Bochum. Mecklenburgische Bank, Schwerin i. M. Norddeutsche Lagerhaus-A.-G., Berlin. Preussische Pfandbriefbank, Berlin. Rheinische Bank in Essen. Rheinisch-Wcstfalische Boden-Credit-Bank, Cologne. Sachsische Boden-Creditanstalt in Dresden. A. Schaaffhausen’scher Bankverein, Cologne. Schmargendorfer Boden-A.-G. Schw'arzburg, Hypothekenbank in Sondershausen. Schwarzburg, Landesbank in Sondershausen. Terrain-Gesellschaft Berlin-Siidwesten. Terrain-Gesellschaft am Centralviehof, A.-G. Terrain-Gesellschaft Dresden-Siid. Terrain-Gesellschaft Park Witzleben, Berlin. Wiirttemberg. Landesbank, Stuttgart. INSURANCE ENTERPRISES. One................................... "Allianz,” Versicherungs-A.-G., Berlin. One.................................... "Deutscher Anker,” Pensions-und LebensversicherungsA.-G., Berlin. One........................... Magdeburger Feuerversicherungs-Gesellschaft. TRANSPORTATION ENTERPRISES. One (chairman).................. Two (chairman)................. Bcrlin-Charlottenburger Strassenbahn, Berlin. Continentale Eisenbahn-Bau- und Betriebs-Gesellschaft, Berlin. One (vice-chairman).......... Deutsch-Atlantische Telegraphen-Gesellschaft, Cologne. One (chairman).................. Deutsch - Niederlandische Telegraphen - Gesellschaft, Cologne. One (vice-chairman).......... Dux-Bodenbacher Eisenbahn, Vienna. One............... Gross Berliner Strassenbahn, Berlin. One (chairman).................. Lausitzer Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft, Sommerfeld. One (chairman).................. Osteuropiiische Telegraphen-Gesellschaft, Berlin. One (chairman).................. Sachsisch - Bohmische Dampfschiffahrts - Gesellschaft, Dresden. One (vice-chairman).......... Strasseneisenbahn-Gesellschaft in Hamburg. One............... Westliche Berliner Vorortbahn, Berlin. 903I I 0— I I -------- 59 913 National Monetary Commission Representation of the great banks on the supervisory boards of stock com panies— C o ntin ued. DRESDNER BANK— Continued. Seats on the supervisoryboard. Class of industry. HOSTELRY AND TAVERN ENTERPRISES. Deutsche Eisenbahn-Speisewagen-Gesellschaft, Berlin. A.-G. vorm. Speyr & Co., Basle. Betriebs-Gesellschaft fiir Orientalische Eisenbahnen Vienna. Belgische Eisenbahnbank, Brussels. Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, Shanghai. Gen. Mining and Finance-Comp., Ltd., Johannesburg, London. Gewerkschaft “ Brucher Kohlenwerke” in Teplitz. in Basel. NATION ALB ANK FUR DEUTSCHLAND. MINING, SMELTING, AND SALT WORKS. One................ One................ One................ One................ One................. One................ One................ One (chairman) One................ One................ One................ One............. .... One................ Alkaliwerke, Ronnenberg, Hanova*. Bergbau-Gesellschaft “ Teutonia,” Hanover. “ Bismarckhiitte’’ in Bismarckhiitte. Deutsch-Luxemb. Bergwerks- u. Hiitten-A.-G. in Bochum. Kamerun-Bergwerks-A.-G., Berlin. Lothringer Hiittenverein Aumetz-Friede. Oberschlesische Eisenindustrie, A.-G. f. Bergbau u. Hiittenbetrieb in Gleiwitz. Oberschlesische Zinkhiitten, A.-G. in Kattowitz. “ Phonix,” A.-G. fiir Bergbau u. Hiittenbetrieb, Duis burg. Rheinische A.-G. fiir Braunkohlen- u. Brikettindustrie in Harrem und Koln. Schantung Bergbau-Gesellschaft in Berlin. Styrumer Eisenindustrie A.-G. in Liqu., Oberhausen. Zechau-Kribitzsche Kohlenwerke “Gliickauf,” A.-G., Zechau i. S. STONES AND EARTHS. One....................... One.................. . One....................... One (vice-chairman) A.-G. fiir Asphaltierung u. Dachbedeckung vorm. J. Jeserich, Charlottenburg. "Adler,” deutsche Portland-Cementfabrik, A.-G., Berlin. Oberschlesische Schainottefabrik friiher “ Didier” A.-G. Gleiwitz. Schomburg, H., & Sohne, A.-G., Berlin. 914 The Ge r ma n Gr e a t Banks Representation of the great banks on the supervisory boards of stock com panies— Continued. NATION ALB ANK FUR DEUTSCHLAND— Continued. Seats on the supervisory board. Class of industry. METAL WORKING. One One One Eisengiesserei A.-G. vorm. Keyling & Thomas in Berlin. K. Kastner, A.-G. in Leipzig. Schwelmer Eisenwerk Muller & Co., A.-G., Schwelm. One One One One One One One One One One A.-G. H. F. Eckert in Berlin-Friedrichsberg. Allgemeine Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft in Berlin. Berliner Elektrizitatswerke. Brandenburgische Carbid- u. Elektrizitatswerke, Berlin. Breslauer A.-G. fur Eisenbahnwagenbau in Breslau. Deutsch-Niederlandische Telegraphen-Gesellschaft, Co logne. Deutsche “ Niles” -\Verkzeugmaschinenfabrik, Berlin. Deutsche Ueberseeische Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft, Berlin. Deutsche Waflen- u. Munitionsfabriken, Berlin. F. Dippe, Maschinenfabrik, A.-G. in Schladen a. Harz. J. Frerichs & Co., A.-G. in Osterholz. Kraftiibertragungswerke Rheinfelden. Ludw. Loewe & Co., A.-G., Berlin. Oberschlesische Eisenbahnbedarfs- A.-G. Friedenshiitte, Upper Silesia. G. Sauerbrey, Maschinenfabrik, A.-G., Stassfurt. Schlesische Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft, Breslau. Telefonfabrik, A.-G., vorm. Jul. Berliner zu Hannover. Waggonfabrik, A.-G., Rastatt. One................ Two (chairman) Chemische Fabrik Honningen, vorm. Walther Fulda & Co. Chemische Werke vorm. Dr. Heinrich Byk, Berlin. One One One Celle-Wietze, A.-G. fur Erdolgewinnung in Hannover. Deutsche Mineralolindustrie, A.-G., Berlin. Deutsche Petroleum-A.-G., Berlin. One Leipziger Gummiwarenfabrik vorm. Jul. Marx, Heine & Co. One....................... Aktien-Brauerei Friedrichshain, Berlin. Berliner Bockbrauerei, Berlin. Bierbrauerei, A.-G., vorm. Gebr. Hugger in Posen. Bierbrauerei A. Schifferer, A.-G. in Kiel. MACHINE CONSTRUCTION AND INSTRUMENT MAKING. One One One One One One One One CHEMICAL. ILLUMINANTS, SOAPS FATS, OILS, AND VARNISHES. LEATHER. FOODS AND DRINKS. One (vice-chairman) One....................... One....................... 915 n etary mm i s s Representation of the great banks on the supervisory boards of stock com panies— Continued. NATIONALBANK FUR DEUTSCHLAND— Continued. Seats on the supervisory board Class of industry. foods a n d d r i n k s — continued. Breslauer Aktien-Malzfabrik, Breslau. Deutsche Bierbrauerei. A.-G. in Berlin. Rositzer Zuckerraffinerie, Rositz (S.-A.). b u il d in g t r a d e s . Tiefbau- u. Kalteindustxie, A.-G., vorm. Gebhardt & Koenig, Nordhausen. “ Union,” Baugesellschaft auf Aktien in Berlin. ART INDUSTRY. A.-G. H. Gladenbeck & Sohn, Bildgiesserei, Berlin. R. W. Dinnendal, A.-G., Kunstwerkerhiitte bei Steele. Kunstanstalt B. Gross, A.-G. in Leipzig. H. Schott, A.-G. in Rheydt. COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES. One......................... Two (vice-chairman). Two (director)......... One........................ One......................... Two......................... One......................... One......................... One......................... Two (chairman)....... One............. ........... One......................... One......................... One......................... One......................... One......................... A.-G. fur Montanindustrie, Berlin. Bank fiir Brauindustrie, Berlin. Berliner Maklerverein, Berlin. Boden-A.-G. Berlin-Nord, Berlin. Boden-Gesellschaft an der Kreisbahn Berlin-Nordost, Berlin. Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, Berlin. Deutsche Orientbank, A.-G., Berlin. Deutsch-Sudamerikanische Bank, Berlin. Deutsche Treuhand-Gesellschaft, Berlin. Gesellschaft fiir elektrische Unternehmungen, Berlin. Handelsstatte “ Bellealhance,” A.-G., Berlin. Industriegelande Schoneberg, Berlin. Neue Boden-A.-G., Berlin. Norddeutsche Creditanstalt, Konigsberg i. Pr. Norddeutsche Immobilien-A.-G., Berhn. Preussische Pfandbriefbank, Berlin. Rheinisch-Westfalische Boden-Creditbank, Cologne. Stansdorfer Terrain-A.-G. am Teltowkanal, Berlin. Teltower Boden-A.G. zu Berlin. Terrain-A.-G. Miinchen Nord-Ost, Munich. Terrain-Gesellschaft am neuen Botanischen Garten Berlin. INSURANCE ENTERPRISES. One. “ Deutscher Anker,” Pensions- u. Lebensversicherung Berlin. 916 Th e G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s Representation of the great banks on the supervisory boards of stock com panies— Continued. NATIONALBANK FUR DEUTSCHLAND— Continued. Seats on the supervisory board. Class of industry. TRANSPORTATION ENTERPRISES. One...................... One...................... One...................... One...................... One..................... One (vice-director) One...................... One..................... One...................... Deutsch-Siidamerikanisclie Telegraphen-Gesellschaft, Co logne. S. Eichelbaum, Transport-A.-G., Breslau. Grosse Berliner Strassenbahn. Kamerun-Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft zu Berlin. “ Midgard," Deutsche Seeverkehrs-A.-G. in Bremen. Niederlausitzer Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft, Berlin. Osteuropiiische Telegraphen-Gesellschaft, Cologne. Santa Katharina-Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft, Berlin. Schantung-Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft, Tsingtau. One One Guatemala-Plantagen-Gesellschaft, Hamburg. Osma-Rochela-Plantagen-Gesellschaft, Hamburg. One One One Bank fur elektrische Untemehmungen in Zurich. Credito Italiano, Genoa. Compagnie Metallurgique Franco-Beige de Martagnea, Brussels. Orientbank, A.-G., Athens. Rumanische A.-G. fiir Industrie "Kdnigreich Rumanien, ” Campina. Ungarische Lokaleisenbahnen-A.-G. in Budapest. PLANTATION COMPANIES. FOREIGN COMPANIES. One One One A. SCHAAFFIIAUSEN’SCHER BANKVEREIN. MINING, SMELTING, AND SALT WORKS. Two (chairman) One................ One (chairman) One................ One................ One................ One (chairman) One................ One................ Six (chairman). Two (chairman) Bergwerks-Gesellschaft “ Aller Nordstem” m. b. H, Gr.-Hauslingen. Bergwerks-Gesellschaft 'Gliickaufsegen” in Horde. Bergwerks-Gesellschaft “ Trier” m. b. H. in Hamm. Deutsch-Luxemburg. Bergwerks- u. Hiitten-A.-G. in Bochum. Eschweiler Bergwerksverein in Eschweiler-Pumpe. Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-A.-G. Gewerkschaft der Zeche Blankenburg in Hammerthal a d. Ruhr. Gewerkschaft “ Zukunft” , Cologne. Harpener Bergbau-A.-G. in Dortmund. Internationale Bohrgesellschaft Erkelenz. Internationale Kohlenbergwerks-A.-G., St. Avoid. 9*7 N a t io n a l M on et a r y Commission Representation of the great hanks on the supervisory boards of stock com panies— Continued. A. SCHAAFFHAUSEN’SCHER BANKVEREIN— Continued. Seats on the supervisory board. Class of industry. mining, smelting, and salt works—continued. One (chairman).................. One.................................... One.................................... One.................................... One.................................... One................................... One................................... Lothringer Hiittenverein Aumetz-Friede in Kneuttingen i. L. “ Phonix,” A.-G. fur Bergbau u. Hiittenbetrieb, DuisburgRuhrort. Rheinische Wasserwerks-Gesellschaft, Cologne. Rombacher Huttenwerke, Cologne. Sieg-Rhein. Hiitten-A.-G. zu Friedrich Wilhelmshiitte. Vereinigte Stahlwerke v. d. Zypen & Wissen Eisenhiitte. Cologne-Deutz. Zechau-Kriebitzsche Kohlenwerke "Gliickauf,” A.-G., Zechau (S.-A.). STONES AND EARTHS. One (vice-chairman).......... One................................... A.-G. fur Rhein.-Westfal. Cementindustrie in Beckum. Weseler Portland-Cement- u. Tonwerke in Wesel. METAL WORKING. One (vice-chairman).......... One (vice-chairman).......... Eschweiler-Koln. Eisenwerke, A.-G. in Eschweiler. Faconeisen-Walzwerk L. Mannstaedt & Cie., Kalk, near Cologne. One (chairman).................. Schwelmer Eisenwerk Muller fc Co., Schwelm (West phalia). One.................................... Stahlwerk “ Krieger,” A.-G. in Diisseldorf. MACHINE CONSTRUCTION AND INSTRUMENT MAKING. One................................... One................................... One................................... One................................... One (chairman)................. One.................................... One................................... One (vice-chairman).......... One (chairman).................. One................................... One.................................... One.................................. One.............................. One.................................... Allgemeine Elektrizitatsgesellschaft in Berhn. Anker-Werke, A.-G., vorm. Hengstenberg & Co., Bielefeld. Bergmanns Elektrizitatswerke, A.-G., Berlin. Deutsche Wallen- und Munitionsfabriken, Berlin, de Fries & Co., A.-G., Diisseldorf. Gasmotorenfabrik ‘ Deutz.” Gesellschaft fiir elektrische Unternehmungen. Kottbuser Maschinenbauanstalt u. Eisengiesserei, A.-G. Maschinenbauanstalt Humboldt, Kalk, near Cologne. A.-G. Maschinenfabrik "Deutschland” in Dortmund. Waggonfabrik A.-G., vorm. P. Herbrandt & Co., CologneEhrenfeld. Waggonfabrik, A.-G., Uerdingen. Walther & Co., Commandit-Gesellschaft auf Aktien, Delbriick, near Cologne. Werkzeugmaschinenfabrik Gildemeister & Co., A.-G., Bielefeld. Weyersberg, Kirschbaum & Co., A.-G. fur Waffen u. Fahrradteile in Solingen. 9 x8 The German Great Banks Representation of the great banks on the supervisory boards of stock com panies— Continued. A. SCHAAFFHAUSEN’SCHER BANKVEREIN— Continued. Seats on the supervisory board. Class of industry. CHEMICAL. One (vice-chairman) . One......................... A.-G. fur chemische Industrie in Gelsenkirchen-Schalke. Chemische Fabrik Honningen, vorm. Walther Feld & Co. A.-G. Two (chairman). Deutsche Mineralol-Industrie, A.-G., Cologne. One (vice-chairman) One...................... . Two (chairman). . . . One (chairman). . . . Dtilkener Baumwollspinnerei, A.-G. in Diilken. Krefelder Teppichfabrik, A.-G., Krefeld. Rhein. Kunstseidefabrik, A.-G., Cologne. Schollersche und Eitorfer Kammgamspinnerei, A.-G. Breslau. One Rositzer Zuckerraffinerie in Rositz. Two (chairman) A.-G. fur Briickenbau, Tiefbohrung u. Eisenkonstruktionen in Neuwied. Rhein. Baugesellschaft, Cologne. Tiefbau u. Kalteindustric, vorm. Gebhardt & Konig, Nordhausen. ILLU MINANTS, SOAPS, FATS, OILS, AND VARNISHES. TEXTILES. FOODS AND DRINKS. BUILDING TRADES. One................ One (chairman) ART INDUSTRY. One (chairman) W. Hagelberg, A.-G., Berlin (Art prints). COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES. One (vice-chairman).......... A.-G. fiir Rhein.-Westfal. Industrie, Cologne. One (chairman).................. Alexanderwerk, A. v. d. Nahmer, A.-G. in Remscheid. One (vice-chairman).......... Allgemeine Boden-A.-G. in Berlin. One................................ Bank fiir deutsche Eisenbahnwerte in Berlin. Three.......................... Deutsche Orientbank, A.-G., Berlin. Two (vice-chairman).......... Deutsch-Siidamerikanische Bank, A.-G., Berlin. Two................................ Dresdner Bank in Dresden. One.................................... Diisseldorfer Baubank in Diisseldorf. One (chairman).................. Kblner Verlagsanstalt u. Druckerei, A.-G., Cologne. Two................................... Mittelrhein. Bank, Koblenz. One (chairman).................. Neue Boden-A.-G., Berlin. One.................................... Oldenburg. Landesbank. One.................................... Ostbank fiir Handel u. Gewerbe, Posen. One.................................... Preussische Pfandbriefbank, Berlin. Two (vice-chairman).......... Rheinische Bank, Essen on-the-Ruhr. One.................................... Rhein.-Westf. Boden-Creditbank, Cologne. One (vice-chairman).......... Schwarzburg. Hypothekenbank in Soudershausen. 