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APPENDIX

Notes for FOMC Meeting
October 1, 1985
Sam Y. Cross

Since the Group of Five's September 22 meeting, the dollar has
dropped sharply. By this morning, it had fallen about 9 to 10 percent
against the Japanese yen, 6 percent against the German mark and 2
percent against the pound sterling. This drop in dollar rates
considerably more than offset the rise in the dollar that had occurred
after your last meeting up until mid-September.
The G-5 agreement had an immediate and strong effect, partly
because its timing came as a surprise. But even more importantly,
market participants were impressed by the fact that the initiative had
come from the United States. They interpreted the agreement as a major
reversal of the Administration's attitude toward a strong currency as
well as toward intervention. And at least initially they interpreted
the agreement as eliminating any possibility that might still have
remained, following the lower-than-expected "flash" GNP figure for the
third quarter, that U.S. monetary policy might be tightened.
In these circumstances, the dollar fell sharply last Monday even
before any official intervention occurred. With Tokyo closed for a
holiday, the first central bank operations were in Europe. The dollar
had already fallen 3 to 4 percent against major foreign currencies by
the time the Bundesbank stepped in to sell
dollars at the
afternoon fixing in Frankfurt. Later on that day, the U.S. authorities
took an opportunity to resist a rise of the dollar from the lower
levels, and we sold $70 million against the Japanese yen and $79 million
against German marks. As has continued to be true throughout the last
week, the Fed operated in a relatively visible manner, in order to
demonstrate our preparedness to intervene.
For the next couple of days there was some skepticism in the
market that the lower dollar rates initially reached after the weekend
would be maintained. Market participants did not find clear guidance
from the vague and bland wording in the communique about policy
adjustments the G-5 governments had agreed upon to support the desired
"upward adjustment" in other currencies against the dollar. And they
doubted that foreign exchange market intervention alone could achieve
such an objective.
Consequently, a number of banks' commercial customers responded
to the apparently attractive rates to buy dollars. This phenomenon was
the most dramatic in Tokyo where, when the market opened on Tuesday
after a three-day weekend, dollar demand from commercial entities
spurred a record turnover of nearly $5 billion in spot trading between
the dollar and the yen. The Bank of Japan responded by selling
that day, to limit the dollar's recovery. The size of the Bank
of Japan's operations was accurately gauged in the market. This
operation was followed up by interventions later in the

week, recurrent statements by
still greater appreciation of
stimulus for next year. As a
perceive the central banks to
to a serious, joint effort to

Japanese officials indicating they wanted
the yen, and talk of some new fiscal
result, market participants have come to
be more firmly committed than in the past
bring the dollar down.

Since the G-5 meeting, the U.S. authorities have sold dollars in
the exchange markets on all but one day. We operated even last Friday,
when hurricane Gloria brought foreign exchange trading to a virtual halt
in new York and our transactions had to be done with banks in Chicago,
London, and Toronto. In total, in the past six days, we sold $408
million, of which $224 million was against yen and $184 million was
against marks. These sales were shared equally between the Federal
Reserve and the Treasury. The Desk's operations have been widely
observed, particularly in dollar/yen. We operated when the dollar was
rising, believing it not appropriate for the U.S. authorities to push
the dollar down in a way that could start an uncontrolled fall. At
times we have aimed at permitting the dollar to recover temporarily in
order to maintain some sense of two-way risk.
In all, official dollar sales by the G-5 central banks since the
G-5 meeting have come to about $2-1/2 billion. Of this amount, the Bank
The United States' share of dollar sales
of Japan has done
has been only about 15 percent of the total. But then, the drop in the
rate has perhaps been faster during the first week than we might have
thought, and we have not yet been severely tested in the U.S. market.
Over a longer time period, we might expect the U.S. share to be about
double that rate.
The dollar's fall against the German mark has put several other
European currencies under pressure within the EMS. Not only the French
but also the Italians and the Belgians have had to intervene to maintain
their place in the EMS. At the request of the Bundesbank and to support
the G-5 agreement, these operations by the others have almost entirely
entailed sales of dollars. As a result, almost all of the G-10
countries have been selling dollars during the past six business days.
Net dollar sales by the smaller countries of the G-10 have amounted to
another $3/4 billion or so of dollar sales.
Apart from our intervention, the only other operation I have to
report is that Argentina completed yesterday the repayment as scheduled
of its drawing on the swap agreement with the United States Treasury.
The repayment of $71 million followed a payment last August 15, and
extinguished the Treasury's facility. It was made using receipts the
same day of Argentina's drawing from the IMF under its new economic
stabilization program. Also completed yesterday through the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York were the repayments of outstanding credits to
Argentina from twelve foreign central banks, representing their part of
the $483 million cooperative bridging facility established on June 18,
1985.

