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FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
OF NEW YORK

[

Circular No. 10395
October 26, 1990

~l

CAPITAL ADEQUACY GUIDELINES
Proposed Amendments to Regulations H and Y
Regarding the Risk-Based Capital Guidelines

Comment Invited by December 17, 1990

To All State Member Banks and Bank Holding Companies
in the Second Federal Reserve District, and Others Concerned:
T h e fo llo w in g s ta te m e n t h as b e e n issu e d b y th e B o a rd o f G o v e rn o rs o f th e F e d e ra l R e se rv e
S y stem :

The Federal Reserve Board has issued for public comment certain clarifications, modifications, and
technical changes to the Board’s risk-based capital guidelines.
Comment is requested by December 17, 1990.
The proposed changes include the modification and clarification of:
• The language of the guidelines to ensure that residential mortgages sold with recourse receive
an adequate capital charge under this framework; and
• Certain provisions of the guidelines that call for prior supervisory approval before any redemption
of perpetual preferred stock.
P rin te d on th e fo llo w in g p a g e s is th e te x t o f th e p ro p o s e d a m e n d m e n ts to A p p e n d ix A o f R e g ­
u la tio n s H an d Y, w h ic h h a s been re p rin te d fro m th e Federal R egister o f O c to b e r 17; A p p e n d ix A
d e a ls w ith r is k -b a s e d c a p ita l g u id e lin e s. C o m m e n ts th e re o n sh o u ld b e su b m itte d b y D e c e m b e r 17,
a n d m ay b e sen t to th e B o a rd o f G o v e rn o rs , as set fo rth in th e n o tic e , o r to o u r B an k A n a ly sis
D e p a rtm e n t.




E. G

erald

C o r r ig a n ,

President.




FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
12 CFR Parts 208 and 225
[Regulation H, Regulation Y; Docket No. R -

0709]

Capital; Capital Adequacy Guidelines
Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.
a c t i o n : Notice of proposed rulemaking.

agency:

The Federal Reserve Board is
proposing several modifications,
clarifications, and technical changes to
the risk-based capital guidelines. The
modifications and technical changes
relate to the: (1) Treatment of certain
assets sold with recourse; (2)
redemption of perpetual preferred stock;
(3) treatment of supervisory goodwill in
the definition of capital; and (4)
treatment of claims on non-OECD
central banks.
The purpose of these modifications,
clarifications, and technical changes is
to make the Board’s risk-based capital
framework consistent with recent
international interpretations of the riskbased capital accord (Basel Accord) and
with the current or proposed treatment
of certain items by the other federal
banking agencies. In addition, certain of
the proposed modifications to the
language of the Board’s risk-based
capital guidelines are intended to bring
the guidelines into closer conformity
with current Federal Reserve
supervisory practices. In light of the
importance of the modifications and
clarifications described in this Notice,
their overall consistency with the spirit
and intent of the risk-based capital
framework and the Basal Accord, and
the need to ensure that risks are backed
by an appropriate level of capital, it is
intended that the modifications and
clarifications be incorporated into the
guidelines by the end of 1990, or as soon
as possible thereafter. Year-end 1990 is
the date upon which the interim riskbased capital ratios first take effect; the
final guidelines take effect at the end of
1992. Because the modifications and
clarifications require adjustments in the
language of the risk-based capital
guidelines, the Board will accept and
consider comments from the public for a
60-day comment period.
DATES: Comments on the modifications,
clarifications, and technical changes
SUMMARY:

,a See p arag rap h (c)(28) o f sectio n 1 of ap p en d ix
A to this p a r t




should be submitted on or before
December 17,1990.
a d d r e s s e s : Comments, which should
refer to docket No. R-0709, may be
mailed to Mr. William W. Wiles,
Secretary, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, 20th Street and
Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington,
DC 20551; or delivered to room B-2223,
Eccles Building, between 8:45 a.m. and
5:15 p.m. weekdays. Comments may be
inspected in Room B-1122 between 9
ajn. and 5 p.m. weekdays, except as
provided in $ 261.8 of the Board’s Rules
Regarding Availability of Information,
12 CFR 281.8.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CO NTACT:

