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Strictly Confidential (FR)

Class I FOMC

MONETARY POLICY ALTERNATIVES

Prepared for the Federal Open Market Committee
By the staff

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Strictly Confidential (FR)
June 26,

Class I - FOMC

1992

MONETARY POLICY ALTERNATIVES
Recent Developments
(1) Reserve pressures have been left unchanged since the FOMC
meeting on May 19.

The federal funds rate has averaged very close to

its expected level of 3-3/4 percent.

To account for rising demands for

seasonal credit, the allowance for adjustment and seasonal borrowing was
raised from $100 to $225 million in three steps during the intermeeting
period.

Actual borrowing has come in somewhat above its allowance, in

part owing to a stronger-than-expected rise in seasonal borrowing.
(2)

In the days following the May FOMC meeting, the failure of

the System to signal an easing action and news reports that a symmetric
directive had been adopted at that meeting prompted a backup in interest
rates.

Later in the period, however, monetary and economic data

strengthened the notion that the recovery and credit demands would
remain modest, and interest rates moved lower, especially at intermediate maturities.

On balance, money market yields were unchanged to up 10

basis points over the intermeeting period; long-term corporate and Treasury rates were about unchanged on the period, while fixed-rate conventional mortgages were marked down about 20 basis points.

Most long- and

intermediate-term yields, although still somewhat above lows set early
in the year, ended the period 1/4 to 1 percentage point below highs
reached in early March.

In the stock market, price indexes declined 3

to 5 percent over the intermeeting period owing to downward revisions to
the markets' ebullient earnings forecast.
(3)

The dollar's weighted average exchange value has declined

2-3/4 percent, on balance, since the May Committee meeting.

With this

decline, the dollar has retraced all of the increase from its January
low.

The growing realization that the pace of the U.S. recovery was not

likely to be strong contributed to the softness in the dollar over the
intermeeting period and since its peak in March.

Moreover, German money

growth has remained high in recent months, which has been seen as likely
to postpone any significant easing of German and associated European
interest rates.

The German mark was particularly strong against the
European mone-

dollar in the wake of the confusion over prospects for
tary union produced by the Danish referendum on June 2.

Monetary

authorities in some European countries, Italy in particular, had to push
interest rates up fairly sharply to reassure exchange market participants after the referendum's defeat in Denmark.

Weakness in Japanese

stock prices re-emerged, along with gloomier prospects for economic
activity and profits; major indices declined 12 to 16 percent over the
period, and the Nikkei index reached a six-year low.

Short-and long-

term interest rates in Japan fell somewhat.

The Desk did not
intervene.
(4)

The monetary aggregates remained weak in May and June.

Over the two months, M2 and M3 are estimated to have fallen at 1-1/4 and
1-3/4 percent annual rates, respectively, in contrast to expectations at
the last FOMC meeting that the two aggregates would increase at about
2-1/2 and 1-3/4 percent rates.

Ml growth rebounded strongly in May but

also has turned negative in June.1

The recent contraction in M2

brought its quarterly average growth to zero, far short of the prediction of the standard money demand model using the staff GDP estimate and
short-term market and deposit interest rates.

Correspondingly, the

velocity of M2 is estimated to have risen at a 5 percent rate during the

1. Over May and June, total reserves expanded at a 2-1/2 percent
rate, while the monetary base rose at a 5-3/4 percent pace.

current quarter in the face of substantial declines in the second half
of last year in this conventional measure of the opportunity cost of M2.
The weakness over the second quarter has depressed the growth of both
aggregates through June by about a percentage point below their annual
ranges.

At the time of the February FOMC meeting, the staff was

projecting M2 and M3 growth over the first half of the year at 3-1/4 and
1-3/4 percent, respectively.

The shortfall in broad money growth

relative to expectations has occurred despite slightly lower short-term
interest rates than envisioned in the staff forecast at the time of the
February FOMC meeting and expansion of nominal GDP over the first half
of the year that, at an estimated 5-1/4 percent, was somewhat above the
projection for the February meeting.

A rise in velocities in the first

half of the year was anticipated, but by significantly less than the
estimated increases of around 3-1/4 and 5 percent at annual rates for M2
and M3, respectively.
(5) Sluggish monetary growth and sharply rising velocities
during the first half of 1992 appear to reflect an intensification of
some of the influences that depressed the demand for money and buoyed
velocity over 1990 and 1991.

In contrast to expectations at the

February meeting, the yield curve steepened further and banks priced
deposits especially unattractively, reflecting weaker loan demand than
forecast and incentives to limit balance sheet expansion.

Retail time

deposit rates at intermediate-term maturities have been particularly low
relative to market rates and relative to the original yields on maturing
deposits; rates on liquid deposits have adjusted down more quickly than
has been typical, with sizable reductions in the last few weeks; generally, depositories have made the largest cuts in the highest-rate liquid

deposits, which may have been held by the most interest-sensitive depositors.

The combination of still-elevated yields on bonds and low

returns on deposits evidently prompted heavy flows out of deposits and
into capital markets, either directly or through mutual funds.

In

addition, high consumer borrowing costs relative to deposit interest
rates likely have encouraged households to emphasize debt repayment at
the expense of M2 asset accumulation.

And RTC activity, at least until

mid-April when resolutions ceased because of the expiration of spending
authority, evidently disrupted banking relationships and prompted
depositors to seek alternative investment outlets.

These factors are

associated, in varying degrees, with impediments to the flow of credit
through depository institutions, and thus are likely to be reflected in
both weak monetary growth and, to a lesser extent, some restraint on
spending and output.
(6) Despite heavy federal borrowing, nonfinancial sector debt
is estimated to have expanded at only a 4-1/2 percent rate through May,
leaving this aggregate at the lower end of its monitoring range.

Non-

federal debt growth, at 2-1/2 percent, has been especially weak relative
to GDP, partly reflecting efforts to restructure balance sheets.

Spend-

ing apparently has been financed out of internal funds, borrowers have
opted to pay down debt rather than hold low-yielding monetary assets,
and equity issuance has been used to reduce indebtedness.

On the supply

side, evidence suggests that lending restraint by intermediaries, though
not abating, probably has stabilized, while open markets have become
more receptive to private borrowers, partly reflecting the diversion of
savings from depositories.

MONEY, CREDIT, AND RESERVE AGGREGATES
(Seasonally adjusted annual rates of growth)

April

May

April
QIV'91
to
to
Junepe Junepe Junepe

14.8

-1.5

6.6

Money and credit aggregates
M1

5.0

M2

-2.1

.6

-3.0

-1.2

1.6

M3

-3.9

-.4

-3.2

-1.8

0.0

5.1

5.2

--

--

4.51

5.2

-.8

2.7

13.1

10.5

-7.5

1.4

16.8

13.0

12.1

-6.8

2.6

16.7

7.4

7.7

3.9

5.8

7.8

88

155

183

-

1137

1001

902

12.2

Domestic nonfinancial
debt

Bank credit

.9

2.9

Reserve measures
Nonborrowed reserves

2

Total reserves
Monetary base
Memo:

(Millions of dollars)

Adjustment plus
seasonal borrowing
Excess reserves

pe - preliminary estimate based on partial data through June 22.
1. 1991:Q4 to May.
2. Includes "other extended credit" from the Federal Reserve.
NOTE:

Monthly reserve measures, including excess reserves and borrowing, are calculated by prorating averages for two-week reserve
maintenance periods that overlap months. Reserve data incorporate adjustments for discontinuities associated with changes
in reserve requirements.

