View original document

The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.

Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 2/3/2021

BOARD OF GOVERNORS
OF THE

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20551

May 14,

1975

CONFIDENTIAL (FR)
CLASS

II

FOMC

TO:

Federal Open Market Committee

FROM:

Arthur L. Broida

Attached is a memorandum from the staff dated May 13, 1975,
and entitled "Foreign Account Repurchase Agreements Handled by the
Trading Desk."
This memorandum, which was prepared in response to a
recent question about Desk accommodation of foreign account RP's,
is being distributed for the information of the Committee.
desired, it could be listed for discussion on the agenda
future meeting of the Committee.

Attachment

If
for a

Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 2/3/2021

CONFIDENTIAL (FR)
CLASS II FOMC

DATE:

TO:

Federal Open Market Committee

FROM:

Staff¹

SUBJECT:

May 13, 1975
Foreign Account Repurchase
Agreements Handled by
the Trading Desk.

Since August 1974, the Federal Reserve Open Market Trading Desk
has been regularly arranging repurchase agreements (RPs) for foreign central
bank correspondents.

This facility was originally offered to the accounts

as a means of temporarily investing large acquisitions of dollars,
particularly by oil-producing countries, until longer-term placement of
the funds could be accomplished.

It was visualized that in the case of

large receipts of funds within a short period of time, in some cases by
countries not previously accustomed to handling large flows, there could
be times when Treasury bills or other securities desired by the foreign
accounts might not be available in sufficiently large supply.

Also, in some

cases, the foreign investor might need time to decide where it wanted to
place its funds.

In these circumstances, it was believed that RPs could

provide a temporary investment while awaiting the availability of
securities that the accounts would be willing to hold on a more permanent
basis, or awaiting the decision-making process by the foreign investors.
Another reason for offering a repurchase agreement facility was to provide
a reasonably attractive domestic alternative to temporary investments
in the Eurodollar market and thus enhance foreign official interest in

¹

This memorandum was prepared mainly by Mr. Cooper of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York. It has been reviewed by Messrs. Holmes,
Sternlight, and Axilrod, who concur in the analysis.

Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 2/3/2021

direct U.S. dollar investments.

This form of investment, it should

be noted, is a common one in the money markets employed by many market
participants at least since the 1950's.
Within a short period of time, the RP proved itself to be a
very useful instrument for the purposes outlined above.

A number of

accounts used them from time to time, rolling over maturing agreements
for a succession of several days, or occasionally making arrangements
that lasted up to a maturity as long as 15 days, while endeavoring to
determine and accomplish their longer-term investment programs.

Some

accounts used it at times when they could not commit funds more permanently
because of uncertainty as to the timing of prospective outpayments.

In

one particular case involving an oil producer, there was considerable
uncertainty as to the kind of longer-term investment program that would
best suit its needs.

That account leaned heavily on the RP for an

extended period of time, but has since cut back its use of the instrument
in response to our urging.

About 17 accounts have used the RP at one

time or another since it was made available.
Over the period of nine months through April 1975, RPs were
arranged by the Desk for foreign accounts on just about every business day
in amounts generally ranging from around $60 million to nearly $1.5 billion,
which was also the largest total outstanding on any day (April 16, 1975).
A considerable portion of the RPs were only overnight, so that the rolling
over of maturing agreements contributed significantly to the daily volume
of new contracts.

(A daily tabulation of foreign RPs and System trans-

actions in the market through RPs and matched sale-purchase agreements is
attached).

Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 2/3/2021

From the beginning, the foreign RPs were meshed with System
open market operations whenever it was considered appropriate in
achieving the reserve and/or money market objectives of the Desk.

Thus,

over the nine months (185 business days), RPs were arranged in the
market on behalf of foreign accounts on only 49 days when there
was no related System action either in the market or directly with
the foreign accounts.

On the remaining days, the Desk also took some

action to affect reserves.

These related transactions usually took the

following forms:
1.

On 33 days the Desk crossed the foreign RPs with the
System Account through System matched sale-purchase
transactions, while taking no related action in the
market to affect reserves. This provided the Desk with
a means of absorbing reserves unobtrusively when it was
either unnecessary or considered undesirable for some
reason to take overt action in the market. These operations had the same result as outright System sales to
foreign accounts except that the effect on reserves was
temporary, usually just overnight or over a weekend. On
another six days, the Desk only crossed part of the foreign
RPs with the System Account, thereby reducing the amount of
foreign RPs done in the market, when it appeared desirable
to do so from the System's standpoint.

2.