Roger T. Cole, Assistant Director (202/
452-2618), Rhoger H. Pugh, Manager
(202/728-5883), Norah Barger, Senior
Financial Analyst (202/452-2402),
Thomas R. Boemio, Senior Financial
Analyst (202/452-2982), Division of
Banking Supervision and Regulation;
Michael J. O’Rourke, Senior Attorney
(202/452-3288) or Mark J. Tenhundfeld,
Attorney (202/452-3612), Legal Division.
For the hearing impaired only,
Telecommunication Device for the Deaf
(TDD), Eamestine Hill or Dorothea
Thompson (202/452-3544).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

transactions for risk-based capital
purposes and the current or proposed
treatment of such transactions by the
other federal banking agencies.
II. Modifications, Clarifications, and
Technical Changes
1. Treatment o f Sales of A ssets
(Including Residential Mortgages) With
Recourse
It is a basic tenet of the Basle Accord,
and of the risk-based capital guidelines
of the three federal banking agencies,
that all forms of credit risk, whether onor off-balance sheet are to be taken into
account in calculating an institution’s
risk-based capital ratio.1 In view of this
principle and in light of questions that
have arisen regarding the application of
the risk-based guidelines to the sale of
certain assets with recourse, the Federal
Reserve Board believes that it is
necessary to modify the language of the
guidelines iri order to clarify that credit
risks stemming from residential
mortgage recourse sales are subject to
an appropriate capital charge.
In general, so-called recourse "sales’’
allow the buyer of a loan or pools of
loans to put back to the seller, that is,
require the seller to repurchase, loans
that are not performing as agreed. This,
in effect, means that the credit risk
associated with the loans remains with
the "seller.” The modifications and
clarifications to the language of the riskbased capital guidelines could clarify
the treatment for risk-based capital
purposes of the sale of certain assets
with recourse, primarily the sale of
residential mortgages with recourse.
In defining assets sold with recourse
for risk-based capital purposes, the U.S.
banking agencies incorporated the
longstanding "general rule" definition
contained in the commercial bank Call
Report instructions. This general rule
states that a transfer of assets is to be
reported as a true sale, and, therefore,
taken off the balance sheet only if the
transferring (that is, selling) institution
(i) Retains no risk of loss from the assets
transferred resulting from any cause,
including a recourse provision, and (ii)
has no obligation to any party for the

Since the Board initially published its
risk-based capital guidelines, some
questions have arisen concerning how
certain recourse transactions involving
credit risk are to be captured by the
framework. In addition, certain
interpretations and clarifications have
emerged from international and
domestic discussions among supervisory
authorities. Finally, the enactment of the
Financial Institutions, Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FTRREA)
affects the treatment of goodwill for
capital purposes. Accordingly, the Board
has proposed the following
modifications and clarifications in order
to address these developments.
The modifications and clarifications
outlined in this notice will: (1) Ensure
that certain off-balance sheet credit
exposures, particularly sales of
residential mortgages with recourse, are
1 In order to conform to the principle* established
adequately captured in the risk-based
in the Basle Accord, the Board's risk-based capital
capital framework; (2) implement
guidelines cover credit risks retained when an
interpretations agreed to by supervisory institution sells an asset, obtained in the issuance of
a financial guarantee, or acquired in any other
authorities represented on the Basle
manner. This could be done directly through the
Committee on Supervision; and (3) foster issuance of any form of direct credit enhancement
consistency between the Federal
or indirectly through the acquisition of an asset or
obligation.
Reserve’s treatment of certain

