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APPENDIX

Notes for FOMC Meeting
July 11, 1979
Scott E. Pardee
Since the last meeting of the FOMC we have had yet another reversal of market
sentiment toward the dollar, which has over the past four weeks come under heavy selling
pressure. Through most of early 1979, the dollar had been buoyed by a sustained reflux of
funds from last year but by late May-early June this reflux tapered off, leaving the dollar
increasingly vulnerable in the downward direction. Most market participants and officials
here and abroad had come to expect that sooner or later there would be renewed pressure on
the dollar in view of our continuing very high rate of inflation, our large trade deficit, and the
many uncertainties around the world which could spark a burst of dollar selling.
As it turned out, the trigger mechanism for the shift in market sentiment was
interest rates. Over the course of the spring interest rates had been raised in most
industrialized countries in response to rapidly expanding aggregates and to sharp hikes in
producer and consumer prices--in excess of one percent per month, even in countries
such as Germany, Switzerland and Japan. The Federal Reserve had also moved on the
funds rate in April, but by early June many market rates in the United States began to
hack off, and exchange traders took note of the fact that the Federal Reserve was holding
steady on the funds rate even though the growth of the monetary aggregates remained
strong. Meanwhile, interest rates elsewhere continued to rise, punctuated by a 2
percentage point jump in the Bank of England’s minimum lending rate, to 14 percent, as
part of the Thatcher Government’s first budget proposal. The prospects were for more
hikes in rates abroad, particularly for Germany. Officials of the Bundesbank were
making no secret of their eagerness to tighten monetary policy further, and indeed of their
view that the D-mark should sooner or later appreciate against the dollar and the EMS
partner currencies.
A further element in the adverse swing in market sentiment reflected changing
attitudes toward the relative ability of countries to cope with the higher oil prices and the
tightening of oil supplies and with the energy problem generally. By early June the
scramble for spot oil by other countries had slowed and spot prices had peaked, but there
were reports that U. S. oil firms had for the first time begun to shop in those very
expensive markets to meet U. S. needs. The growing gasoline shortages in the United
States were taken as further evidence of the lack of an effective energy policy in this
country. The shortages not only generated an immense amount of bad publicity for us
abroad but also affected many foreign exchange traders and their corporate customers
personally, as they also had to wait in line for gas. The very sour attitude this created
toward the Administration and anyone else who might conceivably be blamed for the
situation carried over to attitudes toward the dollar. It was not merely a matter of
psychology. People were beginning to recognize that the sharp increase in oil pricesboth the rise that had already occurred and that expected from an OPEC meeting in
Geneva in late June--was going to add substantially to our oil import bill and thereby

2

hamper our efforts to further reduce our trade deficit. Poor price and trade figures for the
United States reinforced market pessimism.
On intervention, the Treasury--facing both the OPEC meeting in Geneva and the
seven-nation summit in Tokyo during the last week of June--decided that it was an
inopportune time to have a sharply declining dollar. So when pressure on the dollar
erupted beginning on Friday June 1 5 the Desk went into the market forcefully to maintain
a sense of two-way risk in the market and to halt the dollar decline. At first we were only
using Treasury marks but later the intervention was split, as before, between the Federal
Reserve and the Treasury. The pressure became very heavy, however. and although the
Swiss National Bank quickly joined in with heavy intervention on its own account, the
Bundesbank was not prepared to mount a major effort to hold the dollar-mark rate at the
then prevailing levels. The market sensed this, and the apparent lack of coordination
added to the tension in the market. Elsewhere, the British authorities were letting sterling
rise very sharply, and it was beginning to pull other currencies up against the dollar.
By the week of June 25-29, which included the OPEC meeting and the Tokyo
summit, with the dollar already down by about 3 percent. the Bundesbank had agreed to
dig in should hrther pressure develop. During that week the Desk had people [on duty]
each night--an officer and a trader--to monitor markets in Hong Kong and Singapore to
intervene there if necessary. This was for two reasons. First, we had the unusual situation
in which the summit was taking place in the Far Eastern time zones, with ample press
coverage, and anything that came from the meetings ofthe individual delegations, or even
press speculation, could have an exaggerated effect on exchange dealings in those hours.
Second. we were still not sure that the Bundesbank would step in and push the rate back
up if it found the dollar lower at the opening as a result of such exaggerated dealings.
Thus, we made sure we handed over to the Bundesbank a steady market with a reasonably
firm dollar rate. As it turned out, when the rate dipped to DM 1.83 on June 28 the
Bundesbank picked up from us at 7:30 in the morning Frankfurt time, dealing in
of
Singapore and Hong Kong, and hammered the rate back up with some
open intervention. That action, and follow-up intervention since, has erased many
questions about the Bundesbank’s intentions.

