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RESERVE BANK
OF NEW YORK

FEDERAL

r Circular No. 5 8 3 9 1
L
July 26, 1966
J

State Member Bank Purchase o f Stock o f “ Operations Subsidiaries”

To the State Member Batiks in the
Second Federal Reserve District:

Printed below is an excerpt from the Federal Register of July 23, 1966, containing an
interpretation, issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, on the question
whether State member banks may establish and purchase stock of “ operations subsidiaries.”
Additional copies of this circular will be furnished upon request.
A lfred

Title 12— BANKS AND
BANKING
Chapter II— Federal Reserve System
SUBCHAPTER A— BOARD OF GO V ERN O RS OF
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
[R e g . H ]

PART 208— MEMBERSHIP O F STATE
BANKING INSTITUTIONS IN THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

(b ) The B o a rd ’s reexam ination has
confirmed its previous p osition that the
stock-purchase prohibition, which is m ade
app licab le to m em ber S tate banks by the
twentieth p aragrap h o f section 9 o f the
F ederal R eserve A c t ( 1 2 U .S .C . 3 3 5 ) ,
forb id s the purchase by a m em ber State
bank “ f o r its own account o f any shares
o f stock o f any corp oration ” (the statu­
tory la n g u a g e ), except as specifically p e r­
m itted by provisions o f F ed era l law or
as com prised w ithin the concept o f “ such
incidental pow ers as shall be necessary to
carry on the business o f ban kin g,” re­
ferred to in the first sentence o f p aragrap h
“ Seventh” o f R .S . 5 13 6 .

( c ) The F ederal banking statutes ex­
p licitly p erm it the purchase o f stock o f
a num ber o f kinds o f corporations, in ­
§ 208.119 M em ber bank purchase of
cluding stock o f F ederal R eserve B anks,
stock of “ operations subsidiaries.*’
bank prem ises subsidiaries, sa fe deposit
(a )
In response to several inquiries, com panies, “ E d g e ” and “ A greem en t” cor­
porations, sm all business investm ent com ­
the B oard o f G overnors has re-exam ined
panies, bank service corporations, and
the question whether m em ber banks m ay
certain fore ig n banks. I n addition, it has
establish
and
purchase the stock o f
been held that, in the process o f collecting
“ operations subsidiaries” ; that is, organ i­
defaulted loans that were contracted in
zations designed to serve, in effect, as
good fa ith , the “ incidental pow ers” o f
separately-in corp orated departm ents o f
national banks include the pow er to p u r­
the bank, p erfo rm in g fu nction s that the
chase corporate stock where that action
bank is em pow ered to p erfo rm directly.
constitutes a reasonable and ap p ro p riate
T h at question involves the interpretation
step toward the collection o f the indebt­
o f the fo llo w in g provision o f section 5 13 6
edness.
o f the R evised Statutes (1 2 U .S .C . 2 4 ) ,
the so-called “ stock-purchase prohibition” :
( d ) In one p ro p o sal presented to the

Purchase of Stock

Except as hereinafter provided or otherwise
permitted by law, nothing herein contained
shall authorize the purchase by [a national
bank] for its own account of any shares of
stock of any corporation.




B oard , the stock to be purchased would
have been that o f one or m ore corp ora­
tions engaged in the business o f leasing
personalty to customers o f the member
bank and in the business o f selling money

H ayes,

President.