PRINTED IN NEW YORK, FROM

F E D E R A L R E G IS T E R ,

3

VOL. 55, NO. 201, pp. 42022-42026

payment of principal or interest on the
assets transferred.
Under the longstanding general rule, a
transfer involving any retention by the
seller of recourse or risk of loss, even if
limited under the terms of the transfer
agreement, is considered a borrowing
transaction, as opposed to a sale, and
the entire amount of the assets
‘‘transferred’’ must remain on the books
of the “selling” institution. The general
rule was intentionally adopted by the
banking agencies for supervisory policy
reasons and has been in effect for
reporting and primary capital (leverage)
ratio purposes for many years. The
principal reason for adopting the rule
was to ensure that institutions retaining
any credit risk through recourse
provisions would be required under
capital-to-total assets (leverage) ratios
to maintain capital against these
transactions.
In 1985, the banking agencies
considered adopting FASB 77 for
regulatory reporting purposes in lieu of
the general Call Report rule.* However,
given capital adequacy considerations
and other supervisory concerns, the
banking agencies expressly decided not
to adopt FASB 77. Rather, the agencies,
under the auspices of the Examination
Council chose to reaffirm the general
Call Report rule for bank reporting and
leverage ratio purposes.
The regulatory (Call Report) definition
of sales of assets with recourse in the
special case of pools of residential
mortgages differs from the general rule
just described. In particular, the Call
Report instructions state that for
regulatory reporting purposes, any
transfers of residential mortgage loan
pools under government programs, such
as the Federal National Mortgage
Association (FNMA) and the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(FHLMC), will be treated as sales. It
should be noted that such treatment is
related to the reporting of these items
and was never intended to preclude
taking account of the risks associated
with the transactions in assessing a
banking organization’s overall capital
adequacy. In addition, the Call Report
instructions state that transfers of pools
of residential mortgages to private
obligors (not under the government
* GAAP, aa set forth in F inancial A ccounting
S ta n d a rd s B oard S tatem en t No. 77 (FASB 77),
perm its a tran sfer of a s se ts w ith recourse to be
tre a te d a s a sa le if: (a) C ontrol of the future
econom ic b en efits is surrendered; (b) th e am ount of
the se lle r’s obligation u n d er the reco u rse provisions
c a n be rea so n a b ly estim ated; a n d (c) the a sse ts
ca n n o t b e retu rn ed to the seller ex cep t p u rsu an t to
the reco u rse provisions. W h en sa les treatm en t is
acco rd ed , the seller’s e stim ated 'liab ility for an y loss
u n d er the reco u rse p ro v isio n s m ust b e provided for.




programs) are to be reported as sales
when the selling bank does not retain
any significant risk of loss.9
These regulatory reporting definitions
were developed at a time when the
disposition or transfer of residential
mortgages under the government
programs involved little or no recourse
and the amount of possible loss under
the private transactions was considered
to be insignificant. Thus, no major policy
concerns existed regarding the
possibility that the "selling" party in
these transactions could retain a
significant measure of credit risk that
was not adequately backed by capital.
As discussed below, however, this
situation has changed over time.
The Board’s risk-based capital
guidelines incorporated the general Call
Report definition of sales of assets with
recourse and also made specific
reference to the Cali Report treatment of
the sale of l-to-4 family residential
mortgages with recourse. The intent of
the guidelines was to incorporate into
the risk-based capital framework the
supervisory principle implicit in the
general Call Report rule, that is, if the
seller retains any risk of loss, the
transaction would require capital
support. Despite this, the reference to
the Call Report treatment of the sale of
l-to-4 family residential mortgages has
apparently led some to believe that such
transactions could be excluded entirely
from the risk-based capital framework,
regardless of the amount of credit risk
involved in these transactions.
The exclusion from capital
requirements o f tr a n s a c tio n s with a
significant amount of credit risk would
be inconsistent with the principles of
risk-based capital and was not intended
when the Board issued its risk-based
capital guidelines. In this regard, it
should be noted that the Federal
Reserve’s risk-based capital guidelines
contain the statement that “* * * asset
sales with recourse (to the extent not
included on the balance sheet) * * * are
converted at 100 percent" This would
have the effect of applying a capital
charge to such transactions.
The treatment of asset sales with
recourse, including the transfer of
residential mortgages with recourse, is
of particular importance since it has
become apparent that the “sales” of
* T he Call R eport instruction* sta te th at in a
private transaction, recourse is considered
significant if a t the tim e of the tra n sfer the
maximum contractual exposure u nder the recourse
provision (or through retention of a su b ordinated
in terest in the m ortgages) is g reater th an the am ount
of p robable loss th at the ban k h a s reaso n a b ly
estim ated it will incur on the tran sferred m ortgages.