On 38 days, the Desk did matched sale-purchase transactions
with the foreign accounts and also arranged System matched
sale-purchase transactions in the market on its own behalf.
On those days, the Desk's absorption of reserves in the
market was reinforced by its transactions with the foreign
accounts. Alternatively, one might say that the size of the
market action required to achieve the Desk's reserve objectives
was reduced by the opportunity to absorb the foreign account
funds.

3.

On 15 occasions, the Desk undertook to arrange RPs in the
market for both foreign accounts and on behalf of the System
on the same day, thereby investing the foreign account
funds and responding to reserve needs in separate market
actions that were independent of each other. This course
of action proved to be rather complicated, however, because
of different ground rules applicable to the System and
foreign account repurchase agreements, mainly with respect

Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 2/3/2021

to the type of collateral that is acceptable, rights
of termination before maturity, and the method of
calculating margin and proceeds. It was considered
awkward and unnecessarily confusing to the market for
the System to approach dealers for RP propositions with
one set of ground rules for its own account and
different ground rules for its customer accounts.
4.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Desk undertook on 43 occasions to arrange matched sale-purchase
transactions with foreign accounts while on the same day
executing System RPs in the market in sufficient volume
to offset the impact of the matched agreements and
also inject the desired net amount of reserves into the
banking system. This was accomplished by simply
increasing the amount of System RPs in the market by the
amount of matched agreements arranged with foreign
accounts, so that the difference between the System's
RPs in the market and the matched transactions with the
foreign accounts provided the injection of reserves
deemed appropriate for that day.
On those occasions, described in paragraph 3 above, when the

Desk undertook both types of RPs in the market on the same day, it was
generally because the timing of foreign RP orders and Desk decisions to
provide System credit to the market did not permit the coordinated
approach described in paragraph 4.

Thus it sometimes happened that

foreign RPs were executed in the market at a time when it appeared that
no System action was called for; then late in that same day, a tightening
money market may have caused the Desk to arrange System RPs in order to
inject more reserves.

Alternatively, the Desk sometimes arranged

System RPs early in the day, before it was known that there would be
sizable foreign RPs requested; when the foreign requests were received,
it was considered preferable to execute them in the market rather than
cause the reserve absorption that would result from arranging matched
transactions with the System.

Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 2/3/2021

In providing the RP facility to the foreign accounts, the
Desk and related functions of the Reserve Bank anticipated that there
would be an increase in the volume of transactions that had to be
handled.

However, some part of the increase would presumably have

occurred anyway, since part of the foreign-held dollars would undoubtedly
have been invested through the Desk (in Treasury bills or bankers'
acceptances), even if the RPs had not been made available.

So far,

the Desk has been able to handle the increased business with few
problems although some strains were apparent during relatively short
periods of peak activity in November and February.

Meanwhile, this

Bank has urged at least one foreign account to place its funds on
a more permanent basis.

Market forces have also worked in this direc-

tion to some extent by narrowing the spread between RP rates and those
on Treasury bills and other short-term money market instruments.
There are certain advantages to the System in arranging shortterm RPs for the foreign accounts.

It enables the System to keep track

of large and volatile flows of funds that would be unknown or obscure
at best if they were channeled by the foreign accounts through outside
agents.

More importantly, the Desk has the opportunity to coordinate

the foreign flows of funds and its own operations with a view to achieving
monetary policy objectives within the context of maximum efficiency in
the money market.
When a foreign RP is made directly in the market, dealers
are informed that the transaction is for customer account.

While the

market is not informed about each occasion when the Desk undertakes

Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 2/3/2021

matched agreements with foreign accounts, market participants are well
aware that this is always a possibility--just as they realize that the
Desk may be arranging outright purchases or sales of securities with
foreign accounts.

Consideration has been given to informing the

dealers, when relevant, that a particular amount of the System RPs
with the market are being undertaken merely to offset System matched
agreements with foreign accounts, but this has not been done up to this
point, as there did not appear to be sufficient reason to identify for
the dealers one particular factor absorbing reserves--since the System's
decision to make RPs could just as well reflect a variety of factors
such as a temporary build-up in Treasury balances.
As noted, the market is aware that the System always has the
option of making RP-type transactions directly with foreign account.
Thus, if the foreign RP is made in the market (either directly or
indirectly), there is some possibility that dealers will attempt to
interpret the transaction as another clue to the lower bound on the Federal
funds rate (since instead of making foreign RPs in the market, the Desk
could have absorbed reserves by making a matched sale-purchase transaction with the foreign account).

Such market reactions have not,

however, unduly complicated monetary policy operations, and in any event
are no different from possible market reactions to outright U.S.
Government security transactions with foreign account.
A possible disadvantage to the Desk in handling the foreign
account RPs could occur at times when there is a general shortage of
collateral such as existed at times in 1973 and 1974.

