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FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK [ Circular No. 9539 August 17,1983 "1 REGULATION Z Proposed Preemption Determinations To All Depository Institutions, and Others Concerned, in the Second Federal Reserve District: The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has requested com ment as to whether provisions of New Hampshire and New Jersey State laws that govern the offering of cash discounts in the sale of motor fuel are not inconsistent with the Truth in Lending Act or Regulation Z and should not be preempted. The Board has also requested comment on its view that these laws are of a type not subject to the Board’s authority to preempt State law under the Truth in Lending Act. Printed on the following pages is the text of the Board’s Notice of Intent which has been reprinted from the F e d e r a l R e g is te r of August 5, 1983. Comments should be submitted by October 7, 1983, and may be sent to our Regulations Division. A nthony M. S olom on, P r e s id e n t. FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 12 CFR Part 226 [Reg. Z; Doc. No. R-0477] Truth in Lending; Intent To Make Determinations of Effect on State Laws; New Hampshire and New Jersey AGENCY: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. ACTION: Notice of intent to make determinations of effect on state laws. s u m m a r y : The Board is publishing for comment proposed determinations as to whether certain provisions in the laws of New Hampshire and New Jersey are inconsistent with, and therefore preempted by, the Truth in Lending Act or Regulation Z. The request for preemption determinations concerns state laws governing the offering of cash discounts in the sale of motor vehicle fuel. The Board believes that these laws may be of a type not subject to the Board's preemption authority and specifically requests comment on this question. Alternatively, the Board has assumed—for discussion purposes—that these laws are subject to a preemption determination, and proposes to find that the laws are not preempted. DATE: Comments must be received on or before October 7,1983. ADDRESS: Comments should refer to Docket No. R-0477 and be mailed to William W. Wiles, Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, D.C. 20551, or delivered, to Room B-2223, 20th and Constitution Avenue. NW., Washington, D.C., between 8:45 am. and 5:15 p.m. Comments may be inspected in Room B~ 1122 between 8:45 am . and 5:15 p.m. FOR FURTHBt INFORMATION CONTACT: Gerald Hurst or Lynn Goldfaden, Staff Attorneys, Division of Consumer and Community Affairs, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington. D.C. 20551. at (20?) 4523667 or 452-3867. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: (1) General. The Board has received a request for a determination as to whether provisions of certain laws in New Hampshire and New Jersey are inconsistent with, and therefore preempted by, the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 1601 e t seq .l and Regulation Z (12 CFR Part 226). This notice is issued under authority delegated to the Director of the Division of Consumer and Community Affairs, as set forth in the Board’s Rules Regarding Delegation of Authority (12 CFR 265.2(h)(2); 48 FR 4454, February 1 ,1983). Section 111(a)(1) of the act authorizes the Board to determine whether any inconsistency exists between chapters 1 (General Provisions), 2 (Credit Transactions), or 3 (Credit Advertising) of the Truth in Lending Act or its implementing regulation, Regulation Z, and any state law relating to the disclosure of information in connection with consumer credit transactions. Section 171(a) of the act authorizes the Board to determine whether any inconsistency exists between chapter 4 (Credit Billing) of the act or its implementing regulation and any state law relating to credit billing practices. Section 167(b), the federal statutory provision relevant to these determinations, is locatechin chapter 4 of the act, but its purpose is to provide an exception for certain cash discounts to the finance charge rules In section 106, which is found in chapter 1. Since section 167(b) is significant only in its relationship to the finance charge rules, the Board believes that section 111(a)(1), instead of section 171(a), provides the appropriate standard for review for preemption determinations concerning the federal cash discount provision. The Board believes, however, that the state laws addressed in the present preemption request may be outside the scope of the Board’s preemption authority under the Truth in Lending Act. The state laws deal with permissible sales and pricing practices in the sale of motor vehicle fuel rather than with the disclosure of information in connection with consumer credit transactions. Section 111(b) of the act, which limits the effect of the federal act on state laws, provides that: This title does not otherwise annul, alter or affect in any manner the meaning, scope or applicability of the law s of any State, including, but not limited to. law s relating to the types, amounts or rates of charges, or any element or elements of charges, permissible 2 under such law s in connection with the extension or use of credit * * *. (Emphasis added.) If the state laws contained in this request do not fall within the scope of section 111(a)(1). it appears that the Board would not be authorized to make preemption determinations as to those laws. The Board believes that the state laws included in the present request may not be subject to preemption determinations because they do not relate to the disclosure of credit terms. Comment is specifically requested on this point. If the Board, however, ultimately finds that these state laws are within the scope of section 111(a)(1), it will be necessary to make preemption determinations as to those laws. Therefore, in order to facilitate public comment, this notice includes proposed determinations, on the assumption that the state laws may be subject to the Board’s preemption authority. (2) Standards for and effect of preemption determinations. In determining whether a state law is inconsistent with