So far in July trading has continued to be exceedingly erratic, with the dollar at or
near its recent lows. Sterling provided some fireworks, rocketing up to $2.25 before
receding to the $2.23 level, bolstered by the high interest rates there and by North Sea oil.
The market has become thin as traders await the President’s message in his upcoming
address. Traders are so jumpy that last Friday there was even a flurry of activity on a
mmor that the President was canceling because he had had a nervous breakdown. Reports
that the President will not [unintelligible] oil prices reversed dollar selling today. In this
atmosphere, we have continued to intervene to maintain orderly trading conditions but
have not dug in.
On balance, since the last FOMC meeting the dollar has declined by 4% percent
against the German mark and the Swiss franc and by % percent against the Japanese yen,

3

which has not been caught up in the latest pressures in the markets. Sterling, on the other
hand. is up by a net 8 percent.
The Desk’s purchases of marks during the period amounted to $849 million,
mostly early in the period and mostly for the Treasury, with $306 million of the marks for
System account. Our sales of marks for Treasury and System account amounted to $2.7
billion. These compare with dollar intervention purchases by the Bundesbank of
during the same period. The System’s share of U. S. mark sales was $1.2 billion,
financed mainly by swap drawings, which right now amount to $905 million. In the hectic
trading following the release of our trade figures in late June we also sold $69 million of
Swiss francs for System account, which entailed drawing $36 million on the swap line
with the Swiss National Bank. That drawing has been repaid at a modest profit. We did
not operate in Japanese yen during the period.
The immediate outlook remains highly uncertain. The market is concerned about
interest rates. Market participants have noted that the yield in dollar asset markets is
[unintelligible] it has been since December 1977. The Bundesbank has given signals that
it is likely to raise its discount rate tomorrow. Energy policy in the United States, in terms
of President Carter’s next initiatives and the response of Congress and the public, will still
be on the minds of many market participants. We have shown, I think, that intervention
can contain some of the pressure on the dollar for a time, but we already have had to dig
fairly deep into our mark resources. The $2.8 billion of intervention over the past month
is on the same scale as we had last November and December--after the November I
program--and we cannot sustain a pace like that for very long without help in other policy
areas. Some good news on hndamentals would, of course, help.

€OW

MEETING

J U L Y 11, 1979

REPORT O F OPEN
MARKET OPERATIONS

Reporting on open market operations, Mr. Sternlight made
the following statement.
Since the May 2 2 meeting the Account Management has aimed
steadily for reserve conditions consistent with a Federal funds
rate remaining around 10 1/4 percent--the objective first adopted
in late April.

For about the first two weeks of the period the

aggregates were tracking well within their ranges, but by early
June growth seemed to be well up in the ranges--and by mid-June
the estimates for May-June growth pushed through the upper ends
of the tolerance ranges:

This degree of strength would have called

for a firmer stance by the Desk, but the Chairman recommended in
view of recent signs of weakness in the economy and uncertainties
in the outlook that the System's 10 1/4 percent objective remain
unchanged, and a majority of the Committee concurred.

Later in

June, estimated growth increased slightly further, but the Committee,
in the course of a telephone discussion on June 27, left unchanged
the June 15 decision to retain a 10 1/4 percent funds rate objective.
The latest aggregate data, available in early July, showed May-June
growth lightly below where it appeared in late June--but still well
above the Committee's ranges.
For the most part, the funds rate held quite close to
10 1/4, though it sank well below that the day after the last

meeting, and pushed above in late May as banks tried to sort out
the confusion o f differing Memorial Day holidays.

Again, in late

June and early July the rate pushed up for a few days because
of cautious bank reserve management in the week that included
the end-of-June statement date and the July 4 holiday.

For the

whole period, the funds rate averaged 10.30 percent--up 10 basis
points from the preceding five weeks' average.
Early in the period, operations were directed mainly
at absorbing reserves, and included the redemption of $200 million

of bills and sales of $ 5 4 7 million of bills to foreign accounts.
From about mid-June, the emphasis changed to one of predominantly
supplying reserves, and outright activity included the purchase
of $371 million of Federal agency issues and $693 million of
Treasury coupon issues in the market, as well as the net purchase

of $ 8 2 2 million of bills and $ 4 2 million of coupon issues from
foreign accounts.

The market purchase of agency issues was the

first in about a year, while the purchase of Treasury coupon
issues was the first since February.

Outright operations were

supplemented, as usual, by frequent and sizable short-term reserve
adjustments through repurchase agreements and matched sale purchase
transactions.
While the funds rate was essentially steady, most market
interest rates registered a substantial decline for the period.
Market participants continued to regard the System's interest rate
objective as holding unchanged, but sentiment was buoyed repeatedly
by signs of a slowing economy and this was regarded as evidence
that a cyclical peak in rates was near at hand or had been passed.
The softer economy was seen as virtually ruling out any significant

further firming of monetary policy, despite the continuing signs
of inflation and the evidence in June of rapid growth in the
aggregates.

The large rise in oil prices--ordinarily a factor

that might have led to higher rates--was seen by some as an event
that could reinforce recessionary tendencies, and hence be a
neutral or even downward influence on rates.

