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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR L B . SCHWELLENBACH, Secretory BUREAU O F LABOR STATISTICS A* F . H INRICH S, Acting Commissioner The General Maximum Price Regulation Bulletin 1So. 87 9 For sale by the Superintendent o f D ocum ents, U . S . Governm ent Printing Office W ashington £ 5 , D . C. • Price 1 5 cents Letter o f Transmittal United States Department o f Labor, Bureau o f Labor Statistics, Washington, D . C ., June 1 0 , 1 9 4 6 . T h e Secretary o f L abor : I have the honor to transmit herewith a report on the General Maxi mum Price Regulation of the Office of Price Administration, which presents an analysis of one of the most far-reaching o f the wartime price regula tions of the Federal Government. As the principal mechanism fo r control o f prices for many commodities for a considerable period, the regulation was a major influence in stabilizing the cost of living as well as industrial prices during the war. This report is one of a number of bulletins prepared by the Prices and Cost of Living Branch of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, dealing With problems related to prices and cost of living during the war. As the official price-collection agency of the Federal Government outside the field of agriculture, the Bureau has undertaken this series o f reports, comprising the history of wartime prices, as a part of its program to maintain a con tinuous anaylsis o f the impact o f prices and price structures on the economy o f the United States. These studies are prepared by individual staff members under the general direction o f the Chief o f the Branch, and, as a rule, have been extensively circulated for use by the legislative and administrative branches of Government at the time when the issues to which they relate were under consideration. This report, covering the period from the autumn o f 1941 through 1943, was prepared in 1944-45 by Doris P. Rothwell o f the General Price Research and Indexes Division o f the Bureau o f Labor Statistics. A. F. Hinrichs, Acting Commissioner . Hon. L. B. Schwellenbach, Secretary o f Labor . Contents Page Chapter I.—Introduction .......................................................................... 1 P a r t I.— H ist o r y Chapter 2.—Background o f the General Maximum Price Regulation 2 Situation in the fall of 1941................................................................ Nature o f existing price control........, ............................................. Controversy regarding the proper method o f control................... Example of C an a da ............................................................................. Influence o f Pearl Harbor............... Emergency Price Control A ct............................................................ Pressures on price level in February-March 1 9 4 2 ..................... Trend o f prices ................................................................................... Inadequacy of existing price control .............................................. 2 3 4 6 8 8 9 9 10 Chapter 3.—Provisions o f the General Maximum Price Regulation.. 12 Limitations of the Emergency Price Control A ct.......................... Determination o f ceiling .................................................................. March freeze ................................................................................. Progressive pricing formula ..................................................... Record-keeping and posting ............................................................ Licensing ........................................................................................... Penalties ........................................... Provisions for adjustm ents................................................................ 12 13 13 15 15 16 16 16 Chapter 4.—Amendments and subsequent regulations......................... 17 Amendment to the Emergency Price Control A c t .................. . Amendment o f the General Maximum Price Regulation............... Removal of commodities from the General Maximum Price Regulation .................................................................. *................ Subsequent regulations .............................................. , .................... Designed to meet specific industry problems . ........................ Other freeze dates ........... Formula regulations ............... , ................................................ Dollars-and-cents c e ilin g s ........................................................... 17 18 21 22 22 22 22 23 P a r t II.— A p p r a is a l Chapter 5.—Direct and indirect violations ........................................... 25 Open violations ................................ Black markets ..................................................................................... Hidden violations ................................................................... Extras, discounts, and concessions........................................... Quality deterioration .................................................................. Discontinuance of cheaper lines and services......................... Changes in channels of distribution................................... 25 27 28 29 31 33 31 Page Chapter 6.—Difficulties o f administration............. ............................... 35 Enforcement ................................................................... Educational problem ................................... Complexity ........................................................................................... Latitude for independent interpretation.......................................... Other special p ro b le m s ...................................................................... Alternatives in April 1942..................................... 35 36 36 37 38 38 Chapter 7.—Economic limitations ........................................................... 39 Limitations in co v e r a g e ...................................................................... Inadequacy o f supplementary measures to control inflation........ Inequities o f price relationships ........................ Existing abnormalities in March 1942................................ . . . Development of the distributive squeeze.................................. Conflicts with other objectives......................................................... Production versus price control.............................................. Equitable versus stable prices.................................. ................ Lack o f quality control........................................................................ 39 41 42 42 43 45 45 45 46 Chapter 8.—Economic accom plishm ents................................................ 46 Price movements ................................................................................. Rate o f increase since May 1942.................................................. Controlled versus uncontrolled prices...................................... Comparison, with W orld W ar L .................................................. 47 47 48 49 Chapter 9.—Conclusion ................................................. ........................... 49 Appendix.—Detailed tables: Table 1.—Percentage changes in posted average retail ceiling prices o f foods covered by the General Maximum Price Regulation, from October 13, 1942. to December 15, 1 9 4 2 .... Table 2.—Unit labor cost in selected manufacturing industries, 1939-45 ........................................................................................... Table 3.—Indexes o f wholesale prices, controlled and un controlled ...................................................................................... Table 4.—Indexes of wholesale prices o f foods, controlled and uncontrolled ................................................................................. Table 5.—Percentage changes in wholesale prices for ^elected periods ........................................................................................... Table 6.—Percentage changes in consumers’ prices fo r selected periods .......................................................................................... Bibliography ............................................................................... ................ 52 53 53 54 54 54 55 Bulletin N o . 87 9 o f the United States Bureau o f Labor Statistics THE GENERAL MAXIMUM PRICE REGULATION Chapter 1 .—Introduction The General Maximum Price Regulation was issued on April 28, 1942, by. the Office o f Price Administration as an emergency measure to prevent, insofar as possible, further price increases dur ing the war. Simple in concept, but complicated in practice, it sub stituted an absolute freeze o f price relationships at a given date for the pricing mechanism o f an unregulated economy. The regu lation entailed many problems o f administration and enforcement, as well as continual adjustment o f inequities. Because o f its wide coverage, the regulation was one o f the most important o f all OPA measures. This report analyzes the conditions which necessitated its issuance and the effectiveness o f the regulation in meeting the purpose fo r which it was issued. The report is presented in two parts. Part I—History— con sists o f three chapters, the first o f which discusses the develop ments leading to the regulation and in particular contrasts condi tions in the fall o f 1941 with those in the^ spring o f 1942. The second chapter deals with the actual provisions o f the regulation and the third, with the relevant subsequent developments. Part II—Appraisal— contains the writer’s evaluation o f the regulation, based upon an analysis o f its limitations and accomplishments, and the movement o f prices before and after issuance o f the regu lation. It also contrasts the regulation with other means o f price control and considers whether or not other measures might nave been equally effective or more practicable in the emergency. 1 Part I .—History Chapter 2 .—Background o f the General Maximum Price Regulation The forces leading to the wartime price advance in the United States were actually set in motion in August 1939 when Germany invaded Poland. Wartime price rises gained momentum with the initiation o f the American Defense Program in 1940, but it was not until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor compelled our active participation in the war that they reached the alarming prortions which resulted in the issuance o f the General Maximum ice Regulation on April 28,1942. K Situation in the Fall o f 1941 Although the outbreak o f hostilities in Europe led to an increase o f 6 percent in wholesale prices in the United States by the end o f 1939, this advance was largely speculative1 and confined to specific commodities. Prices receded by August 1940 to a. level only 3 percent above August 1939. By this time, however, the recession had run its course, and prices turned upward under the influence o f huge Government orders for armaments, lumber, and other war goods for the defense program, which was initiated in June 1940. Until the first quarter o f 1941, price increases were confined largely to primary markets and particularly to articles immedi-ately affected by defense orders, such as textiles and scrap metals. In February 1941 consumers’ prices were only 2 percent above August 1939, according to the Bureau o f Labor Statistics index of consumers’ prices. In the same period prices in primary markets, as measured by the Bureau o f Labor Statistics wholesale price index o f about 900 commodities, had risen 7% percent. By Febru ary 1941, however, the cumulative effects o f the American Defense Program were becom ing evident. Government expenditures fo r war had increased from 2 hundred m illion dollars monthly in July 1940 to 1 billion dollars in May 1941. Business was boom ing; employ ment and pay rolls were higher; consumers’ purchasing power had increased greatly. Everyone— industrial buyers, distributors, retailers, and even the general public—was building up inven tories. The Lend-Lease Act was signed March 11, 1941, and in March 1941 there began a series o f wage increases in m ajor industries (cotton manufacturing, coal, steel, and autom obiles), which would further raise costs and purchasing power. Conse quently, between February 1941 and the attack on Pearl Harbor i W artim e Prices, Part I.—August 1939 to Pearl H arlor, b y John M. Blair and M elville J. Ulmer, under the direction o f Saul Nelson (U. S, Bureau o f Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 749, W ashington, 1944). 2 3 in December 1941, price increases became more widespread and more marked. Wholesale prices in November 1941 were 23 per cent above August 1939 and consumers’ prices 12 percent. Nature o f Existing Price Control The inherent dangers to price stability were recognized at an early date. In June 1940 an Advisory Commission was appointed to the newly reorganized Council o f National Defense which had functioned during W orld W ar I. Those appointed were: W illiam S. Knudsen, in charge o f industrial production; Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., industrial materials; Sidney Hillman, labor; Chester Davis, agriculture; Ralph Budd, transportation; Harriet Elliott, consumer protection; and Leon Henderson, price stabilization. Since most industries were operating far below capacity at the inception o f the defense program, the early activities o f the Price Stabilization Division were concerned largely with the exoansion o f supply to meet increasing Government and civilian needs fo r goods. As factory operations increased toward capacity and the pressure o f supplv became apparent, however, definite action was necessary to curb price advances. Inform al agreements were arranged, after consultations with the industries, to prevent speculative price advances, as early as the fall o f 1940. Among products which were inform allv controlled in this_ way were copper, lead. zinc, aluminum, tungsten, steel, pig iron, nickel scrap, coke, lumber, w ood pulp, farm implements, machine tools, cotton cloth. w ool, glue, and carnauba wax.2 3 In addition to informal arrangements, the Price Stabilization Division issued maximum price schedules, “ to be enforced bv publicity and the voluntary cooperation o f industry.” * The first o f these schedules, issued February 17, 1941, covering second hand machine tools; was follow ed in the next 8 weeks by similar schedules fo r aluminum scrap and secondary aluminum ingot, zinc scrap and secondary slab zinc, iron and steel scrap, and bitu minous coal. On April 11,1941. as a result o f the acceleration of the price advance beginning in Februarv. the President established the Office o f Price Administration and Civilian Supply, with Leon Henderson as Administrator, “ to take all lawful steps necessary or appropriate in order to prevent price spiralling, rising cost o f living, profiteering, and inflation.” * In spite o f the great increase in the duties o f the Price Admin istrator, this action did not increase his powers. He was com pelled to rely upon publicity and public opinion fo r enforcement o f price regulations.4* This could not insure complete compliance. Efforts to prevent price rises fo r automobiles, fo r example, were abandoned temporarily because o f the defiance o f one large manu facturer.4 2 First Quarterly Report fo r the Period Ended A pril 30, 1942 (Office o f Price Adm inistration, W ashington, 1942), p. 5. 3 Idem, p. 7. 4 Progress o f Price Regulation to September 1942, by Saul Nelson (In Monthly Labor Review, October 1942, p. 664). 4 The types o f measures initiated by the Office o f Price Admin istration and Civilian Supply to stabilize prices were outlined in the First Quarterly Report under five general classes— suggestions and warnings, fair price requests, “ freeze” letters, voluntary agreements, and form al ceiling regulations.5 By August 1, 1941, percent o f the total wholesale value o f manufactures, min erals, and imports lied been brought under inform al control and an additional 10 percent under form al control.5 Since the Office o f Price Administration and Civilian Supply was established without specific statutory authority it was handi capped greatly by the lack o f power to impose penalties for viola tions o f maximum price schedules. It became clear by the summer o f 1941, that the pressures upon prices required m ore forceful price control. Largely as a result o f heavy Government expendi tures for war, incom e payments to individuals had mounted rapidly. Consumer expenditures had reached an annual rate o f 78 billion dollars in August 1941, compared to 65 billion dollars before the start o f the defense program. The fact that price ad vances were not more serious was due to a great expansion o f out put. The Federal Reserve Board’s index o f industrial production, adjusted for seasonal variation, increased from 123 percent o f its 1935-39 level in June 1940 to 167 percent by August 1941. Controversy Regarding the Proper Method o f Control The President o f the United States, on July 30,1941, recogniz ing the threat o f price inflation, requested legislative action to strengthen the price control mechanism. Although a bill, later termed the Emergency Price Control Act, was immediately intro duced in both houses o f the Congress, final action was delayed until January 30, 1942. One basic issue which was discussed time and again through out the 4 months o f hearings before the Banking and Currency Committee o f the House o f Representatives was selective price control versus a general ceiling. The central figures in the con troversy were Bernard Baruch, Chairman o f the W ar Industries Board in W orld W ar I, advocate o f a general ceiling, and Leon Henderson, Administrator o f the Office o f Price Administration and Civilian Supply, advocate o f selective price control as pro posed in the act. Although a general freezing o f prices and wages had been considered as early as the fall o f 1940, most economists appeared to be opposed to such drastic action at that time. Be cause o f the uneven progress o f the defense program in the early stages, selected price and wage increases were considered desirable to stimulate output and make optimum use o f available resources.8 In the spring o f 1941 opinion still generally favored selective price control.* 7 * First Quarterly Report fo r the Period Ended A pril 30, 1942 (Office o f Price Adm inistration), p. 9. e Some Aspects o f Price Control and Rationing, by W . W . Rostow (in Am erican Econom ic Review, September 1942, Princeton, N. J .). (Condensation o f rem arks and dis cussion at the annual m eeting o f the Conference on Price Research at the National Bureau o f Econom ic Research, May 8,1942.) 7 Price Control in Outline, b y Don D. Humphrey (in Am erican Econom ic Review , December 1942). 5 Mr. Baruch, speaking in the fall o f 1941 from his experience during W orld W ar I, was strongly opposed to “ piece-meal” price fixing. He argued fo r a comprehensive general ceiling “for every price in the whole national pattern,” including “ rents, wages, in terest rates, commissions, fees—in short for every item and serv ice in commerce” 8 as o f “ some date on which normal operation o f the law o f supply and demand can be said to have controlled prices.” 9 He maintained that, “ since every price is a resultant o f the combination o f all other prices it is both unjust and imprac tical to regulate one segment o f the industrial fabric while exempt ing or providing special concessions fo r other segments.” 1 In his 0 opinion, the goal o f price control should be the maintenance o f a stable, balanced relationship between all prices, one which could best be achieved by freezing relationships determined under nor mal supply and demand conditions. He felt that fixing prices in a piece-meal fashion courted trouble and invited evasions. An im possible situation would develop when manufacturers* prices are fixed while costs remain uncontrolled. Either ceilings are violated or manufactm'ers cease operations because o f declining profits. During the First W orld W ar it was found necessary continually to extend controls to new items and new levels o f distribution. (Up to the date o f the armistice, fully 70 percent o f the aggregate value o f commodities included in the Bureau o f Labor Statistics wholesale price index had been brought under form al or inform al control.) In addition Mr. Baruch believed that a general ceiling would prove less o f an administrative problem than piece-meal price fixing. Under a general ceiling, he argued, there would be less need fo r adjustment o f ceilings to correct inequalities than under selective price control. Paradoxically, proponents o f the selective plan used die same argument to support the opposite viewpoint. Mr. Henderson conceded that a general ceiling was best from a strictly technical standpoint. Nevertheless, he feared the enor mity o f the administrative problem involved, especially in view o f his relatively small staff, saying that freezing all prices “ looks to me an almost impossible administrative task to be begun at once.” His theory was that if prices o f basic commodities, m ajor semifabricated products, and ipajor manufactured articles were effectively controlled, the pressure for price advances o f other items, especially at later stages o f production, would be substan tially reduced. He felt that price inflation could be prevented by ceilings, adequately enforced, on as few as 75 to 100 items. Among so-called “ price-determining” articles1 fo r which ceilings 1 8 Taking the Profits Out o f W ar, b y Bernard M. Baruch (New York, 1936), p . 997. 9 Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency, House o f Representa tives (77th Cong.) on H.R. 5479, superseded by H.R. 5990, a B ill to Further the National Defense and Security b y Checking Speculative and Excessive Price Rises, Price Disloca tions, and Inflationary Tendencies, and fo r Other Purposes, W ashington, 1941-1942. 