the federal provisions, § 226.28(a)(1) of Regulation Z, which implements § 111 of the act, provides that a state law is inconsistent if it requires a creditor1 to make disclosures or take actions that contradict the federal law. A state law is contradictory, and therefore preempted, if it significantly impedes the operation of the federal law or interferes with the purposes of the federal statute. In general, preemption determinations are limited to those provisions of state law identified in the request for a determination. At the Board’s discretion, however, other state provisions that may be affected by the federal law also may be addressed. If the Board determines that a state requirement is inconsistent with the federal law, the state law is preempted to the extent of the inconsistency. Creditors in that state may not make disclosures using the inconsistent term or form, even on a separate document from the federal disclosures. A determination on provisions in the law 1A service station operator accepting credit cards is a “creditor” for limited purposes under $ 226.2(a)(17)(iii) of Regulation Z, 12 CFR Part 226. vary the price charged for separate sales of one state will have no effect in the validity of similar provisions in other of gasoline from the same pump states. according to the method of payment. As Preemption determinations have an a result, dealers in New Hampshire may offer “a discount for cash program effective date of the October 1 that follows the determination by at least 0 which involves the posting and charging of one price for the same grade of months, as required by section 105(d) of gasoline with a discount provided for the act. It is expected that these customers who pay with cash, if proposed determinations, if adopted, would have an effective date of October advertised and operated in a manner which is neither deceptive nor 1,1984, although creditors could begin misleading." complying with the determinations before that time. The federation argues that since the (3) Discussion of specific requests andfederal law contains a provision stating proposed determinations. In response to that the establishment of separate a request from a federation of trade pumps or islands for cash and credit associations representing independent sales is an allowable means of offering a petroleum marketers, the Board has cash discount (see Comment 4(b)(9)—3 of reviewed provisions in the laws of New the Official Staff Commentary to Hampshire and New Jersey. The request Regulation Z (12 CFR Part 226, is available for public inspection and Supplement I; as amended, 48 FR 41343, copying, subject to the Board’s Rules September 20,1982) the state law, as Regarding Availability of Information interpreted, is inconsistent with federal (12 CFR Part 261). The proposed law, impedes and interferes with the determinations regarding the state laws offering of cash discounts, and is at issue, together with the reasons for preempted. The Board, however, does the proposals, are set forth below. not believe that the state law is N ew Hampshire. The federation has preempted. requested a determination of whether In discussing the term "regular price" section 339-B:8,II of New Hampshire in the Official Staff Commentary, the Revised Statutes Annotated (1981 Supp.) staff made clear that offering a discount (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.), as interpreted by by establishing separate cash and credit the state Attorney General’s office, is pumps, and posting only the cash or inconsistent with, and therefore credit prices on these pumps, would be preempted by, the Truth in Lending Act considered an appropriate means of and Regulation Z. Under that law it is offering a discount under section 167(b) unlawful for any person operating a of the act and would not result in a retail gasoline station to: surcharge prohibited under section 167(a)(2). However, this material only Post a different price at one pump for the describes a permissible means of same grade of gasoline as is dispensed from offering a cash discount under federal another pump when both pumps are supplied law, not a required or the sole means of from a common storage at the same service doing so. station and when the gasoline dispensed from both is represented to be and is sold as the The purpose of the federal cash same quality of gasoline; provided, however, discount provision is to encourage the that this paragraph shall not prohibit such offering of cash discounts by removing price differences betw een a self-service and certain impediments to offering them. an attendant-operated pump supplied from a Specifically, Congress provided that a common storage as described hereinabove. discount offered in accordance with section 167(b) of the act would not be a The New Hampshire Attorney finance charge under the federal Truth General’s office, in opinions dated May in Lending Act, or a finance charge or 26,1982, and January 21,1983, has other charge for credit under stale usury interpreted N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. section or disclosure laws (see section 171(c) of 339-B:8,II as prohibiting the the act). The New Hampshire law does establishment of separate "cash pumps" not provide that a discount offered in and “credit pumps” with different accordance with the federal law is to be posted prices for the same grade of a finance charge for disclosure or usury gasoline, but permitting the dealer to 3 purposes. Rather, the state law, by prohibiting a particular practice in the sale of gasoline, prohibits one manner of offering discounts that is permissible under federal law while allowing dealers to offer discounts in another manner. As a result, the Board does not believe that the state law significantly impedes or interferes with the federal scheme and therefore the state law is not preempted. N ew Jersey. The federation has also requested a determination on two provisions of New Jersey law as they have been interpreted in relation to the offering of cash discounts by petroleum retailers. The first provision in question provides: A retail dealer may sell similar fuels at different prices to cash and credit customers, and the price posted on top of the pump and on the pump meter shall be the credit purchase price. A conspicuous sign shall also be displayed at the pump or at the island posting the price per gallon (or per gallon and per liter) reduction for cash purchasers of fuels. New Jersey Administrative Code (N.J.A.C.) § 18;19— 2.7(b). A February 9,1983 memorandum from the New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety clarified this provision by stating: 1. All gasoline pumps will show the posted price per gallon and/or liter at the higher or credit card price. A sign disclosing the cents-off per gallon discount may be shown at the pump or at the island site. The lower cash price may be posted on a street sign or some other sign not in close proximity to the pumps themselves. This sign shall be accessible to the public. 