In the last few

days, rates have backed up and reversed part of the earlier
declines, as participants began to focus more on the vulnerability
of the dollar, and the possible budget impact of new energy initiatives or anti-recession measures.
Treasury bills fell a net of roughly 50 basis points
over the interval, and part way through the interval, in late
June, some shorter maturity bills were down around 100 basis points
from the level just before the last meeting.

That steep decline

partly reflected seasonal demands, exacerbated by the maturing
of a large block of cash management bills after the June tax date.

Strong speculative demand in the bill futures market, and the
resumption of foreign account buying, in the wake of renewed dollar
support activities, added to demands that temporarily pulled 3-month
bills down to around 8 . 8 0 percent.

The more recent back-up in

rates emerged after dealers had stocked up in anticipation of demands
that failed to materialize, and after financing costs rose abruptly.

In last Monday's bill auctions, 3- and 6-month issues went at
about 9 . 2 7 and 9.16 percent--down from 9 . 7 4 and 9 . 6 0 the day before
the last Committee meeting.

Y i e l d s d e c l i n e d a b o u t 4 0 - 7 5 b a s i s p o i n t s on most

i n t e r m e d i a t e t e r m T r e a s u r y i s s u e s and some 30-40 b a s i s p o i n t s

o n l o n g e r i s s u e s , a l t h o u g h t h e T r e a s u r y raised n e a r l y $ 4 b i l l i o n
t h r o u g h s a l e s of coupon i s s u e s o v e r t h e p e r i o d .

An i s s u e of

$ 1 . 5 b i l l i o n 15-year bonds was a u c t i o n e d o n J u n e 2 1 , when rates

w e r e n e a r t h e i r low f o r t h e p e r i o d .
8.81 percent,

S o l d a t a n average r a t e of

t h e bonds ended t h e p e r i o d a t a d i s c o u n t from

i s s u e p r i c e , t o y i e l d about 8.93 p e r c e n t , w i t h d e a l e r s s t i l l holdi n g some o f t h e i r p u r c h a s e s i n i n v e n t o r y .

F o r t h e most p a r t ,

d e a l e r s h e l d low i n v e n t o r i e s o r n e t s h o r t p o s i t i o n s i n over-one-

year m a t u r i t i e s , a l t h o u g h h o l d i n g s t e m p o r a r i l y b u l g e d j u s t a f t e r
f r e s h s u p p l i e s were a u c t i o n e d .

T y p i c a l l y , t h e big p r i c e g a i n s

o c c u r r e d a g a i n s t a background o f d e c l i n i n g i n v e n t o r i e s , as c u s t o m e r
demand p r e s s e d o n d e a l e r s u p p l i e s .
I n t h e coming month, T r e a s u r y demands a r e e x p e c t e d t o
be moderate.

T h e r e w i l l be the u s u a l 2 - y e a r month-end n o t e , and

t h e q u a r t e r l y r e f u n d i n g of August 1 5 m a t u r i t i e s , i n which t h e
m a r k e t e x p e c t s t h a t t h e T r e a s u r y may r a i s e p e r h a p s $ 2 b i l l i o n o n
t o p of t h e n e a r l y $ 5 b i l l i o n amount h e l d by t h e p u b l i c .

The System

holds n e a r l y $ 1 . 6 b i l l i o n of t h e August 1 5 m a t u r i t i e s , and w e

would p l a n t o exchange t h e s e f o r new i s s u e s - l e a n i n g

somewhat, as

i n May, toward the s h o r t e r o p t i o n s o f f e r e d by t h e T r e a s u r y .
F i n a l l y , I ' d l i k e t o c a l l t o t h e Committee's a t t e n t i o n
t h a t l e g i s l a t i o n w a s signed i n e a r l y J u n e extending t h e Treasury's
a u t h o r i t y t o borrow up t o $5 b i l l i o n d i r e c t l y from t h e F e d e r a l

Reserve b u t a l s o m o d i f y i n g t h a t a u t h o r i t y i n ways t h a t have made

obsolete paragraph 2 of the authorization for domestic open market
operations.

We have been discussing with Treasury the implications

of those modifications and should have a revision to propose in
the authorization f o r the next meeting.

James L. K i c h l i n e
J u l y 11, 1979

--

INTRODUCTION

FOMC CHART SHOW

F o r o u r p r e s e n t a t i o n t h i s morning w e w i l l be r e f e r r i n g t o t h e
package of c h a r t s d i s t r i b u t e d t o you.

The f i r s t c h a r t i n the package d i s p l a y s

t h e p r i n c i p a l assumptions t h a t u n d e r l i e t h e f o r e c a s t .

M - 1 growth i s assumed

t o average 6 p e r c e n t i n 1979 and 1980, measured i n the a b s e n c e of s h i f t s t o
ATS accounts.

This assumption i s unchanged from t h a t u s e d i n r e c e n t p r o j e c -

t i o n s and i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e midpoint of t h e l o n g e r - r u n r a n g e p r e s e n t e d
a s A l t e r n a t i v e B i n the Bluebook.

The f i s c a l p o l i c y assumptions a r e a l s o

l i t t l e changed from t h o s e w e have been u s i n g s i n c e e a r l y t h i s y e a r .

