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FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
OF NEW YORK

[

Circular No. 10554
July 23, 1992

"I

SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS STANDARDS
Request for Comment, by September 14,
on Requirements of Section 132 of FDICIA
To All Depository Institutions, and Others
Concerned, in the Second Federal Reserve District:

Following is the text of a statement issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System:
The Federal Reserve Board has requested public comment on an interagency advance notice of
proposed rulemaking under Section 132 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
of 1991 (FDICIA).
Comments should be received by September 14, 1992.
Section 132 of FDICIA requires each of the Federal banking agencies to prescribe safety and
soundness standards for the insured depository institutions or depository institution holding companies
that it regulates. In particular, the agencies must prescribe operational and managerial standards,
compensation standards, and asset quality, earnings and stock valuation standards.
The advance notice of proposed rulemaking seeks public suggestions on methods to meet the
requirements of Section 132 and does not propose safety and soundness standards.
Comments received in response to the notice will be considered in developing a proposed
rulemaking that would be issued at a later date in consultation with the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
The four Federal banking agencies are required by FDICIA to promulgate final regulations
implementing Section 132 by August 1, 1993.

Printed on the following pages is the text of the interagency notice, as published in the F e d e r a l
of July 15. Comments thereon should be submitted by September 14, 1992, and
sent to the appropriate agency, as indicated in the notice. Comments or questions on this matter
may also be directed, at this Bank, to:

R e g is te r




N am e

Tel. N o .

Fred C. Herriman, Jr., Manager
Domestic Surveillance Staff

212-720-7962

Manuel J. Schnaidman, Manager
Bank Analysis Department

212-720-6710

Andrea Walker-Modu, Attorney
Legal Department

212-720-8190

E. G erald C o rr ig a n ,
P r e s id e n t.

10 £5 4' •'

'it

DEPAR TM EN T OF T H E TREASUR Y
Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency
12 CFR Chapter I

[Docket No. 92-11]
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
12 CFR Chapter II

[Docket No. R-0766]
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION
12 CFR Chapter III
RIN 3064-AB13

DEPAR TM EN T O F TH E TREASURY
Office of Thrift Supervision
12 CFR Part 563

[Resolution No. 92-239]
RIN 1550-AA54
Standards for Safety and Soundriess

Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency. Treasury: Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve
System; Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation: and Office of Thrift
Supervision, Treasury.
ACTION: Joint advance notice of
proposed rulemaking.
AGENCIES:

The Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC), the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (Board of Governors), the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), and the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS) (collectively ‘‘the
agencies") solicit comments on all
aspects of the safety and soundness
standards required to be prescribed
under section 132 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
of 1991 (FDICIA) in order to assist them
in the development of a proposed rule.
d a t e s : Written comments must be
received on or before September 14,
1992.
ADORESSES: Commenters may respond
to any or all of the agencies. AH
comments will be shared among the
agencies.
OCC: Communications Division, 250 E
Street SWMWashington, DC 20219.
attention: Docket No. 92-11. Comments
will be available for public inspection
and photocopying at the same location
on business days between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m.

sum m ary:




Board o f Governors: Comments,
which should refer to Docket No. R0766, may be mailed to Mr. William .
Wiles, Secretary, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, 20th Street
and Constitution Avenue NW.,
Washington, DC 20551. Comments
addressed to Mr. Wiles may also be
delivered to the Board’s mail room
between 8:45 a.m. and 5:15 p.m., and to
the security control room outside of
those hours. Both the mail room and
control room are accessible from the
courtyard entrance on 20th Street
between Constitution Avenue and C
Street, NW. Comments may be
inspected in room B-1122 between 9
a.m. an 5 p.m., except as provided in
§ 261.8 of the Board’s Rules Regarding
Availability of Information, 12 CFR
261.8.
FDIC: Hoyle L. Robinson, Executive
Secretary, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, 55017th Street NW.,
Washington, DC 20429. Comments may
be hand delivered to room F-402,1776 F
Street NW.. Washington, DC, on
business days between 8:30 a.m. and 5
p.m. Comments may also be inspected in
room F-402 between 8:30 a.m. and 5 p.m.
on business days. [FAX number (202)
898-3838]
OTS: Comments should be directed to
Director, Information Services Division,
Public Affairs, Office of Thrift
Supervision. 1700 G Street NW.,
Washington, DC 20552, Attention:
Docket No. [92-239]. These submissions
may be hand delivered to 1770 G Street,
NW., from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. on business
days; they may be sent by facsimile
transmission to FAX number (202) 9067753 or 7755. Submissions must be
received by 5 p.m. on the day they are
due in order to be considered by the
OTS. Late-filed, misaddressed, or
misidentified submissions will not be
considered in this rulemaking.
Comments will be available for
inspection at 1776 G Street NW., Street
Level.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