-3-

Recommendations
Mr. Chairman, I recommend that the Committee should consider
increasing the Authorization's limit on foreign currency balances to be
held by the Federal Reserve System and also raise the informal limits on
individual currency holdings. It is, of course, not possible to predict
how large our intervention operations will be in the next several weeks
following the G-5 meeting. But as you know, the United States has
conveyed to the other G-5 authorities that we are prepared to intervene
in considerable size if necessary. Most of the central banks involved
anticipate the market, sooner or later, will seek to test our resolve.
Under the appropriate circumstances I imagine we would want to be
prepared for some heavy days of intervention. Assuming these operations
continue to be shared equally between the Federal Reserve and the
Treasury, we could easily reach our informal limits in the size of the
System's open position in individual currencies before your next meeting.
The most binding restraint at the moment is the informal limit on
the size of our yen balances--both because we have only about $200
million available and because we expect to be focusing a major part of
our operations in that currency. But also, we have only limited leeway
in marks, less than $500 million. It would be possible to raise the
informal limits on the System's open position without having the
Committee make a formal change in the Authorization. But I believe it
would be far better if an increase in the Authorization should become
needed in the next month or two, to do so now.
Accordingly, I recommend that the Authorization limit should be
increased from the present $8 billion to $10 billion. In the informal
limits, I recommend that the limit on the total be increased also to $10
billion; the limit for German marks to $6 billion; the limit for
Japanese yen to $3 billion; and the limit for all other currencies to $1
billion.

PETER D. STERNLIGHT
NOTES FOR FOMC MEETING
OCTOBER 1, 1985
The Domestic Desk began the last intermeeting period aiming for
the slightly greater measure of restraint that we had begun to seek
shortly before the August meeting.

Reserve paths were constructed using

adjustment and seasonal borrowing of $425 million, the midpoint of the
Committee's $350-500 million range.

About midway through the interval,

with money supply, especially M1, continuing to outdistance expectations
and with indications suggestive of somewhat stronger economic growth,
the Desk began to seek slightly more restraint, indexed by a path
borrowing level of $500 million.
The shift was not readily noticeable in the market, however,
where Federal funds trading continued to center around 7-7/8 percent.
Indeed, the funds rate has hovered largely in a 7-5/8 to 8 percent range
since midyear, when the path level of borrowing was $350 million.
the lack of more noticeable change?

Why

For one thing, the changes in

intended borrowing pressure were too modest to have really pronounced
effects.

Moreover, there was a range of other influences that affected

market participants' expectations of where funds "ought" to trade,
including the shifting mix of news on the economy and money growth, and
the G-5 statement on desired currency rate adjustments.

Finally, the

actual borrowing levels conformed only roughly to path levels, leaving
room for some differences in market interpretations of System
intentions.

In the view of most market observers, the Systems's

intended level of borrowing has been in the $400-500 million range for
the past few months and their associated expectation for Federal funds
trading has scarcely budged, perhaps barely edging up from a range
around 7-3/4 percent in July to about 7-7/8 most recently.

Our own

expectation would associate $500 million of borrowing with a funds rate
centering around 8 percent--and in fact funds have been around 8 in the
last couple of days, but this may be largely due to quarter-end

pressures and possibly some reserve position uncertainties related to
Hurricane Gloria.
Aside from the hurricane, which led to an early market closing
last Friday, the recent period also had some other special factors
tending to complicate day-to-day operations.

These included a burst of

borrowing over the long Labor Day weekend caused largely by a wire
transfer problem at a money center bank and an unusually low demand for
excess reserves on the part of nonmember institutions whose requirements
were being phased up under the Monetary Control Act.
As for actual borrowing, in the first full maintenance period
since the last meeting, it averaged about $720 million, reflecting a
bulge over Labor Day due to some technical problems.
period, it averaged a close-to-path $515 million.

In the second full

In the first few days

of the current period the average was about $950 million, reflecting a
hurricane related bulge last Friday and apparently some technical
problems yesterday, which was the quarter-end.
The System added about $3.6 billion to its outright bill
holdings over the period, including $2.1 billion bought in a market goaround in late August and $1.5 billion bought on various days from
foreign accounts.

Temporary reserves were added through five rounds of

System repurchase agreements and four of customer-related agreements.
Major reasons for the additions were increases in required reserves as
money supply grew and increases in Treasury balances at the Fed
particularly after the mid-September tax date.
Treasury balances, incidentally, are a point of particular
uncertainty in the days just ahead.

