View original document

The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.

DALLASFED
Volume 1, Issue 1
May 31, 2012

Financial Insights
FIRM • FINANCIAL INSTITUTION RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT

Branding the Great Recession

}

by Thomas F. Siems
Calendar of Events
May 30
CEO Forum with
Richard Fisher
San Antonio, TX

June 14
TCUL–Coastal Bend
Corpus Christi, TX

June 19

W

as the 2008 global financial crisis and economic downturn—often branded the Great
Recession—the worst U.S. contraction since the Great Depression of the 1930s? And how
has the subsequent recovery compared with previous recoveries?

According to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the most recent recession
lasted 18 months and output contracted by 5.1 percent from peak (December 2007) to trough
(June 2009). Since the end of World War II and prior to the 2008 downturn, there were 10 official
recessions, lasting an average 10.4 months and contracting an average 1.8 percent from peak
to trough. These 10 downturns ranged from six to 16 months in length and from +0.4 to –3.2
percent in depth, as measured by real gross domestic product (GDP).

July 31

The NBER’s Business Cycle Dating Committee is the generally accepted arbiter for determining
the dates that mark the onset of expansions and contractions in U.S. economic activity, or
business-cycle troughs and peaks. The NBER does not employ the media’s rule of thumb that an
economic recession occurs when there are two or more consecutive quarters of declining real
GDP, even though most recessions identified by the NBER are consistent with this definition.
Instead, the NBER uses a range of other indicators along with changes in real GDP: monthly
indicators such as employment, real income, real sales and industrial production.

Economic Insights:
Conversations with the
Dallas Fed
Webcast

This essay examines how deep the 2008 recession was, compared with previous contractions,
as well as how the current economic recovery stacks up against prior expansions. Chart 1
compares several business cycles by indexing real GDP at the NBER peak recession month for

Economic Roundtable
Stephenville, TX

June 27
Economic Roundtable
Wichita Falls, TX

August 15
Economic Roundtable
Bastrop, TX

Chart

1

August 22
Community Depository
Institutions Advisory Council
Meeting
Dallas, TX

August 30
Economic Roundtable
Lufkin, TX
For more information about
these events, email FIRM at
Dallas_Fed_Firm@dal.frb.org.

GDP: Recession and Recovery Trends

Real GDP
Index, NBER recession peak = 100
111
109
107
105

1991 recession

103

2001 recession

101
99
2008 recession

97
95
93

–3

0

3

6

9

12

15

Quarters from peak
NOTE: Shaded area represents the range of real GDP outcomes against the NBER recession peak for the six major U.S. recessions from 1953
to 1982.

FIRM • Financial Institution Relationship Management
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
2200 N. Pearl St., Dallas, TX 75201

DALLASFED
each business cycle. The 1991, 2001 and 2008 business cycles are all superimposed on the range
of real GDP activity over the previous six recessions from 1953 to 1982, excluding the short 1980
recession.

}

DALLAS FED RESOURCES
Texas Economic
Indicators
Economic Updates
Regional—“Regional
Economy Picks Up”
National—“Outlook Remains
Positive but Cloudy”
International—“Sustained
Recovery Dependent on
Euro-Area Resolution”

Dallas Beige Book
Texas Business Outlook
Surveys
Agricultural Survey
Southwest Economy
“Texas Economy Moves from
Recovery to Expansion”

Banking and Community
Perspectives
“Pathways to Financial
Advancement: A Case
Study”

e-Perspectives
“Texas Housing and
Mortgage Update”

Economic Letter
“Default and Lost
Opportunities: A Message
from Argentina for EuroZone Countries”

Compared with recessions since the early 1950s and examining real GDP, the 1991 recession
was fairly typical, whereas the 2001 downturn was arguably not a recession at all. But the 2008
recession hit new depths and lasted nearly twice as long as an average economic contraction.
Chart 1 also shows that the recovery following the 2008 recession has been longer and slower
than usual. From the trough, it has taken nine quarters for economic output to return to the
prerecession level. Typically, recessions return to their prerecession peak after just two quarters;
the longest previous post-WWII recoveries, following the 1974–75 and 1991 recessions, took
three quarters to return to peak output.
Moreover, the pace of growth following the 2008 recession has been slower than any recovery
since the Great Depression. The annualized rate of growth over the nine quarters since the
economy hit bottom in June 2009 has been 2.4 percent. For post-WWII recoveries, annualized
growth averaged 5.2 percent over the subsequent nine quarters; for the three previous
recoveries, annualized growth averaged 4.0 percent over the same period.
Also of great concern is the impact that recessions have on jobs. In a similar manner as in Chart
1, Chart 2 displays how nonfarm payroll employment levels compare over several business
cycles. As shown by the shaded area, recessions from 1953 to 1982 typically lost 2.7 percent of
the workforce (ranging from a decline of 1.2 percent to 4.2 percent). But the economy returned to
prerecession employment levels usually within two years from the start of the recession, ranging
from 17 to 28 months. And, while the 1991 and 2001 recessions each experienced a falloff in
employment within the range for previous recessions, job growth during the ensuing recoveries
was far slower than usual. It took 31 months for jobs to recover following the 1991 recession and 47
months for jobs to return to peak levels following the 2001 recession. Indeed, the phrase “jobless
recovery” was painfully introduced to the economist’s lexicon following the 1991 recession and
was resurrected following the 2001 recession.
For the 2008 recession, the depth of job losses—declining 6.3 percent from peak to trough—was by
far the most severe since the Great Depression. For the subsequent recovery, job gains have been
meager, rebounding at a flatter trajectory than the two previous jobless recoveries and considerably