However,

r e c e n t developments i n world o i l m a r k e t s have l e d t o a s u b s t a n t i a l change i n
t h e o i l p r i c e assumption.

The r e c e n t OPEC d e c i s i o n i s e s t i m a t e d t o r e s u l t

i n a n a v e r a g e c o n t r a c t s a l e s p r i c e of $21.00 p e r b a r r e l , or more t h a n 60 p e r c e n t h i g h e r t h a n t h e p r i c e i n December 1978.
of $2.00 p e r b a r r e l h a s been assumed.

During 1980, a f u r t h e r r i s e

Thus f o r the two y e a r s combined o i l

p r i c e s a r e assumed t o r i s e c l o s e t o 80 p e r c e n t

compared w i t h the assumption

of a l i t t l e o v e r 20 p e r c e n t when t h e Committee d i s c u s s e d i t s l o n g e r - r u n
r a n g e s i n February.

We have assumed t h a t o i l p r i c e s u p p l i e s w i l l be t i g h t

b u t adequate a t t h e s e h i g h e r p r i c e s

and t h a t r e t a i l f u e l d i s r u p t i o n s w i l l

d i s a p p e a r by t h e f a l l of t h i s y e a r .

The n e x t c h a r t d e p i c t s movements i n t h e f e d e r a l budget.

In the

c u r r e n t f i s c a l y e a r we a n t i c i p a t e a d e f i c i t of $ 2 8 - 1 / 2 b i l l i o n , a shade l e s s
t h a n t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w i l l announce t h i s F r i d a y i n i t s midyear update.

For 1980 there a l s o a r e o n l y s m a l l d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e s t a f f and adminis t r a t i o n e x p e c t a t i o n s , a s shown i n t h e t a b l e .

Even though t h e budget d e f i c i t

-2-

i s e x p e c t e d by t h e s t a f f t o grow somewhat n e x t y e a r , t h i s i s a t t r i b u t a b l e
t o weaker economic a c t i v i t y , a n d

t h e budget p o s t u r e i n o u r judgment is s t i l l

one of r e s t r a i n t .

A s d i s p l a y e d i n t h e n e x t c h a r t , i n d i c a t o r s of economic a c t i v i t y i n
r e c e n t months have shown weakness.

Growth of nonfarm employment slowed con-

s i d e r a b l y i n t h e second q u a r t e r , and m a n u f a c t u r i n g employment a c t u a l l y
declined.

I n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t i o n i n May o n l y r e c o v e r e d s t r i k e - r e l a t e d l o s s e s

of t h e p r e v i o u s month, and p r e l i m i n a r y i n f o r m a t i o n f o r June s u g g e s t s a s l i g h t
decline i n output.

T o t a l r e t a i l sales i n r e a l terms have d e c l i n e d a s u b s t a n -

t i a l 6 - 1 / 2 p e r c e n t from t h e peak i n December.

I n June--not

shown on the

chart--we e s t i m a t e t h a t sales i n r e a l terms dropped 2 p e r c e n t , l e d by a
s h a r p f a l l i n a u t o s a l e s ; s a l e s of domestic makes were a t a 7 . 2 m i l l i o n u n i t
a n n u a l r a t e , t h e s l o w e s t monthly pace i n f o u r y e a r s .

Housing market a c t i v i t y ,

a s measured by s t a r t s , changed l i t t l e i n A p r i l and May, and remains w e l l
below levels i n 1978.

Given t h e i n f o r m a t i o n now a v a i l a b l e the s t a f f e s t i m a t e s

t h a t r e a l GNP d e c l i n e d a t a 1 - 1 / 2 p e r c e n t a n n u a l r a t e d u r i n g t h e second
quarter.

M r . Z e i s e l w i l l c o n t i n u e t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h a d i s c u s s i o n of t h e
s t a f f ' s f o r e c a s t of t h e domestic n o n f i n a n c i a l economy.

Joseph S. Zeisel
July 11, 1979
FOMC CHART SHOW

The evidence seems quite persuasive that the economy turned down
in the second quarter, and thus, as indicated in the next

chart, real GNP

suffered a slight drop over the first half of this year.

We are now fore-

casting that the decline will continue in the latter half of 1979, at about
a 2-114 per cent annual rate.

For the year as a whole this results in a

reduction in real GNP of about 1-114 per cent.

Our projections call for

a fractional upturn early next year, with only a slightly stronger second
half.

For 1980 as a whole, real GNP is expected to increase by only about

314 per cent.

The key element in both the recent and prospective deterioration of
activity is the weakness of personal consumption expenditures.

The next

chart addresses some of the major factors underlying the poorer performance
of consumer markets recently.

The top panel shows the sharp decline of

after-tax real weekly earnings since the end of 1977.

While these data are

an impel-fectmeasure of family income, they do dramatically reflect the erosion
of real earnings by the latest round of accelerating inflation.

- 2
The c o n c u r r e n t d e t e r i o r a t i o n of consumer a t t i t u d e s i s i l l u s t r a t e d

i n the middle panel.