4

residential mortgages under the
government programs can involve either
no recourse, or recourse of up to 100
percent to the "seller”—a distinct
departure from the situation that existed
when the regulatory reporting definition
of “residential mortgages sold with
recourse" was initially adopted. Thus,
the incorporation in the risk-based
capital guidelines of the Call Report
definition of residential mortgages sold
with recourse has been interpreted by
some as allowing sales of residential
mortgages under the government
programs with up to 100 percent
recourse to escape a capital charge.
If such treatment were permitted,
banking organizations would not have to
maintain any capital to support the
credit risks associated with recourse
arrangements, even though these risks
associated with recourse arrangements,
even though these risks would be the
same as if they continued to hold the
assets directly on their books. For this
reason, the Federal Reserve is clarifying
the language in the risk-based capital
guidelines to ensure that l-to-4 family
residential mortgage sales with recourse
are not exempt from an appropriate
capital charge.
To achieve this objective, the
modified language would provide for
risk-based capital purposes that assets
sold with recourse (that are not already
on the balance sheet), including
residential mortgages, are to be treated
by the selling institution like any other
d;rect credit substitute or financial
guarantee. Thus, such off-balance sheet
obligations would be converted at 100
percent to an on-balance sheet credit
equivalent amount and assigned to the
appropriate nsk category, typically 50
percent in the case of residential
mortgages. In general this would have
the effect of putting a 4 percent capital
charge on the entire amount of
residential mortgage loans sold with
recourse.
An exception under this proposal
would be allowed where the maximum
possible recourse obligation, at the time
of the transfer, is less than the expected
loss on the transferred assets and the
banking organization establishes and
maintains a liability or specifically
identified (non-capital) reserve for an
amount equal to the maximum loss
possible under the recourse provision.
Such a liability or reserve would mean
that the maximum possible loss under
the recourse arrangement would in
effect be deducted from capital "up
front," and the originating car selling
institution would not suffer any further
loss under the recourse obligation.
Under such conditions, no additional

capital would be required end the
amount of the liability created to cover
the maximum possible loss under the
recourse agreement would not be
included in capital.
Clarifying in the proposed manner
that residential mortgage sales with
recourse incur a capital charge is
desirable for several reasons.
First, it would ensure that the Federal
Reserve’s treatment for risk-based
capital purposes of residential mortgage
sale with recourse is consistent with (ij
The general regulatory rule on asset
sales with recourse long employed by
the Federal banking agencies and (iij the
existing or proposed treatment of the
ether Federal banking agencies.
Second, addressing the residential
mortgage issue will ensure consistency
with the intent of the Basle Accord,
which requires capital backing for all
on- and off-balance sheet credit risks.
Third, addressing the mortgage
exception will enable the depository
institution regulatory agencies to deal
with a number of broad issues
pertaining to recourse in a consistent
fashion going forward.4
With reference to the second point
above regarding the consistency with
the Accord, it should be noted that the
terms and provisions of the Basle
Accord apply to commercial banks on a
consolidated basis. In this regard, under
the approach described above,
commercial banks will be required to
back their recourse transactions with
capital when the interim risk-based
capital ratios become effective at yearend 1990, or upon the effective date of
the clarification, whichever is later.
While the Basle Accord does not apply
to companies that own banks, the
Accord does caution that bank
ownership structures or affiliations with
ether firms not be allowed to weaken
the capital position of the bank or
expose the bank to undue risks. The
Eoard has chosen to apply risk-based
capital requirements similar to those in
the Basle Accord to bank holding
companies. In this regard, there are
certain limited differences between the
risk-based capital guidelines for banks
and bank holding companies. In view of
this, the Board invites comments on
whether it might be appropriate in the
case of bank holding companies, as
distinct from commercial banks, to
* A u ex p lain ed m are folly below, a prefect under
tr,e auspice* of the Federal F in an cial tnatitutuoa
E xam ination Co— ett (FFKC) to formiag — tfca
type* at m o w n arranp— aato employed by

banking ergaooaticaa. the tacorpoeattaa wtme— re
Me landtag *»rta bees. Am
supervisory and capital treatment of United
recourse, and regulatory reporting bxpfieations.




consider a brief transition or phase-in
arrangement for the full risk-based
capital requirements with respect to the
sale of residential mortgages with
recourse completed prior to the
publication of this Notice. Such
treatment would only be contemplated
in the case of assets sold with recourse
by bank holding companies or their
nonbank subsidiaries. In considering
this point, commenters are asked to
address whether the credit risks of the
recourse arrangements to the bank
holding company selling the assets are
any different from the risks to the
holding company if the assets were held
directly on the holding company’s
books.
In general, under the Board*s
recommended approach, 4 percent
capital would normally be required
against the entire amount of residential
mortgages sold with recourse. However,
this approach would not mean that
banking organizations would be unable
to sell or securitize residential
mortgages, or that they would be unable
to provide limited recourse or certain
other credit enhancements to support
sales of mortgage pools. For example,
banking organizations always have the
clear option to sell assets outright,
without any recourse, thereby avoiding
a capital charge altogther. Moreover,
there are several ways banking
organizations can provide credit
enhancements and still sell assets
without recourse, or with limited
recourse, and either incur no capital
charge or a reduced capital charge.
First, banking organizations can
establish a spread account that provides
a cushion of protection to the purchasers
cf securitized assets, while at the same
time insulating the selling banking
organization from losses arising from the
transaction. Funds can be placed in the
account directly by the selling
institution through a charge against
earnings or capital, or can accumulate in
the account based upon the difference
between the rate paid to the purchasers
of the securities and the higher yield
earned on the underlying assets. Under
these arrangements, any losses on the
underlying assets would be charged
against the spread account So long as
such losses can only be charged against
the spread account and cannot
adversely affect the originating bank’s
capital or future earnings, no additional
capital would be charged for
transactions employing this technique.
Indeed, the banking agencies do not
view such arrangements as recourse
transactions and these spread accounts
have been used successfully to
securitize credit card and automobile

