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Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 1/14/2022

September 28, 2016
Monetary policy implementation frameworks and the payment system
Jeff Walker
1. Summary
One of the evaluation criteria for judging alternative long-run monetary policy
implementation frameworks is the effect on the nation’s payment system objectives,
notably efficiency and resiliency. We consider in this note how alternative frameworks
compare in this regard, assessing likely effects against the definitions of a safe and
efficient payment system described by the Board in its Payment System Risk (PSR)
policy. From a historical payments perspective, perhaps the most relevant high-level
design consideration in assessing the implications of a monetary policy implementation
framework for payment systems is the level of total reserve balances that would typically
be maintained by depository institutions (DIs). Higher levels of reserve balances, all other
things equal, can incentivize settlement earlier in the day. Earlier settlement not only
supports both the efficiency and resiliency objectives but also reduces the amount of
intraday credit needed for settlement, and hence the credit risk faced by the Federal
Reserve. That said, tools other than high reserve balances are available to support earlier
settlement as well as other aspects of a safe and efficient payment system.
In particular, the Federal Reserve has implemented a range of changes to its PSR policy
which provide additional tools that should enable it to meet its payment system objectives
across a wide range of frameworks, including those that would likely result in DIs
holding lesser amounts of reserves than they do currently. Should, for instance,
policymakers want to implement monetary policy with a significantly lower level of
reserves than in place today, the revised PSR policy (adopted in 2008 and implemented in
2011) incorporates provisions that limit credit risk to the Federal Reserve and support
earlier payment settlement than would have been the case previous to the adoption of the
PSR policy in its current form. Overall, payment policy issues are unlikely to be of first
order importance for the choice of a monetary policy framework in the coming period.

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2. Background
The Federal Reserve has a goal of facilitating a safe and efficient payment system, as first
defined in 1988 in its PSR policy. Safety is defined as 1) low direct credit risk to the
Federal Reserve and the private sector, 2) low systemic risk, and 3) rapid final payments.
Efficiency is defined as 1) low operating expense of making payments, 2) equitable
treatment of all service providers and users in the payment system, 3) effective tools for
implementing monetary policy, and 4) low transaction costs in the Treasury security
market.
The Federal Reserve has been particularly concerned when banks delay making payments
until the end of the processing day. Earlier payments result in a more efficient movement
of funds and further the smooth functioning and timely completion of settlements, which
are goals of the PSR policy.1 Earlier payments also reduce operational risk for DIs, as
they have more time to react to a payment not being received as expected, and for the
Federal Reserve.2
Payment delay can occur when banks lack liquidity. To understand why, note that DIs
routinely make numerous payments each day out of their Federal Reserve accounts,
which hold funds for reserve maintenance and payments processing purposes.3 In order
for the payment system to function smoothly, DIs need sufficient intraday liquidity to
process such payments. Fedwire, the Fed-operated and widely used wholesale payment
processing system, is a real-time gross settlement system and, thus, requires sufficient
immediate liquidity for a payment to settle. DIs have three sources of liquidity: the
reserve balances they currently hold in their Federal Reserve accounts, incoming
payments from other DIs which add reserves to the receiving DI’s Federal Reserve
account, and intraday credit from the Fed. Indeed, the Federal Reserve allows most
accountholders to temporarily hold a negative balance (“extension of intraday credit”) in
their Federal Reserve accounts during the day. Though it may expose the Federal Reserve
1

Federal Reserve Policy on Payment System Risk Part 2
The ability of the Federal Reserve to extend the Fedwire operating day mitigates against this risk.
3
The Evolution of the Federal Reserve’s Intraday Credit Policies, Stacy Coleman
2

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Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 1/14/2022

to credit risk, the provision of intraday credit is one way that the Federal Reserve can
promote a safe and efficient payment system across a range of operating regimes.
DIs are likely to use the least costly way to obtain the liquidity they need to support their
payments activity. Pre-crisis, in part because the Federal Reserve did not remunerate
reserves, banks aimed to hold as few reserves as they could in their Federal Reserve
accounts, while still satisfying their reserve requirements, and thus were more likely to
overdraft their accounts if they didn’t delay payments. For that reason, the provision of
intraday credit at a modest cost was an important policy tool to reduce DIs’ incentive to
delay settling their payments.
The Federal Reserve’s PSR policy incorporates a set of flexible tools, such as daylight
overdraft limits, collateralization incentives (which may conceivably in the future
become requirements), overdraft fees, and account controls, to govern intraday credit
extensions in a manner which both supports payment system liquidity and limits the
central bank’s credit risk exposure. In 2008, the Board changed its approach to explicitly
recognize the role of intraday credit as a tool to promote payments efficiency as opposed
to discouraging its use. The new policy is intended to support early settlements, even
when these require intraday credit, by charging no fee for collateralized daylight
overdrafts and offering a fee waiver for small, irregular overdrafts. This policy results in
minimal cost of daylight overdrafts to DIs because of the low opportunity cost of
collateral accepted against overdrafts.4 This, in turn, promotes the smooth functioning of
the payment system by encouraging rapid payments and also limits central bank credit
risk by encouraging collateralization.5 Because the changes were not implemented until
2011, when reserves were abundant, the effectiveness of the policy changes is not
directly observable.

