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Prefatory Note
The attached document represents the most complete and accurate version available
based on original files from the FOMC Secretariat at the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.
Please note that some material may have been redacted from this document if that
material was received on a confidential basis. Redacted material is indicated by
occasional gaps in the text or by gray boxes around non-text content. All redacted
passages are exempt from disclosure under applicable provisions of the Freedom of
Information Act.

Content last modified 01/10/2020.

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Report to the FOMC
on Economic Conditions
and Monetary Policy

Book A
Economic and Financial Conditions:
Current Situation and Outlook
March 12, 2014

Prepared for the Federal Open Market Committee
by the staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Authorized for Public Release

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Domestic Economic Developments and Outlook
The incoming data on spending and production have been to the soft side of our
expectations. Real GDP now appears to have risen considerably less in the fourth quarter
than seemed to have been the case at the time of the January Tealbook, and the available
readings on consumer spending, residential construction, and business investment point
to less spending growth this quarter than in our previous projection. In addition, factory
output has surprised us to the downside in recent months. We think that unusually severe
winter weather can account for part of the unanticipated weakness, but not the bulk of it.
We have let most of the downside surprise show through to the level of real GDP, but in
the face of real-time indicators that we perceive to be unusually noisy, we have not taken
much signal for the growth of demand going forward. Later this year—once weatherrelated fluctuations are expected to have washed out of the data—our updated forecast
has the level of real GDP ½ percent below where we had it in the January Tealbook.
The information from the January and February labor reports was mixed but
generally suggests that the labor market has been improving at a pace similar to what we
anticipated in the January Tealbook. Although payroll gains were lower, on average,
than we had written down in the previous Tealbook, we took only a little signal from
these data because inclement weather appears to have held down payroll growth
noticeably in February and we expect a rebound in March. Meanwhile, the
unemployment rate in both January and February was lower than we had projected.
In light of the combination of yet another downward surprise in the
unemployment rate and weaker-than-expected news on GDP growth, we made a further
adjustment to our supply-side assumptions, reducing the assumed pace of potential output
growth in recent years and carrying forward some of this slower growth into the forecast
period. We lowered potential output growth a little further in 2015 and 2016 to reflect
our revised (but still tentative) estimate of the labor supply implications of the Affordable
Care Act.
Our medium-term forecast for GDP growth is slightly weaker than in the January
Tealbook, reflecting a higher path for the foreign exchange value of the dollar and the
downward adjustments we made to our estimates of potential output growth. That said,
the basic contour of the projection is very similar to our previous forecast: We continue

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Revisions to the Staff Projection since the Previous SEP
The FOMC last published its Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) following
the December 2013 FOMC meeting. The table below summarizes revisions to the
staff economic projection since the December Tealbook.

Real GDP in the second half of last year is now estimated to have been greater
than the staff expected inthe December Tealbook, while our current forecast for
real GDP growth in 2014 through 2016 is a little below our December projection.
In the background (that is, not visible among the SEP variables), we have
trimmed our assumed rate of growth of potential GDP. The unemployment rate
has declined more than we expected in December; it is now on track to average
6.6 percent inthe first quarter of this year, versus our forecast of 6.9 percent in
the December Tealbook. We continue to project that the unemployment rate
will be around 5% percent at the end of 2016.

The staff projection for both overallandcorePCE inflation is little changed from
our December projection. We continueto project that both core andheadline
inflation will edge gradually higher over the medium term.
The unemployment rate is projected to fall belowtheCommittee's 6.5percent
threshold inthe middle of this year, but we assume thatthe federalfunds rate
will notlift off from its effective lowerbounduntil the second quarter of 2015,
the same as inthe December Tealbook. The trajectory of the federalfunds rate
after liftoffis somewhatsteeperthan in our December projection.
Staff Economic Projections Compared with the December Tealbook
2014

Variable

2013
Hl

H2

2014

2015

2016

Longer run

Real GDP1
December Tealbook

2.5
2.2

2.5
2.8

3.4
3.3

2.9
3.1

3.2
3.5

3.0
3.4

2.3
2.3

Unemployment rate2
December Tealbook

7.0
7.1

6.5
6.8

6.2
6.5

6.2
6.5

5.6
5.9

5.1
5.3

5.2
5.2

PCE inflation1
December Tealbook

1.0
.9

1.4
1.4

1.6
1.3

1.5
1.4

1.5
1.4

1.7
1.6

2.0
2.0

Core PCE inflation1
December Tealbook

1.2
1.1

1.4
1.5

1.6
1.4

1.5
1.4

1.7
1.6

1.8
1.7

n.a.
n.a.

Federal funds rate2
December Tealbook

.09
.13

.13
.13

.13
.13

.13
.13

1.10
.82

2.35
1.92

4.00
4.00

Memo:
Federal funds rate,
end of period
December Tealbook

.12
.13

.13
.13

.13
.13

.13
.13

1.25
1.00

2.50
2.00

4.00
4.00

1. Percent change from final quarter of preceding period to final quarter of period indicated.
2. Percent, final quarter of period indicated.
n.a. Not available.

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to expect economic activity to expand more quickly over the next few years than in 2013,
reflecting the waning of some of the forces—such as restrictive federal fiscal policy
changes—that have curtailed economic growth in recent years. Our current forecast has
real GDP growth stepping up from 2½ percent in 2013 to about 3 percent per year over
the next three years. With growth anticipated to run above potential over the medium
term, we project the unemployment rate to decline from about 6½ percent in the current
quarter to just a little above 5 percent at the end of 2016, slightly below our assumption
for the level of the natural rate at that time.
The data we have received on overall PCE prices since the January Tealbook have
been a bit firmer than we had anticipated, reflecting a January spike in heating costs. We
expect this energy-price bulge to be transitory, and, indeed, energy prices flatten out and
then edge down over the medium term in our projection, causing headline inflation to run
a bit below core inflation. Our forecast for core inflation is essentially the same as in
January, with core PCE inflation expected to rise from about 1¼ percent in 2013 to
1¾ percent in 2016.
In the Risks and Uncertainty section, we provide our views on the degree of
uncertainty attending our projections for real GDP growth, the unemployment rate, and
inflation.

KEY BACKGROUND FACTORS
Monetary Policy
Our assumptions for the current LSAP program are essentially unchanged. We
assume that asset purchases will continue to slow at a measured pace and will conclude
before the end of this year, leaving the cumulative amount of purchases under the
program at about $1.5 trillion.
As in the January Tealbook, we assume the federal funds rate will lift off from its
zero lower bound in the second quarter of 2015. We construe the two-quarter lag from
the assumed end in asset purchases to the liftoff of the federal funds rate to be consistent
with the Committee’s view, expressed in its January statement, that “a highly
accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable
time after the asset purchase program ends.” Following liftoff, the federal funds rate rises
at a pace determined by the prescriptions of an inertial version of the Taylor (1999)

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Key Background Factors underlying the Baseline Staff Projection

Long-Term Interest Rates

Federal Funds Rate
Percent

6

6

10

Quarterly average
Current
Previous Tealbook

5

Percent
Quarterly average

9

9

8

8

5

4

4

3

3

7

7

BBB corporate yield

6
5
2

2

4
3

1

1

6
5

Conforming
mortgage rate

4

10-year
Treasury yield

3

2
0

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

0

1

Equity Prices
Ratio scale, 2007:Q1 = 100
Quarter-end

100

Dow Jones
U.S. Total Stock Market
Index

170
160
150
140
130
120
110

105

100

85

90

90

80

80

70

70

60
50

2008

2010

2012

2012

2014

2016

1

2014

2016

Ratio scale, 2007:Q1 = 100

105

100

100

95

95

90

90
85

CoreLogic
index

80

80

75

75

60

70

70

50

65

Dollars per barrel

140

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

2007:Q1 = 100

110

65

110

Quarterly average

Quarterly average
Imported oil

120

100

100
West Texas
Intermediate

80

80

60

60

40

40

2008

2010

Broad Real Dollar

140

20

2008

Quarterly

Crude Oil Prices

120

2

House Prices

170
150
140
130
120
110

10

2010

2012

2014

2016

20

105

105

100

100

95

95

90

90

85

85

80

80

75

75

70

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2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

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policy rule. This path, little changed from the one in the January Tealbook, puts the
federal funds rate at 2½ percent at the end of 2016.

Other Interest Rates
The projected trajectory of the 10-year Treasury yield is slightly lower through
the end of 2014, reflecting a decline in term premiums since January, but it is little
revised in 2015 and 2016. Our projection continues to call for a significant rise in
Treasury yields, primarily because of the movement of the 10-year valuation window
through the period of extremely low short-term interest rates as well as a gradual waning
of the effects of the FOMC’s balance sheet policies.
Investment-grade corporate bond and mortgage spreads have changed relatively
little since the January Tealbook. Consequently, our forecasts for corporate bond yields
and mortgage rates in the medium term have been revised essentially in line with our
revisions to the path for the Treasury yield.

Equity Prices and Home Prices
On net since the January Tealbook, equity prices have increased more than we
had projected. We have carried the higher level of prices forward, raising the trajectory
of stock prices this year around 2 percent. However, with our view of fundamentals
unrevised over the medium term, we project stock prices by the end of 2016 to be the
same as in the January Tealbook.
Our forecast for house prices is little changed since January. With the
relationship between prices and rents now more consistent with historical norms, we
continue to expect house price appreciation to slow markedly—from 11 percent in 2013
to an average rate of about 5 percent per year over the next three years—as supply
gradually expands.

Fiscal Policy
Our assumptions for fiscal policy are the same as in the January Tealbook. The
federal debt ceiling was lifted in February as we had anticipated, and, with an agreement
in place for overall spending levels in fiscal year 2015, the degree of uncertainty about
fiscal policy now seems less elevated than in recent years. Despite the expiration of the
EUC program, we continue to expect the drag from fiscal policy to ease this year because
of a diminishing effect of the tax increases put in place last year and a smaller decline in

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real federal purchases. Consolidating across all levels of government, the restraint on
real GDP growth from fiscal policy actions (excluding multiplier effects) is projected to
diminish from about 1 percentage point in 2013 to ½ percentage point this year,
¼ percentage point in 2015, and roughly zero in 2016.
As in the previous projection, the federal unified budget deficit is anticipated to
narrow from 4 percent of GDP in fiscal 2013 to about 2 percent of GDP in fiscal 2016,
reflecting ongoing budget consolidation efforts and stronger receipts because of further
improvements in the economy. As a result, federal debt held by the public is expected to
remain near 70 percent of GDP for the next few years.

Foreign Activity and the Dollar
We estimate that real GDP growth in the foreign economies slowed slightly to an
annual rate of 2¾ percent in the fourth quarter of 2013, a pace somewhat lower than we
were expecting in the January Tealbook; surprisingly weak growth in Japan and Mexico
more than offset upside surprises in a number of other economies. We expect foreign
output to grow at roughly the same pace in the first half of this year before growth edges
up to a little under 3½ percent in 2016, supported by continued gradual recovery in the
euro area and a return to near-trend growth in the emerging market economies (EMEs).
Relative to the January Tealbook, our outlook for foreign growth is down ½ percentage
point in the first quarter and one-tenth of a percentage point further out, with the revisions
concentrated in the EMEs.
The broad nominal index for the dollar has been about unchanged, on net, since
the January Tealbook. We expect the broad real dollar to depreciate at a 1¼ percent
average annual pace through the forecast period, with all of the depreciation projected to
occur against the currencies of emerging Asia. (See the box “The Path of the Dollar:
Baseline and Alternatives” for a detailed discussion of this forecast.) Relative to the
January Tealbook, we lessened the pace of dollar depreciation in the forecast about
½ percentage point, in part because financial stresses in the euro area have eased to the
point where we no longer expect further improvements to reverse safe-haven flows and
depreciate the dollar. With less of a downward tilt in our forecast, the level of the broad
real dollar is projected to be about 1½ percent higher at the end of the forecast period
relative to the previous Tealbook.

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Oil and Other Commodity Prices
The spot price of Brent crude oil is up about $1 per barrel since the time of the
previous Tealbook, closing at $109 per barrel on March 11. Despite concerns about
Chinese growth, which have depressed industrial metals prices, global oil prices have
been supported by forecasts of stronger oil demand in the advanced economies, continued
disruptions in Libya, and unrest in South Sudan and Venezuela. Meanwhile, the spot
price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) has risen almost $6 per barrel since the January
Tealbook as improved transportation infrastructure has enabled producers to move
significant amounts of crude oil from Cushing, Oklahoma, the pricing hub for WTI, to
the U.S. Gulf Coast. Based on futures markets, we project the price of imported oil to
average $99 per barrel in the first half of this year and then to decline gradually over the
remainder of the forecast period, falling below $90 per barrel at the end of 2016. Overall,
this trajectory is about $2 per barrel higher than in the January Tealbook.
Prices for copper and iron ore moved sharply lower amid continued concerns
about Chinese demand prospects. Even so, the broad index of nonfuel commodity prices
that we track has risen about 5 percent since the time of the January Tealbook as prices of
foods and beverages moved higher. In recent weeks, coffee prices soared nearly
75 percent as a severe drought has cut coffee production in Brazil. Tensions in Ukraine
(an important wheat and corn exporter) boosted grain prices, although Ukrainian exports
to date have not been curtailed. We continue to expect nonfuel commodity prices to
increase only slightly over the forecast period.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND THE NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK FOR REAL GDP
The information we have received since the January Tealbook has led us to
reduce our estimate of real GDP growth in the fourth quarter of last year to 2¼ percent
and our forecast for the current quarter to 1½ percent; both figures are down 1 percentage
point or a little more relative to the January Tealbook. Although it is difficult to
disentangle how much of this unanticipated weakness stems from unfavorable weather
conditions and how much stems from weaker-than-anticipated underlying activity, we
currently estimate that unseasonably adverse weather had little effect last quarter and will
hold down real GDP growth in the current quarter by only about ¼ percentage point.
(The box “Effects of Severe Winter Weather on Economic Activity” presents some of the
detailed empirical examination we undertook to arrive at this conclusion.) In the second
quarter, real GDP growth is projected to be boosted by a rebound in production and sales

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The Path of the Dollar: Baseline and Alternatives
A key element of the staff forecast for U.S. activity and inflation is our projection of the foreign
exchange value of the dollar. In this box, we provide the rationale for our baseline dollar
projection and discuss plausible alternatives.
Our baseline projection has the broad real dollar depreciating 1¼ percent at an annual rate
throughout the forecast period, as shown by the black line in the upper-left figure on the
following page. This depreciation is expected to come almost wholly against the currencies of
our emerging Asian trading partners, the red line, with the real value of the dollar against the
currencies of advanced foreign economies (AFEs), the blue line, projected to appreciate slightly,
and the dollar holding roughly flat against the currencies of Latin America (the green line).
The appreciation of the dollar against the AFE currencies reflects our projections of monetary
policy in the United States and the other advanced economies. We assume that market
expectations for the future paths of policy rates in the United States and elsewhere are already
incorporated into the current value of the dollar. However, the staff projects that when the
FOMC begins to raise its target for the federal funds rate the increase will be more rapid than
the markets now anticipate. Therefore, the dollar should appreciate against the AFE currencies
as market views on the path of U.S interest rates eventually adjust to match those of the staff.
Surprises in the path of interest rates are not the dominant force behind our forecast for dollar
depreciation against the emerging Asian currencies. Instead, we believe that a number of
emerging Asian countries have undervalued currencies and a desire to rebalance their
economies toward domestic consumption. Dollar depreciation, then, results from direct policy
choices these countries make to continue to move away from export-led growth. Importantly,
Chinese authorities have indicated an increased commitment to exchange rate flexibility and to
growth led more by private domestic demand. Although in real effective terms, the Chinese
currency has appreciated more than 25 percent since 2007 and the current account surplus has
fallen sharply (the red line in the upper-right figure), we estimate that the cyclically adjusted
current account surplus is still sizable and the Chinese currency is still significantly undervalued,
leaving room for more adjustment. By contrast, in Latin America, where countries are running
current account deficits, on balance (the green line), currencies do not appear to be
undervalued.
The modest depreciation of the broad real dollar results in a U.S. trade deficit that is little
changed as a share of GDP over the forecast period (the black line in the lower-right figure on
the following page). This depreciation is reasonable based on the assumptions of our baseline
forecast, but it is not difficult to imagine alternative scenarios in which the dollar appreciates
over the forecast period.
First, China and other Asian economies may choose to rebalance their economies less quickly
than we envisage. For example, should growth in China threaten to fall below the authorities’
target, policymakers there might be tempted to guide the renminbi lower for a time. Although
the renminbi has depreciated about 1½ percent in nominal terms against the dollar since the last
Tealbook, we view this decline as a temporary interruption of the appreciation trend rather
than a move back to export-led growth. However, given the importance of China for our overall
forecast of dollar depreciation, if we have overestimated the Chinese authorities’ commitment
to rebalancing, it is likely that the value of the dollar will be higher than in our baseline forecast.

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Second, the current value of the dollar may not fully price in the effects of future U.S. policy
normalization. In this case, as U.S. yields rise, the dollar could appreciate more against the AFE
currencies than we currently anticipate, and could rise against the currencies of emerging
market economies (EMEs) as well. The implications of such a scenario are explored in the
“Stronger Dollar” alternative simulation in the Risks and Uncertainty section. As shown by the
blue line in the lower-left figure, in this scenario, the broad real dollar appreciates somewhat
over the forecast period, instead of depreciating as in the baseline. This appreciation weighs on
the U.S. trade balance, as shown by the blue line in the lower-right figure, and, as described in
the Risks and Uncertainty section, contributes to a modest decline in U.S. output relative to
baseline.
Third, in our baseline, we do not expect any major or persistent disruptions to global financial
markets, although bouts of volatility could recur, such as the financial tension we observed
recently in some vulnerable EMEs. However, stresses in the vulnerable economies could erupt
into a full-fledged EME crisis, a scenario presented in previous Tealbooks and also discussed in
the Risks and Uncertainty section. In this case, we expect flight-to-safety flows to push up the
dollar substantially, as shown by the red line in the lower-left figure, and the trade balance (the
red line in the lower-right figure) deteriorates more markedly, contributing to sharper declines
in U.S. output relative to baseline (not shown).

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Effects of Severe Winter Weather on Economic Activity
According to many reports, economic activity was slowed by the unusually snowy and cold
weather this winter. To gauge the significance of these reports for January and February, we
statistically analyzed the effect of winter weather on four economic indicators: single-family
housing starts, private payroll employment, real PCE-relevant retail sales, and light vehicle
sales. 1 Specifically, we looked to see whether unusually cold or snowy weather since the
1996–97 winter season resulted in a deviation of each economic indicator from its concurrent
trend (defined as a centered five-month moving average). This analysis informed our
assessment in the baseline forecast of the extent of weather effects.
To construct indexes of adverse weather, we developed daily county-level measures of
atypically heavy snowfalls and cold temperatures from weather-station data provided by the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. We then derived daily aggregate indexes
for extreme weather events by weighting these weather measures with county-level
employment for selected industries from the Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns series.
The industries chosen were tailored to each economic indicator (for example, in our housing
starts analysis, county-level construction employment was used to aggregate the county-bycounty weather indexes).
We created these highly granular indexes (rather than employing conventional monthly
national-level series) based on two considerations. First, what constitutes bad weather is
local: Three inches of snow probably has a greater effect on economic activity in Athens,
Georgia, than in Athens, Ohio. Thus, we looked at deviations in temperature or snowfall from
historical norms for each county. Second, compared with a late-month weather event, the
effect of an early-month event is more likely to be reversed before the month ends because
weather effects, particularly for snow, are short lived. For example, weekly chain store sales
appear to be negatively correlated with contemporaneous snowfall but positively correlated
with the previous week’s snowfall—purchases are only delayed temporarily. Similarly, the
lowest readings this winter for many weekly indicators of industrial production occurred
during the coldest weeks.
The table on the next page reports the results using our preferred weather indexes for each
indicator. The middle two columns show the number of months in our 1997–2013 sample that
were either snowier or colder than normal by at least one standard deviation, along with the
number of corresponding months this winter. The next column shows the percentage of the
cold or snowy months in our sample that had economic indicators below trend. The final
column shows the average deviation from trend for the economic indicators in those months.
Single-family housing starts often appeared to be suppressed by extreme cold or snow:
Eighty-two percent of the months in our sample with heavy snows saw single-family housing
1

Real PCE-relevant retail sales comprise the portion of total retail sales used by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis in estimating PCE.
Industrial production was also affected by severe winter weather in January; see the discussion in the
Technical Q&A for the G.17 release at www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/g17_technical_qa.htm.

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starts dip below their recent trend, and the mean reduction from the trend level of starts
during those unusually snowy months was 1.3 percent. Heavy snows late in a month were
more likely to be associated with a weak reading than those early in a month. Housing starts
sagged in every extremely cold month, but the effect of the cold seemed unrelated to when it
occurred within the month. A rough estimate from this analysis suggests that single-family
housing starts were curbed by an annual rate of 25,000 units in January this year and
17,000 units in February.2
Employment tended to be held down only a little when the Bureau of Labor Statistics survey
week was unusually snowy or cold. 3 The snowy survey week in February suggests a reduction
of around 30,000 jobs in that month—with a large portion of that restraint attributable to
lower construction employment—but the reading for January seems likely to have been
affected much less.
Real PCE-relevant retail sales appeared to be suppressed by severe winter weather regardless
of its timing during the month. (Similarly, very warm or snowless weather usually led to
above-trend consumer sales.) Based on weighting county-level weather indexes by retail
employment, January and February of this year were both colder and snowier than normal,
with the cold being more extreme. This analysis suggests that the levels of these retail sales in
January and February were held down about ¼ percent each month.
Light vehicle sales seemed more affected by heavy snowfall than by cold. Using weights
based on employment at auto dealers, neither January nor February were especially cold, but
snowfall was relatively high; sales appeared to have been depressed by an annual rate of
roughly 280,000 units in January and 360,000 units in February.
Historical Behavior of Economic Indicators during Months of Severe Weather
Number of severe
weather months

Behavior of economic indicators during
severe weather months, 1997–2013

Share of months
Mean deviation
1997–
Jan–Feb
below trend
from trend
(percent)
(percent)
2013
2014
Single-family housing starts
Snow
11
1 (Jan.)
82
-1.3
Cold
7
2
100
-2.7
Private payroll employment
Snow
5
1 (Feb.)
60
-.03
Cold
11
1 (Feb.)
73
-.02
Real PCE-relevant retail sales
Snow
9
2
67
-.1
Cold
7
2
71
-.3
Light vehicle sales
Snow
9
2
89
-3.3
Cold
8
0
63
-1.8
Note: A “severe weather month” is defined as a month in which the indicator-specific weather index was
more than one standard deviation above normal.
Source: Staff estimates.

2

The point estimates of the winter effects for all of the indicators are drawn from regressions of the
indicators’ deviations from trend on the cold and snow indexes in just the severe weather months.
3
However, the effect of snow or cold during the Bureau of Labor Statistics survey week on the average
workweek, and thus on aggregate hours for the month, is appreciably larger.

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Summary of the Near-Term Outlook
(Percent change at annual rate except as noted)
2013:Q4

2014:Q1

2014:Q2

Measure

Previous
Tealbook

Current
Tealbook

Previous
Tealbook

Current
Tealbook

Previous
Tealbook

Current
Tealbook

Real GDP
Private domestic final purchases
Personal consumption expenditures
Residential investment
Nonres. private fixed investment
Government purchases
Contributions to change in real GDP
Inventory investment1
Net exports1
Unemployment rate
PCE chain price index
Ex. food and energy

3.5
4.1
4.0
-5.3
7.4
-6.0

2.2
2.5
2.6
-8.6
5.5
-5.2

2.4
3.3
3.1
8.8
3.0
.8

1.5
2.5
2.6
2.9
1.6
.3

3.1
4.0
3.4
8.4
6.3
-1.2

3.5
4.2
3.7
10.4
5.7
-.5

-.1
1.3
7.0
.7
1.1

.1
1.0
7.0
1.0
1.3

-.5
.0
6.7
1.1
1.3

-.4
-.2
6.6
1.4
1.2

.0
-.1
6.6
1.5
1.6

-.2
.2
6.5
1.3
1.5

1. Percentage points.
Recent Nonfinancial Developments (1)
Manufacturing IP ex. Motor Vehicles and Parts

Real GDP and GDI
4-quarter percent change

8
6

Gross domestic product
Gross domestic income

8
6

4

4
Q3
Q4

2
0

10

10

5

5

0

0
Jan.

-5

-5

0

-10

-10

-15

-15

-20

-20

-25

-25

-2

-4

-4
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis.

-6

-30

22

3500
3400
3300
3200
3100
3000
2900
2800
2700
2600
2500
2400
2300

2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
Source: Federal Reserve Board, G.17 Statistical Release,
"Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization."

Sales and Production of Light Motor
Vehicles

18

14

Feb.
Sales

18

14
Jan.

10

10

Production

6

2

6

2004
2006
2008
2010
Source: Ward’s Communications.

2012

-30

Real PCE Goods ex. Motor Vehicles

Millions of units, annual rate

22

15

2

-2

-6

3-month percent change, annual rate

15

2014

2

Billions of chained (2009) dollars
Jan.

2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis.

Page 12 of 96

3500
3400
3300
3200
3100
3000
2900
2800
2700
2600
2500
2400
2300

Authorized for Public Release

March 12, 2014

from the effects of severe weather. For the first half as a whole, real GDP growth
averages 2½ percent, about the average pace last year and down ¼ percentage point from
the January projection.