Long-Run Ranges
(7) The table below presents staff projections of growth of
the monetary and debt aggregates for 1992 and 1993 thought to be consistent with the greenbook outlook for the economy and interest rates. 2
The table also contains the ranges for these aggregates chosen in
February and actual growth through June.

Money and Debt Growth
(Percent change, annual rate)
Current 1992 range

04:1991 to June

M2

2-1/2 to 6-1/2

1-1/2

M3

1 to 5

0

4-1/2 to 8-1/2

4-1/21

Debt

12-1/4

M1
Memo:
Nominal GDP

5-1/4

Staff projections
1993
1992
2-1/2

2
1/4

1/2

5

5-3/4

10

6-3/4

5-1/4

5-3/4

1. Q4:1991 to May 1992.
2. Q4:1991 to Q2:1992, greenbook projection.

Projections for 1992 and 1993
(8)

As discussed above, the broader monetary aggregates have

proven to be weaker in the first half of 1992 than envisioned early this
year.

Moreover, relative to our expectations early in the year, we now

expect the factors damping money growth and raising velocity in the

2. This bluebook has omitted the 5-year simulation of alternative
monetary policy strategies that had become customary in February and
July. Our view is that questions about money demand relationships are
sufficient to cast considerable doubts about the value of alternative
policies keyed to 1 percent greater or lesser M2 growth. Alternatives
based on relationships between nominal interest rates and the economy
also are unreliable very far into the future. Paragraphs (12) and
(13) below discuss strategies involving different outcomes for output
and inflation that the Committee might follow through 1994 and their
rough implications for money growth and interest rates.

period ahead to be more persistent and the restoration of more normal
relationships between growth in the monetary aggregates and income to be
more gradual.

As a consequence, we now anticipate considerably slower

expansion of the broad money aggregates this year, associated with about
the same GDP that was projected in February, and we expect this sluggish
pattern to persist in 1993.

Obviously, substantial uncertainty sur-

rounds our estimates of the relationship of money to spending, and in
On the one hand,

making the forecast, we have balanced several factors.

bank and thrift asset growth is likely to remain damped, and credit will
continue to be channeled away from these intermediaries.

In particular,

implementation of the FDIC Improvement Act (FDICIA) will constrain the
activity of many depositories, raise costs, and accentuate incentives to
bolster capital ratios.

Capital itself is likely to remain under some

pressure at a number of banks and thrifts--stemming importantly from
continuing difficulties in the commercial real estate sector.

The RTC,

though likely to be dormant over the balance of the year, should resume
closing thrifts in 1993, again damping depository credit and the monetary aggregates.

And, demand for depository credit at the wider spreads

that have developed is not expected to pick up much.

Under these cir-

cumstances, deposit rates are likely to continue to be adjusted downward
under the greenbook assumption of flat federal funds rates and declining
long-term yields.

On the other hand, the effects of these restraining

forces should diminish gradually as:

capital positions improve; some

better capitalized banks, including those with ready access to equity
markets, more actively seek profitable lending opportunities; and steady
improvements in business profits and household earnings alleviate some
of the reluctance to lend.

Moreover, households' efforts to pare lia-

bilities and to shift assets toward capital market instruments should

abate as their balance sheets are bought into closer alignment with
desired levels.
(9)

M2 is expected to pick up some in the months ahead, but

only enough to produce growth for the year of 2 percent, below the current annual range.

Expansion of nominal income is projected at about

the same average pace in the second half as in the first.

Acting to

restrain M2 growth relative to income over the balance of this year are
further downward movements in deposit rates--especially as liquid deposit rates move into closer alignment with market rates and as FDICIA
limits begin to constrain some banks' offering rates.

In addition,

FDICIA limitations on brokered deposits as well as other provisions that
tend to raise intermediation costs should reinforce tendencies to hold
down deposit growth and spur further portfolio realignments.

Partly

offsetting these influences should be recent and prospective declines in
consumer loan rates and capital market yields.

The shortfall of M2

growth from standard model predictions is expected to be unprecedented,
on the order of 4 percent this year, and V2 is expected to rise by more
than 3 percent.

Slightly faster growth of M2 is projected for 1993.

By

then, the portfolio adjustment process will be further along, and GDP
growth in the staff economic forecast is projected to pick up a bit.
However, a decline in short-term interest rates, as occurred in late
1991 and on net likely helped boost M2 in early 1992, is not assumed in
the outlook.

Furthermore, a number of additional provisions of FDICIA

that will come into effect in late 1992, including asset growth restrictions and early closure of weaker depositories, as well as limitations
on pass-through insurance and on payments to uninsured depositors, will
likely contribute to restraints on growth of the depository sector.
balance V2 would rise about 3 percent next year as well.

On

(10)

M3 also is projected to remain below the lower bound of

its current range over the balance of 1992.

Weakness in bank credit

should abate a little as businesses shift from inventory liquidation to
modest restocking and as other businesses and household outlays expand.
Funding this credit imparts a slight upward tilt to M3 in the second
half of 1992 and in 1993.

Over the balance of this year and next, ex-

pansion in core deposits will continue to be more than ample to cover
that growth, implying that managed liabilities in M3 will continue to
run off at a brisk clip.

Also tending to buoy M3 over the rest of 1992

is the likelihood that RTC resolution activity will be dormant, owing to
funding constraints that are unlikely to be removed by congressional
action before next winter.

In 1993, when depository resolutions by the

RTC and the FDIC pick up, M3 is expected to grow 1/2 percent, only
marginally faster than this year, extending the exceptionally weak
performance of this aggregate in recent years.
(11)

Growth of debt of domestic nonfinancial sectors is an-

ticipated to pick up a bit over the remainder of 1992 and to firm a
little more in 1993.

Business credit demands will be boosted by the

swing in inventories and a rise in fixed capital spending that outstrips
the improvement in internal funds.

Moreover, firms' borrowing will be

augmented by some slowing in net equity issuance from the extraordinary
pace of recent quarters, as opportunities to reduce overall capital
costs by unwinding over-leveraged balance sheets have been more fully
exploited.

Further gains in earnings also should ease debt servicing

strains and improve access to credit.

Still, restraints on credit

supplies at banks and insurance companies, while abating, are likely to
remain pronounced as these institutions continue to grapple with asset-

-10-

quality problems and regulatory constraints.

Consequently, loan take-

downs at both types of institutions are expected to rise only slowly,
and those borrowers with access to open markets are likely to continue
to concentrate their credit demands on the bond market.

Household bor-

rowing is expected to strengthen a little, in line with modest expansion
in outlays on consumer goods and housing activity and a moderation in
the deleveraging process.

With banks seeking to limit asset growth and

thrifts continuing to run off assets, securitization is expected to
remain the major source of mortgage credit and to be an important source
of funding for consumer credit as well.

Borrowing by state and local

governments will be held in check by fiscal pressures that restrain
their capital outlays and by large scheduled retirements of pre-refunded
bonds.

In contrast, debt of the federal government will continue to

rise rapidly over the next year and a half, although funding constraints
on the RTC limit federal borrowing over the rest of this year before an
expected return to more normal activity early next year.

Total debt of

nonfinancial sectors is projected to grow 5 percent this year, rising
above the lower bound of its range, and 5-3/4 percent next year; such
expansion is in line with growth in nominal GDP in both years.
Alternative longer-run strategies
(12)

The staff's economic projection embodies gradual disin-

flation to about 2-3/4 percent on the GDP fixed-weight price deflator in
the second half of 1993.

Some further progress on inflation would be

in train in 1994 since the level of the unemployment rate, at 6-3/4 percent at the end of 1993, would still be above the natural rate.