10 Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency, House o f Representa tives (77th Cong.) on H.R. 5479, superseded by H.R. 5990 (pp. 996-997). u Progress o f Price Regulation to September 1942, b y Saul Nelson (M onthly Labor Review, October 1942, pp. 664-665). 698255— -46— *2 6 would be established were such key commodities as steel, copper, flour, lumber, and cotton grey goods, for which standard specifi cations could be written. Most of these commodities were pro duced by a relatively small number o f manufacturers, so that there would be little need for the policing o f thousands o f smaller firms which would have been required under Mr. Baruch’s plan. In particular, Mr. Henderson opposed inclusion o f wage ceil ings in the price control law because o f the diverse problems entailed and because be foresaw public resentment against regi mentation o f wages. Mr. Henderson was supported in his opposi tion by Isador Lubin, Commissioner o f Labor Statistics, who testified1 1that— 2 4 3 Price increases that occurred up to August 1941 cannot be attributed to the cost of meeting wage rates. Selling prices rose in advance o f wage rates. The prices which have advanced most are for commodities that are least affected by labor costs. In general, selling prices have risen more than was necessary to cover the cost of wage advances, and, in fact, by enough to cover the cost of all probable wage increases in the immediate future. Dr. Lubin maintained further that price ceilings would lim it wages indirectly, that wage increases might result in increased efficiency and therefore reduce unit labor costs, that a wage in centive would be desirable to divert workers into defense jobs, that ceilings on wages would be complicated, and that voluntary agreements between workers and employers were preferable to rigid government control. His view was shared by many.1 In fact, 8 one o f the strongest objections to Mr. Baruch’s recommendation was the belief that the public, in this period before the attack on Pearl Harbor, would not support such drastic measures. Mr. Hen derson even then recognized that future events might force a reversal o f this viewpoint. In his testimony he said: I could conceive o f a situation where, if we got as deeply Immersed as England, that the bill w e have here would be highly inadequate, even for commodity price control.1* Example o f Canada In further support o f his position that complete control o f all prices should not be attempted, Mr. Henderson cited the expe rience o f other countries, all o f which began price control with only partial price fixing. Although Canada’s W artime Prices and Trade Board was given the power to control prices o f necessaries in September 1939, it was not until August 1941 that the power was expanded to cover prices o f all goods and services, including final authority over prices fixed by controllers o f the Department o f Munitions and Supply and the W artime Industries Control 12 Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency, House o f Representa tives (77th Cong.) on H.R. 5479, superseded by H.R. 5990 (p. I t41). 13 Progress o f Price Regulation to September 1942, by Saul Nelson (M onthly Labor Review, October 1942, p. 665). 14 Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency, House o f Representa tives (77th Cong.) on H.R. 5479, superseded by H.R. 5990 (p. 875). 7 Board.1 During the first 2 years o f the war, Canada relied upon 8 control o f supply, and price regulations were issued sparingly and only as such action became unavoidable.1 0 Canada’s general ceiling order was not announced until Oc tober 18, 1941,1 *and did not becom e effective until December 1. 19 *7 51 It applied to all goods and services, except exports and military purchases, as well as to wages and rentals. It established each seller’s maximum price as his highest selling price between Sep tember 15 and October 11,1941, for items o f the same kind and quality. Provisions fo r a wage bonus o f 25 cents a week fo r each increase in the cost o f living o f 1 percent above August 1939, al ready in effect fo r war industries, were extended to all industries.1 8 This order invoked considerable discussion in the United States, where hearings on the price control bill were still in prog ress. In the month o f October 1941 the index o f wholesale prices o f the Dominion Bureau o f Statistics was 29 percent above its August 1939 level, but this advance was only 6 percent greater than the advance over the same period in the United States.1 It is * curious, therefore, that at the particular time when Canada aban doned its selective price control policy in favor o f a general ceiling, which was later to becom e the m odel fo r the General Maximum Price Regulation, the United States, after prolonged consideration, adopted the selective type o f price control. Canada was by that time “ econom ically prepared” and “ psy chologically ready2 ”—in Mr. Henderson’s words.** . The country was actually at w ar; taxes were far higher than in the United States; profits were diminishing; wages in war industries were already tied to the cost o f living. Forty-four percent o f Canadian production was devoted to war purposes compared to 15 percent at that time in the United States. It was felt that administrative problems in Canada could not be,as great as in a country o f the size o f the United States and, moreover, that Canada’s W artime Prices and Trade Board was better staffed and equipped to cope with a suddenly expanded program than its United States counter part, the Office o f r a c e Administration and Civilian Supply.^ Fur thermore, Canada had relied upon selective price control in the early stages o f her war program, when presumably some price increases were desirable to encourage increased production. It was thought, therefore, that the Canadian action by no means contradicted the desirability o f continuing selective price control in the United States. 15 Orders in Council, P.C. 2516, P.C. 3968, and P.C. 6834; The W artim e Prices and Trade Board Regulations, September 3, 1939, Decem ber 5, 1939; and August 28, 1941 (Ottawa, Canada). is W artime Controls in Canada, Department o f Munitions and Supply, March 9, 1942 (Ottawa, Canada) p. 5 ; and W ar-Tim e Control o f P rices,'b y Kennedy W . Taylor (in Canadian W ar Econom ics, Toronto, Canada, 1941). 17 Broadcast b y Bight Hon. W . L. Mackenzie King, M.P., Prim e M inister o f Canada, October 18, 1941. is Orders In Council, P.C. 8253; W artim e Wages and Cost o f Living Bonus Order, October 24,1941; and P.C. 8527, The Maximum Prices Regulations, November 1,1941. 19 New York Tim es (New Y ork), November 9, 1941. 20OPA Release, PM 1421 (W ashington), October 22, 1941. 8 Influence o f Pearl Harbor The attack on Pearl Harbor altered the whole American econ om y. In the President’s budget message to Congress on January 7, 1942, Government expenditures for war were estimated at 53 billion^ dollars fo r the fiscal year ended June 30, 1943, as against 24 billion dollars fo r the fiscal year 1942. The message indicated the eventual concentration o f at least one-half o f national produc tion on the war effort, compared with about one-fifth at the time o f the message. According to the First Quarterly Report o f the Office o f Price Administration, this fact alone spelled^ the end o f selective price control, for it was obvious that productive capacity would be fully utilized, scarcities would spread from consumer durable goods to “ virtually every type o f product,” and expanded incomes would invite increased demand fo r a declining volum e o f civilian goods. Emergency Price Control Act The Emergency Price Control Act o f 1942, signed by the President January 30, 1942, gave to the Office o f Price Adminis tration statutory power to stabilize prices and rents and authority to punish violators. The Price Administrator was authorized after proper investigation and consultation to establish “ fair and equit able” maximum prices, but was directed to give consideration to prices prevailing between October 1 and October 15, 1941. Price schedules already issued were expressly continued in force. Special limitations were placed upon his powers with respect to agricultural commodities. Ceilings could not be fixed below the highest o f the follow ing levels as determined by the Secretary o f Agriculture: (1) 110 (2) the (3) the (4) the 30,1929.-1 percentum of the parity price . . . ; market price . . . on October 1, 1941; market price . . . on December 15, 1941; or average price . . . during the period o f July 1, 1919, to June In addition, ceilings could not be established for articles man ufactured wholly or substantially from agricultural commodities below a price which would reflect to producers the highest o f these four levels.2 2 Moreover, ceilings were subject to the approval of 2 13 2 the Secretary o f Agriculture.2 8 Policy on wages was expressed in these words: It shall be the policy o f those departments and agencies o f the Gov ernment dealing with wages (including the Department o f Labor and its various bureaus; the War Department; the Navy Department; the War Production Board, the National Labor Relations Board, and the National Mediation Board, the National War Labor Board, and others heretofore or hereafter created) within their limits of authority and jurisdiction to 21 Emergency Price Control Act o f 1912, see. 3 (a ). (P u blic, No, 421, 77th Cong., 2d sess.), W ashington, 1912. 22 Idem , sec. 3 (c). 23 Idem , sec. 3\e)» 9 work toward a stabilization of prices, fair and equitable wages, and cost o f production. Four principal methods o f enforcement o f price regulations were provided in the act: Criminal proceedings, injunctions and com pliance orders, licensing, and suits for treble damages.2 3 Pressures on Price Level in February-March 1 9 4 2 In the first quarter, 1942, it was evident that drastic price rises threatened and that piece-meal price fixing would no longer suf fice. As a result o f expanding war production, employment in manufacturing industries had increased one-third since August 1939, hourly earnings had increased one-quarter, and income pay ments to individuals one-half. Corporate profits before taxes were up 171 percent, and corporate profits after taxes 91 percent. Gov ernment expenditures fo r war had increased from less than 200 million dollars in July 1940 to 2 billion dollars in January 1942 and 3 billion dollars in March 1942. Monthly expenditures o f 6 billion dollars by the end o f 1942 were in prospect.2 The first 4 wave o f wage increases beginning in May 1011— together with overtime pay, upgrading o f workers, and other factors— had raised average hourly earnings in factories 11 percent between May .1941 and March 1942. Since wage contracts were tradition ally renewed in the spring, it was felt that a second wave o f wage increases to meet the increase in the cost o f living since the spring o f 1941 was immiment.2 5 Coupled with these inflationary demand factors were pros pects for greatly reduced supplies o f consumer goods. Output o f civilian goods, which had risen about 25 percent from August 1939 to August 1941, began to contract about that time. Curtailment orders were issued fo r many durable goods, such as automobiles, refrigerators, vacuum cleaners, and others. By March 1942 civil ian consumption had been reduced by 8 percent from its level in August 1941 and further shrinkage in civilian supplies was antici pated with the conversion o f 50 percent o f national production to war goods.2 ® The impact o f increasing demand and decreasing supplies gives rise to what has been termed the “ inflationary gap,” the difference between civilian purchasing power and the supply o f goods and services available for civilians. In early 1942 the amount o f this gap fo r the calendar year 1942 was estimated at 17 billion dollars.2 2 Trend o f Prices These.conditions in the American econom y o f early 1942 re sulted in an accelerated rate of price increases in sharp contrast 23 Emergency Price Control A ct o f 1942, sec. 3 (e). (P ublic, No. 421, 77th Cong., 2d sess.), W ashington, 1942. 24 First Quarterly Report fo r the Period ended A pril 30,1942- (Office o f Price Adm in istration), pp. 23-29. 25 Idem , p. 29. 26 Idem ,, p .. 27. 27 Idem , p.218. 26 Idem p 27. 10 to the steady but slower advance up to the time o f the attack on Pearl Harbor. By March 1942, the Bureau o f Labor Statistics index o f the prices o f 28 basic commodities was 66 percent above its August 1939 level, the comprehensive wholesale price index 30 percent, and the consumers* price index 16 percent. (See Appen dix tables 5 and 6.) These price advances closely-paralleled in scope and timing those which occurred during W orld W ar I.*® Furthermore, the rate o f increase had' been much greater since December 1941, despite the extension o f selective controls. Between August 1939 and November 1941 the average monthly rate o f increase was 0.9 percent for wholesale prices and 0.4 percent for consumers* prices compared with 1.4 and 0.9 percent, respectively, between November 1941 and March 1942. Not only were the price advances greater but they extended over a wider field. At the wholesale level they no longer were confined to individual com modities or even to industrial goods needed fo r direct war use. The greatest increases in wholesale prices after August 1939 were for farm products, foods, and textiles (all consumer goods), having risen, respectively, 69 percent, 43 percent, and 43 percent, by March 1942. The spread o f price increases to the retail field was particularly alarming; in the 3 months from December 15,1941, to March 15,1942, consumers* prices as a whole rose 3% percent, foods 5 percent, and clothing 8 percent. From February to March retail price increases were widespread, particularly fo r clothing and housefurnishings. The behavior o f commodities under price control contrasted sharply with that o f commodities not controlled. According to an OPA analysis,®* the Bureau o f Labor Statistics wholesale price index rose 17 percent as a whole from April 1941 to March 1942; uncontrolled commodities in the index, 20 percent; commodities subject to form al control, only 1.5 percent; and commodities sub ject to inform al control, 16 percent. Furthermore, two items, petroleum and automobiles, accounted for most o f the advance fo r commodities inform ally controlled. Omitting these two com modities, this portion o f the index •was highly stable. The effec tiveness o f selective price control, the purpose o f which might be deemed the control o f relative prices rather than o f the general price level, was expressed in these words: Selective price control has been strikingly successful in stabilizing those prices upon which controls were imposed, once the action was taken.80 Inadequacy o f Existing Price Control Price increases for uncontrolled commodities were respon sible for a continued rise in the general price leveL In December 1941 only 13.3 percent o f the value o f commodities in the Bureau2 0 3 9 8 28 Progress o f Price Regulatiou to September 1942, b y Saul Nelson (M onthly Labor Review, October 1942, pp. 660-663). 29 The Effectiveness o f Selective Price Control (D ivision o f Research, Price Analysis and Review Branch, Office o f Price Adm inistration, W ashington, May 1, 1942). 30 The Effectiveness o f Selective Price Control (D ivision o f Research, Price Analysis and Review* Branch, Office o f Price Adm inistration, W ashington, May 1, 1942), p . 1. 11 o f Labor Statistics wholesale price index was under form al con trol and 14.7 percent under inform al control. Although immediate steps to extend selective price control were taken after the United States entered the war, by March 1942 only one-third o f the Bureau o f Labor Statistics index was under form al and one-eighth under inform al control.*1 The need for m ore decisive action on a broad scale was evi dent. During the period up to the declaration of war, the estab lishment o f ceilings fo r the relatively few items which actually had experienced rapid price increases had seemed the most prac ticable method o f price control. As expressed by OPA,8 “ when 2 the commodities requiring price control were limited in number, price control could be limited in scope” ; and again, “ the defense program produced an uneven pressure on prices and called for selective price control.” By early 1942, however, the pace o f advances was too rapid to admit o f further extension o f selective controls. Commodities already controlled at wholesale represented largely basic m ajor products which required a minimum o f separate simple sched ules; those still uncontrolled included numerous items o f lesser individual importance (though o f equal aggregate value), and many highly fabricated articles requiring com plex ceiling orders. Control at retail presented even more perplexing problems— mil lions o f sellers, a great variety o f products, and complicated local differences. It also should be remembered that the OPA staff was still inexperienced, having been expanded from 529 on July 1, 1941, to 1,500 on January 31,1942, and to 3,711 on April 30,1942.** Furthermore, according to OPA, “ the legal formalities surround ing the transition to a statutory basis, including republication o f the prestatutory price schedules and setting up o f legal procedures for complaint and appeal, slowed down the pace o f form al action.” Because o f the accumulating pressures on the price level and because o f the “ extremely difficult mechanical and administrative problems” involved in extending price control to the remainder o f the economy on a piece-meal basis, “ selective price control had to yield to a general ceiling.” 8 Possibly this decision was also influ * enced by the doubtful outlook fo r effective monetary and fiscal policy in the spring o f 1942.** Accordingly, on April 28, 1942, fo l lowing the example o f Canada, the Office o f Price Administration issued the General Maximum Price Regulation (hereinafter re ferred to as “ GMPR” ), after discussions and consultations with industry representatives which had been begun early in April.3 5 4 2 1 31 First Quarterly Report fo r the Period ended A pril 30,1942 (Office o f Price Adm in istration), p. 24. 32 Facing the Price Problem (D ivision o f Research, Office o f Price Adm inistration, Washington, A pril 23, 1942), pp. 34 and 36. 33 Second Report o f the Office o f Price Adm inistration Covering the Operations o f the Office between May 1 and July 31,1942, House Document No. 891 (77th Cong., 2d sess.), Washington, 1942 (p. 88). 34 First Quarterly Report fo r the Period ended A pril 30, 1942 (Office o f Price Ad m inistration), pp. 24 and 30. 35 The Tactics o f Retail price Control, b y John Perry M iller (in Quarterly Journal o f Economics, Boston, August 1943, p. 498). 12 Chapter 3 .—Provisions o f the General Maximum Price Regulation This regulation, together with a companion order on rents, gave force to one o f the points in President Roosevelt’s seven-point campaign to keep down the cost o f living, which was outlined in his- message to Congress on April 27,1942, and his “ fireside chat” to the American people the next day. Briefly, the regulation set the ceiling for each seller as the highest price charged in March 1942 to the same class o f consumer. It became effective on May 11,1942, for manufacturers and wholesalers, on May 18,1942, fo r retailers, and on July 1, 1942, for services. Its terms were not applicable to any items covered by other price regulations. Limitations o f Emergency Price Control Act Planned as “ an absolute ceiling over virtually everything that Americans eat, wear, and use,” 1 certain exceptions, which were seriously to limit its effectiveness, were enforced by the terms o f the Emergency Price Control Act and others were made for ad ministrative or practical reasons. Among the exceptions were commodities such as advertising, newspapers, books, magazines, m otion pictures, wages, com mon-carrier and public-utility rates, insurance, and real estate, all o f which were excluded because o f the definition o f “ com modity” in the act.2 Of such especial signifi 4 * cance that they were later to require amendment o f the Emer gency Price Control Act and extensive use o f subsidies to hold down the cost o f living were unprocessed farm products and cer tain foods, exempted because the act did not permit control o f agricultural commodities until their prices had attained a level substantially above “ parity.” 2 Possibly o f equal importance was the exemption o f wages. Exclusion o f wages from GMPR was necessitated by the terms o f the act.* Moreover, Mr. Henderson’s opposition to control o f 1 First Quarterly Report fo r the Period ended A pril 30, 1942 (Office o f P rice Adm in istration), p. 36. 2 Sec. 302(c), Em ergency Price Control Act o f 1942 (P ublic, No. 421, 77th Cong., 2d “ The term ‘ commodity* means com m odities, articles, products, and m aterials (ex cept m aterials furnished fo r publication by any press association or feature service, books, magaziues, m otion pictures, periodicals and newspapers, other than as waste or scrap), . . . Provided, That nothing in this act shall be construed to authorize the regu lation o f (1) com pensation paid by an em ployer to any o f his em ployees, or (2) rates charged b y any common carrier or other public utility, o? (3) rates charged b y any person engaged in the business o f selling or underwriting insurance, or (4) rates charged by any person engaged in the business o f operating or publishing a newspaper, periodical, or magazine, or operating a radio-broadcasting station, a m otion-picture or other theatre enterprise, or outdoor advertising facilities, or (5) rates charged fo r any professional services/* ft Sec. 3, Emergency Price Control Act (P ublic, No. 421, 77th Cong., 2d sess.): “ (c) No maximum price shall be established or maintained fo r any com m odity processed or m anufactured in whole or substantial part from any agricultural com mod ity below a price which w ill reflect to producers o f such agricultural com m odity a price for such agricultural com m odity equal to the highest price therefor specified in sub section (a).