View original document

The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.

A T CIRCULAR NO.

Federal R eserve Bank

of

N ew Yo r k

N E W Y O R K , N.Y. 1 0 0 4 5 - 0 0 0 1
A RE A C O D E 212 7 2 0 - 5 2 6 8

W il l ia m L. R u t l e d g e
S e n io r V ice Pr e s i d e n t

April 16, 1993

TO THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS OF
ALL STATE MEMBER BANKS, BANK HOLDING COMPANIES,
AND U. S. BRANCHES AND AGENCIES OF FOREIGN BANKS
IN THE SECOND FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
SUBJECT:

VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL RESERVE MARGIN REGULATIONS IN
CUSTODIAL AGENCY ACCOUNTS RESULTING FROM "FREE-RIDING"
SCHEMES

State member banks, bank holding companies, and U.S. branches
and agencies of foreign banks should be aware of recent targeted
examinations and investigations by the Federal Reserve and the
Enforcement Division of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC),
as well as court actions, that have found banks in violation of
Regulation U (12 CFR 221) (Credit by Banks for the Purpose of
Purchasing or Carrying Margin Stocks) in connection with extensions
of credit by bank trust departments, using bank or other fiduciary
funds, to individuals involved in illegal "day trading" or "free­
riding" schemes.
These activities also involved the aiding and
abetting of violations of two other securities credit regulations:
Regulation T (12 CFR 220) (Credit by Brokers and Dealers) and
Regulation X (12 CFR 224) (Borrowers of Securities Credit). Day
trading and free-riding schemes involve the purchase and sale of
stock on the same day (or within a very short period of time) and
the funding of the purchase by the sales' proceeds.
Because of the illegal activities described below, banks
have been exposed to disciplinary proceedings, as well as to
substantial credit risk.
To date, several banks have sustained
monetary losses in their trust departments as a result of their
involvement in these schemes.
In the late 1980's, the SEC started to uncover illegal
free-riding schemes and addressed them through injunctive actions
filed against broker-dealers and banks in Federal district court.
In one case, SEC v. Hansen, et al. . 726 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y.
1989), a bank was found to have violated Regulation U by knowingly
participating in a free-riding scheme. This was the first case in
which the SEC sued a bank for illegal securities clearance
activities associated with a free-riding scheme.
It appears that
over the past several months these illegal schemes have resurfaced.
Investigations and examinations by SEC and Federal Reserve staffs
have detected similar violations by State member and national
banks' trust departments, leading to follow-up enforcement actions.




HAJUDfliO TA

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK_______

2

Thus, increased vigilance by banking organizations that conduct
trust-related activities is called for to ensure they take all
steps necessary to prevent their customers from involving them in
the customers' attempts at free-riding.

Summary of Illegal Activities
The free-riding conduct in question typically involves
individuals trading large amounts of securities without depositing
the necessary money or appropriate collateral in their customer
accounts.
The customer seeks to free-ride— that is, purchase and
sell the same securities and pay for the purchase with the proceeds
of the sale.
Often, free-riding schemes involve initial public
offerings because broker-dealers are prohibited from financing
these new issues. If the money to pay for the securities is not in
the account when the securities are delivered in a delivery-versuspayment or received-versus-payment (DVP) transaction, a bank or
other financial
institution that permits completion of the
transaction creates a temporary overdraft in the customer's
account. This overdraft is an extension of credit that is subject
to Regulation U.
The typical device used by the perpetrators of a free­
riding scheme is for a new customer to open a custodial agency
account into which a number of broker-dealers will deliver
securities or funds on a DVP basis. Although a deposit may be made
into the custodial agency account, the amount of trading is greatly
in excess of the original deposit causing the bank to extend its
own credit to meet the payment and delivery obligations of the
account.
Thus, while the financial institution may be generating
fees based on the activity of these accounts, it is subjecting
itself to substantial losses should the market prices for the
purchased securities fall or failed transactions otherwise occur.
In addition, other liabilities under Federal banking and securities
laws may be involved.

Application of Securities Credit Regulations
Regulation U.
Because there is no exemption in
Regulation U for trust activities in a bank or other financial
institution,1 any extension of credit in the course of settling

1
The definition of the term "bank" for purposes of
regulation specifically includes institutions "exercising fiduciary
powers."
See 12 CFR 221.2(b), 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(6), and Federal
Reserve Regulatory Service at 5-795 (1946).