OCC: Emily R. McNaughton, National
Bank Examiner (202/874-5170), Office of
the Chief National Bank Examiner: Jeff
Mace, Attorney, Securities and
Corporate Practices Division (202/8745210): Laura H. Plaze, Attorney. Legal
Advisory Services Division (202/8745330), Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, 250 E Street, SW„
Washington, DC 20219.
Board o f Governors: Roger Cole,
Assistant Director (202/452-2618), David
Wright. Supervisory Financial Analyst
(202/728-5854), Division of Banking
Supervision and Regulation; Scott G.
Alvarez. Associate General Counsel
2

(202/452-3583), Gregory A. Baer, Senior
Attorney (202/452-3236), Legal Division,
Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System. For the hearing
impaired only, Telecommunication
Device for the Deaf (TDD), Dorothea
Thompson (202/452-3544), Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 20th and C Streets, NW.,
Washington, DC 20551.
FDIC: For supervisory issues, Robert
F. Miailovich, Associate Director (202/
898-6918) or Robert W. Walsh,
Examination Specialist (202/898-6911),
Division of Supervision, FDIC, 550 17th
Street NW., Washington, DC 20429; for
legal issues, Lisa M. Stanley, Senior
Attorney (202/896-7494), Jeffrey M.
Kopchik, Counsel (compensation
standards issues) (202/898-3872); or
Nancy L. Alper, Counsel (compliance
and enforcement issues) (202/808-3720),
Legal Division, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, 550 17th Street,
NW., Washington, DC 20429.
OTS: John C. Price, Jr., Deputy
Assistant Director for Policy (202/9065745), Robert Fishman, Program
Manager (202/906-5672), Cherly Martin,
Regional Coordinator (202/906-7869),
Policy Office; V. Gerard Comizio,
Deputy Chief Counsel for Securities and
Corporate Structure (202/906-6411),
James H. Underwood, Counsel (Banking
and Finance) (202/906-7354), Chief
Counsel’s Office; Deirdre Kvartunas,
Program Analyst, (202/906-7933), Office
of Thrift Supervision, 1700 G Street,
NW., Washington, DC 20552.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background and Information
Section 132 of the FDICIA, Public Law
No. 102-242, added a new section 39 to
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI
Act) which requires each of the agencies
to prescribe by regulation certain safety
and soundness standards for the insured
depository institutions and depository
institution holding companies for which
it is the primary Federal regulator.
Standards must be prescribed in three
principal areas: (1) Operational and
managerial; (2) asset quality, earnings,
and stock valuation; and (3) employee
compensation. If an insured depository
institution does not meet one of these
standards, section 39 requires that the
institution establish a plan to achieve
compliance with the standard that is
acceptable to the primary regulator of
the institution. Final regulations
implementing section 39 must be
promulgated no later than August 1.
1993, and become effective no later than
December 1,1993.
Various questions and issues have
arisen involving general and specific