Growth

would have to remain moderate and unemployment rates elevated to extend
mild disinflation through 1994 and beyond.

With regard to the financial

conditions necessary to achieve these results, the greenbook forecast

-11-

assumes a flat federal funds rate through 1993.

Given its current low

level, the real federal funds rate will need to rise at some point to
keep downward pressure on inflation, perhaps requiring upward adjustments in the nominal funds rate as well.

While this tightening of

reserve conditions might await 1994, should the economy turn out more
ebullient than expected, an earlier firming in the stance of policy
would be consistent with the gradual disinflation path.

Developments in

financial markets that might necessitate an earlier firming would include a more rapid easing of credit supply constraints than incorporated
in the forecast or a major downward adjustment of real long-term rates
that brought them into better alignment with short-term rates.

Nor-

mally, greater underlying strength in the economy would require slower
money growth to hold to the disinflation path.

However, declining long-

term rates or ebbing credit restraints would work to lower velocity as
well, complicating assessment of the appropriate money growth path.
(13)

Alternatively, the Committee could strive for more rapid

progress toward price stability, which would entail slower economic
expansion and maintenance of greater slack in the economy for a longer
period.

Such a strategy would involve a prompter firming of short-term

rates, probably by sometime early next year, to unwind a portion of the
easing undertaken late last year and earlier this year.

However, the

greater progress in reducing inflation would imply that nominal shortterm rates need not go much higher than they eventually would in the
gradual disinflation case and likely would begin to retreat sooner.
Money growth would have to be slower than in the former case, appreciably so in 1993.

On the other hand, the Committee could put greater

emphasis on reducing unemployment over the next few years, keeping core
inflation around its current levels.

Such a strategy would require a

-12-

significant easing of policy over the next year, perhaps involving a cut
in the federal funds rate of a percentage point or so.

However, given

the already low level of the funds rate and the moderate degree of slack
in the economy, an aggressive tightening of policy at some point in the
next couple years would be needed to avoid an acceleration of wages and
prices.

With regard to money growth, if the staff's assessment of

underlying money demand developments is about right, the initial stages
of this strategy might be produced by hitting the lower end of the curThereafter, money growth would have to decelerate to

rent M2 range.

avoid building in accelerating prices.
Ranges for 1992
(14)

Shown below are two alternatives for money and debt

growth in 1992.3

Alternative I retains the current ranges for all

three aggregates while alternative II lowers them by a full percentage
point.
Money and Debt Growth Options for 1992
(Percent)
Alternative I
(current ranges)

Alternative
II

M2

2-1/2 to 6-1/2

1-1/2 to 5-1/2

M3

1 to 5

0 to 4

4-1/2 to 8-1/2

3-1/2 to 7-1/2

Debt

(15)

Memo:
Staff
projection
2
1/4
5

Alternative II would reduce the ranges, encompassing the

staff projections for M2 and M3.

Choice of this alternative would imply

the Committee's readiness to tolerate shortfalls of M2 relative to
earlier expectations, presumably because in the presence of the unusual

3. Ranges and outcomes for money and credit for years before 1992
are show in Appendix A.

-13-

behavior of money demand such slow growth was considered to be consistent with the Committee's desired outcome for spending in 1992 and early
1993.

At the same time, this range would permit a substantial accelera-

tion of M2 in the event of a quick return to a more normal relationship
between M2 holdings and income and interest rates; indeed, M2 could

expand at a 10 percent annual pace between June and December without
breaching the upper end of this range.

Still, reducing the ranges,

especially if coupled with the choice of ranges for 1993 that were lower
than the current 1992 ranges, might also be seen as pointing in the

direction of the Committee's intention to make further progress toward
price stability.

Although the staff projection for M3 is just within

the alternative II range, the chances that this aggregate could fall
below the lower end are greater than for M2, especially in light of the
size of the unexpected contraction in this aggregate in recent months.
By contrast, the alternative II range for debt would be nearly centered

on the staff's expectation for growth of this aggregate this year.
(16)

Alternative I might be selected if the prospects for a

return to more normal money demand and therefore M2 growth were seen as
greater than envisioned by the staff.

This range also might be pre-

ferred if recent weakness in M2 were thought to be signalling slower
output growth than in the staff forecast--including a risk to the
recovery itself.

In addition, as noted, attempts to hit the lower end

of this range would be more consistent with a strategy that endeavored
to make greater progress in reducing unemployment rates than in the
staff forecast.

Depending on how it was presented, choice of this

alternative could signal that the Committee would not be complacent
about undershooting its current range; in these circumstances, pressure
to reexamine the System's stance in reserve markets would be present
with growth below the ranges.

Instead, the Committee could choose to

-14-

retain the current range because it was so uncertain about money-income
relationships that any change was seen as implying more knowledge of
those relationships and commitment to achieving the new range than it

felt appropriate.

In that event, the Committee would need to explain

that shortfalls from the unchanged range might not warrant policy
action.

Actions to return M2 to its alternative I range would tend to

move M3 closer to its range; however, since any easing action to boost
M2 growth would have less impact on M3 expansion, there is a greater
4
chance that this aggregate would fail to move into its range.
Ranges for 1993
(17)

The alternatives shown for 1993 are the same as those

suggested for 1992. 5

Money and Debt Growth Options for 1993
Alt. I

Alt. II

Staff
Projections

M2

2-1/2 to 6-1/2

1-1/2 to 5-1/2

2-1/2

M3

1 to 5

0 to 4

4-1/2 to 8-1/2

3-1/2 to 7-1/2

Debt

(18)

1/2
5-3/4

Alternative II would tend to be favored if it were

thought that the same forces acting to depress broad money in 1992 were
going to persist through next year.

In the staff projections, M2 would

be squarely in the lower half of this reduced range over 1993 and M3
would be a little above the lower end of its range.

Thus, this lower

4. In the staff's judgment, a rather prompt and substantial easing
of policy--lowering the federal funds rate by 3/4 percentage point in
the third quarter--likely would be needed to hit the lower bound of
the current M2 range by the end of the year.
5. The Committee, of course, could choose target ranges that lie
between these alternatives, or even to widen the ranges, say by
dropping the lower ends.

-15-

range would accommodate the staff forecast of an economy that was expanding at a pace slightly above its potential growth rate and inflationary pressures that were continuing to abate.

While encompassing

more scope for downward shifts in money demand, this alternative also
would embody less room for an acceleration in M2 growth that might
threaten progress toward price stability and greater scope for a rise in
interest rates were that needed to preserve the downtrend in inflation
or to seek an even faster deceleration than in the staff forecast.
Alternative I, the current 1992 ranges, might be chosen

(19)

if the Committee wished to temporize about its 1993 choice, given
velocity uncertainties.

This alternative would seem a more plausible

choice should the Committee choose to maintain, rather than lower, the
1992 ranges.

However, lowering the ranges in 1992 and raising them

again in 1993 could be appropriate if the Committee saw chances of less
robust velocity growth next year.

This alternative also could be

communicated as connoting a willingness to take action to counter any
potential stalling out of the economic expansion; the 2-1/2 percent
lower end of this range is equal to the staff's projection, implying
that only a modest shortfall from this expectation would tend to prompt
an easing of policy.

Particularly if the money demand shifts do not

persist, this alternative might be more consistent with efforts to
promote somewhat stronger growth in the economy than contained in the
staff forecast.

In the staff forecast, M3 expansion would stay below

the lower end of the alternative I range as RTC and FDIC resolutions
pick up.

The staff's projection for debt of domestic nonfinancial

sectors is below the midpoint of the alternative I range, but about
centered on the midpoint of the alternative II range.