919 n et a r y mm t s s i o n Representation of the great banks on the supervisory boards of stock com panies— Continued. A. SCHAAFFHAUSEN’SCHER BANKVEREIN— Continued. Seats on the supervisory board. Class of industry. c o m m e r c ia l e n t e r p r is e s — continued. One....................... One....................... Two (chairman). . . . Schwarzburg. Landesbank, Sondershausen. Treuhand-Vereinigung, A.-G., Berlin. Westfalisch-Lippische Vereinsbank in Bielefeld. One....................... “ Rhenania,” Versicherungs-A.-G. in Cologne. INSURANCE ENTERPRISES. TRANSPORTATION ENTERPRISES. One....................... One....................... One....................... One....................... One (chairman). . . . One (vice-chairman) One....................... One....................... One (chairman). . . . One (chairman). . . . One (vice-chairman) One (vice-chairman) One (vice-chairman) One (chairman). . . . One (chairman) . . . . One (chairman). . . . A.-G. fur Verkehrswesen in Berlin. Badische Lokaleisenbahnen-A.-G. in Karlsruhe. Berlin-Charlottenburger Strassenbahn. Berlin. Braunschweig. Landeseisenbahn -Gesellschaft. Braunschweig - Schdninger Eisenbahn - Gesellschaft in Braunschweig. Brohltal-Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft, Cologne. Grosse Berliner Strassenbahn. Berlin. Kamerun-Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft zu Berlin. Moselbahn-A.-G. in Trier. Modrath-Liblar-Briihler Eisenbahn-A.-G., Cologne. Rinteln-Stadthagener Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft in Rinteln. Schlesische Dampfer-Compagnie in Breslau. Schlesische Kleinbahn A.-G. in Kattowitz. Vereinigte Westdeutsche Kleinbahn-A.-G., Cologne. Westdeutsche Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft. Cologne. Wiirttembergische Nebenbahnen-A.-G., Stuttgart. FOREIGN COMPANIES. One....................... One....................... One (vice-chairman) One....................... One....................... One................ . Banque Internationale de Bruxelles in Brussels. Foraky Soc. au Beige de l’Entreprise de Forage et de Foncage, Brussels. Rumiinische A.-G. fur Industrie, Konigreich Rumanien. Schantung-Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft in Tsingtau. Society Italiana Langen & Wolf, Milan. Society Frangaise de Forage et de Recherches Minteres (Brevet Raky), Paris. 920 The G e r m a n G r e a t a p p e n d ix T O T A L V A L U E E X C H A N G E O F S E C U R IT IE S B Y T H E v. IS S U E D G R E A T B a n k s B A N K S A T T H E B E R L IN D U R IN G T H E STO CK Y E A R S 1882-1908. B A N K FU R HANDEL UND IN D U STR IE. Total value of securities issued at the Berlin stock exchange during the years 1882-1908. [ T o p a g e 395.] Issued exclusively b y the bank. Issued join tly w ith other great banks. Issued join tly w ith other banks. & Issued jo in tly w ith other banks and great banks. & M arks. Y ear.0 M rks. a M arks. M arks. 1 8 8 2 .... 1883.. i 2 , 8 5 0 , OOO 1885 . 18 86 . ....................... 1887 209, 5 1 2 , 800 .................. ....................... 75.380,800 1 8 8 8 ................................... 87, 852, 800 21, 500, OOO 3 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0 314,620,000 1 8 8 9 ................................... 68 ,4 4 0 . 0 0 0 2 8 , OOO,OOO 16 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1,12 3,5 0 9 ,7 4 0 7 7 ,6 0 0 , 0 0 0 8. 000,000 1 8 9 3 ................................... 1 8 9 5 ................................... 1 8 9 6 ................................... 3 , OOO,OOO 2,330.000 19 .8 73.50 0 39,000,000 40 ,2 34 ,52 5 I 1 0 , OOO,OOO 4 1,18 3 ,50 0 8, 000,000 1 0 9 , 1 0 0 , OOO 25 .75 6 .OO O 19 4,9 0 2 ,700 3 , o o o , 000 1 8 9 8 ................................... 1 1 2, 3 8 6 . OOO 2 1 , 7 5 0 , OOO 1 4 . 7 0 3 , OOO 1 2 5 , OOO,OOO 1 8 9 9 ................................... 75,400,000 3 6 , 5 0 0 , OOO 6.939.500 1 1 8 . 7 0 0 , OOO 1 9 0 0 ................................... 2 , 3 0 0 , OOO 8 ,2 0 0 ,0 0 0 83.139.500 2 4 7 , 4 0 0 , OOO 1 9 0 1 ................................... 6 8 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 4 , 5 0 0 , OOO i» 0 7 9 , OOO 3 6 3 ,6 9 1,25 6 1 9 0 2 ................................... 140,265,700 2 3 , OOO,OOO 7,500,000 I .261,0 99,50 0 1 9 0 3 ................................... 2 8 4 , 0 5 0 , OOO 3 0 , OOO,OOO 1,250,000 3, 1 9 0 4 ................................... 2 4 , 6 2 5 , OOO 4 4 , OOO,OOO 3 5 ,0 0 0 . 0 0 0 434. 609, 074 197. 7 2 3 , 5 7 0 820 ,611,0 0 0 1 9 0 5 ................................... 7 0 , OOO,OOO 8 0,250 ,OO O 21,400,000 1 9 0 6 ................................... IIO,OOO,OOO 18 4,O O O , O O O 82,497.200 1 9 0 7 ................................... 13,40 0 ,OOO 1 18, O O O , O O O 9,750 ,0 0 0 6, 584, 0 65, 232 1 9 0 8 ................................... 9,3 10 ,OOO 136, 2 0 0 , O O O 3 .3 0 0 , 0 0 0 565,600,000 aO n l y 274. t h o s e y e a r s a re g i v e n d u r i n g w h i c h issu es w e r e m a d e . 6 I n c l u d i n g p r i v a t e b a n k i n g firms. 921 798,000 M on et a r y Commission Value of securities issued and listed at the Berlin stock exchange during the years 1882-1908. GERMAN PUBLIC SECURITIES. Issued exclusively by the bank. Year.0 1882........................ Marks. 4,500,000 IO,OOO, O O O 1886........................ 1887........................ 1888........................ Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. Marks. M arks. IO,OOO,OOO IO,OOO,OOO 3,000,000 40,O O O O ,O O 4,040,000 2, O O O O ,O O 13,O O O O ,O O 16, 280,700 17. 750.O O O 98, 250,O O O 21,500,O O O 2.300.000 1.500.000 1902........................ 9,000,000 5.000. 2 . 000. 3,000,000 2,330,000 2,321,000 39.034.s2s 8,000,000 7,500,000 3.000. 000 14,500,000 6.000. 000 14,703,O O O 4.939.500 3.639.500 I , 079,O O O 6,000,000 16, 000, 000 35,000,000 12.000. 000 50.000. 000 9,017.200 000 42, 500, 000 2,250,000 000 67.000. 000 235.000. 450.000. 340.000. 25.000. 10.000. 000 000 000 000 000 2,800,000 20, 000,000 6, 000,000 27.700.000 57.500.000 5,000,000 17.000. 000 26, 960,100 17.000. 000 24.000. 000 26.000. 000 24.500.000 190,000,000 FOREIGN PUBLIC SECURITIES 1886........................ 1887........................ 1888........................ 0 0 0 0 0 N a t io n a l 1890........................ 1891........................ 1893........................ 189s........................ 1896........................ 1898........................ Si. 7 S7 . 200 40,252,800 16,400,O O O 28,000,000 34,650,400 22,440,000 274.620.000 247.020.000 148,906,944 so,750,000 138,902,700 26,000,000 14,062,500 51,000,000 0 O n ly those yea rs are given during w h ich issues w ere m ade. 6 In clu d in g p riva te ban kin g firms. 922 The G e r m a. n G r e a t B a n k s Value of securities issued and listed at the Berlin stock exchange during the years 1882-1908— Continued. FOREIGN PUBLIC SECURITIES— Continued. Year.“ 1900................................... 1901................................... Issued exclusively b y the bank. Issued jo in tly w ith other great banks. Mrk !. a< M arks. I ss u e d join tly with other banks an d great b a t ik s . 6 I ss u e d j o i n t l y w it h other b an k s.6 M arks. M arks. 1 0 2 ,0 0 0, 0 00 2 2 6 ,19 1 ,2 5 0 r, 166, 599 , 500 1903................................... 28 0,0 00, 000 3 ,3 8 3,148 ,974 90, 4 2 6 ,5 7 0 67 8 , 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 48 ,4 8 0 ,0 0 0 80. 00 0, 00 0 28 , 3 5 0 , 0 0 0 6, 4 8 1 , 5 6 5 , 232 12 7, 500, 000 GERMAN MORTGAGE BONDS. 3 0 . 000. 1888 10.000. 000 000 20,000,000 I 15,O O O O ,O O 5 5 *3 0 0 .000 75,000,000 26,040,700 10.000. 20.000. 25.000. 65.000. 000 000 000 000 2 0 . 000. 25.000. 000 000 FOREIGN MORTGAGE BONDS. 3 4 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0 GERMAN RAILWAY SHARES. X , 8 0 0 , OOO I , 2 5 0 , OOO 1 3 ,1 5 0 ,0 0 0 1 9 0 0 .............................................. I , 2 0 0 . OOO 0 O n ly those yea rs are given during w hich issues w ere m ade. 6 In clu ding p riva te ban din g firms. 923 National Monetary Commission Value of securities issued and listed at the Berlin stock exchange during the years 1882-1908— Continued. GERMAN RAILWAY SHARES— Continued. Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks, Year.a M arks. M arks. M arks. 1 1 ,4 5 0 ,0 0 0 2 , 0 0 0 , 000 1 4 , 297,000 4 ,0 2 4 ,0 0 0 11 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 FOREIGN RAILWAY SHARES. 1888........................ 17,600,000 49,600,000 5,600,000 GERMAN RAILWAY BONDS. 1888........................ 2,500,000 8,000,000 5,700,000 3.000. 7.000. 2.500.000 3.000. 000 5.500.000 4.000. 000 5.000. 000 4.500.000 000 000 FOREIGN RAILWAY BONDS. 1882........................ 1883........................ 1885........................ 1886........................ 6,500,000 20,000,000 209.512,800 75.380,800 20,000,000 16,000,000 16,000.000 1892........................ 52,800,000 16,000,000 1894........................ 1895........................ 1899........................ 876.489,740 i n , 288,750 48,000,000 O n ly th ose yea rs are given during w hich issues were m ade. 6 In clu d in g p riv a te ban kin g firm s. a 924 mm The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s Value of securities issued and listed at the Berlin stock exchange during the years 1882-1908— Continued. FOREIGN RAILWAY BONDS— Continued. Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. M arks. Year.“ M arks. Issued jointly w’th other banks.6 M arks. Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. 87,000,000 1,687, 500 4 2 , O O O ,O O O GERMAN STREET RAILWAY BONDS. 7,500,000 BANK SHARES. 6.000. 000 20.000. 000 3.000. 000 16, 200,O O O 28.000. 000 16,O O O O ,O O 8,000,000 24,O O O O ,O O 52,O O O O ,O O 4,000,000 19,O O O O ,O O 18,O O O O ,O O 8,000,000 3,000,000 INDUSTRIAL SHARES. 1888 1889 1891 1892 ................. f 1 9 .0 0 0 . 7 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 000 12. 0 0 0 . 000 3 ,6 0 0 ,0 0 0 .......................... 1893 1894 189s 1896 1897 1898 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 I , O O O ,O O O 1 ,3 5 8 ,4 0 0 3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 3 ,5 9 2 ,8 0 0 1 3 , O O O ,O O O 5 .0 0 6 .0 0 0 4 ,8 0 0 ,0 0 0 3 0 , O O O ,O O O 9, 750, 000 2 0 , O O O ,O O O 2 .9 4 4 .0 0 0 2, 436, 000 “ O n ly those yea rs are given d urin g w hich issues were m ade. 6 In clu d in g p riva te b a n k in g firms. 925 National Monetary Commission Value of securities issued, and listed at the Berlin stock exchange during the years 1882-1908— Continued. INDUSTRIAL SHARES— Continued. Year.“ Issued jointly with other great banks. M a rfa . Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks Issued exclusively by the bank. 5,900,000 M arks. M arks. 29,O O O O ,O O 2 ,O O O O ,O O 5 , 200,O O O 1899........................ 2 , 50 0 ,O O O 74,000,000 48,700,000 1903........................ 25,675.000 4,050,000 I,OOO,OOO 5,000,000 i ,500,O O O I ,250,000 28,000,000 12,500,000 1905........................ 26,000,000 250,O O O I ,400,O O O 80,311,000 1907........................ 1908........................ 5,000,000 4,310,000 30,O O O O ,O O 24,200,O O O 7,500,000 3,300,000 5 4 . 5 3 0 .0 0 0 1902........................ 43,000,000 INDUSTRIAL BONDS. 1883. 1884. 1889. 1892. 1 1 ,6 0 0 ,0 0 0 2 ,8 5 0 ,0 0 0 1 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 6 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1893 ■ 189s ■ 1898. 1900. 1901. 1902. 1 5 .0 0 0 . I , 2 0 0 , OOO 2 , O O O ,O O O 2 6 , O O O ,O O O 000 4 0 .0 0 0 . 1 2 , O O O ,O O O 1 3 . 5 0 0 , OOO 000 3 5 .0 0 0 . 000 2 3 .0 0 0 . 000 6 .0 0 0 . 1 4 .0 0 0 . 4 3 .5 0 0 ,0 0 0 000 12. 0 0 0 . 000 1 0 .0 0 0 . 000 1. 0 0 0 . 2 5 , 1 0 0 , OOO 1903 • 190419051906. 1907. 1908. 000 1 0 .0 0 0 . 000 000 4 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 7 .0 0 0 . 000 20. 0 0 0 . 000 3 1 .3 9 7 .5 0 0 000 1 7 4 . 5 7 0 . OO O 3 , 5 0 0 , OOO 4 5 .0 0 0 . 1 5 .0 0 0 . 000 Only those years are given during which issues were made. 6 Including private banking firms. a 926 > I Th e G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s BER LINER H A N D E L 8-G E S E L L 8C H A F T . Total value of securities issued at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the years 1882-1908. Issued ex clu siv ely b y th e bank. Issued jo in tly w ith oth er great ban ks. Issued jo in tly w ith oth er ban ks.6 Issued jo in tly w ith o th er ban ks and great ban ks.6 M a rks. Y e a r .0 M a rk s. M a rk s. M a rks. oc C C 1 4 ,2 2 5 ,OOO 1 8 8 5 ... 1886................................ 1 8 8 7 .. 5 7 . 9 7 S .oo o 1 6 ,OOO,OOO 519 ,2 4 9 ,7 2 0 48,645,000 444,620,000 344,620,000 2 1 5 ,5 2 0 ,OOO 1888................................ 1 7 , 9 0 0 , OOO 1889................................ 62, 198,600 1 9 ,OOO,OOO 20 4,OOO,OOO 1 8 9 1 ................................ 189 2................................ 3 ,716 ,0 0 0 1 5 , OOO,OOO 3 ,6 0 0 ,OOO 1 4 ,6 0 0 ,OOO 16,800,000 7,000,000 40,400,000 4 7 3 . 77° . ° ° ° 5 2 2 ,2 5 0 ,OOO I ,0 5 0 ,OOO 6,000,000 7,000,000 1 4 , 3 5 ° . 800 108, 320, 000 1 1 7,000,000 149, n 8 , 000 4 2 ,OOO,OOO 62,233,000 4,800,000 55,0 56,60 0 196 ,219 ,0 0 0 172,236,00 0 2 9 .3 5 ° . ° ° ° 69,700,500 8 5 ,OOO,OOO 1 5 ,2 0 0 ,OOO 65.685,50 0 4 0 ,7 0 0 ,OOO 8 5 ,1 9 8 ,OOO 2 8 ,5 0 0 ,OOO 1893................................ 1894................................ 18 9 5................................ 1896................................ 8 ,3 13 .0 0 0 1 3 ,0 2 5 ,OOO 18 9 7................................ 1898................................ 520 25.848.000 13,980.000 1899................................ 1900................................ 19,600,000 1 0 ,5 0 0 ,OOO T T ^ 339. 936, 9 . 9 9 9 .5 0 0 190 2................................ 1 7 1 ,5 0 8 ,8 0 0 7 3 ,3 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 0 , 2 2 5 , OOO 6 3 ,O O O ,O O O 1 6 ,1 0 0 ,0 0 0 288,760,000 3 13.5 9 8 ,50 0 155,10 0 ,0 0 0 104,300,000 2 2 , 3 5 0 ,OOO 1 9 0 3 ............................................... 4 19 ,9 0 6 , 9 4 4 47 8,80 0 000 3 ,3 9 6 ,6 2 3 ,9 7 4 1 9 0 4 ............................................... 1 9 ,O O O ,O O O 3 5 ,5 0 0 ,OOO 3 8 ,2 5 0 ,0 0 0 6 5 ,x o o ,O O O 1 9 0 5 ............................................... 2 8 ,3 5 0 ,OOO I I 2 , 1 5 0 ,O OO 5 , O O O ,O O O 604, O O O , OOO T( n f\ y ................................ 8, 000, 000 73, 2 9 6,00 0 2 4 ,9 2 0 ,OOO 1 9 0 8 .............................................. 1 8 ,O O O ,O O O 69, 9 1 0 ,0 0 0 6 2 ,O O O ,O O O 19 07 O n ly those years are given during which issues were made. 6 Including p rivate banking firms. a 927 6, 591. 435. 232 4 3 8 ,9 2 0 ,0 0 0 National Monetary Commission Value of securities issued and listed at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the years 1882-1908. GERMAN PUBLIC SECURITIES. Issued exclusively by the bank. 1 8 8 3 ............................................... Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks.b Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M a rks. Year.0 M a rks. M a rks. M a rks. 2 , o o o ,000 4 0 , O O O ,O O O 1 8 8 8 ............................................... 3 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 2 3 5 .0 0 0 . 000 3 4 0 .0 0 0 . 000 5 0 .0 0 0 . ...................... 000 1 0 .0 0 0 . 3 , O O O ,O O O 3 .5 0 0 .000 000 4 5 0 .0 0 0 . 000 2 , O O O ,O O O 1 0 , 5 0 0 , OOO 2 . 750. 000 1 5 . T o o , 000 6 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 4 , O O O ,O O O 3 , O O O ,O O O 1 2 , O O O ,O O O 3 , O O O ,O O O 2 7 , O O O ,O O O 2 4 .0 0 0 . 000 2 6 .0 0 0 . 8 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 000 9 ,7 9 6 ,0 0 0 12. 