** 4 Sec. 302(c), Emergency Price Control Act o f 1942 (P ublic, No. 421, 77th Cong., 2d sess.). 13 wages by the Price Administrator was expressed repeatedly in the hearings on the price control bill. That wages were not effectively controlled until a much later date entailed serious problems for price control. Rising wages exerted continual pressure on the price level and compelled numerous upward adjustments o f ceilings. Commodities exempted for practical or administrative rea sons included highly seasonal articles, such as fresh fish, and objects o f art, for which it would be difficult to determine fair prices; primary raw materials, such as timber, prices o f which are controlled indiriectly by ceilings at later stages o f production; and commodities covered by other OPA regulations. Sales under certain conditions were also exempted for practical reasons: Food prepared and sold for consumption on the premises, used personal effects when sold at auction or by the owner, used business sup plies not acquired for the purpose of sale, sales fo r philanthropic purposes, processed farm commodities or pelts and furs o f wild animals when sold by farmer or trapper, provided the total sales did not exceed $75 in any one month. Provision was also made for later exemptions, including sales to the Government, under supplementary regulations. Determination o f Ceiling MARCH FItEEZE The reasons fo r the selection of the month o f March 1942 were not necessarily restrictive. Some other base period might have proven equally effective. As expressed in the Statement o f Considerations which accompanied the General Maximum Price Regulation, “ the selection o f one base period rather than another is a matter for reasonable administrative determination.” It was felt that a period as near as possible to the date o f issuance o f the regulation would cause the least disruption o f business activities and the fewest administrative difficulties. Considerable time was needed, howeyer, fo r thoughtful consideration o f the problems entailed and fo r consultation and meeting with trade groups. Furthermore, there were indications that some price increases had been made deliberately during March and April in anticipation o f broader price control. The plan for a general retail freeze was openly discussed in the press in early April.® The net result o f these considerations was the selection o f March 1942, despite the provision in the Price Control Act that maximum prices reflect, insofar as practicable, the level o f prices between October 1 and October 15,1941. It was not expected that absolute equities could be realized in this first step; in fact it was stated that— Supplementary regulations which cannot practicably be analyzed sepa rately at this time, may establish prices closer to October 1 prices as adjusted.®5 6 5 See, fo r exam ple, W all Street Journal (New Y ork ), A pril 2, 1942, and Journal o f Commerce (New Y ork), A pril 6, 1942. 6 Statement o f Considerations Involved in the Issuance o f the General Maximum Price Regulation (Office o f Price Adm inistration, W ashington, 1942), —3 098255— JO 14 A calendar month was selected because records o f so many busi ness concerns are maintained on that basis. Although the price structure in early 1942 was admittedly imperfect, it did represent relationships during a period o f vir tually full employment. It was alleged, m oreover, that “ more nearly than at any time during the last decade, today’s price structure approaches the balance that is required fo r the econom y to function efficiently.” 7 The justice o f this contention is sup 9 8 ported by an analysis® o f the March 1942 price structure by Don D. Humphrey. Chief o f the Price Analysis and Review Branch, Research Division, Office o f Price Administration, along the lines suggested some years ago by Gardiner Means* study o f “ adminis tration dominated” and “ market dominated” prices.® Mr. Hum phrey’s conclusion was that the depression-created spread between sensitive and insensitive wholesale prices had virtually disappeared by March 1942 and that prices had reached both the level and horizontal balance o f predepression days. Although simple in concept, the definition o f the “ highest price charged in March 1942” required lengthy explanation in Bulletin No. 1— The General Maximum Price Regulation, and in Bulletin No. 2—W hat Every Retailer Should Know About the General Maximum Price Regulation. An attempt was made to anticipate all contingencies and to regulate against all possible evasions o f the intent o f the order. Nevertheless, as w ill be seen later, noncompliance with OPA regulations may have been caused as much by confusion as by w illful violation. In contrast, Canada’s entire “ Maximum Prices Regulations,” 1 0 which was the m odel fo r the United States order, was only three pages long and the definition o f maximum prices only one page. This brevity was attained in part by greater reliance upon the obvious intent o f the regulation. Thus, in connection with the determination o f maximum prices fo r goods not sold in the base period on the basis o f prices for similar goods, it is stated— In any case in which the question arises as to the lawful price for any such goods or services the onus o f proving the existence and extent o f any relevant and substantial similarity or dissimilarity alleged by the seller or supplier shall be upon him. 7 Facing the Price Problem (D ivision o f Research, Office o f Price Adm inistration, A pril 23, 1942), p. 38. 8 Price Control in Outline, b y Don D. Humphrey (in Am erican Econom ic Review, Decem ber, 1942), 9 See Structure o f the Am erican Economy (National Resources Committee, Wash ington, June 1939, p. 389), This study showed a high degree o f correlation between the frequency and magnitude o f price change. Commodities included in the BLS wholesale price index were classified into 5 groups, A, R, C, D, and E, w ith those showing the few est changes in group A (adm inistration-dom inated) and those showing the most frequent changes in group E (m arket-dom inated). Price indexes on a 1926-29 base for the year 1932 and fo r March 1942 are com pared below fo r these groups: Number o f monthly changes In price, Jan. 1926 - Dec. 1933 Group A ................................................ 0-7 8-16 Group B ............. Group C ................................................ 17-34 Group D ............................................ 35-77 Group E ............................ 78-95 io Order in CounciJ, P.C. 8527, November 1, 1941, W holesale price indexes (1926-29 = 100) 1932 March 1942 89.5 100 79.3 100 70.1 100 62.0 108 46.3 96 15 The United States regulation, in contrast, attempts a rigid defini tion o f “ similar” commodities and services, as follow s: One commodity shall be deemed “ similar” to another commodity, if the first has the same use as the second, affords the purchaser fairly equivalent serviceability, and belongs to a type which would ordinarily be sold in the same price line. In determining the similarity o f such com modities, differences merely in style or design which do not substantially affect use, o r serviceability, or the price line in which such commodities woujd ordinarily have been sold, shall not be taken into account. One service shall be deemed “ similar” to another service if the first has the same use and purpose as the second and belongs to a type which would ordinarily be sold for the same or substantially the same price. PROGRESSIVE PRICING FORMULA The determination o f the ceiling price rests upon what has been called the “ progressive pricing form ula,” a series o f alterna tive methods each o f which in turn theoretically precludes the use o f those which follow . Thus, if possible, the highest price charged in March means the top price for which the same article was delivered during March 1942; if no delivery was made, the highest offering price in March 1942. Many articles, however, were not sold in March 1942. If the same article was not delivered or offered fo r sale in March, the maximum price is successively the highest price fo r the most similar article delivered in March, or offered fo r sale in March. Frequently no similar article was sold in March. In such cases the maximum price is the highest price charged by the most closely competitive seller o f the same class. For new articles which cannot be priced under any o f the above methods, manufacturers (under the original provisions) must apply to OPA fo r maximum prices; wholesalers and retailers may calculate their own maximum prices by adding the margin on the fastest-moving comparable com modity o f the same general classi fication to the replacement cost o f the new item. Customary allow ances, discounts, and other price differentials must be continued in all cases. Record-Keeping and Posting The regulation included certain record-keeping and price posting requirements. All sellers were asked to keep base period records and to prepare lists o f all items sold in March 1942 show ing the highest prices charged as well as customary allowances and discounts. Retailers were required to display ceiling prices on items designated in the regulation as cost-of-Uving commodities so as to be “ clearly visible” to the customers. Although this require ment was expected to aid enforcement, its purpose was largely psychological, to show the consumer “ (1) that his cost o f living is not rising and (2) that the retailer is perform ing an important role in the battle against inflation on the home front.” 1 It was a 1 part o f OPA’s program to “ sell” price control to the American public.' There was no assurance that posted prices were the legal ii Bulletin No, 2 : W hat Every Retailer Should Know About the General Maximum Price Regulation (Office o f Price Adm inistration* W ashington, May 1942), 16 ceilings and there is little evidence that posting o f GMPR ceiling prices contributed materially to the enforcement o f the regulation. As w ill be steen later, some retailers raised their posted prices, as convenient. Moreover, the burden o f record-keeping and posting caused considerable irritation and a certain lack o f cooperation. Licensing All wholesalers and retailers were required to register their establishments with OPA and were automatically licensed by the OPA to sell commodities or s e r v ic e s covered by the regulations. Penalties Penalties for infraction o f the regulation were those provided in the Emergency Price Control Act and consisted o f criminal proceedings, civil suits, revocation or suspension o f licenses, and suits for treble damages. One feature o f the regulation was that both buyer and seller were adjudged guilty of violation in cases o f sales* above ceiling. This later made it difficult fo r OPA to obtain reports (from buyers) o f violations o f regulations. Provisions for Adjustments Since the GMPR was deemed an emergency measure, numer ous adjustments were anticipated. In particular it was recognized that the normal tendency for retail prices to lag behind whole sale prices, wholesale behind manufacturers’, and prices o f fin ished goods behind those o f raw materials, would cause maladjust ments. Provision for the alleviation o f the resultant squeeze between costs and selling prices was specifically included in the regulation under section 4, as follow s: If the maximum prices established for any commodity under the provisions o f this regulation fail equitably to distribute returns from the sale at retail o f such commodity among producers, manufacturers, whole salers, and retailers, the Price Administrator will by supplementary regu lation establish such maximum prices for different classes o f sellers, or fix such base periods for the determination o f their maximum prices, as will insure that each such class o f sellers shall receive a fair share of such return. It was the intention o f OPA that, as in Canada, such adjust ments would be made backward rather than forward, i.e., “ by rolling back the squeeze.” The Statement o f Considerations ac companying the regulation contains this statement: “ One thing should be clearly understood. Retail prices will not be increased. . . . Adjustments may be made. . . . But the ceiling w ill not be punctured.” It was proposed to accomplish this in several ways: by compelling manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers to absorb appropriate parts o f the squeeze, by effecting economies in manu 17 factoring and distribution, and Anally, if necessary, by the use o f Government subsidies.1 2 In addition to section 4, which deals specifically with toe retail squeeze, section 18 o f toe regulation, known as toe ‘’hard ship” clause, outlines a procedure foi* adjustment o f inequities at the retail level, both for an individual merchant whose maximum prices were abnormally low in relation to his competitors’, and for groups o f retailers whose maximum prices were low in rela tion to prices at other levels o f distribution. Section 19 provides for petitions for other adjustments. Chapter 4. —Amendments and Subsequent Regulations Very soon it became evident that issuance o f the General Maximum Price Regulation had halted only temporarily toe up ward movement o f prices. Reference was made in OPA’s second report o f operations to toe continued rise o f wholesale prices and the cost o f living and to “ toe basic weaknesses in toe program to control prices,” by which was meant the agricultural limitations o f toe Emergency Price Control Act, failure to stabilize wages and incomes, and failure to institute adequate taxation, savings, and other fiscal programs to reduce consumers’ purchasing power, none o f which, it w ill be noted, were inherent in the General Maximum Price Regulation.1* In the third quarterly report it was stated: In spite o f the General Maximum Price Regulation, the outlook for inflation control at the close o f the summer was very bleak. Although the prices brought under control by the GMPR were held firmly, the prices, which, b y reason o f the limitations o f section 3 o f the Emergency Price Control Act, could not be controlled continued to rise, indeed at an accelerating ra te.. . . Only immediate stabilization could prevent a resump tion of the wage-cost spiral, which had been temporarily halted b y tne GMPR in May.14 Amendment to the Emergency Price Control Act The urgency o f toe situation resulted in passage o f toe amend ment to the Emergency Price Control Act by Congress on October 2, 1942, in response to toe President’s message to Congress on September 7. This action, o f m ajor importance in the battle against inflation,, made possible both a. broad extension o f price control and the stabilization o f wages. The original provision in toe Price Control Act prohibiting ceilings on agricultural com modities below 110 percent of. parity was amended to permit toe 12 First Quarterly Report fo r the Period ended A pril 30, 1942 (Office of: Price A d m inistration), pp. 44-46. 13 Second Report o f the Office o f Price Adm inistration, covering the operations o f the Office between May 1 and July 31,1942 (House Doc. No. 891, 77th: Cong., 2d sessi),_p. 3. . 14 Third Quarterly Report fo r the Period ended October 31, 1942 (Office or Price Adm inistration, W ashington, 1943), p . 1. 18 establishment o f ceilings either at parity or the highest market price between January 1 and September 15,1942, whichever was higher. In regard to wages, the President was authorized to sta bilize wages and salaries insofar as practicable at the level o f September 15, 1942. The President’s Executive Order o f October 3,1942,* creating the Office o f Econom ic Stabilization, with form er Supreme Court Justice James F. Byrnes as Director, was an even more farreaching move. It specifically directed (1) the Secretary o f Agri culture and the Price Administrator jointly to stabilize agricul tural prices and (2) the National W ar Labor Board, wages, insofar as practicable at the level o f September 15, 1942. Significantly, the 100 percent o f parity regulation was interpreted to mean parity less benefit payments. The order directed the Price Admin istrator to determine price ceilings so that “ profits are prevented which in his judgment are unreasonable or exorbitant.” It also authorized the use o f subsidies either to insure maximum produc tion or to maintain ceiling prices. Actually, although it was not so used, it set up the machinery fo r the control o f all financial transactions as well as the sale o f all goods and services. The.Di rector o f Econom ic Stabilization was ordered to formulate "com prehensive national econom ic policy relating to the control o f civilian purchasing power, prices, rents, wages, salaries, profits, rationing, subsidies, and all related matters—all fo r the purpose o f preventing avoidable increases in the cost o f living.” Immediately follow ing the President’s order, the OPA, on October 5, 1942, placed poultry, butter, cheese, evaporated milk, eggs, wheat flour, corn meal, onions, navy beans, and oranges under control at wholesale and retail by a new price regulation, raising the propor tion o f foods controlled at retail from 60 to 90 percent.* 4 Amendment o f the General Maximum Price Regulation During the first months o f operation under the regula tion, three m ajor limitations o f the general freeze technique be came “ clearly manifest” . These were well expressed by OPA as follow s: 1. Since all prices in March 1942 did not bear a normal relationship to one another, the GMPR had the effect o f freezing dislocations in the price structure. 2. Some m ajor items o f cost—primarily labor and agricultural com modities—were not controlled or were inadequately controlled, and increases in these costs pressed against the ceiling prices, squeezing the trade badly in many cases. In addition, OPA authorized increases in raw material prices which had similar effects. The squeeze necessitated many adjustments that absorbed much o f the time o f the Office. 3. Almost insurmountable difficulties o f administration w ere en countered in those cases where market practices are complex and the commodity is subject to a large measure o f variability. In addition, pricing 8 Executive O rder N o. 9250 (W a sh in gton ), O ctober 3 , 1942. 4 T hird Q uarterly R eport to r the Period ended October 31, 1942 (O ffice o f P rice A dm in istration ), p . 2 . 19 methods and extent o f coverage under the GMPR sometimes were not clearly understood b y the seller, and caused unintentional violations.5 Revision o f the regulation in regard to specific commodities or conditions o f sale was required frequently. At the end o f 1943, there had been issued 59 amendments, 15 supplementary regula tions, 476 amendments to supplementary regulations, 625 orders under section 1499.3(b) o f GMPR authorizing maximum prices, 24S orders under section 1499.18(b) and 190 under section 1499.18(c) o f GMPR adjusting maximum prices, and 185 orders under supplementary regulations. Some o f these actions were o f m ajor importance. Revised Supplementary Regulation No. 1 contains all the exemptions o f commodities from the General Maximum Price Regulation. W ith its 39 amendments up to the end o f 1943, it filled about 20 pages in “ OPA Service,” voluminous loose-leaf compilation o f all OPA regulations. Similarly, Revised Supplementary Regulation No. 11 lists all the services exempt from GMPR, which totaled 138 by the end o f 1943. Am ong the commodities and services exempted by these supplementary regulations were: imported silk waste, cotton m ill wastes, sales o f all waste materials up to the level o f the in dustrial consumer; zinc, lead, and tin industrial residues; anti m ony ore and concentrates; jewel bearings; certain machines manufactured under subcontract; greenstuffs used fo r Christmas decorations; sales by nonprofit agencies o f articles manufactured by blind persons; dead or fallen animals; services covered under Maximum Price Regulation No. 165; etc. Of particular significance was Supplementary Regulation No. 4, originally issued on May 13,1942, which deals with the exemp tion of military commodities. Despite the example o f Canada, which had exempted military commodities from its “ Maximum Prices Regulations” (see Order in Council, P.C. 8527), and the opposition o f military procurement agencies, OPA had hoped that, at the time GMPR was issued, it could exercise effective price control over military procurement. It soon recognized, however, that “ the General Maximum Price Regulation was not well suited to the pricing o f most m ilitary equipment.” ® Military equipment must be produced to rigid but changing specifications and its pro duction must not be impeded by inadequate pricing. The Army, Navy, Maritime Commission, and other Government procurement agencies maintained that higher prices to marginal producers must be permitted, if necessary. Because o f these considerations, section 9 o f the regulation had provided fo r the exclusion o f “ sales to the United States or any agency thereof o f such commodities or in such transactions as may be specified by supplementary regulations issued under this section.” Under Supplementary Regulation No. 4, “ developmental” and “ secret” contracts with the Government, “ emergency purchases,” and sales to the Govern ment o f a comprehensive list o f finished goods, including combat* 6 . . . * Fourth Quarterly Report fo r the Period ended January 81, 1943 (Office o f Price Adm inistration, W ashington, 1943), p . 33. 