Under those

Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 2/3/2021

conditions, the placement of large amounts of foreign account funds in
RPs could immobilize collateral that might otherwise be available to
the Desk for purposes of making RPs for the System and thus inhibit the
Desk in its efforts to achieve reserve and money market objectives.
Upon examination, however, it seems likely that in the absence of
opportunities to do RPs, the foreign account funds would be invested
more permanently on an outright basis, thereby immobilizing potential
collateral for even longer periods of time.

Moreover, given the pro-

spective deficits and huge borrowing needs of the Treasury over the
next couple of years, it is unlikely, at least in the near term, that
there will be any shortage of securities eligible to serve as collateral
for either System or foreign account RPs.
There are certain risks, however, in an excessively large
volume of foreign RP funds.

For one, an undue amount of the time and

resources of the Trading Desk staff could be absorbed in managing these
transactions.

For another, these funds can be highly volatile, and

there could be short-run disturbances in the financing of the dealer
market should foreign sources become large lenders to dealers and the
market thereby become dependent on these sources.

Foreign central banks

do not, in the nature of the case, have the longer-run interest in stable
relationships with the dealer market that many U.S. commercial banks
and corporations have; and they may be more likely to withdraw funds
without regard to the needs of the domestic money market and irrespective
of interest earnings.

Thus, the staff believes that efforts should

continue to be made by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to encourage

Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 2/3/2021

foreign central banks to invest dollar holdings on a more permanent,
longer-run basis rather than through the RP route.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The opportunity to invest short-term dollar holdings in RPs was
offered to foreign accounts in 1974 for specific purposes and was quickly
recognized as a useful medium for temporary placement of funds at times
when longer-term commitments could not be undertaken for one reason
or another.

Despite the increased burden of handling the transactions,

the Desk and related areas of the Bank have not encountered any great
administrative problems.

Neither has the use of the facility interfered

noticeably with the achievement of the System's reserve or money market
objectives.

Advantages to the foreign accounts are greater flexibility

in handling their short-term dollar holdings and the ability to avoid the
risk of price fluctuations while working on longer-range investment
programs.

Advantages to the System are the ability to keep track of

huge flows of funds passing through the money market more accurately
and the opportunity to offset or mitigage their effect on the money
market when it suits the Desk to do so.

From the standpoint of general

market stability, the investment of the funds in RPs is probably less
unsettling than outright purchases of securities and subsequent sales
would be.
One potential disadvantage to the System, that of competition
for available collateral, is more apparent than real, given the prospective
supply conditions over the next several years.

If shortages of collateral

again develop, the Desk would, of course, have to reassess the priorities
of the System and the foreign accounts.

If foreign RPs were to become

Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 2/3/2021

very large, other disadvantages would include undue absorption of Trading
Desk resources and the potentiality of excessive dependence of the dealer
market on volatile foreign sources of funds.
It appears, on balance, that foreign account RPs, in the
magnitude handled so far, have posed no real problems for the Trading
Desk and the market, and that the advantages of continuing relationships
with foreign accounts and knowledge of foreign flows have outweighed the
thus far minor disadvantages of RP transactions.

However, in order to

guard against excessive foreign activity in the RP market and undue complications in monetary policy operations, the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York is continuing to encourage foreign accounts to employ their dollar
holdings on a more permanent basis.

Should there be increased demand for

RP investments by foreign account, the Bank would be prepared to intensify
its efforts in this direction in order to keep such activity to manageable
levels.

Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 2/3/2021

System Open Market Account Matched Sale-Purchase Transactions
and Foreign Accounts Repurchase Agreements
(In thousands of dollars)

Commit.
Date
-1974Aug. 5

Foreign Account RPs
In
With
Market
System

7

12
13

401,400
100,200
100,100

670,000

300,100

20
21
22

85,000
100,000
100,000
104,375
400,100

23

64,400

26

60,000

510,200
1,075,460
60,175

1,670,000

28

60,145

2,866,000

361,600
100,405
2,095,325

6,966,000

29
30

Sept.3
4

5
6
9
10
11
12

1,213,975

100,000
120,000

400,000
25,000

13
16
17
19
20
23
24

25
26
27
30

100,440
100,465
100,445
100,410
75,235

3,270,590

1,705,630
1,270,000

100,200
266,665
320,925
610,475

1,326,700

805,882
472,295
615,685

18

Tot.

489,380
450,450
745,100

27

Aug.

RPs for FRBNY

1,760,000
361,400
99,900

8
9

Tot.