XQ ^ ^
aspects of the required regulatory safety
and soundness standards. The agencies
are issuing this joint advance notice of
proposed rulemaking for the purpose of
gathering public comment on these
issues to assist them in the development
of a proposed rulemaking. The agencies
intend to work together in formulating
the proposed and final rulemaking.
The agencies are interested in
receiving comments concerning all
aspects of section 39 of the FDI Act. The
overriding issue facing the agencies in
adopting regulations pursuant to section
39 of the FDI Act is how to balance the
objectives of the statute relating to
safety and soundness standards with
the important need to avoid establishing
unrealistic and overly burdensome
standards that unnecessarily raise costs
within the regulated community. In light
of the need to attract and retain capital
and management talent in the banking
and thrift industries, it is important that
the standards not needlessly impose
uncertainty or raise substantive issues
with respect to their implementation by
the agencies going forward.
Section 39 does not require, and the
agencies do not intend to prescribe,
inflexible standards specifying how
depository institutions must be
managed. Rather, the agencies intend to
prescribe standards designed to prevent
institutions from developing serious
problems and thereby prevent loss to
the deposit insurance funds. Thus, for
each safety and soundness standard,
commenters are requested to
recommend specific regulatory language
that fulfills the intent of section 39 of the
FDI Act while leaving management
appropriate latitude and flexibility.
In order to elicit comment on certain
issues identified by the agencies,
specific questions are set forth that
address each subsection of section 39 of
the FDI Act. Commenters are requested
to number their responses to correspond
to the question number. Questions need
not be repeated, and commenters may
respond to as many questions as they
wish. Where a comment recommends a
particular recordkeeping or reporting
requirement, the commenter is requested
to include an estimate of the number of
hours necessary for an institution or
holding company to comply.
II. Operational and Managerial
Standards
Section 39(a) of the FDI Act requires
each of the agencies to prescribe for the
institutions it regulates managerial and
operational standards relating to:
• Internal controls, information
systems, and internal audit systems;
• Loan documentation;
• Credit underwriting;




• Interest rate exposure;
• Asset growth;
• Compensation, fees, and benefits in
accordance with subsection (c) of
section 39; and
• Such other operational and
managerial standards as the agency
determines to be appropriate.
A. Internal Controls, Information
S ystem s, an d Internal A u dit S ystem s

Internal controls, information systems,
and internal audit systems are generally
designed to achieve compliance with
laws and regulations, safeguard assets,
promote operational efficiency, and
encourage adherence to prescribed
managerial policies. Institutions may
define these systems and controls
differently.
(1) Should these items be defined in
the regulation, and what, if any, specific
standards should the regulation include?
The bank and thrift regulatory
agencies, as well as accounting,
auditing, banking and thrift associations
and others, have published guidelines,
opinions, advisories, and other literature
on standards for internal controls,
information systems and internal audit
systems.
(2) Which, if any, of these preexisting
standards should be incorporated into
the regulation?
B. Loan Documentation

Each of the agencies currently reviews
the loan files of the institutions it
examines to determine the adequacy of
loan documentation. The Office of Thrift
Supervision has prescribed regulations
that establish an item-by-item listing of
loan documentation requirements. 12
CFR 563.170(c)(1).
(3) Should loan documentation

standards for all financial institutions
prescribe an item-by-item listing of
requirements, or should loan
documentation standards be general in
nature and prescribe prudential
documentation?
(4) Should documentation standards
vary according to loan types or loan
amounts, and, if so, how?
C. Credit Underwriting
The agencies currently review the
credit underwriting standards
established by each depository
institution in the examination process.
In implementing section 39 of the FDI
Act, the agencies seek comment on
whether the regulation must prescribe
general standards or specific
requirements. General credit
underwriting standards could, for
example, require institutions to adhere
to prudent standards as specified by the
3

institution's loan policies. M ore detailed
credit underwriting standards could
specify criteria— such as descriptions o f
collateral, cash flo w coverage, working
capital, and loan to value ratios— that
should be em ployed in making sound
credit decisions.
(5) Should the agencies prescribe

general or specific underwriting
standards?
(6) Should the regulation specify
minimum acceptable ratios for credit
underwriting criteria, and, if so, what
minimum ratios would be appropriate?
Section 304(a) o f FDICLA added a n ew
section 18(o) to the FDI A ct which
requires each agency to adopt uniform
regulations prescribing standards for
extensions o f credit related to real
estate. FDICLA, section 304(a), 105 StaL
2354 (12 U.S.C. 1828(o)). The agencies
w ill also be promulgating regulations on
section 304. Credit underwriting
standards must also comport with the
standards prescribed pursuant to this
section.
(7) H o w should the agencies
coordinate implementation o f section
18(o) o f the FDI A ct with
implementation o f section 39?

D. Interest R ate Exposure

The FDICLA also requires the agencies
to prescribe standards relating to
interest rate exposure.
(8) H o w should interest rate exposure
standards be defined and measured, and
w hat should the standards prescribe?
(9) H o w and to what extent should the
agencies consider the size o f an
institution or company in determining
standards for interest rate exposure?