6 Second Report o i the Office o f Price Adm inistration, p. 39* 20 items, foods, and clothing, were exempted from GMPR. OPA re tained control over raw materials and semifabricated articles, but by use o f subsidies, as in the case o f metals, or by other means, military articles have been exempted from price control by OPA, wherever necessary. In September 1942, OPA agreed to delegate responsibility to the military services for price control over purely military items purchased by them but reserved the right to resume such responsibility if prices of military goods were not effectively controlled. This extensive exemption o f military items, as w ill be seen later, exerted an inflationary pressure on prices in other seg ments o f the econom y through the medium o f demands fo r higher wages. In sharp contrast to the numerous exemptions from GMPR were the few items subsequently brought under the regulation. In conform ity with OPA’s general policy o f superseding -GMPR as rapidly as possible, new items were usually brought under price control immediately by specific regulations. Modifications o f maximum prices under GMPR are made under Supplementary Regulation 14. The revised regulation in corporating all the provisions o f the original supplementary regu lation and its numerous amendments, and including 70 additional amendments, takes up over 175 pages in OPA Service. Modifica tions o f maximum prices were made frequently in terms o f spe cific dollars-and-cents ceilings. For convenience, maximum prices for milk and milk products and bread and bakery products are contained in separate Supplementary^ Regulations 14A and 14B, respectively. Supplementary Regulation 14A. alone requires 100 additional pages in OPA Service. Many o f the amendments to GMPR were simply clarifications o f definitions or terms o f the original regulation. Others ex empted sales o f certain commodities or services from control, and as such have been incorporated in Supplementary Regulations 1 and 11. Three amendments, however, are o f m ore general im por tance. Amendment No. 10 extended to manufacturers and whole salers the same opportunity originally accorded retailers o f ob taining relief from GMPR ceilings in case o f hardship and also facilitated the procedure for obtaining such relief. Amendment No. 33, effective November 4, 1942, represented a change in OPA policy regarding adjustments. Formerly OPA had devoted con siderable time to the adjustment o f maximum prices fo r individ ual sellers and, up to the date o f this amendment, had already processed “ thousands” o f applications under Paragraph 1499.18 o f the regulation.7 By this amendment OPA gave warning that m ajor emphasis in the future would be on regulations or adjust ments o f general application only, and that after November 30, 1942, adjustment o f maximum prices for an individual' seller would be made in exceptional cases only, hi the same vein was Amendment No. 54, which granted manufacturers the same privilege already accorded wholesalers and retailers o f determin 7 Statement o f Considerations, Amendment No. 33, General Maximum Price Regu lation (W ashington), November 4, 1942. 21 ing maximum prices fo r a new product not sold by them or by their competitors in March 1942 on the basis o f cost plus the mark-up on a comparable commodity. Originally manufacturers had been required to apply to OPA for approval o f specific prices. Removal o f Commodities From GMPR W ithin 6 or 7 months after May 1942, individual regulations replaced GMPR to a great extent.8 Most o f the commodities cov ered by the 123 specific regulations issued between August 1,1942, and January 31,1943, for example, had originally been controlled by GMPR.® OPA’s Directory o f Commodities and Services, cor rected through March 15,1943, shows clearly the degree to which GMPR had at that time already been superseded by specific regu lations. The tabulation which follow s, arranged according to organizational division in the Office o f Price Administration, shows that, out o f m ore than 5,000 commodities listed, only 1,400 were governed entirely by GMPR as o f March 15, 1943, 1,650 by specific regulations, and 2,000 partly by GMPR and partly by specific regulations. In only a few sectors, notably chemicals and drugs and nonferrous metals, were appreciable proportions still under sole control o f GMPR. In some fields, such as machinery, petroleum, rubber, building materials, sendees, and consumer durable goods, only negligible proportions remained solely under GMPR. N u m b er o f c o m m o d ity item s listed , b y O P A organisational bra nch1 OPA organizational branch A ll items A ll branches: Total .................................... 240 Grocery products ......................................... 60 Sugar, tobacco, and dairy products.......... 86 Meats, fish, fats and o ils............................... 240 Cereals, feeds, and agricultural chem icals 41 Petroleum ' ...................................................... 14 Solid fuels ...................................................... 715 Chemicals and d r u g s .................... ............... 645 Machinery ...................................................... 225 Paper and paper products........................... 199 Rubber ........................................................... 302 Building m aterials ........................................ 335 Nonferrous metals ...................................... 132 Iron and steel ............................................... 236 Lumber ........................................................... Textiles, leather, and apparel: 423 Prim ary products .................................. 208 Manufactured articles .......................... 72 Service trades ................................................ Consumer durable goods ............................ 1,018 3 Transportation ............................................... Specific regula tion GMPR and specific regula tion Ex empt GMPR 136 1,400 1,652 2,006 20 3 9 38 16 79 18 17 90 106 2 29 16 43 25 11 34 620 93 10 13 115 94 63 35 10 44 69 ...1 4 3 6 ..26 ♦ 2 6 2 ... ... ... ••• 3 573 14 69 9 9 194 31 93 107 85 ...6 3 220 25 72 63 *** 107 7 60 174 280 *5 74 94 98 949 1 Source: D irectory o f Commodities and Services, Office o f Price Adm inistration (W ashington), 1943. 2 Including one item controlled by inform al agreement. 8 Price Control in Outline, by Don D. Humphrey (in Am erican Econom ic Review. December 1942). * » Fourth Quarterly Report fo r the Period ended January 31, 1943 (Office o f Price Adm inistration), pp. 4 and 33. 698255— IO'— 4 22 Subsequent Regulations Specific regulations issued subsequently to GMPR can be classified for convenience into four general types, often used in combination in a single regulation: (1) Those retaining the March 1942 freeze date, but designed to fit particular industry problems, (2) those having base dates other than March 1942, (3) form ula or cost-plus regulations, and (4) specific dollarsand-cents ceilings, including Nation-wide as well as “ community” ceilings. A detailed discussion o f these regulations is not possible within the scope o f this report, but a few illustrative examples may suffice to emphasize the principles involved.1 0 DESIGNED TO MEET SPECIFIC INDUSTRY PROBLEMS Certain peculiar characteristics o f the service trades required their removal from GMPR on June 23, 1942, just prior to the effective date o f control, and their inclusion under Maximum Price Regulation 165, effective July 1, 1942. Many services are not standardized, many are seasonal, and many are o f the “ custombuilt” variety, fo r which there are no established prices. The most important element o f cost fo r most services, i.e., wages, was not controlled. Accordingly, retaining the March 1942 base date, sellers were permitted to determine their ceiling prices using the same component charges as in the base period, adjusted for regu lar seasonal variations. A special provision was made fo r applica tion fo r ceiling adjustments because o f cost increases up to April 27,1942. In view o f administrative difficulties, the requirement o f posting ceiling prices fo r cost-of-living services was omitted. OTHER FREEZE DATES The most important examples o f regulations subsequent to GMPR, providing for base dates other than March 1942, can be found in foods, particularly those commodities brought under control by authority o f the October 2, 1942, amendment to the Price Control Act.- Thus, prices o f these items were “ frozen” for 60 days under Temporary Maximum Price Regulation 22 at the level o f September 28 to October 2, 1942, and continued at this level under Maximum Price Regulation No. 280 pending further study. A few regulations, such as Maximum Price Regulation No. 177— Men’s and Boys’ Tailored Clothing, issued July 6, 1942, and Maximum Price Regulation No. 153—W om en’s, Girls’ and Chil dren’s Outerwear Garments, issued May 23, 1942, provided for base periods earlier than March 1942. Both o f these, however, could also be classified under the next or foim ula type o f regu lation. FORMULA REGULATIONS This form ula type is o f many varieties. Basically, ceilings are determined by adding certain margins to cost. The margin may 10 For a com plete- discussion o f the regulations issued from A pril 30 to July 31, 1942, see Second Report o f the Office o f Price Adm inistration • 77th Cong., 2d sess., House Doc. No. 891), Appendix A , pp. 91-192. 23 be the individual seller’s normal margin or, more commonly, as the program developed, a fixed margin specified in the regulation. Cost price might be current replacement cost or cost during a specified base period. In some cases, sellers are permitted to add specified increases in raw material or labor costs to base period costs. In the case o f Maximum Price Regulation No. 177, for example, specified percentages could be added to base period prices to cover increased material and labor costs. In the case o f Maximum Price Regulation No. 153, as amended on June 9,1942, manufacturers were permitted to add their customary- margin in the base period to current replacement costs. Most extensive use o f margin or cost-plus regulations was in foods, principally be cause o f the problem o f rising costs, which makes effective control by the freeze technique impossible. DOLLARS-AND-CENTS CEILINGS Probably the most desirable method o f price control, wher ever practicable, and certainly the most readily enforceable, as will later be seen, is the establishment o f specific dollars-andcents ceilings, alike fo r all sellers. Obviously, however, such ceil ings presuppose detailed and painstaking investigation, inconceiv able at the time o f issuance o f GMPR. Dollars-and-cents ceilings represented the ultimate goal o f OPA policy. The second quarterly report officially expressed “ the desire o f the Office to substitute specific dollars-and-cents ceilings wherever possible fo r the freeze technique o f the GMPR.” 1 In November 1942, Henderson stated: 1 “The end we seek is a simple manageable system o f controls, where possible, in dollars-and-cents terms and which both buyers and sellers can readily understand.” 1 2 The development and extension o f “ specified dollars-and-cents prices, as distinguished from base-period and cost-plus or formula prices,” was emphasized in OPA’s quarterly reports beginning with the report for the period ended January 3 1 ,1943.1* Although this program was initiated shortly after the the issuance o f GMPR and extended broadly during the fourth and fifth quarter opera tions o f OPA, it received m ajor impetus under the President’s “hold-the-line” order o f April 8,. 1943,1 *which was accompanied 4 by a statement o f the Director o f Econom ic Stabilization that dollars-and-cents ceilings would shortly be issued for many items.1 During May and June 1943 alone, 67 regulations were 8 issued setting specific dollars-and-cents ceilings fo r the Nation as , Second Report o f the Office o f Price Adm inistration covering the operations o f the Office between May 1 and July 31,1942 (77th Cong., 2d sess., House Doc. No. 891). p . 95. , „ 12 Address hy Leon Henderson, Adm inistrator, Office o f Price Adm inistration, before the S t Louis Chamber o f Commerce, Jefferson H otel, S t Louis, Mo., Novem ber 12. 1942. (OPA Release No. 1118, W ashington, 1942.) is Fourth Quarterly Report fo r the Period ended January 31, 1943 (Office o f Price Adm inistration), pp. 34-36. F ifth Quarterly Report fo r the Period ended A pril 30, 1943 (Office o f P rice Adm in istration, House Doc. No. 302, 78th Cong., 1st sess., W ashington, 1943), pp. 1-4. Sixth Quarterly Report fo r the P eriod ended June 30, 1943 (Office o f P rice Admin istration, W ashington, 1943), pp. 1-7. 14 Executive Order No. 9328 (W ashington), A pril 8, 1943. 15 Fifth Quarterly Report fo r the Period ended A pril 30, 1943 (Office o f Price A d -, m inistration, House Doc. No. 302, 78th Cong., 1st sess., W ashington), p. 1. 24 a whole or fo r broad geographic areas. In addition to these regu lations, a “ community ceding” program was inaugurated early in May. Under this program, dollars-and-cents maximum prices had been established at retail, by the end o f June, on about 1,000 grocery items in about 200 m ajor cities.1 These ceilings were cal 4 culated and set, fo r four types o f retail outlets, by district OPA offices on the basis o f cost data furnished by local suppliers, using the allowable wholesale and retail mark-ups set in existing food regulations.1 6 16 Sixth Quarterly Report fo r the Period ended June 30, 1943 (Office o f Price Ad m inistration), pp, 2-4. Part BE.—Appraisal Chapter 5 .—Direct and Indirect Violations Open Violations Enforcement o f OPA regulations has been difficult because “ facilities for enforcement have never been equal to the task,” 1 and in the case o f GMPR there also were inherent difficulties which prevented adequate enforcement. Legitimate ceilings under GMPR were indefinite and individ ual, and base period records not readily accessible. Posting Jof ceiling prices does not guarantee their legality. P roof o f violation consequently was difficult. Comprehensive statistics are not avail able to show the degree o f compliance, but unpublished records o f the Enforcement Division o f the Office o f Price Administration show that nearly 3,000 complaints o f violations o f GMPR were received per month between November 1942 and March 1943. Moreover, an OPA report, discussing the increase in the cost o f living between May 1942 and May 1943, acknowledged the exist ence o f “ many flagrant violations.” 2 3 One form er OPA official, writing in the Quarterly Journal o f Economics, described “ a general lack o f compliance with the letter and even the spirit o f the law” and a tendency o f a large number o f retailers to follow the principle o f “ mark-ups as usual” rather than ceilings o f GMPR or other regulations.2 Many small shopkeepers made no pretense o f determining March 1942 ceil ings, but simply calculated a profitable selling price and stamped “ ceiling price” on the price ticket. Some proof o f this tendency may be gleaned from the results o f an extensive survey o f food prices which showed advances in posted ceiling prices, during the latter part o f 1942, although no increases had been granted by OPA. Average ceiling prices on October 13, 1942, and December 15,1942, were compared fo r 27 foods covered by GMPR on both dates. These averages were not strictly comparable because the number o f stores was not identical on the two dates. It is sig nificant, however, that the number o f items fo r which average ceilings increased was much greater fo r small independent stores than for chains and supermarkets, and the size o f increase ap peared to be smaller fo r chains and supermarkets, as shown in the follow ing figures. 1 F ifth Quarterly Report fo r the Period Ended A pril 30, 1943 (Office o f Price Ad m inistration), p . 52. 2 One Year o f Retail P rice Control (May 1942-May 1943), P rice Control Report No. 15 (Office o f Price Adm inistration, W ashington, 1943). 3 The Tactics o f Retail Price Control, b y John Perry M iller (In Quarterly Journal o f Econom ics, August 1943, p . 507). 25 26 Number o f Increases All stores ....................... ...................... Small independent s t o r e s ................. Medium size independent s to r e s .... Large independent stores ................. Chain stores ........................................ Supermarkets ...................................... Number o f Decreases Number o f increases o f 1 percent or more 9 22 17 17 10 9 18 5 10 10 17 18 6 13 8 10 7 5 Trade papers, which have reported over-ceiling transactions in many commodities, have been both reticent and oblique in making accusations o f violations o f GMPR. This makes all the m ore significant those reports which have appeared and also makes not untenable the assumption that outright violations of GMPR were relatively more widespread than were reported for other more specific regulations. The Retail Merchants Association o f Detroit found by query in 1942 that only 42 percent o f its 27,000 members were com ply ing completely with GMPR rules. Many o f them had no records o f March 1942 prices and others could not understand the rules. Twenty-one percent o f the Detroit stores said they were not com plying in any part.4* OPA discovered in the fall o f 1942 that 50 6 percent o f 10,000 grocery stores investigated were not com plying with price regulations.® Of these, 40 percent represented m inor violations, largely failure to post prices, and 10 percent, violations serious enough to require legal action. Between April 27 and May 1, 1943, OPA, at the request o f President Roosevelt, made a survey o f food prices in 230 mining communities in Pennsylvania, W est Virginia, Kentucky, Illinois, Indiana, and Alabama, ranging from a population o f 300 to 12,000, the purpose o f which was to determine the degree o f compliance with OPA food regulations.® Prices were checked in 475 stores, o f which 100 were company stores and 65 were chain stores, and which represented 70-75 percent o f food sales in these communi ties. The foods checked were confined to those covered by three regulations (Nos. 238, 268, and 336), namely, coffee, fats and oils, processed foods, fresh fruits and vegetables, poultry, dairy prod ucts, and pork products. Maximum Price Regulations 238 and 268 were margin regulations under which ceiling prices were determined by adding a specified margin to the actual cost to the retailer, and Maximum Price Regulation No. 336 on pork prod ucts contained specific dollars-and-cents ceilings. The survejr did not attempt to check the degree o f compliance with GMPR, but the evidence indicates that nonconform ity with GMPR might have been even greater than with the three regulations checked. Viola tions o f mark-up regulations occurred in Pennsylvania and West Virginia for about 40 percent o f the items checked. Compliance with specific dollars-and-cents ceilings was markedly better. It was estimated that actual prices on the commodities checked 4 W all Street Journal (New Y ork), Decem ber 24, 1942, » Business W eek (New Y ork), Novem ber 14, 1942. 6 OPA Release No. 2472 (W ashington), May 10, 1943. 27 averaged 5 percent above ceiling prices. The survey also disclosed substantial noncompliance with the provisions for posting prices. The follow ing table shows the results: O PA su rvey o f food -p rice violations, April-M ay Regula tion No. State Illinois and Indiana ........................ Illinois and Indiana ........................ Kentucky ............................................ Kentucky ...................................... Kentucky .......................................... < Pennsylvania ...................................... Pennsylvania ............................... Pprmsvlvfinifl ................... ......................... West V irginia ..................................... West Virginia .................................... W est Virginia ..................................... 1943, Number o f items checked 238 & 268 336 238 268 336 238 268 336 238 268 336 3,356 1,080 740 394 498 1,226 515 436 420 321 550 specified States Number o f viola tions 331 111 11 10 4 479 210 0 186 122 93 Percent o f viola tion 9.1 10.0 1.5 2.5 0.8 39.1 40.8 0 44.3 38.0 16.9 Chief among recommendations made as a result o f the survey was that specific dollars-and-cents ceilings be substituted on all foods for existing form ula regulations as rapidly as possible. There was also evidence that violations o f price ceilings for clothing were even more numerous than fo r food.7 An OPA * investigation o f 300 chain stores selling clothing disclosed viola tions in 40 percent o f the stores. Violations in small independent stores would probably have been even higher. Black Markets In addition to outright violations o f ceilings in over-thecounter trade there was the continuing problem o f black markets, which multiplied with scarcities. Those fo r gasoline and meat, for example, were com m on knowledge. Other examples were cotton wash fabrics,® zippers,9 nylon hose,1 liquor,1 second-hand 0 1 furniture,1 and hardware and tools.1 Countless other illustra 2 3 tions could be cited.1 * In February 1944, Chester Bowles estimated 4 6 1 that “ between 3 and 4 percent o f the average cost o f all food is due to black market operations” .1 8 7 Sixth Quarterly Report fo r the Period ended June 30, 1943 (Office o f Price Admin istration). s Daily News Record (New Y ork), May 27, 1943. o Idem , March 26, 1943. io Journal o f Commerce, February 4, 1943; Daily New's Record, September 23, 1942. n W all Street Journal (New Y ork), May 13, 1943. 12 New York Tim es (New Y ork), November 6,1942. 13 Hardware Age (New Y ork), A pril 15, 1943. 