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Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 5/27/2020

RECD INRECORDS SECTON
BOARO

OF GOVERNORS

JJn3,-4 196

OFTHE

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
WASHINGTON,

O. C.

2051S

June 3, 1968.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL (FR)

TO:

Federal Open Market Committee

FROM:

Mr. Holland

Attached for your confidential reference is a staff
memorandum dated June 3, 1968, summarizing Treasury views
concerning "backstopping" of Federal Reserve swap arrangements.

Robert C. Holland, Secretary,
Federal Open Market Committee.

Attachment

Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 5/27/2020

June 3, 1968.
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL (FR)

TO:

Federal Open Market Committee

FROM:

The Staff

SUBJECT:
Treasury views
concerning "backstopping" of
Federal Reserve swap arrangements

The following is a summary of views expressed by Under Secretary
Deming to Chairman Martin in connection with negotiations over a formal
statement as to Treasury backstopping of Federal Reserve swap arrangements.
On the basis of these views, drafting work is proceeding on a possible

formal communication between the Treasury and the System.

Background

1.

The basic concept of a swap drawing by the Federal Reserve

is that it is short term.

It is used to provide an exchange guarantee

for a dollar accrual to a foreign central bank in excess of that bank's

"normal" (uncovered) dollar balances where there is every reason to expect
that the accrual is temporary and will soon be reversed.
2.

On occasion, anticipated reversals have not occurred, and it

has been necessary for the United States to acquire the foreign currency
needed to repay the drawing by:

(a) "funding,"

through sales of foreign-

currency-denominated securities (providing an exchange guarantee) or IMF

drawings (providing a gold value guarantee): or (b) sale of gold; or (c)
by the foreign central bank's increasing its "normal" (uncovered) dollar
balances; or by a combination of these three.
3.

There has been some evolution in practice toward using swap

drawings for interim financing even when early reversal is not reasonably
certain, and this development puts more emphasis than before on "funding"
or "settling" and raises questions as to the definition of "short-term."

Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 5/27/2020

- 2 -

Issues
1. As the Treasury sees it, we should keep in our hands all
present "settlement" options, and give no commitment to settle in gold.
The present ad hoc arrangements for settlement of non-reversed flows of
funds have worked out fairly well, and it would be unwise to give even
an implied commitment to settle in gold.
2. While the Treasury must naturally continue its long-standing
commitment to"take out" a matured Federal Reserve swap by use of the basic
reserve resources of the United States (gold, IMF drawings, foreign currencydenominated securities, and--in the future--Special Drawing Rights), the
evolution of swap drawings into an interim financing device that is likely
to require more "funding" than in the past means that closer policy and
operational consultation on swap usage probably needs to be worked out
between the Treasury and the Federal Reserve for the future.
3. Consideration should also be given to somewhat longer terms
for swap drawings, although they should still be repaid within a year.