Matched

the Market

450,000

6

14
15
16
19

System Transactions in

1,990,000
1,710,500

467,630
427,797
1,072,695

165,000

213,885

612,500

358,000

605,900

225,730
419,831

Sept. 3,289,140

3,837,320

5,583,000

4,710,925

Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 2/3/2021
con't

Foreign Accounts RPs
In
With
Market
System

Commit.
Date

-1974Oct. 1

System Transactions in the Mark
Matched

281,625

893,900

148,640
435,000
149,480
68,165
122,270
148,535
63,215
117,390

RPs for FRBN

417,550
832,600
3,200,000
2,046,000

1,020,000
580,000

4,000

2,196,400
1,557,500

625,335

280,000
233,795
280,720
70,060

1,200,000
819,000

105,000
25

28
29
30
31
Tot. Oct.
Nov.

58,000

187,000

58,000

918,000

2,324,245

10,250,000

1,507,640

1

197,665

4

250,335
202,070
222,800
388,495
314,505

7
8
12

13
14

67,000

255,220

6,799,650

885,300
1,339,700

1,455,000

327,700

214,545

15

18
19

1,145,555
1,095,365

20
21
22

1,106,500
1,005,800

762,600
783,300

1,103,980

25
26
27

29
Nov.

901,700

232,000

6

Tot.

105,435
58,220

4,680,920

833,060
208,460
209,270
325,055
4,725,460

700,000

2,155,000

2,113,800
1,194,555
1,572,100
1,237,650
9,889,005

Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 2/3/2021

Commit.
Date
-1974Dec.

2
3
4
5
6
9
10
11
12
13
16
17
18
19
20
23

26
27
30
31
Total Dec.

-1975Jan. 2
3
6
7
8
9
10
13
14
15
16
17
20
21
22
23
24
27
28
29
30
31
Total Jan.

Foreign Account RPs
In
With
Market
System

200,000

224,055
188,12.0
451,885
312,910

System Transactions in the Market
Matched

RPs for FRBNY

1,521,200
3,107,000

312,000
325,500
127,210
127,240

2,327,020

1,054,510
409,870

1,418,400

85,900
387,900
409,400
411,350

1,399,900

881,580
1,577,950
2,777,800

441,735

325,255

2,132,050

323,850
215,445
118,275
287,208
4,607,568

843,380
2,191,900
1,100,580

1,140,250
4,247,250

182,100

16,039,710

1,764,380
468,800

74,785

168,500
84,150
87,420
64,575

925,000
2,116,000
1,155,000

130,300
193,500

454,250
205,870
130,700
630,855

272,015

683,000

631,590
60,595
348,575
348,705

2,416,050
1,836,815

530,155
333,540
346,490

2,256,005
894,700

343,500
331,000

357,000
1,795,815

297,690
4,357,795

4,879,000

1,057,400
11,148,400

Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 2/3/2021
-4Foreign Account RPs

System Transactions in

Commit.
Date

In
Market

With
System

Matched

Feb.

204,800
192,095
195,425
198,335
222,190

1,232,000
1,265,000
680,000

3

4
5
6
7
10
11
13
14
18
19
20
21
24
25
26
27
28
Total Feb.
Mar. 3
4
5
6
7
10
11
12
13
14
17
18
19
20
21

24
25
26
27
31
Total Mar.

the Market

RPs for FRBNY

1,123,400

218,500

1,083,960

2,413,250
798,555
1,372,250

558,060

1,945,200

484,820

2,764,800

224,835
242,500
1,276,875
717,500
708,400
499,900
490,700
517,640
4,876,815

830,145
3,989,865

3,177 000

2,264,400
12,681,855
2,286,300

856,180
840,800
219,795
441,580
272,670
262,580
163,870
142,140
234,930

235,310
238,510
239,665

239,560

1,480,000

1,565,000
1,500,000
2,815,000
1,445,000
1,125,000
514,000
790,000
478,000

141,400
160,400
180,760

2,727,500
2,727,500

345,590
147,765

869,350

361,500
229,800
298,700
2,032,600

4,220,905

11,712,000

5,883,150

Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 2/3/2021

Commit.
Date

Foreign Account RPs
In
Market
SOMA

Apr.

234,700

1
2
3
4
7M
8
9
10
11
14M
15
16
17
18
21
22
23
24
25
28M
29
30
Total Apr.

May

1
2
5
6

266,915
226,875
92,370
157,300

Matched

RPs for FRBNY

2,140,000
-

182,035
517,895
1,396,745
132,310
398,000
1,345,300

SOMA Transactions in the Market

675,000
1,315,000
1,270,000

-

1,459,125
958,790

2,825,800
1,766,100

505,050
271,950
258,500
334,135

1,305,000

213,105

2,442,575
1,688,800
1,587,660
14,861,285

537,300

884,300
2,361,050

317,500
181,200
3,171,300

159,270
6,975,070

108,095
105,190

5,400,000

2,018,900
1,002,100

102,700
97,630
179,975
123,500

709,500
1,984,060