14 Linings (D aily News Record, October 28, 1943); mattresses, blankets, and com fortable covers (Journal o f Commerce, May 21, 1943); rayon yarn (Journal o f Commerce, March 26, 1943, November 1, 1943); potatoes (Journal o f Commerce, May 5, 1943, New York Tim es, May 19, 1943); butter (New York Times, January 27, 1943); watches (New7 York Tim es, March 20, 1943); coal (W ashington Post, W ashington, D. C., January 27, 1943); beds and hedsprings (New York Tim es, A pril 15, 1943); hops (Journal o f Com m erce, November 9, 1943); used photographic equipment (Business W eek, October 31, 1942); second-hand farm machines (Journal o f Commerce, January 28, 1943; OPA Release No. 1409, W ashington, D. C., January 5,1943); spruce and hardw oods (Com m ercial Bulletin, Boston, Mass., November 28, 1942). 16 Address by Chester Bowles, Adm inistrator, Office o f Price Adm inistration, at the New York Times H all, February 29, 1944 (New York Tim es, March 1, 1944). 28 An interesting analysis o f black-market tricks was made by the magazine Business Week, which pointed out that “ there have been observable black markets in every rationed commodity* plus a lot o f unrationed ones.” According to this analysis, black-market operations in food follow a ten-point pattern (two points are omitted from the follow ing listing because they refer to evasion o f rationing rules rather than price ceilings): (1) Plain bootlegging or hijacking—that is, routing o f foods through non-normal channels so as to evade price and rationing rules. (2) Use of tij)s and prizes. (3) Combination purchases o r combination sales. (4) Classifying a commodity erroneously—that is, describing an ordinary hen as a prize chicken or potatoes intended for the table as seed potatoes. (5) Classifying a purchaser erroneously—that is, labeling a locker holder as a cooperative farmer or a grocer as an institutional user. (6) Short-weighting the purchaser, a very common practice. (8) Upgrading—that is, labeling a grade B product as Grade A. (9) Use o f tw o sets o f books to cover illegal sales.16 Bidden Violations The above listing includes a number o f indirect violations, sometimes called “hidden price increases,” as opposed to open violations. Commonly, although the prices are ostensibly con stant, they cover a smaller quantity o f goods or goods o f poorer quality or less serviceability, resulting in higher costs “ per unit o f satisfaction.” In some fields, e.g., textiles and clothing,1 such 7 increases were so widespread as to minimize the benefits o f price control. The Bureau o f Labor Statistics and the Office o f Price Administration devoted considerable attention to the problem o f reflecting hidden increases in price indexes, but the nature o f the violations does not permit adequate quantitative measurement.1 8 For purposes o f the Bureau o f Labor Statistics consumers’ price index, experienced agents price goods according to rigid specifica tions and where changes in quality occur, they attempt to price a product whose quality is equivalent to that o f the original article priced. Nevertheless, a special committee o f the American Statisti cal Association, on the basis o f an exhaustive analysis undertaken at the request o f the Bureau o f Labor Statistics, concluded: We believe that consumers’ goods and services, in the aggregate, have since 1939 suffered some loss of quality that is not reflected in reio Business W eek, June 26, 1043. it See Effects o f Rising Cost on Quality o f W earing A pparel, b y Laura Mae Brown (in Monthly Labor Review, February 1941), and Recent t ’.innres in. the Character o f Civilian Textiles and Apparel, by the same author (in Montuly Labor Review , K<;>tem ber 1943). 18 The follow ing footnote is carried regularly on m onthly consumers* prices releases: “ The index only partially shows the wartim e effects ,f changes in quality, avail ability o f consum er goods, etc. The President’s Committee on the Cost o f Living lias estim ated that such factors, together w ith certain others not fu lly measured b y the index, w ould add a m aximum o f 3 to 4 points to the index fo r larg * cities between January 1341 and September 1944. I f sm all cities were included in t! e national average, another % point w ould be added. I f account is also taken o f continued deterioration o f quality and disappearance o f low -priced merchandise between Scptem ler 1944 and September 1940, the over-all adjustm ent fo r the period January 1941 to Septem ber 1945 w ould total approxim ately 5 points. As merchandise o f prewar quality and specifications com es back into the markets and the Bureau is able regularly to price it again, this adjustm ent factor w ill gradually decrease and finally disappear.’9 29 ported prices. No dollar value can be put on this loss. In large part it is an intangible and unmeasurable element o f the war. Consumers cannot be compensated fo r it. The cost-of-living index takes incom plete account o f it.19 Later a technical advisory committee, under the chairman ship o f W esley C. Mitchell, which was requested by the President’s Committee on the Cost o f Living to render an independent opinion on the index, concluded:4 0 Extensive quality deterioration has occurred in the items covered b y the index. Most o f it is the direct result o f the shortage o f materials and labor, w hich, in turn, resulted from the w ar . . . W e know no satisfactory w ay o f measuring changes in “ real prices” —that is, the prices o f a given quantity o f utility, usefulness, or service . . . Although the direction o f quality change is usually obvious, its magnitude in price terms is not, even to individual consumers. Some lowering o f quality has been caused by wartime scar cities or higher costs o f labor and materials. Thus, restrictions on use o f fats and oils in soap manufacture forced greater use o f linseed oil, resulting in poorer quality soap.4 The W ar Produc 1 tion Board’s limitation on the use o f w ool compelled the elimina tion o f all-wool blankets and clothing. In certain cases o f this kind OPA has concurred in the inevitable price increase. Among such was the order which permitted a reduction in the number o f sheets in tablets made o f newsprint, to compensate fo r an increase during 1943 o f $8 per ton in the ceiling price o f newsprint.4 An 4 other example was a ruling to the effect that where the butterfat content o f ice cream was reduced 2% percent or less, no change in the March 1942 ceiling had to be made.4 F or the most part, 4 however, OPA ruled that corresponding reductions in price must be made for reductions in quality, serviceability, or services. For convenience o f discussion, these indirect violations were classified by one writer into four main groups: (1) extras, dis counts and concessions, (2) quality deterioration, (3) discontinu ance o f cheaper lines and services, and (4) transportation costs and changes in channels o f distribution.4 4 EXTRAS, DISCOUNTS, AND CONCESSIONS The classification “ extras, discounts, and concessions” includes a great variety o f indirect price increases, as indicated in the fol lowing listing, which is not necessarily com plete: Discontinuance or lowering o f customary discounts, discontinuance or lowering o f commissions, elimination o f customary differentials to different classes o f purchasers, extra charges in the form o f “bets,” bribes, tips, gifts, kick-backs, cash payments on the side, or fictitious quantity estimates, charges for delivery or other services not for merly perform ed or form erly performed free, charges for ficti-1 4 3 0 2 9 19 An Appraisal o f the U. S. Bureau o f Labor Statistics Cost o f Living Index, by a Special Committee o f the Am erican Statistical Association (in Journal o f the American Statistical Association, Boston, Mass., Voi. 38, Decem ber 1943, pp. 387-405). 20 Report o f the Technical Committee appointed b y the Chairman o f the President’s Committee on the Cost o f Living, June 15, 1944. 21 Journal o f Commerce, May 28, 1943. 22 OPA Release No. 3599 (W ashington), Decem ber 7, 1943. 23 OPA Release No. 1780 (W ashington), February 23, 1943. 24 Indirect Price Increases, b y M elville J. Ulmer (in Monthly Labtir Review, No vem ber 1942). 30 tious legal o r brokerage services, charges fo r goods not actually delivered, pyramiding o f mark-ups through dummy jobbing con cerns, etc. Many persons were alleged to have violated GMPR by exact ing an extra charge fo r paper cups in which soft drinks and re freshments are served, when no such charge had been made in March 1942.2 In liquor, for which substantial discounts from list 7 6 2 5 8 price were customary prior to GMPR, the list price tended to be com e the suppliers’ ceiling.8 In October 1942, it was reported ® that stores “ gladly” purchased, at 10 percent off list price, textile housefurnishings on which they form erly obtained 26 to 37 per cent discount.2 7 The follow ing table,2 expressing quantitatively the effect o f 8 some indirect prices o f this type, is o f interest, even though the items shown were covered by regulations other than GMPR: Effect o f indirect price increases on actual prices paid by consumers o f specified steel products1 Percent o f change in— Item end date Actual net price paid Actual base price paid Pub lished base price W ithdrawal o f “ concession” — reinforcing steel bars (V/j" round), W ashington, D. C. August 1939 to December 1941........................... + 13 +43 +36 W ithdraw al o f discount— standard steel pipe, Philadelphia. August 1939 to Decem ber 1941.......................... 0 0 +7 New extra charges fo r size, processing, and head ing—steel w ire, Philadelphia. August 1939 to February 1942............................ 0 0 +14 W ithdrawal o f “ concession** and increase o f extra charge—cold-rolled steel strip, New York City. August 1939 to June 1942..................................... 0 +10 +33 W ithdrawal o f “ concession** and discount and im position o f new extra charge—cold-rolled steel strip, Toledo. September 1939 to A pril 1942............................. -8 +2 +48 i Computed from dr.ta collected in a special field study by the Bureau o f Labor Statistics. The device o f “ bets” or other cash payments on the side was used in lumber,2 3 textiles,8 furniture,8 lamps,8 and foods.8 In 9 2 * 0 9 1 2 8 addition, it was noted for other items not covered by GMPR.8 A 4 25 Drug Topics (New Y ork), Decem ber 28, 1942. 26 New York Tim es, March 21, 1943. 27 Daily News Record (New Y ork), October 7, 1942. i 28 in £ii’ect Price ^ creases, M elville J. Ulmer (in Monthly Labor Review, November. 1942). * 29 Am erican Lumberman (C hicago), March 20, 1943. 30 Daily News Record, A pril 7, 1943; Journal o f Commerce, June 7, 1943; Daily News Record, June 24, 1943. s i Journal o f Commerce, Decem ber 11, 1942. 32 Trade Clip Sheet 694 (W ashington), July 30, 1943. 33 Journal o f Commerce, Decem ber 18, 1942. 84 K raft paper (Com m ercial Bulletin, February 6, 1943); waste paper (Comm ercial Bulletin, June 26, 1943); toys (New York Tim es, March 29, 1943); meats (New York Tim es, January 2, 1943, January 6, 1943); crude petroleum (W all Street Journal, June 15, 1943). 31 similar device is the fictitious quantity estimate. A farm er, faced with dire need fo r corn, purposely overestimates the quantity o f corn in a neighbor’s bin which he intends to purchase.** QUALITY DETERIORATION Hidden price increases as a result o f quality deterioration are a less insidious form o f violation, because they are not cumu lative in nature. They were most marked fo r nonstandard, style merchandise, where they are difficult to detect. Quality deteriora tion takes a variety o f form s: upgrading, shortweighting, less workmanship, defective workmanship, reduction in weight, changes in style or design, use o f substitute or inferior grades and materials, blending with less expensive grades o r materials, reduc tion in the amount o f materials used, decrease in the length o f the guarantee period, combination sales at higher prices, forced pur chase o f an unwanted com m odity as a condition fo r sale o f a scarce com modity, etc. One noticeable failure o f GMPR was inability to control prices o f new products. Many retailers exceeded their March prices on the pretext that the merchandise was not comparable to that previously sold. Under Amendment No. 54 “ new” products could be priced by adding the mark-up on a comparable commod ity to the cost o f the new article. Abuse o f this privilege was particularly prevalent fo r liquor,8 but it was also reported for 6 other goods, fo r example lumber *Tand lamps.** In the case o f lug gage, unwarranted increases occurred under GMPR because o f this loophole and a specific regulation was issued to curb them.** Upgrading and shortweighting were com mon, particularly following serious shortage conditions.3 The practice in butcher 4 9 8 7 3 *0 5 stores o f weighing in large amounts o f fat and bone with meats became very prevalent.4 In many cases, in changing from one type 1 o f container to another, manufacturers and distributors reduced the size o f container without lowering the price, as fo r chem icals and drugs.4 3 Whiskies, packed in bottles holding a fifth o f a 2 4 gallon, were sold at prices as nigh as or higher than those form erly charged for a quart size; 85 proof whisky was sold at prices weft above those form erly charged for 100 proof.4* Poorer workmanship, and poorer or skimpy materials, etc., have been most noticeable in textiles. This has been due in large part to the fact that quality rather than price competition is cus tomary in this indusry. Clothing and textile products sell at certain generally accepted levels or “ price lines.” W om en’s dresses, for example, ordinarily sell fo r $5.95, $6.95, $7.95, $10.95, $14.95, and 35 Chicago Journal o f Commerce (Chicago), June 8, 1943. scO PA Release No. 1164 (W ashington), November 23, 1942; New Y ork Tim es, May 12, 1943. 37 Commercial Bulletin, July 31, 1943; Am erican Lumberman, March C, 1943. 38 Trade Clip Sheet 694 (W ashington), July 30, 1943. 39 OPA Release No. 3290 (W ashington), October 11, 1943. 40 Southern pine (OPA Release No. 3760, W ashington, Decem ber 31, 1943); corru gated waste paper (Com m ercial Bulletin, February 6, 1943, May 22, 1943); eggs (Journal o f Commerce, July 20, 1943); potatoes (W all Street Journal, May 20, 1943); and butter (Journal o f Commerce, July 8, 1943). 41 CIO News (W ashington), A pril 19, 1943; PM (New Y ork), Novem ber 10, 1942. 42 Journal o f Commerce, January 11, 1943. 43 New York Tim es, May 12, 1943. 32 $16.95; men’s street shoes for $2.98, $4.00, and $5.00. Normally, quality changes are made within relatively narrow limits to main tain these price lines. During the war period, however, drastic quality changes (by altering fiber content or weave and other means) were frequently necessary.** To mention two specific examples: Manufacturers o f men’s woven underwear shorts low ered the thread count o f the material without lowering the price;4 4 5 tests by Consumers Union showed an average deterioration o f 20 percent (or a 25 percent price rise) in men’s white broadcloth shirts between 1941 and 1944, owing to poor construction and inspection, and to a 10 percent reduction in thread count and ten sile strength, in addition to a 20 percent rise in actual prices.4* Quality deterioration was by no means confined to style mer chandise. In April 1943, John W . McClure, secretary o f the Na tional Hardwood Lumber Association, warned against the “ grow ing disregard o f grading standards” in lumber because o f pressure o f costs against ceiling.4 Similar complaints were made o f coke,4 7 8 scrap iron,4 * coal,3 and steel,5 all o f which were covered by 9 9 1 specific regulations. Because o f difficulty in buying finished products, some whole salers and retailers manufactured their own products, frequently in a makeshift fashion, with shoddy or second-hand materials and sold them at handsome- profits. This practice was noted for radios, refrigerators, furniture,5 5 electric heaters,5 and mat 2 3 8 tresses.5 4 Food and Drug Administration inspectors detected much quality deterioration in foods. Coffee has been m ixed with roasted cereal. Dried grass has been sold as tea. Imported spices have been mixed with 20-25 percent cornstarch. Canned sardines “ packed in pure olive oil” have been found packed in corn oil or cottonseed oil. Saccharine has been substituted fo r sugar; cornstarch has been used instead o f egg in prepared baking mixes. In egg macaroni the standard 5Vz percent egg content has been reduced to 2 percent and the yellow coloring supplied by a coal tar dye. Instead o f the usual vegetable oils, mayonnaise and salad dressings have been made with mineral oils, which act as laxatives.5 Containers, for 5 merly filled to the brim, have been partially filled, syrups have been diluted, and jar sizes o f jam s and jellies have been reduced.5 6 Changes in the size, weight, and quality o f candy bars were numerous. One leading candy company was found guilty o f re ducing the weight o f its bars without reducing its prices by the United States Circuit Court o f Appeals at Kansas City, Mo., in 44 Hecent Changes in the Character o f Civilian Textiles and A pparel, b y Laura Brown W ebb (in Monthly Labor Review, September 1943). 45 Daily News Record, October 8, 1942. 4« Consumer Reports (New Y ork), February 194*1. 47 Southern Lumberman (Nashville, Tenu.), A pril 15, 1943. 48 Daily Metal Trade (Cleveland), January 27, 1943; Am erican Metal Market (New Y ork ), June 3, 1943. 49 D aily Metal Trade, Decem ber 16, 1942. so Business W eek, December 12, i942. si Steil (Cleveland), December 7, 1942. 52 Business W eek, April 3, 1943. 53 WPB Release No. 2467 (W ashington), February 6, 1943, 54 Furniture W orld, July 8, 1943. 55 W ashington News (W ashington), May 20, 1943. so OPA Release No. 1C95 (W ashington), November 8, 1942, 33 May 1943. Seven other candy companies actually obtained OPA permission to reduce weights 10 to 30 percent or to raise prices, or both.®7 Tests by Consumers Union indicate that 19 out o f 20 candy bars tested in 1939 and again in 1943 shrank so in size that a 23. percent hidden price rise resulted. Actually the increase in cost ranged from zero to 78 percent.5 8 Another form o f evasion is the “ tying-in” sale, one in which the buyer is required to purchase a less-desired and, possibly, slow-selling item to obtain a scarce commodity in great demand. The sale o f a com m odity which is scarce and under price control is linked with the sale o f an exempt item or one on which the profit margin is greater. This practice was reported repeatedly fo r coffee prior to rationing.5® It has also been noted in connec tion with cosmetics,8 flashlight batteries,8 popular brands o f 0 1 chewing gum and candy bars,0 nylon hosiery.8 and other items.6 2 8 8 One o f the most curious illustrations is that o f a sale o f a live pig, exempt from price control, in conjunction with a used com picker, at a combined price greatly in excess o f the ceiling price o f the picker plus the market value o f the pig.8 5 DISCONTINUANCE OF CHEAPER LINES AND SERVICES A very noticeable phenomenon of the war econom y has been the discontinuance o f cheaper lines o f services. This has been due in part to greatly increased demand for higher priced merchandise by consumers possessing more spending money than ever before. It has, however, been fostered by the desire o f businessmen, under the pressure o f rising costs and fixed ceiling prices, to reap the larger profits norm ally obtained from higher priced goods. This trend has been noticeable in .clothing. Indicatively, Buyers Informant, directory o f coat and dress manufacturers in the important New York market, listed only 37 manufacturers o f coats to retail between $5.75 and $7.98 in the fall o f 1942, and none in the spring or fall o f 1943, compared with 108 in the spring o f 1942. F or women’s cotton dresses to sell at $1.29, the spring 1942 listing o f 20 manufacturers had dwindled to one in July 1943.8 8 Fanned by increasing, consumer resentment, the condition became so apparent in late 1943 that positive action was taken by Econom ic Stabilization Director Vinson to increase the produc tion o f “ low-end” goods. The W ar Production Board was directed to initiate plans for increasing production o f scarce consumer goods, particularly low-cost items, and OPA to permit minimum * 4 6 67 Business W eek, May 22, 1943. 68 Consumer Reports, A pril 1943. 6© Journal o f Commerce, October 14, 1942; New Y ork Tim es, O ctober 17, 1942. eo Journal o f Commerce, November 9, 1942. 6i OPA Release No. 2784 (W ashington), July 9, 1943. «2 New York Tim es, A pril 28, 1943. 68 OPA Release No. 1769 (W ashington), February 23, 1943. 64 Sheer rayon hosiery (D aily News Record, October 19, 1942); meats (PM, Novem ber 10, 1942; Journal o f Commerce, July 1, 1943); butter (New Y ork Tim es, January 11, 1943) ; potatoes (New York Tim es, June 6, 1943); copper and brass scrap (D aily Metal Reporter, New York, N. Y ., March 12. 1943); sherbet and ice cream (OPA Release No. 2502, W ashington, D. C., May 14, 1943); fresh vegetables (Journal o f Commerce, No vem ber 12, 1943); autom obiles (New York Tim es, May 17, 1943); m illfecds (Northwestern M iller, M inneapolis, Minn., May 12, 1943). es Chicago Journal o f Commerce (C hicago), January 27, 1943. «o Business W’cek, September 25, 1943. 