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A meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee was held on
Thursday, November 4, 1965, at 11:35 a.m.
conference meeting, and each participant

This was a telephone
was in Washington except

as otherwise indicated in parentheses:
PRESENT:

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

Martin, Chairman
Hayes, Vice Chairman
Balderston
Ellis
Galusha
Maisel
Mitchell
Patterson
Robertson
Scanlon

(Philadelphia)
(New York)
(Boston)
(Minneapolis)

(Atlanta)
(Chicago)

Mr. Bopp, Alternate Member of the Federal
Open Market Committee
(Philadelphia)
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

Young, Secretary
Sherman, Assistant Secretary
Kenyon, Assistant Secretary
Hackley, General Counsel
Brill, Economist
Holland, Associate Economist
Holmes, Manager, System Open Market
Account
(New York)

Mr. Axilrod, Associate Adviser, Division
of Research and Statistics, Board of
Governors
Miss Eaton, General Assistant, Office of
the Secretary, Board of Governors
Mr. Marsh, Assistant Vice President,
Federal Reserve Bank of
(New York)
New York
Mr. Geng, Manager, Securities Department,
Federal Reserve Bank of
(New York)
New York
Federal
Vice
President,
Mr. Eastburn,
Reserve Bank of Pniladelphia (Philadelphia)

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11/4/65

Secretary's Note: Prior to this meeting the
members of the Committee had heard the morn
ing telephone conference callin which the
Desk reviewed developments in the Government
securities market against the background of
the response to the Treasury's $9.7 billion
offer of new 4-1/4 per cent notes of March 15,
1967, on which a 48 per cent allotment ratio
had been announced yesterday, this being con
siderably higher than anticipated. Today's
meeting of the Committee had been called at
the request of the Manager of the System
Open Market Account.
Chairman Martin called first upor. Mr. Holmes, who said that
the poor reception of the Treasury financing had introduced a new
note of uncertainty in the Government securities market.

The

initial market response had been mild, but it was necessary to be
alert to the problems that could develop during an even keel period.
In addition to the basic objective of maintaining steady money market
conditions, a major objective guiding the Desk during this period
would be to make sure that any further adjustment of interest rates
that might take place remained an orderly one.

This could involve

purchases of coupon issues, and it might require paying even less
attention to the net borrowed reserve figures than would ordinarily
be the case.
Obviously it was not possible to tell at this particular
point what market pressures could develop or in what area they might
center, Mr. Holmes continued.

Without prejudging future action, he

thought it advisable for the System to be in a position to purchase

11/4/65

-3

when-issued securities if market pressures should center on that
area.

The Treasury this morning had purchased about $150 million

when-issued securities at about 3/64s below the issuing price.
This had helped to stabilize that market, and at the moment there
was no particular pressure there or it other areas.

On the other

hand, pressure could develop in that area beyond the Treasury's
capacity--in view of its cash position--to handle.

In such cir

cumstances, it could be advantageous for the System to buy when
issued securities at any fixed price, but would do so, if required
to buy at all, only at declining prices.
As the Committee knew, Mr. Holmes added, there was no
standing instruction that would forbid the Manager from buying
when-issued securities.

But since this would represent a departure

from normal practices, he had thought it best to put the matter
before the Committee.
Chairman Martin requested comments on the Manager's proposal,
and Mr. Hayes said he felt the proposal was a reasonable one. It
seemed possible, although one could not tell in advance, that in
resisting disorderly pressures it might be more economical to operate
in when-issued securities, if pressures centered in that area.

It

would seem wise to give the Manager the requested degree of leeway.
Mr. Ellis said that he would approve the idea, with the hope,
however, that it would not be necessary to deviate from normal

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11/4/65

practices because the System action, if it occurred, would be
picked up in the market as evidence that the market needed help.
It would be better if the Desk could get along without having to
do this.
Messrs. Galusha, Patterson, and Scanlon agreed with
Mr. Ellis.

Mr. Bopp, after noting that he was not a voting member

of the Committee, also concurred.
Mr. Mitchell said that, while he would approve the proposal,
he rather hcped that the Manager would start taking steps that
might help to obviate the necessity.

While he did not know exactly

what the proper steps would be, he would prefer to reassure the
market by indirection rather than to be forced to assure the market
by direct operations in when-issued securities.
Messrs. Maisel and Robertson concurred with Mr. Mitchell's
comments.
Mr. Hayes said he thought it would be difficult to accomplish
what Mr. Mitchell had in mind without creating a false impression
about the direction of System policy.

He felt it was necessary to

strike a delicate balance between preventing disorderly conditions
and misleading the market on basic System policy.
Chairman Martin commented that he thought this was obvious
and that he would question operating across the board in this
situation.

The Committee, he felt, had to leave this essentially

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11/4/65

to the judgment of the Account Manager.

What the Committee was

really doing was giving the Manager latitude to deal in when-issued
securities if he thought it wise.

Otherwise, the Manager's authority

would remain just the same as it had been.
Mr. Balderston said he felt it was important that the
problem of the Treasury refinancing not change the direction of
monetary policy.
of pegging.

It was also important not to give the impression

What the Manager was proposing was to depart from the

tradition against operating in when-issued securities if a disorderly
market seemed in prospect.

If a disorderly market was an actuality,

the Manager had authority to act in any way required.
difference

The one

was that the Manager was proposing to act in an anticipatory

way if the threat of a disorderly market seemed serious.
Mr. Mitchell said he would not dissent from giving the
Manager the requested leeway.

However, just as Mr. Hayes was con

cerned that some action the Manager might take could give an impres
sion of a change of System policy in the direction of greater ease,
he (Mr. Mitchell) was equally concerned that the Manager's failure
to take action could create an impression of a change toward a
tighter policy.

He had confidence that the Manager would attempt

to carry out the Committee's directive to the best of his ability,
but he wanted to be on record that there were operations at this
stage that could give rise to anticipation cf a change in policy

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11/4/65
in either direction.

He was prepared to place matters in the

Manager's hands, but would not want it thought that he agreed that
a change in the direction of policy could only be in one direction
as a result of the Desk's operations.
Mr. Hayes agreed that what the Manager should do was give,
to the greatest extent possible, the impression that policy remained
exactly as it had been.
Chairman Martin said he thought all were in agreement on
that point.

The only thing this meeting was concerned with, he

added, was the question of the Manager's dealing in when-issued
securities within the framework of a potentially disorderly market.
Mr. Galush said he wanted to be sure he understood correctly
that the Manager could work in an anticipatory way as well as a
responsive one, and Chairman Martin replied that the Manager had
full authority with respect to the maintenance of an orderly market.
Mr. Holmes said he had nothing to add.

The purpose of his

requesting this meeting had been to have the Committee consider the
possibility of purchasing when-issued securities, if necessary, with
all other prescriptions of policy remaining unchanged.

He hoped he

would not have to purchase when-issued securities, and he did not
now anticipate having to do so, but it seemed well to be prepared
if market forces required such action.

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-7
Thereupon, it was agreed unanimously
that the Manager of the System Open Market
Account was authorized to purchase Treasury
4-1/4 per cent notes of May 15, 1967, for
the Account on a when-issued basis if in his
judgment circumstances warranted such action.

The meeting then adjourned.
Secretary