View original document

The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.

January 16, 2009

Authorized for Public Release

Appendix 1: Materials used by Mr. Madigan

66 of 69

January 16, 2009

Authorized for Public Release

67 of 69

BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
DIVISION OF MONETARY AFFAIRS
FOMC SECRETARIAT

Date:

January 12, 2009

To:

Federal Open Market Committee

From:

Brian Madigan

Subject: Questions for Committee discussion of possible inflation objective

Attached are several suggested questions related to the possibility of establishing
a numerical inflation objective. Participants may wish to address some or all of these
questions at the Committee’s videoconference this Friday, January 16.

Attachment

1 of 3

January 16, 2009

Authorized for Public Release

68 of 69

January 12, 2009
Suggested questions for Committee discussion of issues related to a possible
medium-term inflation objective
1. What do you see as the principal benefits and costs of setting an explicit
objective for medium-term inflation?
a. What lessons do you draw from the foreign experience in inflation
targeting?
b. Do you see particular aspects of the U.S. situation that make setting
an inflation target especially appropriate or inappropriate? How
would an explicit inflation objective relate to the Federal Reserve’s
dual mandate? Would setting an inflation objective effectively
assign less weight to the objective of maximum employment?
c. In view of the current potential for excessive declines in inflation
and inflation expectations, do you see particular advantages under
present circumstances of setting a numerical inflation objective?
2. How should the Committee’s conduct of policy be affected by the
establishment of a medium-term inflation objective?
a. How would the Committee respond to actual and projected
deviations of inflation from its objective? How would that response
differ from the Committee’s current behavior?
b. How would an inflation objective affect the Federal Reserve’s ability
to address financial stability issues? How would an inflation
objective interact with policy concerns about asset price
developments?
3. Should the Committee set a definite time frame for measuring inflation
vis B vis the objective? How exactly would the objective be framed? How,
if at all, would the Federal Reserve judge its own success in meeting its
price stability and employment objectives?

2 of 3

January 16, 2009

Authorized for Public Release

69 of 69

4. In view of all the considerations, should the Committee set an objective for
medium-term inflation? Alternatively, should the Committee set a price
level objective?
5. If the Committee were to set a numerical inflation objective, should the
objective be framed as single number or a range?
6. What price index should be used? PCE, CPI, or other? Total or core?
7. What should be the numerical value(s) of the target or range?
a. How large of an “inflation buffer” do you think is appropriate?
b. Given the risk of excessive disinflation, should the Committee set a
higher objective for the medium term than it would in more normal
circumstances?
8. In its quarterly Summary of Economic Projections, should the Committee
publish longer-term projections for GDP growth and unemployment?
Should the Committee also publish longer-term projections for inflation?
a. Should the Committee publish forecasts for short-term interest rates
(and other policy tools)?
b. How would other aspects of the Federal Reserve’s policy
communications be affected?

3 of 3