5

receivables. Moreover, these
arrangements can be supplemented or
enhanced by the originating or selling
bank’8 purchase of a standby letter of
credit from a third party guarantor in
order to protect the purchasers from
losses on the securitized assets.
Second, transactions can be
structured in such a way that the seller
and the buyer proportionately share in
any losses, that is, on a pro rata basis.
For example, if a bank sells assets of
$1,000,000 and the buyer agrees to
absorb 90 percent of any losses while
the seller will absorb the other 10
percent, the selling bank would only
have to maintain capital against
$100,000, as opposed to the entire
amount of the asset transferred.
Third, as noted above, with respect to
the sale of mortgages either under the
government programs or in private
transactions, banking organizations can
avoid a capital charge by (1) limiting
their maximum recourse obligation to an
amount that is lest than the expected
lose on the transferred pool of
mortgages at the time of the transfer and
(2) establishing and maintaining a
liability oc a specifically identified non­
capital reserve for the maximum amount
of possible loss under the recourse
provision. This provision would give
banking organizations engaged in
recourse transactions an incentive to
limit recourse and take a charge against
capital for their maximum possible loss
under the recourse arrangement. Given
the uncertainties that can surround
recourse obligations, such incentives
would appear to have a sound
prudential and supervisory justification.
As a general rule, this treatment
should not result in extraordinary or
unwarranted new capital requirements
for most banking organizations. This is
because prudently run institutions have
always had the responsibility to monitor
off-balance sheet risk-taking and back
such activities with adequate capital,
regardless of how the transactions have
been treated for regulatory reporting or
regulatory capital purposes.
FFIEC Study on Recourse
In light of the matters discussed in this
notice, as well as other emerging
concerns relating to recourse
transactions, the staffs of the banking
agencies recognize the need to address
in a comprehensive fashion the
reporting, supervisory, and capital
adequacy issues stemming from the sale
of assets with recourse. In this regard,
the federal depository institution
regulatory agencies, under the auspices
of the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council (FFIEC), have