Household Spending
Real PCE is now estimated to have risen at an annual rate of 2½ percent in the
fourth quarter of last year, 1½ percentage points less than our projection in the January
Tealbook. This updated estimate, which incorporated an unusually large downward
revision to retail sales in November and December, puts consumer outlays on a lower
trajectory going into this year. In addition, retail sales fell sharply in January, and light
motor vehicle sales through February have been weaker than we had expected; that said,
the BEA’s initial estimates of health-care-services consumption rose more in January
with the introduction of the Affordable Care Act than we had expected. On balance, we
now project that real PCE will rise at an annual rate of 2½ percent in the current quarter,
down ½ percentage point from the previous Tealbook. We think that weather had little
effect on real PCE last quarter; however, on the view that adverse weather accounts for a
portion of the unexpected softness in outlays this quarter, we project that real PCE
growth will move up to 3¾ percent in the second quarter as the weather returns to
seasonal norms. As before, we estimate that the projected increase in spending in the
first half would be larger if not for the termination of the EUC program.
The incoming data on housing activity have also been softer than we were
anticipating. Both single-family and multifamily housing starts tumbled in January, with
the weather likely playing a role. However, permits, which tend to be less sensitive to
weather influences and a better indicator of the underlying trajectory of activity, also
moved down in January and have shown essentially no sign of sustained improvement
since last spring. Although we expect a weather-related bounceback in housing activity
in coming months, we read the recent data as pointing to a flatter underlying trajectory
than we had projected last round. As a result, we now forecast real residential investment
to increase at an annual rate of about 6½ percent over the first half of this year, a
downward revision of 2 percentage points from our previous forecast.

Business Investment
We estimate that real private investment in equipment and intangibles (E&I)
increased at a solid pace in the fourth quarter. However, orders and shipments of
nondefense capital goods point to a deceleration in business equipment outlays early this

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Recent Nonfinancial Developments (2)
Single-Family Housing Starts and Permits
Millions of units, annual rate

2.1
1.8

Home Sales
2.1
1.8

Millions of units
(annual rate)

7.5

1.5

1.5

1.2

1.2

0.9

0.9

4.5

0.6

4.0

Adjusted permits
Starts

0.3
0.0

2004

2006

2008

1.5

Existing homes
(left scale)

6.0

1.2

5.5
5.0

Jan.

0.9

New single-family
homes (right scale)
Jan.

3.5
0.3
2010

2012

2014

0.0

0.3

2.5

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

0.0

Source: For existing, National Association of Realtors;
for new, U.S. Census Bureau.

Nondefense Capital Goods ex. Aircraft
Billions of dollars

0.6

3.0

Note: Adjusted permits equal permit issuance plus total starts
outside of permit-issuing areas.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

75

1.8

7.0
6.5

0.6

Millions of units
(annual rate)

Nonresidential Construction Put in Place
Billions of chained (2009) dollars

75

450

70

400

400

350

350

450

3-month moving average
Jan.

70
65

65

Orders

60

60

Shipments

300

55

55

50

50

45
40

2004
2006
2008
Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

2010

2012

2014

Jan.

250

250

45

200

200

40

150

2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
Note: Nominal CPIP deflated by BEA prices through
2013:Q3 and by staff’s estimated deflator thereafter.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

Inventory Ratios ex. Motor Vehicles

1.7

Staff flow-of-goods system

1.8
1.7

1.6

1.6
Jan.

1.5

1.5

1.4

1.4

1.3

Census book-value data

1.3

1.2
1.1

Dec.
2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

150

Exports and Non-oil Imports
Months

1.8

300

2014

Jan.

200
180

Non-oil imports

220
200
180

160

160

140

140

120

120

100

100
Exports

1.2

80

1.1

60

Note: Flow-of-goods system inventories include manufacturing
and mining industries except motor vehicles and parts and are
relative to consumption. Census data cover manufacturing and
trade ex. motor vehicles and parts, and inventories are relative
to sales.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau; staff calculations.

Billions of dollars

220

80
2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis; U.S. Census Bureau.

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year. Some of the spending slowdown may be due to the expiration of bonus
depreciation tax provisions at the end of last year, which we had long since built into our
forecast. In addition, some of the weakness in January shipments likely reflected severe
weather. We anticipate that the weather-related weakness will be made up in February
and March and project that business purchases of capital goods will rebound in the
second quarter, consistent with the generally positive readings from surveys of business
sentiment and rising earnings expectations. On balance, real outlays for E&I are now
projected to increase at an annual rate of 3½ percent in the first half of this year, a little
softer than in the previous Tealbook.
Real investment in nonresidential structures excluding drilling and mining edged
down in late 2013, as high vacancy rates and tight financing conditions for new
construction continued to restrain activity in this sector. Incoming spending data point to
another decline in outlays on new buildings early this year. Meanwhile, real investment
in drilling and mining structures is projected to post a sizable gain over the first half of
this year, supported by high oil prices and new drilling technologies.
We revised up our projection for nonfarm inventory investment in the current
quarter, as it seems likely that some producers were left with higher stocks in the wake of
widespread downward surprises to final sales. However, these adjustments were
relatively small, and, more broadly, inventory-to-sales ratios from book-value data and
the staff’s flow-of-goods system, as well as gauges of inventory sentiment from regional
and national manufacturing surveys, do not point to significant inventory imbalances in
most industries. One exception to this pattern is motor vehicles, where days’ supply in
January and February was well above the automakers’ target.

Government
After falling sharply in the fourth quarter, real federal purchases are projected to
rise at an annual rate of 1½ percent in the first quarter, reflecting a reversal of the effects
of the temporary government shutdown in October. We expect federal purchases to fall
3 percent in the second quarter, as spending resumes its trend rate of decline.
We project that real state and local government purchases will edge up over the
first half of this year. Although incoming data point to a further decline in public-sector
construction spending this quarter, we attribute some of the weakness to unseasonably
adverse weather and expect it to be reversed in the second quarter. Meanwhile,

Page 15 of 96

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Projections of Real GDP and Related Components
(Percent change at annual rate from final quarter
of preceding period except as noted)
2014
Measure

2013
H1

Real GDP
Previous Tealbook

2014

2015

2016

H2

2.5
2.8

2.5
2.7

3.4
3.5

2.9
3.1

3.2
3.4

3.0
3.2

1.7
2.1

2.8
3.0

3.3
3.4

3.0
3.2

3.4
3.7

3.1
3.4

Personal consumption expenditures
Previous Tealbook

2.1
2.5

3.2
3.3

3.8
3.8

3.5
3.5

3.7
3.9

2.9
3.2

Residential investment
Previous Tealbook

6.7
7.6

6.6
8.6

13.1
16.5

9.8
12.5

15.1
15.6

11.0
9.2

Nonresidential structures
Previous Tealbook

-.6
-.4

4.6
4.3

4.7
4.3

4.6
4.3

2.4
2.5

1.9
2.2

Equipment and intangibles
Previous Tealbook

3.4
4.0

3.4
4.7

5.0
5.8

4.2
5.2

5.8
6.2

5.0
5.5

-6.2
-6.8

-.8
-1.1

-2.7
-3.1

-1.7
-2.1

-3.6
-3.7

-1.2
-.1

.2
.3

.3
.4

.5
.5

.4
.4

1.1
1.1

1.5
1.5

Exports
Previous Tealbook

4.9
5.7

1.7
3.8

4.4
4.8

3.1
4.3

4.9
5.4

5.6
6.2

Imports
Previous Tealbook

2.8
3.0

1.6
3.6

5.1
5.3

3.3
4.4

4.9
5.1

4.5
4.6

Final sales
Previous Tealbook

Federal purchases
Previous Tealbook
State and local purchases
Previous Tealbook

Contributions to change in real GDP
(percentage points)
Inventory change
Previous Tealbook

.8
.7

-.3
-.2

.1
.1

-.1
-.1

-.2
-.3

.0
-.2

Net exports
Previous Tealbook

.2
.3

.0
-.1

-.2
-.2

-.1
-.1

-.1
-.1

.0
.1

Real GDP
4-quarter percent change

10
Current
Previous Tealbook

8

10
8

6

6

4

4

2

2

0

0

-2

-2

-4

-4

-6

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

Note: The gray shaded bars indicate a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Page 16 of 96

2016

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March 12, 2014

employment by these governments continued to trend up early in the year at the same
modest pace seen over the second half of last year.

Foreign Trade
After surging 9½ percent at an annual rate in the final quarter of 2013, real
exports of goods and services are expected to be about flat in the current quarter,
consistent with the softness of the January trade data. For the second quarter, we project
that exports will rise 3¼ percent, a pace more in line with foreign growth. Meanwhile,
real imports of goods and services are expected to rise 1½ percent in the first half of the
year, held back by a net decline in oil imports and the slow pace of U.S. GDP growth.
All told, the external sector is projected to subtract ¼ percentage point from real GDP
growth in the current quarter and then to make a positive ¼ percentage point contribution
in the second quarter. On average, this contribution is about the same as in the January
Tealbook.

The Industrial Sector
After rising at an annual rate of 4½ percent in the fourth quarter, manufacturing
output is projected to be little changed this quarter, held down in part by disruptions from
the severe winter weather. With most of the new orders indexes from the latest
manufacturing surveys at generally favorable levels and some catch-up anticipated for the
weather-related losses in output this quarter, we expect the growth of manufacturing
output to step up to about 4 percent in the second quarter. Even so, the projected average
rate of increase over the first half of this year is 1½ percentage points below our forecast
in the January Tealbook.

THE MEDIUM-TERM OUTLOOK FOR REAL GDP
We revised down slightly our forecast for real GDP growth over the medium term
in light of the drag from the higher path for the foreign exchange value of the dollar and
the downward adjustments we made to our estimates of potential output growth. We now
forecast real GDP growth to edge up from 2½ percent in 2013 to 3 percent, on average,
over the next three years. These changes leave the output gap unrevised at the end of
2016 and the level of real GDP about ¾ percent lower than in the January Tealbook.
Our projection that real GDP growth will step up over the medium term—even as
interest rates rise—reflects our expectation that some of the forces that have been holding
back growth in recent years will recede. In particular, the restraint from changes in

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March 12, 2014

Components of Final Demand

Personal Consumption Expenditures
4-quarter percent change

Residential Investment
4-quarter percent change

5

20

4

15

15

3

3

10

10

2

2

5

5

5
Current
Previous Tealbook

4

1

1

20

0

0

-5

-5

-10

-10

-15

-15

0

0

-1

-1

-2

-2

-20

-20

-3

-3

-25

-25

-4

-4

-30

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Equipment and Intangibles
20

15

15

10

10

5

5

0

0

-5

-5

-10

-10

-15

-15

-20

-20

-25

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

25
20
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
-15
-20
-25
-30
-35

-25

Government Consumption & Investment
4-quarter percent change

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

-30

4-quarter percent change

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

25
20
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
-15
-20
-25
-30
-35

Exports and Imports
5

20

4

4

15

3

3

2

2

1

1

5

5

2010

Nonresidential Structures

4-quarter percent change

20

2009

4-quarter percent change

20
15

10

10

Exports

5
Imports

0

0

0

-1

-1

-5

-5

-2

-2

-3

-3

-10

-10

-4

-4

-15

-15

-5

-20

-5

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Page 18 of 96

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

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federal fiscal policy is waning and should continue to do so, and we think that mortgage
credit will gradually become more broadly available. These developments are expected
to foster a growing sense among households and firms that the downside risks to the
recovery have diminished; in turn, the improvement in confidence should provide
additional support to consumer spending, business investment, and hiring.
These influences are most apparent in our projection for consumer spending. In
particular, we continue to anticipate that the fading effects of last year’s tax increases,
gains in household wealth produced by rising house and equity prices, and improved
consumer confidence will lead real PCE growth to move up to 3½ percent this year and
3¾ percent in 2015 before slowing to about 3 percent in 2016. This forecast is about
¼ percentage point per year lower than in the January Tealbook, largely due to the slower
growth in potential output (and hence in permanent income) in this projection.
Rising income and confidence also are expected to lead to a higher pace of
household formation and thereby boost residential construction. However, the effect on
homebuilding will likely be damped by rising mortgage rates and—at least for some
time—the limited availability of buildable lots and other specialized inputs. We expect
the growth in residential investment to increase at an annual rate of roughly 15 percent in
the second half of 2014 and in 2015 before slowing to 10 percent in 2016.
Real outlays for E&I are expected to rise 5 percent per year, on average, over the
next three years. Although faster than the pace of growth posted in 2013, our mediumterm projection for E&I growth is modest by historical standards and reflects our
expectation that business output will increase at only a moderate pace over this period.
Similarly, we continue to expect only subdued growth in spending on nonresidential
structures over the medium term.
The external sector is expected to deduct slightly from the growth of real GDP
this year and next and then to be about neutral for growth in 2016. We expect real
exports to pick up over the forecast period, supported by firming foreign growth and
dollar depreciation. But we also project real imports to increase at a solid pace, as the
boost from U.S. growth more than offsets the drag from both the depreciating dollar and
a continued trend decline in oil imports.
Federal government spending is projected to continue to trend down over the
forecast period, restrained by ongoing fiscal consolidation and reductions in spending on

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Aspects of the Medium-Term Projection
Personal Saving Rate

Wealth-to-Income Ratio
Percent

9
8

Current
Previous Tealbook

9
8

7

7

6

6

5

5

4

4

3

3

2

2

1

1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis.

Ratio

6.8

1

6.4

6.4

6.0

6.0

5.6

5.6

5.2

5.2

4.8

4.8

4.4

1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
Note: Household net worth as a ratio to disposable personal
income.
Source: For net worth, Federal Reserve Board, Financial
Accounts of the United States; for income, U.S. Dept. of
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Single-Family Housing Starts
2.00

1.75

1.75

1.50

1.50

1.25

1.25

1.00

1.00

0.75

0.75

0.50

0.50

0.25

0.25

0.00

1995
2000
2005
Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

2010

2015

0.00

Share of nominal GDP

12

12

11

11

10

10

9

9

8

8

7

1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis.

Federal Surplus/Deficit

7

Current Account Surplus/Deficit
Share of nominal GDP

6

4.4

Equipment and Intangibles Spending
Millions of units

2.00

6.8

Share of nominal GDP

6

1

4

4

0

0

2

2

-1

-1

0

0

-2

-2

-2

-2
-3

-3

-4

-4

-6

-6

-4

-4

-8

-8

-5

-5

-10

-10

-6

-6

-12

-7

1

4-quarter moving average

-12

1995
2000
2005
2010
Source: Monthly Treasury Statement.

2015

1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis.

Note: The gray shaded bars indicate a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.

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overseas military operations. In contrast, spending by state and local governments is
expected to accelerate gradually, reflecting an improving revenue stream.

THE OUTLOOK FOR THE LABOR MARKET AND INFLATION
Recent Developments and Near-Term Outlook for the Labor Market
The latest readings on the labor market, notably the January and February jobs
reports, suggest that the labor market has been improving at a pace similar to what we
anticipated in the January Tealbook. 1 Total nonfarm payrolls rose at an average pace of
150,000 in January and February, about 20,000 less per month than we had expected.
However, we think that adverse weather conditions held down payroll employment in
recent months. In addition, we think that weather accounted for much of the recent
decline in the workweek, which fell to 34.2 hours in February from an already low level
in December and January.
In the household survey, the unemployment rate stood at 6.7 percent in February,
¼ percentage point below its fourth-quarter average and 0.1 percentage point lower than
we had projected in the previous Tealbook. The labor force participation rate moved up
0.2 percentage point over the same period, to 63.0 percent, in contrast to our January
projection of no change. Other measures of labor utilization were generally upbeat in the
past two months as well. We think the key measures from the household survey were
probably little affected by weather-related disruptions.
Looking ahead, we expect nonfarm payrolls to increase 230,000 in March, a
figure that includes a 50,000 weather-related bounceback. In the second quarter, we
expect payroll gains to average 210,000 per month. We have carried forward the lower
level of the unemployment rate and now project it to edge down to 6.6 percent in March
and 6.5 percent in the second quarter. Similarly, we have adjusted up the path of the
labor force participation rate and expect that it will remain at its current level of
63.0 percent in coming months.

1

The January report incorporated the annual benchmark revisions, which raised the level of
payroll employment in December 2013 by about 500,000. Of this amount, about 350,000 was the direct
effect of the March 2013 benchmarking, which was more than accounted for by the expansion of the
payroll survey’s scope to include an additional industry that provides home-based social services for the
elderly and disabled. The remainder reflected an upward revision to the estimated pace of payroll gains
since last March, some of which may have been due to the expanded scope.

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Labor Market Developments and Outlook

Measures of Labor Underutilization
Percent

12
U-5*
Unemployment rate
Part time for economic
reasons**

11
10
9

12
11
10
9

8

8

7

7
Feb.

6

6

5

5

4

4

3

3

2

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2

11.0
10.5
10.0
9.5
9.0
8.5
8.0
7.5
7.0
6.5
6.0
5.5
5.0
4.5

Percent
Unemployment rate
Previous Tealbook
September 2012 Tealbook
Natural rate of unemployment
Natural rate of unemployment with EEB adjustment

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

11.0
10.5
10.0
9.5
9.0
8.5
8.0
7.5
7.0
6.5
6.0
5.5
5.0
4.5

* U-5 measures total unemployed persons plus all marginally attached to the labor force, as a percent of the labor force plus persons marginally
attached to the labor force.
** Percent of Current Population Survey employment.
EEB Extended and emergency unemployment benefits.
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Level of Payroll Employment*
125

Millions

Millions

145

Total (right axis)
Private (left axis)

Total
Previous Tealbook
September 2012 Tealbook

144

120

140
Feb.

115

146
144

142

142

140

140

138

138

136

136

134

134

135

110

105

Millions

146

130

125
132
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2012
2013
* 3-month moving averages in history; average levels in each quarter during the forecast period.
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

2014

2015

2016

132

Change in Payroll Employment*
Thousands

400
200

Feb.

0

300

200

250

250

200

200

150

150

0

-200

-200

-400

-400

-600

-600
Total
Private

-800
-1000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

Thousands

400

100

-800

50

-1000

0

100
Total
Previous Tealbook
September 2012 Tealbook
2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

* 3-month moving averages in history; average monthly changes in each quarter during the forecast period.
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Note: In September 2012, judgmental projections were prepared through 2015 for the Summary of Economic Projections variables, including the
unemployment rate, while projections for other variables, including the labor force participation rate and payroll employment, were prepared only
through 2014. This exhibit therefore reports a 2015 projection from the September 2012 Tealbook only for the unemployment rate.
The gray shaded bars indicate a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.

Page 22 of 96

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Labor Market Developments and Outlook (2)

Labor Force Participation Rate*
68.0
67.5
67.0
66.5
66.0
65.5
65.0
64.5
64.0
63.5
63.0
62.5
62.0

Percent

68.0
67.5
67.0
66.5
66.0
65.5
65.0
64.5
64.0
63.5
Feb.
63.0
62.5
62.0
2014

Labor force participation rate
Estimated trend**

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

Percent

65.0

Labor force participation rate
Previous Tealbook
September 2012 Tealbook
Estimated trend**
Previous trend**

64.5

64.0

65.0

64.5

64.0

63.5

63.5

63.0

63.0

62.5

2012

2013

2014

2015

62.5

2016

* Published data adjusted by staff to account for changes in population weights.
** Includes staff estimate of the effect of extended and emergency unemployment benefits.
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; staff assumptions.

Initial Unemployment Insurance Claims*
Thousands

700

Private Hires, Quits, and Job Openings
700

650

650

4.5

600

600

4.0

550

550

500

500

450

450

400

Mar. 1

400

2.0

2.0
1.5

250

1.0

2010

2012

2014

3.5

2.5

1.5

2008

4.0

2.5

300
2006

4.5

3.0

300
2004

Jan.

5.0

3.0

350

2002

Hires*
Quits*
Openings**

3.5

350

250

Percent

5.0

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

1.0

* Percent of private nonfarm payroll employment, 3-month
moving average.
** Percent of private nonfarm payroll employment plus
unfilled jobs, 3-month moving average.
Source: Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.

* 4-week moving average.
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and
Training Administration.

Change in Labor Market Conditions Index and Selected Indicators*
Index points

40
Labor market conditions index
Private payroll employment
Negative unemployment rate

30
20

40
30
20

10

10
Feb.

0

0

-10

-10

-20

-20

-30

-30

-40

-40

-50

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

* 3-month moving average.
Note: Labor market conditions index estimated by staff; indexes for unemployment rate and private payroll employment are standardized
deviations from estimated trend.
Note: The gray shaded bars indicate a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.

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March 12, 2014

Decomposition of Potential GDP
(Percent change, Q4 to Q4, except as noted)
Measure

19962000

1974-95

2001-07 2008-10 2011-13

2014

2015

2016

Potential real GDP
Previous Tealbook
Selected contributions1
Structural NFB labor productivity2
Previous Tealbook

3.1
3.1

3.4
3.4

2.6
2.6

1.9
1.9

1.5
1.6

1.8
2.0

2.0
2.1

1.9
2.1

1.6
1.6

2.7
2.7

2.6
2.6

1.8
1.8

1.2
1.3

1.4
1.6

1.8
1.8

1.8
1.9

Structural hours
Previous Tealbook
Labor force participation
Previous Tealbook
Memo:
GDP gap3
Previous Tealbook

1.5
1.5
.4
.4

1.0
1.0
.0
.0

.7
.7
-.3
-.3

.2
.2
-.4
-.4

.6
.6
-.5
-.5

.7
.7
-.3
-.3

.6
.6
-.4
-.3

.3
.5
-.4
-.3

-1.9
-1.9

2.5
2.5

1.0
1.0

-4.8
-4.8

-3.0
-3.0

-1.9
-1.9

-.7
-.6

.4
.4

Note: For multiyear periods, the percent change is the annual average from Q4 of the year preceding the first year shown to Q4 of the last year
shown.
1. Percentage points.
2. Because of substantial revisions from the Bureau of Economic Analysis to productive investment as part of the latest comprehensive revision,
staff estimates of the components of structural productivity are not available for this Tealbook.
3. Percent difference between actual and potential GDP in the final quarter of the period indicated. A negative number indicates that the economy
is operating below potential.

GDP Gap
6

Unemployment Rate
Percent

8
Current
Previous Tealbook

8

Unemployment rate
Previous Tealbook
Natural rate of unemployment

6

4

4

2

2

0

0

-2

-2

-4

-4

-6

-6

-8

Percent

12

1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
Note: The GDP gap is the percent difference between actual
and potential GDP; a negative number indicates that the
economy is operating below potential.
Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, BEA; staff assumptions.

-8

10

Percent

8

6

6

4

4

2

2
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics;
staff assumptions.

Structural and Actual Labor Productivity
(Nonfarm business sector)
90

Chained (2009) dollars per hour

68
Actual
Structural

66
85
80

85
Average rate from
1972 to 2013

80

75

75

70

70

65
60

65

1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
Source: Federal Reserve Board, G.17 Statistical Release,
"Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization."

10

8

Manufacturing Capacity Utilization Rate
90

12

60

68
66

64

64

62

62

60

60

58

58

56

56

54

54

52

52

50

50

48

48

46

46
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics;
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis;
staff assumptions.

Note: The gray shaded bars indicate a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.

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Potential GDP and the Natural Rate of Unemployment
The downward surprise in the unemployment rate so far this year was
accompanied by disappointing news about the growth of real GDP in the fourth quarter of
2013 and the first quarter of this year. To help reconcile these apparently divergent
signals for resource utilization, we marked down our assumptions for potential output
growth from 2011 to 2013 by 0.1 percentage point per year, which reduced the level of
potential output about ¼ percent at the end of 2013, similar to the downward revision to
the level of real GDP in that quarter. In addition, we carried forward some of the weaker
potential output growth in recent years into the forecast period. Finally, for this
Tealbook, we reassessed the labor supply implications of the Affordable Care Act, which
led us to lower potential output growth in 2015 and 2016 slightly further.
Based on our revised assumptions, we now expect potential output growth to
increase from 1½ percent in 2013 to 1¾ percent in 2014 and about 2 percent in 2015 and
2016, leaving the level of potential output ¾ percent lower at the end of 2016 than in the
January Tealbook. We continue to assume that the natural rate of unemployment will
edge down from 5½ percent in 2013 to 5¼ percent in 2015 and 2016.

The Medium-Term Outlook for the Labor Market
Total payroll employment is projected to increase 210,000 per month in 2014 and
then rise 220,000 per month, on average, in 2015 and 2016. This trajectory is slightly
lower than in the January Tealbook, in line with the slower projected rate of output
growth over the medium term.
Starting from its slightly lower level of 6.6 percent in the current quarter, the
unemployment rate is projected to edge down to 6¼ percent at the end of the year, the
same level as in the January Tealbook. Thereafter, the projected path is unrevised, with
the unemployment rate falling about ½ percentage point per year to just above 5 percent
at the end of 2016. The projected level of the unemployment rate at the end of 2016 is
slightly below the staff’s estimate of the natural rate of unemployment.

Resource Utilization
We estimate the unemployment rate is about 1¼ percentage points above our
estimate of the natural rate in the first quarter, and we put the GDP gap at about

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The Outlook for the Labor Market
2014
Measure

2013
H1

2014

2015

2016

H2

Output per hour, nonfarm business1
Previous Tealbook

1.2
1.7

1.3
.8

1.4
1.6

1.4
1.2

1.4
1.6

1.8
1.9

Nonfarm private employment2
Previous Tealbook

197
184

197
203

228
242

212
223

224
235

202
210

Labor force participation rate3
Previous Tealbook

62.8
62.8

63.0
62.8

63.0
62.8

63.0
62.8

63.0
62.8

62.9
62.8

Civilian unemployment rate3
Previous Tealbook

7.0
7.0

6.5
6.6

6.2
6.2

6.2
6.2

5.6
5.5

5.1
5.1

1. Percent change from final quarter of preceding period at annual rate.
2. Thousands, average monthly changes.
3. Percent, average for the final quarter in the period.
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; staff assumptions.

