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Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 2/3/2021

BOARD OF GOVERNORS
OF THE

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
20551
WASHINGTON,D.C.

March 14,

1975

CONFIDENTIAL (FR)
CLASS II FOMC

TO:

Federal Open Market Committee

FROM:

Arthur L.

Broida

Attached for your information is a copy of a report by
Mr. Solomon on recent meetings of Working Party 3 and the Economic
Policy Committee of OECD.

Attachment

Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 2/3/2021

Robert Solomon
March 13, 1975

Report on Meetings of OECD's Working Party 3 and
Economic Policy Committee, March 5-7, 1975

The WP-3 discussions focussed on a) the overall current account deficits of the OECD area with the rest of the world, b) the
distribution of these deficits among member countries and c) the position of the U.S. dollar in foreign exchange markets.
a)

There was general agreement that the OECD area's current

account deficit realized in 1974 and projected for 1975 was considerably
less than earlier estimated.

The 1974 deficit was put at about $34

billion and the 1975 deficit at $28 billion.

Most of the improvement

was related to the general cyclical weakness, which had a depressing
effect on both volumes and prices of imports from non-member countries,
including oil imports.
rapidly.

Exports to OPEC countries have been increasing

The better OECD position for 1975 was likely to be reflected

in balance of payments difficulties for non-oil developing countries.
b)

The distribution of the projected deficits among OECD

countries implied only little progress, if any, towards a diminution of
the large imbalances that currently exist.
for Italy and Denmark.

Some improvement was seen

But improvement was also projected for countries

whose external positions were already relatively favorable, e.g.,
Netherlands, Belgium, and Japan.

The OECD Secretariat also foresaw a

further increase in the surplus position of Germany (to a current account surplus of $12 billion) but the German representative argued

Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 2/3/2021

-2strongly that a small reduction in the surplus was more likely (and
the Federal Reserve staff is inclined to agree with this judgment).
The United States is likely to have a current account deficit of $5
to $7 billion, a not excessive share of the total OECD deficit.

On

the whole, financing of the prospective deficits in 1975 was viewed
with equanimity, except for some doubts regarding the U.K. and the
Danish positions.
c)

During the discussion of the foreign exchange position

of the U.S. dollar, the Swiss representative outlined the severe difficulties that the Swiss export and tourist industries were confronting
at the present exchange rate, though he failed to note that some of
these difficulties may be a reflection of world recession rather than
of an overvalued exchange rate.

The U.S. representatives reviewed

recent developments and, according to Chairman Emminger's sum-up, "reassured" other members of the working party that the U.S. attitude
was not one of benign neglect.

U.S. monetary policy was not criticized

for being insufficiently stimulative.

Instead two or three representa-

tives expressed a concern that U.S. short-term rates ought to be regarded as an instrument of foreign exchange management.

But others

stressed that recent exchange rate movements have a number of causes,
only one of which is interest rate differentials.

Finally, there was

widespread agreement with the proposition that this is not the time
to return to exchange rate targets or zones.
******

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-3-

The discussions in the EPC focussed largely on the economic
position and policy stance of the United States, Germany and Japan.

In

all three of these countries activity had declined rather more than
expected, price performance had been better than expected, and the
external position was relatively strong.
Alan Greenspan presented a relatively favorable picture of
the prospects for an upturn in the U.S. economy and expressed his wellknown concerns about future financial strains.
the table were mixed:

The reactions around

some doubts were expressed about the timing and

sustainability of the U.S. upturn and about Greenspan's concern over
the future effects of financing deficits.

The German delegate observed

that the present uncertainty as to the timing and extent of U.S. policy
was unsettling.
The discussion of Germany acknowledged that the Government
had adopted significant fiscal action--involving a fiscal stimulus
estimated to be about 2-1/2 percent of GNP--as well as an easier monetary
policy.

While foreign orders for German products had fallen, domestic

orders may have turned up again.

Germany has less of an inventory over-

hang than other countries and the major question was not whether activity
would turn up but whether the domestic expansion would be sufficiently
strong and sustained to restore prosperity in Germany and permit some
of its trade partners to improve their balance of payments positions.

Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 2/3/2021

Economic activity in Japan has fallen sharply--industrial
production has dropped more than in any other major country--and the
rate of price advance has moderated strikingly.

The Government has

adopted a number of selective and unannounced measures of a stimulative nature but its general stance is to hold off on major policy
actions until the spring wage negotiations (beginning mid-April) are
completed.

The Japanese representatives stressed the persistence of

inflation expections, despite the recent price performance.

They

also believe that Japan's future growth potential will be less than
in the past, perhaps 5-7 percent instead of 10 percent.
The meeting was summed up by its chairman with the statement that there was a diversity around the table in the degree of
concern over the economic prospects and policies of the three major
countries, but that most representatives tended to give present
policies the benefit of the doubt without being fully convinced.