Recent Michigan Survey r e p o r t s show consumers' e x p e c t a -

t i o n s of p r i c e i n f l a t i o n a t a r e c o r d h i g h and i n d i c a t e t h a t buying c o n d i t i o n s

f o r c a r s were r a t e d more u n f a v o r a b l e t h a n a t any time i n t h e p a s t t h r e e y e a r s .

The w i l l i n g n e s s of consumers t o i n c r e a s e t h e i r u s e of c r e d i t

played a s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t i n s u s t a i n i n g growth of r e t a i l s a l e s f o r much of

this e x p a n s i o n .

However, a s shown i n t h e bottom p a n e l , by l a t e l a s t y e a r ,

consumers' d e b t b u r d e n s had reached h i s t o r i c a l l y h i g h rates.

I n such

c i r c u m s t a n c e s , consumer spending p r o p e n s i t i e s become v u l n e r a b l e t o any

,fwd a s t h e Lop p a n e l o f t h e n e x t c h a r t shows, slower t-nployment
growth, a s h o r t e r workweek and a c c e l e r a t i n g i n f l a t i o n c u t t h e g a i n i n r e a l

income s h a r p l y i n t h e f i r s t h a l f of t h i s y e a r .

This p l a y e d a key r o l e in t h e

r e c e n t d e c l i n e i n r e a l r e t a i l s a l e s d e s c r i b e d e a r l i e r by M r . K i c h l i n e .

In

r e g a r d s t o t h e f u t u r e , we a r e f o r e c a s t i n g a n a c t u a l d r o p i n r e a l income i n

t h e second h a l f of 1979

and o n l y a s l u g g i s h r e c o v e r y d u r i n g 1980.

R e c e n t l y , consumer s p e n d i n g h a s been f u r t h e r undermined by the s h a r p

runup i n petroleum p r o d u c t p r i c e s and g a s o l i n e s h o r t a g e s .

Increased u n c e r t a i n t i e s

- 3 r e g a r d i n g s u p p l i e s have a p p a r e n t l y damped r e t a i l s a l e s , a f f e c t e d v a c a t i o n

p l a n s and c u t i n t o a wide range of o t h e r household a c t i v i t i e s .

One e s p e c i a l l y

n o t a b l e impact has been t h e reduced demand f o r l a r g e r , l e s s f u e l - e f f i c i e n t

c a r s ; a s a r e s u l t , t o t a l a u t o s a l e s have plummeted.

We e x p e c t s h o r t a g e s of f u e l s t o d i m i n i s h l a t e r t h i s y e a r , b u t

p r i c e i n c r e a s e s a l r e a d y announced imply--as

t h e middle p a n e l shows--that

the

s h a r e of d i s p o s a b l e income g o i n g t o e n e r g y p r o d u c t s w i l l be r i s i n g p r e c i p i -

tously.

Some $20 b i l l i o n t h a t would o t h e r w i s e b e a v a i l a b l e for p u r c h a s e of

d i s c r e t i o n a r y goods such a s consumer d u r a b l e s w i l l i n s t e a d be f l o w i n g o v e r s e a s

i n 1979 t o pay f o r t h e added c o s t of imported o i l .

A s t h e bottom p a n e l

i n d i c a t e s , t h e s e v a r i o u s f a c t o r s have l e d us t o e x p e c t a v e r y s l u g g i s h o u t l o o k

f o r r e a l consumer demand--a d e c l i n e f o r 1979 a s a whole, and o n l y a l i m i t e d

r i s e i n 1980.

Many of t h e f o r c e s which have been a f f e c t i n g consumer a t t i t u d e s a r e

l i k e l y t o be undermining b u s i n e s s c o n f i d e n c e a s w e l l .

As t h e t o p p a n e l of t h e

n e x t c h a r t shows, new c a p i t a l goods o r d e r s a p p e a r t o have a l r e a d y topped o u t

i n r e a l terms.

As i n d i c a t e d i n t h e m i d d l e p a n e l , t h e p r e s s u r e s on c a p a c i t y

s h o u l d be d i m i n i s h i n g a s m a r k e t s weaken, and p a s t performance s u g g e s t s t h a t

t h i s w i l l lead t o c u t b a c k s i n c a p i t a l s p e n d i n g , a s shown i n t h e bottom p a n e l .

1

- 4 But from an historical point of view, the contraction in capital outlays

is relatively mild, reflecting the moderate overall decline in noninvestment
demand, the lack of significant financing problems and needs to adjust to
changes in the cost and availability of energy.

Thc rate of inventory iiivestment is likely to mirror dcvelopnients

in fixed capital spending and other final demands.

A s the top panels of the

next chart show, there are indications of a backup in stocks recently,
reflecting the downturn in consumer demand, particularly for large cars.

But

businesses are likely to adjust output rather promptly--as they have in
recent years--and, as shown in the middle panel, we expect the rate of
inventory accumulation to decline through the remainder of 1979 and remain
minimal in 1980.