which banking organizations acquired
goodwill in the past in connection with
supervisory mergers with troubled or
failed depository institutions. The
wording of the footnote could also be
interpreted as accommodating the
possible future inclusion in capital of
goodwill stemming from the merger of
troubled or failed institutions. As a
2. Redemption of Perpetual Preferred
matter of policy, the Federal Reserve
Stock
does not give credit for goodwill in
The Board's risk-based capital
assessing the capital of institutions
guidelines currently indicate that
involved in supervisory mergers. Indeed,
banking organizations should consult
institutions making acquisitions are
with the Federal Reserve before
normally required to exceed minimum
redeeming permanent equity
capital levels without undue reliance on
instruments or debt capital instruments
intangible assets, particularly goodwill.
prior to their stated maturity. A limited
In addition, FIRREA prohibits the
exception to this rule is provided for
regulatory agencies from^ allowing
instruments redeemed with the proceeds goodwill to be included in the
of a higher form of capital, if the capital
calculation of capital if the goodwill was
position of the banking organization is
acquired after April 12,1989. Thus, the
deemed fully adequate by the Federal
Board is proposing to delete the footnote
Reserve. As a practical matter, it has
that appears to suggest the possibility
long been expected that banking
that supervisory goodwill acquired in
organizations would consult with the
the future could be included in the
Federal Reserve when contemplating
definition of capital for risk-based
redemptions of core capital in order to
capital purposes.
give the Federal Reserve an opportunity
4. Claims on Central Banks
to determine the impact of the
The Basle Accord assigns all claims
redemption on the organization’s
on OECD commercial banks and short­
financial condition.
term claims on non-OECD commercial
The Basle Committee on Supervision
banks to the 20 percent risk category.
has arrived at a consensus that the
redemption of perpetual preferred stock On the other hand, long-term claims on
non-OECD commercial banks, and all
should only be permitted at the issuer’s
claims on non-OECD central
option and only with the prior approval
governments are assigned to the 100
of the supervisory authority. This
percent risk category. Claims on OECD
approach is not inconsistent with the
Federal Reserve’s current practice as set governments and central banks are
assigned to the zero percent risk
forth above, and is consistent with
category.
requirements contained in letters sent
by the Board in connection with the
In promulgating their risk-based
review of capital plans submitted by
capital guidelines, the U.S. banking
bank holding companies seeking to
agencies' allowed claims on non-OECD
engage in Section 20 securities
central banks to be in the same risk
underwriting activities. These letters
category as short-term claims on nonstipulated that any redemption of
OECD commercial banks on the
perpetual preferred stock could be only
assumption that claims on central banks
at the bank holding companies’ option
should not be in a higher category than
and only with prior approval from the
claims on commercial banks. However,
Federal Reserve.
further discussions among international
As a result of the Basle interpretation, supervisors have led to a consensus that
the Federal Reserve Board is proposing
claims on central banks should be in the
to amend the language of its risk-based
same risk category as claims on the
capital guidelines to clarify that the
corresponding central governments. This
approval of the Board is necessary prior will have little impact on OECD central
to the redemption of any perpetual
banks since claims on OECD central
preferred stock.
banks and governments are already
assigned to the zero percent risk
3. Treatment of Supervisory Goodwill
category. On the other hand, the Basle
Currently, the Board’s risk-based
Committee on Supervision has held that
capital guidelines, consistent with the
claims on non-OECD central banks,
Basle Accord, require that goodwill be
which could involve an element of
deducted from Teir 1 capital. However,
transfer risk, should be assigned to the
the guidelines contain a footnote that
same 100 percent risk category as claims
was intended to give the Federal
on their central governments.
Reserve the option to make an exception
Incorporation of this change into the
in those very limited situtations in

requested public comment on how to
define recourse and how to treat various
types of recourse for purposes of
regulatory reporting, capital adequacy,
and lending limits. This interagency
effort is also focusing on a number of
related issues, including cases where
assets are sold with limited recourse.




6

U.S. banking agencies’ capital
guidelines, which is necessary to ensure
consistency with the Basle framework,
will have the practical effect of moving
claims on non-OECD central banks that
involve an element of transfer risk from
the 20 percent to the 100 percent risk
category. As already noted, this will
have no effect on the treatment of
claims on central banks in OECD
countries since all claims on these
institutions are already assigned to the
same risk category as OECD central
governments, that is, to the zero percent
risk category.
As a result of the Basle interpretation,
the Federal Reserve Board is proposing
to amend the language of its risk-based
capital guidelines to provide that claims
on central banks are to be assigned to
the same risk category as claims on the
respective central governments.

III. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
The Federal Reserve Board does not
believe that adoption of this proposal
would have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
business entities (in this case, small
banking organizations), in accord with
the spirit and purposes of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et s e q ). In
addition, consistent with current policy,
these guidelines generally will not apply
to bank holding companies with
consolidated assets of less than $150
million.
List of Subjects
12 CFR Part 208
Accounting, Agricultural loan losses.
Applications, Appraisals, Banks,
Banking, Capital adequacy, Confidential
business information, Currency,
Dividend payments, Federal Reserve
System, Publication of reports of
condition, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Securities, State member
banks.
12 CFR Part 225
Administrative practice and
procedure, Appraisals, Banks, Banking,
Capital adequacy, Federal Reserve
System, Holding companies, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements,
Securities, State member banks.
For the reasons set forth in this notice,
end pursuant to the Board’s authority
under section 5(b) of the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1844(b)),
and section 910 of the International
Lending Supervision Act of 1983 (12
U S.C. 3909), the Board proposes to
amend 12 CFR parts 208 and 225 as
follows:

PART 208—MEMBERSHIP OF STATE
BANKING INSTITUTIONS IN THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

30 under “IU. C. 2. Category 2; 20
percent*’ of appendix A to part 206 are
removed.