Inflation Projections
(Percent change at annual rate from final quarter of preceding period)
2014
Measure

2013

2014

2015

2016

1.6
1.4

1.5
1.4

1.5
1.6

1.7
1.7

.9
.6

1.3
.7

1.1
.6

1.3
1.3

1.4
1.4

-1.5
-2.5

1.8
-.3

1.2
.0

1.5
-.2

-.8
-.5

-.3
-.1

Excluding food and energy
Previous Tealbook

1.2
1.1

1.4
1.4

1.6
1.6

1.5
1.5

1.7
1.7

1.8
1.8

Prices of core goods imports1
Previous Tealbook

-1.1
-1.2

.8
.6

1.4
1.5

1.1
1.1

1.3
1.5

1.4
1.6

H1

H2

1.0
.9

1.4
1.3

Food and beverages
Previous Tealbook

.8
.8

Energy
Previous Tealbook

PCE chain-weighted price index
Previous Tealbook

1. Core goods imports exclude computers, semiconductors, oil, and natural gas.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

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3 percent. 2 These gaps are roughly conformable in the first quarter given the staff’s
preferred Okun’s law coefficient of 0.44. Over the medium term, these gaps are
projected to diminish gradually, and by the end of 2016, both the unemployment gap and
output gap are expected to be completely closed. In the manufacturing sector, capacity
utilization is currently nearly 2¾ percentage points below its long-run average but is
projected to rise to its long-run average by early 2016.

The Outlook for Prices and Compensation
After rising at an annual rate of 1 percent in the fourth quarter, total PCE prices
are projected to increase at a 1½ percent pace in the first quarter, reflecting a weatherinduced jump in energy prices. Core PCE inflation was 1¼ percent in the fourth quarter
and appears to be running at a similar rate in this quarter, in line with our previous
forecast. We project that by midyear, both total and core PCE inflation will be about
1½ percent, the same as in the January Tealbook.
We have marked up our near-term projection for consumer energy price inflation.
In January, consumer prices for heating fuel, natural gas, and electricity came in much
higher than we predicted in the January Tealbook, likely reflecting the effect of cold
weather on heating demand. Indeed, the path of futures prices for natural gas over the
next year has moved up sharply since the time of the January Tealbook, as inventories
have fallen to their lowest levels in more than a decade. As a result, overall consumer
energy prices are now projected to rise at an annual rate of about 4 percent in the current
quarter and to hold at that higher level in the second quarter, rather than edging down
over the first half as we had anticipated in the previous Tealbook. Given the downward
tilt in our medium-term forecasts for crude oil and natural gas prices, we continue to
project that PCE energy prices will decline modestly beyond the near term.
Consumer food prices are projected to increase at a moderate pace over the first
half of this year after being about unchanged in the fourth quarter. This projected pickup
in food price inflation reflects the pass-through of recent increases in farm commodity
prices following their sizable declines last year, as well as the effect of drought
conditions in California on prices of fruits and vegetables. We continue to project that

2

We assume that the natural rate is on a downward trajectory, reflecting some unwinding of the
effects of the recession. We put it at 5.4 percent at present and anticipate that it will decline to 5.2 percent
in the medium term.

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Inflation Developments and Outlook
(Percent change from year-earlier period)

Headline Consumer Price Inflation
Percent

6
5

CPI
PCE

6

4

3

3

2
1

2
Jan.

1

0

0

-1

-1

-2

-2

-3

5

PCE - Current
PCE - Previous Tealbook

5

4

Percent

5

4

4

3

3

2

2

1

1

-3
0
0
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Source: For CPI, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; for PCE, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Measures of Underlying PCE Price Inflation
4.0
3.5
3.0

Percent
Trimmed mean PCE
Market-based PCE excluding food and energy
PCE excluding food and energy

4.0
3.5
3.0

2.5

2.5

2.0

2.0

1.5

1.5

1.0

Jan.

0.5
0.0

1.0
0.5

Percent

3.5
3.0

Core PCE - Current
Core PCE - Previous Tealbook

3.5
3.0

2.5

2.5

2.0

2.0

1.5

1.5

1.0

1.0

0.5

0.5

0.0
0.0
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Source: For trimmed mean PCE, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas; otherwise, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

0.0

Labor Cost Growth (Private Industry)
8
7
6

Percent
Employment cost index
Average hourly earnings
Compensation per hour

8
7

1

6
5

4

4

4

3

3

3

2

2

1

1

4

Feb.
Dec.

7

5

5

2

6

Compensation per hour - Current
Compensation per hour - Previous Tealbook

6

5

3

Percent

7

2
1

Q4
0

0

-1

-1
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

0

2012

2013

2014

2015

Note: The gray shaded bars indicate a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.

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PCE food prices will increase at a pace that is slightly below core inflation over the
medium term.
Since the January Tealbook, core PCE inflation was revised up slightly in the
fourth quarter to 1¼ percent, with the changes concentrated in the nonmarket component.
However, the core inflation reading in January was close to what we were expecting, and
we continue to predict that core inflation will be about 1¼ percent in the current quarter,
will edge up to 1½ percent in the second quarter, and will remain there over the second
half of the year.
Much of the projected pickup in core PCE inflation this year reflects a projected
acceleration in import prices. After falling throughout most of last year, prices of
imported core goods are expected to increase at an annual rate of ¾ percent in the first
half of this year and then to step up to a 1½ percent pace in the second half, as the
restraining effect of previous dollar appreciation fades. Core import prices are projected
to continue to rise just under 1½ percent per year in 2015 and 2016, a pace that is in line
with a modest projected increase in commodity prices and our assumed pace of dollar
depreciation. We estimate that import prices will continue to have a slightly restraining
effect on U.S. consumer price inflation over the medium term, albeit noticeably less than
in the past two years.
Readings on longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable. The final
February reading on median 5-to-10-year-ahead inflation expectations from the Michigan
survey stood at 2.9 percent, well within the relatively narrow range seen in recent years.
Expectations for PCE price inflation over the next 10 years, as measured by the Survey of
Professional Forecasters, were unchanged at 2 percent in the first quarter. TIPS-based
measures of longer-term inflation compensation are just slightly lower than at the time of
the January Tealbook.
With stable long-run inflation expectations, a projected pickup in import prices,
and gradually diminishing margins of slack, we expect core PCE inflation to increase
from 1¼ percent in 2013 to 1½ percent this year and 1¾ percent in 2016; this forecast is
essentially the same as in the January Tealbook. Given the slight downward trajectory
for energy prices, total PCE inflation is projected to be a bit below core inflation over
most of the medium term. Thus, through 2016, total PCE inflation is projected to remain
below the Committee’s long-run objective of 2 percent.

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Inflation Developments and Outlook (2)
(Percent change from year-earlier period, except as noted)

Commodity and Oil Price Levels
1967 = 100

Dollars per barrel
1967 = 100
220
Brent crude oil history/futures (right axis)
1680
168
CRB spot commodity price index (left axis)
1420
142
1200
120
1000
100
800
80
Mar. 11
600
60

Dollars per barrel

2000

2200

200
Brent crude oil history/futures (right axis)
CRB spot commodity price index (left axis)

1600
1400
1200

160
140
120

1000

100

800

80
Mar. 11

400

200

40

600

60

20
400
40
2002
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2012
2013
2014
2004
Note: Futures prices (dotted lines) are the latest observations on monthly futures contracts.
Source: For oil prices, U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Agency; for commodity prices, Conference Research Board (CRB).

Energy and Import Price Inflation
18

Percent

Percent
PCE energy prices (right axis)
Core import prices (left axis)

15
12

12

60
50

Percent

10

40

Percent

30

PCE energy prices (right axis)
Core import prices (left axis)

25

8

20

9

30

6

20

6

15

3

10

4

10

0

0

2

5

-3

Jan.

-10

0

-6

-20

-9

-30

-2

-40

-4

-12

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

0
Jan.

2012

-5

2013

2014

-10

Source: For core import prices, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; for PCE, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Long-Term Inflation Expectations
Percent

4.25
5-to-10-year-ahead TIPS
Michigan median next 5 to 10 years
SPF PCE median next 10 years

3.75
3.25
2.75

Feb.

2.25

4.25

Percent

4.25

3.75

3.75

3.25

3.25

2.75

2.75

2.25

2.25

5-to-10-year-ahead TIPS
Michigan median next 5 to 10 years
SPF PCE median next 10 years

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

3.75
3.25
Feb.

2.75
2.25

Q1

Q1
1.75

4.25

1.75

1.75

2012

2013

2014

Note: Based on a comparison of an estimated TIPS (Treasury inflation-protected securities) yield curve with an estimated nominal off-the-run
Treasury yield curve, with an adjustment for the indexation-lag effect.
SPF Survey of Professional Forecasters.
Source: For Michigan, Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers; for SPF, the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia; for
TIPS, Federal Reserve Board staff calculations.
Note: The gray shaded bars indicate a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.

Page 30 of 96

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The incoming data suggest that labor compensation has continued to rise at a
modest pace. We now estimate that compensation per hour in the nonfarm business
sector will increase at a 2½ percent annual rate in the current quarter—close to its
average seen over the previous two years. We expect the gradual tightening of the labor
market over the medium term to push hourly compensation growth up to 3½ percent by
2016. The employment cost index has provided a less volatile measure of compensation
pressures in recent years. In 2013, it increased 2 percent; over the next few years, as
labor markets tighten, we expect this index to accelerate to about a 3¼ percent pace.

THE LONG-TERM OUTLOOK
We have extended the staff’s forecast beyond the medium term using the FRB/US
model and our assumptions about long-run supply-side conditions, fiscal policy, and
other factors. The contour of the long-term outlook depends on the following key
assumptions:
•

The federal funds rate continues to be set according to the prescriptions of an
inertial version of the Taylor (1999) rule.

•

The Federal Reserve’s holdings of securities continue to put downward
pressure on longer-term interest rates, albeit to a diminishing extent. The
process of returning the SOMA portfolio to a normal size is expected to be
completed by 2021.

•

Risk premiums on corporate equities and bonds continue to decrease, on
balance, toward their longer-run normal levels, and financial institutions
further ease their lending standards.

•

The federal budget deficit (measured on a NIPA basis) is 3½ percent of GDP
in 2017 and widens thereafter, primarily reflecting fast-rising transfer
payments for retirement and health-care programs. The ratio of federal debt
to GDP remains at about 70 percent in 2017 but edges up thereafter.

•

The real foreign exchange value of the dollar stays constant from 2017
onward. The price of crude oil holds steady in real terms. Foreign real GDP
rises at an annual rate of about 3 percent from 2017 to 2020.

•

The natural rate of unemployment is 5¼ percent, and potential GDP rises
around 2¼ percent per year from 2017 to 2020.

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The Long-Term Outlook
(Percent change, Q4 to Q4, except as noted)

Measure

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Longer run

Real GDP
Previous Tealbook

2.9
3.1

3.2
3.4

3.0
3.2

2.5
2.7

2.0
2.1

2.3
2.3

Civilian unemployment rate1
Previous Tealbook

6.2
6.2

5.6
5.5

5.1
5.1

4.9
4.8

4.9
4.8

5.2
5.2

PCE prices, total
Previous Tealbook

1.5
1.4

1.5
1.6

1.7
1.7

1.8
1.8

2.0
2.0

2.0
2.0

Core PCE prices
Previous Tealbook

1.5
1.5

1.7
1.7

1.8
1.8

1.9
1.9

2.0
2.0

2.0
2.0

Federal funds rate1
Previous Tealbook

.1
.1

1.1
1.1

2.4
2.4

3.3
3.4

3.9
4.0

4.0
4.0

3.5
3.5

4.1
4.0

4.4
4.4

4.7
4.7

4.8
4.9

4.8
4.8

10-year Treasury yield1
Previous Tealbook
1. Percent, average for the final quarter of the period.

Real GDP

Unemployment Rate
4-quarter percent change

Potential GDP

Real GDP
2004

2008

2012

2016

Percent
10

5
4
3
2
1
0
−1
−2
−3
−4
−5

Unemployment rate

8
Natural rate
with EEB
adjustment

7
6
Natural rate

5
4

2020

2004

PCE Prices

9

2008

2012

2016

2020

Interest Rates
4-quarter percent change

Percent
4

Total PCE prices
10-year Treasury

3

BBB corporate
2
PCE prices
excluding
food and
energy

1
0

Federal
funds rate

−1
2004

2008

2012

2016

2020

2004

2008

2012

2016

2020

Note: In each panel, shading represents the projection period, and dashed lines are the previous Tealbook.
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With the federal funds rate and longer-term interest rates continuing to rise, real
GDP growth slows to 2½ percent in 2017. The unemployment rate edges down further
and is almost ¼ percentage point below its natural rate at the end of 2017. The opening
of a modest positive output gap helps return inflation to the Committee’s 2 percent
objective by 2018. As monetary policy accommodation continues to be gradually
withdrawn, gains in real GDP slow to below their potential pace so that the output gap
narrows and the unemployment rate moves back toward its natural rate. The nominal
federal funds rate rises to just over 4 percent in 2019 and 2020.

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Domestic Econ Devel & Outlook

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Domestic Econ Devel & Outlook

Authorized for Public Release

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March 12, 2014

Evolution of the Staff Forecast
Change in Real GDP
Percent, Q4/Q4
5

5
2012

4

4

2015

2013

2014

3

3

2016

2

2

1

1

0

4/20

6/15

8/3

9/14

10/26 12/7

2011

1/18

3/7

4/18

6/13

7/25

9/5

10/17 12/5

2012

1/23

3/13

4/24

6/12

7/24

9/11

2013

10/23 12/11 1/22

3/12

0

2014

Tealbook publication date

Unemployment Rate
Percent, fourth quarter
9.0

9.0

8.5

8.5

8.0
7.5

8.0

2013

7.5

2012

7.0

2014

7.0

2015

6.5

6.5

6.0

6.0

5.5

5.5

2016

5.0
4.5

5.0
4/20

6/15

8/3

9/14

10/26 12/7

2011

1/18

3/7

4/18

6/13

7/25

9/5

10/17 12/5

2012

1/23

3/13

4/24

6/12

7/24

9/11

2013

10/23 12/11 1/22

3/12

4.5

2014

Tealbook publication date

Change in PCE Prices excluding Food and Energy
Percent, Q4/Q4
2.5

2.5

2.0

1.5

2015

2.0

2016

2012

1.5

2014
2013

1.0

1.0

0.5

0.5

0.0

4/20

2011

6/15

8/3

9/14

10/26 12/7

1/18

3/7

4/18

6/13

7/25

9/5

10/17 12/5

2012

1/23

2013

Tealbook publication date

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3/13

4/24

6/12

7/24

9/11

10/23 12/11 1/22

2014

3/12

0.0

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International Economic Developments and Outlook
Foreign real GDP growth edged down to a 2¾ percent pace in the fourth quarter
of 2013. This outcome was somewhat weaker than we projected in January, as growth in
Japan and Mexico was much lower than we had anticipated, overwhelming upside
surprises in many other economies. We expect foreign growth in the first half of this
year to continue at a similar rate and then to move up to almost 3½ percent by 2016.
area and a firming of conditions in emerging markets, especially in Latin America, after
particularly poor performance last year.
The trajectory of foreign economic growth is somewhat lower than we wrote
down in the previous Tealbook, particularly in the current quarter, owing to severe winter
weather in Canada and relatively subdued recent indicators in EMEs. The rest of the
forecast also has been revised down a bit. This revision is partly in response to the
slightly weaker path for U.S. growth, but it owes more importantly to our reassessment of
the underlying strength of economic activity in a number of countries. We now see
China’s economy decelerating a touch faster over the next few years than we previously
assumed, which will weigh on other EMEs, particularly in emerging Asia, and we are
somewhat more pessimistic about prospects in Latin America as well.
Although we believe that foreign growth will pick up over the forecast, we are
attentive to several risks to our outlook. The financial stresses that intensified in many
EMEs around the time of the January FOMC meeting have eased, but these could well
return, perhaps as monetary policy in the advanced economies normalizes. A possible
scenario along these lines is discussed in the “Stronger Dollar” simulation in the Risks
and Uncertainty (R&U) section of the Tealbook. In the extreme, such stresses could
snowball into a broad-based EME crisis, which is also discussed in R&U. Finally, we are
watching recent developments in Ukraine carefully. Although the response of global
financial markets to the Ukrainian crisis has been minimal, were this crisis to intensify, it
could have deeper effects on global markets and growth.
Foreign inflation is estimated to have fallen slightly in the current quarter, as a
welcome rise in inflation in the advanced foreign economies was more than offset by an
equally welcome decline in some EMEs. The rise in AFE inflation has been concentrated

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Much of this pickup in growth comes from a strengthening of the recovery in the euro

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in the euro area and Canada, where inflation had fallen to very low levels late last year.
Although the risk of AFE deflation has receded somewhat, substantial resource slack and
below-target inflation will keep monetary policy in the AFEs highly accommodative for
some time. Meanwhile, a number of the more vulnerable EMEs continued to tighten
monetary policy during the intermeeting period, and financial stress in some of these
economies appears to have become less acute in recent weeks.

ADVANCED FOREIGN ECONOMIES
Int’l Econ Devel & Outlook

Real GDP growth in the AFEs remained near a 2 percent pace in the fourth
quarter of 2013. Economic activity expanded for the third consecutive quarter in the euro
area, and growth was particularly solid in Canada and the United Kingdom. In contrast,
the pace of activity in Japan failed to pick up from its modest third-quarter rate. We see
AFE growth continuing at about 2 percent in the first quarter, before dipping to
1¾ percent in the second quarter as Japanese output contracts in response to a
consumption tax hike. Thereafter, as the Japanese economy resumes growth and the
recovery in the euro area continues to firm, AFE growth moves back up, averaging
2¼ percent over the remainder of the forecast period, somewhat above our estimate of
potential growth. Relative to the January Tealbook, our outlook for the AFEs is down a
touch, largely reflecting the markdowns to U.S. and EME growth.
Recent data suggest that quarterly inflation in the AFEs will pick up to 1¼ percent
in the first quarter from 0.7 percent at the end of 2013. With output gaps projected to
narrow and inflation expectations relatively well anchored, AFE inflation should rise to
1¾ percent by the end of the forecast period, still a bit below the 2 percent targets in most
of these economies. Given our outlook of moderate growth and subdued inflation, we
expect monetary policy in the major AFEs to remain highly accommodative through
2016. That said, we do have policy rates moving up in all of the major advanced
economies by the end of 2016 as slack is substantially eroded.

Japan
Japanese real GDP rose just 0.7 percent in the fourth quarter, 3 percentage points
less than estimated in the previous Tealbook. Much of the surprise reflected a large
negative contribution from the external sector, as imports rose sharply, while export
growth was muted. In addition, household spending picked up less than we had thought
given our expectation that purchases will be pulled forward ahead of April’s consumption
tax hike. Our sense is that the fourth-quarter weakness will prove transitory, as a surge in
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industrial production in January, as well as relatively strong car registrations and elevated
PMI readings through February, point to a substantial strengthening of activity. Despite
the recent weakness of exports, we continue to expect that last year’s large yen
depreciation will provide a noticeable boost to external demand this year. Accordingly,
we project that real GDP will expand 4¼ percent in the first quarter before contracting
3¾ percent in the next as the consumption tax rate jumps from 5 percent to 8 percent.
Thereafter, growth should rebound to a 2 percent pace in the second half of the year,
partly boosted by fiscal stimulus measures, and average 1¼ percent over the remainder of

Quarterly inflation was 2 percent (annual rate) at the end of 2013 but should fall
back to 1 percent in the current quarter, as energy and food prices stabilize after being
elevated by the pass-through of previous yen depreciation. Excluding the direct effect of
two planned tax hikes, we see inflation remaining near 1 percent in 2014 and then rising
to 1¾ percent by late 2016 as additional monetary easing promotes a further narrowing of
the output gap and an increase in inflation expectations. Indeed, we continue to assume
that the Bank of Japan will extend and expand its asset purchase program next quarter as
it aims to raise inflation to 2 percent.

Euro Area
Euro-area GDP expanded 1.1 percent in the fourth quarter, with activity
strengthening in both core and peripheral economies. Recent data, including a pickup in
retail sales in January, and further gains in the composite PMI and economic sentiment
through February, suggest that the pace of expansion is firming. In addition, bank
lending standards for mortgages in the fourth quarter eased for the first time since 2007.
All told, we revised up slightly our projection for euro-area growth in the near term. We
now think that GDP growth will average 1¼ percent in the first half of this year before
rising to 2 percent in 2016. This projection reflects a gradual pickup in domestic demand
as fiscal consolidation diminishes, financial and credit conditions normalize, and
monetary policy remains accommodative. It also assumes that European authorities will
make continued progress with fiscal and structural reforms, including the review of the
banking system and establishment of a single European supervisor.
Data through February suggest that inflation will rise to a ¾ percent annual rate
this quarter from 0.1 percent in the previous quarter, as a further decline in retail energy
prices is more than offset by a firming of core prices. The recovery in output and

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Int’l Econ Devel & Outlook

the forecast period.

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stabilization of energy prices should gradually push inflation to 1½ percent by the end of
2016. Amid signs of improvement in inflation and activity, the European Central Bank
(ECB) left its benchmark policy rate at 0.25 percent in March, reiterating its readiness to
act if conditions deteriorated. We continue to expect the ECB to raise its main policy rate
in the first half of 2016.

United Kingdom
The final release of national accounts data confirmed that the U.K. economy

Int’l Econ Devel & Outlook

expanded at an annual rate of nearly 3 percent in the fourth quarter of last year, similar to
the average pace for the first three quarters and up sharply from a stagnant 2012. Last
year’s acceleration in growth was accompanied by a surprisingly strong performance of
the labor market, with the unemployment rate falling from 7.8 percent in mid-2013 to
7.2 percent in the fourth quarter. In addition, investment picked up noticeably during the
course of 2013. Given the momentum in investment, and taking into account robust
PMIs in recent months, we believe output growth will remain at a solid 3 percent in 2014
before easing back to 2½ percent in 2015 and 2016.
Consumer prices fell slightly in January, leading us to lower our forecast of
current-quarter inflation to 1¼ percent. Thereafter, with the output gap projected to
close, inflation should gradually pick up to nearly 2 percent over the remainder of the
forecast period. On February 12, the Bank of England updated its guidance on monetary
policy following a decline in the unemployment rate to near its previously announced
threshold of 7 percent, as discussed in the box “The Bank of England’s Next Phase of
Forward Guidance.” The guidance was consistent with our prior expectation of a rate
hike in early 2015, followed by gradual increases thereafter.

Canada
Canadian real GDP rose 2.9 percent in the fourth quarter, ¾ percentage point
more than estimated in the January Tealbook, driven by solid gains in consumption and
exports. However, data through February show that employment growth slowed sharply
and that the manufacturing PMI fell well below its fourth-quarter level. We judge that
these readings owe their weakness largely to severe winter weather in Canada and lower
growth in the United States, and we have first-quarter growth slowing to 1¾ percent,
¾ percentage point less than in the January Tealbook. Looking ahead, we expect real
GDP growth to bounce back to 3 percent in the second quarter, before settling near
2½ percent over the remainder of the forecast period. This outlook is down a touch since

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the previous Tealbook, reflecting a downbeat annual survey of Canadian investment
intentions and the more moderate path for U.S. growth.
In January, core inflation firmed and headline inflation rose to 1.5 percent on a
12-month basis, from 1.3 percent in December. Accounting for recent currency
depreciation and higher projected energy prices, we now expect consumer prices to rise at
an annual rate of 2 percent in the first half of this year, up from 0.5 percent in the fourth
quarter of 2013. Inflation should then moderate to 1½ percent in the second half of 2014
Against the backdrop of slightly slower growth and still-moderate inflation, we expect
the Bank of Canada to keep its policy rate at 1 percent until the third quarter of 2015, one
quarter longer than in the previous Tealbook.

EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES
Real GDP growth in the EMEs slowed to an annual rate of 3½ percent in the
fourth quarter from 4¼ percent the previous quarter, as a surprising step-down in
Mexico’s growth and moderating activity in China more than offset a step-up in Brazil
and much of emerging Asia. Recent indicators suggest that EME growth will remain at a
3½ percent pace in the current quarter before strengthening to a near-trend pace of
4½ percent by next year. This pickup is concentrated in Latin America. In particular, we
expect the Mexican economy, which has a large weight in U.S. trade, to exit its recent
soft patch and be boosted by the implementation of structural reforms.
Relative to the January Tealbook, we have marked down our forecast for the
EMEs. This downshift is particularly evident in China, where we see a sharper reining-in
of credit than previously anticipated, and in Brazil, where elevated inflation in the face of
unaddressed structural problems will weigh on activity.
Taking a longer view, we see EME growth settling at a pace that, at 4½ percent,
is considerably below that observed in the several years prior to the global financial
crisis. The slowdown is greater in emerging Asia, particularly China, where the aging of
the population and the lessening of opportunities for technological catch-up as these
economies mature should lower potential growth. Our path for economic activity in the
EMEs is also predicated on the assumption that monetary policy normalization in the
advanced economies does not severely disrupt financial or economic conditions in the
EMEs. Under this assumption, the situation improves for vulnerable EMEs and the

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Int’l Econ Devel & Outlook

before slowly edging back up to 2 percent by late 2016 as the output gap is eliminated.

