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Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 3/17/2020
November 4, 1963
To:

FOMC Staff Economists

From:

Albert R.

Subject:

Reserve Guideline

Koch

At the last meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee,
Presidents Bryan and Hickman raised two issues about the required reserve
guideline computations presented every three weeks in the staff reserve
memorandum.

One issue concerned the advisability of shifting the base

period after each significant change in policy, thereby eliminating in
each instance the accumulated excess or deficit.

The second concerned

the advisability of continuing to use a 3 per cent annual growth rate in
the computations.
The fact that these questions were raised concerning the present
guideline computations suggests that a review of present guideline procedures is in order.

This review, in addition to concerning itself with the

issues raised by Presidents Bryan and Hickman, might well also include discussion of certain other issues concerning the present computations that
have been raised from time to time.

Among these are:

(1) the present

implicit relative weights given to demand and time deposits in the single
required reserve figure;

(2) the present procedure of subtracting from

reserves those required behind Government deposits in calculating the
guideline; and (3) the value of

any guideline at all for required re-

serves behind private deposits, or for that matter for any total reserve
concept.
In the case of all of these issues,
contain all advantages and no disadvantages.

there are no solutions that
The task is rather that of

Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 3/17/2020
-2choosing the particular guideline computations that are most likely to
illuminate and least likely to mislead one who is involved in making a
judgment as to the appropriateness or inappropriateness of current monetary policy.
The Base Period
The decision to adopt the present procedure of reverting to a
zero base period after each significant change in monetary policy was first
made at the time of the December 1961 policy change and has been followed
with respect to each of the subsequent four policy changes as well.

As is

shown in the following table, on four occasions the result was to cancel
out an overage and in one case, in June 1962, an underage was erased.

Annual rates of expansion 1/
Assumed

Policy period

Actual

(?er cent)

Mar. 1 - Nov. 29, 1961
Nov. 29, 1961 - June 13, 1962
June 13 - Dec. 19, 1962
Dec. 19,

1962 -

May 22,

May 22 - July 31, 1963
1/

1963

Excess (+) or
shortfall (-)
of
actual compared
with projected
required reserves
(Millions)

5
4
3

5.1
2.8
4.2

3

3.2

+39

3

4.3

+56

+53
-95
+129

Annual rates of expansion and differences from actual figures based on
revised seasonally adjusted deposits data. Projected rates allow for
expansion in demand and time deposits only; actual rates include in
addition changes in net interbank deposits.
Required reserves held
against time deposits computed at 5 per cent requirement ratio in the
first two periods between March 1, 1961, and June 13, 1962, and at 4
per cent thereafter, to reflect the change in requirements that
occurred at the end of October 1962.

This procedure was followed mainly because it was thought that
the usefulness of the guideline figure to policy formation would be

Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 3/17/2020
-3maximized if

the figures tried to show what effects current policy was
It

having on the current rate of reserve growth.
course,

for current policy

accomplished

is

also

appropriate, of

to take into account what has or has not been

as a result of past policies.

Obviously "updating" of the base period at some interval is desirable.

Carrying forward surpluses or deficits from remote past periods

would not only reduce the usefulness of the guideline, it might be actually
misleading with respect to the impact of current policy on reserve growth.
As I understand President Bryan's comment, he does not feel that the current procedure regarding the base period adequately handles the balancing
of past and current contributions to the reserve base.

1/

Growth Allowance
A growth allowance of some dimension has been included in the
staff reserve projections since early 1961.

At first, as the table shows,

the allowance was at an annual rate of 5 per cent, but it was cut to 4 per
cent at the end of 1961 and to 3 per cent in mid-1962.
These procedures have been used essentially for the following
reasons.

Some growth allowance was felt to be a desirable addition in pro-

jections in order to avoid overlooking the need, over time, to provide for
expanding monetary needs of a growing economy.

The actual amounts involved

for growth alone (ranging from $10 million to $15 million a week over the
past 2-1/2 years)

are insignificant in

relation to the large reserve fluc-

tuations experienced in any one or a few weeks.

But the steady accumula-

tion of the growth allowance over time gradually amounts to a sizable sum.

1/

A simple way of handling this problem, for the present at least, might
be to add a second guideline computation using a fixed base, say in
December 1961, approximately the time at which the current course of
gradually lessening ease began.

Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 3/17/2020
-4The percentage allowance first chosen was set in relation to
past and prospective growth patterns of monetary demand within the framework of expected trends in GNP and the flow-of-funds accounts.

Thereafter,

the usual operating rule, on each occasion when the Committee acted to
make monetary policy slightly less easy than it had been, was to reset the
projected growth rate below the actual rate that had developed under the
preceding policy.

This procedure was tempered when the result seemed un-

reasonable or out of keeping with the expressed wish of the Committee (as
it did on one occasion, in mid-1962).

Furthermore, the amount of the step-

down in rate from the preceding actual rate of growth to the projected one
was a matter of judgment, reached in the light of Committee expressions and
the apparent sustainability of past and expected patterns of business and
financial activity.

A particular case in point was the decision to con-

tinue to use a 3 per cent growth rate after the July 1963 FOMC action,
which itself followed an actual May-July annual growth rate of over 4 per
cent.
In this most recent case, it is also of relevance to note that
with actual required reserves behind time and savings deposits recently
increasing at a seasonally adjusted annual rate of a little over 16 per
cent, a 3 per cent increase in required reserves behind total private deposits provided no reserves for expansion of demand deposits.