1. The authority citation for part 208
continues to read as follows:
Authority: Sections 9 ,11(a), life), 19, 21. 25,
and 25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act, as
amended (12 U.S.C. 321-338, 248(a). 248(c),
461, 481-488, 001, and 611, respectively);
sections 4 and 13(j) of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act, as amended (12 U.S.C. 1814
and 1823(|}, respectively): section 7(a) of the
International Banking Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C.
3105); sections 907-910 of the International
Lending Supervision Act of 1983 (12 U.S.C.
3908-3909); sections 2 ,12(b), 12(g), 12(i),
15B(c)(5), 17,17A, and 23 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78b, 787(b).
787(g), 78/(1), 73Q-4(c}(5), 78q, 78q-l, and 78w,
respectively); section 5155 of the Revised
Statutes (12 U.S.C. 36) as amended by the
McFadden Act of 1927; and sections 11011122 of the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (12
U.S.C. 3310 and 3331-3351).

Appendix A [Amended]

Appendix A (Amended)
2. A new sentence i« added
immediately following the first sentence
of the first paragraph under “II. A. 1. b.
Perpetual preferred stock” of appendix
A to Part 206 to read as follows;
II. Definition of Qualifying Capital for the
Risk-Based Capital Ratio
* * * * *
A* * *

| * 4 *

b. * * * Consistent with these provisions,
any perpetual preferred stock with a
redemption feature may qualify at capital
only if the redemption is subject to prior
approval of the Federal Reserve. * * *
* * * * *

Appendix A [Amended]

5.
Two new sentences are added
immediately following the second
sentence of the seventh paragraph under
"II. D. 1. Items with a 100 percent
conversion factor” of appendix A to part
208 to read as follows:
III. Procedures for Computing Weighted R isk
Assets and Off-Balance Sheet Items
*
*
*
*
*
1.

* * *

Appendix A [Amended]
3.
In appendix A to part 225, in EL B.,
the footnote designator 15 in the text is
removed and footnote 15 is removed and
reserved.

* * •

* * * Accordingly, the entire amount of
any assets transferred with recourse that are
not already included on the balance sheet,
including pools of one-to-four family
residential mortgages, are to be converted at
100 percent and assigned to the risk weight
appropriate to the obligor, or if relevant the
nature of any collateral or guarantees. The
only exception involves transfers of pools of
residential mortgages that have been made
with insignificant recourse for which a
liability or specific non-capita) reserve has
been established and is maintained for the
maximum amount of possible loss under the
recourse provision. * * *
*
*
*
*
*

PART 225—BANK HOLDING
COMPANIES AND CHANGE IN BANK
CONTROL
1. The authority citation for part 225
continues to read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C 1817(j)(13). 1818.183U
1843(c)(8), 1844(b), 3100 ,3108, 3907, 3909,
3310, and 3331-3351.

Appendix A [Amended]
2. A new sentence is added
immediately following the first sentence
of the first paragraph under ”H. A. 1. b.
Perpetual preferred stock of appendix A
to part 225 to read as follows:

Appendix A [Amended]

II. Definition o f Qualifying Capital fa r the
R isk Based Capital Ratio




1.

b.
* * * Consistent with these provisions,
any perpetual preferred stock with a
redemption feature may qualify as capital
o n ly i f the redemption is subject to prior
approval of the Federal Reserve. * * *

D. * * *

3. In appendix A to part 208, in II. B.
1., the footnote designator 14 in the text
is removed and footnote 14 is removed
and reserved.

4. The last two sentences of footnote

A. * * *

*

*

*

*

*

Appendix A [Amended]
4.
The last two sentences of footnote
33 under "III. C. 2. Category 2: 20
percent” of appendix A to part 225 are
removed.

Appendix A [Amended]
5.
Two new sentences are added to
the end of footnote 48 under “in. D. 1.
Items with a 100 percent conversion
factor” of appendix A to part 225 to read
as follows:
48 * * * Accordingly, the entire amount of
any assets transferred with recourse that are
not already included on the balance sheet,
including pools of one-to-four family
residential mortgages, are to be converted at
100 percent and assigned to the risk weight
appropriate to the obligor, or if relevant, the
nature of any collateral or guarantees. The
only exception involves transfers of pools of
residential mortgages that have been made
with insignificant recourse for which a
liability or specific non-capital reserve has
been established and is maintained for the
maximum amount of possible loss under the
recourse provision.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, October 11.1990.
William W. Wiles,
Secretary o f the Board.

[FR Doc. 90-24425 Filed 10-16-90; 8:45 am)
BILLING CODE S210-01-M

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