(10) Should the agencies consider the
overall financial condition of the
institution or company in establishing
interest rate exposure standards, and if
so, how?
Section 305(b) of the FDICIA requires
each agency to revise its risk-based
capital standards to ensure that those
standards take adequate account of
interest rate risk. FDICLA, section 305(b),
105 S tat 2354.
(11) How does section 305(b) of the
FDICIA affect the types of standards
that need to be established pursuant to
section 39 of the FDI Act?
E. Asset Growth
Under section 39 of the FDI Act, the
agencies must prescribe standards
relating to asset growth. The principal
issues in prescribing asset growth
standards are how asset growth should
be defined and measured, and what
limits, if any, should be established. The
FDIC currently addresses “rapid
growth” by requiring all insured
depository institutions to give the

4
appropriate FDIC regional director for
supervision 30 days advance notice
when planning to increase their assets
by 7.5 percent or more during any threemonth period through the solicitation, in
any combination, of fully insured
brokered deposits, fully insured out-ofterritory deposits, or secured
borrowings, including repurchase
agreements. 12 CFR 304.6.
(12) What limits on asset growth
should be established for purposes of
section 39 of the FDI Act? Since a
regulation to monitor rapid asset growth
is in place, what other standards for
asset growth, if any, should be
prescribed under section 39?
(13) If other growth measures should
be included, what should they consider?
Should the regulation consider only the
percentage change in total assets or also
the mix and quality of asset growth?
(14) Should asset growth standards be
different for depository institutions and
depository institution holding
companies?
(15) How should the agencies treat
asset growth funding sources,
supervisory ratings assigned by the
primary regulator, and off-balance-sheet
risk in establishing asset growth
standards?
(16) Growth through merger is
generally supervised by the agencies
through applications received under the
Bank Merger Act (12 U.S.C. 1828(c)),
Bank Holding Company Act (12 U.S.C.
1941, et seq.), and Savings and Loan
Holding Company Act (12 U.S.C. 1467a).
Should standards for asset growth
through' merger be prescribed under
section 39, and, if so, how?
(17) What is the appropriate time
period for measuring asset growth—
quarterly, yearly?
(18) Should asset growth standards
differentiate between insitutions or
companies based on factors such as
capital adequacy, asset quality, or size,
and, if so, how?
(19) Should the regulation permit
exceptions, and. if so, under what
circumstances?
III. Asset Quality, Earnings, and Stock
Valuation Standards
Section 39(b) of the FDI Act requires
each of the agencies to prescribe
standards specifying:
• A maximum ratio of classified
assets to capital;
• Minimum earnings, sufficient to
absorb losses without impairing capital;
• To the extent feasible, a minimum
ratio of market value to book value for
publicly traded shares of the institution
or company; and




i •

• Such other asset quality, earnings,
and valuation standards as the agency
determines to be appropriate.

A. A sse t Q u ality
The statute requires that the agencies
incorporate “classified assets" in the
ratio. The agencies currently have a
joint policy that defines "classified
assets" as those assets considered
substandard, doubtful, or loss.
(20) Is this definition appropriate for
purposes o f section 39 o f the FDI A c t or
should classified assets be weighted or
adjusted in some other manner in
calculating the ratio— that is, to weigh
the more adverse classifications more
heavily, or to include additional problem
assets?
(21) H o w should capital be defined for
purposes o f establishing a maximum
ratio o f classified assets to capital?
(22) Should maximum ratios vary
depending on an institution’s size,
earnings, or other factors?
(23) W h a t other factors should be
considered in determining a maximum
ratio o f classified assets to capital?
(24) H o w should the ratio be defined
to discourage institutions that are
approaching the maximum ratio from
understating problem assets?

B. Earnings
The statute requires that the agencies
specify earnings sufficient to avoid
impairing capital.

(25) What is the appropriate earnings
measure and time period for determining
whether minimum earnings have been
achieved without impairing capital?
(26) How should the term “impairing
capital" be defined—as an absolute
reduction in capital, as a reduciton in
capital below the minimum required
capital ratios, as earnings insufficient to
maintain capital ratios, or otherwise?
(27) Should the quality of earnings be
taken into account, and, if so, what
factors should be considered?
(28) How should the regulation
address the potential incentive for
manipulation of short term earnings?
(29) Should an institution that is part
of a holding company be subject to
different earnings standards than an
institution that is not part of a holding
company?
C. M arket Value to Book Value
Section 39(b)(1)(C) of the FDI Act
requires the agencies to prescribe
standards specifying a minimum ratio of
market value to book value for publicly
traded shares, “to the extent feasible."
The market price of depository
institutions’ publicly traded common
stock, like the stock price of all
4