0 0 0 . 000 2 0 . 0 0 0 , OOO 3 , O O O ,O O O 6 0 .0 0 0 . 000 8 5 .0 0 0 . 000 FOREIGN PUBLIC SECURITIES. 32, 860,320 492,129,720 5,000,O O O 300,620,O O O 1886........................ 1887........................ 1888........................ 1890........................ 1892........................ 189s........................ 1896........................ 1898........................ 1902........................ 22,440,O O O 304,620,O O O 148,906, 9 4 4 26, O O O O ,O O 38,250,O O O 287, 786. 520 66,300,000 393.000,O O O 1903........................ 1905........................ 1906........................ 1907........................ 1908........................ 6,481,565, 232 0 O n ly those years are given during which issues were made. 6 Including p rivate banking firms. 928 wammmmamHBmmam The Ger man V a l u e o f s e c u r it ie s i s s u e d a n d Gre at lis t e d a t the B e r l i n y ea rs 1 8 8 2 - 1 9 0 8 S to c k Banks E x c h a n g e d u r in g the — Continued. GERMAN MORTGAGE BONDS. Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. Issued jointly with other great banks. M arks. Year.“ Issued exclusively by the bank. M arks. M arks. 1892...................... 1894................... 1895........................ 2 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 3 0 .0 0 0 . 2 0 .0 0 0 . 3 0 .0 0 0 . 1898.............. 7 0 .0 0 0 . 000 20. 0 0 0 . 000 7 5 .0 0 0 . 000 000 15. 0 0 0 . 000 000 2 0 .0 0 0 . 000 25.0 0 0 . 000 4 0 .0 0 0 . 000 2 0 .0 0 0 . 2 0 , O O O ,O O O 000 10, 00 0,.0 0 0 2 0 , O O O ,O O O FOREIGN MORTGAGE BONDS. 1883 7 , 42s. 000 1886 9 . 3 7 5 . 00° 1887 13. 975. 000 x o ,60 0,80 0 6, 750,00 0 1 1 ,2 5 0 , 000 2 2 , 5 0 0 , OOO • GERMAN RAILWAY SHARES. 1883 1884 1889 1891 1 2 , O O O ,O O O I » 9 0 5 , OOO 3 .1 5 0 .000 2 .3 1 6 .000 189s 1896 1897 1898 2 , O O O ,O O O 3 ,6 5 0 ,0 0 0 1.4 0 0 .000 1899 1900 1902 6 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 2 . 10 0 .0 0 0 8, 500, 000 1 .3 5 0 .0 0 0 60 0,00 0 3 .7 2 5 .0 0 0 19 0 3 a O n ly those y ea rs are given d urin g w h ich issues w ere m ade. 6 In clu d in g p riv a te ba n k in g firms. 9 0 3 11”— 1 000 74,118, 0 0 0 929 8 ,6 0 0 ,0 0 0 National Monetary V a l u e o f s e c u r it ie s is s u e d a n d lis t e d a t th e B e r l i n Commission S to c k E x c h a n g e d u r in g the Continued. y ea rs 1 8 8 2 - 1 9 0 8 — ^ GERMAN RAILWAY SHARES— Continued. Is s u e d e x c lu s iv e ly b y th e b a n k . Iss u e d jo i n t ly w ith o th e r g re a t b an k s. Iss u e d jo i n t ly w ith o t h e r b a n k s .6 Iss u e d jo i n t ly w it h o th e r b a n k s an d grea t b a n k s .6 Marks. Y e a r .“ Marks. Marks. Marks. 1 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 5 .3 0 0 .0 0 0 4 .0 2 4 .0 0 0 4 ,2 1 0 ,0 0 0 1 1 ,0 0 0 , 000 FOREIGN RAILWAY SHARES. 1883. 1884. 1885. 1888. 1889. 1892. 16.O O O O ,O O 25,486,380 51,975,000 144,O O O O ,O O 24,O O O O ,O O 5,600,000 II,O O O O ,O O 1894. GERMAN RAILWAY BONDS. 1885. 1886. 3 , 0 0 0,00 0 1893. 1894. 18951896. 1897. 1898. 1 .0 5 0 .0 0 0 4 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 2 , O O O , OOO 2 .6 3 8 .000 4, 27 5,00 0 96 0.60 0 1 5 , OOO ,OOO I , 8 3 0 , OOO 18 99 - 1900. 19 0 1. 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 4 , 0 *0 0 , OOO 1902. I9 ° 3 1904. 1 9 , 6 5 0 , OOO I , 5 0 0 , OOO 2, 4 , 3 0 0 , OOO 00 0,00 0 19 0 6 . 19 0 7. I I , 7 0 0 , OOO 2 , O O O ,O O O “ O n ly those y e a rs are given d u rin g w h ich issues were m ade. 6 In clu d in g p riv a te b a n k in g firms. 1 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s Value of securities issued and listed at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the years 1882-IQ08— Continued. FOREIGN RAILWAY BONDS. Issued jo in tly w ith o th er grea t banks. Issued jo in tly w ith oth er b a n k s.6 Issued jo in tly w ith o th er ban ks and gre a t b a n k s.6 M a rks. M a rk s. M a rk s. 8,400,000 0 0 0 0 1883................................ 1 8 8 4 .............................. Issued ex clu siv e ly b y th e ban k. M a rks. Year.® 1886....................... 18 8 7......................... 2 1 , OOO,OOO X 0 0 0 149,040,000 6 , 7 5 3 »6 oo 1 6 , OOO,OOO 1 8 5 ,OOO,OOO 1890....................... i 8$ i ....................... l 6 l ,68 3,500 1 4 .000. 000 2 1 . 4 2 0 . 000 1 1 . 0 00. 000 6,800,000 1 0 . 2 0 0 . 000 189 2........................... 2 0 ,4 0 0 ,OOO 189 4 ..................... 75,820,000 18 9 5......................... 189 6 ................................ 18 9 7....................... 7,446,0 0 0 3 6 ,9 5 5.50 0 1898................ 1899................ 48.645.000 67, 286, 500 1 6 .0 0 0 . 000 3 6 .0 0 0 . 000 9 ,770 ,0 0 0 132,000,000 16 .0 0 0 . 000 60, 000, 000 158 .2 19 .0 0 0 56 .736 .0 0 0 243.210 .0 00 228,300,500 44,800,000 1900................ 2 7 ,OOO,OOO 1 9 0 1 ................ 1 6 0 ,OOO,OOO 170 ,15 8 ,8 0 0 I ,6 8 7,50 0 4 2 ,OOO,OOO GERMAN STREET RAILWAY SHARES. I , 2 0 0 , OOO BANK SHARES. 1886........................ 1 7 . 000. 000 I I , 0 4 3 , OOO I , 4 0 0 , OOO 1 5 . 000. 000 I , OOO,OOO 5,000,000 9,500,000 1 5 , OOO,OOO 1 0 , OOO,OOO 4 0 , OOO,OOO 3.498.00 0 1898........................ 7 . 5 0 0 . 000 8 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 0 O n ly those yea rs are g iv en d urin g w h ich issues w ere m ade. 6 In clu d in g p riv a te b an kin g firms. 931 Commission Value of securities issued and listed at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the years 1882-1908— Continued. BANK SHARES— Continued. Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks. 6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. Year.o M arks. M arks. M arks. 5,000,000 IO,OOO,OOO 8,000,000 IO,OOO,OOO IO, 923.750 4.000. 5 .000. 000 000 12,500,O O O 16.000. 000 10.000. 000 2 0 . 000. 000 8,000,000 24,O O O O ,O O 18,000,000 INDUSTRIAL SHARES. 1884. 1885. 1886. 1887. 1888. 1889. 1890. 1891. 1892. 1893. 1894. 18951896. 18971898. 1899. 1900. 1901. 1902. 19031904. i 9°5 1906. 19071908. 6.000. 000 6.000. 000 10. 6ocf, 000 4, 000,000 19.000. 17,900,000 19.000. 37. 752.000 000 000 3,600,000 4,000,000 675,000 3.750.000 12.150.000 12.350.000 3.250.000 7, 500, 000 3,000,000 . 1 9 9 .500 6,600,000 1,000,000 3 3.750,000 3.000. 000 21,500,000 000 3.000. 000 2.000. 4,800,000 3.000. 000 6 , 2 9 4 , 000 8, 000, 000 15.200, 000 18.200, 000 1.000, 000 5.000. 000 10.000, 000 1.000. 000 1 1 .000, 000 13.850.000 1 . 7 5 0 . 000 10.250.000 17, 800, 000 4.000. 000 9.000, 000 21.200, 000 10,000,800 9.398,000 6, 000,000 14.250.000 40.798.000 91.850.000 25.700.000 5,000,000 29.050.000 11,600,000 1,000,000 35,000,000 56.500.000 152,200,000 55.870.000 46.100.000 ° Only those years are given during which issues were made. 6 Including private banking firms. 932 - J l L - i !, T h e G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s Value of securities issued and listed at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the years 1882-1908— Continued. in d u s t r ia l b o n d s. Year.“ Issued exclusively by the bank. M arks. 1884 1887 2.000. 6.000. Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks. b Issued jointly with other banks and great banks. & M arks M arks. M arks. 000 1 4 , 2 2 5 , 0 0 0 000 5.000. 6.000. 1891 000 000 1 2 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 1892 5 .0 0 0 . 000 6 .0 0 0 . 1893 3 .0 0 0 . 000 4 9 .0 0 0 . 1894 189s 1896 4,000,000 5 .0 0 0 . 1 1 ,4 8 3 ,0 0 0 34, 300, 000 2 6 ,6 0 0 ,0 0 0 28, 730, 000 1 7 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904. 1905 000 1 0 .0 0 0 . 000 3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1897 000 000 10, 7 0 0 ,0 0 0 2 0 .0 0 0 . 000 7, 0 0 0 ,0 0 0 24, 000, 000 7 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 2 9 .0 0 0 . 000 5 5 .0 0 0 . 1 6 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 000 6 .0 0 0 . 000 3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 3 7 .1 0 0 .0 0 0 6 .0 0 0 . 000 4 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 7 .3 0 0 .0 0 0 4 .5 0 0 .0 0 0 4 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 6 .5 0 0 .0 0 0 3 5 ,4 0 0 ,0 0 0 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 10, 5 0 0 ,0 0 0 2, 92 0, 000 2 1 ,5 0 0 , 000 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1906 8 .0 0 0 . 4, 800, 000 1907 1908 000 7 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 20, 3 4 7 ,5 0 0 4 .0 0 0 . 000 161,32 0, 000 DEU TSCH E B A N K . Total value of securities issued at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the years 1882-1908. Year.** Issued exclusively by the bank. M arks. 1 8 8 2 ............................................... Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks. & M ark s. Issued jointly with 'other banks and great banks. b M arks. M arks. 1,50 0, 000 35, 78 2,56 0 1 8 8 3 ............................................... 1 4 .4 0 0 .0 0 0 2 .6 0 0 .0 0 0 15, 1 8 8 4 ............................................... 3 2 3 ,4 0 5 ,0 8 0 6 .9 8 0 .0 0 0 17, 400, 1 8 8 5 .............................................. 2 3 .8 7 5 .7 0 0 2 2 0 ,6 1 2 ,8 0 0 1 8 8 6 .............................................. 1 2 4 .3 7 5 .0 0 0 OOO ,OOO OOO 1,6 7 8 , 966. 538 18 87 ............................ 6 9 .4 6 0 .0 0 0 210. 0 0 0 . 000 1 6 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 18 88 ............................ 78, 354. 600 1 0 0 .0 0 0 . 000 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 < O n ly th o s e yea rs are giv en d urin g w h ich issues were m ade. » 6 In clu d in g p riv a te b a n k in g firms. 933 7 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 8 5 . 734,2 00 .............. Ts National Monetary Commission Total value of securities issued at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the years 1 8 8 2 -1 9 0 8 Year." Issued exclusively by the bank. M arks. —Continued. Issued jointly with other great banks. M arks. 1889........................ 71 ,O O O O ,O O S4 7 . 132.048 1891........................ 34,320,000 180,243,600 189s........................ 1896........................ 1,433,080,O O O 67.655.O O O 1897........................ 1898........................ 171.379.480 329,430,O O O 1899........................ 1 9 0 0 ........................ 4 5 S .747.000 81,378,800 1901........................ 1902........................ 144.5 3 0 . O O O 1903........................ 603,334.040 710,269,800 1904........................ Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. M arks. 397 321,080,000 34, 910, 400 10,600,000 3,000,000 572,400,O O O 35,450,O O O 10,O O O O ,O O I I ,700,O O O 68,406,500 77,500,000 7 4 . S9 t .200 241,700,O O O I 18,300,O O O 18,500,000 27,600,000 6, 500,000 21,998,400 10,O O O O ,O O 41,228,000 I 19,320,O O O 65,772,O O O I 10,6 s °.800 691,038,408 109,092,O O O 250,125,O O O 5 9 , 5 °o .000 5 9 . 446, 33,000,000 178.55° . 0 0 0 65,800,000 116,198,400 606.430,000 133.350.000 183,000,000 388, 050. 000 3,209.204.4 9 ° 130,100,O O O 829,900,O O O 19 °S ............ _ ........... 1906.......... : ............ 6 3 S. 9 4 7 . 9 0 0 7 3 7 . S4 3 . 800 80,887,000 235.687,000 259,100,O O O 1 9 0 7 ............................................... 2 2 7 .9 6 3 ,6 0 0 3 7 0 , 2 7 0 , OOO 9 7 ,2 6 5 ,0 0 0 6 ,6 0 3 ,2 3 5 ,2 3 2 1 9 0 8 ............................................... 2 0 6 ,3 9 5 ,0 0 0 2 2 0 ,0 6 4 ,9 0 0 7 2 , 9 0 0 . OOO 6, 3 0 8 ,0 3 0 ,0 0 0 2 3 4 , 9 5 0 , OOO Value of securities issued and listed at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the years 1882-1908. GERMAN PUBLIC SECURITIES. Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M a rk s. Year.o M arks. M arks. M arks. 1882 1 8 8 6 ............................................... 1 8 8 7 ............................................... 4 1 , 2 0 0 , OOO 1 8 8 8 ............................................... 9 ,8 5 4 ,2 0 0 4 0 , O O O ,O O O 1 8 8 9 ............................................... 1 8 9 0 ............................................... 7 , OOO ,OOO 3 8 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 2 3 5 .0 0 0 . 1 8 9 3 ............................................... 1 ,1 0 0 ,0 0 0 000 5 0 8 .0 0 0 . 1 8 9 1 ............................................... 000 2 5 , O O O ,O O O 0 O n ly those yea rs are giv e n d u rin g w hich issues were m ade. 6 In clu d in g p riv a te b a n k in g firms. 934 T h e G e r m a n G r e a t V a l u e o f s e c u r it ie s is s u e d a n d lis te d a t the B e r l i n y ea rs 1 8 8 2 - 1 9 0 8 B a n k s S to ck E x c h a n g e d u r in g the —Continued. GERMAN PUBLIC SECURITIES— Continued. Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. Year.® M arks. M arks. M arks. 3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 5 9 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 9 0 0 ............................................... 4 8 ,2 0 0 ,0 0 0 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 3 ,2 2 8 ,0 0 0 1 9 0 1 ............................................... 13. 310, OOO 1 7 2 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 8 8 ,5 7 0 ,0 0 0 1 9 0 2 ............................................... 12, 3 00 , OOO 4 2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 , 2 7 2 , OOO 7 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 9 0 3 ............................................... 1 i ,8 7 3 .2 0 0 3 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 I,O O O ,O O O 6 9 ,8 6 5 ,0 0 0 3 .9 5 2 ,0 0 0 6 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 T0 J 9/ 1 9 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 9 0 5 ............................................... 2 8 , O O O ,O O O 5 8 ,9 3 7 .0 0 0 1 9 0 6 .............................................. 4 2 , 4 0 0 , OOO 7 5 .5 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 9 0 7 ............................................... 5 9 ,4 6 4 ,0 0 0 1 2 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 2 , 1 6 5 , OOO 7 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 9 0 8 ............................................... 5 2 . 5 7 5 .0 0 0 1 2 3 ,6 5 4 ,9 0 0 2 9 , O O O ,O O O 7 3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 20, O O O ,O O O 4 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 FOREIGN PUBLIC SECURITIES. 1883........................ 1885........................ 1886........................ 1887........................ 1888........................ 14.400.000 14,055,600 16.000. 000 1 6 . 000. 000 1.626, 966, 538 14.400.000 19.200.000 294,132,048 51.546, 397 21.600.000 4 5 , 7 3 4 , 320 148,906,944 3 4 ,6 1 0 ,4 0 0 I I ,250,O O O 26,000,000 2 0 , 4 0 0 , OOO 116,767,080 46,406,500 5 1,O O O O ,O O 463,080,oco 242,250,000 3 . 1 2 1 , 5 3 9 .4 9 0 66,300,000 651,219,408 1906........................ 216,960,000 75,850,000 678,300,000 173,400,O O O 142,800,000 6,481,565,232 0 O n ly th ose years are given d urin g w h ich issues w ere m ade. 6 In clu ding p riva te b an kin g firms. 935 Monetary Commission Value of securities issued and listed at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the years 1882-1908— Continued. GERMAN Year." Issued exclusively by the bank. M arks. 5,000,000 1,500,000 1886 1888 M ORTGAGE BONDS. Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 Marks. Marks. M arks. 10.000. 70.000. 1892 1894 4,450,000 10.000. 000 000 5,000,000 70.000. 000 10.000. 10.000. 000 45.000. 000 000 000 30.000. 30.000. 000 35.000. 000 60.000. 000 46.000. 000 10.000. O ,O O 000 100,O O O 76.000. 000 45.000. 29.000. 000 25.000. 000 100,000,000 80.000. 000 32,420,000 000 50.000. 000 30.000. 000 15.000. 000 50.000. 000 10.000. 000 60.000. 000 30.000. 000 40.000. 