-16-

Short-Run Policy Alternatives
(20)

Three short-run policy alternatives are presented below

for Committee consideration.

Under alternative B, the federal funds

rate would continue to center on 3-3/4 percent.

Maintaining that un-

changed stance likely would entail retaining the assumption for adjustment plus seasonal borrowing at its $225 million level.

Under the

easier alternative A, the funds rate would be reduced to 3-1/4 percent,
placing it 1/4 percentage point below the discount rate, in association
with a borrowing assumption of $200 million.

Or this same funds rate

could be achieved by keeping a $225 million borrowing assumption and
reducing the discount rate 1/2 percentage point to 3 percent.

Under

alternative C, the funds rate would be raised to around 4-1/4 percent by
selecting a borrowing specification of $250 million.

Further upward

technical adjustments to the borrowing assumption likely will be needed
over the intermeeting period with any of the alternatives to account for
a continued upswing in seasonal borrowing.
(21)

Market participants appear to have built into interest

and exchange rates some probability of a near-term easing in the stance
of monetary policy next week after the FOMC meeting and release of June
employment data.

Thus, in the near-term, rates would rise somewhat

under alternative B.

Over the course of the third quarter, with infla-

tion pressures subdued and the pace of economic expansion moderate, as
in the staff forecast, short-term and long-term rates might come back
down.

Long-term rates could well end up below current levels, espe-

cially if the lack of Federal Reserve action ultimately contributes to
downward adjustments to inflation expectations.

The exchange value of

the dollar would probably average around current levels.

-17-

Under alternative A, most of the drop of 50 basis points

(22)

in the funds rate would be transmitted to other money market interest
rates.

The prime rate would be cut a half percentage point.

reaction of bond yields is difficult to anticipate.

The

To the extent mar-

ket participants saw the easing as warranted by prospective economic
weakness, long-term rates would decline further on the policy easing.
On the other hand, to the degree that the action was interpreted as more
aggressive than was justified by economic fundamentals and by the prospects for continued disinflation, heightened inflation concerns and an
enhanced possibility that a policy tightening may be needed in the nottoo-distant future would temper such a decline and could even bring
about some increase in nominal bond rates.

Still, the easing would

provide some stimulus to economic activity as real long-term yields
moved lower and the recent weakening in the exchange value of the dollar
was extended.
The increase of 50 basis points in the funds rate under

(23)

alternative C would come as a considerable surprise to market participants.

Short-term rates would back up by at least as much, and the

dollar exchange rate would strengthen appreciably.

The surprise element

itself could well trigger a flurry of selling pressures on longer-term
securities.

Later, market reflection about the System's anti-inflation-

ary resolve, combined with favorable incoming price data, might well
engender a bond-market rally, leaving nominal long-term rates not much
above their current levels.
(24)

The table below presents anticipated growth of the mone-

tary aggregates from June to September under the three short-run policy
alternatives.
detailed data.)

(The charts and table on the following pages show more
Under all the alternatives, M2 and M3 in September

-18-

would remain below the lower bounds of their current ranges.

Even

under alternative A, M2 would be on a trajectory that would bring it
closer to, though still a bit below, its lower bound in the fourth
quarter, and M3 also would be expected to remain somewhat below its
current range through year-end.

The response of M2 under alternatives A

and C incorporates the reduced interest elasticity now thought to be
embodied in demand for this aggregate, partly as a consequence of
heightened depositor sensitivity to the slope of the yield curve.

Alt. A

Alt. B

Alt. C

Growth from June to
September
2-3/4
1
8

M2
M3
M1

1/2
6-1/2

1-1/4
0
5

1-3/4
0
10-1/2

1-1/2
0
10

2

Growth from QIV'91
to September
M2
M3
M1
(25)

2
1/4
11

While M2 under all three alternatives appears likely to

resume growth over the June-to-September period, under alternative B
this aggregate still is projected to grow at only a 2 percent annual
rate.

The same forces that have been evident in recent years will

continue to depress the demand for broad money.

Growth in M2 likely

will be damped additionally by runoffs of demand deposits associated
with the slowing in the pace of mortgage refinancing.

Partly as a

result, M1 growth probably will be held down to a 6-1/2 percent annual

Alternative Levels and Growth Rates for Key Monetary Aggregates
M2

M3

M1

Alt. A

Alt. B

Alt. C

Alt. A

Alt. B

Alt. C

Alt. A

Alt. B

Alt. C

Levels in billions
1992 April
May
June

3468.0
3469.6
3461.0

3468.0
3469.6
3461.0

3468.0
3469.6
3461.0

4177.6
4176.1
4164.9

4177.6
4176.1
4164.9

4177.6
4176.1
4164.9

942.9
954.5
953.3

942.9
954.5
953.3

942.9
954.5
953.3

July
August
September

3467.6
3475.7
3485.0

3466.8
3472.8
3479.2

3466.0
3469.9
3473.4

4167.2
4170.6
4175.0

4166.3
4168.0
4169.8

4165.4
4165.4
4164.6

959.1
965.6
972.4

958.5
963.7
968.9

957.9
961.8
965.4

-2.1
0.6
-3.0

-2.1
0.6
-3.0

-2.1
0.6
-3.0

-3.9
-0.4
-3.2

-3.9
-0.4
-3.2

-3.9
-0.4
-3.2

5.0
14.8
-1.5

5.0
14.8
-1.5

5.0
14.8
-1.5

July
August
September

2.3
2.8
3.2

2.0
2.1
2.2

1.7
1.4
1.1

0.7
1.0
1.3

0.4
0.5
0.5

0.2
0.0
-0.3

7.3
8.1
8.5

6.5
6.5
6.5

5.7
4.9
4.5

Quarterly Ave. Growth Rates
1991 Q2
Q3
Q4
1992 Q1
Q2
Q3

4.4
0.6
2.3
4.3
0.0
1.1

4.4
0.6
2.3
4.3
0.0
0.8

4.4
0.6
2.3
4.3
0.0
0.4

1.8
-1.3
1.0
2.3
-1.5
-0.2

1.8
-1.3
1.0
2.3
-1.5
-0.5

1.8
-1.3
1.0
2.3
-1.5
-0.7

7.4
7.5
11.1
16.4
10.1
6.5

7.4
7.5
11.1
16.4
10.1
5.7

7.4
7.5
11.1
16.4
10.1
4.8

-1.5
2.8

-1.5
2.1

-1.5
1.3

-2.5
1.0

-2.5
0.5

-2.5
0.0

6.1
8.0

6.1
6.5

6.1
5.0

2.2
1.7
1.6
2.0

2.2
1.7
1.6
1.8

2.2
1.6
1.6
1.6

0.4
0.2
0.0
0.3

0.4
0.1
0.0
0.1

0.4
0.0
0.0
0.0

13.5
11.3
12.2
11.1

13.5
11.0
12.2
10.6

13.5
10.7
12.2
10.1

Monthly Growth Rates
1992 April
May
June

Mar 92 to Jun 92
Jun 92 to Sep 92
Q4
Q4
Q4
Q4

91
91
91
91

to
to
to
to

Q2 92
Q3 92
Jun 92
Sep 92

1992 Target Ranges:

2.5 to 6.5

1.0 to 5.0

o

Chart 1

ACTUAL AND TARGETED M2
Billions of dollars

3700

6.5%

Actual Level
* Short-Run Alternatives

-

3650

--

3600

-1

3550

-4 3500

-1 3450

-1 3400

I

O

I

I

N

1991

D

I

J

I

F

I

M

I

A

I

M

I

J

I

J

1992

I

A

I

S

I

O

I

N

3350
D

Chart 2

ACTUAL AND TARGETED M3
Billions of dollars

4425
Actual Level
* Short-Run Alternatives
4375

4325

4275

4225

4175

4125

4075

O

N
1991

D

J

F

M

A

M

J
1992

J

A

S

O

N

D

I

Chart 3

M1
Billions of dollars

15%

Actual Level
------ Growth From Fourth Quarter
* Short-Run Alternatives

,'

*A

si

-

A

*

970

B
IJ

0

I

-- 950

,

,*

..