companies, varies with the actual or
perceived financial health and earnings
power of the individual institution and
the relative attractiveness of stocks in
general as compared to alternative
investments.
(30) Is a standard prescribing a
minimum ratio of market value to book
value feasible, and why or why not? Is it
possible to adjust such a ratio for
structural fluctuations in the stock
market that may not be related to the
market value of any individual
depository institution’s stock price?
Would a minimum ratio of market value
to book value encourage undesirable
behavior by publicly traded depository
institutions, and, if so, how may a ratio
be defined to minimize such undesirable
consequences?
(31) If a minimum ratio of market to
book value were considered feasible,
what should the minimum market to
book ratio be? Should this ratio be tied
to an industry or market index, and, if
so, what index and how?
IV .

Compensation Standards

Section 39(c) of the FDI Act requires
each of the agencies to prescribe for the
institutions it regulates standards for
determining when compensation paid to
officers, directors, employees, and
principal shareholders of insured
depository institutions is excessive. The
agencies must also prescribe standards
prohibiting as an unsafe and unsound
banking practice any employment
contract, compensation or benefit
agreement, fee arrangement, perquisite,
stock option plan, post-employment
benefit, or other compensatory
arrangement that either provides the
recipient with excessive compensation,
fees, or benefits, or could lead to
material financial loss to the institution.
In prescribing these standards, the
agencies must consider:
• The combined value of all cash and
noncash benefits provided to the
individual;
• The compensation history of the
individual and other individuals with
comparable expertise at the institution;
• The financial condition of the
institution;
• Comparable compensation
practices at comparable institutions;
• For post-employment benefits, the
projected total cost and benefit to the
institution;
• Any connection between the
individual and any fraudulent act or
omission, breach of trust or fiduciary
duty, or insider abuse with regard to the
institution; and
• Any other factors that the agency
determines to be relevant.

10£& 4 *
The agencies are concerned about
achieving an appropriate balance
between preventing excessive
compensation, as the statute directs,
and not unduly interfering with the
business relationships between an
institution and its officers, directors, and
employees. In this regard, they have
identified the following issues for
consideration:
• Specificity of standards;
• "Excessive” based on performance
and condition;
• “Excessive” based on form of
compensation;
• “Excessive” based on connection to
impropriety.
• “Compensation procedures and
reviews;
• “Peer group comparisons; and
• Coverage of holding companies.
A. S p ecificity o f Standards

Section 39 of the FDI Act requires the
agencies to establish standards
specifying what constitutes excessive
compensation "by considering” the
above factors enumerated by statute
and any other factors the agency
determines to be relevant.
(32) Do the statutory factors need
further clarification by regulation, or are
they sufficient to give notice of what
would constitute excessive
compensation? If the statutory factors
are not sufficient, what additional
factors should the agencies include in
determining whether compensation is
excessive?
(33) Do troubled institutions require
more scrutiny of compensation than
other institutions, and should different
standards for excessive compensation
be established for troubled institutions?
(34) Should the standards reflect that
troubled institutions may have to offer
higher compensation to attract and
retain management to resolve their
problems, and, if so, how?
The agencies are concerned about the
usefulness of applying such a regulation
to lower level, non-official personnel
where the likelihood of abusive
practices would seem to be very low.
(35) While the statute addresses the
compensation of all officers, directors,
employees, and principal shareholders,
should the standards be more specific
regarding the compensation of senior
executive officers and directors?
B. “E x c e ssiv e ”B a sed on Perform ance
an d Condition

Section 39(c)(2)(C) of the FDI Act
provides that unreasonable or
disproportionate compensation shall be
determined by considering, among other
factors, the financial condition of the
institution.