189s 1896 1899 1900 1901 1902 000 000 3 . 4 S3 . 6 o° 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 f o r e ig n 1 8 8 s ........................................... m o r t g a g e b o n d s 6 . 3 7 5 .0 0 0 25, O O O O ,O O . 5 .1 0 0 .0 0 0 1 8 8 6 ........................................... 5 2 .000. 2 0 , OOO,OOO 1 8 8 7 ........................................... 000 16 .0 0 0 . 000 1 7, 00 0 ,0 0 0 1 7 , OOO,OOO I 1 0 , 5 0 0 , OOO 8 ,10 0 ,0 0 0 1 1 , 2 5 0 , OOO I 3 . 9 3 I . 200 33. 7 50 .0 0 0 4 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 6 7 , 5 0 0 , OOO 5 6 , 2 5 0 , OOO GERMAN 0 00 00 National R A ILW AY SHARES 2 , 2 0 0 , OOO 1891........................ I , 2 0 0 , OO O 1895........................ O n ly those yea rs are given during w h ich issues were m ade. 6 In clu d in g p riva te b an kin g firms. a 3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s Value of securities issued and listed at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the years 1882-1908— Continued. GERMAN RAILWAY SHARES— Continued. Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. Year.a M arks. M arks. M arks. 3 , 5 0 0 , OOO S , OO O ,O O O 6 0 0 , OOO 2 , O O O ,O O O 2 6 , 3 0 0 , OOO I , 700, OOO 4 0 , O O O ,O O O 4 ,2 1 0 ,0 0 0 GERMAN RAILWAY BONDS. 1884 6 .0 0 0 . 1885 2, 1888 1891 775. 7 000 00 50 0,00 0 1 .0 0 0 . 000 1893 189s 2 , O O O ,0 0 0 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1896 1 5 .0 0 0 . 5 ,7 0 0 ,0 0 0 1897 000 2 ,3 0 0 ,0 0 0 1899 1900 1 2 .5 0 0 .0 0 0 1902 2 3 .6 5 0 .0 0 0 1903 1 0 .0 0 0 . 2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1904 1906 4 .3 0 0 .0 0 0 2 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 1907 7 .2 0 0 .0 0 0 2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 FOREIGN RAILWAY SHARES. 1884 1 0 ,S o o ,000 1889 2 4 , O O O ,O O O 1892 5 ,6 0 0 ,0 0 0 1899 5 2 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 1900 3 3 1 ,1 6 2 ,0 0 0 4 8 ,9 6 0 ,0 0 0 1901 8 0 , O O O ,O O O 1902 2 3 ,1 0 0 ,0 0 0 1903 4 0 4 ,8 3 5 ,8 4 0 1904 5 2 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ° O n ly those yea rs are giv en d urin g w h ich issues were m ade. 6 In clu d in g p riv a te b a n k in g firms. 937 000 Value of securities issued and listed at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the years 1882-1908— Continued. FOREIGN RAILWAY SHARES— Continued. Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. Year.“ M arks. M arks. M arks. 1 3 6 , 743. 6oo 4 8 1 ,0 4 2 ,8 0 0 7 3 .5 o o ,000 FOREIGN RAILWAY BONDS. 1882. 3 5 .7 8 2 ,5 6 0 1884. 3 0 3 ,4 0 9 .4 8 0 2 0 9 ,5 1 2 ,8 0 0 1885. 1886. 8 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1887. 1 3 .8 6 0 .0 0 0 190. 1888. 2 7 ,3 0 0 , 000 1 0 0 .0 0 0 . 000 1889. 46, 20 0,00 0 1 6 9 .0 0 0 . 000 1890. 9 2 ,z o o ,000 1891. 000 2 9 3 , 0 8 0 , OOO 2 6 .1 2 0 .0 0 0 1892. 0 0 0 . 132, 000, 000 1893- 64, 000, 000 1894. 3 2 .6 4 0 .0 0 0 1895- 1 3 2 ,6 4 0 ,0 0 0 1896. 1 .1 7 6 ,7 3 0 ,8 0 0 GERMAN STREET RAILWAY SHARES. I , 200, OOO GERMAN STREET RAILWAY BONDS. 1 8 9 4 ............................................... 1 6 , O O O ,O O O BANK SHARES. 1888. 20, OOO. 400 1889. 6 8 .0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1891. 300, 000 1892. 1, 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1894. 36, 500, 000 “ Only those years are given during which issues were made. 6Including private banking firms. 938 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s Value of securities issued and listed at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the years 1882-1908— Continued. BANK SHARES— Continued. Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with r other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. Year.« M arks. M arks. M arks. 3 .000. 000 42.250.000 25.500.000 8.000. 000 2,000,000 S.000,000 93,249,200 50, 000, 000 24,201,600 17, 880, 000 18,000,000 6.000. 9.000. 000 000 . 9, 252,000 18.400.000 44,750,800 108,500,800 71.316.000 23.999.600 29.220.000 4,500,000 34,O O O O ,O O 11.400.000 13. 5 0 0 . 000 24,O O O O ,O O 12,500,O O O 16.000. 000 6,250,000 20.000. 000 BANK DEBENTURES. ...................... ...................... 5 0 , 4 0 0 , OOO INDUSTRIAL SHARES. 1883. 1884. 1885. 1887. 1888. 1889, 1890. 1891, 1892, 1893 1894 189s 1896 1897 1898 1899 2, 600,000 1,980,000 11,100,000 7 , 0 0 0 , 000 900.000 16 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 900.000 3,316 ,8 0 0 3 .0 0 0 . 4, 000, 000 1 7 ,4 0 0 , 0 0 0 000 1,600,000 2.000. 000 3, 75° . 0 0 0 15.500.000 12 .150.00 0 1,500,000 2.000. 000 4.600.000 4, 700, 000 3 .0 0 0 . 000 8 .705.000 10 .5 0 0 .0 0 0 7,810,8 00 18, 99 8,4 00 3 4 .6 0 0 .0 0 0 3 7, 198, 400 9 1.8 50.0 00 0 O n ly those y ea rs are giv en during w h ich issues were m ade. 6 In clu din g p riv a te b an kin g firms. 939 years 1882-1908— Continued. INDUSTRIAL SHARES— Continued. Issued exclusively by the bank. Year.o Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M ark s. 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 3 4 ,7 5 0 ,0 0 0 1 9 0 1 ............................................... 38, 068, 800 1 8 ,2 0 0 , OOO 750,00 0 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ........................ IO ,IO O ,O O O IO ,O O O ,O O O I,O O O ,O O O 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 9 0 4 ............................................... 2 7 ,5 1 9 ,OO O 2 , 4 5 0 ,OOO 3 0 ,2 1 9 ,OOO 1 9 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 G c 1903 c M arks. 6, 700,00 0 c M arks. 7 ,3 8 5 ,0 0 0 0 M ark s. 1 9 0 0 .............................................. I 9 ° S ............................................... 1 8 ,4 2 3 ,5 0 0 5 9 ,2 5 0 ,0 0 0 5 ,O O O ,O O O 1 9 0 6 .............................................. 2 1 , 2 3 5 , OOO 3 6 ,8 0 0 ,OOO 1 3 , 2 2 5 , OOO 6 8 ,1 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 6 2 ,3 0 0 ,0 0 0 ........................ IO ,O O O ,O O O 4 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 5 , 1 0 0 , OOO 4 2 ,6 7 0 ,0 0 0 1 9 0 8 ............................................... 7 4 ,4 0 0 ,0 0 0 3 4 ,7 0 0 ,OOO 3 ,9 0 0 ,0 0 0 6 6 ,7 8 0 ,0 0 0 19 07 INDUSTRIAL BONDS. o c o c Value of securities issued and listed at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the 15,000,000 5,000,000 1886.......................... 1888.......................... 1889.......................... 6,600,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 4,100,000 1,200,000 3,000,000 1,500,000 1 2 , 500, O O O 5,000,000 15,000,000 34,300,000 6,500,000 1898.......................... 8. 000,000 5,000,000 23,000,O O O 16,000,000 1902.......................... 12, 528, 000 1903.......................... 1904.......................... 35,125,000 1,000,000 8,650,800 12,800,000 4,000,000 9,600,000 1905.......................... 1906.......................... 38,650,000 28,500,000 13,000,000 8,000,000 7,500,000 11,000,000 46,470,000 2 0 , OOO, O O O 40,200,000 27,500,000 1907.......................... 1908.......................... a b 8, 740,000 O n ly those years are giv e n during w hich issues were m ade. In clu din g p riv a te b an kin g firms. 940 41,500,000 168,250,000 T h e G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s D I8C O N T O -G E 8E L L S C H A F T . Total value of securities issued at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the years 1 8 8 2 -1 9 0 8 . Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. M ark s. Year.“ Issued jointly with Issued jointly with other banks other banks.6 and great banks.6 M arks. M arks. 1 8 8 2 .......................................................................... M arks. 85 ,7 8 2 ,5 6 0 1 8 8 3 .......................................................................... 1 8 8 4 .......................................................................... 13 , 000 , OOO 9,225,000 12 ,800,000 3 9 ,4 3 7 ,2 0 0 4 8 ,6 4 5 ,0 0 0 1 8 8 5 .......................................................................... 1 8 8 6 .......................................................................... 46 ,3 2 8 ,0 0 0 16 ,0 00 ,00 0 6 5 ,2 50 ,00 0 1 8 8 7 .......................................................................... 30,509,250 21 0,00 0,0 00 253,37 7,0 90 67 ,2 8 6 ,5 0 0 1 8 8 8 .......................................................................... 30 ,6 1 5 ,3 0 0 9 4 ,5 00 ,00 0 16 9,83 8,3 45 3 4 ,4 18 ,82 5 1 8 8 9 .......................................................................... 6 5 ,2 05 ,40 0 1 4 8,39 2,0 48 , 3 i S ,738, 68o 9 2 4 ,86 9,3 60 1 8 9 2 .......................................................................... 9,500,000 8,10 0,0 00 6 6 ,9 87 ,50 0 4 I 5 J 3007 OOO i 1 8 9 s .......................................................................... 10 4,80 7,0 00 7,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 8 2,73 0,0 00 198,21 9,0 00 1 8 9 6 .......................................................................... 73,5 50 ,00 0 24,0 00 ,00 0 1,8 8 3 ,5 9 5 ,7 0 0 241,98 6,0 00 1 8 9 7 .......................................................................... 7 1 1,69 2,0 00 30,350,000 3 3 1 ,90 0,0 00 3 1 5 ,96 0,0 00 1 8 9 8 .......................................................................... 6 7 ,6 80 ,90 0 2 7 ,2 51 ,60 0 63 2,69 0,7 84 4 1 7 ,81 3,2 80 1 8 9 9 .......................................................................... 1 8 5,72 4,0 00 4 1 ,1 00 ,00 0 3 5 7 ,20 0,0 00 67 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 9 0 0 .......................................................................... 12 2,61 0,0 00 23,031,20 0 204,20 0,0 00 240 , 450 , OOO I Q O I .......................................................................... 4 9 ,4 64 ,60 0 17 9,00 0,0 00 8 9 ,4 00 ,00 0 51 6,49 2,0 00 1 9 0 2 .......................................................................... 1 7 1,00 0,0 00 52 ,0 00 ,00 0 56 1,60 0,0 00 1 , 505 , 349,500 3,2x 4 ,82 4,59 0 1 9 0 3 .......................................................................... 2 1 3,61 5,1 88 32 ,2 1 3 ,0 0 0 1 5 9,85 0,0 00 1 9 0 4 .......................................................................... 16 9,00 0,8 00 6 4 ,9 3 7 ,0 °° 21,5 00 ,00 0 5 8 5,54 0,5 70 9 ° 5 .......................................................................... 2,1 9 3 ,2 2 2 ,0 0 0 2 3 1,33 7,0 00 48 7,77 1,3 30 I , 141, 25 0,00 0 i 1 9 0 6 .......................................................................... 23 » 322 >34 ° 1 7 2,50 0,0 00 8,000,000 21 8,55 9,0 00 1 9 0 7 .......................................................................... 5 3 ,4 99 ,60 0 3 3 3 ,79 6,0 00 9 2 ,5 5 0 ,0 0 0 6,57 5,0 15 ,2 32 1 9 0 8 .......................................................................... 9 7 ,6 00 ,00 0 16 5,00 0,0 00 6 1 ,7 00 ,00 0 53 1,82 0,0 00 o Only those years are given during which issues were made. 6Including private banking firms. 941 Na tional M on e t a r y Commission Value of securities issued and listed at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the years 1882-1908. GERMAN PUBLIC SECURITIES. 0 ! 0 0 ( 0 T882........................ 1885........................ 1886........................ 1888........................ Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. Year.0 M arks. M arks. M arks. 6,050,000 15,000,000 2,000,000 1,500,000 4,000,000 5,000,000 13,740,000 I I , 500,000 3,000,000 7,500,000 12,000,000 36,3S7,000 18, 5 5 ° . 5 °o 6,275.800 4,092,500 54,000,000 15,488,000 1,000,000 36.200.000 235.000. 000 458.000.000 342,500,O O O 50.000. 000 32.000. 000 10.000. 000 3,500,000 6,230,000 10.000. 000 3 ,O O O O ,O O H 5 . 3 9 5 . 7oo 40.000. 000 2, 750,000 4,000,000 6,000,000 7,500,000 1 2 . 000. 000 8,000,000 7, 500, 000 169.000. 000 67, O O O O .O O 10.000. 000 42.000. 000 138.000. 000 9, 500,000 64,960,100 408,317,O O O 11.937.000 23.937.000 474.000. 000 56.000. 000 26.000. 000 127,296,000 25,O O O O ,O O 2 0 . 000. 000 106.000. 000 5 ,O O O O ,O O 190.000. 000 FOREIGN PUBLIC SECURITIES. 1882........................ 1883........................ 1884........................ 1886........................ 1887........................ 1888........................ 1889........................ 1890........................ 1891........................ 1892........................ 118,560,O O O 4,050,000 7,128,000 18,009,250 I2,800,O O O 54,000,000 238.500.000 161,064, 4 5 5 148,392,048 I ,081,561,680 t , 425,887,664 206.400.000 36,187,500 0 Only those years are gi ven during which issues were made. Including private banking firms. 6 942 34. 418. 825 76.500,O O O The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s V a lu e o f securities issu e d a n d listed at the B e r l i n S t o c k E x c h a n g e d u r in g the years 1 8 8 2 -1 9 0 8 — C o n t i n u e d . FOREIGN PUBLIC SECURITIES— Continued. T . „ Year.a Issued exclusively by the bank. ^th^erelt M arks. Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks.* 6 M arks. M arks. M arks. 40.000,000 2,883.035,200 108,000,000 1, 757, 700,000 286.900.000 448.200.000 357, 200, 000 151.200.000 133.502. 7 °o 51,000,000 102.000. 000 212.500.000 561.600.000 149.850.000 1 , 3 1 7 . 3 4 9 ,500 3,125,364, 4 9 0 90,426,570 500.000. 000 6,481,565,232 127.500.000 424,936, 530 142,800,000 56,700,000 GERMAN MORTGAGE BONDS. 3,500,000 1887 1891 1892 4,000,000 20.000. 000 10.000. 18 9 3 1894 30.000. 20.000. 000 678,139,500 31.000. 000 10.000. 000 1902 70.000. 000 000 000 189s 1896 1897 1898 1900 4,118,000 60,000,000 30,000,000 19 0 4 19 0 5 1907 1908 22,400,000 10.000. 000 150,000,000 10.000. 000 16.000. 000 29.000. 000 12.500.000 32.000. 000 115,000,000 40,634,800 23. 9 5 0 . 000 23,000,000 20,000,000 0Only those years are given during which issues were made. 6Including private banking firms. 943 20.000. 000 50.000. 20,000,000 19 1 0 19 0 3 3,000,000 20,000,000 000 National Monetary Commission V a lu e o f securities issu e d a n d listed at the B e r l i n S t o c k E x c h a n g e d u r in g the years 18 8 2 -1 9 0 8 — C o n t i n u e d . f o r e ig n m ortgage bo n d s. Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. M arks. Year.“ M arks. ................. 1887 1888 .............. .............. 2 0 ,O O O O ,O O Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. M arks. 1 1 .250.000 n.377.090 7.800,300 26.7 7 5 .000 3.400,000 850,000 244. 231,632 51.000. 5 1.000. 000 000 184.4 9 0 .784 13.931.200 34,000,000 2 2 ,5 0 0 ,O O O GERMAN RAILWAY SHARES. 18 83 1 .500.000 .. . 1 .500.000 2 . 4 0 0 . 000 1 .9 3 8 . 000 1.800.000 I, 250,000 5 . 000. 000 5.000. 000 9.200.000 6,000,000 1 , 560 ,00 0 3 5 .2 3 , 199. 200 GERMAN 1888........................ 1894........................ 1896........................ 1897........................ 1898........................ 9 7 , 000 4,024.000 11,000,000 R A I L W A Y BONDS. 2 , 5 0 0 ,O O O 6,000,000 10,O O O O ,O O 0 O n ly those y e a rs are giv e n d u rin g w h ich issues were m ade. 6 In clu d in g p riv a te b a n k in g firms. 944 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s V a lu e o f securities issu e d a n d listed at the B e r l i n S t o c k E x c h a n g e d u r in g the years 1 8 8 2-1 908 — C o n t i n u e d . GERMAN RAILWAY BONDS— Continued. Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. Year.0 M arks. M arks. M arks. 25.000. 000 42.000. 000 1,560,000 7.000. 000 9.500.000 5.000. 000 4.500.000 500,000 FOREIGN RAILWAY SHARES. l88S.................. 1888........................ 37,120.000 4,800,000 36,000,000 6,913.890 8,000,000 S,600.000 243,210,000 273.013.280 126.000.000 27,000,000 214,992,000 56,522,688 42,000,000 2, 100,000,000 105,000,000 FOREIGN RAILWAY BONDS. 