While mid-September tax receipts

filled the Treasury's coffers through month end, those balances are now
being paid down rapidly.

Without action to raise the debt ceiling, the

balances are expected to be just barely positive by Monday, October 7,
and could turn negative later that week.

One result of the Treasury's

running out of money is that the drop in their balance at the Fed will
release a large amount of reserves.

This is a relatively minor

consequence because the reserve impact probably can be handled fairly
readily through sales of securities, particularly temporary matched-sale

purchase transactions.

Of greater concern are the disruptions that

could come from actually exhausting their cash and having to shut off
payments.

Also of concern is the prospect of hitting the market hard to

raise large sums quickly once a larger ceiling is voted, as it must be.
With a variety of influences at work in the market, interest
rates showed small mixed changes over the period.

News on the economy

alternately suggested some pickup or absence of significant pickup from
the sluggish first-half pace.

Reaction to money growth information was

subdued, and tended to be filtered through assessments of the economy
and inflation prospects.

Debt limit constraints caused some technical

supply shortages that had a temporary depressing effect on yields
although at times the market also focussed on the prospective bunching
of new issues shortly after the limit is raised.

The G-5 announcement

of new efforts to coordinate policies among five leading industrial
nations, particularly to encourage higher relative values for nondollar
currencies, also had somewhat mixed effects.

Briefly, it tended to

depress rates on shorter maturities in the expectation that the
agreement reduced any likelihood for a near-term firming in U.S.
monetary policy.

At the same time, some observers saw the new approach

as increasing the likelihood of a stronger U.S. economy and some pickup
in inflationary pressures as imports become less competitive.
On balance, key bill rates showed modest mixed changes over the
interval.

Bills were auctioned yesterday at about 7.06 and 7.24 percent

for the 3- and 6-month issues, just slightly below the 7.14 and 7.28
percent rates just before the last meeting.

Net bill issuance declined

about $3 billion over the interval, chiefly reflecting a sizable paydown
on September 26 because of debt limit constraints.
For Treasury coupon issues, maturities out to about three
years were unchanged to down in yield by a few basis points, while most
longer issues were up about 5-10 basis points.

The volume of new cash

raised in the coupon sector was a relatively moderate $10 billion, again
reflecting cutbacks or postponements due to debt ceiling delays.
Notably, the Treasury delayed the usual end-of-quarter batch of coupon
issues that would be reaching the market just about now.

The other side

of this coin is the likely bunching of perhaps $50 billion of coupon
issues--more than half of it for new cash--in a few weeks from midOctober to early November.
In other markets, particular attention focussed on the Farm
Credit System issues, where additional adverse publicity in early
September caused spreads against Treasury issues to widen from about 2040 basis points in August to about 60-90 most recently.

For a time

after the adverse news reports, spreads were as wide as 100 basis points
or more.

There have been substantial shifts in ownership reported for

these issues, with some traditional buyers like small banks and state
and local government funds backing away.

At the same time, some foreign
On a

buyers, money funds and other large investors have taken more.

smaller scale, Federal Home Loan Bank securities also experienced some
widening in spreads following proposals that the Home Loan Banks use
part of their capital to bolster FSLIC's resources.
Finally, I should mention the particular impact of Hurricane
Gloria on Desk operations last Friday.

With dealers manned very

skimpily and generally distracted from normal trading concerns, the
dealer firms closed at 10 a.m. as regards conduct of business, but there
was still much to be done in financing positions and carrying through on
previous trading commitments.

This created an unusually large and

urgent demand to borrow securities to avert delivery failure.

In order

to alleviate potential disruptions, the Desk, following consultation
with the Chairman, relaxed its usual unwillingness to facilitate short
sales.

Our total lending of securities for the day was about $1.1

billion--roughly two or three times normal.

I believe this helped the

market to cope with the day's delivery problems.

J.L. Kichline
October 1, 1985

FOMC BRIEFING

Since the last meeting of the Committee, information
that has become available on the economy suggests activity has
picked up a little.

In reassessing the staff forecast, we

interpreted the information as consistent in the aggregate
with expansion of real GNP at a 3 percent annual rate in both
the third and fourth quarters of this year--about the same as
in the previous forecast.
One of the first signs of an improved tone to the
economy was provided by the labor report for August.

There

were good gains in payroll employment, including a rise in the
manufacturing sector following months of decline;

the

unemployment rate fell 0.3 percentage point to 7.0 percent.
Those data seem, however, to have been influenced by seasonal
adjustment difficulties, especially with the movement of youth
out of the labor force, and we could soon see a small uptick
in unemployment rates.