2. Separate islands for cash and/or credit may be used provided that the pump posted signs and computer prices on both the cash island and credit card island reflect the higher credit card price. The federation believes that these provisions result in two positions that are contradictory to positions taken by the Board and should be preempted. Specifically, the positions are: (1) New Jersey law requires the meter on a gasoline pump dedicated to cash sales to display the higher credit card price. (2) New Jersey law requires the meter on a gasoline pump used for both cash and credit card sales to display the higher credit card price. With respect to the first position, the federal law does permit a service station operator to designate separate pumps or separate islands as being for either cash or credit purchases while displaying only the appropriate cash or credit price at the pumps. (See Comment 4(b}(9}-3 of the Official Staff commentary to Regulation Z.) The New Jersey law, however, like the New Hampshire law described above, requires certain sales practices to be followed by persons offering cash discounts in the sale of gasoline. The federal law, as interpreted by the staff, simply gives an example of a permissible means of offering a discount under section 167(b). The federal law does not require the use of this method and a state’s decision to prohibit a specific method of offering cash discounts does not significantly impede the operation of the federal law or interfere with its purposes. Therefore, the Board believes that the provisions of New Jersey law are not preempted. With respect to the second position, the staff has not taken a position as to whether it is appropriate to display the cash price on the meter of a pump used for both cash and credit card sales. However, even if a position had been taken that it was permitted, the Board believes the state law would not be preempted. Once again, the federal law would only be providing an example of a method of giving a discount that is proper under federal law. The federation also asks for a determination that New Jersey Attorney General’s Formal Opinion No. 2—1982 is preempted. The opinion addresses section 56:6-2(e) of New Jersey Statutes Annotated, which provides: No rebates, allow ances, concessions or benefits shall be given directly or indirectly, so as to permit any person to obtain motor fuels from a retail dealer below the posted price or at a net price lower than the posted price applicable at the time of sale. Relying largely upon a court decision, Sperry and Hutchinson Co. v. Margetts, 15 N.J. 203 (1954), that discusses the Statutory provision, the Attorney General concluded that: There is no statutory impediment under the Motor Fuel Act to a motor fuel retail dealer establishing one price for the sale of gasoline to its credit customers and a separate lower price to its cash customers, provided a discount would approximate the economic value to the retailer o f providing a discount to his cash customers. (Emphasis added.) The federation argues that this opinion, in implicitly placing a limit on the amount of the discount that can be offered to cash customers, is inconsistent with the federal cash discount provision and therefore should be preempted. Congress, in passing the Cash Discount Act of 1981, expressly removed the five percent limitation on the amount of a cash discount that could be offered to cash customers and excluded from the treatment as a finance charge in credit card transactions. Once again, however, the federal law is permissive with respect to the amount of a cash discount that is allowed under the federal cash discount provision. The state law, as interpreted, results in an absolute prohibtion on the offering of discounts in a certain manner. The law 4 does not say that cash discounts in excess of a specific amount, or in excess of an amount that approximates “the economic value to the retailer of providing a discount to his cash customers,” is to be treated as a finance charge or other charge for credit under state disclosure or usury laws; instead the law prohibits a retail dealer from offering a discount at all under certain circumstances. A retail dealer can offer a cash discount in compliance with the state law and still take advantage of the benefits of the federal cash discount provision, although the dealer may not take advantage of the unlimited nature of the federal cash discount provision. As a result, the Board believes that the state position, as set forth in the formal opinion of the Attorney General, does not significantly impede the operation of the federal law or interfere with its purposes, and therefore is not preempted. (4) Comment requested. Interested persons are invited to submit comments regarding the proposed finding that these state laws are not subject to the Board’s preemption authority and the proposed determinations. After the close of the comment period and analysis of the comments received, notice of final action on the proposals will be published in the Federal Register. List of Subjects in 12 CFR Part 226 Advertising, Credit, Consumer Protection, Finance, Truth in Lending. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, August 2,1983. William W. Wiles, Secretary of the Board. |FR Doc. 83-21395 Filed 6-4-03; 8:45 am) BILLING COC* S210-04-M