34 price increases if necessary fo r operation o f the W ar Production Board’s production programs.9 The trend to higher priced shoes, 7 accentuated under shoe rationing,9 resulted in OPA action mak 8 ing shoes retailing at $3 or less per pair ration-free fo r 3 weeks, January 17 to February 5, 1944." W oolw orth stores were selling an increasing number o f items above the $1 price.6 This trading*0 8 6 7 up tendency also was noted for many yard goods and housefurnishings, e.g., furniture,7 rayon yard goods,7 * and towels.7 1 2 8 Included under this classification, in addition to elimination or reduction o f stocks o f low profit items, are elimination o f cheaper services such as “ wet wash,” elimination o f special serv ices or “ frills,” such as gift wrapping, and extra shopping hours, increased self-service operations, reduced assortments o f styles and sizes, etc. The discontinuance o f retail “ frills” was instigated by OPA as the first m ove in a “ Retailers’ Econom y fo r Victory Plan,” chiefly because o f the manpower problem. Among frills which could be discontinued were deliveries o f small packages, sales on approval, acceptance o f returned goods, gift wrapping, lay-away and will-call privileges, free telephone calls, free concerts, instruc tion classes, style shows, store decorations, air-conditioning.7 7 4 6 5 Decrease o f services and increase o f self-service operations have been rather general in both food and department stores. Among stores which have experimented with such operations are R. H. Macy & Co., New York; L. Ramberger & Co., Newark; Goldblatt Bros., Chicago; W illiam F ile n e ’ s, Boston; the Emporium; San Francisco; and the W . T. Grant chain stores.7 According to 8 a survey o f about 5,000 independent grocers in New York by the New York State Food Merchants Association, only 40 percent o f * the members were planning to continue operations under the old credit and delivery method.7 9 CHANGES IN CHANNELS OF DISTRIBUTION In some cases added costs result from changes in channels of distribution or methods o f transportation. For products sold on a delivered basis, producers have shewn preference fo r nearby con sumers in order to save freight charges, and in certain cases such as waste paper and coal-tar derivatives, OPA has permitted addi tional freight charges in order to correct a serious supply prob lem in distant areas.7 Sometimes a shift in base point will result 7 in greatly increased costs to the buyer.7 7 67 W all Street Journal, Decem ber 15, 1943, 68 New Y ork Tim es. March 10, 1943 and June IS, 1943. 60 OPA Kelease No. 3824 (W ashington), January 17, 1914. 70 W all Street Journal, June 17, 1943. 71 New York Tim es, A pril 11, 1943. 72 Daily News Record, February 6, 1913. 78 D aily News Record, February 17, 1943. Other exam ple 4 are dom estic fiber rug’; (Journal o f Commerce, May 12, 1943); drapery fabrics (Journal o f Commerce, October 15, 1942); tufted spreads (Journal o f Commerce, August 18, 1943); curtains (Journal o f Commerce, June 30, 1943). 74 OPA Release No. 1157 (W ashington), Novem ber 25, 1£42. 75 W all Street Journal, May 21, 1943. 76 New York Tim es, September 5, 1943. 77 Indirect Price Increases, b y M elville J. Ulmer (in M onthly Labor Review , No vem ber 1942). 35 Reference has already been made to indirect price increases through pyramiding o f mark-ups, a practice more prevalent under mark-up regulations than under GMPR. It has been noted for underwear7 and some foods,7 as well as other items not covered 8 9 by GMPR.8 Other devices, reported fo r fresh produce,8 8are split 0 1 2 ting shipments to obtain premiums allowed for less-than-carload lots, and making truck deliveries in order to qualify fo r the legal mark-up allowed service jobbers. Chapter 6 .—Difficulties o f Administration There were many practical problems o f administration and enforcement under GMPR. Among them were public information and education; the large number t>f sellers; lack o f adequate records; difficulty o f proving violations; complexity o f the regula tions; ambiguity o f some o f the provisions; latitude for individual interpretations; the need fo r thousands o f individual adjustments; pricing o f new commodities, seasonal commodities, and others not sold in the base period; the pricing o f style and custom-built merchandise; etc. Enforcement It has been seen that OPA’s inadequate enforcement staff, as well as the nature o f GMPR ceilings, made enforcement o f the regulation difficult. No real attempt was made to com pel rigid adherence. OPA efforts Were concentrated on securing voluntary compliance. The provision in the regulation making both buyer and seller guilty o f violation in all cases o f sales above ceiling level was not the aid to enforcement which had been anticipated. Buyers were unwilling to complain o f overcharges fo r fear o f forfeiting sources o f needed supplies. Experience has shown on ly too clearly that, w ith occasional and insignificant exceptions, the great mass o f potential evidence o f violations contained in the m illions o f daily retail purchases by individual consumers throughout the country is not brought to the attention o f the enforcem ent authorities o f this office.s- OPA found, moreover, that the penalties fo r violations pro vided in the Emergency Price Control Act were cumbersome and too drastic for the mass o f m inor retail infringements, and urged simplified penalties, such as small fines. In addition, they re quested the right to make test purchases as evidence o f violation. As a result— 7$ Journal o f Commerce, July 26, 1943. 79 Journal o f Commerce, A pril 16, 1943. so Fresh fish (OPA Release No. 2949, W ashington, August 23, 1943); w ork clothing (D aily News Record, July 9, 1943); casein (OPA Release No. 2699, W ashington, June 16, 1943); citrus fru its (Business W eek, May 22,1943). 81 Business W eek, January 15, 1944. 82 Fifth Quarterly Report fo r , the Period ended A pril 30, 1943 (Office o f Price Ad m inistration), p. 54. 36 Enforcem ent o f the General Maximum Price Regulation . . . was o f necessity lim ited largely to various key wholesale com m odities, where a strategically aimed enforcem ent campaign could achieve far-reaching results. Also, in the hope o f producing an exemplary effect among retail sellers generally, suits were instituted against a small number o f the m ore flagrant retail violators. No systematic enforcem ent program could be developed, however.2 Considerable success in securing voluntary com pliance was achieved through the use o f “price panel assistants/’ volunteers assigned to local boards. As o f March 1, 1944, there were 39,000 o f these volunteers. Their duties, a compromise between educa tional and policing wQrk, were to furnish information and other wise to assist the merchants in their particular localities in under standing OPA regulations and periodically to check compliance on selected items. In one city, where form erly 36 percent o f all sales, had been made above ceiling, 30 days’ intensive effort reduced this figure to 3 percent.® Educational Problem The educational problem posed by GMPR was form idable even for manufacturers and wholesalers, but particularly so for retailers. According to the Census o f Retail Trade, there were 1,770,355 retail stores in 1939. Unfortunately Ihere is no national roster o f retailers; and it is difficult to maintain such a list because o f the frequency with which small retailers open or close their businesses. Listing these numerous small stores located in every community and crossroads o f the country would be difficult no matter what the form o f control used. In addition, adequate ex planation o f the provisions o f GMPR proved fo be a difficult un dertaking. This was attempted by a campaign o f local group meetings in the summer o f 1942 and by issuance o f elaborate question-and-answer press releases. A great deal o f time and energy was expended in refinement o f the regulation. As order follow ed order, the great number o f amendments, supplementaiy orders, and interpretations led to confusion and to a lesser degree o f freedom o f the businessman to make normal changes in the conduct o f his own affairs. Complexity Probably on no other count has the criticism o f GMPR been so severe or so bitter as on the ground o f the com plexity and con fusion o f its provisions. Trained economists, form er OPA offi cials, and practical businessmen alike have protested the seem ing triviality and the impracticability o f many o f its provisions. Even OPA ofticallv attested to the complexity o f GMPR which arose from the desire fo r absolute equity. As one form er OPA official phrased it: 2 F ifth Quarterly Report fo r the Period Ended A pril 30,1943 (Office o f Price Adm in istration), pp. 51-55. a Address by Chester Bowles, Adm inistrator, Office o f P rice Adm inistration, at the New Y ork Tim es H all, February 29, 1914 (New Y ork Tim es, March 1, 1944). 37 Comprehensive price freezing is at best extrem ely hard to enforce. The im practicability o f the particular plan w hich was adopted, how ever, together with the inordinately obscure and unnecessarily com plex lang uage o f the regulations, and the frequency with w hich they w ere amended and even basically m odified in principle, added greatly to the difficulties o f securing com pliance.4* Another official wrote: Only persons thoroughly trained in Marshallian econom ics could have been responsible fo r this beautifully logical but painfully im practical set o f price rules. They im ply the existence in fact o f a high degree o f substitutability and a definable pattern o f normal price regulations. The author is inform ed that a group o f lawyers claim the credit for much o f the refinement.1 In November 1942, Henderson outlined a “ new offensive,” the first tenet o f which was the replacement o f much o f GMPR (and other regulations) by simpler, more definite ceilings.6 Latitude fo r Independent Interpretation Necessarily, under the terms o f the Regulation, considerable latitude remained for independent judgment, find compliance rested largely upon the integrity o f the seller. Under the pressure o f scarcities and narrowed profit margins, reliance upon honesty proved inadequate, particularly for nonstandardized items. More over, maximum prices were a matter o f individual determination, frequently on the basis o f information not readily available. Many small stores had only fragmentary records o f the March 1942 base prices. Many o f the pricing rules were indefinite. The concepts o f “ similar” commodities, “ comparable” commodities, and “ most closely competitive seller o f the same class” were subject to indi vidual interpretation, especially for items differing in style, brand, or design. On page 14 o f Bulletin No. 2, W hat Every Retailer Should Know About the General Maximum Price Regulation, a “ similar” article o f a “ competing” retailer was defined in part as one “ which was sold by the competing retailer at the same price or in the same price line as he (the retailer determining his price) would have sold the article being priced had he carried it during March.” Stated simply, this meant whatever the retailer thought his own price should be. Simply to find out a com petitor’s most nearly comparable product was impractical, and to determine the max?mum March price o f the item was even more impractical. Moreover, except for identical items actually sold and deliv ered in March 1942, the seller really had a choice o f conflicting pricing methods. Although in theory the progressive pricing for mula specified the conditions under which each method was to be used, in practice it allowed the seller considerable independent judgment. If, according to his own interpretation, a wholesaler 4 Price Freezing under the Office o f Price Adm inistration, b y V ictor Abramson (Am erican Econom ic Review, December 1942, pp. 760-761). 6 The Tactics o f Retail Price Control, by John Perry M iller (in Quarterly Journal o f Econom ics, August 1943), 6 Address by Leon Henderson, Adm inistrator, Office o f Price Adm inistration, Statler Hotel, Boston, November 19, 1942 (in Journal o f Commerce, November 20, 1942). 38 or retailer could not price an article under the “ same” or “ similar” commodities rules, ne could determine his maximum price by applying the percentage mark-up on a “ comparable” com modity to the replacement cost o f the article to be priced. As expressed by one writer, a “ seller may obtain almost any mark-up by judi cious selection o f a similar item under section 2 or o f a compar able com m odity under section 3 (a ).” T Other Special Problems There were also other special problems. W ith its freeze at March levels, GMPR was obviously inappropriate for pricing sea sonal commodities such as agricultural insecticides and fungi cides, summer wearing apparel, and fur garments. Special regu lations, Maximum Price Regulations Nos. 144, 142, and 178, respectively, were issued fo r pricing such items under special formulas. Commodities not sold in March 1942 presented another prob lem. Because o f style changes, many articles of clothing to be priced under GMPR were not identical with those sold in March 1942 and had to be priced under the “ similar” commodity ruling. Fall clothing naturally was not sold at all in the base period and a special regulation. Schedule No. 153, was issued, providing a costplus pricing form ula. Alternatives in April 1 9 4 2 In this connection a question arises as to the alternatives in April 1942. W ould some other method of price control have been m ore feasible at that time? No attempt will be made to judge whether or not adequate fiscal policies, promptly applied, would have been effective in arresting the inflation spiral. The question is simply whether or not, under the conditions then existing, an other type o f price control would have been possible in the spring o f 1942, and if possible, whether it would have been more effective. When we consider other known form s o f price control— se lective, cost plus a percentage mark-up, cost, plus a dollars-andcents mark-up, freeze at primary levels, specific dollars-and-cents ceilings— we must conclude that the general freeze was most practicable under the circumstances. Selective price control was found by actual experience to be inadequate to cope with rapidly changing war conditions. A system o f price control based upon cost plus normal percentage or dollars-and-cents mark-ups, super imposed upon the existing pattern o f selective controls, would have exercised very little restraint on prices, because wages and many materials were uncontrolled. Such a system, without se lective controls, would have furnished almost no control at all. Establishment o f specific dollars-and-cents ceilings, specific mark ups, or extensive selective controls would have been inconceivable7 7 The Tactics o f Retail Price Control, b y John Perry M iller (in Quarterly Journal . o f Econom ics, August 1943, p. 501). 39 in the emergency because o f the laborious investigation such controls require. Finally, although a general freeze below the retail level would have had the merit o f greater simplicity, control at the retail level was plainly needed. Tremendously expanded purchasing power, in the face o f prospectively lower civilian supplies, would have touched off a sharp rise in prices, while huge profits at the retail level would have made enforcement o f primary ceilings impos sible. A general freeze at primary levels, coupled with margin control at retail, would have been inequitable because it would not have distributed the inevitable squeeze. Moreover, it would have led to concentration on higher priced goods, a result which was delayed under GMPR. W e must therefore agree with one writer that “ any other alternative would have been administratively im possible” in the spring o f 1942.® Chapter 7 .—Econom ic Limitations Limitations in Coverage Appraisal o f GMPR requires careful consideration o f two basic exemptions, i.e., agricultural commodities and wages, both o f which were im plicit in the terms o f the original Emergency Price Control Act. Their importance Cannot be denied. They have been at once the root o f many o f the problems arising from the General Maximum Price Regulation, necessitating gradual replacement by other regulations, and a m ajor factor in the con tinued advance in the general price level. It is remarkable, in view o f their importance, that GMPR proved as effective as it did. Agricultural commodities are the raw material fo r a large proportion Of the finished articles o f commerce. In their raw state they have a weight o f 17 percent o f the wholesale price index o f the Bureau o f Labor Statistics, based on 1941 values. Together with foods and textiles, m ajor groups derived from agriculture, they comprise 44 percent o f the Bureau o f Labor Statistics index. Food and clothing make up 48 percent o f the consumers’ price index o f the Bureau o f Labor Statistics on the basis o f December 1941 values, and 54 percent on the basis o f March 1943 values. Wages are likewise an important element in total values; fo r many industries they are the most important single element o f cost. Agricultural prices continuouslv exercised an upward press ure on prices. Neither the October 1942 amendment to the Price Control Act, which reduced the 110 percent o f parity rule to 100 percent, nor the President’s interpretation o f parity as parity less benefit payments, eliminated this pressure, because parity, the. ratio o f prices received by farmers to prices paid by farmers, is8 8 The Tactics o f Retail Price Control, b y John Perry M iller (in Quarterly Journal o f Economics, August 1943, p . 498). 40 itself affected by this rise. Since a large part o f prices paid by farmers is fo r farm products, any increase in prices received by farmers causes automatically a smaller rise in prices paid by farmers and a consequent increase in the parity ratio. Even if all industrial prices were controlled rigidly, the parity ratio would rise with farm prices. Moreover, the 100 percent rule applied to individual products, not to the general ratio. Thus, a rise to parity in the price o f one com modity might necessitate an increase in the price o f a second related com modity in order to maintain the proper ratio, even though the price of the latter item were already well above parity. Such was the case fo r feed and meat prices in June 1942, when prices o f the form er were 25 percent below par ity, and, o f the latter, 25 percent above parity.1 As compared to farm prices, wages have constituted^ “ a less visible but similarly powerful pressure upon price ceilings.” 2 3 The indirect control o f wages through price regulations, which was hoped for in the summer o f 1941 when the Emergency Price Control Act was being discussed, was not sufficiently effective. This control was inoperative in two important sectors o f the econ omy, i.e., those producing war materials, which were largely exempt from OPA control, and those in which profits were suffi cient to absorb wage increases without price adjustments. W age increases in these sectors inevitably led to a movement o f workers to high wage industries and, later on, to demands fo r wage in creases in areas where such increases could not be absorbed out o f profits. Moreover, adequate measures to implement the wage stabilization aspect o f the President’s seven-point program o f April 27, 1942, were not realized8 until October 1942. Voluntary stabilization agreements, such as in the shipbuilding and con struction industries, were negotiated and the National W ar Labor Board evolved a set o f principles, including the famous “ Little Steel” form ula,4 under which numerous dispute cases were set tled. “ In spite o f these efforts, however, wage increases continued to be granted in all industries and in all parts o f the country.” 5 * These were outside the jurisdiction o f the Board, since they in volved no dispute and were granted voluntarily. Larger incomes, resulting from higher wages, longer hours, and overtime pay also exerted an upward pressure from the standpoint o f demand. Total wages and salaries, as computed by the Department o f Commerce, increased more than 70 percent between August 1939 and May 1942, from 3,712 m illion dollars in August 1939 to 6,338 million dollars in May 1942. In December 1943 they were more than 9 billion dollars, 143 percent above the 1 Price Control in Outline, by Don D. Humphrey (in Am erican Econom ic Review , Decem ber 1942, p. 754). 2 Second Report o f the Office o f Price Adm inistration, p . 17. 3 Idem , pp. 17-21. 4 This form ula was announced by the National W ar Labor Board on July 16, 1942, in connection with a..dispute in the steel industry. It was based upon the principle that workers, in order to m aintain their peacetime standards o f livin g, were entitled to a 15-percent increase in wages between January 1941 and May 1942. This was the amount o f the increase in the consumers’ price index o f the Bureau o f Labor Statistics over the same period. Oh this basis, wage increases up to 15 percent above January 1941 were considered justifiable. W age increases to elim inate inequalities or to correct substandard conditions were also deemed justifiable. « Second Report o f the Office o f Price Adm inistration, p. 21. prewar level. Since wages and salaries comprise about 70 percent o f total incom e payments to individuals, they have been an im portant element in the rapid rise o f consumer purchasing power and in the “ inflationary gap.” Even if basic wage rates had been stabilized sooner, this influence would have been a factor, since a large part o f the increase in wage earners’ income was due, not to higher basic rates, but to longer hours o f work with payment o f overtime rates, and to shifts to higher-wage industries. Between October 1942, when the W ar Labor Board was authorized to sta bilize basic wage rates, and October 1943, Bureau o f Labor Statis tics data show an increase o f 9*6 cents in average hourly earnings o f factory workers. Of this total increase, according to a study o f the W ar Labor Board, approximately one cent was due to in creases in basic wage rates.