Our reading of developments in the

industrial sector also suggests some caution in judging
production trends.

Industrial output rose 0.3 percent in

August, with gains across a variety of areas, but production
for several earlier months was revised downward.
In the consumption area, spending was very strong in
August, and probably in September as well, given the surge

- 2 -

in auto sales.

There has been a terrific response to the

concessionary finance terms offered by domestic producers and
domestic car sales in late August through the first 20 days of
September have averaged around 12 million units annual rate.
But most of this we believe to be transitory--basically
selling 1985 models now rather than later--so that it will
influence mainly the mix of sales and inventories in the third
and fourth quarters.

Auto producers, in fact, are scheduling

little change in production in the fourth quarter compared
with the preceding quarter.

Outside of autos, spending on

consumer goods hasn't shown

any particular strength and we

anticipate moderate spending increases through 1986.

The

possibility of sustained sizable gains in consumer outlays is
limited by the already low saving rate and high debt burdens
along with prospective growth of real disposable income that
is not too exciting.
We have been counting on the housing market to perk
up in response to earlier declines in interest rates.

It

seems to be doing that, but not by a lot, and projected
housing starts have been reduced somewhat.

There are some

strong positive indicators in the market, such as home sales
and permits, but single-family starts have not demonstrated
the extent of response that we anticipated earlier.

It may

well be that the tightening of mortgage lending terms and

- 3 -

uncertainties about tax reform are larger negative influences
than thought.

Nevertheless, the current projection of

residential construction still provides support to GNP growth
through 1986.
For business fixed investment there is little new to
report.

Following two very strong years of expansion,

business fixed investment in real terms is expected to rise
only about 3 percent and the same in 1986.

Indicators of

future spending on the whole remain sluggish and with ample
capacity and moderate growth of final sales there do not
appear to be pressing reasons for many firms to undertake
aggressive expansion efforts.
The net export area currently is difficult to
interpret in light of major statistical problems, although it
does seem that there was no further deterioration in the trade
balance in the third quarter and maybe some improvement.
Looking ahead, the G-5 initiative induced us to change the
projected path of the foreign exchange value of the dollar.
For this forecast we have assumed the dollar value by year end
1986 will be 20 percent below its second quarter 1985 average,
a 5 percentage point lower value than incorporated in the
previous projection.

Much of the drop has already occurred,

and the somewhat larger and faster fall of the dollar leads to
stronger performance of exports, thereby boosting domestic
production.

- 4 -

The fall in the dollar also is expected to entail
higher import prices, cutting into import volume and adding to
domestic inflation.

As measured by the GNP deflator,

inflation next year is expected to come in at 4 percent, 1/2
percentage point above that anticipated this year.

The recent

data on prices and wages actually have been quite favorable
and in the absence of the dollar impact we might have been
inclined to chip a couple of tenths off of our previous
projection of inflation.

****

* * * ***

FOMC Briefing
SHAxilrod
9/30/85
Since the last meeting of the Committee, it has become clearer that
the FOMC's long-run target for M1 pertaining to the second half of this year
is in all likelihood not practically attainable.

Because of that we have

suggested a new paragraph in the directive for Committee consideration
which indicates that M1 growth above the long-run range would be appropriate
or, alternatively, acceptable.

Of course, the Committee may not feel the

need to express itself on the growth range at this point, or not through
a formal change in the directive.

But the economic issue of whether, or to

what extent, an effort should be made to bring M1 close to its range remains.
All of the short-run policy alternatives presented to the Committee would
leave M1 well above its

long-run range by year-end although I would not

discount the possibility of a much sharper slowing than we had projected
given the huge build-up in liquidity that has been already experienced.
From one perspective,
the nore natural is
demand pressures.

it

the longer the strong M1 growth continues,

to be troubled about its potential for excessive

There is good historical reason for this.

Over the

past 25 years, eleven periods can be identified of acceleration in M1
(using two-quarter moving averages) that lasted two quarters or more and
involved an acceleration of 2-1/2 percentage points or more (and most
were substantially more).

In all but two of those periods nominal GNP

also accelerated significantly with a one-quarter lag, and in all but
four with a two-quarter lag.

Thus, whatever the underlying economic

reason for the money to GNP relationship--and it

is possible that both

money and GNP are being affected by interest behavior but with the lag
between rates and money shorter than that between rates and GNP-the

relationship appears to be fairly consistent in direction, though it has
been less so in degree.

Incidentally, we tried the same test with M2.