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 16,000,000 6,500,000 20,000,000 8 5 .7 8 2 ,5 6 0 3 9 .437.200 160,445,260 15,200,000 75.38o,800 48,645,000 67,286,500 16.000. 000 190,000,000 92.000. 000 22,450,000 207,402,000 46,515,600 848, 369, 360 i n , 288, 750 25 . 9 5 7 ,000 21, 3 7 4 . 000 52,800,000 16, 000,000 160,000,000 18 3 9 1894 0Only those years are given during which issues were made. 6 Including private banking firms. 903 H U I 945 National Monetary Commission V a lu e o f securities issu e d a n d listed at the B e r l i n S t o c k E x c h a n g e d u r in g the years 1 8 8 2 -1 9 0 8 — C o n t i n u e d . FOREIGN RAILW AY BONDS— Continued. Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks Issued jointly with other banks.6 M arks. Year.o M arks. Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. M arks. 158,219,000 56,736.000 1,687, 500 GERMAN STREET RAILWAY BONDS. l 6 , O O O ,O O O 7,500,000 BANK SHARES. 18 8 7................................ 2,500,000 1 6 ,5 0 0 ,OOO 1 5 , OOO,OOO 9 .950,000 4,500,000 4 1 .5 0 0 .000 1 4 .5 0 0 .000 2 4 .5 0 0 .000 1 0 ,5 0 0 ,OOO 6 .0 0 0 . 9 .0 0 0 . 000 000 28, 2 5 0 ,OOO 1 8 ,OOO,OOO 8,000,000 4,000,000 2 7 .5 1 0 .000 17, 000,000 7 ,8 0 0 ,OOO 2 4 ,0 0 0 ,OOO 3 6 .5 0 0 .000 7 ,7 13 ,0 0 0 1 0 ,OOO,OOO 30,000,800 9, 000,000 30,834.000 16, OOO,OOO 1 .0 0 8 .000 6,000,000 2 1,9 9 9 ,6 0 0 8,000,000 3 3 ,6 0 0 ,OOO 1 2 . 5 0 0 . 000 1 6 .0 00. 4.500.000 INDUSTRIAL SHARES. 1 8 8 2 .............................. 1,860,000 1 8 8 8 ............................................... 1 8 8 9 ............................................... 1 8 9 0 ............................................... 2 , IO O ,O O O 1 2 , O O O ,O O O “ O n ly those y e a rs are g iv e n d u rin g w hich issues w ere m ade. 6 In clu d in g p riv a te b a n k in g firms. 000 2 3 .2 5 0 .000 2 0 . 000. 000 3,450,000 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s V a lu e o f securities issued a n d listed at the B e r l i n S t o c k E x c h a n g e d u r in g the years 1 8 8 2 -1 9 0 S — C o n t i n u e d . INDUSTRIAL SHAR ES— Continued. Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks. 6 Marks. Year.a Marks. Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 Marks. 1893 1894 4, 9 5 ° . ooo 47.050.000 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 15.0 00 0 0. 0 12,180,900 30, 724, 000 31.100.000 4, 768, 800 62, 000, 000 3,000,000 27.000. 000 14, 900, 000 16,315,140 4,500,000 12.900.000 1902 1903 1904 19 5 0 1906 1907 1908 1,750, 000 4, 000, 000 36,200,000 11,751,600 28,600,000 9,100,000 50.000. 000 57,500, 000 54.000. 000 21.000, 000 Marks. 3,750,000 6, 000, 000 2 4 .8 0 0 .0 0 0 3 3 . 5 ° ° . 000 52.750.000 6, 200,000 20,000,000 12, 500, 000 5,000,000 41,250,000 131,700,000 38, 450, 000 22, 000, 000 INDUSTRIAL BONDS. 5.000. 000 6.000. 000 1882. 1883. I I , 000,000 1884. 1886. 1887. 1888. 1889. 1892. 1893. 19.000. 000 10.000. 000 4, 275,000 3,815,000 2, 000, 000 30, 000, 000 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 2 ,0 00 ,0 00 9, 225,000 2,500,000 2,500,000 3,500,000 6, 000, 000 2i, 600, 000 2, 500, 000 5,000,000 1899 1900 1901 1902 6 0 0 00 , 0, 0 27,500,000 2,500,000 40,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 35.000. 0 0 0 4 5 , 5 °o ,000 30.000. 12.000. 19 3 0 a O n ly those yea rs are giv en d urin g w h ich issu es w ere m ade. 6 In clu d in g p riv a te b a n k in g firms. 34. 000, 000 15.000. 000 10.000. 000 7,500, 000 947 000 000 r N at ion a l M on e t a r y Commission Value of securities issued and listed at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the years 1882-1908— C o n tin u e d . INDUSTRIAL BONDS— Continued. Year, a Issued jointly with other great banks. M a r k s. Issued jointly with other banks. 6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks. 6 M a r k s. Issued exclusively by the bank. M a r k s. M a r k s. 2 4 .0 0 0 . 000 4 2 , 4 0 0 , OOO 5 3 .0 0 0 . I , 8 0 0 , OOO 000 9, 70 0,00 0 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 2 1 , O O O ,O O O 1 8 .0 0 0 . 2 7 . 3 9 7 .SO O IO ,O O O ,O O O 000 I S ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 181,32 0, 000 DRESDNBR B AN K . Total value of securities issued at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the years 1 8 8 2 -1 9 0 8 . Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks.fr Issued jointly with other banks and great banks, f r M a r k s. Year.0 M a r k s. M a r k s. M a r k s. 1883...................... 1885....................... 1886........................ 1887........................ 1888........................ 1889........................ 31,966, 800 82, 138, 200 6, 100,060 213,740.000 4.000,O O O 170, 520, 000 1891........................ 1892........................ 10,140,O O O 3,900,O O O 6. 000,000 29.499.900 41.000,O O O 628,470,000 372.000.O O O 1894......................... 189s......................... 1896......................... 13,82s,OOO 155.323.000 100,648,O O O 3,000,000 16,250,000 30,362,500 6, 000,000 106,000,000 38,900,000 100,758,O O O 52, 640, O O O i 19.500,000 90,650,O O O 40, 100, 000 62,200,000 143,000,000 13,000,000 605.080,000 30,O O O O ,O O 24, 491. 250 242.250,O O O 4 4 * 700, 000 142,900,000 172,000,000 480,000,000 1898........................ 1899........................ 1900........................ 1901........................ 1902........................ 3 7 . 7 3 4 .4 0 0 20,839,000 50.000,000 a Only those years are given during which issues were made. f Including private banking firms. r 948 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s Total value of securities issued at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the years 1882-1908— C o n tin u ed . Year.° Issued exclusively by the bank. M a r k s. Issued jointly with other great banks. M a r k s. 1903........................ 4 3 .293.100 1904........................ 1905........................ 1906........................ 100,393,000 128,247,400 25,200,000 32, 7 t 3 . 000 225, 229,O O O 4 5 7 . 070, 000 320, 415, 200 209.734.400 Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M a r k s. M a r k s. 278,154,900 36,260,000 IO,OOO,OOO 684,000,000 5,000,000 85,404,900 498, 114, 000 158,700,000 121,835,750 268,120,000 Value of securities issued and listed at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the years 1882-1908. GERMAN PUBLIC SECURITIES. Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M a r k s. Year.0 M a r k s. M a r k s. M arks. 1883. 1890. 1891. 1892. 1893. 3,000,000 1894. 18951896. 1897. 1898. i, 000, 000 I I , 100,000 12,000,000 12, 000, 000 66, 500, 000 1,750,000 17.000. 000 4, 000, 000 13.000. 000 S,000,000 15.000. 000 118,000,000 12,500,000 29,142,100 6.000. 000 48.779.000 67,000,000 S,652,400 81.500.000 10.000. 000 24, 000, 000 63.720.000 118,154,900 7.000. 000 1899 1900, 1901, 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 106.000. 000 4,000,000 20.000. 000 75.000. 000 112.000. 000 9,800,000 35,000,000 3,200,000 0 O n ly those yea rs are giv en d urin g w h ich issues w ere m ade. 6 In clu d in g p riva te ba n k in g firms. 949 235.000.000 508, 000, 000 340.000. 000 25.000. 000 10.000. 000 48,000,000 29, 000, 000 15,700,000 50.000. 000 17.000. 000 416,000,000 54. 904, 900 460,317,000 60.000. 000 65,000,000 Commission Value o f securities issued and listed at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the years 1882-IQ08— Continued. 1888....................... Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. M a rks. Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks.6 M a rks. Year.o M a rks. 400,000 26,520,000 M a rks. 158.340.000 170.520.000 50, 750, 000 10 , 145,74°,000 14,O O O O ,O O 6, 750, 000 117,748,000 14,062,500 77,520,000 142,800,000 51,000, 000 463.080.000 13,691, 250 242.250.000 678.300.000 6, 481,565. 232 199.834,400 GERMAN MORTGAGE BONDS. 7,000,000 15,718,200 ............ 1.. 3,000,000 20.000. 000 4, n s , 000 20.000. 000 30,000,000 60.000. 30.000. 30.000. 30,000.000 15.000. 10.000. 25.000. 120.000. 220.000. 15.000. 55.000. 90.000. 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 15,000,000 50,000,000 0 Only those years are given dining which issues were made. 6Including private banking firms. 95° V The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s Value of securities issued and listed at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the years 1882-1908— Continued. FOREIGN MORTGAGE BONDS. Issued exclusively by the bank. 1 8 9 5 ............................................... 1 8 9 6 ................................. 1 9 0 5 .............................................. Issued jointly with other great banks. M a rks. Year.a M a rks. Issued jointly with other banks. & M a rk s. Issued jointly with other banks and great banks. & M a rks. 6 ,0 7 5 ,0 0 0 1 7 , O O O ,O O O 9, 000, 000 67, 500, 000 GERMAN RAILW AY SHARES. 1 8 9 4 ..................................... I , 2 0 0 , OOO 1 8 9 6 ............................................... I , 8 0 0 , OOO 4 0 , O O O ,O O O GERMAN RAILW AY BONDS. 1 8 9 9 ............................................... 2 5 , O O O ,O O O 1 9 0 0 ................................. 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 9 0 1 ..................................... I . 8 3 9 , OOO 1 9 0 5 ............................................... 1 9 0 6 ..................................... 4, 500, 000 1 9 0 8 ........................................... 4 , O O O ,O O O FOREIGN RAILW AY SHARES. 1882................................ 1 2 ,9 2 0 ,OOO 1890................................ 2,740,060 1900................................ 4 8 ,OOO,OOO 1904................................ 190 5................................ 2 5 .5 0 0 .000 1 5 .3 0 0 .000 8 0 ,OOO,OOO 2 5 ,OOO,OOO FOREIGN RAILW AY BONDS. 00 00 IO ,O O O , 2 0 0 1 8 8 4 ............................................... 2 6 ,4 1 3 ,2 0 0 1 8 9 0 ............................................... 2 0 ,4 0 0 ,OOO 2 9 .4 9 9 .9 0 0 1 5 ,O O O ,O O O 1 8 9 3 .............................................. a k 16, 32 0, O O O 1 2 , O O O ,O O O 6 4 , O O O , OOO O n ly those yea rs are given during w h ich issues were m ade. In clu d in g p riva te b a n k in g firms. 951 National Monetary Commission Value o f securities issued and listed at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the years 1882-1908— Continued. FOREIGN RAILWAY BONDS— Continued. Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. Year. < • M arks. M arks. M ark s. 32, 640, 000 32. 640, 000 48,948,000 1,687, 500 GERMAN STREET-RAILWAY SHARES. 4 ,2 7 5 ,0 0 0 I , 2 5 0 , OOO 1. 3 5 0 .0 0 0 6, 00 0.00 0 2 6 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 I , 2 0 0 , OOO 2 3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 5 0 0 , OOO GERMAN STREET-RAILWAY BONDS. 16,000,000 7 , 500, 000 3 , OOO,OOO BANK SHARES. 1883 1887 1889 1891 1892 1894 1 2 . 000. 000 1 2 . 000. 000 16, 800,O O O 68, 000,000 300,O O O 10.O O O O ,O O 189s 15,O O O O ,O O 50,400,O O O 32,O O O O ,O O 0Only those years are given during which issues were made. 6 Including private banking firms. 952 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s Value of securities issued and listed at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the years 1882-1908— Continued. B A N K S H A R E S — Continued. Issued ex clu siv ely b y th e ban k. Issued jo in tly w ith oth er grea t banks. Issued jo in tly w ith oth er b a n k s .* Issued jo in tly w ith oth er ban ks and great banks.* M a rk s. M a rks. M a rk s. M a rks. 2,900,000 Y e a r .“ 26,000,000 78.000,000 8, 000,000 9. 600, 000 29, 600,000 2 4 ,OOO,OOO 7. 713.000 4 1 , OOO,OOO 30 0 ,OOO 1 0 .5 0 0 .000 20 .6 0 0 .000 1 2 , 5 0 0 , OOO 6,500,000 2 2 , IOO,OOO 2 $ ,50 0 ,OOO 1 6 ,OOO,OOO 6,250,000 2 0 , OOO, OOO IN D U S T R IA L SH A R E S. 1886................................ 3 2 0 ,OOO 18 8 7................................ 1888................................ 2 , OOO,OOO 3 1,9 6 6 ,8 0 0 1 5 , OOO,OOO 1 0 ,5 0 0 ,OOO 4,000,000 3,360,000 3,500,000 750, OOO 3,600,000 1 4 0 ,OOO 3,750 ,0 0 0 6 0 0.000 3 , OOO,OOO 2 .4 0 0 .000 4. 750, 000 2 .8 0 0 .000 6,000,000 8,800,000 6, 000,000 1 5 , OOO,OOO 3 6 ,2 0 0 ,OOO 7 5 0 .000 4.850.000 6.050.000 2 ,OOI,600 4 0 ,IOO,OOO 2 1 . 2 0 0 . 000 20,734.400 I , OOO,OOO 5 .7 0 0 .000 9 ,2 0 0 ,OOO 2 0 .1 9 3 .000 2 8 .1 9 5 .000 4.700.000 1 0 .9 50 .000 6 0 .7 5 0 .000 2 9 .0 00 . 2 8 .000. I, 260, OOO 000 1 8 .5 0 0 .000 1 1 . 0 00. 000 4 9 .8 0 0 .000 2 .9 5 0 .000 7 9 .3 15 .2 0 0 3 7 .0 0 0 . 000 2 .9 0 0 .000 2 3 .0 00 . 5,000,000 000 a O n ly those yea rs are giv en during w h ich issues were m ade. * In clu ding p riva te ban kin g firms. 953 000 53.700.000 9 1.7 5 0 .7 5 0 4 1 .2 5 0 .000 3 1 .8 0 0 .000 Monetary Commission Value o f securities issued and listed at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the years 1882-1908— Continued. in d u s t r ia l b o n d s . Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. M arks. Year.® oc « oc National M arks. Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued joitly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. M arks. i x , 2 5 0 , OOO 1 8 8 9 ................................... 12 , 6 0 0 , OOO 6,000,000 3 4, 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 11,50 0,00 0 1 . 2 5 0 . 000 7,500,000 2. 500. 000 2 1 ,00 0, 00 0 4,000,000 10 ,0 00 ,0 0 0 1 3 , 5 0 0 , OOO 40.000. 000 4 5 , 5 0 0 , OOO 3 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0 I , OOO,OOO 3 6 . 000. 20 .00 0. 1 . 6 0 0 . 000 000 000 2 , 5 0 0 , OOO 6 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 8 2 . 5 0 0 .0 0 0 ................................... 000 1 0 , OOO,OOO 10 .0 0 0 . 3 . 2 0 0 . 000 000 12. 0 0 0 . 8 .451.0 0 0 y 000 3 5 . 000. 17 ,14 7 .5 0 0 33. 970.000 43.0 0 0. 2 7 , 5 0 0 , OOO 000 I 7 1 , 3 2 0 , OOO A . 8 C H A A F F H A U 8 E N 'S C H R B A N K T E R E I N . Total value of securities issued at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the years 1882-1908. Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks.6 A la r k s . Year.o Issued exclusively by the bank. M arks. Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. M arks. 20,100,000 450 .0 0 0 . 18 .0 0 0 . 1 9 . 9 8 0 .0 0 0 000 3 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0 4 0 .8 7 0 .0 0 0 12 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0 17.0 0 0 . 000 110.500 .0 0 0 2,500,000 15.500.000 1 8 .8 5 0 .0 0 0 7,121,00 0 127.558.600 11.0 0 0 . 135.S89.000 43. 544.000 69.950.000 700, 000 18 .6 0 0 .0 0 0 000 5,050,000 17.8 70 .0 00 20.000. 000 5.000,000 23.000. 000 27.780.000 45.. 000 3 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0 3 6.189 .0 00 1 0 6 , OOO,000 000 346.000. 2 9 .7 0 0 .0 0 0 1 2 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 130.450.000 0 Only those years are given during which issues were made. 6 Including private banking firms. 954 V The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s Total value of securities issued at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the years 1882-1908— Continued. Year.® Issued exclusively by the bank. M arks. Issued jointly with other great banks. M arks. 1 9 0 1 ............................................... 4 ,8 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 9 0 2 ............................................... 4 4 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 9 0 3 ............................................... 