I

I

I

OF J

M

A

I%

930

M

-- - -- - - -- - ------ - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - I*

*

SN

D

I

F

M

A

I

1991

J

M

I870

1992

A

S

N

D

9

Chart 4

DEBT
Billions of dollars

Actual Level
- - Estimated Level
SProjected Level

12300

12100

11900

11700

11500

^

^

^

^

^

11300

11100

10900
O

N

1991

D

J

F

M

A

M

J

J

1992

A

S

O

N

D

-20-

rate from June to September, about in line with its reduced March-toJune pace.

By contrast, the runoff of the non-M1 component of M2

is expected to come to an end, leaving its level about unchanged over
the June-to-September period.

The declines in intermediate-term mar-

ket yields relative to rates on retail time deposits of comparable
maturity during the spring, as well as a prospective flattening of the
yield curve, should damp the shifting out of small time deposits.
(26)

The turnaround in M2 growth under alternative B should

show through to M3.

After its decline over the second quarter, this

aggregate is projected to expand at a 1/2 percent annual rate over the
next three months.

Bank credit growth should strengthen some from its

torpid second-quarter pace, though loan demand would still be relatively weak.

Domestic nonfinancial debt is projected to move gradu-

ally above its lower bound in coming months, placing its growth from
the fourth quarter of last year through September at 4-3/4 percent.
This strengthening owes almost entirely to heavy federal borrowing, as
non-federal debt growth is expected to remain sluggish.
(27)

Choice of alternatives A or C would entail somewhat

stronger or weaker M2 over the third quarter.

Most of the adjustment

would come in liquid money balances, whose offering rates are unlikely
to respond much to changes in short-term market interest rates.

M2

growth from June to September could be expected to respond by about
3/4 percentage point to a lowering or raising of the funds rate by 1/2
percentage point.

The effect of such a changed policy stance on M3

growth over the same interval would be smaller, however, perhaps on
the order of 1/2 percentage point, reflecting the reaction of loans
demanded to a movement in borrowing costs of this magnitude.

6. With currency and total reserves projected to expand from June
to September at 6 and 7 percent annual rates, respectively, growth of
the monetary base is forecast to be 6-1/4 percent over the three
months.

-21-

Directive Language
(28)

Presented below for Committee consideration is a draft

of the paragraph relating to the ranges for 1992 and 1993.

The lan-

guage in the first set of brackets is offered as a suggestion should
the Committee reaffirm the current ranges and at the same time wish to
indicate an expectation that acceptable growth could be around (implicitly including a little below) the lower ends of those ranges.

The

language in the second bracket would cover a decision to reduce the
Were the Committee to chose this option, a second sen-

1992 ranges.

tence, like the one suggested in this bracket, might be considered to
explain the reason for the reduction.
(29)
run ranges.

A draft operational paragraph follows that for the longThe language in brackets at the end of that paragraph

might be considered should the Committee wish to reduce the weight it
places on the near-term growth of the monetary aggregates relative to
Committee expectations as a guide to adjustments in reserve conditions
over the coming intermeeting period.
PARAGRAPH FOR 1992 AND 1993 RANGES
The Federal Open Market Committee seeks monetary and
financial conditions that will foster price stability and
promote sustainable growth in output.

In furtherance of

its]
these objectives, the Committee REAFFIRMED at THIS [DEL:
meeting THE RANGES IT HAD ESTABLISHED in February
[DEL:
established ranges] for growth of M2 and M3 of 2-1/2 to
6-1/2 percent and 1 to 5 percent respectively, measured
from the fourth quarter of 1991 to the fourth quarter of
1992.

[THE COMMITTEE ANTICIPATED THAT DEVELOPMENTS CON-

TRIBUTING TO UNUSUAL VELOCITY INCREASES COULD PERSIST IN

-22-

THE SECOND HALF OF THE YEAR, AND UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES
M2 AND M3 GROWTH AROUND THE LOWER ENDS OF THEIR RANGES
WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH ITS BROAD POLICY OBJECTIVES.]
[IN FURTHERANCE OF THESE OBJECTIVES, THE COMMITTEE AT THIS
MEETING LOWERED THE RANGES IT HAD ESTABLISHED IN FEBRUARY
TO
TO ____
AND ____
FOR GROWTH OF M2 AND M3 TO RANGES OF ____

PERCENT RESPECTIVELY, MEASURED FROM THE FOURTH QUARTER OF
1991 TO THE FOURTH QUARTER OF 1992.

THE COMMITTEE ANTICI-

PATED THAT DEVELOPMENTS CONTRIBUTING TO UNUSUAL VELOCITY
INCREASES WOULD PERSIST OVER THE BALANCE OF THE YEAR, AND
THAT MONEY GROWTH WITHIN THESE LOWER RANGES WOULD BE
CONSISTENT WITH ITS BROAD POLICY OBJECTIVES.]

The moni-

toring range for growth of total domestic nonfinancial
set] at 4-1/2 to 8-1/2 percent
debt ALSO was MAINTAINED[DEL:
[(ALSO) WAS LOWERED TO ____ TO ____ PERCENT]

for the year.

[DEL:
With regard to M3, the Committee anticipated that the
ongoing restructuring of depository institutions would
continue to depress the growth of this aggregate relative
to spending and total credit.] FOR 1993, THE COMMITTEE
AGREED ON TENTATIVE RANGES FOR MONETARY GROWTH, MEASURED
FROM THE FOURTH QUARTER OF 1992 TO THE FOURTH QUARTER OF
1993,

M3.

PERCENT FOR
TO ____
OF____ TO ____ PERCENT FOR M2 AND ____

THE COMMITTEE PROVISIONALLY SET THE ASSOCIATED

MONITORING RANGE FOR GROWTH OF DOMESTIC NONFINANCIAL DEBT
AT ___ TO ____
PERCENT FOR 1993.

The behavior of the mone-

tary aggregates will continue to be evaluated in the light
of progress toward price level stability, movements in

-23-

their velocities, and developments in the economy and
financial markets.

OPERATIONAL PARAGRAPH
In the implementation of policy for the immediate
future, the Committee seeks to DECREASE SOMEWHAT/maintain/
INCREASE SOMEWHAT the existing degree of pressure on
reserve positions.

In the context of the Committee's

long-run objectives for price stability and sustainable
economic growth, and giving careful consideration to
economic, financial, and monetary developments, slightly
(SOMEWHAT) greater reserve restraint (MIGHT/WOULD) or
slightly (SOMEWHAT) lesser reserve restraint might (WOULD)
be acceptable in the intermeeting period.

The contem-

plated reserve conditions are expected to be consistent
April
with growth of M2 and M3 over the period from [DEL:
through] June THROUGH SEPTEMBER at annual rates of about
____
AND ____[DEL:
2-1/2 and 1-1/2]percent, respectively.

[HOWEVER, THE RECENT UNUSUAL BEHAVIOR OF THESE AGGREGATES
SUGGESTS THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEIR GROWTH AND
THE COMMITTEE'S LONG-RUN OBJECTIVES IS ESPECIALLY UNCERTAIN AT THIS TIME.]