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The Bank of England’s Next Phase of Forward Guidance

Int’l Econ Devel & Outlook

Following a much more rapid drop in the unemployment rate than was anticipated when the
Bank of England (BOE) introduced its forward guidance last August, the BOE’s Monetary Policy
Committee (MPC) provided new guidance in February on how it will set monetary policy once
the unemployment rate has crossed the policy threshold.
The BOE’s August announcement of forward guidance focused on reassuring the public that it
would not consider raising its policy rate at least until the unemployment rate fell below a
threshold of 7 percent or one of three “knockouts” materialized. The knockouts were stated
as: (1) the MPC projects CPI inflation 18 to 24 months ahead to be 0.5 percentage point or more
above the 2 percent target, (2) “medium-term inflation expectations no longer remain
sufficiently well anchored,” and (3) “The Financial Policy Committee judges that the stance of
monetary policy poses a significant threat to financial stability. . .” At the time of the August
announcement, the MPC projected that the unemployment rate (shown in the upper-left figure
on the following page) would remain above the threshold until late 2016. Since then, however,
U.K. employment has grown rapidly and the unemployment rate has fallen surprisingly quickly
to 7.2 percent by December.
The BOE’s new guidance, published in its February Inflation Report, provides little concrete
information about the likely timing of liftoff of the policy rate, aside from the assertion that the
MPC sees further scope to reduce spare capacity before raising the Bank Rate from its present
level of 0.5 percent. Instead, the guidance aims to inform the public about the factors likely to
be most influential in determining the pace at which policy accommodation is removed over the
next couple of years as well as the factors likely to affect policy in the medium run after inflation
and resource gaps have closed.
More specifically, there are four key facets of the new guidance. First, it ties policy rate
adjustment not only to keeping inflation near the BOE’s 2 percent target but also to “avoiding
wasteful spare capacity” in the U.K. economy. At the moment, the MPC judges that spare
capacity is equivalent to 1 to 1½ percent of GDP and is concentrated in the labor market. This
estimate reflects the gap between the unemployment rate and its estimated medium-term
equilibrium rate of 6 to 6½ percent as well as the shortfall of average hours worked relative to
employees’ desired hours (illustrated in the upper-right figure by the rise in those working part
time because they could not find a full-time job).
Second, as the new guidance does not contain a threshold once the unemployment rate falls
below 7 percent, the inflation and financial stability knockouts will not continue. The inflation
knockouts will be replaced by the normal discussion of the inflation forecast, and the financial
stability knockout will be replaced by a statement that monetary policy is a last line of defense
in mitigating financial stability risks, suggesting a clear division of labor between monetary
policy and macroprudential policy.
Third, the MPC projects that the eventual increase in its policy rate will be gradual, based on its
assessment that the recovery will continue to be restrained by several headwinds, including
restrictive fiscal policy, elevated interest rate spreads, and subdued global demand. Moreover,
the MPC thinks that productivity growth, which plunged during the recession and has
disappointed during the recovery, will gradually increase. In the MPC’s view, faster productivity
growth would slow employment growth, allowing output to expand briskly while limiting wage

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and price pressures (shown in the lower-left figure). (Given the U.K.’s strong job growth in
recent months, this part of the MPC’s outlook seems especially subject to risks.) Finally,
inflation is expected to remain at, or a little below, target in the next three years.

Market reaction to the new guidance was quite muted, with little change to policy expectations
(shown in the lower-right figure). In our view, the new guidance is likely to play a constructive
role in reassuring markets that liftoff is probably a ways off and that future rate increases likely
will be gradual. Moreover, we find it useful that the guidance is linked to the degree of overall
spare capacity in the U.K. economy, which the BOE has attempted to measure and forecast.
However, the new guidance does not communicate how the MPC would respond to shocks,
beyond noting that the Bank Rate would rise more slowly if the recovery falters or more quickly
if inflation picks up. Thus, it remains to be seen whether this guidance will prove to be useful in
shaping future market expectations as the recovery progresses.

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Fourth, the MPC indicated that, even when the economy will be operating at normal levels of
capacity with inflation close to target, its policy rate in the medium term likely will be materially
lower than its pre-crisis average of 5 percent, reflecting the persistent economic headwinds
listed above. The MPC signaled that the lower rate in the medium term is also consistent with
the global downward trend in real interest rates that started before the financial crisis.
Governor Carney suggested that one possible path of the Bank Rate is that implied by market
expectations, which puts the Bank Rate at the end of 2016 at around 2 percent.

Class II FOMC - Restricted (FR)

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March 12, 2014

malaise recently seen in Latin America gradually lifts. However, as discussed earlier, we
continue to view a broad EME financial crisis as a notable downside risk to the outlook.
We estimate that quarterly inflation in the EMEs fell to 2¾ percent in the current
quarter, primarily reflecting a dip in Asian inflation. We expect EME inflation to rise
again as a rebound of inflation in emerging Asia more than offsets a moderation in Latin
America. Central banks in Argentina, Brazil, India, South Africa, and Turkey tightened
policy during the intermeeting period to contain inflation and support their currencies,

Int’l Econ Devel & Outlook

while those in Chile, Israel, and Thailand cut rates, citing growth concerns.

China
Chinese economic indicators are difficult to interpret this time of year due to the
irregular timing of the Chinese New Year holiday but, on balance, appear consistent with
moderation from the robust pace of growth in the second half of last year. Of note, the
official PMI moved down in January and February and currently stands at around 50, a
level we judge to be consistent with growth of 7 to 8 percent. Although credit growth
remains relatively strong, our sense is that rising interest rates, amid a steady rollout of
new regulations aimed at reining in the shadow banking sector, will curb investment
more than we previously anticipated. As a result, we now expect growth to fall to
7¼ percent this year—½ percentage point below what we wrote down in the January
Tealbook—from 7½ percent last year. We expect growth to remain a little above
7 percent in 2015 and 2016. Although we see a risk that the combination of slowing
growth and tightening credit could trigger a financial crisis, we do not view this scenario
as very likely.
We estimate that consumer price inflation fell to 1 percent at an annual rate in the
current quarter, reflecting both a decline in pork prices and a pronounced easing of core
inflation. Inflation should rise to 3¼ percent next quarter as some of the decline in pork
prices is reversed and core inflation firms, before stabilizing at about 3 percent for the
remainder of the forecast period.
As noted in the Financial Developments section, Chinese authorities engineered a
notable 1½ percent depreciation of the renminbi against the dollar during the
intermeeting period, likely in order to flush out speculative positions betting on continued
appreciation of the currency. At this point, we do not believe this move is the start of a

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sustained depreciation to support growth, as this would undermine the authorities’ stated
intention to liberalize the exchange rate and rebalance the economy.

Other Emerging Asia
Growth in the other emerging Asian economies picked up to a brisk 5¼ percent
annual pace in the fourth quarter, nearly a percentage point stronger than we were
expecting. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan all registered
very strong growth of 6 percent or more. The region’s growth was boosted by a pickup
products. However, available indicators for the current quarter, including PMIs,
industrial production, and exports, suggest that growth slowed from the above-trend pace
of the fourth quarter. We expect growth to dip to 3¾ percent this quarter, before rising
gradually to 4½ percent by early next year.
We estimate that consumer price inflation fell to an annual rate of 2½ percent in
the current quarter from higher-than-usual rates in the previous several quarters. This dip
was largely driven by a sharp decline in food price inflation in India. We expect inflation
to rise again going forward, stabilizing at about 3½ percent by the end of this year.

Latin America
Mexico’s economy stalled unexpectedly in the fourth quarter, with real GDP
growing at just ¾ percent, as auto plants closed for retooling and consumer confidence
fell. A subsequent bounceback in auto production in the first two months of the year
provides comfort that some of the fourth-quarter weakness was transitory. However, the
significant downward revision in the outlook for U.S. manufacturing production led us to
mark down our forecast for Mexican growth in the first half of this year. We now see
growth rising to only 2½ percent in the current quarter, before picking up to 3½ percent
by the end of the year as U.S. manufacturing output firms.
We estimate that consumer price inflation in Mexico spiked to 5½ percent in the
current quarter, on the back of hikes in VAT rates and administered prices for gasoline
and public transport. The effects of these increases should be temporary, and we expect
inflation to decline to about 3½ percent by the second half of this year, within the central
bank’s target band of 2 to 4 percent.
After contracting in the third quarter, Brazil’s real GDP grew at a stronger-thanexpected 2¾ percent rate in the fourth quarter. However, recent weakness in industrial
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in exports at the end of last year, reflecting in part strong shipments of high-tech

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production, exports, PMI, and consumer confidence caused us to revise down growth in
the current quarter by 2 percentage points to a mere ½ percent. We have also grown
gloomier about Brazil’s economic prospects as fiscal and monetary tightening, as well as
slower growth in key trading partners, including China, Argentina, and Venezuela, are
expected to weigh on growth. Our downward revision also reflects a reassessment of
Brazil’s potential growth in light of continued elevated inflation despite weak activity.
We now see growth picking up to about 2½ percent by the end of this year and edging up
only slightly thereafter. Beyond the current quarter, our outlook is about ¾ percentage
Int’l Econ Devel & Outlook

point lower throughout the forecast period than in the January Tealbook.
Inflation continues to hover around 6 percent in Brazil, a reflection of tight labor
market conditions, pass-through from the depreciation of the real in recent months, and
persistently high inflation expectations. Citing concerns over inflationary pressures,
Brazil’s central bank raised its main policy rate a further 25 basis points in February,
bringing the cumulative increase during the current tightening cycle to 350 basis points.
We expect inflation to fall gradually as this tightening takes effect, reaching about
5½ percent by the end of this year. Inflation has risen sharply elsewhere in South
America, notably in Argentina and Venezuela, whose currencies have depreciated
sharply. In February, Argentina, which has long been suspected of underreporting
inflation, introduced a long-awaited new consumer price index. The index showed a
3.7 percent increase (not at an annual rate) in January, consistent with private estimates.

Other Emerging Market Economies
Ukraine is on the verge of economic collapse. During the intermeeting period,
pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovich was ousted after months of political protests.
Accelerating capital outflows as the political crisis deepened forced Ukrainian authorities
to abandon the currency peg and expand capital controls. Russia’s subsequent decision to
deploy armed soldiers to Crimea led to a sharp escalation in geopolitical tensions with
brief but unsettling reverberations throughout global financial markets.
Although markets rebounded, the risk of further turmoil remains significant,
especially given the lack of a clear way forward. The United States has responded by
imposing sanctions on certain Russian individuals linked with the invasion of Crimea. It
remains uncertain how Europe, which depends heavily on Russia for its oil and gas, will
respond. Ukraine’s transitional government is now in talks with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and Western governments to secure external financing, although

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negotiations are expected to be challenging given the unstable political situation and
Ukraine’s checkered history with IMF adjustment programs. Should the crisis intensify,
and especially if geopolitical tensions flare up again, there could be significant effects on
world commodity and financial markets and, at an extreme, adverse consequences for the

Int’l Econ Devel & Outlook

global economic outlook.

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The Foreign GDP Outlook

Real GDP*

Percent change, annual rate

Int’l Econ Devel & Outlook

2013

2014

2015

2016

3.2
3.3

3.3
3.4

3.4
3.5

1.7
1.5
3.0
1.3
-3.8
2.9

2.2
2.2
2.5
1.4
2.0
2.9

2.2
2.2
2.6
1.7
1.0
2.6

2.2
2.3
2.6
1.9
1.3
2.5

3.8
4.3
7.3
3.9
2.9
2.2

4.1
4.5
7.1
4.2
3.4
2.5

4.4
4.6
7.3
4.5
3.6
2.6

4.5
4.6
7.4
4.6
3.7
2.7

H1

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

H2

1. Total Foreign
Previous Tealbook

2.2
2.1

3.0
2.9

2.8
3.1

2.7
3.3

2.8
2.9

2.

2.0
1.7
2.5
0.2
4.3
2.3

1.9
1.9
2.7
0.6
0.9
3.4

2.1
2.0
2.9
1.1
0.7
2.9

2.1
2.3
1.8
1.3
4.2
3.0

Emerging Market Economies 2.4
Previous Tealbook
2.5
China
6.9
Emerging Asia ex. China
2.9
Mexico
-1.0
Brazil
3.7

4.2
3.9
8.8
4.4
3.9
-2.1

3.5
4.2
8.0
5.2
0.7
2.8

3.4
4.2
7.5
3.7
2.5
0.4

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Advanced Foreign Economies
Previous Tealbook
Canada
Euro Area
Japan
United Kingdom

* GDP aggregates weighted by shares of U.S. merchandise exports.

Total Foreign GDP

Foreign GDP
Percent change, annual rate

8

Current
Previous Tealbook

Percent change, annual rate

10

Current
Previous Tealbook
6
Emerging market economies
4

5

2

0
0
-2

Advanced foreign economies

-4
-5

-6
-8

-10
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

-10
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Page 46 of 96

Authorized for Public Release

Class II FOMC - Restricted (FR)

March 12, 2014

The Foreign Inflation Outlook

Consumer Prices*
2013

2014

2015

2016

2.5
2.4

2.6
2.6

2.6
2.6

2.9
2.7
2.0
1.2
8.8
1.7

1.3
1.3
1.5
1.3
0.8
2.0

1.7
1.7
1.7
1.3
2.6
1.9

1.7
1.7
1.9
1.5
1.7
1.9

3.4
3.3
3.2
3.0
3.3
6.0

3.4
3.3
3.0
3.4
3.4
5.8

3.3
3.3
3.0
3.4
3.4
5.4

3.3
3.3
3.0
3.4
3.4
5.3

H1

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

H2

1. Total Foreign
Previous Tealbook

2.1
2.1

2.8
2.8

2.4
2.3

2.1
2.3

3.2
3.0

2.

Advanced Foreign Economies
Previous Tealbook
Canada
Euro Area
Japan
United Kingdom

0.7
0.7
0.8
0.7
0.4
2.0

2.1
2.0
1.9
1.7
3.0
2.9

0.7
0.5
0.5
0.1
1.9
1.3

1.2
1.0
2.0
0.7
1.0
1.2

Emerging Market Economies
Previous Tealbook
China
Emerging Asia ex. China
Mexico
Brazil

3.2
3.2
2.6
2.8
4.2
6.4

3.3
3.3
3.4
4.0
2.0
4.6

3.7
3.7
3.0
4.0
4.2
6.0

2.7
3.3
1.1
2.5
5.4
5.9

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Int’l Econ Devel & Outlook

Percent change, annual rate

* CPI aggregates weighted by shares of U.S. non-oil imports.

Foreign Monetary Policy
AFE Policy Rates

AFE Central Bank Balance Sheets
Percent

Japan
Euro area
Canada
United Kingdom

Percent of GDP

3.0

Japan
Euro area
Canada
United Kingdom

2.5

EME Policy Rates
Percent

50

Korea
Brazil
Mexico

45

14

12

40
10

2.0

35
30

8

25

6

1.5

1.0

20
4
15

0.5

2

10
0.0
2009

2011

2013

2015

5
2008

2010

Page 47 of 96

2012

0
2009

2011

2013

2015

Class II FOMC - Restricted (FR)

Authorized for Public Release

March 12, 2014

Recent Foreign Indicators
Nominal Exports

Industrial Production
Jan. 2008 = 100

Int’l Econ Devel & Outlook

Foreign
AFE
EME*

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

120
115

120

110

110

105

100

100

90

95

80

90

70

85

60
2014

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

80
2014

* Excludes Australia and Switzerland.
** Excludes Colombia, Hong Kong, the Philippines, and Venezuela.

Retail Sales

Employment
12-month percent change

Foreign
AFE*
EME**

2010

Foreign
AFE*
EME**

130

* Excludes Venezuela.

2009

Jan. 2008 = 100

140

2011

2012

2013

3

2

10

1

5

0

0

-1

* Excludes Australia and Switzerland.
** Includes Brazil, China, Indonesia, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan.

Consumer Prices: Advanced Foreign Economies
Headline
Core*

Foreign
AFE
EME*

15

-5
2014

12-month percent change

4-quarter percent change

20

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

-2
2014

* Excludes Argentina and Mexico.

Consumer Prices: Emerging Market Economies
12-month percent change
8
Headline
Ex. food--East Asia
Ex. food--Latin America
6

3.0
2.5
2.0

4

1.5
1.0

2

0.5

0

0.0
-2

-0.5
2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Note: Excludes Australia, Sweden, and Switzerland.
* Excludes all food and energy; staff calculation.
Source: Haver Analytics and CEIC.

-1.0
2014

2009

Page 48 of 96

2010

2011

2012

2013

-4
2014

Authorized for Public Release

Class II FOMC - Restricted (FR)

March 12, 2014

Evolution of Staff’s International Forecast

Total Foreign GDP
Percent change, Q4/Q4

6
5

2015

2014

2013

4

2016

2012

2
1

9/14 10/26 12/7 1/18
2012

3/7

4/18

6/13 7/25

9/5 10/17

12/5

1/23
2013

3/13 4/24

6/12 7/24

9/11 10/23 12/11 1/22
2014

3/12

0

Tealbook publication date

Total Foreign CPI
Percent change, Q4/Q4

4.0
3.5

2015

2014

2013

2012

3.0

2016

2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5

9/14 10/26 12/7 1/18
2012

3/7

4/18

6/13 7/25

9/5 10/17

12/5

1/23
2013

3/13 4/24

6/12 7/24

9/11 10/23 12/11 1/22
2014

3/12

0.0

Tealbook publication date

U.S. Current Account Balance
Percent of GDP

0
-1

2012
-2
2015
-3
2016

2013

2014
-4
-5

9/14 10/26 12/7 1/18
2012

3/7

4/18

6/13 7/25

9/5 10/17

12/5

1/23
2013

3/13 4/24

Tealbook publication date

Page 49 of 96

6/12 7/24

9/11 10/23 12/11 1/22
2014

3/12

-6

Int’l Econ Devel & Outlook

3

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Authorized for Public Release

Int’l Econ Devel & Outlook

(This page is intentionally blank.)

Page 50 of 96

March 12, 2014

Class II FOMC - Restricted (FR)

Authorized for Public Release

March 12, 2014

Financial Developments
Market participants appeared to discount the generally weaker-than-expected
U.S. economic data released over the intermeeting period in light of the possible
temporary effects of unusually cold weather. In addition, investors appeared to become
broadly more willing to take riskier positions, likely due in part to an easing of concerns
about financial stresses in the emerging market economies (EMEs) early in the
intermeeting period. On balance, the path of the federal funds rate was little changed, as
were longer-term Treasury yields; however, equity prices rose, corporate bond spreads
narrowed—particularly for speculative-grade issues—and the dollar depreciated slightly.
•

FOMC communications over the intermeeting period were about in line
with market expectations. The Open Market Desk’s March Survey of
Primary Dealers suggests that most dealers expect the Committee to
change its forward-guidance language at the upcoming meeting, with
many anticipating a shift toward qualitative guidance.

•

Credit flows to nonfinancial corporations remained robust. Financing
gradually.

•

Credit conditions in residential mortgage markets remained tight, even as
further incremental signs of easing emerged. Access to credit cards
continued to be tight for borrowers with low credit scores, while auto and
student loans stayed widely available.

•

Asset price movements in foreign financial markets were broadly similar
to those in the United States. Global financial market volatility increased
only temporarily with the turmoil in Ukraine. Notably, the Bank of
England updated its forward guidance, stating that there remains scope to
absorb spare capacity further before raising its policy rate.

Page 51 of 96

Financial Developments

conditions in commercial real estate (CRE) markets continued to improve

Class II FOMC - Restricted (FR)

Authorized for Public Release

March 12, 2014

Policy Expectations and Treasury Yields
Selected Interest Rates
Percent
2.9

Percent

Monetary Policy
Report released

Jan. FOMC
statement

Jan. FOMC
minutes 10-year Treasury
yield (left scale)

Jan. retail
trade report

Jan. employment
report

2.8

1.2

Feb. employment
report

1.1

2.7

1.0

2.6

0.9
December 2015
Eurodollar (right scale)

2.5

0.8
Jan. 29

Feb. 3

Feb. 6

Feb. 11

Feb. 14

Feb. 19

Feb. 24

Feb. 27

Mar. 4

Mar. 7

Note: 5-minute intervals. 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.
Source: Bloomberg.

Treasury Yield Curve

Implied Federal Funds Rate
Percent

Percent
4.5

2.5

Mean: March 11, 2014
Mean: January 28, 2014
Mode: March 11, 2014
Mode: January 28, 2014

Most recent: March 11, 2014
Last FOMC: January 28, 2014

2.0

4.0
3.5
3.0

1.5

2.5
2.0

1.0

Financial Developments

1.5
0.5

1.0
0.5

0.0

0.0
2014

2015

2016

2017

1

3

5

7

10

20

Years ahead

Note: Mean is estimated using overnight index swap quotes.
Mode is estimated from the distribution of federal funds rate
implied by interest rate caps. Both include a term premium of
zero basis points per month.
Source: Bloomberg; CME Group.

Note: Smoothed yield curve estimated from off-the-run
Treasury coupon securities. Yields shown are those on
notional par Treasury securities with semiannual coupons.
Source: Federal Reserve Board.

Inflation Compensation

Option-Implied Interest Rate Volatility
Percent

Basis points
4

Daily

Jan.
FOMC

5 to 10 years ahead

Daily

150
Jan.
FOMC

Short-term rate
Long-term rate

130

3
110
Mar.
11

2
Mar.
11

90
70

1
Next 5 years*

50
0

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

30
2011

2012

2013

2014

Note: Implied volatility of the long-term rate is based on
options on the 10-year swap rate that expire in 3 months, while
implied volatility of the short-term rate is based on options on
the 1-year swap rate that expire in 2 years.
Source: Staff calculations from Barclays data.

Note: Estimates based on smoothed nominal and inflationindexed Treasury yield curves.
* Adjusted for lagged indexation of Treasury inflationprotected securities (carry effect).
Source: Barclays PLC; staff estimates.

Page 52 of 96

Class II FOMC - Restricted (FR)

Authorized for Public Release

March 12, 2014

POLICY EXPECTATIONS AND TREASURY YIELDS
Market reactions to FOMC communications were muted over the intermeeting
period. The January FOMC decision and statement were largely anticipated by market
participants. The Monetary Policy Report and Chair Yellen’s congressional testimony
were viewed as emphasizing continuity in the approach to monetary policy, solidifying
expectations that the pace of the FOMC’s asset purchases would be reduced by a further
$10 billion at each upcoming meeting absent a material change in the economic outlook.
Following the release of the January FOMC minutes on February 19, market commentary
noted that meeting participants seemed to attribute the soft economic data, at least in part,
to adverse winter weather.
Policy expectations moved little, on net, over the intermeeting period. The path
of the federal funds rate implied by financial market quotes was little changed, and the
Desk’s March Survey of Primary Dealers indicates that dealers’ expectations about
monetary policy—including the projected path of the federal funds rate and SOMA
holdings—have held steady since January. 1 However, most dealers now expect the
Committee to modify its forward rate guidance at the March meeting, and dealers appear
to see substantial odds that the threshold-based guidance will be de-emphasized or

Treasury yields were little changed, on net, over the intermeeting period, as
waning flight-to-quality demands early in the period appeared to offset generally weakerthan-expected economic data releases. Investors reportedly attributed the softer data, to
some extent, to adverse weather conditions. On net, 5-year Treasury yields edged up
4 basis points since the January FOMC meeting, 10-year Treasury yields were
unchanged, agency MBS yields ticked up 4 basis points, and option-adjusted spreads on
production-coupon MBS were about unchanged. TIPS-based measures of inflation
compensation were also little changed.

1

According to the results from the Desk’s pilot survey of market participants, which was
conducted for the second time in March with a modestly expanded panel of respondents, expectations of
active investors are broadly in line with those of the primary dealers.

Page 53 of 96

Financial Developments

dropped and replaced with qualitative guidance.

Authorized for Public Release

Class II FOMC - Restricted (FR)

March 12, 2014

Treasury and Agency Finance and Short-Term Funding Markets
Average Nominal On-the-Run Daily Bid-Asked
Cents per 100 dollars
Spread

Billions of dollars
9

2-year
5-year
10-year
30-year

5-day moving average

Nominal Treasury Issuance and Fed Purchases

Jan.
FOMC

Monthly rate

8

Gross issuance
Net issuance
Fed purchases by settlement date

7
6

H1

5

H1
H2

H2

Q3

Jan.
Q4 Feb.

2013

2014

H1

4
3
Mar.
11

2
1
0

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2010

2011

2012

Note: Series contain breaks and are considered more reliable
starting on January 1, 2010 (indicated by the dashed vertical line),
and going forward.
Source: BrokerTec.

Note: Excludes bills.
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury; Federal Reserve
Bank of New York.

Agency MBS Issuance and Fed Purchases

Funding Spreads

Billions of dollars
Daily

Gross issuance
Net issuance
Fed purchases by settlement date
H2

200

26

Jan.
FOMC

3x6 FRA-OIS*
3-month LIBOR-OIS

24
22

150
H1

Q3

H1

20
Mar.
11

100
Q4 Jan.

H2

H1

Financial Developments

Basis points

250

Monthly rate

400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
-50
-100

Feb.

18
16

50

14

0

12

-50

10

Note: Issuance and purchases of 30-year fixed-rate agency
MBS.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

July
Sept.
Nov.
Jan.
Mar.
2013
2014
* Spread is calculated from a LIBOR forward rate agreement
(FRA) 3 to 6 months in the future and the forward overnight
index swap (OIS) rate for the same period.
Source: Bloomberg.

Treasury Bill Yield Curves

ON RRP Take-Up versus Market Spreads

2010

2011

2012

2013

Mar.

2014

May

Yield (basis points)
Mar. 1,
2014

Total take-up (billions of dollars)
14

February 7, 2014
February 14, 2014

Intermeeting period, $5 billion cap
Intermeeting period, $7 billion cap
Prior intermeeting periods, all caps

12
10

200

150

8
100

6
4

50
2
0
Feb.

Apr.

June

Aug.
2014

Oct.

Dec.