the

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

3

customer securities transactions must comply with all of the
provisions of Regulation U.2 This includes the requirement that
all extensions of credit that are secured by marginable stock be
within the 50 percent margin limit set by Regulation U.
To avoid violations of the Board's securities credit
regulations, the customer's account must hold sufficient funds on
the settlement date to pay for each transaction and the funds may
not include the proceeds of their sale. If a financial institution
is relying on the proceeds of the sale of securities as its source
of payment for accepting delivery of the securities, Board staff,
the SEC, and the courts have viewed the institution as extending
credit secured by the securities to the customer.
Because
Regulation U limits the amount of credit that can be extended in
these cases to 50 percent of the securities' current market value
if the securities qualify as margin stock and, generally, in a
free-riding scheme a customer's account does not have funds to pay
for all such purchases or a customer instructs the institution to
pay for the purchase of securities with the proceeds from the sale
of those securities, a banking organization that has extended
credit in a free-riding scheme has violated Regulation U.
Although the proscriptions of Regulation U apply only to
transactions in margin stock, free-riding in nonmargin stocks in
custodial agency accounts could, as described below, result in
aiding and abetting violations by the banking organization of
Regulations T and X and other securities laws, and raise financial
safety and soundness issues.

Regulation T and X.
Because the custodial agency
accounts described above are used to settle transactions effected
by the customer at broker-dealers, a banking organization that
opens this type of account should have some general understanding
of how Regulation T restricts the customer's use of the account at
the institution.
Regulation T requires the use of a cash account
for customer purchases or sales on a DVP basis.
Section 220.8(a)
of Regulation T specifies that cash account transactions are
predicated on the customer's agreement that he or she will make
full cash payment for securities before selling them and does not
intend to sell them before making such payment.
Therefore, free-

2
When used in discussing a bank's trust department, or any
other type of financial institution exercising fiduciary powers,
the term "extension of credit" includes overdrafts in settling
customer's accounts that may be covered by advances from the
banking organization, from other fiduciary customers, or from a
combination of both.




FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

4

riding is prohibited in a cash account.
A customer who instructs
his or her agent bank or other financial institution to pay for a
security in reliance on the proceeds of its sale in a DVP
transaction is causing, or aiding or abetting, the broker-dealer to
violate the credit restrictions of Regulation T.
Regulation X,
which generally prohibits borrowers from willfully causing credit
to be extended in contravention of Regulations T or U, also applies
to the customer in such cases.
As described above, banking organizations involved in
free-riding schemes may be aiding and abetting violations of
Regulation T by the broker-dealers delivering securities or funds
to the institutions' customers' accounts. As long as the bank uses
its funds to complete a customer's transactions, the broker-dealers
may not discover that they are selling securities to the customer
in violation of their obligations under Regulation T.
A similar
aiding and abetting violation of Regulation X could occur with
respect to violations by the customers who have used the financial
institution to induce their broker-dealers to violate Regulation T.

New Customer Inquiries and Warning Signals
Banking
organizations
that
conduct
trust-related
activities should make sure that they follow appropriate written
policies and procedures concerning the establishment of custodial
agency accounts or any new account involving customer securities
transactions. They should address, among other things, ways a bank
can protect against free-riding schemes. One of the ways banks can
protect themselves is to obtain adequate background and credit
information from new clients, including whether the customer
intends to obtain bank credit to use the account for transactions
as if it were a margin account at a broker-dealer.
This type of
activity requires more extensive monitoring than the typical DVP
account in which no credit is extended.
It would be prudent to
inquire why a new customer is not utilizing the margin account
services of its broker-dealers.
Regulation U Form FR U-l must be
obtained and constantly updated if the account is to be used as a
margin account.
It also would be advisable for the bank or bank holding
company subsidiary to obtain from the customer a list of brokerdealers that will be sending securities to or receiving funds from
the account on a DVP basis. If it appears that a number of brokerdealers may be used on a DVP basis, the bank should obtain an
undertaking from the customer,
as part of the new account
agreement, that all transactions with the broker-dealer will be in
conformance with Regulations T and X and that the customer is aware
that a cash account security is not to be sold until it is paid
for.
Similarly,
in obtaining instructions for settling DVP




FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

5

transactions for a customer, the bank should clarify that it will
not pay for the purchase of securities with the proceeds from the
sale of those securities.
State member banks, bank holding companies, and U.S.
branches and agencies of foreign banks exercising trust powers
should also ensure that they monitor such accounts closely for an
initial period to detect patterns typical of free-riding, including
intraday overdrafts, and ensure that sufficient funds or margin
collateral are on deposit at all times.
Frequent transactions in
securities being offered in an initial public offering may suggest
an avoidance of Regulations T and X. In the event it appears that
a customer is attempting to free-ride, a banking organization
should immediately alert the broker-dealers involved and take steps
to minimize its own credit risk and legal liability.
At
a minimum,
you
should
also
evaluate
a trust
institution's ability to ensure that it does not extend more credit
on behalf of the banking organization to a customer than is
permitted under Regulation U. Any overdraft related to a purchase
or sale of margin stock is an extension of credit subject to the
regulation, including overdrafts that are outstanding for less than
a day.
Board staff has published a number of opinions discussing
the application of Regulation U to various transactions related to
free-riding in the Federal Reserve Regulatory Service. See, for
example, Federal Reserve Regulatory Service, at 5-942.2 (1992); 5942.18 (1990); and 5-942.15 (1989).