Appendix A

ADOPTED LONGER-RUN GROWTH RATE RANGES FOR THE MONETARY AND CREDIT AGGREGATES

(percent annual rates; numbers in parentheses are actual growth rates as reported at end of policy
period in February Monetary Policy Report to Congress)

QIV

1978 - QIV

19792

3 -

QIV

1979 - QIV

1980

4 - 6.5

-QIV

1980 - QIV

1981

QIV

1981 - QIV

1982

QIV

1982 - QIV

1983

5 -

QIV

1983 - QIV

1984

QIV

1984 - QIV

QIV

6

5 -

(5.5)

Domestic Nonfinancial Debt

M3

M2
8

(8.3)

6 -

9

(8.1)

(7.3) 3 ,

4

6 - 9

(9.8)

6.5 -

9.5

(9.9)

3.5 - 6

(2.3) 3 ,

5

6 - 9

(9.4)

6.5 -

9.5

2.5 - 5.5

(8.5)

6 -

9

(9.2)

6.5 -

98

(7.2)

7 -

109

(8.3)

6.5 -

4 - 8

(5.2)

6 -

9

(7.7)

6-

9

1985

3 - 810

(12.7)

6 -

9

(8.6)

6 -

9.5

1985 - QIV

1986

3-

(15.2)

6 -

9

(8.9)

QIV

1986 - QIV

1987

11
n.s

(6.2)

5.5 -

8.5

QIV

1987 - QIV

1988

n.s

(4.3)

4 -

QIV

1988 - QIV

1989

n.s

QIV

1989 - QIV

1990

QIV

1990 - QIV

1991

3

7.5 -

10.5 (12.2)

6 - 9

(7.9)

(11.4)

6 -

9

(8.8)6

9.5

(10.1)

6 -

97

(7.1)

9.5

(9.7)

8.5 - 11.5

(10.5)

(10.5)

8 -

11

(7.4)

9 -

12

(13.5)

6 - 9

(8.8)

8 -

11

(12.9)

(4.0)

5.5 - 8.5

(5.4)

8 -

11

(9.6)

8

(5.3)

4 - 8

(6.2)

7 -

11

(8.7)

(0.6)

3 - 7

(4.6)

3.5 - 7.5

(3.3)

6.5 -

10.5

(8.1)

n.s

(4.2)

3 - 7

(3.9)

1 -

(1.8)

5-

9

(6.9)

n.s

(8.0)

(2.8)

1 - 5

8

2.5 -

6.5

512

(1.2)

4.5 -

n.s.--not specified.
1. Targets are for bank credit until 1983; from 1983 onward targets are for domestic
nonfinancial sector debt.
2. At the February 1979 meeting the FOMC adopted a QIV'78 to QIV'79 range for Ml of 1-1/2
to 4-1/2 percent. This range anticipated that shifting to ATS and NOW accounts in New
York State would slow M1 growth by 3 percentage points. At the October meeting it was
noted that ATS/NOW shifts would reduce Ml by no more than 1-1/2 percentage points. Thus,
the longer-run range for M1 was modified to 3-6 percent.
3. The figures shown reflect target and actual growth of M1-B in 1980 and shift-adjusted
M1-B in 1981. M1-B was relabeled M1 in January 1982. The targeted growth for Mi-A was 31/2 to 6 percent in 1980 (actual growth was 5.0 percent); in 1981 targeted growth for
shift-adjusted M1-A was 3 to 5-1/2 percent (actual growth was 1.3 percent).
4. When these ranges were set, shifts into other checkable deposits in 1980 were expected
to have only a limited effect on growth of M1-A and M1-B. As the year progressed,
however, banks offered other checkable deposits more actively, and more funds than
expected were directed to these accounts. Such shifts are estimated to have decreased MlA growth and increased M1-B growth each by at least 1/2 percentage point more than had
been anticipated.
(Footnotes are continued on next page)

8.5

6

(13.4)

(4.5)

5. Adjusted for the effects of shifts out of demand deposits and savings deposits into
other checkable deposits. At the February FOMC meeting, the target ranges for observed
M1-A and M1-B in 1981 on an unadjusted basis, expected to be consistent with the adjusted
ranges, were -4-1/2 to -2 and 6 to 8-1/2 percent, respectively. Actual M1-B growth (not
shift adjusted) was 5.0 percent.
6. Adjusted for shifts of assets from domestic banking offices to International Banking
Facilities.
7. Range for bank credit is annualized growth from the December 1981-January 1982 average
level through the fourth quarter of 1982.
8. Base period, adopted at the July 1983 FOMC meeting, is QII'83. At the February 1983
meeting the FOMC had adopted a QIV'82 to QIV'83 target range for M1 of 4 to 8 percent.
9. Base period is the February-March 1983 average.
10. Base period, adopted at the July 1985 FOMC meeting, is QII'85. At the February 1985
meeting the FOMC had adopted a QIV'84 to QIV'85 target range for M1 of 4 to 7 percent.
11. No range for M1 has been specified since the February 1987 FOMC meeting because of
uncertainties about its underlying relationship to the behavior of the economy and its
sensitivity to economic and financial circumstances.
12. At the February 1990 meeting the FOMC specified a range of 2-1/2 to 6-1/2 percent.
This range was lowered to 1 to 5 percent at the July 1990 meeting.
6/26/92 (MARP)

June 29, 1992

SELECTED INTEREST RATES
(percent)
Short-Term
federal
funds

91

- High
-- Low

92 -- High
-- Low
Monthly
Jun 91

Treasury bills
secondary market
__3-month
6-month I 1-year

Long-Term
CDs
secondary
market

comm.
paper

money
market
mutual

bank
prime

U.S. government constant
maturity yields

3-month

1-month

loan

3-year

10-year

30-year

1
S

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

7.46
4.22

6.46
3.84

6.49
3.93

6.43
4.01

7.75
4.25

8.49
4.88

7.37
4.53

9.93
7.07

7.47
5.24

4.20
3.47

4.05
3.57

4.22
3.67

4.51
3.88

4.32
3.76

5.02
3.82

4.51
3.42

6.50
6.50

5.57
5.58
5.33
5.21
4.99
4.56
4.07

5.75
5.70
5.39
5.25
5.04
4.61
4.10

5.96
5.91
5.45
5.26
5.04
4.64
4.17

6.07
5.98
5.65
5.47
5.33
4.94
4.47

6.06
5.98
5.72
5.57
5.29
4.95
4.98

5.49
5.46
5.38
5.24
5.03
4.82
4.61

fund

corporate
conventional home mortgages
A-utility municipal secondary
primary
recently
Bond
market
market