Acceleration phases in that variable too showed a relationship with
accelerations in nominal GNP, but the correlation coefficient between M2
and GNP lagged one quarter was noticeably weaker than in the case of Ml.
While history provides cause for worry about the behavior of Ml,
one of the exceptional periods I noted appears to be in process.

To

attempt to understand the reason for exceptions, we searched for other
variables that might more or less consistently behave differently in
"exceptional" periods than they do in more normal periods.

Though not

entirely infallible in that respect, the behavior of the nontransactions
component of M2, and to a degree of M2 itself, was either not accelerating
much or actually decelerating in "exceptional" periods.

In the current

period the nontransactions component has decelerated in part reflecting
large shifts of funds out of the small time deposit component of M2 into
more liquid deposit assets, including the NOW account component of Ml.
Such shifts do not affect M2 of course, but in the current period they
have occurred when M2 is not accelerating in any event.
Of course, one cannot really be sure that past relationships
between M1 and GNP will not soon reassert themselves.

Perhaps the disparate

behavior of M1 and M2 and other associated unusual developments in the
current period, such as the still

apparently high level of real interest

rates, give some assurance that they will not over the near-term.
But another element that needs to be considered at the present
time is the exchange value of the dollar.

Its relatively high and rising

value over the past few years has, as the Committee knows, acted to
restrain price increases and also production and employment in a number

of sectors of the economy.

A drop in the dollar will tend to have reverse

effects, exerting upward pressures on prices and stimulating economic
activity.

If the drop occurs exogenously as a result of changing foreign

investor preferences and is not the result of endogenous changes in the
U.S. economy associated, for example, with a reduced budget deficit or
simple economic weakness, the pressures will have a much greater chance
of manifesting themselves in an actual acceleration of prices.

The

sharper the drop in the dollar, the greater would be near-term price
pressures.
A sharp drop well beyond what has already developed could occur
if

foreign investors lose confidence in the dollar at current interest

rate levels.

The decline in the dollar may be moderated if

at the same

time upward pressures on interest rates emerge, or were permitted to
emerge, so that it

remained attractive to continue net placement of money

here to finance the still

large current account deficit, which responds

to the exchange rate declines with a lag.

But if

interest rates do not go

up, and investors have at the same time lost their appetite for dollars,
the exchange rate may then tend to fall to well below the value needed in
the long run to restore current account balance, and the necessary capital
inflow will be provided by funds attracted to the U.S. on the speculation
that the dollar will rise in the future.

Thus, a large-scale shift away

from dollar assets promotes the potential for inflation through a rapid
exchange rate adjustment and also in my view promotes the potential for
recession, given the sensitivity of certain economic and financial sectors
at this point to significant interest rates increases.
I am not intending to say that the recent G-5 intervention
operation has itself driven the dollar to the point where the Committee's

problems are being unduly compounded.

Indeed, there are obvious advantages

to some decline in the dollar before the economy becomes excessively
unbalanced.

I am only pointing to the risk under present circumstances

that, given the probable underlying vulnerability of the dollar, a rather
large-scale dollar selling wave could be set off--something that has not
yet been evident.
Behavior of the dollar in exchange markets has already become
one of the key elements noted in the operating paragraph of the directive.
We have not suggested any additional directive language to reflect the
policy toward exchange markets stemming from the G-5 meeting partly because
the existing language seems general enough to cover whatever weight the
Committee may wish to place on exchange market developments over the
weeks ahead.

We have, however, suggested an alternative structure for

the operating paragraph--variant II--for consideration as better reflecting
the way the Committee has recently been implementing policy.

The language

places the aggregates and other economic and financial variables,

including

the exchange rate, more or less on the same footing in affecting intermeeting changes in bank reserve pressures.
To the extent that the Committee wants the aggregates to serve
as something of a cutting edge for policy, the proposed variant becomes
less relevant.

There is some argument at the present time for letting

the aggregates--at least as a group, if not M1 itself--serve in some
degree as the cutting edge.

That case, in my view, would revolve around

the potential for greater price pressures should the dollar decline
precipitately.

Such pressures would tend to make restraint on money more

necessary and also more understandable.

In the immediate market environ-

ment, where significant upward price pressures are not evident, changes

-5in the directive--whether in the operating paragraph or in relation to
the long-run targets--might also need to be assessed aginst the impact
they might have on market psychology and on the market's perception of
Federal Reserve intentions.

If the Committee were viewed,

for instance,

as having changed the directive because it had become more willing to let
money grow in order to accommodate to foreign exchange market developments,
that could in the end, depending on such circumstances as the actual
behavior of money and prices, fuel inflationary psychology and be generally
counterproductive to the Committee's basic policy posture.