8 ,6 0 0 ,0 0 0 3 3 ,7 0 0 ,0 0 0 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks. 6 M arks. M arks. 21, I O I ,5 0 0 ,OOO O O O ,O O O I I , O O O ,O O O 2 6 ,O O O ,O O O 7 6 ,O O O ,O O O 43, 3 0 ,O O O ,O O O 3 7 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 40 0,00 0 1 9 0 4 ............................................... 3-7, 7 8 4 , 0 0 0 2 3 1 ,1 7 9 ,OOO 6 0 ,O O O ,O O O 6 8 ,7 9 7 ,0 0 0 1 9 0 5 ............................................... 1 3 .5 5 °.0 0 0 2 9 0 ,2 9 7 ,7 7 0 3 0 ,O O O ,O O O 7 4 9 , 6 0 0 , OOO 1 9 0 6 .............................................. 6 0 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 8 5 ,8 1 5 ,2 0 0 3 i , 00 0,00 0 1 4 0 ,3 5 9 ,0 0 0 t 9 ° 7 ........................ 4 ,6 8 4 ,6 0 0 1 5 4 ,9 2 0 ,OOO 3 1 , 5 2 0 , OOO 1 0 5 ,5 0 0 ,OOO 1 9 0 8 .............................................. 60 0,00 0 238, 320, OOO 3 0 ,O O O ,O O O 2 1 6 , 8 7 0 , OOO Value of securities issued and listed at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the years 1882-1908. GERMAN PUBLIC SECURITIES. Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks.6 M arks. Year.“ M arks. Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. M arks. 450.000. 340.000. 3,000,000 2 . 5 0 0 . 000 5.500.000 3,000,000 2,321,O O O 3,500,000 2.500.000 8.100.000 17,500,O O O 4,O O O O ,O O 7,500,000 2,500,O O O 23,O O O O ,O O 5,000,000 6.000. 3 9 .779.000 10,O O O O ,O O 2.000. 41.220.000 96.500.000 10.000. 15.000. 26.000. 000 30.000. 60.000. 30.000. 000 30.000. 30.000. 30.000. 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 12.000. 000 2,800,O O O 20.000. 000 15,700,O O O 40.000. 000 5,000,000 50.000. 000 18,O O O O ,O O 65,O O O O ,O O FOREIGN PUBLIC SECURITIES. 19 5 0 77.625,170 0 O n ly those years are given during w hich issues w ere m ade. 6 In clu ding p riva te ban kin g firms. 955 678,300,000 Value of securities issued and listed at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the years 1882-1908— Continued. GERMAN MORTGAGE BONDS. Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued exclusively by the bank. Year.** M arks. M arks. 20.000. 80.000. 20.000. 60.000. 30.000. 20.000. Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. M arks. 000 000 000 000 000 000 2 0 . 000. 110.000. 165.000. 45.000. 60.000. 000 000 000 000 000 15.000. 50.000. 000 000 GERMAN RAILWAY SHARES. 5 , o o o , ooo 5 .0 0 0 . 5 . 0 00. 1 4 ,2 9 7 ,ooo 4 ,0 2 4 ,ooo I I ,o o o ,o o o FOREIGN RAILWAY SHARES. 1901........................ 60,ooo,ooo 25.500.000 15.300.000 i ,687,soo 0 0 0 0 0 GERMAN RAILWAY BONDS. 1 3 ,0 0 0 ,ooo 190 6................................ o O n ly those y ea rs are given d u rin g w h ich issues were m ade. 6 In clu d in g p riv a te b a n k in g firms. 956 H 000 000 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s Value of securities issued and listed at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the years 1882-1908— Continued. FOREIGN RAILWAY BONDS. Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. M arks. Year.® M arks. Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. M arks. 100,000,000 BANK SHARES. 1892 12. 0 0 0 . 000 4,000,000 . 000. 000 4, 000,000 30.000. 000 5.500.000 34.800.000 600,O O O . 25,O O O O ,O O 8.750.000 3 5 . 2 0 0 . 000 1894 12 189s 1896 1897 1898 1899 1901 1904 I9 ° 5 1906 4,500,000 7 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 2 , 2 5 0 , OOO 6 .0 0 0 . 000 9 .0 0 0 . 000 8 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 6 ,O O O O ,O O 24.000. 000 1 2 . 5 0 0 . 000 16.000. 000 16.250.000 2 0 . 000. 000 6 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 2 2 , IOO,OO O 1907 INDUSTRIAL SHARES. 1890. 1892 2 0 , IOO,OO O 1.500.000 16.980.000 3.689.000 8.500.000 33.620.000 74,058,600 29.589.000 35.150.000 15.700.000 4.200.000 1.500.000 3.600.000 12.784.000 4.800.000 25.300.000 4,684,600 600,O O O 1893 1894 189s 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 19 5 0 1906 1907 1908 3 ,O O O O ,O O 1 2 , O O O ,O O O 3,O O O O ,O O 4,800,000 6 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 7 5 0 .000 3 7 0 .000 16.0 4 4 . 000 8,280,000 18.600.000 15.200.000 8,000,000 I I ,400,O O O 25.400.000 5,872,600 104,415,200 51.O O O O ,O O 22.700.000 9 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 2 , 5 0 0 , OOO 25.000. I,OOO,OOO 1,520,O O O 957 000 2 1 . 0 0 0 . O n ly those years are given during w h ich issues were m ade, b In clu d in g p riva te b an kin g firms. a 4 3 ,2 5 0 ,2 5 0 000 22.400.000 89.500.000 20.500.000 3 4 . 550. 000 mmission Value of securities issued and listed at the Berlin Stock Exchange during the years 1882-IQ08— Continued. Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. M arks. Year.® M arks. Issued jointly with other banks.6 M arks. 4 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 000. . 000. Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. 6 ,0 0 0 .0 0 0 3 . 000 6 000 3 ,5 0 0 .0 0 0 3 , 5 0 0 , OOO 3 .2 5 0 ,0 0 0 1 0 , O O O ,O O O 5 , O O O ,O O O 4 0 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 4 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 2 , O O O ,O O O 000. 000. 2 6 . 000. 1 2 . 000. 3 . 000. 000 000 000 000 000 2 5 . 1 6 . 000. 000 3 .0 0 0 . 000 6 .0 0 0 . 3 . 000 3 0 .5 0 0 .0 0 0 1 0 .0 0 0 . 000 • 5 7 .3 0 0 .0 0 0 6 .0 0 0 . 1 7 .7 0 0 .0 0 0 1 5 .0 0 0 . 5 9 .1 2 0 .0 0 0 1 0 6 ,3 2 0 , “ Only those years are given during which issues were made. 6 Including private banking firms. 958 000 2 4 .3 9 7 .5 0 0 000 OO O 1" !i11... The Ge r man Gre at Banks APPENDIX VI. TOTAL VALU E OF SECU RITIES ISSUED AT ALL GERMAN STOCK EXCHANGES B Y THE G R E A T BAN KS DURING THE Y E A R S 18 9 7 -19 0 8 . B A N K F t K HANDEL ITNR IN D U STR IE . Total value of securities issued at all German stock exchanges during the years 1897-1908. [To page 396.] 1898........................ 1899........................ 1900........................ 1 9 0 1 ........................ 1902........................ 1903........................ 1904........................ 1905........................ 1906....................... 1907........................ 1908........................ Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. Year.» M arks. M arks. M arks. 269,840,000 85,500,000 31,600, 000 73,100,000 187,815,700 421,374,700 54,509,000 90,050,000 203,250,000 14,550,000 48,810,000 68,156,500 36,500,000 8,200,000 34, 500, 000 43,000,000 30,000,000 44,000,000 81,450,000 184,000,000 190,000,000 142,700,000 25.703.000 6 . 9 3 9 .5 0 0 83.139.500 5.079,000 12, 5 0 0 ,O O O 11,906,800 38,500,000 21,400,O O O 82,497,200 9 ,750,000 3,300,000 451,400,O O O 118,700,000 247,400,000 386, 691,250 1,261,099,500 3,434.609,074 586,040,570 1,183,611,000 420,158,200 7,008,815,232 1.573.185,000 Value 0} newly issued securities listed at all German stock exchanges during the years 1897-1908. GERMAN PUBLIC SECURITIES. 1903........................ Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. Year.® Issued exclusively by the bank. M arks. M arks. M arks. 287,500,000 14.703.000 26.500.000 2.300.000 4.500.000 1.050.000 13,000,000 24,703,000 7,500,000 4 . 9 3 9 .500 3.000. 000 3.639.500 1,079,000 14,soo.000 6.000. 000 8, 500, 000 10, 656, 800 a O n ly those years are given during which issues were m ade. 6 In clu ding p riva te b an kin g firms. 959 20.000. 000 6,000,000 27,700,000 57,500, 000 28.000. 000 17.000. 000 26,960,100 National Monetary Commission Value of newly issued securities listed at all German stock exchanges during the years i8 g j-ig o8 — Continued. GERMAN PUBLIC SECURITIES—Continued. Year.a Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. M arks. M arks. 1 6 .0 0 0 . 1904- 12 , Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks.6 M arks. 000 1 2 .0 0 0 . 2. 0 0 0 . 000 5 0 .0 0 0 . 000 1907. 5 .0 0 0 . 000 1908. 6 .0 0 0 . 000 6 7 .0 0 0 . 405 . 3 1 7 .0 0 0 000 1906. M a rk s . 3 5 , O O O ,O O O 1905. 5 0 0 , OOO 4 2 , 5 0 0 , OOO 3 8 7 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 9 ,0 1 7 ,2 0 0 4 4 .0 0 0 ,0 0 0 2 , 2 5 0 , OOO 4 3 8 .5 0 0 .0 0 0 000 . I33.32S. 0 0 0 FOREIGN PUBLIC SECURITIES. 4 6 ,4 0 6 ,SO O 3 7 7 ,4 0 0 ,0 0 0 2 2 6 ,1 9 1 ,2 5 0 1, 1 6 6 , 5 9 9 , 5 0 0 2 8 0 .O O O ,O O O 3 ,3 8 3 , 148,974 90, 4 2 6 ,5 7 0 678, 300, 000 8 0 ,O O O ,O O O 2 8 ,3 5 0 ,0 0 0 4 8 ,4 8 0 ,0 0 0 6, 4 8 1 .5 6 5 , 232 1 9 1 ,7 6 0 ,0 0 0 GERMAN MORTGAGE BONDS. I 1 5 , O O O ,O O O 8 5 .3 0 0 .000 20, O O O ,O O O 7 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 66, 04 0,70 0 3 0 .0 0 0 . 000 1 2 4 ,3 2 4 ,7 0 0 20. 0 0 0 . 000 2 1 .5 0 0 .000 2 5 .0 0 0 . 000 6 5 .0 0 0 . 000 4 5 , 0 0 0 , OO O 2 0 , OOO ,OOO 2 5 , O O O , O OO 1 9 0 7 ............................................... 1 9 0 8 ............................................... 95, 3 6 0 ,2 0 0 1 0 , 7 5 0 , O OO 3 0 , OOO ,OOO FOREIGN MORTGAGE BONDS. 1 8 9 7 ............................................... 1 9 0 4 ................................................................................ O n ly those y e a rs are g iv e n d u rin g w h ich issues were m ade. 6 In clu d in g p riv a te b a n k in g firms. a 960 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s Value of newly issued securities listed at all German stock exchanges during the years 1897-1 go8— Continued. GERMAN RAILWAY SHARES. Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. Year.® M arks. M arks. M arks. i , 250,000 19,800,000 1.200.000 2,O O O O ,O O 14,297,O O O 4.024.000 II,O O O O ,O O II, 4 5 0 , O O O GERMAN RAILWAY BONDS. 5 ,7 0 0 ,OOO 7.500.000 1 .3 0 0 .000 2 ,5 0 0 ,OOO 3 .0 0 0 . 000 5 .5 0 0 .000 4 .0 0 0 . 000 IO,OOO,OOO 7,000,000 5 . 0 00 . 000 4.500.000 4,000,000 FOREIGN RAILWAY BONDS. 48.000. 48.000. 000 000 I ,687,500 42,O O O O ,O O BANK SHARES. 16. 2 0 0 . 000 78.101. 000 I ,500,O O O 3,O O O O ,O O 1898. 1899. 1900. 1901. 1902. 8,000,000 17,O O O O ,O O 24,O O O O ,O O 52,O O O O ,O O 1903- 4,O O O O ,O O O n ly those yea rs are given during w h ich issues w ere m ade. 6 In clu d in g p riva te b an kin g firms. a 9031 1 0— 1 1 ----- 62 961 Value o f newly issued securities listed at all German stock exchanges during the years 1897-1908— Continued. BAN K SHARES— Continued. Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks. 6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks. 6 M a rks. M a rk s. M a rks. 0 0 0 0 3 0 Issued exclusively by the bank. M a rks. Year.® 1 9 ,O O O , O O O 6 3 3 , ooo,000 8 . 2 5 0 .0 0 0 , ooo,ooo INDUSTRIAL SHARES. 1899........................ 9,500,O O O 29,ooo,ooo 1902........................ 500,OOO 74,ooo,ooo 48, 700,ooo 2 , O O O ,O O O 2 , 30,67s, OOO 4,050,ooo z»ooo,ooo 5 ,ooo,ooo 2 , 7 5 0 , OOO 28,ooo,ooo * 9 ° 3 ............................................... I , 250,ooo 1 2 , 5 0 0 , OOO 1 9 ° S ............................................... 33,ooo,ooo I ,450,ooo I ,400,ooo 80, 311, ooo 7,500,ooo 3,300,ooo 5 4 , 5 3 0 . OOO , OOO,OOO I , ooo,ooo 40,ooo,ooo ,O O O O O, O 6 ,ooo,ooo I , ooo,oco 4 ,ooo, ooo 1, 250,ooo 23,ooo,ooo 43.500.ooo 3,500,ooo 4,500,009 1 9 0 7 ............................................... 1908........................ s , 150,ooo 6, 810, ooo 1 0 2 , O O O ,O O O 24,2 0 0 , OOO 43,ooo,ooo INDUSTRIAL BONDS. 1898............................ 13,500,ooo 1901............................ 1902............................ 27,600,ooo 26,600,ooo 12 20 14,ooo,ooo 0 0 1905............................ 1906............................ 1907............................ 1908............................ 0 d mmission 47.500,ooo ° O n ly those y e a rs are given d u rin g w h ich issues were m ade. 6 In clu d in g p riva te b an kin g firm s. 962 174.570,ooo N M m H H fls m The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s BERLINER H A N D E LS-G E SE LLSC H A FT. Total value of securities issued at all German stock exchanges during the years ' i8gy-igo8. Year.® Issued exclusively by the bank. M a rks. 1897........................ Issued jointly with other great banks. M a rks. 2 5 ,8 4 8 ,0 0 0 2 9 , 3 5 0 , OOO Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.** Issued jointly with other banks.** M a rk s. M a rks. 6S. 6 8 5 ,5 0 0 2 8 8 ,7 6 0 ,0 0 0 313.598.500 1 8 9 8 ............................................... 1 3 .9 8 0 ,0 0 0 6 9 ,7 0 0 ,5 0 0 4 0 ,7 0 0 ,OOO 1 8 9 9 ............................................... 1 9 ,6 0 0 ,0 0 0 8 5 ,O O O ,O O O 8 5 ,1 9 8 ,OOO 1 5 5 ,IO O ,O O O 1 9 0 0 .................... .......................... I O , 5 0 0 , COO 1 5 , 2 0 0 , OOO 2 8 , 5 0 0 , OOO 1 0 4 , 3 0 0 , OOO 1 9 0 2 ............................................... 1 7 1 ,5 0 8 ,8 0 0 7 3 .3 0 0 .0 0 0 2 2 , 3 5 0 ,OOO 4 7 8 ,8 0 0 ,OOO 1 9 0 3 .............................................. 1 0 , 2 2 5 , OOO 6 3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 6 ,1 0 0 ,0 0 0 3 .3 9 6 ,6 2 3 ,9 7 4 1 9 ,O O O ,O O O 3 5 .5 0 0 ,0 0 0 3 8 ,2 5 0 ,0 0 0 6 5 ,IO O ,O O O 2 8 , 3 5 0 , OOO I I 2 , 1 5 0 , OOO 1 4 ,O O O ,O O O 6 0 4 ,O O O ,O O O 1 9 0 4 .............................................. 190 7 s.................... 1907........................ 8 ,0 0 0 .0 0 0 7 3 ,2 9 6 ,0 0 0 2 4 , 9 2 0 , OOO 1 9 0 8 .............................................. 1 8 ,0 0 0 .0 0 0 6 9 ,9 1 0 ,0 0 0 6 2 ,O O O ,O O O 6 , 5 9 1 , 4 3 5 .2 3 2 4 3 8 ,9 2 0 ,0 0 0 Value of newly issued securities listed at all German stock exchanges during the years i8gy-igo8. GERMAN PUBLIC SECURITIES. Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks.** Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.** M a rks. Year.0 M a rks. M a rks. M a rks. 2,750,000 1 5 . 700,O O O 6,000,000 14,000,000 3,000,000 12,000,000 3,000,000 27,000,000 8,000,000 9.796,000 3,000,000 12.000. 60.000. 000 000 0 O n ly those years are given during w hich issues were m ade. * In cluding p riva te b an kin g firms. > 963 24.000. 26.000. 20.000. 85.000. 000 000 000 000 M o n et a r y Commission Value o f newly issued securities listed at all German stock exchanges during the years 189J-1908— Continued. FOREIGN PUBLIC SECURITIES. Year.3 Issued exclusively by the bank. M arks. Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. M a rk s. M arks. 4 6 ,4 0 6 ,5 0 0 6 6 ,3 0 0 , 000 39 3 . 000. 000 3 . 3 7 9 . 3 2 3 .9 7 4 5 0 0 .0 0 0 . 000 2 8 ,3 5 0 ,0 0 0 1 9 0 7 ............................................... 6 ,4 8 1 ,5 6 5 . 232 1 2 7 , 5 0 0 , OO O GERMAN MORTGAGE BONDS. 2 0 . 000. 000 000 2 0 . 000. 000 o c B o c National 70.000. 2 0 . 000. 000 40.000. 000 1 5 .000. 7 5 .000. 000 000 10,OOO,OOO 2 0 , OOO,OOO FOREIGN MORTGAGE BONDS. I I ,2 5 0 ,OOO 2 2 , 5 0 0 ,OOO GERMAN RAILWAY SHARES. 3.50 0.0 00 1 . 4 0 0 . 000 6.500.000 2. 100.00 0 11,0 50,00 0 8 ,5 0 0 , 0 0 0 1, 35° . o ° o 8 .6 0 0 .0 0 0 600,000 3.7 25.00 0 5.300.000 1.500.000 4.024.000 4,210,000 0 O n ly those y e a rs are given during w h ich issues were m ade. 6 In clu d in g p riva te ban kin g firms. 964 11,0 00 ,0 00 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s Value of newly issued securities listed at all German stock exchanges during the years 1897-1908— Continued. GERMAN RAILWAY BONDS. Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. Year.a M arks. M arks. M arks. 2 , 3 0 0 , OOO 1 0 .0 0 0 . 1,83 0, 000 000 1 2 .5 0 0 .000 1 4 . 0 0 0 , OOO 4 , O O O ,O O O 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 9 .6 5 0 .0 0 0 1 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 2 , O O O ,O O O 4 , 3 0 0 , OOO * 1 1 , 7 0 0 , OOO 2 , O O O ,O O O T9 " 7 IO ,O O O ,O O O FOREIGN RAILWAY BONDS. 3 6 .9 5 5 .5 0 0 2 4 3 , 2 1 0 . OOO 2 2 8 ,3 0 0 ,5 0 0 4 4 ,8 0 0 ,0 0 0 2 7 , O O O ,O O O 1 6 0 , O O O ,O O O 1 7 0 ,1 5 8 ,8 0 0 x ,6 8 7 ,5 0 0 4 2 , O O O ,O O O BANK SHARES. 