However, as is evident in the bottom panel, we are not anti-

cipating a substantial inventory adjustment.

Indeed, our expectation is that

business will be keeping stocks about in line with growth of final sales.
Housing is also likely t o continue to be a negative factor in
overall growth through the kalance of 1979. As is shown in the t o p panels

- 5 o f t h e n e x t c h a r t , d e p o s i t growth a t t h r i f t s and t h e commitments o f S&Ls

have been on a g e n e r a l downtrend, f o l l o w i n g t h e s u r g e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e

i n t r o d u c t i o n of MMCs.

I n t h e f a c e o f g e n e r a l l y weak d e p o s i t growth and a

r e l a t i v e l y t i g h t F e d e r a l Home Loan p o l i c y on advances, t h e s e l e n d e r s a r e

l i k e l y t o c o n t i n u e t o reduce o u t s t a n d i n g commitments.

Given s l u g g i s h income

growth and r a p i d l y e s c a l a t i n g homeownership costs--now a g g r a v a t e d by r i s i n g

e n e r g y prices--we have assumed t h a t h o u s i n g a c t i v i t y w i l l c o n t i n u e t o s l a c k e n .

A s t h e bottom p a n e l shows, we a r e

now f o r e c a s t i n g s t a r t s t o bottom o u t a t

a b o u t a 1 - 1 / 2 m i l l i o n annual r a t e a t t h e end of t h i s y e a r , and t o edge up

d u r i n g 1980, l a r g e l y i n r e s p o n s e t o s t r o n g u n d e r l y i n g demands.

A s t h e n e x t c h a r t shows, w e e x p e c t l i t t l e c o n t r i b u t i o n t o growth

from government spending through 1980.

The t o t a l p u r c h a s e s of f e d e r a l , s t a t e

and l o c a l governments a r e p r o j e c t e d t o show no r i s e a t a l l i n r e a l terms d u r i n g

1979,assuming no new f i s c a l i n i t i a t i v e s .

Such programs a s c o u n t e r - c y c l i c a l

revenue s h a r i n g and l o c a l p u b l i c works g r a n t s have l e v e l e d o u t or a r e d e c l i n i n g ,

and governments g e n e r a l l y have curbed t h e growth of spending.

The r e a l i n c r e a s e

i n government purchases i s p r o j e c t e d a t o n l y a 1 p e r c e n t a n n u a l r a t e i n 1980.

- 6 -

The next chart compares our projection of overall activity with
previous postwar contractions.

The absence of'the serious distortions that

precipitated the post-1973 recession is a key to the milder decline expected
this time.

The relative drop projected for real GNP is about equal to the

average of the four preceding post-World War I1 recessions.

However, the

upturn projected to begin in 1980 is expected to lack the vigor of the
earlier recoveries.

This reflects in large measure the impact on consumer

and business behavior of continued rapid inflation, the assumed lack of new
fiscal policy initiatives and a policy of monetary restraint--associated with

the effort to bring inflation under control.

The modest recovery forecast

for 1980 reflects a bottoming-out of housing activity, the small upturn
anticipated in business fixed investment and an improvement in net exports.
Consistent with the weakness in overall activity, we are projecting
substantially reduced growth in total employment this year--as shown in the
next chart--and only a small increase in 1980.

Nonfarm payroll employment is

projected to decline by about half a million from peak to trough, as reductions
in manufacturing employment--reflecting production cuts, particularly in

consumer durables and capital related products--are partly offset by
continued--albeitmodest--grDwth in the service sectors.

- 7 -

growth t h a n i n r e c e n t y e a r s , we a n t i c i p a t e t h a t i n a d d i t i o n t o normal i n c r e a s e s

i n t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f w o r k i n g a g e , a s i g n i f i c a n t number of women will
z n t e r t h e l a b o r m a r k e t , particularly i n an envirocmenc in whicl, r e a l

family

-

inco,;i,:s a r c b r i n g r e d u c e d by b o t h r e c e s s i o n ~ n dr a p i d l y r i s i n g p r i c e s .

1.11us,

t h e unemployment r a t e i s p r o j e c t e d t o r i s e q u i t e r a p i d l y , p a r t i c u l a r l y l a t e r
t h i s y e a r , and c o n t i n u e up d u r i n g 1980, r e a c h i n g a b o u t 8 per c e n t by y e a r end.

p e r f o r m a n c e of p r o d u c t i v i t y .

Continued upward p r e s s u r e on wogzs, i n r e s p o n s e

t o p a s t and prospective i n f l a t i o n i s e x p e c t e d to o f f s e t t h e e f E e c t s o f l a b o r
market s l a c k ; c o m p e n s a t i o n i s p r o j e c t e d t o r i s e by c l o s e t o 10 p e r c e n t i n

1980, svmewhar above t h i s y e a r ' s e x p e c t e d i n c r e s s e .

A s t h e m i d d l e p a n e l shows, we e x p e c t l i t t l e h e l p from improved

p r o d u c t i v i t y p e r f o r m a n c e i n damping t h e i m p a c t on l a b o r c o s t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y

in mCn r a r t e r n : .