Chart

Employment: Recession and Recovery Trends

2

Nonagricultural employment
Index, NBER recession peak = 100
110
108
106
104
102

1991 recession

100
98
2001 recession
96
94
2008 recession

92
90

–3

0

3

6

9

12

15

18

21

24

27

30

33

36

39

42

45

48

Months from peak
NOTE: Shaded area represents the range of employment outcomes against the NBER recession peak for the six major U.S. recessions from
1953 to 1982.

2

FIRM • Financial Institution Relationship Management
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
2200 N. Pearl St., Dallas, TX 75201

DALLASFED
below normal. At more than four years since the recession began, nonfarm payroll employment is
still 3.7 percent below the prerecession level, and it is likely to take many more months of solid job
gains—perhaps another two to three years—before employment fully rebounds.

}

About Financial
Insights and FIRM

Depicting the 2008 economic downturn as the Great Recession seems justifiable. It was the
longest and deepest economic contraction, as measured by the drop in real GDP, since the Great
Depression. And the time it took to return to prerecession peak output was far longer than any
other post-Great Depression recovery. Job losses during the Great Recession were also the most
dreadful since the Great Depression. And, for the nation as a whole, job growth has been muted
during the recovery.

Financial Insights is
published periodically by
FIRM – Financial Institution
Relationship Management –
to share timely economic
topics of interest with
financial institutions.

Siems is a senior economist and director of economic outreach in the Financial Institution Relationship
Management Department at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. Send comments or questions about this
article to the author at Tom.Siems@dal.frb.org.

FIRM was organized in 2007
by the Federal Reserve Bank
of Dallas as an outreach
function to maintain mutually
beneficial relationships
with all financial institutions
throughout the Eleventh
Federal Reserve District.
FIRM’s primary purpose
is to improve information
sharing with district financial
institutions so that the
Dallas Fed is better able
to accomplish its mission.
FIRM also maintains the
Dallas Fed’s institutional
knowledge of payments,
engaging with the industry to
understand market dynamics
and advances in payment
processing.

Richard Fisher’s speech before the Dallas Regional Chamber of Commerce
In this speech (“‘Not to Be Used Externally, but Also Harmful if Swallowed’: Projecting the Future of
the Economy and Lessons Learned from Texas and Mexico”), Dallas Fed President Richard Fisher
concludes that monetary policy has largely done its job and that it is now up to Congress and the
executive branch to create the right environment for businesses to create jobs and for consumers to
help drive the economy forward.

FIRM outreach includes
hosting economic roundtable
briefings, moderating CEO
forums hosted by Dallas
Fed senior management,
leading the Dallas Fed’s
Community Depository
Institution Advisory Council
(CDIAC) and Corporate
Payments Council (CPC),
as well as creating relevant
webcast presentations and
this publication. In addition,
the group supports its
constituents by remaining
active with financial trade
associations and through
individual meetings with
financial institutions.

Noteworthy Items

http://www.dallasfed.org/news/speeches/fisher/2012/fs120305.cfm
Richard Fisher’s speech before the Texas Bankers Association’s annual convention
In this speech (“Adios ‘Texas Ratio’”), Dallas Fed President Richard Fisher concludes that Texas is
home to the nation’s best-run banks, and Texas is the best-performing economy in the country.
Fisher shows how the Texas economy has outperformed the nation and other large economies in
creating jobs, how Texas banks continue to outperform the nation and why the so-called Texas ratio
should be renamed.
http://www.dallasfed.org/news/speeches/fisher/2012/fs120511.cfm
Chairman Bernanke’s speech at the Independent Community Bankers of America National
Convention and Techworld (in Nashville, Tenn.)
In this speech, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke stresses the importance of community
banks to our financial system and economy, as well as the importance the Federal Reserve places on
its relationship with community banks.
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20120314a.htm
Dallas Fed’s 2011 Annual Report essay released
The essay, “Choosing the Road to Prosperity: Why We Must End Too Big to Fail—Now,” argues
that greater stability in the financial sector begins when the giant banks are broken up and the
assumption of government rescue is driven from the marketplace.
http://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/fed/annual/2011/ar11b.pdf
Economic Insights: Conversations with the Dallas Fed webcast on ending too big to fail
Harvey Rosenblum, the Dallas Fed’s executive vice president and director of research, is featured in
this webcast as he presents the 2011 Annual Report essay, “Choosing the Road to Prosperity: Why
We Must End Too Big to Fail—Now.” Rosenblum is joined by S. Scott MacDonald, president and
CEO of the Southwestern Graduate School of Banking Foundation and finance professor at SMU, to
examine the concentration of assets in the banking industry and for a brief panel discussion.
http://www.dallasfed.org/publications.cfm?tab=1#dallastabs

Contact us at Dallas_Fed_
FIRM@dal.frb.org.

3

FIRM • Financial Institution Relationship Management
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
2200 N. Pearl St., Dallas, TX 75201