Feb.
2015

Maturity date

0
-5

0

5

10

15

20

GC repo asked rate spread to ON RRP rate
Note: The general collateral (GC) repurchase agreement (repo)
asked rate is collected by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
15 minutes before the operation. Cap is per-counterparty constraint.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Note: Each observation is a Treasury bill quote.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Page 54 of 96

Class II FOMC - Restricted (FR)

Authorized for Public Release

March 12, 2014

TREASURY AND AGENCY FINANCE AND MARKET FUNCTIONING
Since the January FOMC meeting, the Treasury Department auctioned
$230 billion of nominal fixed-rate coupon securities and $9 billion of TIPS. In addition,
the Treasury’s first-ever auction of a floating-rate note (FRN) on January 29 was well
received, as was the subsequent reopening, with a broad set of investors (including
foreign central banks, hedge funds, and corporate cash managers) reportedly participating
in the auctions. In total, the Treasury has issued $28 billion of two-year FRNs. The
February Quarterly Refunding Statement noted that the Treasury expects to auction
additional FRNs quarterly (each with two monthly reopenings).
Federal Reserve purchase operations did not appear to have any material adverse
effect on the functioning of Treasury and agency MBS markets. 2 As in the fourth quarter
of 2013, the size of SOMA settlements roughly equaled the gross issuance of agency
MBS in January and February. Dollar-roll-implied financing rates for production-coupon
MBS moved lower, although they remained in recent ranges.

SHORT-TERM FUNDING MARKETS
Conditions in unsecured short-term dollar funding markets remained stable over
the debt ceiling until March 2015. In response to news of the pending legislation, yields
on Treasury bills maturing between late February and mid-March of this year—those that
could have been affected by delayed payments if a debt ceiling agreement had not been
reached—declined to more typical levels.
Market participants continued to focus on the Federal Reserve’s fixed-rate
overnight reverse repurchase agreement (ON RRP) exercise. Four separate changes to
the operations were announced over the period: The bid limit was raised from $3 billion
to $5 billion, the fixed rate was raised from 3 basis points to 4 basis points, the bid limit
was increased again to $7 billion, and the fixed rate was increased again to 5 basis
points. The second fixed-rate increase appeared to boost market repurchase rates for a
2

Over the intermeeting period, the Desk purchased $53 billion of Treasury securities under the
flow-based Treasury purchase program and $66 billion of agency MBS under the flow-based MBS
program and the reinvestment program. The Desk conducted $2 billion of dollar rolls.
3
The effective federal funds rate averaged 7 basis points over the intermeeting period, with the
intraday standard deviation averaging about 5 basis points.

Page 55 of 96

Financial Developments

the intermeeting period. 3 In mid-February, the Congress passed legislation suspending

Authorized for Public Release

Class II FOMC - Restricted (FR)

March 12, 2014

Other Asset Prices and Business Finance
S&P 500 Index

Corporate Bond Spreads
Log scale; Jan. 28, 2014 = 100
125 400

Jan.
FOMC

Daily

Basis points
115

Mar.
11

Daily

Basis points
800

Jan.
FOMC

10-year high-yield
(right scale)

105 350

650

95
300
85

500

75 250
350

65 200

Mar.
11

10-year BBB (left scale)

55 150
2011

2012

2013

200

2014

2011

Source: Bloomberg.

2012

2013

2014

Note: Spreads over 10-year Treasury yield.
Source: Staff estimates of smoothed corporate yield curves based
on Merrill Lynch data and smoothed Treasury yield curve.

Selected Components of Net Debt Financing,
Nonfinancial Firms
Billions of dollars

Institutional Leveraged Loan Issuance
Billions of dollars

120

Monthly rate

e

Feb.
Q3

100

H1

p

Q4e

Feb.

New money
Refinancing

80

e

90

Monthly rate

60

70

H1
p

Jan.

40

Financial Developments

40

0

Jan.e

Q3

30

-20

Total

-40

20

-60

10

-80
2010

2011

2012

2013

0

2014

2004

2006

2008

2010

Gross Proceeds from Nonfinancial Equity Issuance

Q4

Q3
H1

2004

2006

2008

Source: Securities Data Company.

2010

2012

Jan.
Feb.

2014

CMBS Issuance

Billions of dollars

Secondary equity offering
Initial public offering

2012

p Preliminary.
Source: Thomson Reuters LPC LoanConnector.

e Staff estimate of net corporate bond issuance and Feb. 2014
change in commercial and industrial (C&I) loans outstanding.
* Period-end basis, seasonally adjusted.
Source: Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation; Thomson
Reuters Financial; Federal Reserve Board.

Quarterly rate

60
50

Q4

20
Commercial paper*
C&I loans*
Bonds

80

Billions of dollars
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

240

Annual rate

210
180
150
120
Q4
H1

Feb.

90

Q3

60
Jan.

30
0

2014

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

Note: CMBS is commercial mortgage-backed securities.
Source: Commercial Mortgage Alert.

Page 56 of 96

2014

Class II FOMC - Restricted (FR)

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March 12, 2014

time, both at overnight and term maturities. Early in the period, market repurchase rates
were low and even dipped below the fixed rate, prompting high take-up in the
operations. Later on, repurchase rates moved higher, apparently in response to a rise in
Treasury bill issuance, and operation volumes moderated.
Responses to the March 2014 Senior Credit Officer Opinion Survey on Dealer
Financing Terms suggested little change over the past three months both in conditions in
securities financing and OTC derivatives markets and in credit terms applicable to most
classes of counterparties covered by the survey. However, nearly one-half of the dealers
surveyed reported an increase in demand for funding of non-agency RMBS. Also of note
was the result that roughly two-fifths of the dealers indicated some decline over the past
three months in the use of financial leverage at trading real estate investment trusts.

EQUITY VALUATIONS AND BOND SPREADS
Broad stock price indexes ended the intermeeting period up about 4 percent,
despite generally weaker-than-expected economic data. Investors attributed the
weakness, to some extent, to the temporary effects of unusually harsh winter weather.
Share prices also appeared to be boosted by a solid finish to the corporate earnings
likely reflecting, in part, an easing of concerns about EMEs early in the period. 4 The
VIX, an index of option-implied volatility for one-month returns on the S&P 500 index,
returned to very low levels after reaching a 52-week high around the time of the January
FOMC meeting, when concerns about EMEs peaked. Investment- and speculative-grade
corporate bond spreads spiked in early February but narrowed, on net, over the period,
with speculative-grade spreads declining to near the bottom of their range over the past
decade.

BUSINESS AND MUNICIPAL FINANCE
The pace of business financing in credit and equity markets continued to be fairly
strong, on balance, over the first two months of the year. Following a slowdown in
January, nonfinancial corporate bond issuance rebounded in February, with the majority

4

The stock price gains over the current intermeeting period followed a 3 percent decline in share
prices between the January Tealbook publication date and the January FOMC meeting, as concerns about
EMEs increased markedly.

Page 57 of 96

Financial Developments

season, as well as by a broad increase in investors’ willingness to take riskier positions,

Authorized for Public Release

Class II FOMC - Restricted (FR)

March 12, 2014

Household Finance
Prices of Existing Homes

Credit Scores at Mortgage Origination

Index peaks normalized to 100

FICO score

110

850

Monthly

Monthly
90th percentile

Zillow

800

100

Dec.

Dec.

750

Median

FHFA

90

Jan.
Jan.
Dec.

700

80

CoreLogic
10th percentile

650

70
20-city S&P/Case-Shiller

600

2003

2005

2007

2009

2011

60

2013

2006

2008

2010

Mortgage Rate and MBS Yield

Purchase and Refinance Activity
Percent
Jan.
FOMC

30-year conforming
fixed mortgage rate

Mar. 16, 1990 = 100
600

4.5

Financial Developments

Mar.
11

MBA Purchase Index (left scale)

500
400

8000

3.5

300

6000

MBA Refinance
Index
(right scale)

200

4000
Mar.
7

2.5
2.0
1.5
2011

2012

2013

100

Note: The MBS yield is the Fannie Mae 30-year current-coupon rate.
Source: For MBS yield, Barclays; for mortgage rate, Loansifter.

2005

2008

2011

24
20

2014

Note: The data are weekly and seasonally adjusted
by FRB staff.
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association.

Gross Consumer ABS Issuance

Percent change from a year earlier

Student loans

0
2002

Consumer Credit

2000

0

2014

Monthly

10000

4.0

3.0

MBS yield

12000

5.5
5.0

2010

2014

Source: For FHFA, Federal Housing Finance Agency; for
CoreLogic, CoreLogic; for S&P/Case-Shiller, Standard & Poor’s;
for Zillow, Zillow.

Note: Concerns 30-year GSE-backed purchase mortgages
originated in month shown.
Source: LPS Applied Analytics.

Daily

2012

Billions of dollars
Subprime auto
Prime auto
Credit card
Student loan

Monthly rate

16
12

28
24
20

8
Jan.

16

4
Q2

0
Auto

Q1

Feb.
Jan.

-4

8

-8

2008

2009

2010

2011

Mar.*

-12

Credit cards

2007

12

Q3 Q4

2012

Note: The data are not seasonally adjusted.
Source: Federal Reserve Board.

2013

2014

2008

2010

2012

2013

2014

* Month to date as of March 7.
Source: Inside MBS & ABS; Merrill Lynch; Federal Reserve
Board.

Page 58 of 96

4

Class II FOMC - Restricted (FR)

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March 12, 2014

of proceeds going to investment-grade firms. In addition, the growth of C&I loans on
banks’ balance sheets remained solid in January and surged in February. Institutional
issuance of leveraged loans has continued to be quite brisk this year; strong inflows into
the asset class by retail and institutional investors have contributed to a further easing of
lending standards and terms, which, in turn, has spurred additional refinancing
activity. Secondary-market equity offerings by nonfinancial companies also remained
robust, but the volume of IPOs was seasonally sluggish.
While Call Report data suggest that banks still have not appreciably increased
their lending to small businesses—even as credit supply to established small businesses
has reportedly eased—preliminary analysis of PayNet data suggests that credit flows
from nonbank lenders may have increased (see the box “Small Business Financing
Conditions”).
Demand for credit by nonfinancial corporations was likely boosted by merger and
acquisition activity, which increased further in the final quarter of 2013. The pace of new
deals was particularly notable for technology and health-care firms. The recent volume
of announced and pending deals suggests another step-up in merger activity in coming

Financing conditions in CRE markets continued to improve gradually. CRE loans
on banks’ books increased at a solid pace over the first two months of the year, and,
according to the most recent Call Report data, the fourth-quarter increases in banks’ CRE
loans were widespread across all major categories, including construction and land
development loans. After a slow start in January, CMBS issuance was robust in
February. Underwriting standards for commercial mortgages have reportedly continued
to ease somewhat as competition among lenders has intensified, although banks’ lending
standards do not appear to be nearly as loose as those prevailing in 2006 and 2007.
Conditions in the municipal bond market remained favorable over the
intermeeting period. Municipal bond yield ratios and the MCDX, an index of CDS for a
broad portfolio of municipal bonds, changed relatively little. That said, the City of
Detroit proposed a bankruptcy plan that offers much lower recovery rates for its
bondholders than would be suggested by historical benchmarks. Moreover, Standard &
Poor’s, Moody’s Investors Service, and Fitch Ratings downgraded Puerto Rico’s general
obligation (GO) bonds from investment grade to speculative grade over the
period. However, the prices of Puerto Rico GO bonds held steady through these events,
Page 59 of 96

Financial Developments

months.

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Small Business Financing Conditions
After declining sharply in the wake of the financial crisis, commercial lending by domestic banks
began to rebound in late 2010. However, the recovery has not been uniform. According to Call
Report data, outstanding large loans to businesses (a rough proxy for loans to large businesses)
have grown rapidly since late 2010, while outstanding small loans to businesses (a rough proxy
for loans to small businesses) continued to decline into 2013 and have remained essentially flat
since then (figure 1).

Financial Developments

This stagnation in outstanding small loans is a bit puzzling in light of improving credit supply
conditions for small businesses. Beginning in mid-2007, respondents to the Federal Reserve
Board’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices reported a sustained
period of tightening of standards and terms on loans to small businesses. However, since mid2010, banks have generally been reporting a net easing of standards and terms to such firms.
Similarly, small business borrowers reported substantial difficulty obtaining credit during and
immediately following the financial crisis, but they have been reporting gradually improving
access to credit since 2011. The most recent data from the National Federation of Independent
Business (NFIB) monthly member polls indicate that, among firms applying for credit, the
fraction reporting that their credit needs were satisfied has returned to near pre-crisis levels. In
addition, in the January 2014 Wells Fargo Small Business Index (WFSBI) survey, the fraction of
respondents reporting that credit was very difficult or somewhat difficult to obtain in the past
12 months declined to levels not seen since early 2009, though it remained elevated relative to
pre-crisis norms.
At least part of the explanation for the low levels of outstanding small loans seems to be
lackluster demand by small businesses for new loans. Only 13 percent of the respondents to the
January 2014 WFSBI survey reported that they intended to apply for a new credit product in the
next 12 months—a share that is essentially unchanged from the previous seven quarters.
Among NFIB members, 53 percent of respondents to the February 2014 member poll explicitly
stated that they were not interested in a loan, suggesting that the share of firms with

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borrowing needs is well below historical averages. Weak loan demand from small businesses
likely reflects, at least in part, their reluctance to expand. The share of respondents to the
NFIB’s member poll who view the next three months as a good time for expansion has
fluctuated between 5 and 10 percent since early 2008—a level that is quite low by historical
standards.

At this point, we cannot determine the extent to which the differences in trends between the
Call Report data and the PayNet data reflect the fact that PayNet measures loan originations
while Call Reports measure outstanding loan balances, the fact that the two data sources
capture the activities of different groups of lenders and credit products, or something else. The
Call Report data are limited to the universe of U.S. banks. About 50 percent of loan dollars
originated in the PayNet data are attributed to a subset of participating U.S. banks, about
30 percent to a number of captive finance companies, and the remaining 20 percent to some
noncaptive finance companies, credit unions, and alternative lenders. The lenders that do not
report to PayNet may be having very different experiences in terms of loan originations to small
businesses than those that do report.
To the extent that the increased originations may be driven in part by alternative lenders, one
should be cautious about interpreting them too positively. Alternative lenders generally make
small, short-term loans at high interest rates, typically with annual percentage rates greater
than 30 percent.

Page 61 of 96

Financial Developments

To gain additional insights into small businesses’ access to credit, the Board recently acquired
more-detailed quarterly data on small business lending from PayNet, a consortium of
commercial banks, credit unions, captive and noncaptive finance companies, and alternative
lenders that collects loan-level information on commercial loans and leases from individual
lenders to small businesses. PayNet analyzes the data and constructs the Thomson
Reuters/PayNet Small Business Lending Index (SBLI), which aims to track originations of new
loans to small businesses. The index is based on the monthly dollar-weighted percentage
change in loan originations to small businesses. The SBLI suggests that loan originations to
small businesses by lenders of all types have been trending upward since mid-2009 (figure 2).

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Banking Developments and Money

S&P 500 Stock Price Indexes

CDS Spreads of Large Bank Holding Companies

Log scale; Jan. 28, 2014 = 100
Jan.
FOMC
Mar.
11

Daily

S&P 500

Basis points
120

Citigroup
JPMorgan Chase
Wells Fargo
Goldman Sachs
Bank of America
Morgan Stanley

105
90
75

S&P 500 Bank Index

Jan.
FOMC

Daily

800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0

60
Mar.
11

2011

2012

2013

2014

45
2010

Source: Bloomberg.

Return on Assets and Return on Equity
Percent
2

2011

2012

2013

2014

Source: Markit.

Delinquency Rate on All Loans
Percent

Percent
30

Quarterly, s.a.a.r

8

Quarterly, s.a.

7
1

Q4

15

6
5

0

0
4
Return on assets (left scale)
Return on equity (right scale)

Financial Developments

-1

Q4

-15

3
2

-2

-30
1997

2001

2005

2009

2013

Source: Federal Reserve Board, FR Y-9C, Consolidated
Financial Statements for Holding Companies.

100

2001

2005

2009

2013

Note: The delinquency rate is calculated as loans more than 30
days delinquent and nonaccrual loans relative to total loans.
Source: Federal Reserve Board.

Growth of M2 and Its Components

Measures of Adequacy of Loan Loss Reserves
Percent

1
1997

Percent

Quarterly, s.a.

600

Reserves/delinquent loans
(left scale)

80

Percent, s.a.a.r.

M2 Liquid Small time Retail Curr.
deposits deposits MMFs

480

60

360

2013

6.0

8.0

-14.8

1.4

6.6

2013:Q4

6.3

8.5

-12.8

-5.3

5.9

Dec.

5.5

7.1

-5.9

-8.9

6.7

Jan. & Feb. (avg.) 8.4

11.5

-20.9

-3.8

6.2

Q4

40

240

20

120

Reserves/net charge-offs
(right scale)

0

0
1997

2001

2005

Source: Federal Reserve Board.

2009

2013
Note: Retail MMFs are retail money market funds.
Source: Federal Reserve Board.

Note: The shaded bars indicate periods of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.

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albeit at substantially depressed levels, as the rating changes were largely anticipated. On
March 11, 2014, Puerto Rico successfully brought to market a $3.5 billion GO bond
issue, substantially easing near-term liquidity pressures.

HOUSEHOLD FINANCE
Financing conditions in mortgage markets have remained tight, particularly for
borrowers with low credit scores. However, a few signs that mortgage markets may have
begun to ease emerged over the intermeeting period. In particular, the lower end of the
distribution of credit scores for GSE-backed purchase mortgages shifted down slightly in
December. In addition, a major residential mortgage lender announced plans to decrease
its minimum required credit scores on mortgages eligible to be guaranteed by the FHA.
House prices rose notably further in January, and mortgage interest rates and their
spreads to Treasury yields were little changed over the intermeeting period. Applications
for both purchase mortgages and refinancings stayed at low levels through early March.
Conditions in consumer credit markets have remained mixed. Credit bureau data
through the fourth quarter indicate that auto loans continued to be broadly available,
including to consumers with subprime credit histories. Meanwhile, credit card limits for
low levels through the fourth quarter. Partly reflecting these supply conditions, credit
card balances stayed nearly flat, on net, through January, while auto and student loans
continued to grow briskly. Consumer loans on banks’ books posted only modest gains in
February, likely owing to a weather-related moderation in auto loan growth. Issuance of
auto and credit card ABS continued to be robust in January and February, including
significant issuance of paper backed by subprime auto loans.

BANKING DEVELOPMENTS AND MONEY
On net, stock prices for large bank holding companies (BHCs) increased about in
line with the broad equity market over the intermeeting period, while CDS spreads for
such firms remained low. The profitability of BHCs increased in the fourth quarter of
2013, supported by further declines in loan loss provisions and a reduction in litigation
expenses, even as BHCs generally continued to report compressed net interest margins,
weak mortgage revenues, and relatively subdued trading income. Loan performance
improved further across most loan types, and banks’ loan loss reserves relative to net
charge-offs increased.

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Financial Developments

borrowers with subprime and prime credit scores—a proxy for supply—remained at very

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Foreign Developments
Stock Price Indexes

Dollar Exchange Rate Indexes
Aug. 1, 2012 = 100
Jan.
FOMC

Daily
British pound
Brazilian real
Canadian dollar
Broad

Mar.
11

130

Aug. 1, 2012 = 100
Jan.
FOMC

Daily
MSCI Emerging Markets
DJ Euro Stoxx
Nikkei
FTSE 100

125
120

215
200
185
170

115
Mar.
11

110

155
140

105

125

100

110

95

95

90

80
Sep Nov Jan Mar May Jul Sep Nov Jan Mar
2012
2013
2014

Sep Nov Jan Mar May Jul Sep Nov Jan Mar
2012
2013
2014

Source: Bloomberg.

Source: Federal Reserve Board; Bloomberg.

AFE 10-Year Nominal Benchmark Yields

36-Month-Ahead Policy Expectations
Percent
Daily
United Kingdom
Euro area

Jan.
FOMC

Percent

2.2
2.0

Jan.
FOMC

Daily
Germany
United Kingdom
Canada

1.8
1.6

3.0

Financial Developments

1.4
Mar.
11

3.5

2.5

1.2
Mar.
11

1.0
0.8

2.0

0.6
1.5

0.4
0.2
0.0
Note: 1-month forward rates from OIS quotes, 3-day moving average.
Source: Bloomberg.

10-Year Sovereign Bond Spreads
Daily

Source: Bloomberg.

Chinese Renminbi Exchange Rate
Basis points

Portugal
Spain
Ireland
Italy
France

1.0
Sep Nov Jan Mar May Jul Sep Nov Jan Mar
2012
2013
2014

Sep Nov Jan Mar May Jul Sep Nov Jan Mar
2012
2013
2014

Jan.
FOMC

1100
1000

RMB per dollar

Aug. 1, 2012 = 100

Daily

Jan.
FOMC

900

100

700
Mar.
11

600
500

97

300

96

200

95

100
0
Note: Spreads are relative to Germany.
Source: Bloomberg.

99
98

400

Sep Nov Jan Mar May Jul Sep Nov Jan Mar
2012
2013
2014

102
101

800

Mar.
11

103

94
Sep Nov Jan Mar May Jul Sep Nov Jan Mar
2012
2013
2014

Source: Federal Reserve Board; Bloomberg.

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M2 grew briskly, on average, over January and February, owing mainly to gains
in liquid deposits. The monetary base expanded at a slower rate, on average, than in
2013, as the rate of increase in reserve balances was constrained by the reduced pace of
asset purchases and the larger sizes of operations in the Federal Reserve’s ON RRP
exercise. 5

FOREIGN DEVELOPMENTS
Financial market sentiment abroad appeared to improve over the period. In
particular, financial stresses in the EMEs, which reached a peak in the days just prior to
the January FOMC meeting, appear to have eased, as central banks in some of the most
vulnerable economies raised policy rates.
Although global markets fell abruptly on March 3, following the deepening of the
political crisis in Ukraine, most markets quickly retraced these losses. Both the Russian
ruble and the Ukrainian hryvnia depreciated over the period, and local-currency
sovereign bond yields rose about 70 basis points and 140 basis points in Russia and
Ukraine, respectively.

stresses eased early in the intermeeting period. Local-currency sovereign bond yields
declined in most emerging markets, and EMBI spreads narrowed. In addition, stock
markets in many EMEs retraced the losses experienced in late January, and the pace of
outflows from EME-dedicated mutual funds slowed.
Over the intermeeting period, consistent with improvement in financial market
sentiment, the currencies of most advanced foreign economies (AFEs) appreciated
against the dollar as flight-to-safety flows reversed. Headline equity indexes in the AFEs
also increased substantially. Long-term sovereign bond yields and market-based
measures of policy expectations were little changed, on net, over the period. Peripheral
euro-area interest rate spreads continued to narrow.
5

During the intermeeting period, the Federal Reserve announced that it would conduct a series of
four seven-day TDF operations in March; on average over the first two operations, tenders totaled
$14.4 billion, with 28 participants. The last operation in this series will employ a floating-rate format, with
the rate set equal to the sum of the interest rate paid on excess reserves and a fixed spread of 1 basis point,
resulting in an effective rate of 26 basis points.

Page 65 of 96

Financial Developments

The currencies of most EMEs recovered notably with respect to the dollar as

Class II FOMC - Restricted (FR)

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March 12, 2014

The Bank of England updated its forward guidance in February, stating that, even
with the unemployment rate near its 7 percent threshold, there remains scope to absorb
spare capacity further before raising its policy rate. The Bank also stated that future rate
increases are likely to be gradual and that the eventual level of rates is likely to be below
the 5 percent pre-crisis average (see the box “The Bank of England’s Next Phase of
Forward Guidance” in the International Economic Developments and Outlook section).
Market-based measures of expected policy rates moved up slightly on the release. The
Bank of Japan (BOJ) renewed and expanded its funding-for-lending programs, and
market participants continue to expect the BOJ to implement further easing this year.
The European Central Bank kept its policy rate unchanged.
The People’s Bank of China pushed the value of the Chinese renminbi down
about 1½ percent against the dollar over the period. Market commentary suggested that
the depreciation may have been engineered to introduce two-way risk in the currency
market and so reduce speculative capital inflows. Separately, a Chinese company failed
to make a scheduled interest payment on its outstanding bonds, reportedly the first
corporate bond default in the People’s Republic of China since 1997. Observers had long
believed that the authorities should allow such a default in order to instill market

Financial Developments

discipline; in the event, the default did not elicit any substantive market reaction.

Page 66 of 96

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March 12, 2014

Risks and Uncertainty
ASSESSMENT OF RISKS
We continue to view the extent of uncertainty around our projections for real
GDP growth and the unemployment rate as roughly in line with the average of the past
20 years (the benchmark used by the FOMC), a period that includes considerable
volatility. 1 We see a number of risks attending our forecast for economic activity,
including those posed by the possibility that the recent softer tone in spending and
production data may signal weaker momentum in aggregate demand than we have
projected, that the economy has incurred more supply-side damage since the recession
than we have assumed, or that economic and financial stresses in emerging market
economies (EMEs) will intensify. Importantly, we see neither monetary policy nor fiscal
policy as being well positioned to help the economy withstand adverse shocks. Given
these considerations, we continue to believe that the risks to our forecast for real GDP
growth are tilted a little to the downside. However, we view the uncertainty around our
projection for the unemployment rate as roughly balanced, with the risk of a higher
unemployment rate from adverse demand-side developments largely countered by the
possibility that the unemployment rate could continue to surprise us to the downside as it
has in recent years, despite the further reduction of our estimate of potential GDP growth
in the current Tealbook.
Our view of the risks to the economic outlook is informed by the staff’s ongoing
quantitative surveillance (QS) assessment. Overall, the vulnerabilities of the financial
system to adverse shocks appear to remain at moderate levels. This perspective is
predicated, in part, on the relatively strong capital positions of large domestic banking
firms, the generally low leverage and moderate growth of aggregate credit in the

1

We have updated our estimates of the average historical forecast errors that are reported in
table 2 of the FOMC’s Summary of Economic Projections, using the experience over the 20-year period
from 1994 to 2013. The root mean squared errors for the unemployment rate and CPI inflation are nearly
unchanged from the previous estimates. Those for real GDP growth increased because we assessed our
forecast performance against the latest available estimates of GDP, adjusted for the effect of major
methodological revisions, rather than the BEA’s third estimates.