(36) How should the financial
condition of the institution be
considered in applying this standard?
(37) Could and should the regulation
require that executive compensation be
tied to and vary with an institution’s
profitability or its overall financial
condition? If so, how should this be
done? Should the agencies consider the
supervisory rating assigned to an
institution in determining its financial
condition, or should other indicia of
condition be considered? If the agencies
were to consider profitability, how could
this be done in a way that would not
encourage management to sacrifice long
term profitability for short term gain?
(38) Should the role of management in
any deterioration of the financial
condition of an institution be considered
in applying this standard?
C. “E x c e ssiv e ”B a sed on Form o f
Compensation

The statute lists various forms of
compensation to be considered in
determining whether the compensation
of a director, officer, or employee is
excessive.
(39) Should the definition of
"excessive” vary according to the form
of compensation to be received—for
example, cash versus stock options?
Should items of compensation be
considered individually or in the
aggregate?
(40) How should the agencies construe
the word “perquisite” as it is used in
section 39(c)(1) of the FDI Act? Should
this term encompass preferential non­
credit transactions and deposit accounts
provided to officers, directors, and
employees?
(41) Should the agencies establish
different standards for what constitutes
excessive compensation for outside
directors—that is, directors who are not
employees or officers?
D. "Excessive” B a sed on Connection to
Im propriety

The statute requires the agencies to
consider "any connection between the
individual and any fraudulent act or
omission” in determining whether an
individual’s compensation is excessive.
(42) How should the agencies interpret
this requirement?
E. Compensation Procedures and
R eview s

In complying with the compensation
standards, institutions will need to
determine and monitor the total
compensation of their directors, officers,
and employees.
5

(43) Should the agencies define
“employment agreement,” and, if so,
how?
(44) Should employment agreements
between institutions and executive
officers and directors be required to be
in writing?
(45) Should the institution’s
compensation records indicate all
related direct and indirect payments,
fees, and benefits which are provided to
an executive officer?
(46) Should the institution’s board of
directors be required to review and
approve all executive officer
compensation?
F. P eer Group Com parisons

In arriving at compensation
standards, section 39(c)(2)(D) of the FDI
Act requires the agencies to consider a
peer group comparison of compensation
at comparable institutions defined by
geographic location, asset size, and the
complexity of the loan portfolio or other
assets.
(47) Is information currently available
to the industry through private data
vendors sufficient for the industry and
regulators to determine whether the
compensation paid by a depository
institution to its officers, directors,
employees, and principal shareholders
is comparable to the levels paid by
comparable institutions? If not, what
additional information would need to be
gathered, from whom, and how?
G. Coverage o f Holding Com panies

Section 39(a) of the FDI Act requires
that various operational and managerial
standards be established for both
insured depository institutions and
depository institution holding
companies, including standards for
compensation "in accordance with
subsection (c).” Section 39(c) of the FDI
Act requires the agencies to prescribe
compensation standards only "for all
insured depository institutions.”
Accordingly, the agencies do not believe
that they are required to prescribe
compensation standards for depository
institution holding companies.
(48) Should the agencies construe the
statute as requiring the establishment of
compensation standards for depository
institution holding companies? Would
this interpretation, or a contrary
interpretation, create anomalies or
problems in applying the statute?
V.

Failure to M eet Prescribed Standards

Section 39(e) of the FDI Act requires
an institution to submit an acceptable
plan to the appropriate Federal banking
agency whenever the agency determines
that the institution has failed to meet
a n y of the safety and soundness

standards prescribed under subsections
(a), (b), and (c) of section 39.
Plans must specify the steps the
institution will take to correct the
deficiency. Hans must be submitted
within a reasonable time, as established
by the agency, and generally not later
than 30 days after the agency
determines that the institution fails to
meet a prescribed safety and soundness
standard.
In the event that an institution fails to
submit an acceptable plan within the
time allowed or fails in any material
respect to implement an accepted plan,
section 39(e)(2) of the FDI Act requires
the appropriate agency to issue an order
requiring the institution or company to
correct the deficiency, and authorizes
the agency to take various other actions
until the deficiency has been corrected.
These actions include limiting asset
growth, restricting interest rates paid,
requiring an increase in the ratio of
tangible equity to assets, and other
actions that the agency determines will
better carry out the purpose of section
38 of the FDI Act (prompt corrective
action). Agencies are required to take
certain of these actions whenever an
institution fails to meet a prescribed
standard and either has commenced
operations or experienced a change in
control during the 24-month period
preceding the institution’s failure to
meet the standard, or has experienced
extraordinary asset growth during the
18-month period preceding the
institution’s failure to meet the standard.
The agencies are concerned that the
sanctions imposed on an institution not
in compliance with a prescribed
regulatory standard be consistent with
the safe and sound operation of the
institution. For example, a requirement
to increase tangible equity to assets may
induce certain institutions to shrink their
balance sheets and could thereby
adversely affect safety and soundness
by increasing an institution’s risk.
(49) How can the agencies avoid this
risk?
Agencies monitoring compliance with
the safety and soundness standards
prescribed under section 39 of the FDI
Act will rely on examinations, financial
reports, and other tools, but will often
not be able to determine immediately
when an institution has failed to comply
with those standards.
(50) Should a depository institution or
depository institution holding company
be required to notify its primary
regulator when it has failed to comply
with a safety and soundness standard