S m e impsovcxent i n p r o d u c t i v i t y growth i s l i k e l y a s

o v e r a l l o u t p u t bottoms out--a

t y p i c a l c y c l i c a l performance--but

gains w i l l

p r o b a b l y b e modest, i n l i n e w i t h t h e s l u g g i s h r e c o v e r y p r o j e c t e d .

- 8 -

As a r e s u l t , while

b7e

a r e p r o j e c t i n g some moderation i n t h e r i s e

of u n i t l a b o r c o s t s n e x t y e a r from t h e 1979 p a c e , t h e s e c o s t s w i l l s t i l l be

putcine.

c o n s i d e r a b l e up..,ard prcs.,<lre on p r i c e s .

T h e n e x t c h a r t a d d r e s s e s t h e o t h e r m a j o r f o r c e s which have been

f u e l i n g i n f l a t i o n r e c e n t l y - - e n e r g y and food p r i c e s .

The t o p p a n e l p r e s e n t s

o u r c u r r e n t f o r e c a s t of o v e r a l l e n e r g y p r i c e i n c r e a s e s .

The s h a r p r i s e

t o o v e r a 40% r a t e a t y e a r - e n d r e f l e c t s t h e a d j u s t m e n t s f o r OPEC o i l , a s w e l l

as t h e impact of d e c o n t r o l of d o m e s t i c c r u d e , and m a r k e t f o r c e s which are
p u t t i n g upward p r e s s u r e on e n e r g y p r i c e s .

Our assumption of a 10 p e r c e n t

f u r t h e r i n c r e a s e i n OPEC o i l p r i c e s i n 1980 p e r m i t s e n e r g y p r i c e i n c r e a s e s t o

moderate s u b s t a n t i a l l y n e x t y e a r .

N o n c t h e l c s s , even w i t h such a d e c e l e r a t i o n ,

energy p r i c c s a r c s t i l l e x p c c t c d t o be r i s i n g a t a 20 p e r c e n t a n n u a l r a t e

toward year-end.

And of c o u r s e , t h e feedback e f f e c t s of e a r l i e r e n e r g y p r i c e

i n c r e a s e s on wages and o t h e r c o s t s w i l l s t i l l be f u e l i n g i n f l a t i o n .
:Is

tile 1 1 u t L i n 1 1

p ~ i i i i ~Sl ~ I O W S ,

wi.Lli

somc improvcmc.nt i n supplies, f o o d

p r i c e i n c r e a s e s are p r o j e c t e d t o e a s e s l i g h t l y i n 1980 from the 11 p e r cent

r a t e now f o r e c a s t f o r t h i s y e a r .

However, r e p o r t s o f poor g r a i n h a r v e s t s

..
- 9 in the USSR and elsewhere in Eastern.Europe have recently introduced

uncertainties in regard to even t h i s outlook for modest improvement.
The next chart shows our current view of the outlook for overall
inflation.

Prices excluding food and energy items--what has sometimes been

called the underlying rate of inflation--are projected to be rising at about
an 8 per cent rate in 1980,little different from the expected increase for
Less pressure from OPEC oil permits some easing of overall price

this year.

increases during 1980, b u t we are forecasting prices to still be increasing
at a rate in excess of 9 per cent at year end.
Mr. Truman will continue with a discussion of the international

situation.

E.M. Truman
July 71, 1979
FOMC Chart Show Presentation

The f i r s t international c h a r t summarizes the assumptions and
projections underlying t h e s t a f f ' s outlook f o r the external s e c t o r of

the U.S. economy over the next s i x q u a r t e r s .

T h a t outlook is dominated

by recent and prospective o l l price developments, which a r e depicted

i n the upper left-hand panel.

As Mr. Kichline has indicated, we now

expect t h a t the average price of U.S. petroleum imports w i l l rise by

60 percent during 1979 and have assumed t h a t t h e price will rise by a
f u r t h e r 10 percent d u r i n g 1980.

Moving clockwise, the next panel shows the s t a f f ' s projection

f o r the average increase i n co'isumer p r i c e s i n foreign i n d u s t r i a l
countries.

The average i n f l a t i o n rate abroad is expected t o remain

somewhat lower t h a n i n the United S t a t e s .

However, following the s h a r p

improvement d u r i n g 1978, i n f l a t i o n abroad is expected t o average almost a
d o u b l e - d i g i t r a t e d u r i n g t h e four q u a r t e r s of 1979 before subsiding some-

what i n 1980.

The increase this year w i l l be s t r o n g l y influenced by

dramatically higher o i l prices, by the absence of a further d o l l a r
depreciation, and, a s always, by a number of special f a c t o r s .

The d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n the o i l and i n f l a t i o n s i t u a t i o n abroad,

a l o n g w i t h actual and expected policy responses t o i t , have l e d us t o mark
down our forecast f o r real economic a c t i v i t y , as i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n the next

panel.