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Risks & Uncertainty

nonfinancial sectors, and the reduced reliance on fragile short-term wholesale funding

Class II FOMC - Restricted (FR)

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Alternative Scenarios
(Percent change, annual rate, from end of preceding period except as noted)

2014
Measure and scenario

Risks & Uncertainty

H1

H2

2015 2016 201718

Real GDP
Extended Tealbook baseline
Weaker household demand
Faster recovery
Supply-side damage
Low inflation
Stronger dollar
Financial crisis in the EMEs

2.5
1.5
3.5
2.3
2.6
2.5
2.2

3.4
2.1
4.5
3.1
3.5
3.2
2.0

3.2
2.0
4.1
2.7
3.2
3.0
2.7

3.0
2.4
3.4
2.1
3.0
2.9
3.4

2.3
2.4
2.2
1.2
2.6
2.4
2.6

Unemployment rate1
Extended Tealbook baseline
Weaker household demand
Faster recovery
Supply-side damage
Low inflation
Stronger dollar
Financial crisis in the EMEs

6.5
6.6
6.4
6.5
6.5
6.5
6.5

6.2
6.5
5.9
6.1
6.2
6.2
6.4

5.6
6.3
5.0
5.3
5.6
5.7
6.2

5.1
6.0
4.4
4.8
5.0
5.3
5.6

4.9
5.6
4.3
4.6
4.5
5.1
5.2

Total PCE prices
Extended Tealbook baseline
Weaker household demand
Faster recovery
Supply-side damage
Low inflation
Stronger dollar
Financial crisis in the EMEs

1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.0
1.2
.2

1.6
1.6
1.6
1.7
1.0
1.3
-.1

1.5
1.4
1.5
1.7
.7
1.3
1.2

1.7
1.6
1.8
2.0
.7
1.6
1.9

1.9
1.8
2.0
2.3
.9
1.9
2.2

Core PCE prices
Extended Tealbook baseline
Weaker household demand
Faster recovery
Supply-side damage
Low inflation
Stronger dollar
Financial crisis in the EMEs

1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.0
1.4
1.2

1.6
1.6
1.6
1.7
1.0
1.5
1.0

1.7
1.6
1.7
1.9
.9
1.6
1.4

1.8
1.7
1.9
2.1
.8
1.7
1.8

1.9
1.8
2.0
2.3
.9
1.9
2.0

Federal funds rate1
Extended Tealbook baseline
Weaker household demand
Faster recovery
Supply-side damage
Low inflation
Stronger dollar
Financial crisis in the EMEs

.1
.1
.1
.1
.1
.1
.1

.1
.1
.1
.1
.1
.1
.1

1.1
.1
1.9
1.7
.1
.8
.1

2.4
.1
3.6
3.4
.1
2.1
1.2

3.9
1.9
5.3
5.2
.5
3.6
3.6

1. Percent, average for the final quarter of the period.

Page 68 of 96

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March 12, 2014

across the financial sector in recent years. 2 That said, short-term funding continues to be
an important structural vulnerability for the financial system, as do the complexity and
interconnectedness of the largest financial institutions. Valuations in major domestic
asset markets still appear to be broadly in line with historical norms, although equities in
a few segments of the stock market, including social media and biotechnology, appear to
have become increasingly overvalued. In addition, investor demand for riskier corporate
credit has continued to be very strong, contributing to rapid credit growth and moreaggressive underwriting in the leveraged finance sector and to the lowest levels of risk
spreads on speculative-grade corporate bonds since 2007, albeit in the context of strong
corporate balance sheets and cash flows.
With regard to inflation, we see significant uncertainty around our projection but
do not view the current level of uncertainty as unusually high. Longer-run inflation
expectations appear to have remained stable in recent years despite fluctuations in the
prices of crude oil, other commodities, and imports more generally, as well as persistent
margins of slack in labor and product markets. Furthermore, we still view the risks to our
inflation forecast as broadly balanced. On the downside, there is the possibility that the
soft readings on inflation seen since the beginning of last year could prove more
persistent than we expect, especially if longer-term inflation expectations move down or
if low levels of resource utilization and subdued increases in unit labor costs persist
longer or have larger effects than we currently project. On the upside, an increase in
inflation expectations, potentially related to concerns about the size of the Federal
Reserve’s balance sheet and the ability to execute a timely exit from the current stance of
policy, could cause inflation to rise, as could significant unanticipated increases in oil and
other commodity prices caused by overseas developments, a stronger-than-expected
economic recovery, or a larger amount of damage to the supply side of the economy than
is assumed in the baseline.

ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS
alternatives to the baseline projection using simulations of staff models. The first
scenario considers the possibility that the recent downside surprises in spending data
signal weaker aggregate demand conditions than we have assumed in the baseline. By
2

Results from the 2014 Dodd-Frank Act stress tests and the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and
Review, which examine the capital positions and planning processes of large banking organizations under
stress scenarios, are expected to be released to the public in the days after the FOMC meeting.

Page 69 of 96

Risks & Uncertainty

To illustrate some of the risks to the outlook, we construct a number of

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Forecast Confidence Intervals and Alternative Scenarios
Confidence Intervals Based on FRB/US Stochastic Simulations
Extended Tealbook baseline
Weaker household demand
Faster recovery

Supply−side damage
Low inflation

Real GDP

Stronger dollar
Financial crisis in the EMEs

Unemployment Rate
4-quarter percent change

Percent
7

70 percent
interval

10.5
10.0

6

9.5
5

9.0
8.5

4

8.0

3

7.5
2

7.0

1

6.5
6.0

0

5.5
−1

5.0

−2

90 percent
interval

4.5
4.0

−3

3.5
−4

3.0

−5
2010

2012

2014

2016

2.5

2018

2010

PCE Prices excluding Food and Energy

2012

2014

2016

2018

Federal Funds Rate

4-quarter percent change

Percent
4.0

8

3.5

7

3.0

6
5

2.5

4

Risks & Uncertainty

2.0

3
1.5
2
1.0
1
0.5
0
0.0
2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

2010

Page 70 of 96

2012

2014

2016

2018

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contrast, the second scenario assumes that inclement weather may have masked greater
underlying momentum in household spending than is reflected in the baseline; thus, the
economic recovery accelerates at a faster pace than we have projected. In the third
scenario, the reduction in potential output growth is eventually realized to be deeper and
more persistent than assumed in the baseline. The fourth scenario considers the risk that
the softness in consumer price inflation seen over the past year could prove to be more
persistent than anticipated. The final two scenarios consider risks to the U.S. economy
from foreign economic developments—first, that the dollar could appreciate rather than
depreciate as in the baseline, and, second, that a dramatic increase in financial stress in
EMEs could have substantial negative spillovers to the U.S. economy.
We generate the first four scenarios using the FRB/US model and the last two
using the multicountry SIGMA model. Once the federal funds rate has lifted off from its
zero lower bound, its movements are governed—as in the baseline forecast—by an
inertial version of the Taylor (1999) rule. The date of liftoff in each scenario takes into
account the guidance provided in the Committee’s January statement indicating that the
liftoff date will depend on when the asset purchase program ends, when the
unemployment rate threshold is crossed, and how the Committee’s outlook for inflation
stands. In all cases, we assume that the size and composition of the SOMA portfolio
follow their baseline paths.

Weaker Household Demand
In the baseline projection, the unanticipated slowdown in the pace of consumer
spending growth over the past few months is assumed to be transitory, and continued
improvements in consumer sentiment, households’ financial conditions, and labor market
prospects lead to an acceleration in household spending; the projected resumption of the
housing market recovery is expected to reinforce this acceleration. By contrast, this
scenario assumes that the recent downside surprises in household spending signal greater
caution on the part of households in the face of continued uncertainty about the pace of
of restrained household spending and residential investment that, in turn, leads to a
slower pace of business investment and hiring. All told, real GDP rises at an average
annual rate of 2 percent over the next three years, 1 percentage point lower than in the
baseline, and the unemployment rate declines more gradually, falling to only around
6 percent in 2016. With a wider margin of resource slack than in the baseline, inflation
rises somewhat more slowly. The federal funds rate lifts off in the first quarter of 2017

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Risks & Uncertainty

the economic recovery and their employment prospects. These conditions spawn a cycle

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March 12, 2014

Selected Tealbook Projections and 70 Percent Confidence Intervals Derived
from Historical Tealbook Forecast Errors and FRB/US Simulations
Measure
Real GDP
(percent change, Q4 to Q4)
Projection
Confidence interval
Tealbook forecast errors
FRB/US stochastic simulations
Civilian unemployment rate
(percent, Q4)
Projection
Confidence interval
Tealbook forecast errors
FRB/US stochastic simulations
PCE prices, total
(percent change, Q4 to Q4)
Projection
Confidence interval
Tealbook forecast errors
FRB/US stochastic simulations
PCE prices excluding
food and energy
(percent change, Q4 to Q4)
Projection
Confidence interval
Tealbook forecast errors
FRB/US stochastic simulations

Risks & Uncertainty

Federal funds rate
(percent, Q4)
Projection
Confidence interval
FRB/US stochastic simulations

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2.9

3.2

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.4–4.4
1.7–4.3

1.4–5.1
1.6–5.1

...
1.3–5.0

...
.6–4.7

...
.0–4.2

6.2

5.6

5.1

4.9

4.9

5.6–6.8
5.6–6.7

4.7–6.5
4.6–6.4

...
3.9–6.2

...
3.4–6.0

...
3.4–6.1

1.5

1.5

1.7

1.8

2.0

.5–2.4
.7–2.3

.4–2.7
.6–2.5

...
.6–2.7

...
.7–3.0

...
.8–3.2

1.5

1.7

1.8

1.9

2.0

.9–2.0
1.0–2.0

.9–2.5
1.0–2.4

...
.9–2.7

...
1.0–2.8

...
1.0–3.0

.1

1.1

2.4

3.3

3.9

.1–.4

.1–2.2

.6–4.1

1.4–5.5

2.0–6.2

Note: Shocks underlying FRB/US stochastic simulations are randomly drawn from the 1969–2012 set of
model equation residuals.
Intervals derived from Tealbook forecast errors are based on projections made from 1979 to 2012, except
for PCE prices excluding food and energy, where the sample is 1981–2012.
. . . Not applicable. The Tealbook forecast horizon has typically extended about 2 years.

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(seven quarters later than in the baseline) and rises more gradually thereafter, reaching
2 percent by the end of 2018. 3

Faster Recovery
In the staff’s view, the recent softer spending data reflect both the effects of
adverse weather and a somewhat more subdued state of underlying demand than we had
previously projected. However, some outside analysts have ascribed a considerably
larger portion of the recent weakness in spending to the weather. In this scenario, we
assume that adverse weather conditions have been masking, to a greater extent than in the
baseline, a more robust underlying trajectory in private-sector demand. Continued
improvements in labor market conditions and generally positive readings on consumer
and business confidence may support this view. Thus, as the weather returns to normal
and the labor market continues to improve, the stronger underlying momentum in
household spending starts to show through, which in turn leads businesses to be more
willing to invest, fostering a faster, more broadly based recovery. Real GDP rises at an
average annual rate of 3¾ percent over the next three years, and the unemployment rate
falls to 5 percent by the end of 2015. Inflation reaches its 2 percent target level by early
2018. The federal funds rate lifts off one quarter earlier than in the baseline and rises
more steeply thereafter, reaching 5¼ percent by the end of 2018.

Supply-Side Damage
Over the past three years, the unemployment rate has fallen nearly 1 percentage
point per year despite only moderate increases in real GDP. The staff has therefore
marked down its estimate of the pace of potential output growth, and in the current
forecast, we have lowered the growth rate of potential GDP from 2011 through 2016
somewhat further. However, some of the models we consult suggest that the damage to
aggregate supply during the past several years may have been even greater than is
assumed in the current baseline. This scenario assumes a slower pace of structural
productivity gains such that potential output has expanded at an annual rate of only
the level of potential output is currently ¾ percentage point lower. Thereafter, potential

3

In this scenario and the following two, we assume that the inertial Taylor (1999) rule takes over
in the quarter following the observation of an unemployment rate of 6 percent, the same as the
unemployment rate in the baseline forecast in the quarter prior to liftoff. The differences in inflation
outcomes relative to the baseline through the first few years of these scenarios are not large enough to
affect the liftoff date.

Page 73 of 96

Risks & Uncertainty

1¼ percent starting in 2011, ¼ percentage point lower than in the baseline. As a result,

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GDP continues to grow at a 1¼ percent pace through 2018; the level of potential output is
4½ percentage points lower at the end of 2018 than in the baseline.
Real GDP rises at a rate of 2¾ percent this year and next, slower than in the
baseline projection by ¼ percentage point and ½ percentage point, respectively.
Thereafter, the pace of economic growth gradually slows, and real GDP rises at an annual
rate of only 1¼ percent in 2017 and 2018. Nonetheless, the unemployment rate continues
to decline rapidly, reaching 5 percent in the middle of 2016. With resource slack
substantially narrower and productivity gains smaller, inflation rises to 2 percent in early
2016 and edges up to nearly 2½ percent in 2018. Initially, policymakers continue to
perceive supply-side conditions as consistent with the staff’s baseline view. As evidence
of the weaker supply-side conditions mounts, their perceptions gradually come in line
with reality and are assumed to be fully adjusted by 2016. Given the initial
misperception of slack and the gradual response of inflation to higher resource utilization,
the federal funds rate begins to rise from its effective lower bound in the second quarter
of 2015, the same quarter as in the baseline, but it thereafter rises more steeply as
policymakers recognize the weaker supply-side conditions.

Low Inflation
In the baseline projection, the downside surprise on core inflation over the past
year is assumed to be largely transitory, and over the next few years, inflation gradually
moves up toward 2 percent as the recovery continues. This forecast is based on the
staff’s assumption that long-run inflation expectations are firmly anchored at the
Committee’s longer-run inflation target of 2 percent. In this scenario, we examine the
possibility that the extended experience of below-target inflation has led to a reduction in
current long-run inflation expectations to about 1½ percent, and that continued low
inflation in the coming years leads to further erosion in these expectations. As a
consequence, prices rise only 1 percent this year and inflation remains below 1 percent
through 2018. Persistently low inflation in this scenario causes liftoff to occur in midRisks & Uncertainty

2018, three years later than in the baseline. At that time, the unemployment rate has
declined to 4½ percent, ¾ percentage point below its natural rate. However, given the

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March 12, 2014

decline in long-horizon inflation expectations, inflation projected one to two years ahead
is still well below the Committee’s target despite this degree of labor market tightness. 4

Stronger Dollar
As discussed in the box “The Path of the Dollar: Baseline and Alternatives” in
the Domestic Economic Developments and Outlook section, we project that the dollar
will depreciate gradually over the next few years. However, it is possible that rising
interest rates associated with a prospective withdrawal of policy accommodation in the
United States and the AFEs may take investors somewhat by surprise, inducing a
progressive shift into dollar-denominated assets and contributing to somewhat greater
financial stresses in the EMEs. 5 In this scenario, the broad real dollar appreciates about
1 percent by the end of 2016—rather than depreciating 3 percent, as in the baseline—
largely because of foreign exchange risk premium shocks. We also assume modest
negative shocks to confidence and credit conditions in the EMEs. The stronger exchange
value of the dollar and weaker foreign activity reduce U.S. real net exports. All told, U.S.
real GDP rises at an annual rate of about 2¾ percent, on average, in 2014 and 2015—
¼ percentage point below the baseline. The weaker U.S. activity and lower import price
inflation cause core inflation to run about 0.1 percentage point below baseline throughout
the forecast horizon and induce a somewhat lower path for the federal funds rate. 6

Financial Crisis in the Emerging Market Economies
We expect financial market stresses in the EMEs to remain generally manageable.
However, with investors focused on both EME vulnerabilities and the prospective effects
of policy normalization in advanced economies, the risk of a substantial ratcheting up of
financial stress in the EMEs remains significant. Any number of events could trigger
such a development, including an intensification of the geopolitical crisis in Ukraine. In
this scenario, we consider the effects of a financial crisis that engulfs many EMEs.
Sovereign and private borrowing costs in these countries soar, and the confidence of their
households and businesses weakens significantly. These events cause EME currencies to
The choice of liftoff date is meant to capture the Committee’s intention to maintain the current
target for the federal funds rate well past the time that the unemployment rate declines below 6½ percent,
“especially if projected inflation continues to run below the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal.”
5
An alternative possibility for a stronger dollar path that is discussed in the box is that China and
other EMEs might allow their currencies to appreciate less quickly than assumed in our baseline.
6
In this scenario and the next, we assume a broadly similar policy rule to the one used in the first
three domestic scenarios. One key difference relative to the FRB/US simulations is that the policy rule in
SIGMA uses a measure of slack equal to the difference between actual output and the model’s estimate of
the level of output that would occur in the absence of slow adjustment of wages and prices.

Page 75 of 96

Risks & Uncertainty

4

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depreciate roughly 8 percent, on average, against the dollar relative to the baseline, even
though EME central banks are assumed to raise policy rates to attenuate capital outflows.
These factors lead real GDP in the EMEs to decline 4½ percent relative to the baseline by
early 2015. 7
The stress in the EMEs is assumed to have some financial spillovers to the rest of
the world. In the United States, corporate bond spreads rise and equity prices decline
relative to the baseline, while flight-to-safety flows push down term premiums on
government bond yields. In addition, weaker foreign economic activity and the stronger
exchange value of the dollar depress U.S. net exports. As a result, U.S. real GDP growth
is around 2 percent in 2014, about 1 percentage point below baseline, and remains
subdued for another year. The unemployment rate hovers around 6½ percent through
mid-2015. With substantially greater resource slack and lower import prices, core U.S.
PCE inflation dips to nearly 1 percent in 2014. Under these conditions, the federal funds

Risks & Uncertainty

rate remains at its effective lower bound five quarters longer than in the baseline.

7

In the 2013 QS background report on EME vulnerabilities, the staff considered a variant of this
scenario in which the EME financial crisis was even deeper and more broadly based. That alternative
scenario assumed more adverse financial spillover effects to the United States and the AFEs and, hence,
implied larger declines in U.S. and AFE GDP than the scenario examined here.

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Risks & Uncertainty

Class II FOMC - Restricted (FR)

Page 77 of 96

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March 12, 2014

Alternative Projections
(Percent change, Q4 to Q4, except as noted)
2013
Measure and projection

2014

2015

Previous
Tealbook

Current
Tealbook

Previous
Tealbook

Current
Tealbook

Previous
Tealbook

Current
Tealbook

Real GDP
Staff
FRB/US
EDO
Blue Chip

2.8
2.8
2.8
2.5

2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5

3.1
2.0
3.2
2.8

2.9
1.9
2.6
2.7

3.4
2.5
2.9
3.0

3.2
2.4
2.9
3.0

Unemployment rate1
Staff
FRB/US
EDO
Blue Chip

7.0
7.0
7.0
7.0

7.0
7.0
7.0
7.0

6.2
6.7
6.9
6.6

6.2
6.4
6.9
6.2

5.5
6.4
6.8
6.1

5.6
6.1
6.7
5.8

Total PCE prices
Staff
FRB/US
EDO
Blue Chip2

.9
.9
.9
1.2

1.0
1.0
1.0
1.2

1.4
1.0
1.2
1.9

1.5
1.3
1.4
2.0

1.6
1.1
1.4
2.1

1.5
1.2
1.5
2.1

Core PCE prices
Staff
FRB/US
EDO
Blue Chip

1.1
1.1
1.1
...

1.2
1.2
1.2
...

1.5
1.2
1.2
...

1.5
1.3
1.3
...

1.7
1.2
1.4
...

1.7
1.4
1.5
...

.1
.1
.1
.1

.1
.1
.1
.1

.1
.1
1.2
.1

.1
.1
.9
.1

1.1
.1
2.0
.8

1.1
.1
1.8
.9

Federal funds rate1
Staff
FRB/US
EDO
Blue Chip3

Risks & Uncertainty

Note: Blue Chip forecast completed on March 10, 2014.
1. Percent, average for Q4.
2. Consumer price index.
3. Treasury bill rate.
... Not applicable. The Blue Chip forecast is not available for core inflation.

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March 12, 2014

Tealbook Forecast Compared with Blue Chip
(Blue Chip survey released March 10, 2014)
Real GDP

Real PCE
Percent change, annual rate

8
6

Percent change, annual rate

8

5

6

4

5
4

3

3

2

2

1

1

4

4

2

2

0

0

0

0

-2

-2

-1

-1

-2

-2

-3

-3

-4

-4
-5

Blue Chip consensus
Staff forecast

-6

-4
-6

-8

-8

-5

-10

-10

-6

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Note: The shaded area represents the area between the
Blue Chip top 10 and bottom 10 averages.

2008

Unemployment Rate

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

-6

Consumer Price Index
Percent

11
10

11
10

Percent change, annual rate

8

8

6

6

4

4

9

9

2

2

8

8

0

0

7

7

-2

-2

-4

-4

-6

-6

-8

-8

6

6

5

5

4

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

4

-10

2008

Treasury Bill Rate
Percent

4

3

3

2

2

1

1

0

0

2008

2009

2010

2011

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

-10

10-Year Treasury Yield

4

-1

2009

2012

2013

2014

2015

-1

Percent

5.5

5.5

5.0

5.0

4.5

4.5

4.0

4.0

3.5

3.5

3.0

3.0

2.5

2.5

2.0

2.0

1.5

1.5

1.0

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Note: The yield is for on-the-run Treasury securities. Over
the forecast period, the staff’s projected yield is assumed
to be 15 basis points below the off-the-run yield.

Page 79 of 96

1.0

Risks & Uncertainty

-4

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March 12, 2014

Assessment of Key Macroeconomic Risks (1)

Probability of Inflation Events
(4 quarters ahead—2015:Q1)

Probability that the 4-quarter change in total
PCE prices will be ...

Staff

FRB/US

EDO

BVAR

Greater than 3 percent
Current Tealbook
Previous Tealbook

.04
.03

.02
.01

.10
.07

.07
.03

Less than 1 percent
Current Tealbook
Previous Tealbook

.26
.32

.38
.48

.32
.40

.15
.23

Probability of Unemployment Events
(4 quarters ahead—2015:Q1)

Probability that the unemployment rate will...

Staff

FRB/US

EDO

BVAR

Increase by 1 percentage point
Current Tealbook
Previous Tealbook

.01
.01

.03
.03

.21
.23

.01
.01

Decrease by 1 percentage point
Current Tealbook
Previous Tealbook

.31
.38

.16
.15

.14
.13

.36
.35

Probability of Near-Term Recession

Risks & Uncertainty

Probability that real GDP declines in
each of 2014:Q2 and 2014:Q3
Current Tealbook
Previous Tealbook

Staff

FRB/US

EDO

BVAR

Factor
Model

.02
.01

.05
.06

.03
.05

.04
.01

.11
.06

Note: “Staff” represents Tealbook forecast errors applied to the Tealbook baseline; baselines for FRB/US, BVAR, EDO, and
the factor model are generated by those models themselves, up to the current-quarter estimate. Data for the current quarter are
taken from the staff estimate for the second Tealbook in each quarter; if the second Tealbook for the current quarter has not yet
been published, the preceding quarter is taken as the latest historical observation.

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Assessment of Key Macroeconomic Risks (2)

Probability that Total PCE Inflation Is above 3 Percent

Probability that Total PCE Inflation Is below 1 Percent

(4 quarters ahead)

(4 quarters ahead)
Probability

Probability
1

1

.8

.8

.6

.6

.4

.4

.2

.2

FRB/US
BVAR

0
1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

0

2012

1998

Probability that the Unemployment Rate Increases 1 ppt

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

Probability that the Unemployment Rate Decreases 1 ppt

(4 quarters ahead)

(4 quarters ahead)
Probability

Probability
1

1

.8

.8

.6

.6

.4

.4

.2

.2

0
1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

0

2012

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

Probability that Real GDP Declines in Each of the Next Two Quarters
Probability
1

.8

.4

.2

0
1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

Note: See notes on facing page. Recession and inflation probabilities for FRB/US and the BVAR are real-time estimates. See
Robert J. Tetlow and Brian Ironside (2007), "Real−Time Model Uncertainty in the United States: The Fed, 1996−2003,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking , vol. 39 (October), pp. 1533−61.