under section 39? Would such a
requirement aid enforcement of the
statute? Would requiring such
notification have any undesirable
effects?
VI. A dditional Standards

Section 39 of the FDI Act authorizes
the agencies to prescribe safety and
soundness standards relating to
operation and management, asset
quality, earnings, and stock valuation,
and employee compensation, in addition
to those enumerated in the statute.
(51) The agencies request comment on
whether additional standards are
necessary and feasible, and if so, which
areas should be addressed and what
standards should be implemented.
VII. H olding C om pany R ole

The agencies anticipate that, in order
to promote efficiency and cut costs,
multi-bank or thrift holding companies
may wish to establish safety and
soundness standards for all their
subsidiary institutions. So long as the
standards are ratified by the board of
the subsidiary institutions, the agencies
believe that this procedure is a
reasonable means of complying with the
requirements of section 132 of FDICIA.
(52) Is such a procedure an adequate
and advantageous way of complying
with section 132 of FDICIA?
VIIL R elationship to Other Statutory
P rovisions

Section 39 of the FDI Act requires the
agencies to prescribe safety and
soundness standards by regulation in
certain areas. Several other statutory
provisions pertain to the same or similar
safety and soundness standards—for
example, section 304 of the FDICIA
requires restrictions on real estate
lending. Where appropriate, commenters
are requested to specify how their
interpretation of section 132 relates to
other sections of FDICIA.

supervisory transaction. These savings
and loan holding companies (unlike
similarly structured bank holding
companies) may generally engage in any
type of activity. This activity flexibility
permits a wide range of commercial and
industrial firms to become diversified
savings and loan holding companies.
With these companies, only a small
portion of their overall business may
consist of the thrift and its activities.
The OTS’s regulation of thrift holding
companies concentrates on ensuring
that subsidiary thrifts are well-managed
and well-capitalized and that
transactions and relationships between
thrifts and their holding companies
satisfy fiduciary requirements and do
not negatively affect the thrift’s safety
and soundness. The OTS has not sought
to regulate the way a holding company
conducts its nonthrift business if these
fundamental objectives are being met.
The OTS requests comment on the
application of the Operational and
Managerial Standards (Section II,
above) and the Asset Quality, Earnings,
and Stock Valuation Standards (Section
III, above) to all savings and loan
holding companies and requests that
commenters address the following
questions:
(53) Should the OTS’s standards for
savings and loan holding companies
differ from the bank regulatory agencies’
standards for bank holding companies
and, if so, how?
(54) Should the OTS set different
standards for diversified savings and
loan holding companies versus nondiversified savings and loan holding
companies and, if so, how?
(55) Should different standards be set
for operating versus "shell” holding
companies?
X. D ifferential R egulation

The agencies request comment on the
extent to which the regulatory standards
IX. Issu es R elating to Thrifts and
for the areas described above should
Savings and Loan H olding C om panies
vary based on an institution’s financial
and managerial condition. The agencies
The OTS particularly solicits
request that commenters address this
comment on the application of these
issue in their responses to the questions
safety and soundness standards to
listed above.
savings and loan holding companies.
By Order of the Board of Governors of the
The Home Owners’ Loan Act provides
Federal Reserve System.
significant flexibility to unitary savings
Dated: June 26,1992
and loan holding companies whose thrift
subsidiaries meet the “Qualified Thrift
Jennifer J. Johnson,
Lender" test and, in the case of multiple Associate Secretary of the Board.
savings and loan holding companies,
(FR Doc. 92-16576 Filed 7-14-92; 8:45 amj
where all, or all but one, of the thrift
BILLING CODE 6 7 2 0 -0 1 -M
subsidiaries were acquired in a

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