® As an element o f the total cost o f production, wages and sal aries were not at first a m ajor threat because higher wages could be absorbed in the higher profits arising from greatly expanded volume o f business. In fact, during 1940, rising production and greater productivity m ore than offset higher wage rates, so that unit labor costs in manufacturing industries actually declined.6 7 Since 1940, however, according to available data from the Bureau o f Labor Statistics, unit labor costs have increased markedly in many industries. (See Appendix table 2.) The problem o f rising wages as an element o f cost will be discussed further in connec tion with the problem o f the distributive squeeze. Inadequacy o f Supplementary Measures to Control Inflation Final judgment on GMPR must not ignore the inadequacy o f supplementaiy measures to control the basic cause o f rising prices, namely, rising purchasing power in the face o f a declining volume o f goods and services. GMPR never was considered a cure-all. At the time it was issued, the President described as “in divisible” his seven-point stabilization program— heavy taxes on excess profits, price and rent ceilings, wage stabilization, stabiliza tion o f farm prices, increased purchases o f war bonds and reduced spending, rationing o f essential commodities, and discouragement o f credit and installment buying. The Statement o f .Considerations accompanying GMPR stated clearly that— There can be no effective price control w hile at the same time there is so large an amount o f excess purchasing pow er. . . . The universal price ceiling serves as the fram ework for other policies w hich w ill diminish the inflationary gap. It makes possible an effective w ar labor policy, more stringent incom e and excess-profits taxes, ahd greatly enhanced savings. . . . W ithout the econom ic measures, the ceiling w ould in the long run becom e administratively unenforceable and socially harmful. Unfortunately the companion measures were delayed and inade 6 O f the rem ainder, higher overtim e pay caused an increase o f 1.9 cents in average earnings; the shift o f workers to higher-paid w ork, an increase o f 1.6 cents; incentive wage rises, m erit increases, upgrading, and individual prom otions, an increase o f 5 cents. (National W ar Labor Board Release No. B-1225, W ashington, January 12, 1944). 7 Productivity and Unit Labor Cost in Selected M anufacturing Industries, 1919-40 (U. S, Bureau o f Labor Statistics, W ashington, February 1942). 42 quate. Throughout the war, fiscal policies were inadequate in face o f the magnitude o f the “ inflationary gap” — the difference be tween the amount o f money available for expenditure and the supply o f goods and services available fo r civilians. Inequities o f Price Relationships In addition to these econom ic handicaps to successful control under GMPR and the administrative difficulties already discussed, there were two m ajor econom ic limitations o f the regulation it self. In the first place, it froze abnormal price relationships. Sec ondly, a serious distributive squeeze developed, partly because o f these abnormal relationships, but also because, o f the rising costs o f uncontrolled elements. EXISTING ABNORMALITIES IN MARCH 1942 The first limitation— that it froze abnormal price relation ships—is a general criticism o f the freeze technique. Price rela tionships in a competitive econom y are constantly changing. A given price pattern exists only for a particular moment o f time under certain conditions o f demand and supply. Such conditions vary greatly between geographical locations and even between individual sellers. The slightest change in any o f these conditions may cause a shift in the price relationships. Thus, any general freeze may result in abnormal relationships under a new set o f demand and supply factors. Actually GMPR produced unequal effects on different sellers. Many were caught with maximum prices out o f line with those o f competitors in the same commun ity. Frequently a particular chain store, through accident or spec ial promotional sale or some other reason, found its maximum prices lower than those o f another store in the same chain. Moreover, this limitation was aggravated by the manner o f issuance o f GMPR. Many commodities, controlled before GMPR, were already frozen at the levels o f earlier periods, out o f line with March 1942 prices for commodities previously uncontrolled. Since prices, particularly at retail, were advancing sharply in the spring o f 1942, the GMPR in theory implied a roll-back o f prices from the middle o f May, when the regulation became effective, to March 1942. In actuality, this period between March and May 1942 was termed a “ twilight* zone” by one writer, who states: It is clear that prices w ere not rolled back to the March levels. The meager evidence available indicates that w hile chain stores reduced prices when the General Maximum Price Regulation became effective, small independents m erely held the May levels.8 In addition GMPR, by freezing prices, also froze profit mar gins, which normally vary widely, in both absolute and percent age terms, fo r different commodities o f a given seller. A natural outcome o f the regulation, therefore, under the conditions o f scarcity and heavy demands which developed, was the concentra * 8 The Effectiveness o f Price Control, by Don D. Humphrey, OPA (in Survey o f Current Business, W ashington, February 1943). 43 tion on production o f those items which yielded the highest net return. Since profit margins are normally greater on higher priced goods, this led to the “ discontinuance o f cheaper lines and services,” which was discussed in chapter 5. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DISTRIBUTIVE SQUEEZE In a period o f rising prices, such as prevailed in March 1942, retail prices may not be based upon replacement costs but upon the lower costs o f an earlier period when the articles were pur chased. This causes the so-called “ retail lag,” which may be ex pressed either as tire length o f time which occurs between changes in wholesale costs and corresponding changes in retail prices, or as the percentage by which wholesale prices must be reduced to equal the costs contained in current retail prices. The general ceiling, by freezing this lag, caused a reduction o f margins, com m only called a “ squeeze.” The amount o f this squeeze varied widely among commodities. For some slow-m oving articles, orders may be placed by retailers several weeks or even months in advance; for others, such as nonmanufactured foods and meats, for which the turn-over is rapid, average replacement and inven tory costs are approximately the same.9 0 1 The amount o f the squeeze1 in March 1942 was minimized by 9 two factors: the relatively more rapid rise o f retail prices than o f wholesale prices in the months follow ing the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the control o f about one-third o f the econom y prior to GMpR at 1941 levels. Nevertheless, competent retail authori ties, among them Q. F. W alker, economist o f R. H. Macy & Co., New York, estimated the lag for some retailers as high as 15 per cent.1 1 In any case, it is clear that the 1-week difference between 1 * 2 the effective date o f GMPR fo r wholesalers and manufacturers and for retailers did not provide an adequate solution o f this problem. March 1942 maximum prices fo r wholesalers were not the cost basis fo r March 1942 retail prices. The lag o f retail prices behind wholesale prices was greater than expected.1 J. K. Gal 9 braith called attention to a general underestimate^ o f the time fac tor in demand and supply relationships during this phase o f price control.1 8 Another factor, rising costs o f uncontrolled elements, aggra vated the problem o f the distributive squeeze. Costs o f farm prod ucts and other uncontrolled commodities, and wages, continued their steady advance. Prices o f farm products included in the Bureau o f Labor Statistics wholesale price index rose 9 percent between May and December 1942. During the same period, prices 9 The Retail Price Lag (based on Bureau o f Labor Statistics W holesale and Retail Prices fo r 100 Comparable Item s), Office o f Price Adm inistration, W ashington, A pril 17, 1942. 10 For a quantitative measurement o f the amount o f the potential retail squeeze in March 1942, see Price Control in Outline, by Don D. Humphrey (in Am erican Econom ic Review, Decem ber 1942, p. 751). 11 Journal o f Commerce, May 21, 1942. 12 Price Freezing under the Office o f Price Adm inistration b y V ictor Abramson (In Am erican Econom ic Review, Decem ber 1942, p. 766). is Price C ontrol: Some Lessons from the First Phase, by J. K. Galbraith (Papers and Proceedings o f the F ifty-fifth Annual Meeting o f the Am erican Econom ic Association, January 1943). u o f all commodities still uncontrolled as o f the date o f GMPR rose 8.1 percent. This advance was accelerated in early 1943. Between December 1942 and March 1943, prices o f the uncontrolled group o f commodities increased an additional 9.1 percent to a level 20;5 percent above March 1942, base date o f GMPR. (See Appendix table 3.) Similarly, hourly wages and weekly earnings rose steadily even after the October 1942 wage-stabilization action. In May 1942, average weekly earnings in manufacturing industries were $35.82, compared with $23.77 in August 1939. By October 1942 they had risen to $38.89, and in December 1943 they were $44.68, 25 percent above May 1942. Average hourly earnings, which were 62.4 cents in August 1939, rose to 83.5 cents in May 1942 and 89.3 cents in October 1942, and by December 1943 were 99.5 cents, 19 percent above May 1942. As a result, wages and salaries increased 15 percent as a proportion o f total dollar value o f industrial out put between 1939 and 1941, and 40 percent between 1939. and 1943. u Moreover, unit labor costs increased markedly in many industries after 1940 (see Appendix table 2.) The original plan o f operations under GMPR contemplated the handling o f the squeeze problem under section 4 o f the regula tion without “ puncturing” the retail ceilings. A roll-back o f prices actually was effected in some cases, such as men’s and boys’ cloth ing, work clothing, and soap,1 but such examples are not many. 8 As rising costs after March 1942 aggravated the squeeze, the policy o f maintaining the retail price level became less and less tenable. Retail food prices, collected by the Bureau o f Labor Statistics, increased 17.6 percent between May 1942 and May 1943. Accord ing to an OPA analysis,1 84 percent o f this rise was accounted fo r 5 1 4 6 by higher farm prices. As early as July 29,1942, rising raw mate rial costs forced a 15 to 25 percent increase in ceiling prices for canned fruits and berries, and an even more general withdrawal from the line was made in September 1942 for foods under mark up regulations 236, 237, and 238. Many requests for higher ceilings were received by OPA. In January 1944, the Price Administrator announced that 6,000 were received weekly, but that only a small number o f these were honored.1 7 Despite this announcement, however, it appears that the cumulative effect o f higher wages and other production costs was evidenced during 1943 and early 1944 by a little publicized trend toward higher ceilings. General advances in ceiling prices were allowed in many important industries. Among them were coal and coke, lumber, newsprint and woodpulp, and furniture. There were also numerous upward adiustments for specific items. Be cause the President’s “ hold-the-line” order o f April 8, 1943, for14 Industry Survey, November 1943 (Bureau o f Foreign and Domestic Commerce, U. S. Department o f Commerce, W ashington). . M 15 Progress o f Price Regulation to Septem ber 1942, b y Saul Nelson (in Monthly Labor Review, October 1942). „ _ # 16 One Year o f Retail Price Control (P rice Control Report No* 15, Office o f Price Adm inistration, June 1943). 17 Journal o f Commerce, January 19, 1941, 45 bade increases fo r cost-of-living items, these adjustments were confined chiefly to industrial goods. The problem o f the distribu tive squeeze, as regards cost-of-living commodities, was handled by an increasing use o f Government subsidies. Conflicts With Other Objectives PRODUCTION VERSUS PRICE CONTROL This discussion has assumed the desirability o f a stable price level, but in passing it seems appropriate to comment briefly on the conflict o f this objective with other aspects o f our war econ omy. The most important o f these, conflicts is that o f maximum production and price stabilization. Reconciliation o f the two ob jectives has been difficult, because they have been the responsibil ity o f two different Government agencies— the W ar Production Board and the Office o f Price Administration. Historically, higher prices have induced greater output. This is true because they offer a profit incentive not only to operating firms but also to submarginal firms, whose costs o f production are higher. Price stabilization eliminates this incentive. During the early days o f the defense program, when industry was able to expand production by greater utilization o f unused capacity, the lack o f this incentive was obscured. Increased output brought decreased unit costs o f production and higher profits. But as operations increased to capacity, it became desirable to draft less efficient marginal operators. Under price control, higher prices were impossible, and as a result there were many complaints, e.g., as in the petroleum industry, that ceilings were hampering pro duction. During 1943 and 1944, OPA was forced by declining pro duction to raise the .ceilings on a number o f items important to the war^ effort. Am ong them were lumber, wood pulp, and low priced civilian goods. In some fields the conflict resulted in rather serious changes in merchandising practices. In textiles, fo r exam ple, there has been a noticeable tendency for manufacturers to sell goods in the finished state rather than in the gray, because profit margins are greater on finished goods.1 In some cases, 8 notably nonferrous metals and petroleum, the conflict o f objec tives was resolved by the payment o f subsidies to marginal producers. EQUITABLE VERSUS STABLE PRICES Another continuing conflict was that o f equitable- versus stable prices. Primary consideration o f OPA was the maintenance o f a stable retail price level, even though refusal to grant higher prices might entail hardships fo r individual sellers or specific commodities. Under this policy the less efficient were forced out o f business. In a losing battle to support its original pronounce ment, when GMPR was issued, that the retail ceilm g would not be punctured, OPA stoutly resisted continuing appeals o f industry is Journal o f Commerce, February 10, 1944. 46 and, sometimes, o f other Government agencies for higher prices. Its basic policy under the industry-earnings standard, was not to grant higher ceilings, even when the evidence clearly showed an unabsorbable squeeze on a specific commodity, if the over-all industry profits were adequate. However, strong objections were raised to this policy, and OPA later amended it, particularly when curtailment o f production threatened. Another facet o f this conflict arose from the prewar goal o f equitable prices fo r farmers. The parity concept, expressly stated by Congress,1 sought the restoration o f the 1910-14 relationship 9 o f farm and industrial prices. Since this relationship had not yet been restored in March 1942, it was impossible to freeze prices o f agricultural commodities. As has been seen, higher prices fo r these proved to be one o f the greatest handicaps to OPA in the maintenance o f the March 1942 general price level, which was the avowed purpose o f the legislation. There was little attempt to stabilize basic wage rates until October 1942, and no attempt to stabilize total incom e from .wages and salaries. There never was serious disagreement with the prem ise that prices could not be effectively controlled without control o f wages, but, except for Bernard Baruch, few officials in this early period explicitly advocated the comprehensive control that wage regulation implied. Lack o f Quality Control Price control in theory is not incompatible with quality con trol. In fact, true price control would require adequate regula tion o f standards o f quality. OPA regulations expressly forbid the reduction o f quality or quantity without corresponding price reduc tions but this provision was virtually unenforceable, particularly for items covered by GMPR. Efforts o f OPA to link price control effectively with quality control by grade labeling, as for hosiery and canned foods, met determined opposition o f Congress and o f business interests. As a result, quality deterioration (see chapter 5) minimized the apparent success o f OPA in maintaining price stability. Chapter 8 .—Econom ic Accomplishments There can be little doubt that, despite tremendously expanded war production and national income and greatly curtailed civilian production, the dangerous price rise which threatened in the spring o f 1942 was prevented. Americans generally may have had to pay m ore fo r their food and clothing, and some articles may have been unobtainable, but on the whole their standard o f living 19 Section 2 o f the A gricultural Adjustm ent A ct o f 1933; section 2 o f the A gricul tural Marketing Agreem ent Act o f 1937; section 301 o f the A gricultural Adjustm ent"Act o f 1938. 47 has not suffered greatly. Those who can remember the sharp price increases o f W orld W ar I are fully aware o f the more stable conditions o f W orld W ar n . General opinion gives OPA a large share o f the credit fo r preventing inflation. Even the bitterest critics o f OPA usually w ill admit that price increases would have been greater in the absence o f price control. Determination o f the effectiveness o f GMPR as a specific tool o f price control distinct from other measures is not so obvious.. Final decision must rest, o f course, upon the movement o f prices. It should not be unduly swayed by consideration o f the limitations o f the regulation, or the lack o f supplementary measures to con trol inflation, or the complexity o f the control problem. However, despite these difficulties, it seems correct to conclude that GMPR “ did hold down prices.” 1 The discussion which follow s is based upon the movements o f official price indexes. Although these indexes have been carefully constructed they cannot measure all the price increase which occurs as a result o f quality deterioration (see pages 31-33). Nevertheless they give fairly conclusive evidence o f the effective ness o f GMPR. Price Movements BATE OF INCREASE SINCE MAY 1942 The best test o f the effectiveness o f GMPR can .be made at the consumer level, since there was no control at retail prior to the date o f GMPR. The sharp rise in consumers’ prices during the 5 months follow ing the attack on Pearl Harbor was abruptly halted. From increases ranging from 0.7 to 1.4 percent per month in this period, monthly advances were cut to 0.5 percent or less in the follow ing year, except fo r a few months during which there were sharply higher prices fo r fresh fruits and vegetables. During the whole period from May 1942 to December 1943, the Bureau o f Labor Statistics consumers’ price index rose only 7.2 percent, or 0.4 percent per month, compared with 15.1 percent, or 0.9 percent per month, from January 1941 to May 1942. The follow ing state ment compares the percentage changes fo r these two periods for the index as a whole and for its subgroups: Percent o f change In consumers* pricesi May 1942 to December 1943 January 1941 to May 1942 items ........................................ +7.2 +15.1 Food ...................................... Clothing ....................... ......... Rent ...................................... Fuel, electricity, and ice * * .. Housefurnishings ............. . . Miscellaneous ....................... +12.7 +6.7 -1.6 +4.4 +4.7 +6.5 +24.3 +25.3 +4.7 +4.1 +22.1 + 8.8 l Source: TJ. S. Bureau o f Labor Statistics. i One Year o f Retail Price Control (P rice Control Report No. 15, Office o f Price Adm inistration). 48 Likewise, price increases at the wholesale level were smaller after GMPR than before. From May 1942 to December 1943, the Bureau o f Labor Statistics comprehensive index rose only 4% per cent compared with 22 percent between January 1941 and May 1942. In the 6 months after GMPR, the index rose only lVfc per cent in contrast to 5.6 percent between the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and May 1942. (Price movements for the m ajor groups in the wholesale price index are shown fo r various periods in Appendix table 5.) For chemicals and allied products, fo r example, which were controlled largely by GMPR, prices rose only 3 percent in the 19 months between May 1942 and December 1943 compared with 24 percent in the 16 months from January 1941 to May 1942. CONTROLLED VERSUS UNCONTROLLED PRICES Comparison o f the movements o f controlled and uncontrolled prices during the first year after issuance o f GMPR gives striking p roof o f the effectiveness o f GMPR in preventing higher prices for commodities subject to its control. Between May 1942 and December 1942, the comprehensive wholesale price’ index o f the Bureau o f Labor Statistics rose 2.2 percent. Prices o f commodities controlled by GMPR or earlier regulations increased only 0.3 percent, whereas prices o f commodities not controlled as o f the date o f GMPR rose 8.1 percent during this period. A similar com parison o f price changes between May 1942 and March 1943 shows an advance o f 1.1 percent for those controlled as o f May 1942 and 18.0 percent fo r those uncontrolled. (See Appendix table 3.) Price movements o f controlled and uncontrolled foods show the same contrast. In December 1942, wholesale prices o f foods controlled by GMPR were at the same level as in May 1942, and in March 1943 they were only 4 percent above the March 1942 base period. W holesale prices o f uncontrolled foods, on the other hand, increased 11 percent from May to December 1942, and in March 1943 they were 20 percent above the base period. (See Appendix table 4.) Between May 1942 and May 1943, retail food prices'included in the Bureau o f Labor Statistics consumers’ price index, rose 17.6 percent as a group. However, foods controlled by GMPR increased only 4.1 percent in price, while prices o f foods not controlled by GMPR, which had a weight o f about 40 percent in the food index, increased nearly 10 times as much, as shown by the follow ing figures.