offered

Buyer

12

13

14

15

16

8.35
6.96

9.96
8.49

7.40
6.76

9.97
8.38

9.75
8.35

7.78
6.02

6.32
5.11

7.65
6.79

8.99
8.46

6.87
6.53

9.22
8.36

9.03
8.23

6.22
5.78

8.50
8.50
8.50
8.20
8.00
7.58
7.21

7.39
7.38
6.80
6.50
6.23
5.90
5.39

8.28
8.27
7.90
7.65
7.53
7.42
7.09

9.53
9.55
9.25
9.05
9.02
8.95
8.68

7.30
7.18
7.05
6.97
6.89
6.89
6.87

9.93
9.79
9.44
9.18
9.04
8.86
8.56

9.62
9.57
9.24
9.01
8.86
8.71
8.50

7.24
7.23
7.08
6.87
6.71
6.42
6.19

fixed-rate fixed-rate

ARM

Jul

91

Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec

91
91
91
91
91

5.90
5.82
5.66
5.45
5.21
4.81
4.43

Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Weekly
Mar
Mar
Mar

92
92
92
92
92

4.03
4.06
3.98
3.73
3.82

3.80
3.84
4.04
3.75
3.63

3.87
3.93
4.18
3.87
3.75

3.95
4.08
4.40
4.09
3.99

4.05
4.07
4.25
4.00
3.82

4.11
4.11
4.28
4.02
3.87

4.18
3.84
3.73
3.66
3.52

6.50
6.50
6.50
6.50
6.50

5.40
5.72
6.18
5.93
5.81

7.03
7.34
7.54
7.48
7.39

8.57
8.79
8.91
8.82
8.70

6.67
6.83
6.86
6.80
6.72

8.65
8.92
9.17
8.98
8.85

8.43
8.76
8.93
8.85
8.67

5.89
5.88
6.11
6.15
6.00

11 92
18 92
25 92

3.95
4.04
3.94

4.02
4.05
4.05

4.14
4.22
4.21

4.37
4.51
4.45

4.24
4.30
4.27

4.27
4.32
4.29

3.72
3.72
3.73

6.50
6.50
6.50

6.05
6.32
6.30

7.47
7.65
7.58

8.99
8.98
8.87

6.86
6.87
6.87

9.19
9.22
9.17

8.88
9.03
8.98

6.04
6.22
6.19

Apr
Apr
Apr
Apr
Apr

1
8
15
22
29

92
92
92
92
92

4.09
3.98
3.65
3.47
3.65

4.02
3.94
3.63
3.68
3.69

4.14
4.02
3.73
3.83
3.84

4.32
4.19
3.92
4.10
4.11

4.21
4.14
3.95
3.97
3.93

4.26
4.19
3.98
3.97
3.92

3.73
3.74
3.66
3.62
3.59

6.50
6.50
6.50
6.50
6.50

6.18
5.94
5.71
5.99
6.02

7.53
7.43
7.35
7.55
7.58

8.77
8.78
8.81
8.90
8.86

6.85
6.78
6.74
6.82
6.83

9.02
8.85
9.03
9.00
9.02

8.96
8.84
8.76
8.85
8.84

6.22
6.15
6.11
6.13
6.10

May
May
May
May

6
13
20
27

92
92
92
92

3.77
3.84
3.89
3.80

3.65
3.62
3.57
3.70

3.78
3.73
3.67
3.83

4.09
3.99
3.88
4.05

3.89
3.79
3.76
3.85

3.92
3.84
3.82
3.89

3.55
3.51
3.51
3.47

6.50
6.50
6.50
6.50

5.96
5.83
5.67
5.87

7.55
7.40
7.27
7.41

8.73
8.64
8.68
8.65

6.77
6.70
6.69
6.74

8.88
8.80
8.81
8.75

8.75
8.64
8.53
8.60

6.02
5.97
5.93
5.96

Jun
Jun
Jun
Jun

3
10
17
24

92
92
92
92

3.85
3.69
3.73
3.72

3.72
3.68
3.65
3.64

3.85
3.82
3.75
3.75

4.08
4.02
3.94
3.95

3.91
3.88
3.84
3.84

3.94
3.92
3.91
3.89

3.49
3.45
3.44
3.42

6.50
6.50
6.50
6.50

5.78
5.71
5.60
5.53

7.35
7.33
7.27
7.22

8.65
8.65
8.61
8.56

6.73
6.69
6.62
6.58

8.72
8.67
8.66
8.58

8.59
8.54
8.48
8.43

5.94
5.90
5.86
5.78

3.66
3.87
3.77 p

3.65
3.62
3.62

3.76
3.70
3.71

3.97
3.88
3.94

3.83
3.83
3.81

3.87
3.87
3.88

6.50
6.50
6.50

5.54
5.41
5.42

7.24
7.14
7.15

Daily
Jun
Jun
Jun

19 92
25 92
26 92

7.83
7.78
7.79

NOTE: Weekly data for columns 1 through 11 are statement week averages. Data in column 7 are taken from Donoghue's Money Fund Report. Columns 12,13 and 14 are 1-day quotes for Friday, Thursday or Friday, respectively,
following the end of the statement week. Column 13 Is the Bond Buyer revenue index. Column 14 Isthe FNMA purchase yield, plus loan servicing lee, on 30-day mandatory delivery commitments. Column 15 is the average
contract rate on new commitments for fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) with 80 percent loan-to-value ratios at major Institutional lenders. Column 16 isthe average initial contract rate on new commitments for 1-year, adjustablerate mortgages (ARMs) at major institutional lenders offering both FRMs and ARMs with the same number of discount points.
p - preliminary data

Strictly Confidential (FR)

I I
Class

Money and Credit Aggregate Measures
Seasonally adjusted

JUN.

Money stock measures and liquid assets
Period

Ml

nontransactions
components

M2

Bank credit
M3

in M3 only
4

MC
FO

29, 1992
Domestic nonlinancial debt'

total loans
and
investments'

U.S.
government'

other'

total'

61

7

8

9

10

L

1

2

in M2
3

0.6
4.2
8.0

4.8
4.0
2.8

6.2
3.9
1.1

-0.9
-7.2
-5.6

3.6
1.7
1.2

4.8
1.8
0.4

7.5
5.5
3.5

7.3
10.3
11.3

8.4
6.1
2.3

8.1
7.0

QUARTERLY AVERAGE
1991-3rd QTR.
1991-4th QTR.
1992-1st QTR.
1992-2nd QTR. pe

7.5
11.0
16.5
10

0.6
2.3
4.3
0

-1.6
-0.7
0.0
-3

-9.8
-5.2
-7.2
-9

-1.3
1.0
2.2
-1h

0.7
0.1
1.9

1.9
6.1
3.7

13.9
12.3
8.2

1.6
1.6
2.3

4.5
4.2
3.8

MONTHLY
1991-JUNE
JULY
AUG.
SEP.
OCT.
NOV.
DEC.

9.0
3.8
9.1
7.6
12.2
14.3
9.0

2.2
-1.5
0.7
0.7
2.0
4.8
2.8

-0.1
-3.3
-2.1
-1.7
-1.5
1.5
0.6

-14.1
-9.5
-4.5
-9.5
0.3
-8.9
-6.4

-0.8
-3.0
-0.2
-1.2
1.8
2.3
1.2

6.8
1.2
-1.5
-2.6
0.7
3.0
-0.5

3.8
0.4
1.3
5.3
7.1
7.4
6.2

16.0
12.3
15.3
12.3
13.3
11.3
7.5

2.2
1.0
0.8
1.5
1.6
2.3
1.3

5.4
3.7
4.3
4.1

16.4
27.2
10.3
5.0
14.8
-2

3.2
9.6
-0.5
-2.1
0.6
-3

-1.5
3.3
-4.5
-4.7
-4.8
-4

-8.4
-3.0
-12.7
-13.0
-5.1
-5

1.2
7.4
-2.7
-3.9
-0.4
-3

-1.1
8.0
2.9
-1.4

3.5
0.2
2.7
5.2
-0.8

6.0
7.0
15.0
13.1

2.1
3.8
2.2
2.4

3.0
4.6
5.3
5.1

910.4
931.0
939.0
942.9
954.5

3448.0
3475.5
3474.0
3468.0
3469.6

2537.6
2544.5
2535.0
2525.1
2515.1

726.9
725.1
717.4
709.6
706.6

4174.9
4200.6
4191.3
4177.6
4176.1

4983.0
5016.2
5028.4
5022.4

2846.3
2846.8
2853.1
2865.4
2863.5

2781.0
2797.3
2832.2
2863.2

8450.9
8477.5
8492.8
8509.9

11232.0
11274.8
11325.0
11373.1

950.9

955.3
953.9
951.1

3470.7
3477.0
3470.4
3460.1

2519.8
2521.8
2516.5
2509.1

704.3
708.8
708.6
713.0

4175.0
4185.8
4179.1
4173.2

958.3
956.0
953.1

3467.1
3467.5
3464.9

2508.8
2511.5
2511.9

695.7
704.9
704.9

4162.8
4172.4
4169.8

ANN. GROWTH RATES I() :
ANNUALLY (Q4 TO Q4)
1989
1990
1991

1992-JAN.
FEB.
MAR.
APR.
MAY
JUNE pe
LEVELS ISBILLIONS) :
MONTHLY
1992-JAN.
FEB.
MAR.
APR.
MAY

HEEKLY
1992-MAY

JUNE

1
8 p
15 p

S

1.
2.