2 5 ,S o o ,000 3 .4 9 8 .0 0 0 8 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 7 .5 0 0 .0 0 0 5 , O O O ,O O O IO ,O O O ,O O O 8 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 4 .0 0 0 . IO ,O O O ,O O O 000 5 .0 0 0 . 000 1 2 , 5 0 0 , OOO 1 6 .0 0 0 . 2 4 , O O O ,O O O 1 8 , O O O ,O O O 000 1 0 .0 0 0 . 000 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 1 0 ,9 2 3 , 750 000 8 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 O n ly those y ea rs are given d urin g w h ich issues w ere m ade. 6 In clu d in g p riv a te b a n k in g firms. a 9 63 mission Value of newly issued securities listed at all German stock exchanges during the years 1897-1908— Continued. INDUSTRIAL SHARES, Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks. b Issued jointly with other banks and great banks. b M arks. Year.0 M arks. M arks. M arks. 1 8 9 8 ............................................... 3 ,2 5 0 ,0 0 0 6 ,2 9 4 .0 0 0 1 0 , OOO ,OOO 1 8 9 9 ............................................... 7 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 8 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 9 .39 8, 000 9 1 ,8 5 0 1 9 0 0 ............................................... 3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 5 , 2 0 0 , OOO 6 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 2 5 , 7 0 0 , OOO 4 0 ,7 9 8 .0 0 0 000 2 9 . 0 5 0 , O OO 1 1 ,6 o o ,000 1 9 0 5 ............................................... 1 3 .8 3 0 ,0 0 0 I . 7 5 0 , OOO 1 4 , O O O ,O O O 5 6 , 5 0 0 , OOO 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 2 1 , 2 0 0 , OOO 1 9 0 8 ............................................... I,OOO,OOO 4 6 , 1 0 0 , OOO INDUSTRIAL BONDS. 1 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1897. 1898. 1899. 26,600,000 17,000,000 7,000,000 2 8 .7 3 0 .0 0 0 1 0 .7 0 0 . 0 0 0 2 4 .000, 000 2 9 .000, 000 7 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 1900. 16,000, 0 0 0 6.000, 0 0 0 6.000, 0 0 0 1901. 1902. 1903. 1904. 4 .5 0 0 .0 0 0 1905. 6 .5 0 0 .0 0 0 1906. 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1907. 1908. 20. 000, 000 4.500. 0 0 0 35.400, 0 0 0 4,800, 0 0 0 10.500, 0 0 0 21.500, 0 0 0 5 5 .0 0 0 , 000 3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 3 7 .1 0 0 , 000 4 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 7 .3 0 0 , 8, 000, 7.50 0, 00 0 OO O OO O 2 0 ,3 4 7 . 500 2 , 9 2 0 , OO O I,OO O O,OO O 4. 000, O O 161,320, O O O Only those years are given during which issues were made. &Including private banking firms. a 966 Hi v 1 Th e G e r ma n G r e a t B a n k s DEU TSCH E BANK . Total value of securities issued at all German stock exchanges during the years 1897-1908. Year.a Issued exclusively by the bank. M arks. 1897........................ 1898........................ 1899........................ 1900........................ 1 9 0 1 ........................ 1902........................ 1903........................ 1904........................ 1905........................ 1906........................ 1907........................ 1908........................ 103.9 5 5 .000 258.279,480 3 4 7 . 3 3 °. 000 476,497,000 9 8 , 3 4 7 .5 5 0 217,030,O O O 656, 134. 040 736,0x9,800 688,797,900 762,043,800 262,763,600 241,945,000 Issued jointly with other great banks. M a rk s. 700,O O O 68,406,500 77,500,000 7 4 .591,200 261,700,O O O 140,500,O O O 60,750,O O O 82,887,O O O 235,687,000 267,037,O O O 370,270,O O O 221,264,O O O I I , Issued jointly with other banks and great banks, 6 Issued jointly with other banks.6 M a rk s. 27,950,O O O 247, 149, 480 IO ,O O O ,O O O 61, 228, O O O 125,320,O O O 172,632,O O O 131.566,300 843.338,408 129, 842, O O O 291,125,O O O 107.915.O O O 318, 900, O O O M a rk s . 65,800,O O O 489,004,900 606,430,O O O 133.350.O O O 206,O O O , O O O 70s,650,O O O 3,221,204,490 527,417,O O O I. 346. 550. OOO I . 5 5 5 .674,856 7,100,435,232 1,3x5,865,000 a Only those years are given during which issues were made. 6 Including private banking firms. Value of newly issued securities listed at all German stock exchanges during the years 1897-1908. GERMAN PUBLIC SECURITIES. Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. Year.0 Issued exclusively by the bank. M arks. M arks. M arks. 24,O O O O ,O O 1900........................ 48, 200, O O O 1 9 0 1 ........................ 13.310.O O O 13,800,O O O XI,873,200 17,600,O O O 28,O O O O ,O O 42,400,O O O 59,464,000 5 ,O O O O ,O O 172,500,O O O 4 5 ,000,000 3,500,000 20,937,000 58,937.000 83.43 7.000 125,000,000 5 * . 5 7 5 .000 123,654.900 1902........................ 1903........................ 1904........................ 1905........................ 1906........................ 1907........................ 1908........................ 3,228,000 94, 570, 000 5,272,O O O I, O O O O ,O O 3,800,000 3,952, O O O 32,O O O O ,O O 10, 165,O O O 245,O O O O ,O O 59,000,000 42,000,000 388,000,000 81,865,000 448,317.000 450,000,000 1; 321, 720, 600 481,500,000 1,016,325,000 a O n ly those years are giv en during w hich issues were m ade. 6 In clu ding p rivate b an kin g firms. 967 M o n et a r y Commission Value of newly issued securities listed at all German stock exchanges during the years 1897-IQ08— Continued. FOREIGN PUBLIC SECURITIES. Issued exclusively by the bank. Year.o M arks. Issued jointly with other great banks. M arks. Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. M arks. 46,406,500 86, 551, 080 66.300,000 116,767.080 85,860,000 4 . 387.S00 798,219,408 423,806,500 463,080,O O O 7,818, 750 242,250,O O O 3 ,121,539.490 698,700,O O O 216.960,000 75,850,000 173. 400,O O O 142,800.000 6, 481.565, 232 64,260,O O O GERMAN MORTGAGE BONDS. 70 000.000 § C Q S G 45.O O O O ,O O i 5,000,000 50.000 O O O 30,O O O O ,O O 1906........................ 30,000,000 55,O O O O ,O O FOREIGN MORTGAGE BONDS. 8,100,000 I I ,250,O O O 00 0 00 National 1 3 .9 3 1 200 1903........................ 1905........................ 56, 250. O O O ° O n ly th ose yea rs are g iv e n during w h ich issues were m ade. 6 In clu d in g p riv a te ban kin g firms. 968 34,000,000 The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s Value of newly issued securities listed at all German stock exchanges during the years 1897-1908— Continued. GERMAN RAILWAY SHARES Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. Year, a M arks. M arks. M arks. 8,500,000 3 , 500.O O O 5 ,4 0 0 ,O O O 5,000,000 600,O O O 1,800.O O O 26,300,O O O I , 700,O O O 40,O O O O .O O 4,210,000 GERMAN RAILWAY BONDS. 5,700,ooo 5 ,ooo,000 2,300,O O O 12,500,O O O IO,OOO,OOO 900,ooo 23,650,ooo 2,ooo,ooo 2,500,O O O 2,O O O O ,O O 4,300,000 16,204,256 IO, ooo, ooo FOREIGN RAILWAY SHARES. 52,500,ooo 331,162,ooo 48,960,ooo 80, ooo,ooo 23,too,ooo 404.83s.840 525,ooo,ooo 105,ooo.ooo 136.743.600 481,042,800 73,500,ooo 0 0 0 0 0 BANK SHARES. 8 , o o o ,o o o 1 8 9 9 ................................................. 2 0 , 8 8 0 , OOO « O n ly th ose y ea rs are giv en d urin g w hich issues were m ade. 6 In clu d in g p riv a te b an kin g firms. 99 6 N a t io n a l M on e t a r y Commission Value of newly issued securities listed at all German stock exchanges during the years 1 8 9 7 -IQ 0 8 — Continued. BANK SHARES—Continued. 1 8 9 8 ............................................... 7 ,8 1 0 ,8 0 0 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 36, 498, 400 37, 198, 400 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 34, 75 0.00 0 1 9 0 0 ............................................... 1 8 .1 3 5 .0 0 0 6, 70 0,00 0 1 9 0 1 ............................................... 4 4 ,5 1 8 ,8 0 0 1 8 , 2 0 0 , OOO 7 5 0 , OOO 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 9 0 2 ............................................... 2 2 , 6 0 0 , OOO 1 9 , 2 0 0 , OOO 5 , 5 0 0 , OOO 2 9 ,0 5 0 ,0 0 0 1 9 0 3 ............................................... IO ,IO O ,O O O x i , 25 0,00 0 I , O O O ,O O O 5 , O O O ,O O O 1 9 0 4 ............................................... 2 9 , 6 6 9 , OOO 2 , 4 5 0 , OOO 3 0 , 9 6 9 , OOO 2 6 , 6 0 0 , OOO 1 9 0 5 ............................................... 2 0 ,2 7 3 ,5 0 0 5 9 ,2 5 0 ,0 0 0 1 2 , 7 5 0 , OOO 6 9 . 3 5 ° . OOO 1 9 0 6 ............................................... 2 5 . 23 s,O O O 3 6 , 8 0 0 , O OO 2 2 , 2 2 5 , OO O 1 6 2 , 3 0 0 , OOO 1 9 0 7 ............................................... 1 3 , O O O ,O O O 4 4 .0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 7 , O O O ,O O O 6 2 , 6 7 0 , OO O 1 9 0 8 ............................................... 7 5 . 9 5 0 .0 0 0 3 5 , 9 0 0 . OOO 1 8 , 9 0 0 , OO O 6 7 . 0 3 0 , O OO I , IOO,OO O 2 0 , O O O , OOO 1 8 9 8 ............................................... b o n d s . 0 0 0 O O in d u s t r ia l 8 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 5 , O O O ,O O O 6 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 4 3 , O O O ,O O O 3 6 , O O O ,O O O 1 9 0 3 ............................................... 3 6 ,9 2 5 ,0 0 0 I , O O O ,O O O 1 5 ,1 7 8 ,8 0 0 1 2 , 8 o o , OOO 1 9 0 4 ............................................... 6 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 3 0 , 5 0 0 , OOO IO, 3 5 0 . 0 0 0 9 ,4 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 9 0 5 ............................................... 3 8 ,6 5 0 ,0 0 0 8, 740, 000 7 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 3 ,O O O ,O O O 1 9 0 6 ............................................... 1 9 0 7 ............................................... 1 1 ,8 0 0 ,0 0 0 46 ,4 1 9 0 8 ................................... 4 0 , 2 0 0 , OOO 2 7 ,5 0 0 ,O O O 7 0 ,OOO 2 0 ,7 5 0 ,O O O 0Only those years are given during which issues were made. Including private banking firms. 970 44,7 0 0 , OO O 168,250,O O O The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s D IS C O N T O -G E S E L L S C H A F T . Total value of securities issued at all German stock exchanges during the years 1897-1908. Year.® Issued exclusively by the bank. 1 8 9 7 ............................................... 7 1 1 ,6 9 2 ,0 0 0 M arks Issued jointly with other great banks. M arks. 3 0 ,3 5 0 ,0 0 0 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks.6 M arks. M arks. 3 3 1 ,9 0 0 ,OOO 3 6 5 ,9 6 0 ,0 0 0 4 1 7 ,8 1 3 ,2 8 0 1 8 9 8 .............................................. 67, 680, 900 27, 2 5 1,60 0 6 3 2 ,6 9 0 ,7 8 4 1 8 9 9 ............................................... 1 8 5 ,7 2 4 ,0 0 0 4 1 ,io o ,O O O 3 5 7 . 2 0 0 , OOO 67, 500, 000 1 9 0 0 .............................................. 1 2 2 ,6 1 0 ,0 0 0 2 3 ,0 3 1 ,2 0 0 2 0 4 , 2 0 0 , OOO 2 4 0 . 4 5 0 , OOO 1 9 0 1 .............................................. 49, 464, 600 1 7 9 .O O O ,O O O 8 9 ,4 0 0 ,0 0 0 561,49 2, OOO 1 9 0 2 .............................................. 1 7 2 , O O O ,O O O 7 2 ,O O O ,O O O 5 6 1 ,6 0 0 ,0 0 0 1. 5 0 5 . 3 4 9 . 50 0 3 ,2 1 4 ,8 2 4 ,5 9 0 1 9 0 3 .............................................. 2 1 3 ,6 1 5 ,1 8 8 3 2 ,2 1 3 ,OOO 1 5 9 ,8 5 0 ,0 0 0 1 9 0 4 ........................................ • • • 2 5 9 ,O O O ,800 64. 93 7 , 000 5 1 ,5 0 0 ,OOO 585. 54 0 , 570 1 9 ° S .............................................. 2 , 1 9 3 ,2 2 2 , OOO 2 3 1 , 3 3 7 . OOO 5 2 1 ,2 7 1 ,3 3 0 I , 1 4 1 , 2 5 0 , OOO 1 9 0 6 ............................................... 9 3 .0 2 2 ,3 4 0 180, 437, 000 2 5 ,9 4 2 ,2 0 0 2 4 6 .5 5 9 .0 0 0 1 9 0 7 .............................................. 7 7 .^4 9 9 . 6 0 0 4 0 5 ,7 9 6 ,OOO 9 4 ,5 5 0 ,0 0 0 7 ,0 1 0 , 4 1 5 .2 3 2 1 9 0 8 ............................................... 137. 850, 000 1 6 9 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 7 5 .3 0 0 .0 0 0 1 . 5 3 9 . 6 5 5 .0 0 0 Value of newly issued securities listed at all German stock exchanges during the years 1897-1908. GERMAN PUBLIC SECURITIES. 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. M arks. Year.0 M arks. 18, 552, 500 6, 275,800 1, 000,000 4, 092,500 94,000,000 15,488,000 2,000,000 43, 200,O O O 2.750.000 4,000,000 7.500.000 169.000. 000 42, 000, 000 9,500,000 11,93 7,000 23, 937. 000 63. 9 3 7 . 000 127, 296, 000 106.000. 000 Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. M arks. 40,000,000 6, 000, 000 12.000, 000 7,500, 000 10.000. 000 138.000. 000 64,960,100 408, 317, 000 474.000. 000 26.000. 000 434, 000, 000 8, 000, 000 67, 000, 000 30,000,000 31,500,000 25,000,000 7,000,000 1,133.325.°°o O n ly those years are given during which issues were made. 6 In clu ding p riva te b an kin g firms. a 971 National Mo n e t ar y Commission Value of newly issued securities listed at all German stock exchanges during the years 1897-1908— Continued. FOREIGN PUBLIC SECURITIES. Issued jointly with other great banks. M arks. Issued jointly with other banks.6 M arks. Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. Issued exclusively by the bank. Year.o M arks. 286, 900, 000 448.200.000 5 1 , OOO,OOO 357, 200, 000 1 5 1 . 2 0 0 . 000 1 0 2 , OOO,OOO 561.600.000 424.936,530 1.317.349,500 3,125,364.490 90,426,570 500,000,000 56,700,000 6,481.565.232 191,760,000 149.850.000 143,800,000 GERMAN MORTGAGE BONDS. 678 31 10 50 , O O O ,O O O , 1 3 9 . 5 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 30 22 4 0 0 , O O O ,O O O , 70 150 66 0 0 0 32 65 24 55 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . , O O O ,O O O . 30 10 0 0 29 0 15 0 0 0 . . 0 0 0 . . 0 0 0 . . 0 0 0 . . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 00 0 , O O O ,O O O 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . I . , OOO 0 0 0 12 50 0 40 634,8 0 0 17 942,20 0 23 950 11 6 0 0 0 .0 0 . . 0 0 0 , , . 2 0 , O O O ,O O O . 0 0 0 . FOREIGN MORTGAGE BONDS. 5 00 0 0 ,0 0 i , 184 490.784 . 1 3 . 9 3 1 .20 0 34 0 0 0 0 .0 0 . 2 2 , 50 0 , O O O O n ly th ose y ea rs are g iv e n d u rin g w h ich issues w ere m ade. 6 In clu d in g p riv a te b a n k in g firms. a 97a The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s Value of newly issued secureties listed at all German stock exchanges during the years i8 g j-ig o8 — Continued. GERMAN RAILWAY SHARES. Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. M arks. Year.o M arks. Issued jointly with other banks.6 M arks. 1897. . ................... Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. 1, 250,000 5.000. 000 5.000. 000 9,200,000 6,000,000 1,560,000 35* 297,000 4,024,000 11,000,000 3,199,200 GERMAN RAILWAY BONDS. 2,500,000 10,000,000 . 25.000. 000 42.000. 000 1,560,000 7.000. 000 9.500.000 5.000. 000 4.500.000 500,000 4,000,000 FOREIGN RAILWAY SHARES. 243 273 013,280 , 2 1 0 , OOO , 126 0 0 0 0 ,0 0 , 27 214 992 , O O O ,O O O , , OOO 56 522 6 8 8 , , 4 2 , O O O ,O O O 1905 1906 ............................................................................... 105 , O O O ,O O O 2 , IO O ,O O O ,O O O ............................................................................... I , 68 0 7,50 BANK SHARES. 1897 1898 1899 24,500,O O O 4,000,O O O 6.000. 9.000. 000 000 0 O n ly those years are given during which issues were made. 6 Including p rivate banking firms. 9 7 3 18.000. 000 8,000,000 17.000. 000 Commission Value of newly issued secureties listed at all German stock exchanges during the years 1897-1908— Continued. BANK SHARES— Continued. Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. Year.“ M arks. M arks. M arks. 27.510.0 0 0 7,800,O O O 36.500.0 0 0 24,O 7, 713,000 30,000,800 30,834,O O O 3,508,O O O 21, 9 9 9 ,600 4, 500, O O O 6,000,000 O O ,O O O IO ,O O O ,O O O 9, O O O , O O O 16, O O O O ,O O 8,000,000 33,600,O O O 1 2 . 5 0 0 . 000 16.000. 23.250.0 2 0 . 000. 0 0 000 0 0 000 INDUSTRIAL SHARES. 1 5 ,O O O , O O O 12,180,900 1900.......................... 