* 1935-39 w eight A ll foods .................................... Controlled by G M P R ............... Not controlled by GMPR.......... Controlled after G M P R ............ U ncontrolled (May 1943) ........ 100 61 39 35 4 Percent o f increase, May 1942 to May 1943 17.6 4.1 39.0 34.7 74.7 2 One Year o f Retail Price Control (Price Control Report No. 15* Office o f Price Adm inistration). 49 COMPARISON W ITH W ORLD W AR I Corroborative evidence o f the effectiveness o f GMPR in con* junction with other price controls can be seen from a comparison with W orld W ar I experience, particularly at the retail level, since there was little or no control at this level during the earlier period. As may be seen from the follow ing figures, retail price increases during W orld W ar I were several times greater than during a similar period in W orld W ar II: Percent o f Increase In consumers pricesi Aug. 1939 to Dec. 1943 A ll items ....................................... Food ...................................... Clothing ...................................... Rent ......... .............................. Fuel, electricity, and i c e ... Housefurnishings ....................... Miscellaneous ............................. July 1914 to Nov. 1918 26.2__________ 61.8 46.6 34.2 3.6 12.3 27.1 17.6 79.7 106.6 4.9 43.3 94.9 57.9 1 Source: U. S. Bureau o f Labor Statistics. A similar comparison may he made o f wholesale price move ments during the two war periods, as follow s: Percent o f Increase in wholesale pricesi Aug. 1939 to Dec. 1943 A ll commodities ........................... Farm products ..................... Foods ................... ; ............... Hides and leather ^products. Textile products ................. Fuel and lighting m aterials. Metals and metal p rod u cts.. Building materials ............. Chemicals and allied products Housefurnishing goods . . . . Miscellaneous com m odities. July 1914 to Nov. 1918 37.6 102.5 99.7 57.1 26.2 44.1 13.1 11.4 26.6 35.3 20.1 27.3 110.5 104.5 88.8 157.9 105.2 81.4 92.4 128.5 75.0 61.5 i Source: U. S. Bureau o f Labor Statistics. It w ill be noted that, except for farm products, which were not controlled until a late date, increases during W orld W ar II were much smaller than during W orld W ar I. Chapter 9 .—Conclusion The theory o f general price control, as exemplified in the General Maximum Price Regulation, was discussed thoroughly during the hearings on the Emergency Price Control Act in the 50 fall o f 1941. There was little disagreement concerning its theo retical desirability but, fo r practical and political reasons, it was discarded at that time in favor o f selective price control, despite the example o f Canada. The attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 necessitated profound changes in the American econom y and selective price controls became inadequate to cope with the new conditions. By the spring o f 1942 strong inflationary pressures, which had been latent in the econom y even before our entry into the war, were causing a dangerous price rise. Emergency action on a wide scale was imperative to prevent serious inflation. It was to meet this emergency that the General Maximum Price Regulation was issued on April 28, 1942. Conceived as a corollary to other direct measures to control inflation, the order was as comprehensive as was possible under the terms o f the Emergency Price Control Act. It was admittedly a stop-gap to be superseded in time by more specific regulations. Many com m od ities actually were transferred subsequently to m ore appropriate regulations. Moreover, because o f the comprehensive character of GMPR, numerous problems arose which required adjustment, amendment, and clarification-. Probably, however, it was the most feasible action in the emergency. Because o f the nature o f GMPR ceilings, there is little con clusive statistical evidence to show the degree o f compliance with the regulation, but admittedly it was not good. There were nu merous outright violations, some o f which were w illful, but many o f which arose from ignorance or confusion. In addition, many devices fo r circumventing the regulation were found and put into practice. Although evasions were possible under other form s o f price regulation, they were more difficult to detect under GMPR and consequently m ore numerous. Administration o f GMPR proved to be difficult and effective enforcement almost impossible. Ceilings were a matter o f indi vidual interpretation and there was considerable latitude fo r indi vidual judgment. Little attempt was made to com pel rigid com pliance. The educational problem alone was difficult. Moreover, in its efforts to insure equity, OPA attempted to cover all contin gencies by regulation. The resultant complexity, as well as the impracticability o f the regulation, soon occasioned severe criticism o f GMPR. GMPR also was hampered by two serious limitations imposed by the terms o f the Emergency Price Control Act, namely, absence o f initial controls over agricultural prices and wages, which were not established until later. Their exemption rendered OPA’s avowed polity o f maintaining the March 1942 price level virtually impossible, as later events proved. Moreover, expected companion measures, such as forced savings and adequate taxation, were not enacted. Price control could only minimize price increases. It could not remove the basic inflationary threat—rising purchasing power imposed upon a declining volume o f goods. In additidn to these handicaps to effective price control under GMPR were certain econom ic limitations o f the regulation itself. 51 Inequitable price relationships were perpetuated under the freeze. Some were already present in March 1942 and others developed with the increasing pressure o f rising costs against fixed ceilings. As the months passed, it became more and more difficult to main tain March 1942 ceilings and OPA was compelled frequently to grant upward adjustment o f ceilings. GMPR, moreover, was unable to cope with hidden price increases through quality deteri oration or other means, The regulation proved remarkably effective, despite its short comings and the obstacles which it faced. Price increases which can be measured by official indexes were held to a minimum. This is evident from comparison o f price movements before and after GMPR, as well as during W orld W ar I and W orld W ar II. The contrast between price increases o f commodities controlled by GMPR and those not controlled also gives unmistakable proof o f its effectiveness. In retrospect, therefore, the regulation ap pears to have been a necessary and successful emergency pricecontrol measure which subsequently was superseded in large part by more appropriate regulations. It is not possible within the scope o f this report to discuss other anti-inflation measures or the merits o f price stabilization. Mention .is made o f some conflicts with other objectives, but evaluation o f these conflicts must be reserved for another analysis. Speculation as to the relative efficacy o f other anti-inflation meas ures is also beyond the limits o f this study. 52 Appendix.— Detailed Tables Table 1 .—Percentage changes in posted average retail celling prices o f foods covered by the General Maximum Price Regulation9 from October 1 3 ,1 9 4 2 9 to December 1S9 1942 Commodity A ll stores Small Medium- Large size inde inde inde pendent pendent pendent Macarpni, 8-oz. pkg......................... Bread, w hite, 16 oz......................... Bread, whole wheat, 16 oz.............. Bread, rye, 16 oz............................... Vanilla cookies, plain, 1 lb ............. Soda crackers, 1 lb ........................... +3.4 +4.9 + .3 + .3 -2.9 + 1.1 +1.5 +15.2 Steak, sirloin, 1 lb ........................... Steak, round, 1 lb ............................. Boast, chuck, center cut* bone in, l i b ................................................... Roast, rib , bone in , 1 lb .................. Cutlets, veal, steak, best cut, 1 lb. Chops, pork, center cut, 1 lb ......... Bacon, sliced, % lb . pkg.................. Ham, sliced, smoked, lb .................. Ham, whole, smoked, lb ................ Salt pork, bellies, lb ........................ -.9 -.4 + 1.0 + 1.0 - 1.1 + 1.0 - 2.1 + 2.2 + 1.0 +3.2 + 1.1 +.2 -.2 +.6 +1.3 -.6 -.6 ( 1) -1.7 -.2 +.2 -1.5 + .4 -.7 -.7 +.0 -5.1 + 2.8 +10.4 -.4 +10.5 +1.7 -.7 -1.7 -5.0 +2.3 - 1.8 + 1.0 - 1.6 -.2 + 1.2 + 1.0 -.6 + .3 -6.7 -2.3 +1.4 -.3 - 1.0 + 2.0 + .7 -.3 -.3 -4.0 + 1.3 +.6 + 1.1 + 8.2 + 2.6 + 1.8 -.4 -1.7 -3.9 +1.7 - 1.1 -4.4 - 2.8 - 1.6 -3.6 -.5 -3.3 -.5 - 1.6 +.8 - 2.6 -.9 -.8 + .7 -.6 +.8 + .3 -.4 +4.1 -.6 +.2 +1.5 +1.4 -1.4 - 1.1 + 1.1 -.2 -9.7 + .4 +3.2 + .7 - 2.6 +1.7 -.2 +4.5 Oleomargarine, 1 lb ........................ Salad dressing, pint ja r ................. Mayonnaise, pint ja r ........................ Corn syrup, 24 oz............................. Molasses, 13 fl. oz............................. +.2 +.8 + 1.1 + .3 + 2.2 + .7 + .9 -1.3 +1.5 + .9 + 2.0 + 2.1 + .5 i Less than a tenth o f 1 percent increase. +.1 -.6 -.6 -.6 -.7 +3.3 + .5 + 6.8 +1.7 +1.5 -.2 +.1 +.1 -.2 +.1 w7 - l .* 8 -1.5 - 2.2 -5.6 -1.3 Super m arket +0.5 + .3 M ilk, fresh, 1 q t ............................. Bananas, 1 lb .................................... Coffee, 1 lb ....................................... Tea, black, % lb ............................... Cocoa, % lb ....... ................................ Chocolate, baking, unsweetened. % U»................................................. +1.3 +1.5 r.hqtr| -.1 • +.2 -.5 -.4 +3.6 +3.3 _ -2.7 -.8 -.9 +.6 -.6 -.6 48 -.3 + .3 -.8 53 Table 2 .—Unit labor cost In selected manufacturing industries, 1940-451 [1 939= 100] 1941 1040 Industry Agricultural implements ........... Boots and shoes ........................... Bread and other bakery products Cane-sugar refining ...................... Canning and preserving g ro u p ... Canned and preserved fruits and vegetables ......... , ......... Canned and cured f is h ......... 100.2 111.6 1942 1943 1944 1945 110 9 98.2 96.0 1026 102.9 92.9 104.9 1414 118.9 130.8 114.0 139.6 141.6 146.9 122.9 137.4 150.1 150.8 114.4 146.7 152.7 97.6 81.0 105.8 93.0 115.7 134.1 137.9 146.1 147.8 154.6 „ 150.8 156.0 Cement ............................................ Clay construction p ro d u cts......... Coke group ..................................... Condensed and evaporated m ilk. Confectionery ............................ Cotton goods ................................... 99.4 90.8 95.4 90.9 961 103.3 98.4 91.3 95 0 89.9 104.8 1117 152.0 151.0 146.9 149.9 Fertilizers .................................. Flour and other grain-m ill products ................................. . Glass products ........................... Hosiery ........................................ Ice cream ................................... Leather ........... .......................... . Lumber and tim ber products: Sawmills ............................. 98.2 110 6 130.3 147.8 100.2 112.2 101.1 116.2 110.4 117.2 135.8 111.6 134.2 127.8 161.1 131.8 135.4 174.4 95.7 105.4 132.1 150.8 159.5 160.8 101.4 103.7 95.7 96.3 101.3 106.4 106.1 96.7 84.7 126.8 1143 102 7 73.5 110.2 156.9 115.9 109.0 91.6 123.9 166.2 123.3 112.4 92.0 127.8 112.5 95.1 132.0 94.9 110.3 137.6 162.7 175.1 Malt liquors ................................... Newspaper and periodical printing and publishing ............................ Nonferrous m etals: Prim ary smelters and refiners ............... Paints and varnishes .................. Paper and pulp group ................. Petroleum refining ........................ Rayon and allied products......... 104.4 103.6 110.2 124.3 130.6 98.6 98.5 103.6 112.3 135.9 140.4 93.3 103.2 99.4 97.8 92.2 111.5 97.3 106.2 99.7 89.2 127.4 111.5 124.8 116.1 90.1 143.3 117.5 143.4 134.2 100.5 151.4 117.2 152.1 138.3 99.7 155.9 115A 152.9 143.7 97.2 Slaughtering and meat packing. Tobacco products group ............. Cigars ...................................... Cigarettes ............................... Chewing and smoking tobacco and snuff ............. W oolen and worsted goods.......... 981 103.6 103.4 105.2 107.8 105.9 108.4 103.5 123.3 1178 118.2 111.7 131.9 130.8 135.9 113.1 132.7 136.5 139.3 117.8 126.4 135.5 133.0 119.3 100.6 102.0 121.4 141.7 137.6 146.5 151.7 140.5 160.0 144.3 101.8 130.7 127.4 150.5 160.3 112.1 136.5 l Source: Productivity and Unit Labor Cost in Selected M anufacturing Industries, 1939-1945 (U. S. Bureau o f Labor Statistics). Table 3 * —Indexes o f wholesale prices,1 controlled and uncontrolled2 [March 1 4, 1942=1001 Week ending— Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. 14,1942.......................... 18,1942.......................... 16,1942............. ........... 13,1942.......................... 18,1942............. ........... 15,1942......................... 12,1942............... .......... 17,1942.......................... 14,1942.......................... 12,1942.................. . 16,1943.......................... 13,1943.......................... 13,1943.......................... A ll com m oditiess 100.0 Controlled Uncontrolled as o f as o f May 11,1942 May 11,1942s 101.3 101.4 101.4 100.0 100.0 101.1 102.1 101.9 102.3 102.7 103.2 103.6 104.9 105.4 106.5 101.0 101.4 101.3 101.3 101.4 101.4 101.7 101.9 101.8 101.2 100.9 101.3 102.2 102.5 101.4 103.6 105.3 106.8 109.0 110.4 114.8 116.5 120.5 1 Source: U S. Bureau o f Labor Statistics. 2 Fixed-base, constant-com position index num bers. 8 Excluding gas and electricity, w hich are regulated b y state or m unicipal ftgeneltgx 54 Table 4 .—Indexes o f wholesale prices o f foods,1 controlled and uncontrolled2 [M arch 14, 1942=1001 Mar. Apr. May .Tune July Aug. Sept Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Controlled Uncontrolled as o f as o f May 11,1942 May 11,1942 All foods W eek ending— 14,1942.......................... 18,1942.......................... 16,1942..........*.............. 13,1942.......................... 18,1942.......................... 15,1942......................... 12,1942.......................... 17,1942.......................... 14,1942.......................... 12,1942......................... 16,1943.......................... 13,1943.......................... 13,1943.......................... 100.0 100.0 101.6 100.0 103.2 102.9 103.6 102.7 103.6 102.8 103.4 100.1 102.0 101.5 104.2 105.0 106.7 105.2 105.6 107.1 107.6 107.8 99.6 105.0 108.3 113.1 113.2 114.9 118.5 119,6 119.8 103.9 104.0 104.6 102.6 102.7 103.5 103.7 104.0 1 Source: U. S. Bureau o f Labor Statistics. 2 Fixed-base, constant-com position index num bers. Table 5 * —Percentage changes in wholesale prices for selected periods1 Percent o f change from — Commodity group 11 com m odities............................... Farm products.......................... Foods.......................................... Hides and leather p rodu cts.. Textile products........................ Fuel and lighting m aterials.. Metals and m etal prod u cts... Building m aterials................... Chemicals and allied products. Housefurnishing goods........... Miscellaneous com m odities... .1 com m odities other than farm 1 products...................; ................. .1 com m odities other than farm 1 products and fo o d s ..................... Aug.1939 Dec.1941 Dec.1941 May 1942 Jan. 1941 Mayl942 to to to to to to Mar.1942 Mar.1942 Mayl942 Dec.1942 Mayl942 Dec.1943 +30.1 +4.3 +68.5 +43.0 +25.9 +42.5 +7.0 +11.4 +23.3 +30.9 +19.9 +22.4 + 8.6 + 6.2 + 1.7 +5.2 -.9 + .5 +2.5 +6.4 +15 +2.4 +23.5 +18.9 +5.6 ...... ! + 10.2 ; +9.3 +3.0 + 6.8 -.5 + 2.2 +22.3 +4.5 +9.0 +5.5 +16.7 + 6.8 -1.5 -.3 +5.3 + 2.1 + 6.6 + 1.8 +3.3 -.1 +2.3 -.4 0 +45.8 +34.2 +16.0 +30.3 + 8.2 +6.3 +10.5 +23.8 +15.6 +17.4 +3.1 +4.4 + .7 +17.8 + 1.6 + 1.6 + 2.1 +.2 +13.5 + 2.0 +.6 -.8 -.8 +1.5 -.1 -.1 +3.0 +3.2 -.1 +3.1 l Source: U. S. Bureau o f Labor Statistics. Table 6,^— Percentage changes in consumers9 prices for selected periods1 Percent o f change from — Commodity group Aug.1939 Dec.1941 Dec.1941 Mayl942 Jan.1941 Mayl942 to to to to to to Mar.1942 Mar.1942 Mayl942 Dec.1942 May 1942 Dec.1943 A ll item s............................................ +15.9 +3.4 +5.0 +3.8 4+5 1 +7.2 Food........................................ Clothing..................................... Rent............................................ Fuel, electricity, and ice ....... H ousefurnishings............. ........ M iscellaneous............................. +26.8 +23.2 +4.4 +7.2 +20.5 +9.7 +4.9 +7.7 +7.5 +J.J + 1.6 +9.1 +24.3 -t-25.3 +4.7 +4.1 + 22.1 + 8.8 +12.7 +6.7 - 1.6 +4.3 +4.7 +6.5 +.6 +♦4 +3.8 + 2.2 i Source: U. S. Bureau o f Labor Statistics. +.8 +4.6 +3.0 -.2 -1.7 +1.3 +L2 +1.7 55 Bibliography Articles and B ooks Abramson, V ictor: Price Freezing Under the Office o f Price Administra tion (in American Econom ic Review, Princeton, N. J„ December 1942). American Statistical A ssociation: An Appraisal o f the U. S. Bureau o f Labor Statistics Cost o f Living Index (in Journal o f the American Statistical Association, Boston, Vol. 38, December 1943). Baruch, Bernard M.: Taking the Profits Out o f W ar, New York, 1936. Blair, John M. and Ulmer, M elville J., under the direction o f Saul N elson: Wartime Prices, Part I—August 1939 to Pearl Harbor. U. S. Bureau o f Labor Statistics Bulletin No. 749, W ashington, 1944. Department o f Munitions and Supply: W artime Controls in Canada. Ot tawa, Canada, March 9, 1942. Galbraith, J. K .: Price C ontrol: Some Lessons from the First Phase. Papers and Proceedings o f the Fifty-fifth Annual Meeting o f th* American Econom ic Association, January 1943. Hardy, Charles 0 .: W artime Control o f Prices. W ashington, Brookings Institution, 1940. Hirsch, Julius*: Evaluation o f Our Wartime Price Control (in Journal o f Marketing, New York, January 1944). Humphrey, Don D .: Price Control in Outline (in American E conom ic Review, Princeton, N. J., December 1942.) The Effectiveness o f Price Control (in Survey o f Current Business, W ashington, February 1943.) Miller, John P erry: The Tactics o f Retail Price Control (in Quarterly Journal o f Econom ics, Boston, Mass., August 1943). Mikesell, Raymond F. and Galbreath, C. Edw ard: Subsidies and Price Con trol (in American Econom ic Review, Princeton, N. J., September 1942). National Resources Committee: Structure o f the American Econom y. Wash ington, June 1939. Nelson, Saul: Progress o f Price Regulation to September 1942 (in Monthly Labor Review, W ashington, October 1942). Office o f Price Adm inistration: Bulletin No. 1: The General Maximum Price Regulation. W ashington, 1942. Bulletin No. 2: What Every Retailer Should Know About the General Maximum Price Regulation. W ashington, May 1942. D irectory o f Commodities and Services. W ashington, 1943. One Year o f Retail Price Control (May 1942-May 1943) (P rice Control Report No. 15). W ashington, 1943. Quarterly Reports: First Quarterly Report for the Period Ended April 30, 1942, Second Report Covering the Operations o f the Office between May 1 and July 31, 1942, Third Quarterly Report for the Period Ended October 31, 1942, Fourth Quarterly Report for the Period Ended January 31, 1943, Fifth Quarterly Report for the Period Ended April 30,1943, Sixth Quarterly Report for the Period Ended June 30, 1943, Seventh Quarterly Report for the Period Ended September 30, 1943. The Retail Price Lag (based on Bureau o f Labor Statistics W holesale and Retail Prices for 100 Comparable Item s). W ashington, April 17, 1942. Division of Research: Facing the Price Problem. W ashington, April 23, 1942. Price Analysis and Review Branch: The Effectiveness o f Selective Price Control (Price Control Report No. 7). 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House o f Representatives: Hearings before the Committee on Bank ing and Currency, House o f Representatives (77th Cong.) on H.R. 5479, superseded by H.R. 5990, a Bill to Further the National Defense and Security by Checking Speculative and Excessive Price Rises, Price Dislocations, and Inflationary Tendencies, and fo r other Purposes. W ashington, 1941-1942. W ebb, Laura B row n: Effects o f Rising Costs on Quality o f W earing Apparel (in Monthly Labor Review, W ashington, February 1941). Recent Changes in the Character o f Civilian Textiles and Apparel (in Monthly Labor Review, September 1943). W ilson, Kenneth R .: Wartime Prices and Trade Board (Booklet No. 1). Ottawa, Canada, December 1941. Newspapers and Periodicals American Lumberman, Chicago, 111. American Metal Market, New York, N. Y. Business W eek, New York, N. Y. Chicago Journal o f Commerce, Chicago, 111, CIO News, W ashington, D. C. Commercial Bulletin, Boston, Mass. Consumer Reports, New York, N. Y. D aily Metal Reporter, New York, N. Y. D aily Metal Trade, Cleveland, 0 . D aily News Record, New York, N. Y. Drug Topics, New York, N. Y. Furniture W orld, East Stroudsburg, Pa. Hardware Age, New York, N. Y. Journal o f Commerce, New York, N. Y. New York Times, New York, N. Y. Northwestern Miller, Minneapolis, Minn. PM, New York, N. Y. Southern Lumberman, Nashville, Tenn. Steel, Cleveland, 0 . W all Street Journal, New York, N. Y. W ashington News, W ashington, D. C. W ashington Post, W ashington, D. C. Docum entary R eferences Emergency Price Control Act o f 1942 (Public Law No. 421, 77th Cong., 2d sess.), W ashington, 1942. Executive Order No. 9328, issued by the President April 8, 1943, The W hite House, W ashington. Executive Order No. 9250, issued by the President October 3, 1942, The W hite House, W ashington. Orders in Council, P.C. 2516, P.C. 3998, and P.C. 6834: The Wartime Prices and Trade Board Regulations. 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Hearings before the Committee on Bank ing and Currency, House o f Representatives (77th Cong.) on H.R. 5479, superseded by H.R. 5990. & U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1946-498255