SEC and Federal Reserve Sanctions and Enforcement Actions
As noted earlier, the SEC has exercised its broad
authority to enforce the Board's securities credit regulations.
This has included the initiation of several enforcement actions in
Federal district court against banks involved in activities similar
to those outlined above. In each case, the SEC obtained permanent
injunctions against future violations from the banks involved. The
SEC also required the banks to establish credit compliance
committees to formulate written policies and procedures concerning
the extension of purpose credit in their securities clearance
business,
establish
training
programs
for
bank
personnel
responsible for the conduct of their securities clearance business
and submit to outside audits to ascertain whether the banks met
their undertakings under the injunctions.
It should be noted that under recently revised
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the SEC may, and
an intention to, seek civil money penalties in addition
district court injunctive actions. Civil penalties and
abetting liability may be assessed by the SEC against




section 21
has stated
to Federal
aiding and
a banking

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

6

organization if the customer or its broker-dealer is found in
violation of Regulations X or T, if the financial institution has
knowledge of the facts and assists the scheme— that is, by
extending credit to finance the free-riding.
In addition, we may institute enforcement proceedings
against banking organizations supervised by the Federal Reserve and
their institution-affiliated parties involved in these activities,
including cease and desist, civil money penalty assessment, and
removal and permanent prohibition actions.
In the event you have any questions concerning this
matter, please contact Scott Holz, Senior Attorney, or Angela
Desmond, Senior Attorney, at (202) 452-2781, at the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System in Washington, D.C., or
K. Walter Winkhart, Supervising Examiner, Specialized Examinations
Department,
at
the
Federal
Reserve
Bank
of
New
York at
(212) 720-5893.




Very truly yours,

William L. Rutledge
Senior Vice President

A T C IR C U L A R

Federal R eserve Bank

of

N ew Yo r k

N E W Y O R K , N. Y. 1 0 0 4 - 5 - 0 0 0 1
AREA

R

o b e r t a

J. P

CODE

212

72 0-6166

u s c h e l

E x e c u t iv e V ic e P r e s i d e n t

April 27, 1993

TO:

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS OF FOREIGN BANKING ORGANIZATIONS
THAT HAVE A PRESENCE IN THE U.S. AND THAT FILE THE Y-7
REPORT WITH THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

SUBJECT:

VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL RESERVE MARGIN REGULATIONS IN
CUSTODIAL AGENCY ACCOUNTS RESULTING FROM "FREE-RIDING"
SCHEMES

On April 16, 1993 the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
mailed the attached letter regarding violations of Federal Reserve
margin regulations in custodial agency accounts to state member
commercial banks, bank holding companies and agencies and branches
of foreign banks in the Second Federal Reserve District.
The
concerns discussed in that letter are relevant for all U.S.
offices of foreign banking organizations, including bank and
nonbank subsidiaries, as well as branches and agencies of foreign
banks.
I am writing to you to call to your attention the
requirements of, and the possible consequences of failure to abide
by, the relevant regulations.
Recent targeted examinations and investigations
conducted by the Federal Reserve and the Enforcement Division of
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), as well as court
actions, have found banks in violation of Regulation U (12 CFR
221) (Credit by Banks for the Purpose of Purchasing or Carrying
Margin Stock) in connection with extensions of credit by bank
trust departments to individuals involved in illegal "day trading"
or "free-riding" schemes.
These activities may have also involved
violations of two other securities credit regulations:
Regulation
T (12 CFR 220) (Credit by Brokers and Dealers) and Regulation X
(12 CFR 224) (Borrowers of Securities Credit).
Of note, banks that have been cited for such illegal
activities have been subject to disciplinary proceedings and
exposed to substantial credit risk.
To date, several banks have
sustained monetary losses in their trust departments as a result
of their involvement in these schemes.




(Over)

(fiflY c .

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

2

Since this matter extends to all offices of your
organization operating in the U.S., including branches and
agencies, and banking and nonbanking subsidiaries, we would like
your assistance in assuring that all of your banking and
nonbanking operations in the U.S. are cognizant of the
regulations.
If you have any questions related to this matter, please
contact Scott Holz, Senior Attorney, or Angela Desmond, Senior
Attorney, at (202) 452-2781, at the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System in Washington, D.C., or K. Walter Winkhart,
Supervising Examiner, Specialized Examinations Department, at the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York at (212) 720-5893.
Sincerely,

0

Roberta J. Puschel
Executive Vice President
Attachment

Mtsc 1 3nm \
0