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Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 2/3/2021

BOARD OF GOVERNORS
OF THE

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
WASHINGTON,
D.C.
20551

March 11, 1975

CONFIDENTIAL (FR)
CLASS II - FOMC

TO:

Federal Open Market Committee

FROM:

Arthur L. Broida

Attached is a copy of a memorandum from the System
Account Manager, dated March 7, 1975, and entitled "Recommendations
on System Lending of Securities."

A related memorandum from the

Committee's General Counsel is expected to be available for distribution soon.
It is contemplated that these memoranda will be discussed

by the Committee at its meeting on March 18, 1975.

Attachment

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March 7, 1975

CONFIDENTIAL (FR)
CLASS II - FOMC

Recommendations on

TO:

Federal Open Market Committee

SUBJECT:

FROM:

Alan R. Holmes

System Lending of Securities

Attached is a statistical report on the lending to dealers
of securities held in the System Open Market Account since the last
annual meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee in March 1974.
The report indicates another sharp rise in the number of these loans
although the average daily amount outstanding has not risen commmensurately, due to the smaller size of individual loans and to the daily
balance between new loans and the return of securities previously
loaned.

The intensive use of this dependable source of borrowed secu-

rities has enabled dealers to keep delivery failures at a tolerable
level and thus to continue servicing market participants, including
the accounts handled by the Federal Reserve Trading Desk.

On the

basis of this report, I have concluded that the lending of securities
remains reasonably necessary for the effective conduct of System
open market operations and

I recommend that the Federal Open Market

Committee extend the lending authorization for another year.
I also recommend that the guidelines for the lending

of

securities be revised to provide for an increase from 3/4 per cent
to 1-1/2 per cent per annum in the daily rate charged dealers on the
face amount of securities borrowed.

The higher charge would appear

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to be more equitable in the light of the consistently heavy use of
this facility by the dealers and the increased expense incurred by
the Reserve Bank in handling the transactions due to higher operating
costs.

The over-all operation continues to be profitable despite the

increase in costs, which are estimated to be about 15 per cent of
earnings.

Earnings for the New York Bank in 1974 amounted to $1,054,433,

compared with $774,863 in 1973, an increase of 36 per cent.

More

importantly, the higher charge might encourage the dealers to search
more actively for other sources of lendable securities before coming
to the System, which was intended by the Committee to be a lender of
last resort.

The original charge of 3/4 of one per cent, compared

with the 1/2 of one per cent charge by other lenders, was initially
expected to provide a sufficient penalty to discourage recourse to the
System until other sources of lendable securities had been exhausted.
However, given the effects of inflation psychology on all cost considerations and the expense and time required to search for other
lenders (when the System has an available supply of practically every
issue of Government securities), the 1/4 per cent penalty has apparently
become less effective than when it was first imposed.

A spread of

1 per cent over the charge of other lenders, instead of only 25 basis
points, should provide somewhat more incentive to the dealers to seek
other potential lenders first, without imposing an excessive fee for
the accommodation provided.

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If the Committee agrees to this increase in the lending
charge, paragraph 5 of the Terms and Conditions for Lending Securities from System Open Market Account should be amended as follows:
5.

The borrower will be charged interest on the principal
amount (par value) of the securities borrowed at the
following per annum rates:
Initial charge for five-day loan

1-1/2 per cent

First renewal of one day

3

Second renewal of one day

4-1/2 per cent

Subsequent renewals

6

per cent

per cent

The Federal Reserve will have the option of waiving or
reducing penalty rates if the circumstances appear to
warrant it.
I also propose to make a procedural change in the lending
operations of the Desk.

The guidelines require that the borrower be

required "to pledge collateral consisting of United States Government
securities of greater current market value than the securities borrowed..."

In practice, the loaned securities are not released to the

dealers until the collateral securities have been received by the
Reserve Bank.

The collateral securities are usually not delivered by

the dealers' clearing banks until late in the day.

This results in a

corresponding delay in the receipt of the loaned securities by the

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dealers.