orders. The F ederal statutes contain no
express perm ission fo r the purchase o f
stock o f corporations o f these kinds, and
the B o ard o f G overnors concluded that
the p ow er to purchase the stock o f such
corporations m a y not p ro p erly be re­
garded as com prised w ithin “ such in ci­
dental pow ers as shall be necessary to
carry on the business o f banking” , within
the m eaning o f section 5 13 6 .
(e ) One o f the inquiring m em ber banks
contended that the above-cited provisions
o f the N a tio n al B a n k A c t and F ederal
R eserve A c t :
were intended to restrict member banks in
dealing in securities and stock in the sense
of trading therein or in the sense of the
purchase of the stock o f a going concern
and, perhaps, further to restrict national
and member [State] banks from engaging
through subsidiaries in activities in which
such banks were not directly empowered to
engage, but not in the sense of holding the
entire stock of an operating corporation
created by the bank.
A lo n g the sam e lines, the contention has
been advanced that the stock-purchase
prohibition was intended by Congress
only to prevent banks fro m investin g de­
p ositors’ fu n d s in corporate stock f o r in ­
come and ap p reciation , in the w ay that
banks invest in debt obligations o f the
F ederal Governm ent, m unicipalities, and
p rivate corporations.
( f ) The B o ard did not ad o p t either o f
these constructions o f the statu tory p r o ­
visions. A lth ou g h the prevention o f such
investm ent in stocks undoubtedly w as a
m a jo r C ongressional p u rp ose, it ap p eared

( over)

to the Board that the stock-purchase prohibition was intended generally to prevent
the purchase of the stock of corporations,
including those created to perform func­
tions that could be performed by the bank
itself. The provisions have been so in­
terpreted and applied by the Board (and
by the Comptroller of the Currency until
recently) since their enactment in the
Banking Act of 1933.
(g) One of the banking problems that
principally concerned Congress in the
early 1930’s and that led to the enactment
of the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935
was the “ affiliate system”, including mem­
ber banks’ ownership of other corpora­
tions. Among the objectives of the Bank­
ing Act of 1933, as expressed by the
Senate Banking Committee, was “ To sep­
arate as far as possible national and
member banks from affiliates of all kinds.”
(S. Rep. No. 77, 73rd Congress, p. 10)
Together with a number of other provi­
sions of the Banking Act of 1933, the
stock-purchase prohibition of R.S. 5136
served the purpose of confining the bankaffiliate system by preventing banks from
purchasing the stock of other corpora­
tions, except to the limited extent speci­
fied in that general prohibition.
(h) The Board also considered, among
other contentions, the assertion that, de­




spite the apparent intent of the terms of
the pertinent statute and its legislative
history, it should not be interpreted to
prevent the separate incorporation of a
banking department engaged in a legiti­
mate activity. The supporting argument
would be that, if a proposed course of
action cannot possibly produce the evil
effect at which a statutory provision was
directed, a construction of the provision
that would prevent such action would be
unrealistic, and, by emphasizing statutory
language rather than underlying purpose,
would injure rather than safeguard the
public interest.

operations in a way that is unsuitable for
a part of a banking enterprise, to disregard
pertinent restrictions and requirements,
and, in particular, to venture through
their subsidiaries into activities that are
beyond the powers of the parent bank.
It is reasonable to infer that Congress,
having in mind the predepression affiliate
system, concluded that the American bank­
ing system and the general welfare would
be benefited by limiting the authority of
member banks to conduct their operations
through separately-incorporated organi­
zations.
(12 U .S.C. 248 ( i ) .

Interprets 12 U .S.C. 24

(i)
The Board agreed that, if a pro­
and 335)
posed course of action could not result
in any evil at which a statute is aimed,
interpretation of the statute to prohibit
Dated at Washington, D. C., this 14th
such action should be avoided, if possible.
day of July 1966.
However, it appeared to the Board that
this principle does not apply to the situa­
By order of the Board of Governors.
tion presented by the inquiries. Experi­
ence in the supervision of banks has
revealed that the likelihood of unsafe and
[ seal]
M e r r it t S h e r m a n ,
unsound practices, violations of law, and
S ecreta ry.
other developments contrary to the public
interest is significantly greater when banks
operate through subsidiary corporations.
[F .B . Doc. 6 6 -8 0 2 9 ; Filed, July 22, 1966;
There appears to be an inevitable tend­
ency for some banks, in time, to regard
8 :4 6 a.m.]
their subsidiary corporations as separate
enterprises and thereupon to conduct their