A wide range of collateral is acceptable for daylight overdrafts. Any securities or loan collateral
acceptable for discount window purposes is also acceptable for overdrafts. The Federal Reserve’s
acceptance of bank loans, in particular, as collateral keeps the opportunity cost very low.
5
Federal Reserve Policy on Payment System Risk Part 2
4

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3. Impact of the Level of Reserve Balances on Payments Behavior
The level of reserves available to DIs has historically influenced both the timing of their
payments and the need to use intraday credit from the Federal Reserve. Empirical and
theoretical research has shown that when the amount of reserves is low, as was the case
pre-crisis, banks will delay payments if intraday credit is costly.6 Indeed, when the level
of reserves is low and daylight overdrafts have a cost, banks have an incentive to delay
non-urgent payments until they can settle these payments without incurring a daylight
overdraft. Some payments cannot be delayed, though, and banks will incur overdrafts to
settle them. Research has also shown that banks borrow from the central bank to a greater
extent when the amount of reserves is low.
With higher reserve levels, intraday credit is needed less and payments move earlier.
Indeed, the effects of higher reserve levels on payments outcomes have been observed in
the United States since the crisis. As reserve balances increased from $20 billion in 2007
to $2.8 trillion in 2014, there has been a trend to earlier payments and a reduction in
daylight overdrafts. As shown in Chart 1, average overdrafts fell from a peak of over
$200 billion to less than $10 billion. In a sense, the buffer of much higher levels of total
reserves replaced the buffer provided by daylight overdrafts, reducing the credit risk to
the Fed.7 Similarly, as shown in Chart 2, in 2015, 45 percent of funds transfer value was
sent by noon, a significant increase from the 17 percent sent in 2007.8 It is important to
note, however, that despite the abundant level of reserves, a substantial portion of
payments still occur in the afternoon, partly because not all payments are known until
later in the day; for example, DTC and CHIPS final settlement obligations are computed
in the late afternoon. So, while earlier settlement is generally desirable, no operating
framework can avoid late-day settlements completely. Finally, the magnitude of the

Settlement Liquidity and Monetary Policy Implementation – Lessons From the Financial Crisis, Bech,
Martin, and McAndrews
7
The extent of credit risk reduction may be small. Even in the pre-crisis era when overdrafts were more
prevalent and not explicitly collateralized, the credit risk to the Federal Reserve was mitigated by collateral
commonly pledged by banks for discount window purposes that may have been seized if needed to cover
overdrafts.
8
Excluding CHIPS and DTC payments
6

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Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 1/14/2022

benefits of lessened credit risk to the Federal Reserve and earlier funds transfers is
uncertain.
Research also provides evidence from foreign countries that operating regimes with
abundant reserves are beneficial for the payment system. The Reserve Bank of New
Zealand (RNBZ) is probably the most cited example. RNBZ switched to a floor system
for implementing monetary policy in 2006. It subsequently stopped providing intraday
credit and instead offered sufficient reserve balances based on institutions’ liquidity
needs.9 The abundant reserves regime freed up payments, enabling the system to function
more smoothly.
The data also suggest that there are diminishing marginal returns (“returns” defined here
as earlier-in-the-day aggregate timing of payments and lower overdrafts) of higher levels
of reserve balances. In Charts 1 and 2, one can observe the limited additional reduction in
daylight overdrafts and limited increase in the percent of payments sent before noon after
total reserves exceeds approximately $1.5 trillion, respectively. The effects from the
initial expansion in reserves, on the other hand, are much more noticeable.
4. Conclusion
Some observations related to payments may be noteworthy when considering changes to
the management of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. For example, the data suggest
that a gradual reduction in reserves would have only a modest effect on the level of
daylight overdrafts and timing of payments throughout the day. After the level of reserves
falls below a certain level (perhaps approximately $1.5 trillion), however, we might
expect to see a more meaningful increase in overdrafts. Undesirable effects such as
increased payment delays, however, should be mitigated by the recent PSR policy
changes if those changes work as intended.

This change was implemented to address the local scarcity of collateral that prevented access to intraday
credit and created payment gridlock in New Zealand’s RTGS system.

9

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Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 1/14/2022

Overall, payment system considerations are likely to be secondary ones. In general,
higher levels of reserves support more payment system efficiency, but the magnitude of
the benefit is uncertain, particularly under the current PSR policy.

3,000

250

2,500

200

2,000

150

1,500
100

1,000

50

500

Reserve Balances (left axis)

Jan-16

May-16

Sep-15

Jan-15

May-15

Sep-14

Jan-14

May-14

Sep-13

Jan-13

May-13

Sep-12

May-12

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Sep-10

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Jan-10

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Jan-09

May-09

Sep-08

Jan-08

May-08

Sep-07

Jan-07

May-07

-

Daylight Overdrafts ($ B)

Reserves Balances ($ B)

Chart 1: Daylight Overdrafts Compared to Reserve Balances ($ B)

Peak Daylight Overdrafts (right axis)

50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
Jan-07
May-07
Sep-07
Jan-08
May-08
Sep-08
Jan-09
May-09
Sep-09
Jan-10
May-10
Sep-10
Jan-11
May-11
Sep-11
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May-13
Sep-13
Jan-14
May-14
Sep-14
Jan-15
May-15
Sep-15
Jan-16
May-16

Reserve Balances ($ B)

3,000

Reserve Balances (left axis)

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% of Funds Sent by 12 p.m. (right axis)

% of Funds Sent by 12 p.m.

Chart 2: Payment Timing and Reserve Balances