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Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 1/13/2023

BOARD

OF

GOVERNORS

OF THE

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

Division of Monetary Affairs
FOMC SECRETARIAT

Date:

October 26, 2017

To:

Federal Open Market Committee

From:

Brian F. Madigan

Subject: Corrected Version: Some Implications of Uncertainty and Misperception
for Monetary Policy
Attached is a corrected version of the memo titled “Some Implications of
Uncertainty and Misperception for Monetary Policy.” The version circulated on
October 24 contained errors on three pages:
• On page 5 of 29, the memo now correctly says, “we use the September 2017
staff forecast as the baseline” (not October).
• On page 6 of 29, footnote 11 has been corrected and amplified.
• On page 24 of 29, the first two equations in “The Rules” table in Appendix A
now correctly have plus signs in front of the coefficient on the inflation gap
term in each equation (instead of a minus sign).

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Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 1/13/2023

BOARD

OF

GOVERNORS

OF THE

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

Date:

October 24, 2017

To:

Federal Open Market Committee

From:

Steven B. Kamin, Thomas Laubach, and Andreas Lehnert

Subject:

Some Implications of Uncertainty and Misperception for Monetary Policy

This year’s combination of below-target and declining inflation with low and
declining unemployment highlights some important areas of uncertainty confronting
policymakers. The attached memo, prepared by Chris Erceg (IF), Michael Kiley (FS),
and James Hebden, David Lopez-Salido, and Robert Tetlow (MA), begins by reviewing
the degree of uncertainty around estimates of the natural rate of unemployment (u*), and
around the persistence of inflation and its responsiveness to resource utilization (the slope
of the Phillips curve). In light of the fact that empirical evidence cannot meaningfully
reduce these uncertainties, the memo then examines how various strategies for
conducting monetary policy interact with errors in estimating the level of u* and the key
parameters of the Phillips curve to affect the likely distribution of economic outcomes.
The three policy strategies are the balanced-approach policy rule and two variants,
one that responds more strongly to inflation (“inflation-averse”) and one that responds
more strongly to the unemployment rate (“unemployment-averse”). The performance of
these strategies is evaluated using stochastic simulations, thus taking into account a wide
range of possible shocks hitting the economy. Previous literature has highlighted that,
when there is substantial uncertainty about u*, inflation-averse policy rules perform well
because they attenuate the response of policy to potentially mismeasured resource
utilization. The memo finds that this result has little force under current circumstances,
for two reasons: first because the Phillips curve is presently estimated to be very flat, so
that responses to a mismeasured unemployment gap lead to little degradation in economic
performance; and more importantly, because an aggressive response to below-target
inflation under current circumstances would lead to an even larger undershooting of the
unemployment rate below u* than is already projected in the staff’s baseline. Even if
policymakers view low unemployment as not socially costly per se, they may nonetheless
be concerned that high levels of resource utilization may induce other imbalances, or that
a very tight labor market may lead inflation dynamics to change in undesirable ways that
could be hard to detect in real time. If the most salient risk is not that u* is mismeasured
but rather that inflation dynamics will revert to those prevailing in the 1970s, the
inflation-averse strategy would raise the likelihood of initially very low and later high
unemployment outcomes without noticeable gains in stabilizing inflation, compared to
the balanced-approach rule.
If you have any questions about the contents of this memo, please feel free to
contact the authors of the memo directly or any of the three of us.

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