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March 12, 2014

2.8
3.1
6.2
5.0
3.6
5.0
5.1
5.4
5.5
5.3
5.2
4.9

3.0
5.6
4.3
5.2
5.4
5.1

3.8
4.3
4.7
5.2
5.1

Quarterly
2013:Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2014:Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2015:Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4

Two-quarter2
2013:Q2
Q4
2014:Q2
Q4
2015:Q2
Q4

Four-quarter3
2012:Q4
2013:Q4
2014:Q4
2015:Q4
2016:Q4

Page 83 of 96

3.8
4.0
4.6
5.1
4.9

3.0
5.1
4.0
5.1
5.2
5.0

2.8
3.1
6.2
3.9
3.0
5.0
5.0
5.3
5.2
5.1
5.0
5.0

03/12/14

2.0
2.8
3.1
3.4
3.2

1.8
3.8
2.7
3.5
3.5
3.3

1.1
2.5
4.1
3.5
2.4
3.1
3.3
3.7
3.5
3.5
3.4
3.2

01/23/14

2.0
2.5
2.9
3.2
3.0

1.8
3.2
2.5
3.4
3.2
3.2

1.1
2.5
4.1
2.2
1.5
3.5
3.2
3.5
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.3

03/12/14

Real GDP

1.7
.9
1.4
1.6
1.7

.5
1.3
1.3
1.4
1.6
1.6

1.1
-.1
1.9
.7
1.1
1.5
1.5
1.4
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.5

01/23/14

1.7
1.0
1.5
1.5
1.7

.5
1.5
1.4
1.6
1.6
1.5

1.1
-.1
1.9
1.0
1.4
1.3
1.6
1.5
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.5

03/12/14

PCE price index

1.7
1.1
1.5
1.7
1.8

1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
1.7

1.4
.6
1.4
1.1
1.3
1.6
1.6
1.5
1.7
1.8
1.8
1.7

01/23/14

Greensheets

1.8
1.2
1.3
1.7
1.8

1.7
1.2
1.5
1.7
1.8

1.0
1.3
1.4
1.6
1.7
1.7

1.4
.6
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.5
1.6
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.7
1.6

03/12/14

8.1
7.4
6.5
5.8
5.3

-.9
-.8
-.8
-.7
-.4

-.3
-.5
-.4
-.4
-.4
-.3

7.7
7.5
7.3
7.0
6.7
6.6
6.4
6.2
6.0
5.8
5.7
5.5

01/23/14

8.1
7.4
6.4
5.8
5.3

-.9
-.8
-.8
-.6
-.5

-.3
-.5
-.5
-.3
-.3
-.3

7.7
7.5
7.3
7.0
6.6
6.5
6.4
6.2
6.0
5.9
5.7
5.6

03/12/14

Core PCE price index Unemployment rate1

Authorized for Public Release

Annual
2012
4.6
4.6
2.8
2.8
1.8
1.8
1.8
2013
3.5
3.4
1.9
1.9
1.1
1.1
1.2
2014
4.7
4.3
3.1
2.7
1.2
1.3
1.3
2015
5.3
5.1
3.5
3.3
1.5
1.5
1.7
2016
5.1
5.0
3.2
3.1
1.6
1.6
1.8
1. Level, except for two-quarter and four-quarter intervals.
2. Percent change from two quarters earlier; for unemployment rate, change is in percentage points.
3. Percent change from four quarters earlier; for unemployment rate, change is in percentage points.

01/23/14

Interval

Nominal GDP

Changes in GDP, Prices, and Unemployment
(Percent, annual rate except as noted)
Class II FOMC - Restricted (FR)
March 12, 2014

Page 84 of 96

57
57
33
19

Change in priv. inventories2
Previous Tealbook2
Nonfarm2
Farm2
117
113
97
20

-5.2
-6.0
-12.8
-14.4
-10.1
.2

.4
.4
-1.5
-.5
-3.1
1.7
116
116
89
23

-383
-372
9.5
1.5

5.5
7.4
7.6
9.8
-1.4
-.5

-8.6
-5.3

2.6
4.0
2.5
3.5
2.2

2.1
3.6
2.5
4.1

2.2
3.5

Q4

-420
-420
3.9
2.4

4.8
4.8
2.4
2.4
13.4
13.4

10.3
10.3

2.0
2.0
7.9
2.9
.7

2.5
2.5
2.7
2.7

4.1
4.1

Q3

109
97
97
12

.3
.8
1.6
-1.2
6.2
-.6

-392
-373
.1
1.6

1.6
3.0
1.6
3.4
1.9
1.4

2.9
8.8

2.6
3.1
.1
.5
3.8

1.9
2.9
2.5
3.3

1.5
2.4

Q1

106
100
100
7

-.5
-1.2
-3.1
-5.1
.2
1.2

-384
-377
3.3
1.5

5.7
6.3
5.2
6.0
7.3
7.3

10.4
8.4

3.7
3.4
10.3
4.9
2.3

3.7
3.1
4.2
4.0

3.5
3.1

Q2

105
102
100
5

-.9
-1.0
-3.1
-5.2
.3
.4

-389
-382
4.2
4.4

4.6
5.5
4.6
5.7
4.7
4.6

11.7
16.1

3.8
3.6
9.2
3.1
3.2

3.2
3.3
4.2
4.3

3.2
3.3

Q3

2014

111
110
106
5

-.6
-.8
-2.2
-2.4
-2.0
.5

-401
-392
4.6
5.8

5.2
5.4
5.3
5.9
4.6
4.0

14.6
16.9

3.9
3.9
9.9
3.0
3.2

3.4
3.5
4.5
4.7

3.5
3.7

Q4

100
93
98
2

-1.1
-1.0
-4.4
-5.2
-3.0
1.0

-404
-391
4.8
4.5

5.0
5.6
5.8
6.5
2.4
2.5

16.6
18.7

3.9
4.1
9.3
3.1
3.3

3.6
4.0
4.5
4.9

3.2
3.5

Q1

90
90
88
2

-.8
-.8
-3.8
-4.3
-3.0
1.1

-410
-400
5.0
5.3

5.0
5.1
5.8
5.9
2.4
2.5

16.3
16.5

3.8
4.0
9.2
3.1
3.2

3.5
3.6
4.5
4.7

3.2
3.5

Q2

85
87
83
2

-.8
-1.0
-3.9
-4.1
-3.5
1.1

-414
-404
5.2
5.0

5.0
5.3
5.8
6.1
2.4
2.6

14.8
14.0

3.6
3.8
9.0
2.8
3.0

3.4
3.5
4.3
4.4

3.2
3.4

Q3

2015

83
68
80
2

-.2
-.2
-2.5
-2.5
-2.5
1.1

-420
-405
4.8
4.9

5.1
5.4
5.9
6.2
2.5
2.6

12.9
13.1

3.5
3.7
9.0
2.7
2.9

3.3
3.7
4.1
4.4

3.3
3.2

Q4

83
82
60
20

-2.4
-2.6
-6.2
-6.9
-5.0
.2

-412
-410
4.9
2.8

2.5
3.0
3.4
4.0
-.6
-.4

6.7
7.6

2.1
2.5
5.6
2.7
1.4

1.7
2.1
2.4
2.7

2.5
2.8

20131

108
102
101
7

-.4
-.5
-1.7
-3.5
1.1
.4

-392
-381
3.1
3.3

4.3
5.0
4.2
5.2
4.6
4.3

9.8
12.5

3.5
3.5
7.3
2.9
3.1

3.0
3.2
3.9
4.1

2.9
3.1

20141

90
84
87
2

-.7
-.8
-3.6
-4.0
-3.0
1.1

-412
-400
4.9
4.9

5.0
5.3
5.8
6.2
2.4
2.5

15.1
15.6

3.7
3.9
9.1
2.9
3.1

3.4
3.7
4.4
4.6

3.2
3.4

20151

80
44
77
2

.5
.9
-1.2
-1.9
.0
1.5

-419
-395
5.6
4.5

4.3
4.7
5.0
5.5
1.9
2.2

11.0
9.2

2.9
3.2
6.3
2.4
2.5

3.1
3.4
3.5
3.7

3.0
3.2

20161

Authorized for Public Release

1. Change from fourth quarter of previous year to fourth quarter of year indicated.
2. Billions of chained (2009) dollars.

-.4
-.4
-1.6
-.6
-3.1
.4

Gov’t. cons. & invest.
Previous Tealbook
Federal
Defense
Nondefense
State & local

4.7
4.7
1.3
1.3
17.6
17.6

Nonres. priv. fixed invest.
Previous Tealbook
Equipment & intangibles
Previous Tealbook
Nonres. structures
Previous Tealbook
-424
-424
8.0
6.9

14.2
14.2

Residential investment
Previous Tealbook

Net exports2
Previous Tealbook2
Exports
Imports

1.8
1.8
6.2
1.6
1.2

2.1
2.1
2.6
2.6

Final sales
Previous Tealbook
Priv. dom. final purch.
Previous Tealbook

Personal cons. expend.
Previous Tealbook
Durables
Nondurables
Services

2.5
2.5

Q2

Real GDP
Previous Tealbook

Item

2013

Greensheets
Changes in Real Gross Domestic Product and Related Items
(Percent, annual rate except as noted)
Class II FOMC - Restricted (FR)
March 12, 2014

Page 85 of 96

1.8
1.8
2.7
2.5
2.9
1.2
36
36
37
-1

Gov’t. cons. & invest.
Previous Tealbook
Federal
Defense
Nondefense
State & local

Change in priv. inventories1
Previous Tealbook1
Nonfarm1
Farm1

-34
-34
-35
1

3.3
3.3
8.4
9.4
6.5
.2

-547
-547
-2.9
-5.9

-8.9
-8.9
-11.8
-11.8
-1.2
-1.2

-24.3
-24.3

-2.0
-2.0
-12.9
-2.7
.2

-2.2
-2.2
-4.1
-4.1

-2.8
-2.8

2008

-148
-148
-146
-2

2.3
2.3
3.9
3.6
4.6
1.3

-392
-392
.4
-6.2

-12.2
-12.2
-6.0
-6.0
-27.1
-27.1

-10.8
-10.8

-.1
-.1
2.5
.2
-.6

-.4
-.4
-2.3
-2.3

-.2
-.2

2009

Greensheets

58
58
66
-7

-1.1
-1.1
3.2
2.0
5.5
-4.0

-463
-463
9.8
11.7

8.1
8.1
12.0
12.0
-4.0
-4.0

-5.2
-5.2

3.1
3.1
9.3
3.3
2.1

2.0
2.0
3.5
3.5

2.8
2.8

2010

34
34
40
-4

-3.3
-3.3
-3.9
-4.2
-3.3
-2.8

-446
-446
4.6
3.5

8.6
8.6
8.7
8.7
8.3
8.3

5.6
5.6

2.0
2.0
5.7
.7
1.9

1.8
1.8
3.0
3.0

2.0
2.0

2011

58
58
69
-7

-1.1
-1.1
-2.3
-5.0
2.6
-.3

-431
-431
2.4
.1

5.0
5.0
3.9
3.9
9.3
9.3

15.5
15.5

2.0
2.0
7.8
1.6
1.3

2.5
2.5
2.9
2.9

2.0
2.0

2012

83
82
60
20

-2.4
-2.6
-6.2
-6.9
-5.0
.2

-412
-410
4.9
2.8

2.5
3.0
3.4
4.0
-.6
-.4

6.7
7.6

2.1
2.5
5.6
2.7
1.4

1.7
2.1
2.4
2.7

2.5
2.8

2013

108
102
101
7

-.4
-.5
-1.7
-3.5
1.1
.4

-392
-381
3.1
3.3

4.3
5.0
4.2
5.2
4.6
4.3

9.8
12.5

3.5
3.5
7.3
2.9
3.1

3.0
3.2
3.9
4.1

2.9
3.1

2014

90
84
87
2

-.7
-.8
-3.6
-4.0
-3.0
1.1

-412
-400
4.9
4.9

5.0
5.3
5.8
6.2
2.4
2.5

15.1
15.6

3.7
3.9
9.1
2.9
3.1

3.4
3.7
4.4
4.6

3.2
3.4

2015

80
44
77
2

.5
.9
-1.2
-1.9
.0
1.5

-419
-395
5.6
4.5

4.3
4.7
5.0
5.5
1.9
2.2

11.0
9.2

2.9
3.2
6.3
2.4
2.5

3.1
3.4
3.5
3.7

3.0
3.2

2016

Authorized for Public Release

1. Billions of chained (2009) dollars.

-704
-704
9.8
.7

Net exports1
Previous Tealbook1
Exports
Imports

7.1
7.1
3.9
3.9
17.1
17.1

-21.3
-21.3

Residential investment
Previous Tealbook

Nonres. priv. fixed invest.
Previous Tealbook
Equipment & intangibles
Previous Tealbook
Nonres. structures
Previous Tealbook

1.5
1.5
4.1
.1
1.5

2.0
2.0
.8
.8

Final sales
Previous Tealbook
Priv. dom. final purch.
Previous Tealbook

Personal cons. expend.
Previous Tealbook
Durables
Nondurables
Services

1.9
1.9

2007

Real GDP
Previous Tealbook

Item

Changes in Real Gross Domestic Product and Related Items
(Change from fourth quarter of previous year to fourth quarter of year indicated, unless otherwise noted)
Class II FOMC - Restricted (FR)
March 12, 2014

Page 86 of 96

.4
.4
.3
.1

Change in priv. inventories
Previous Tealbook
Nonfarm
Farm

1.7
1.7
1.6
.1

.1
.1
-.1
.0
-.1
.2

.1
.1
.5
-.4

.6
.6
.2
.2
.4
.4

.3
.3

1.4
1.4
.6
.5
.3

2.5
2.5
2.3
2.3

4.1
4.1

Q3

.1
-.1
.2
-.1

-1.0
-1.1
-1.0
-.7
-.3
.0

1.0
1.3
1.2
-.3

.7
.9
.7
.9
.0
.0

-.3
-.2

1.7
2.7
.2
.5
1.0

2.1
3.5
2.1
3.4

2.2
3.5

Q4

-.4
-.5
.0
-.4

.1
.1
.1
-.1
.2
-.1

-.2
.0
.0
-.3

.2
.4
.1
.3
.1
.0

.1
.3

1.8
2.1
.0
.1
1.7

1.9
2.9
2.1
2.8

1.5
2.4

Q1

-.2
.0
.1
-.2

-.1
-.2
-.2
-.2
.0
.1

.2
-.1
.5
-.2

.7
.8
.5
.6
.2
.2

.3
.3

2.5
2.3
.7
.7
1.1

3.6
3.1
3.5
3.4

3.5
3.1

Q2

.0
.1
.0
.0

-.2
-.2
-.2
-.2
.0
.1

-.1
-.1
.6
-.7

.6
.7
.4
.5
.1
.1

.4
.5

2.6
2.4
.7
.5
1.4

3.2
3.3
3.5
3.6

3.2
3.3

Q3

2014

.2
.2
.1
.0

-.1
-.1
-.2
-.1
-.1
.1

-.3
-.2
.6
-.9

.6
.7
.5
.6
.1
.1

.5
.5

2.6
2.7
.7
.5
1.5

3.4
3.5
3.7
3.9

3.5
3.7

Q4

-.3
-.5
-.2
-.1

-.2
-.2
-.3
-.2
-.1
.1

-.1
.0
.6
-.7

.6
.7
.5
.6
.1
.1

.5
.6

2.6
2.8
.7
.5
1.5

3.5
4.0
3.8
4.1

3.2
3.5

Q1

-.2
-.1
-.2
.0

-.1
-.1
-.3
-.2
-.1
.1

-.2
-.2
.7
-.8

.6
.6
.5
.6
.1
.1

.5
.6

2.6
2.7
.7
.5
1.5

3.5
3.5
3.8
3.9

3.2
3.5

Q2

-.1
-.1
-.1
.0

-.1
-.2
-.3
-.2
-.1
.1

-.1
-.1
.7
-.8

.6
.7
.5
.6
.1
.1

.5
.5

2.5
2.6
.7
.4
1.4

3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7

3.2
3.4

Q3

2015

-.1
-.5
-.1
.0

.0
.0
-.2
-.1
-.1
.1

-.1
.0
.6
-.8

.6
.7
.6
.6
.1
.1

.5
.5

2.4
2.5
.7
.4
1.3

3.3
3.6
3.5
3.7

3.3
3.2

Q4

.8
.7
.5
.2

-.5
-.5
-.5
-.3
-.1
.0

.2
.3
.7
-.5

.3
.4
.3
.4
.0
.0

.2
.2

1.5
1.7
.4
.4
.6

1.7
2.1
2.0
2.3

2.5
2.8

20131

-.1
-.1
.1
-.2

-.1
-.1
-.1
-.2
.0
.0

-.1
-.1
.4
-.5

.5
.6
.4
.5
.1
.1

.3
.4

2.4
2.4
.5
.4
1.4

3.0
3.2
3.2
3.4

2.9
3.1

20141

-.2
-.3
-.2
.0

-.1
-.1
-.2
-.2
-.1
.1

-.1
-.1
.7
-.8

.6
.7
.6
.6
.1
.1

.5
.5

2.5
2.7
.7
.4
1.4

3.4
3.7
3.7
3.9

3.2
3.4

20151

.0
-.2
.0
.0

.1
.2
-.1
-.1
.0
.2

.0
.1
.8
-.7

.5
.6
.5
.5
.1
.1

.4
.4

2.0
2.2
.5
.4
1.2

3.1
3.4
3.0
3.1

3.0
3.2

20161

Authorized for Public Release

1. Change from fourth quarter of previous year to fourth quarter of year indicated.

-.1
-.1
-.1
.0
-.1
.1

Gov’t. cons. & invest.
Previous Tealbook
Federal
Defense
Nondefense
State & local

.6
.6
.1
.1
.4
.4

Nonres. priv. fixed invest.
Previous Tealbook
Equipment & intangibles
Previous Tealbook
Nonres. structures
Previous Tealbook
-.1
-.1
1.0
-1.1

.4
.4

Residential investment
Previous Tealbook

Net exports
Previous Tealbook
Exports
Imports

1.2
1.2
.5
.3
.5

2.1
2.1
2.2
2.2

Final sales
Previous Tealbook
Priv. dom. final purch.
Previous Tealbook

Personal cons. expend.
Previous Tealbook
Durables
Nondurables
Services

2.5
2.5

Q2

Real GDP
Previous Tealbook

Item

2013

Contributions to Changes in Real Gross Domestic Product
(Percentage points, annual rate except as noted)

Greensheets

Class II FOMC - Restricted (FR)
March 12, 2014

2.4
2.4
1.8
1.8
3.8
3.8
2.0
2.0
-2.4
-2.4

ECI, hourly compensation2
Previous Tealbook2

Nonfarm business sector
Output per hour
Previous Tealbook
Compensation per hour
Previous Tealbook
Unit labor costs
Previous Tealbook

Page 87 of 96

Core goods imports chain-wt. price index3
Previous Tealbook3
-3.2
-3.2

3.5
3.7
1.3
1.6
-2.1
-2.0

1.7
1.7

2.2
2.6
1.8
1.8

1.9
1.9
11.8
11.8
1.2
1.2
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4

2.0
2.0

Q3

.6
.3

1.6
3.2
1.7
1.6
.1
-1.6

2.0
2.1

1.1
.9
1.6
1.6

1.0
.7
-1.0
-5.0
.1
.1
1.3
1.1
1.0
.9

1.7
1.5

Q4

1.1
.7

1.4
.2
2.5
1.8
1.0
1.6

2.4
2.2

1.9
1.4
1.7
1.8

1.4
1.1
4.3
-2.0
.6
.5
1.2
1.3
1.0
1.3

1.5
1.2

Q1

.5
.6

1.2
1.4
2.6
2.7
1.4
1.3

2.5
2.5

1.7
1.8
2.0
2.0

1.3
1.5
-.6
1.4
1.2
.6
1.5
1.6
1.5
1.6

1.5
1.8

Q2

1.2
1.4

1.4
1.7
3.1
3.1
1.7
1.5

2.6
2.6

1.8
1.6
2.0
1.8

1.5
1.4
.3
-.3
1.1
.7
1.6
1.5
1.5
1.5

1.7
1.6

Q4

Greensheets

1.6
1.7

1.4
1.5
3.0
3.0
1.6
1.6

2.5
2.5

2.0
1.7
2.0
2.0

1.6
1.5
2.2
.3
1.4
.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6

1.8
1.7

Q3

2014

1.3
1.5

1.4
1.6
3.2
3.2
1.8
1.6

2.8
2.8

1.7
1.7
2.1
2.0

1.6
1.6
-.6
-.3
1.1
1.0
1.7
1.7
1.8
1.8

1.9
1.9

Q1

1.3
1.5

1.4
1.6
3.3
3.3
1.9
1.7

2.9
2.9

1.7
1.8
2.1
2.1

1.6
1.6
-1.0
-.5
1.3
1.3
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.8

1.8
1.8

Q2

1.3
1.5

1.4
1.4
3.3
3.3
1.9
1.9

2.9
3.0

1.7
1.8
2.0
2.1

1.6
1.6
-.9
-.6
1.3
1.3
1.7
1.8
1.7
1.8

1.8
1.7

Q3

2015

1.3
1.5

1.4
1.8
3.5
3.5
2.0
1.7

2.9
3.0

1.7
1.7
1.9
2.0

1.5
1.5
-.8
-.5
1.4
1.4
1.6
1.7
1.6
1.6

1.7
1.7

Q4

-1.1
-1.2

1.2
1.7
.3
.4
-.9
-1.3

2.0
2.0

1.2
1.2
1.7
1.7

1.0
.9
-1.5
-2.5
.8
.8
1.2
1.1
1.1
1.1

1.4
1.4

20131

1.1
1.1

1.4
1.2
2.8
2.7
1.4
1.5

2.5
2.5

1.8
1.6
1.9
1.9

1.5
1.4
1.5
-.2
1.1
.6
1.5
1.5
1.4
1.5

1.6
1.6

20141

1.3
1.5

1.4
1.6
3.3
3.3
1.9
1.7

2.9
2.9

1.7
1.7
2.0
2.0

1.5
1.6
-.8
-.5
1.3
1.3
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7

1.8
1.8

20151

1.4
1.6

1.8
1.9
3.6
3.6
1.7
1.7

3.2
3.2

1.8
1.8
2.0
2.0

1.7
1.7
-.3
-.1
1.4
1.4
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.8

1.8
1.8

20161

Authorized for Public Release

1. Change from fourth quarter of previous year to fourth quarter of year indicated.
2. Private-industry workers.
3. Core goods imports exclude computers, semiconductors, oil, and natural gas.

.4
.0
1.4
1.4

-.1
-.1
-11.9
-11.9
.5
.5
.6
.6
.5
.5

.6
.6

Q2

Previous Tealbook
Ex. food & energy
Previous Tealbook

CPI

PCE chain-wt. price index
Previous Tealbook
Energy
Previous Tealbook
Food
Previous Tealbook
Ex. food & energy
Previous Tealbook
Ex. food & energy, market based
Previous Tealbook

GDP chain-wt. price index
Previous Tealbook

Item

2013

Changes in Prices and Costs
(Percent, annual rate except as noted)
Class II FOMC - Restricted (FR)
March 12, 2014

Greensheets

3.3
3.3
19.1
19.1
4.9
4.9
2.2
2.2
2.1
2.1
4.0
4.0
2.3
2.3
3.0
3.0
2.4
2.4
3.9
3.9
1.5
1.5
3.0
3.0

PCE chain-wt. price index
Previous Tealbook
Energy
Previous Tealbook
Food
Previous Tealbook
Ex. food & energy
Previous Tealbook
Ex. food & energy, market based
Previous Tealbook

CPI

Previous Tealbook
Ex. food & energy
Previous Tealbook

ECI, hourly compensation1
Previous Tealbook1

Nonfarm business sector
Output per hour
Previous Tealbook
Compensation per hour
Previous Tealbook
Unit labor costs
Previous Tealbook

Page 88 of 96

Core goods imports chain-wt. price index2
Previous Tealbook2
3.9
3.9

-.5
-.4
3.0
3.0
3.5
3.5

2.4
2.4

1.6
1.6
2.0
2.0

1.5
1.5
-8.2
-8.2
6.9
6.9
1.6
1.6
2.2
2.2

1.9
1.9

2008

-1.9
-1.9

5.5
5.5
1.2
1.2
-4.0
-4.0

1.2
1.2

1.5
1.5
1.8
1.7

1.2
1.2
2.3
2.3
-1.8
-1.8
1.4
1.4
1.8
1.8

.4
.4

2009

2.3
2.3

1.9
1.9
1.6
1.6
-.3
-.3

2.1
2.1

1.2
1.2
.6
.6

1.3
1.3
6.4
6.4
1.3
1.3
1.0
1.0
.7
.7

1.8
1.8

2010

4.2
4.2

.4
.4
1.0
.9
.5
.5

2.2
2.2

3.3
3.3
2.2
2.2

2.6
2.6
11.7
11.7
5.1
5.1
1.8
1.8
1.9
1.9

1.8
1.8

2011

.1
.1

.8
.9
5.3
5.3
4.4
4.4

1.8
1.8

1.9
1.9
1.9
1.9

1.7
1.7
2.1
2.1
1.2
1.2
1.7
1.7
1.5
1.5

1.8
1.8

2012

-1.1
-1.2

1.2
1.7
.3
.4
-.9
-1.3

2.0
2.0

1.2
1.2
1.7
1.7

1.0
.9
-1.5
-2.5
.8
.8
1.2
1.1
1.1
1.1

1.4
1.4

2013

1.1
1.1

1.4
1.2
2.8
2.7
1.4
1.5

2.5
2.5

1.8
1.6
1.9
1.9

1.5
1.4
1.5
-.2
1.1
.6
1.5
1.5
1.4
1.5

1.6
1.6

2014

1.3
1.5

1.4
1.6
3.3
3.3
1.9
1.7

2.9
2.9

1.7
1.7
2.0
2.0

1.5
1.6
-.8
-.5
1.3
1.3
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7

1.8
1.8

2015

1.4
1.6

1.8
1.9
3.6
3.6
1.7
1.7

3.2
3.2

1.8
1.8
2.0
2.0

1.7
1.7
-.3
-.1
1.4
1.4
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.8

1.8
1.8

2016

Authorized for Public Release

1. Private-industry workers.
2. Core goods imports exclude computers, semiconductors, oil, and natural gas.

2.5
2.5

2007

GDP chain-wt. price index
Previous Tealbook

Item

Changes in Prices and Costs
(Change from fourth quarter of previous year to fourth quarter of year indicated, unless otherwise noted)
Class II FOMC - Restricted (FR)
March 12, 2014

.6
7.5
7.5
5.6
5.6
-3.8
-4.0
1.2
1.2
.1
.1
76.1
76.1
.9
15.5
3.1
4.1
4.1
4.7
4.7
13.9
12.3
-653
-198
17.7
2.5

Employment and production
Nonfarm payroll employment2
Unemployment rate3
Previous Tealbook3
Natural rate of unemployment3
Previous Tealbook3
GDP gap4
Previous Tealbook4