As a result, the loaned securities are sometimes received

too late to be redelivered before deadlines are reached and cannot be
used by the dealers to avoid the delivery failures for which they were
borrowed.
Such problems have reportedly been occurring more frequently
since March 1974, when the automated securities clearing arrangement
operated by the New York Reserve Bank was placed on a "real time" basis.
This prevents any of the participating banks from sending any security
from a book-entry account unless, or until, there is a sufficient amount
of that issue already held to that bank's credit in the Sigma-5 computer.
Before the

"real time" restraint was adopted, the clearing banks had

been able to wire out securities for a dealer as soon as the Desk
agreed to lend them, since commitments of the Desk were regarded as a
"guaranteed delivery."

Collateral was delivered later in the day and

the loaned securities were then released to the dealer by the Reserve
Bank, usually by crediting the clearing bank's account in Sigma-5.
This practice of anticipating securities loaned by the Desk is no
longer possible under "real time" management of the computer.
It has been proposed that the delay in the receipt of loaned
securities by the dealers could be eliminated if the System would lend
them against "cash" early in the day, and return the cash later when
the collateral

in the prescribed form is delivered to the Reserve Bank.

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This would enable the dealers to obtain borrowed securities immediately
and to derive the maximum benefit from the borrowing.

The later

delivery of the security collateral would still fulfill the requirements of the Committee's guidelines for System lending of securities.
In order to expedite the operation of the securities clearing arrangement and to assure that all loans of securities by the
dealers accomplish the purpose of the Committee in enabling the dealers
to avoid delivery failures, the Manager proposes to adopt the procedure
of temporarily holding cash against the securities loaned during the day,
returning the cash when the securities collateral is received.
is no objection from the Committee, the new procedure will

If there

become

effective as soon as operating details can be worked out among the
Reserve Bank, the dealers, and the clearing banks.
Briefly, the procedure will be as follows:
1.

The Desk will agree to lend a dealer a specified amount of a
particular security against other specified issues of Government securities having a greater market value than the loaned
securities.

2.

As soon as the loan is processed, the loaned securities will
be delivered or credited to the dealer's clearing bank against
a charge to that bank's reserve account amounting to twice the
par value of the loaned securities.

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3.

Later in the day, upon receipt of the specified collateral
securities, the charge to the clearing bank's reserve
account will be reversed.
It should benoted that occasionally a dealer, for reasons

beyond his control, might fail to deliver the security collateral
before the usual delivery deadline set by the Reserve Bank.

In such

a case, the double charge to the member bank's account will remain in
effect overnight, thereby penalizing the bank and, ultimately, the
dealer for the failure.

Given the usual cost of Federal funds, this

penalty should provide a strong

incentive for the dealers to avoid any

such failure to deliver the collateral.

In the event of such a

failure, the loaned securities would be collateralized overnight
by twice the amount of cash rather than by securities collateral
with a much smaller excess of value over the loaned securities,
thereby affording more than adequate protection to the System.

Col-

lateral securities would, of course, be obtained the next day unless
the loaned securities were returned.

It is not expected that such

a failure to make timely delivery of security collateral would occur
with any frequency.

If it did, an offending dealer might be penalized

further by the suspension of his borrowing privileges for a period
of time.

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-7-

The failure of a dealer to deliver securities in a timely
fashion and the debit to a bank's reserve account would result in
an unintended absorption of reserves.

The amount, however, should

be infinitesimal when compared with our typical daily miss in the
projections.

In the unlikely event that this becomes a problem,

I would be prepared to recommend abandonment of the procedure.

Attachment

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STATISTICS ON FEDERAL RESERVE
LENDING OF SECURITIES
(dollars in millions)

March 1973
through
February 1974
Number of Loans
Total Amount

March 1974
through
February 1975

7,516

11,107

$14,319

$19,378

Percentage
Change

+48%
+35

Daily Averages

+50%

30

45

$57.7

$77.8

+35

Balance Outstanding

$117.1

$150.5

+29

Size of Each Loan

$ 1.9

$

-11

Number of Loans
Amount

1.7

Dealer Fail Statistics
Percentage
Change

1973

1974

Daily Average Fails to Receive

$346

$293

-15%

Daily Average Fails to Deliver

$293

$220

-25

March 7,

1975