__ ____J___

_

.

___
___

___
___I

5

t.___ ___
__

_

I____

___I

I

__

____

_

I___

4.4

4.4

4.5
2.8

___

Adjusted for breaks caused by reclassifications.
Oebt data are on a monthly average basis, derived by averaging end-of-month levels of adjacent months, and have been adjusted to remove
discontinuities.
p-preliminary
pe-preliminary estimate

Strictly Confidential (FR)
Class II FOMC

Components of Money Stock and Related Measures
seasonally adjusted unless otherwise noted

Small
Period

Money market

deposits

deposits

Eurodollars
NSA'

deposits'

time
deposits'

purpose
and broker/
dealer*

tions
only

time
deposits'

RPs
NSA'

Eurodollars
NSA'

bonds

__

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

221.2
245.5
266.0

279.2
277.5
287.0

282.8
292.7
329.1

76.2
78.8
72.6

884.7
919.9
1028.8

1145.3
1167.7
1079.1

311.2
346.2
359.8

106.8
130.1
173.6

561.3
501.9
443.1

MONTHLY
1991-MAY
JUNE

256.6
257.6

278.4
280.1

307.8
311.6

68.5
67.9

966.1
976.8

1150.9
1140.6

367.8
368.8

155.2
155.3

483.5
478.3

JULY
AUG.
SEP.

259.3
261.3
262.9

279.3
280.1
280.6

313.7
317.3
320.6

64.8
67.3
66.4

986.1
994.1
1002.4

1129.5
1120.8
1111.0

367.9
362.4
359.9

155.4
158.6
162.6

OCT.
NOV.
DEC.

264.8
266.0
267.3

283.8
287.6
289.5

324.5
329.7
333.2

69.4
75.3

1015.0
1028.7
1042.6

1095.2
1079.2
1063.0

359.3
359.5
360.5

1992-JAN.
FEB.
MAR.

269.4
271.6
271.8

293.9
305.1
309.7

339.0
346.3
349.5

76.6
76.4
73.1

1061.2
1083.9
1098.0

1042.9
1019.8
1002.9

273.6
274.7

311.3
315.2

350.0
356.6

70.6
67.0

1111.3
1122.5

985.5
968.9

APR.
MAY

73.0

29, 1992

Large

Currency

LEVELS ISBILLIONS) :
ANNUALLY 14TH QTR.)
1989
1990
1991

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

JUN.

106.8
93.6
73.3

Treasury
cial paper'
securities
13

14

tances

15

78.8
68.0
60.8

116.8
125.2
137.0

320.3
331.1
320.1

349.1
357.4
337.9

40.3
33.6
24.4

80.4
78.4

62.3
61.6

131.3
132.4

299.5
325.1

327.9
333.0

29.1
28.1

471.2
465.5
458.5

78.8
78.4
76.7

62.7
63.6
61.5

133.5
134.4
135.2

332.8
330.6
322.9

339.8
336.3
337.7

28.1
27.2
25.8

168.2
173.6
179.1

450.0
442.3
437.1

75.5
73.6
70.9

62.8
61.9
57.7

136.1
137.1
137.9

321.0
323.4
315.9

336.2
337.9
339.7

25.3
24.5
23.3

360.1
363.9
358.0

182.4
188.2
185.3

427.9
420.7
412.9

70.8
72.0
73.7

55.7
56.3
58.7

138.9
140.1
141.2

311.1
325.1
336.6

334.8
327.5
337.0

23.2
22.9
22.2

354.1
355.0

189.2
194.8

405.7
401.2

72.3
71.7

57.1
55.6

142.4

339.1

341.7

21.6

Net of money market mutual fund holdings of these items.
Includes money market deposit accounts.
Includes retail repurchase agreements. All IRA and Keogh accounts at commercial banks and thrift institutions are subtracted from small time deposits.
Excludes IRA and Keogh accounts.
Net of large denomination time deposits held by money market mutual funds and thrift institutions.
p-preliminary

NET CHANGES IN SYSTEM HOLDINGS OF SECURITES
Millions of dollars, not seasonally adjusted

June 26, 1992

I

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

1

(FR)

CLASS II-FOMC

Treasury coupons

Period

1989

1,468
17,448
20,038

12,730
4,400
1,000

-11,263
13,048
19,038

327
425
3,043

946
50
6,583

258
-100
1,280

---Q1
---02
--Q3
---04

2,160
4,356
7,664
5,858

1,000
-------

1,160
4,356
7,664
5.858

800
900
1,165
178

2,950
550
650
2,433

400

1992 --Q1

-1,000

-2,600

1991

37
1,359
5,776
529
2,198
2,823
837

37
1,359
5,776
529
2,198
2,823
837

-1,628
123
505

-3,228
123
505

1990
1991
1991

June
July

August
September
October
November
December
1992 January
February
March
April
May
Weekly
March 4
11
18
25

April 1
8
15
22
29
May 6
13
20
27
June 3
10
17
24

S

500
-----

1,315
375
11,282

-10,390
13.240
25,199

-1,683
11,128
-1,614

---------

4,150
1,450
1,815
3,867

5,310
3,172
9,419
7,299

-16,864
992
152
14,106

2,452

2,452

-233

-14,636

650

625
340
850

2,133
300

3,567
300

37
1,929
6,116
1,374
2,185
4,022
1,092

775
71
-2,134
2,216
6,942
-8,871
16,035

1,027
1,425

1,027
1,425

-3,313
1,150
1,930
-49
4,149

-12,874
-2,010
248
345
-1,203

--0
625
839
417

1,892
1,165
3,800
-6,138
2,654
S -3,412
-- 9,028
- -10,233
1,490
--598
3.639
-4,120
10,994
-6,274
-2,998
- -1,690
5,070

880

.---

4.110

200

4,110

39
466

39
466

668
3,442
306

668
3,442
306

Memo: LEVEL (bil. $) 6
June 24
1. Change from end-of-period to end-of-period.
2. Outright transactions in market and with foreign accounts.
3. Outright transactions in market and with foreign accounts, and short-term notes acquired
in exchange for maturing bills. Excludes maturity shifts and rollovers of maturing issues.

625
800

625
800

200

200

2,278

3,530

707
3,411
3,836
--

66.4

16.2

25.5

140.0

286.3

-3.8

4. Reflects net change In redemptions (-) of Treasury and agency securities.
5. Includes change in RPs (+), matched sale-purchase transactions (-), and matched purchase sale transactions (+).
6. The levels of agency issues were as follows:
within

within

June 24

1 year
2.2

1-5
2.6

5-10
0.8

over 10
0.2

total
5.8