If the 3

per cent figure were to be reduced to 2 per cent, and assuming continuation
of the current actual rate of growth of time deposits, a demand deposit
contraction at an annual rate of about 1-1/2 per cent would be implied.
Although it is true that some of the recent growth in time and savings deposits has no doubt reflected a shift out of relatively inactive demand

Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 3/17/2020
-5deposits which, in other interest rate contexts, might well have remained
as temporarily idle demand deposits, the staff did not consider it appropriate to use a guideline figure that implied actual demand deposit contraction.

1/

Time Deposits
What, if any, allowance in the guideline computation should be
made for required reserves behind time and savings deposits?

As mentioned

earlier, the present computations give an implicit weight to time deposits
of approximately one-fourth that given to demand deposits.

This is in a

sense an accidental weight, but if it had not seemed reasonable or if
there had been evidence to support an alternative, it would not have been
adopted.

The weighting depends mainly on the different reserve require-

ment percentages behind time and demand deposits but also to a lesser ex-

tent on the difference in the outstanding volume of time and demand deposits which currently is quite small.

Government Deposits
There is also the question as to the most meaningful procedure
for allowing for required reserves behind Government deposits.

The current

guideline includes reserves required to cover seasonal changes and growth
in private deposits plus reserves for whatever growth in Government deposits
occurs, or less any reserves that are released by Government deposit

1/

A simple way of partially handling this problem in the first chart
used in the staff memorandum would be to again add a "fan" of alternative growth lines,
At one time this fan embraced growth lines
of from -3 to +3 per cent.
With respect to the guideline statistic
embodied in Table 1 of the memorandum, the growth allowance (whether
3 per cent or any other figure) could be dropped, and only the
actual rate of change from the base period reported.

Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 3/17/2020
-6decreases.

The essential reason for adopting this procedure was to con-

form to a private money supply concept, which, in turn, is based on the
thought that private spending is affected by the size of cash balances
but Government spending is not.

In other words, under the present pro-

cedure Government fiscal, budget and debt management policies are treated
as exogenous factors.

This means that a decision, in effect, is made as

to whether any given change in private deposits, no matter what the
sources, is appropriate to the given economic and financial situation
both at home and abroad.
The present procedure has, however, caused problems on occasion
in the interpretation of deviations of actual required reserves from the
guideline projections in the short run, a short run which can run over
several weeks or even months.

Shortfalls and excesses from the present

reserve guidelines have at times been due mainly to shifts in deposits
between Government and private hands.

The question is whether such shifts

significantly affect private decision-making in the short run.

The answer

probably depends to a large extent on the particular source or disposition
of the change in Government deposits, the duration of the change, and on
the resulting effects on bank credit availability and interest rates.
Another argument for including reserves required behind Government deposits in any guideline is that these reserves are as much the base

for bank credit creation as reserves required behind private deposits.
This is true even though some of the Government deposits on occasion prove
to be quite temporary, as for example, around financing dates.

This argu-

ment appeals particularly to those who lay main emphasis on the bank credit

Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 3/17/2020
-7creation, as contrasted to the money creation, aspects of monetary policy.

Elimination of the Guideline
The issues raised by the necessary arbitrariness in deciding
upon the particular weights for reserves required against demand and time
deposits, as well as the difficulty of arriving at the most appropriate
treatment for reserves required behind Government deposits, raises the

more general question as to whether there should be any guideline at all
for reserves required behind total private deposits.
It can be argued that if trends in the total of demand and time
deposits cannot be considered independently of trends in each of the two
components considered separately, then there is no point in setting a
guideline for required reserves against total private deposits.

It can

also be argued that a guideline computation restricted to the reserve
creation aspects of policy can be misleading in that it does not adequately take into account the bank credit creation and interest rate aspects
of policy./

1/

An alternative for handling required reserves behind Government deposits might be to include an assumed volume of such reserves in

the guideline computations. In such a case, it might still be
appropriate to make special allowance for large temporary swings of
Government deposits and the reserves required to support them. Or,
alternatively, an allowance might be made in the guideline for required reserves behind private deposits for changes in such deposits
that are estimated to have been due to more than seasonal changes in
Government deposits

2/

One suggestion that has been made is that the guideline computation
include, in addition to a separate allowance for growth of demand
and time deposits, a third allowance for growth in total bank credit.
Offhand, the problem of reconciling what could be conflicting growth
objectives for the asset as well as the liability side of the balance
sheet of the banking system would seem to be a difficult one.

Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 3/17/2020
-8Concluding Comments
It should be stressed that whatever decision is made on these
issues regarding the construction, or for that matter the elimination, of
the guideline computations, such computations in and of themselves have
no necessary connection with the appropriateness or inappropriateness of
any particular monetary policy.

If it is felt that recent growth in re-

serves has been inappropriate, a change in policy is called for, not because of any observed relationship of actual reserve developments to any
given guideline, but rather because of a judgment concerning the course
of actual reserve developments relative to over-all economic and financial developments, including those in the balance of payments.

Perhaps

"reference line" is a more appropriate term than "guideline" for these
reserve computations and perhaps more than one reference line is called
for.
It would, of course, be most useful if there were available and
generally accepted one or even a few mutually consistent and specific
goals or targets by which to assess the appropriateness or inappropriateness of current monetary policy.

But, unfortunately, such is not the

case, and it is unlikely that it ever will be.

The reserve guideline,

no matter how constructed, is only one of a number of statistical indicators to be used in arriving at what in the end must still be essentially a matter of judgment concerning the appropriateness of current policy.
Nevertheless, if policy has to be determined in the context of the whole
economic situation, any guideline computations, too, should try to embrace
the whole rather than one or even a few of its parts.

ARK: jsc

FOR FILES
Albert R. Koch