Industrial production5
Previous Tealbook5
Manufacturing industr. prod.5
Previous Tealbook5
Capacity utilization rate - mfg.3
Previous Tealbook3

Housing starts6
Light motor vehicle sales6

Income and saving
Nominal GDP5
Real disposable pers. income5
Previous Tealbook5
Personal saving rate3
Previous Tealbook3

Corporate profits7
Profit share of GNP3

Page 89 of 96

Net federal saving8
Net state & local saving8

Gross national saving rate3
Net national saving rate3
17.8
2.7

-850
-226

7.7
12.4

6.2
3.0
3.0
4.9
4.9

.9
15.7

2.5
2.4
1.6
1.5
76.1
76.0

.5
7.3
7.3
5.5
5.5
-3.2
-3.4

Q3

18.2
4.3

-655
-227

6.9
12.5

3.9
.6
.9
4.5
4.2

1.0
15.6

5.4
6.8
4.6
6.2
76.6
76.9

.6
7.0
7.0
5.5
5.5
-3.0
-3.0

Q4

18.2
3.7

-629
-230

-.1
12.4

3.0
2.4
2.9
4.5
4.2

1.0
15.4

2.3
4.3
-.1
2.8
76.3
77.0

.5
6.6
6.7
5.4
5.4
-3.1
-2.9

Q1

18.4
4.0

-611
-211

2.5
12.3

5.0
3.7
3.3
4.5
4.2

1.0
16.1

4.7
4.4
4.1
4.0
76.7
77.4

.6
6.5
6.6
5.4
5.4
-2.7
-2.6

Q2

2014

18.3
4.0

-609
-207

7.9
12.4

5.0
2.9
3.2
4.3
4.1

1.1
16.0

4.3
3.3
3.3
3.9
76.9
77.7

.6
6.4
6.4
5.4
5.4
-2.3
-2.3

Q3

18.4
4.1

-591
-198

8.1
12.5

5.3
2.9
3.2
4.0
3.9

1.2
16.0

3.5
3.8
3.6
4.2
77.2
78.1

.7
6.2
6.2
5.3
5.3
-1.9
-1.9

Q4

18.3
4.0

-593
-193

2.0
12.4

5.2
3.9
4.1
4.0
3.9

1.3
16.2

4.4
4.9
3.9
4.7
77.5
78.5

.7
6.0
6.0
5.3
5.3
-1.6
-1.5

Q1

18.5
4.2

-569
-171

6.7
12.5

5.1
2.8
3.3
3.8
3.8

1.3
16.3

4.5
4.6
4.1
4.4
77.8
78.9

.7
5.9
5.8
5.2
5.2
-1.3
-1.2

Q2

2015

18.5
4.3

-554
-167

5.0
12.5

5.0
3.1
3.2
3.6
3.6

1.4
16.4

3.9
3.2
3.9
4.1
78.0
79.2

.7
5.7
5.7
5.2
5.2
-1.0
-.9

Q3

18.6
4.4

-544
-157

3.8
12.5

5.0
3.3
3.2
3.6
3.5

1.4
16.6

3.2
2.8
3.9
3.6
78.3
79.4

.7
5.6
5.5
5.2
5.2
-.7
-.6

Q4

Greensheets

18.2
4.3

-753
-220

5.6
12.5

4.0
-.2
-.1
4.5
4.2

.9
15.5

3.3
3.6
2.8
3.1
76.6
76.9

2.4
7.0
7.0
5.5
5.5
-3.0
-3.0

20131

18.4
4.1

-610
-211

4.6
12.5

4.6
3.0
3.2
4.0
3.9

1.1
15.9

3.7
4.0
2.7
3.7
77.2
78.1

2.4
6.2
6.2
5.3
5.3
-1.9
-1.9

20141

18.6
4.4

-565
-172

4.4
12.5

5.1
3.2
3.5
3.6
3.5

1.3
16.4

4.0
3.9
4.0
4.2
78.3
79.4

2.7
5.6
5.5
5.2
5.2
-.7
-.6

20151

18.9
4.8

-583
-142

5.1
12.5

4.9
3.1
3.2
3.8
3.5

1.5
16.6

3.5
3.0
3.6
3.3
79.1
80.0

2.6
5.1
5.1
5.2
5.2
.4
.4

20161

Authorized for Public Release

1. Change from fourth quarter of previous year to fourth quarter of year indicated, unless otherwise indicated.
2. Change, millions.
3. Percent; annual values are for the fourth quarter of the year indicated.
4. Percent difference between actual and potential GDP; a negative number indicates that the economy is operating below potential.
Annual values are for the fourth quarter of the year indicated.
5. Percent change, annual rate.
6. Level, millions; annual values are annual averages.
7. Percent change, annual rate, with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments.
8. Billions of dollars; annual values are annual averages.

Q2

Item

2013

Other Macroeconomic Indicators

Class II FOMC - Restricted (FR)
March 12, 2014

Greensheets

1.2
4.8
4.8
5.3
5.3
1.0
1.0
2.7
2.7
2.9
2.9
78.4
78.4
1.4
16.1
4.4
1.2
1.2
2.9
2.9
-9.0
9.9
-267
-73
16.3
1.0

Employment and production
Nonfarm payroll employment1
Unemployment rate2
Previous Tealbook2
Natural rate of unemployment2
Previous Tealbook2
GDP gap3
Previous Tealbook3

Industrial production4
Previous Tealbook4
Manufacturing industr. prod.4
Previous Tealbook4
Capacity utilization rate - mfg.2
Previous Tealbook2

Housing starts5
Light motor vehicle sales5

Income and saving
Nominal GDP4
Real disposable pers. income4
Previous Tealbook4
Personal saving rate2
Previous Tealbook2

Corporate profits6
Profit share of GNP2

Page 90 of 96

Net federal saving7
Net state & local saving7

Gross national saving rate2
Net national saving rate2
15.0
-1.6

-635
-165

-30.8
6.9

-1.0
1.1
1.1
6.1
6.1

.9
13.1

-8.9
-8.9
-11.6
-11.6
69.9
69.9

-2.8
6.9
6.9
5.6
5.6
-4.0
-4.0

2008

14.7
-1.6

-1,250
-272

54.5
10.7

.1
-.6
-.6
5.7
5.7

.6
10.4

-5.5
-5.5
-6.1
-6.1
67.2
67.2

-5.6
9.9
9.9
6.2
6.2
-5.8
-5.8

2009

15.2
-.4

-1,330
-237

17.0
11.9

4.6
2.5
2.5
5.5
5.5

.6
11.5

6.2
6.2
6.4
6.4
72.9
72.9

.8
9.5
9.5
6.2
6.2
-4.8
-4.8

2010

15.8
.5

-1,248
-213

8.4
12.4

3.9
1.4
1.4
5.0
5.0

.6
12.7

3.3
3.3
3.3
3.3
74.8
74.8

2.0
8.7
8.7
6.0
6.0
-4.3
-4.4

2011

16.9
1.7

-1,110
-253

2.7
12.3

3.8
3.6
3.6
6.6
6.6

.8
14.4

2.8
2.8
2.8
2.8
75.7
75.7

2.2
7.8
7.8
5.8
5.8
-3.9
-4.1

2012

18.2
4.3

-753
-220

5.6
12.5

4.0
-.2
-.1
4.5
4.2

.9
15.5

3.3
3.6
2.8
3.1
76.6
76.9

2.4
7.0
7.0
5.5
5.5
-3.0
-3.0

2013

18.4
4.1

-610
-211

4.6
12.5

4.6
3.0
3.2
4.0
3.9

1.1
15.9

3.7
4.0
2.7
3.7
77.2
78.1

2.4
6.2
6.2
5.3
5.3
-1.9
-1.9

2014

18.6
4.4

-565
-172

4.4
12.5

5.1
3.2
3.5
3.6
3.5

1.3
16.4

4.0
3.9
4.0
4.2
78.3
79.4

2.7
5.6
5.5
5.2
5.2
-.7
-.6

2015

18.9
4.8

-583
-142

5.1
12.5

4.9
3.1
3.2
3.8
3.5

1.5
16.6

3.5
3.0
3.6
3.3
79.1
80.0

2.6
5.1
5.1
5.2
5.2
.4
.4

2016

Authorized for Public Release

1. Change, millions.
2. Percent; values are for the fourth quarter of the year indicated.
3. Percent difference between actual and potential GDP; a negative number indicates that the economy is operating below potential.
Values are for the fourth quarter of the year indicated.
4. Percent change.
5. Level, millions; values are annual averages.
6. Percent change, with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments.
7. Billions of dollars; values are annual averages.

2007

Item

Other Macroeconomic Indicators
(Change from fourth quarter of previous year to fourth quarter of year indicated, unless otherwise noted)
Class II FOMC - Restricted (FR)
March 12, 2014

Page 91 of 96
-448.9
-1.3
-.6
-.5

-1.9
-1.2
-1.3

-622

-870

-653.5

3,223
3,849
948
595
354
2,901
-626
269

2,938
3,797
981
620
361
2,815
-859
277

70

625
18
-159

3,047
3,531
-484
-467
-499
15

-.4
-.4

.0

-458.1

-557

3,437
4,013
941
588
353
3,073
-577
259

70

539
0
-120

3,284
3,702
-419
-416
-441
22

2015

Fiscal year
2014

-2.0
-2.0

-1.5

.2
-.1
.0

-629.4

-860

2,900
3,753
982
620
363
2,771
-853
273

79

336
14
-43

581
888
-307
-307
-303
-4

Q1a

-521.0

-540

3,638
4,211
940
587
353
3,271
-573
252

70

568
0
-120

3,481
3,929
-448
-409
-464
16

2016

-.7
-.7

-1.1

-440.7

-663

3,167
3,820
976
616
360
2,844
-653
277

135

-17
-56
-18

891
800
91
91
36
55

88

69
46
55

687
857
-170
-170
-143
-28

Q3a

-.7
-.7

1.2

-659.9

-861

2,976
3,826
972
615
358
2,853
-850
279

2013
Q2a

-1.5
-1.7

-1.1

-471.0

-656

3,118
3,772
953
598
355
2,820
-654
272

162

371
-74
-123

665
838
-174
-174
-184
10

Q4

2014
Q3

150

-44
-21
-25

981
891
90
83
38
52

70

49
80
-30

771
870
-99
-96
-68
-31

Q4

70

226
0
-30

740
935
-196
-182
-219
24

Not seasonally adjusted

Q2

-.5
-.5

-.2

-438.1

-628

-.7
-.6

.0

-438.0

-606

-.6
-.5

.0

-448.6

-599

-.4
-.3

.0

-449.5

-578

Seasonally adjusted annual rates
3,217
3,258
3,300
3,348
3,845
3,869
3,909
3,940
949
947
945
943
597
594
590
589
352
353
355
354
2,896
2,922
2,964
2,997
-629
-611
-609
-591
271
268
264
263

130

250
33
19

630
931
-301
-281
-286
-16

Q1

-.6
-.7

.1

-465.1

-575

3,417
4,011
945
590
355
3,066
-593
260

70

302
0
-30

675
947
-272
-277
-254
-19

Q1

-.4
-.4

-.1

-457.4

-546

3,466
4,035
940
587
353
3,095
-569
257

70

-84
0
-30

1,039
924
114
103
64
50

70

95
0
-30

830
895
-65
-60
-32
-33

Q3

-.3
-.3

.0

-460.3

-527

3,515
4,069
934
584
350
3,134
-554
255

2015
Q2

-.2
-.2

.0

-469.0

-515

3,563
4,107
932
584
348
3,175
-544
253

70

222
0
-30

770
961
-192
-178
-213
21

Q4

Greensheets

Authorized for Public Release

1. Budget receipts, outlays, and surplus/deficit include corresponding social security (OASDI) categories. The OASDI surplus and the Postal Service surplus are excluded from the on-budget
surplus and shown separately as off-budget, as classified under current law.
2. Other means of financing are checks issued less checks paid, accrued items, and changes in other financial assets and liabilities.
3. Gross saving is the current account surplus plus consumption of fixed capital of the general government as well as government enterprises.
4. HEB is gross saving less gross investment (NIPA) of the federal government in current dollars, with cyclically sensitive receipts and outlays adjusted to the staff’s measure of potential output and the
natural rate of unemployment. The sign on Change in HEB, as a percent of nominal potential GDP, is reversed. FI is the weighted difference of discretionary changes in federal spending and taxes in chained
(2009) dollars, scaled by real GDP. The FI estimates are calendar year contributions to Q4/Q4 real GDP growth. Also, for FI and the change in HEB, positive values indicate aggregate demand stimulus.
Quarterly figures for change in HEB and FI are not at annual rates.
a Actual.

Fiscal indicators4
High-employment (HEB)
surplus/deficit
Change in HEB, percent
of potential GDP
Fiscal impetus (FI),
percent of GDP
Previous Tealbook

NIPA federal sector
Receipts
Expenditures
Consumption expenditures
Defense
Nondefense
Other spending
Current account surplus
Gross investment
Gross saving less gross
investment3

88

702
-3
-19

Means of financing:
Borrowing
Cash decrease
Other2

Cash operating balance,
end of period

2,774
3,454
-680
-680
-720
39

2013a

Unified budget
Receipts1
Outlays1
Surplus/deficit1
Previous Tealbook
On-budget
Off-budget

Item

Staff Projections of Federal Sector Accounts and Related Items
(Billions of dollars except as noted)

Class II FOMC - Restricted (FR)
March 12, 2014

2.3
2.3
1.0
1.6
.0
2.4
.8
1.5
3.3
3.3
1.0
3.2
3.5
3.2
7.0

Consumer prices 2
Total foreign
Previous Tealbook
Advanced foreign economies
Canada
Japan
United Kingdom
Euro area
Germany
Emerging market economies
Asia
Korea
China
Latin America
Mexico
Brazil

Page 92 of 96

2

2.8
2.8
2.1
1.9
3.0
2.9
1.7
2.6
3.3
3.6
1.7
3.4
2.6
2.0
4.6

3.0
2.9
1.9
2.7
.9
3.4
.6
1.3
4.2
6.0
4.3
8.8
2.7
3.9
-2.1

Q3

GDP aggregates calculated using shares of U.S. exports.
Foreign CPI aggregates calculated using shares of U.S. non-oil imports.

1.9
1.9
.5
-.1
.8
1.7
.7
.7
3.1
2.1
.4
2.1
5.4
5.3
5.8

2.4
2.4
2.2
2.2
4.1
3.0
1.3
2.9
2.6
5.1
4.5
7.3
.3
-2.7
7.5

Q2

2.4
2.3
.7
.5
1.9
1.3
.1
.7
3.7
3.4
1.1
3.0
4.5
4.2
6.0

2.8
3.1
2.1
2.9
.7
2.9
1.1
1.5
3.5
6.2
3.7
8.0
1.2
.7
2.8

Q4

2.1
2.3
1.2
2.0
1.0
1.2
.7
.9
2.7
1.6
1.2
1.1
5.6
5.4
5.9

2.7
3.3
2.1
1.8
4.2
3.0
1.3
1.8
3.4
5.1
3.5
7.5
1.9
2.5
.4

3.2
3.0
2.9
2.0
8.8
1.7
1.2
1.6
3.4
3.2
2.2
3.2
3.8
3.3
6.0

2.8
2.9
1.7
3.0
-3.8
2.9
1.3
1.8
3.8
5.2
3.6
7.3
2.6
2.9
2.2

2.4
2.4
1.2
1.5
.8
1.8
1.2
1.6
3.3
3.1
2.8
3.0
3.9
3.4
6.0

3.1
3.3
2.1
2.5
2.0
2.9
1.4
1.9
4.1
5.2
3.9
7.1
3.1
3.3
2.5

2.5
2.5
1.4
1.6
.9
2.3
1.3
1.6
3.4
3.2
3.1
3.0
3.9
3.4
5.6

3.2
3.4
2.2
2.6
2.1
2.9
1.4
1.9
4.2
5.3
4.1
7.1
3.2
3.5
2.5

2.5
2.5
1.4
1.7
1.1
1.7
1.3
1.6
3.3
3.2
3.2
3.0
3.8
3.4
5.4

3.3
3.4
2.2
2.6
1.8
2.7
1.5
2.0
4.3
5.5
4.2
7.3
3.3
3.6
2.6

2.5
2.5
1.4
1.7
1.2
1.7
1.3
1.6
3.3
3.2
3.2
3.0
3.8
3.4
5.4

3.3
3.5
2.2
2.6
1.4
2.7
1.7
2.0
4.4
5.5
4.4
7.3
3.3
3.6
2.6

2.6
2.5
1.5
1.8
1.3
1.8
1.4
1.6
3.3
3.2
3.2
3.0
3.8
3.4
5.4

3.4
3.5
2.4
2.6
2.6
2.6
1.7
2.2
4.4
5.5
4.5
7.3
3.4
3.6
2.7

3.0
3.0
2.6
1.8
6.8
2.3
1.4
1.6
3.3
3.2
3.1
3.0
3.8
3.4
5.4

3.2
3.3
1.9
2.6
-1.8
2.4
1.9
2.2
4.4
5.5
4.5
7.3
3.4
3.6
2.7

------------------------------------Projected-----------------------------------2014
2015
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4

Authorized for Public Release

1 Foreign

2.0
1.8
1.8
2.9
4.5
1.6
-.9
.0
2.1
3.6
3.4
6.4
.7
.8
.0

Q1

Real
Total foreign
Previous Tealbook
Advanced foreign economies
Canada
Japan
United Kingdom
Euro area
Germany
Emerging market economies
Asia
Korea
China
Latin America
Mexico
Brazil

GDP 1

Measure and country

2013

Foreign Real GDP and Consumer Prices: Selected Countries
(Quarterly percent changes at an annual rate)

Greensheets

Class II FOMC - Restricted (FR)
March 12, 2014

Page 93 of 96

3.3
3.3
2.0
1.8
1.1
3.9
2.3
1.7
4.6
3.7
4.5
2.5
6.6
6.2
6.2

Consumer prices 2
Total foreign
Previous Tealbook
Advanced foreign economies
Canada
Japan
United Kingdom
Euro area
Germany
Emerging market economies
Asia
Korea
China
Latin America
Mexico
Brazil
1.2
1.2
.2
.8
-2.0
2.2
.4
.3
2.1
1.3
2.4
.6
3.9
4.0
4.2

1.0
1.0
-1.5
-1.4
-.6
-2.5
-2.3
-2.2
3.9
8.1
6.3
11.3
-.1
-1.2
5.3
3.2
3.2
1.7
2.2
-.3
3.4
2.0
1.6
4.3
4.3
3.2
4.7
4.4
4.3
5.6

4.6
4.6
3.0
3.6
3.5
1.8
2.3
4.2
6.4
7.8
5.0
9.7
4.7
4.4
5.3

2010

2 Foreign

3.4
3.4
2.2
2.7
-.3
4.6
2.9
2.6
4.3
4.5
3.9
4.6
4.0
3.5
6.7

3.0
3.0
1.5
2.4
.3
1.1
.7
2.2
4.6
5.0
3.4
8.7
4.0
4.1
1.4

2011

Greensheets

Foreign GDP aggregates calculated using shares of U.S. exports.
CPI aggregates calculated using shares of U.S. non-oil imports.

-.7
-.7
-1.5
.1
-4.8
-4.3
-2.1
-1.8
.4
.9
-3.2
7.7
-.4
-1.3
.9

Real GDP 1
Total foreign
Previous Tealbook
Advanced foreign economies
Canada
Japan
United Kingdom
Euro area
Germany
Emerging market economies
Asia
Korea
China
Latin America
Mexico
Brazil

2009

2.3
2.3
1.3
.9
-.2
2.6
2.3
2.0
3.1
2.6
1.7
2.1
4.3
4.1
5.6

2.3
2.3
.3
1.0
-.3
.2
-1.0
.3
4.3
5.4
1.4
7.8
3.3
3.3
1.8

2012

2.3
2.3
1.0
1.0
1.4
2.1
.8
1.3
3.3
3.1
1.1
2.9
4.0
3.7
5.8

2.6
2.6
2.0
2.7
2.5
2.7
.5
1.4
3.1
5.2
4.0
7.6
1.2
.6
2.0

2013

2.5
2.6
1.7
1.8
2.8
1.7
1.1
1.4
3.2
2.8
2.3
2.6
4.3
3.9
5.9

3.0
3.2
2.0
2.5
1.1
2.9
1.3
1.8
3.9
5.2
3.8
7.2
2.7
3.0
1.9
2.6
2.6
1.7
1.7
2.6
1.9
1.3
1.6
3.3
3.2
3.2
3.0
3.8
3.4
5.4

3.3
3.4
2.2
2.6
1.0
2.6
1.7
2.1
4.4
5.5
4.4
7.3
3.4
3.6
2.6

2.6
2.6
1.7
1.9
1.7
1.9
1.5
1.7
3.3
3.2
3.2
3.0
3.7
3.4
5.3

3.4
3.5
2.2
2.6
1.3
2.5
1.9
2.3
4.5
5.6
4.5
7.4
3.5
3.7
2.7

-------------Projected------------2014
2015
2016

Authorized for Public Release

1

2008

Measure and country

Foreign Real GDP and Consumer Prices: Selected Countries
(Percent change, Q4 to Q4)
Class II FOMC - Restricted (FR)
March 12, 2014

Page 94 of 96

U.S. current account balance
Previous Tealbook
Current account as percent of GDP
Previous Tealbook
Net goods & services
Investment income, net
Direct, net
Portfolio, net
Other income and transfers, net

U.S. current account balance
Previous Tealbook
Current account as percent of GDP
Previous Tealbook
Net goods & services
Investment income, net
Direct, net
Portfolio, net
Other income and transfers, net

-681.3
-681.3
-4.6
-4.6
-702.3
157.8
284.3
-126.5
-136.9

2008

-416.9
-419.6
-2.5
-2.5
-487.8
211.6
276.6
-65.0
-140.6

Q1

Q3

2009

-382.6
-379.4
-2.3
-2.2
-486.2
248.7
304.6
-55.9
-145.1

-381.6
-381.6
-2.6
-2.6
-383.7
132.3
257.7
-125.4
-130.2

-383.8
-386.4
-2.3
-2.3
-469.8
232.7
290.6
-57.9
-146.7

Q2

2013

-449.5
-449.5
-3.0
-3.0
-499.4
185.7
288.0
-102.3
-135.8

2010

Q2

Q3

-457.7
-457.7
-2.9
-2.9
-556.8
240.7
310.6
-69.8
-141.6

2011

2012

-387.9
-374.5
-2.2
-2.1
-458.1
213.4
305.7
-92.4
-143.1

-440.4
-440.4
-2.7
-2.7
-534.7
232.3
293.5
-61.2
-138.0

2013

-412.6
-399.8
-2.3
-2.2
-473.7
200.8
304.4
-103.6
-139.7

Q4

-385.2
-382.7
-2.3
-2.3
-474.9
231.6
294.2
-62.6
-141.9

Billions of dollars

-354.5
-346.7
-2.0
-2.0
-440.8
225.9
307.1
-81.2
-139.5

Billions of dollars, s.a.a.r.

Q1

-385.0
-375.2
-2.2
-2.2
-457.6
229.2
304.9
-75.8
-156.5

Annual Data

-357.6
-345.2
-2.1
-2.0
-455.7
233.3
304.9
-71.6
-135.2

Q4

-420.9
-405.9
-2.3
-2.2
-460.9
179.6
311.1
-131.5
-139.5

Q2

-447.2
-428.6
-2.4
-2.3
-473.6
169.6
317.3
-147.7
-143.1

Q3

-465.9
-442.9
-2.5
-2.3
-484.6
158.4
323.7
-165.3
-139.7

Q4

-444.0
-425.7
-2.4
-2.3
-473.7
174.5
315.1
-140.6
-144.7

-385.0
-374.0
-2.2
-2.1
-457.6
217.3
305.6
-88.2
-144.7

Authorized for Public Release

127.3
337.6
-210.3
-144.7

-495.7
-459.9
-2.6
-2.4
-478.2

-------------Projected------------2014
2015
2016

-441.9
-425.3
-2.4
-2.3
-475.7
190.4
308.1
-117.8
-156.5

Q1

------------------------------------Projected-----------------------------------2014
2015

Quarterly Data

U.S. Current Account

Greensheets

Class II FOMC - Restricted (FR)
March 12, 2014

Class II FOMC - Restricted (FR)

Authorized for Public Release

March 12, 2014

Abbreviations
ABS

asset-backed securities

AFE

advanced foreign economy

BHC

bank holding company

BOJ

Bank of Japan

CDS

credit default swaps

C&I

commercial and industrial

CMBS

commercial mortgage-backed securities

CPI

consumer price index

CRE

commercial real estate

Desk

Open Market Desk

ECB

European Central Bank

E&I

equipment and intangibles

EMBI

Emerging Markets Bond Index

EME

emerging market economy

EUC

emergency unemployment compensation

FHA

Federal Housing Administration

FOMC

Federal Open Market Committee; also, the Committee

FRN

floating rate notes

GDP

gross domestic product

GO

general obligation

GSE

government-sponsored enterprise

IMF

International Monetary Fund

LSAP

large-scale asset purchase

M&A

mergers and acquisitions

Michigan
survey

Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers

MBS

mortgage-backed securities

NIPA

national income and product accounts

Page 95 of 96

Class II FOMC - Restricted (FR)

Authorized for Public Release

OIS

overnight index swap

ON RRP

overnight reverse repurchase agreement

OTC

over the counter

PBOC

People’s Bank of China

PCE

personal consumption expenditures

PMI

purchasing managers index

QS

quantitative surveillance

RMBS

residential mortgage-backed securities

R&U

Risks & Uncertainty

SCOOS

Senior Credit Officer Opinion Survey

SOMA

System Open Market Account

TIPS

Treasury inflation-protected securities

VAT

value-added tax

WTI

West Texas Intermediate

Page 96 of 96

March 12, 2014