1905.......................... II, 751,600 5,000,000 24.800.0 30.724.0 0 0 31.10 0 .000 28,600,O O O 9, 100, 000 5 ,O 33.500.000 52.750.000 14,900,O O O 50,O 6 , 2 0 0 , OOO O O ,O O O O O ,O O O 41, 250,O O O 16,315,140 14 ,150 , O O O 2 2 , 250,O O O INDUSTRIAL BONDS. 21,600,O O O 2, 500,O O O 40,O O O ,O O O 5,000,000 6 , 1901.......................... 000,000 27,500, O O O 10,OOO,OOO 10,OOO,OOO 35.000. 000 45.500,000 30.000. 000 2,500,O O O 1903.......................... 1905.......................... 2,O O O , OO O 1906.......................... 1907.......................... 1908.......................... 4,000,000 9,700,000 18 , O I 2 , OOO, O O O O O ,O O O 0 Only those years are given during which issues were made. 6 Including private banking firms. 974 16,400,O O O 181,320, O O O The G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s D R ESD N ER BANK. Total value of securities issued at all German stock exchanges during the years 1897-1908. Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. M arks. Year.® M arks. 8 5 . 3 5 0 ,000 1898........................ 1899........................ 1900........................ 1 9 0 1 ........................ 1902........................ 1903........................ 1904........................ 1905........................ 1906........................ 1907........................ 1908........................ 47, 451,600 I O I ,700,O O O 44, 613,400 28, 439, O O O 5 9 , 546, 900 4 7 , 0 5 3 ,100 106,893,O O O 136,122,400 6 5 . 5 5 i . 4PO 56,820,O O O 210, 734, 400 14, 001, 600 40,100,O O O 62,2 0 0 , O O O 143,000,000 35,200,000 33,963,000 225,229,000 458,270,000 320,415,200 357.990.000 280,654,900 Issued jointly with other banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. M arks. 82,000,000 134,000,000 605,980,000 32,500,O O O 26, 991, 2 5 0 280,530,000 1,260,O O O 48, 2 0 0 , O O O 721,400,O O O 662,400,O O O IS ,O O O ,O O O 32,500,O O O 23. 75°,000 69,200,000 44, 700,000 142,900,O O O 172,O O O O ,O O 480,O O O , O O O 90,404,900 505,714,O O O 541, 700, O O O I , 509,720,806 7,091,065,232 1, 222,380, 000 Value of newly issued securities listed at all German stock exchanges during the years 1897-1908. GERMAN PUBLIC SECURITIES. Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. M arks. Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks.6 M a rk s. Year.<* M arks. 75,O O O O ,O O II 2 , O O O O ,O O 1899........................ 13,000,000 M arks. 2 0 , OOO,O i , 750,000 29,000,000 OO 15,700,O O O 50,O O O O ,O O 5,000,000 n 416,O O O O ,O O 3,000,000 1903........................ 29,142,100 6,000,000 5,652,400 10,O O O O ,O O 2C» 5°o,OOO 0 cnn r\, 7.000,000 54,904.900 48,779,000 67,000,000 81,500,000 63,720,000 n 8 , 154,900 16,500,O O O 562,400,O O O 443,000,000 I, 277, 720,600 29,500,O O O O n ly those years are given during w hich issues were m ade. 6 In clu ding p riva te b a n k in g firm s a 975 95 tj n n n OOO National Monetary Commission Value of newly issued securities listed at all German stock exchanges during the years 1897-1908— Continued. FOREIGN PUBLIC SECURITIES. Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. M arks. Year.o M arks. Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 Issued jointly with other banks.6 M arks. M arks. 51,000,000 463.080.000 13.691.250 242.250.000 7, 875,000 77,520,000 698.700.000 6, 481,565, 232 142,800,000 64, 260,000 199. 834,400 GERMAN MORTGAGE BONDS. 6 0 .0 0 0 . 000 000 1 0 .0 0 0 . 000 3 0 .0 0 0 . 1 5 .0 0 0 . 000 3 0 .0 0 0 . 000 2 5 , O O O , OOO 3 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 120. 0 0 0 . 000 220. 0 0 0 . 3 0 , O O O ,O O O 000 15 . 0 0 0 . I s , O O O , OOO 000 5 5 .0 0 0 . 000 9 0 .0 0 0 . 9 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 9 5 ,3 6 0 .2 0 0 000 6 0 , 7 5 0 , OOO FOREIGN MORTGAGE BONDS. GERMAN RAILWAY SHARES. 40,OOO,OOO ............. ............. GERMAN RAILWAY BONDS. 1898.......................... 2 , OOO,OOO 1899.......................... 25,OOO,OOO [900............... ........... 6,479,000 1901.......................... 8, 839, 000 0 O n ly those ye a rs are given during w hich issues were m ade. 6 In clu d in g p riv a te b a n k in g firms. 976 M am m a Th G e r m a n G r e a t B a n k s Value of newly issued securities listed at the German stock exchanges during the years 1897-1908— Continued. GERMAN RAILWAY BONDS— Continued. Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. M arks. Year.™ M arks. Issued jointly with other banks.6 M arks. Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. 1 , ooo, o o o I , 5 0 0 , OOO 7 , o o o , o o o 90 0 13 50 256 4 I I , 4 , o o o ,0 0 0 2 . , OOO . , o o o , o o o FOREIGN RAILWAY SHARES. 48, ooo,ooo 80,ooo,ooo 25,ooo,ooo 25.500.000 15.300.000 FOREIGN RAILWAY BONDS. I, 687, 500 GERMAN STREET RAILWAY SHARES. I ,250,ooo 1.350,ooo 6, ooo, ooo 26,ooo,ooo I ,200,O O O I , OOO,ooo 26,795,ooo 14,297,ooo 500,ooo GERMAN STREET RAILWAY BONDS. 2.500.000 3,ooo,00c 5.500.000 1897........................ 1901........................ « O n ly those yea rs are given during w hich issues were m ade. 6 In clu d in g p riva te b a n k in g firms. 9Q 311 11 >3 977 mission Value of newly issued securities listed at all German stock exchanges during the years 1897-1908— Continued. BANK SHARES. Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. Issued jointly with other banks.* 6 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. Year.® M arks. M arks. M arks. 7 8 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 9 ,6 0 0 ,0 0 0 8 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 2 9 ,6 0 0 ,0 0 0 2 4 , O O O ,O O O 7, 7 1 3 .0 0 0 2 5 , O O O ,O O O 4 1 , O O O ,O O O 3 0 0 , OOO 6 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 0 .5 0 0 .000 2 2 . 100.000 22. 600. 000 2 5 .5 0 0 .000 1 2 , 5 0 0 , OOO 1 6 .0 0 0 . 000 6 ,2 5 0 ,0 0 0 20. 0 0 0 . 000 INDUSTRIAL SHARES. 2 , 0 6 0 , OOO 1 1 0 fi 0 5 3 .7 0 0 ,ooo i 1 < 0 0 9 , 2 0 0 , OOO 1 , 2 6 0 , OO O 2 3 ,5 0 0 ,ooo 9 1 .75° . 75° 1 9 0 7 ............................................... 5 , 7 2 0 , OOO 3 7 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 3 , O o o .0 0 0 41, 2 5 0 ,ooo 1 9 0 8 ............................................... 3 ,9 0 0 ,0 0 0 2 3 , O O O ,O O O I , o o o ,o o o 3 1 ,8 0 0 ,ooo 0 9 0 4 9 .8 0 0 ,ooo 5 , O O O ,O O O p 2 , 2 0 0 , OOO 79.3 1 5 .2 ° ° 0 6 1 ,9 5 °.0 0 0 9 ,5 5 0 .0 0 0 0 1 , 2 5 0 , OOO 0 2 8 . I 9 S . OOO 0 0 1 9 0 5 ............................................... 1 9 0 6 ............................................... 0 7. 46 0 , 0 0 0 0 1 9 0 3 ............................................... INDUSTRIAL BONDS. 1897. 1898. 1899. 2,500,O O O 1 2 , OOO,OOO 3,250,ooo 2.500.000 1900. 1901. 1902 . 40,ooo,ooo 900,ooo 4 , ooo,ooo 10,ooo, ooo 16 ,ooo,ooo 35 .000. 2.500.000 4 5 . 5 0 0 ,ooo 3 , ooo,ooo 36.000. 1904. 1905 . 1.600.000 1906. I , 501,400 10.000. 000 82.500.000 1907 • 3, ooo,ooo 3 3 . 9 7 0 . 000 1908. 2 0 . 000. 4 . ooo,ooo a Only those years are given during which issues were made. 6 Including private banking firms. H. 000 000 10,ooo,ooo 45.500.000 978 000 1 2 . 000. 8. 951 .000 9.700.000 1903 • 000 6 , ooo,ooo 22,947,500 27.500,ooo 171.320,ooo 1 The Ger man Gre at Banks A. SCHAAFFHATTSEN’ SCHER B AN K YEB EIN . Total value of securities issued at all German stock exchanges during the years 1897-1908. Y e a r .< » Is s u e d e x c lu s iv e ly b y th e b an k . Ma rks. Is s u e d j o i n t l y w it h o th e r g re a t b an k s. M arks. Is s u e d jo i n t ly w it h o th e r b an k s, b Is s u e d j o i n t l y w it h o th e r b a n k s an d g reat b an ks, b M arks. M arks. 1 8 9 7 ................................... 18 9 8 ................................... 12 7 , 558 . 600 11 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 7 ,8 7 0 ,0 0 0 20 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 3 S .5 8 9 . 000 4 3 .5 4 4 .0 0 0 2 7 ,2 5 0 , OOO 2 3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 8 9 9 ................................... 8 5 ,4 5 ° .0 0 0 2 7 ,7 8 0 ,0 0 0 1 ,3 5 0 , OOO 2 9 ,7 0 0 ,0 0 0 1900................................... 45, 700, OOO 1 8 ,6 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 4 , 5 0 0 , OOO 1 3 0 ,4 5 0 ,0 0 0 1 0 1 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 9 0 1 ................................... 4, 8 0 0 ,OOO 3 3 ,7 0 0 ,0 0 0 21, OOO,OOO 1 9 0 2 ................................... 4 6 , OOO,OOO 11 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 2 6 , OOO,OOO 7 6 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 9 0 3 .................................: I I , 6 0 0 , OOO 4 3 ,4 0 0 ,0 0 0 3 0 , OOO,OOO 3 7 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1904................................... 1 9 S ................................... ° 3 9, 284, 000 23 1. .000 2 9 0 ,2 9 7 ,7 7 0 179 4 1 7 ,6 1 7 , OOO 68, 7 9 7, 000 3 1 , 2 5 0 , OOO 7 4 9 ,6 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 4 0 ,3 5 9 ,0 0 0 20, 550, OOO 19 0 6 ................................... 6 0 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 8 5 ,8 1 5 ,2 0 0 3 1 , OOO,OOO 1 9 0 7 ................................... 1 9 0 8 ................................... 1 8 4 ,6 8 4 ,6 0 0 1 5 4 ,9 2 0 ,0 0 0 3 3 .4 7 0 ,0 0 0 1 0 5 ,5 0 0 , OOO 5 ,1 0 0 ,0 0 0 2 3 8 ,3 2 0 ,0 0 0 3 0 , OOO,OOO 2 1 6 , 8 7 0 , OOO aO n ly th o s e y e a r s a re g iv e n d u rin g w h ic h is su e s w e re m a d e , b I n c lu d in g p r iv a t e b a n k in g firm s. Value of newly issued securities listed at German stock exchanges during the years 1897-1908. G E R M A N P U B L IC S E C U R IT IE S . Is s u e d e x c lu s iv e ly b y th e b a n k . Issu ed j o i n t l y w it h o th e r g re a t b an k s. M arks. Year.® M arks. Iss u e d jo i n t ly w it h o t h e r b a n k s.b Is s u e d j o i n t l y w it h o th e r b a n k s an d great b a n k s.b M arks. M arks. 2 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 7 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 3 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 5 ,7 0 0 ,0 0 0 7 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 0 .0 0 0 . 2 , 5 0 0 ,OOO 1 5 .0 0 0 . 000 2 6 .0 0 0 . 2 3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 000 6 .0 39.7 0 0 . 7 9 .0 0 0 1 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 000 3 0 .0 0 0 . 000 4 0 .0 0 0 . 5 0 .0 0 0 . 000 1 8 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 4 0 8 ,3 1 7 ,0 0 0 3 0 .0 0 0 . 000 000 3 0 .0 0 0 . 000 4 1 .2 2 0 .0 0 0 3 0 .0 0 0 . 000 9 6 .5 0 0 .0 0 0 3 0 .0 0 0 . 000 2 .0 0 0 . o O n ly those y e a rs are g iv )n d urin g w h ich issues were m aue. b In clu d in g p riva te b an kin g firms. 979 000 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 6 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 000 Monetary Commission Value of newly issued securities listed at all German stock exchanges during the years iSgy-igoS— Continued. FOREIGN PUBLIC SECURITIES. Year.0 Issued jointly with other great banks. Marks. Issued jointly with other banks.6 Marks. Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 Marks. 77 .62S.170 Marks. 678,300,000 GERMAN MORTGAGE BONDS. 000. 000 6 0 .000. 3 0 .0 00. 20. 000 000 2 0 . 0 00. 000 2 0 . 0 00. 1 1 0 .0 00. 000 000 1 6 5 .0 00. 000 4 5 .0 0 0 . 6 0 .0 00. 1 5 . 000. 000 5 0 .000. 000 000 000 GERMAN RAILWAY SHARES. oc c oc 5,000,000 5 . 000. 5 . 000. 9 . 2 0 0 . 000 14,297,0 0 0 4.024.000 I I , OOO,OOO FOREIGN RAILWAY SHARES. 6 0 ,0 0 0 .OOO 2 5 .5 0 0 .000 1 5 . 300.000 1 , 687, 500 GERMAN RAILWAY BONDS. oc 0 oc National 1 0 ,OOO,OOO 1 9 0 1................................ IO, OOO,OOO 13* 000,000 9* 500,000 190 4................................ 190 5................................ 3 ,6 8 0 ,OOO i , *50,000 190 6................................ 1 1 .9 0 0 ,OOO 4 .5 0 0 ,OOO “ Only those years are given during which issues w effected. ere 6Including private banking firms. 980 000 000 ssn is The G e r m a n Gr e a t B a n k Value o f newly issued securities listed at German stock exchanges during the years 1897-1908— Continued. BANK SHARES. 1897 1898 1899 1901 1904 1905 1906 1907 Issued exclusively by the bank. Issued jointly with other great banks. M arks. Year.a M arks. 30, 000 000 S ,500,000 34, 800, 000 600,000 25,000,000 8, 750,000 35, 200,000 180,000,000 6.000. 9.000. Issued jointly with other banks.6 M a rk s. 000 000 Issued jointly with other banks and great banks.6 M arks. 8,000,000 6,000,000 6,500,000 22,100.000 24, 000,000 12.500.000 16.000. 000 16.250.000 20.000. 000 in d u str ial sh ar es . 1899........................ 1900........................ 40,650,000 IS,700,000 8,280,000 18,600,000 x,35°,000 4,500,000 43.250,000 1904........................ 12,784,000 25,400,000 1,620,000 21,000,000 1906........................ 25,300,000 4,684,600 104,415,200 51,000,000 22,700,000 I , 000,000 3,470,000 89,500,000 20,500,000 1907........................ 9,000,000 34.55°.000 INDUSTRIAL BONDS. 5,000,000 1899........................ 1900........................ 1902........................ 1903........................ 10,000,000 12,000,000 25,000,000 3,000,000 7,000,000 1906........................ 2,000,000 16.000. 000 3.000. 000 6.000. 000 30.500.000 4 , 000,000 10.000. 000 57.300.000 17.700.000 59.120.000 0 O n ly those yea rs are given during w hich issues w ere m ade. 6 In clu d in g p riva te b an kin g firms. 981 26.000. 000 12.000. 000 3,000,000 6, 000,000 24 . 3 9 7 . Soo 15.000. 000 106, 320, 000 APPENDIX VII. TH E D E V E L O P M E N T O F C O N C E N T R A T IO N OF TH E GERM AN G R E A T B A N K S .1 I. B a n k f u r H a n d e l u n d I n d u s t r ie in D a r m s ta d t . [Founded in 1853. Capital, 154,000,000 marks. Surplus, 30,250,000 marks.] [To page 641.] Branches (7).— Frankfort on-the-Main since 1864 (agency as early as 1854); Berlin since 1871; Hannover since 1900; Strassburg since 1901; Halle and Stettin (with deposit office Bollwerk) since 1906; Leipzig (with deposit office Leutzsch) since 1908. Commandites2 (4).— Riimelin & Co. in Heilbronn, Wingenroth, Scherr & Co. in Mannheim; Schmitz, Heidelberger & Co. in Mainz, Fuld & Co., Pforzheim. Deposit offices (3 1 ).— Since 1900, viz, 16 in Berlin; 2 in Chariottenburg; 1 each in Halensee, Gross-Lichterfelde W., Zehlendorf, K ottbus, Forst (Lausitz), F r a n k fo r t-o n -th e -O d e r , Greifswald, Guben, Offenbach-on-the-Main, Prenzlau, Spremberg (Mark), Lahr (Baden), Stargard (Pomer ania). Establishments (Niederlassungen) (5).— In F reib u rg-in -th e-B re isga u , Giessen, Landau (Pfalz), N eustadt (Haardt), Quedlinburg. Agencies (7).— In Alsfeld, Butzbach, Herbom, Pasewalk, Sangerhausen, Senftenberg, and Sorau. T h e Darmstadter Bank has founded or participated in the founding of the following subsidiary institutions (Tochtergesellschaften).3 1871. T he Amsterdamsche Bank in Amsterdam (share capital 6.000. 000 florins.) T h e B ank fur Handel und Industrie is represented on the supervisory board b y three members of its own managing board. 1881. T h e W urttembergische Bankanstalt, formerly Pflaum & Co., in Stu ttga rt (share capital 10,000,000 marks). Since 1881 it has had a contractual com m unity of interest with the Wurttem bergische Vereinsbank in Stuttgart, founded in 1869 (share capital 30.000. 000 marks; branches in Heilbronn, Reutlingen, and Ulm; commandites in Ellwangen, Esslingen, and Gerabronn). The two banks share up to 1930 profits and losses pro rata of their share capital, i. e., in the proportion of 1 to 3.4 T h e B ank fur Handel und Industrie is represented on the supervisory board of the Wurttembergische Bankanstalt by two members of its own managing board.
@FedFRASER