The average growth of real GNP i n foreign i n d u s t r i a l countries i s

expected t o slow from about 4 percent d u r i n g 1978, t o about 3-1/4 percent

t h i s year, and t o about 2-1/2 percent next year.

-2-

The last panel shows the weighted-average foreign exchange value
The d o l l a r has declined somewhat since l a t e May and e a r l y

of t h e d o l l a r

June; i t i s about 7 percent higher than a t t h e end of l a s t October b u t
15-1/2 percent lower t h a n it was i n September 1977.

The s t a f f expects

t h a t by the second half of 1980, the foreign exchange value of t h e d o l l a r
will be e s s e n t i a l l y unchanged from i t s average level i n May and June of

t h i s year.

T u r n i n g t o the upper left-hand panel of the next c h a r t , the
volume of U.S.

non-agricultural exports, shown by the red l i n e , has

increased sharply since e a r l y l a s t year in response t o the d o l l a r ' s

-

depreciation d u r i n g 1977 and 1978 and f a s t e r growth abroad.

Although

the volume of such exports appears t o have declined l a s t q u a r t e r , we
expect a rebound i n the second half of the year, followed by a slowing
through the end of 1980 i n l i n e w i t h the projected moderation of growth
abroad.

Again moving clockwise, our a g r i c u l t u r a l exports have been on
a plateau a t an annual r a t e of around $30 b i l l i o n f o r about a year.
However, as a consequence of poor growing conditions i n t h e U.S.S.R.

and

i n Eastern Europe, the volume and value of such exports should pick up
over the next several quarters.
Turning t o t h e import side, the e f f e c t s o f the projected
decline i n U.S.
o i l imports

--

economic a c t i v i t y should begin t o show up i n lower nonboth value and volume

--

toward the end of 1979.

By the

fourth quarter of 1980, the volume of non-oil imports i s expected t o be
2 percent lower t h a n the estimated rate l a s t quarter.

-3-

T h e l a s t panel on t h i s c h a r t shows our o i l imports.

The volume

o f such imports is expected t o average about 8-1/2 million barrels per
day in 1979, s l i g h t l y lower than t h e r a t e in 1978.

However, the value of

our o i l imports i s expected t o r i s e by more than $20 b i l l i o n d o l l a r s

d u r i n g 1979 t o around $65 b i l l i o n a t an annual rate by the fourth quarter
of t h i s year.

Because of higher o i l prices and reduced aggregate demand,

t h e volume of U.S.
in 1980.

o i l imports i s expected t o decline t o l e s s than 8 MMB/d

T h i s would be comfortably within t h e U.S.

commitment a t the Tokyo

Summit, w h i c h , on an equivalent basis, is t o l i m i t o i l imports t o l e s s than
9.4 MMB/d.

The l a s t international chart summarizes the s t a f f ' s outlook f o r
the external s e c t o r of the U.S.

-

economy.

As i s shown i n t h e upper panel,

the t r a d e d e f i c i t is expected t o be somewhat larger over the remainder of
t h i s year than i t has been i n the l a s t three quarters.

The influence of

higher p r i c e s f o r imported o i l will o f f s e t higher exports and the e f f e c t s
on imports of reduced U.S. economic a c t i v i t y .

However, t h e t r a d e d e f i c i t i s

expected t o decline t o less t h a n $20 b i l l i o n i n 1980 l a r g e l y r e f l e c t i n g the
continuing e f f e c t s of reduced U.S.

economic a c t i v i t y .

Taking account of

t he Comnerce Department's recent, sharp upward revision i n U.S.

net direct

investment income, t h e U.S. current account d e f i c i t i s expected t o be
sharply reduced t o about $5 b i l l i o n t h i s y e a r , compared with $14 b i l l i o n
l a s t year.

For 1980, we a r e projecting a current account surplus of

around $14 b i l l i o n .

The middle panel t r a n s l a t e s these developments i n t o t h e GNP
accounts.

Real imports of goods and services are expected t o decline

-4 -

t h r o u g h e a r l y 1980.

Real exports of goods and services a r e expected t o

increase through the second quarter o f 1980, cushioning the decline i n
U.S. economic a c t i v i t y , and t h e n level o f f .

The bottom panel shows net exports of goods and services a s
measured i n the GNP accounts i n real terms (the red l i n e ) and i n nominal
terms (the black l i n e ) .

Note t h a t between t h e f i r s t and t h i r d quarters of

t h i s year net exports a r e expected t o be e s s e n t i a l l y unchanged i n real

terms b u t decrease sharply i n nominal terms.

T h i s divergent movement

r e f l e c t s t h e terms-of-trade loss resulting from the sharp increase i n the

relative price o f o i l , a loss t o the United States t h a t has depressing
e f f e c t s on domestic economic a c t i v i t y .
Against the backgroAd of what I have presented t h i s morning,
t h e outlook f o r the foreign exchange value of the d o l l a r i s surrounded by
even g r e a t e r uncertainty than usual.

Several c o n f l i c t i n g influences a r e

l i k e l y t o be f e l t over t h e next 18 months: F i r s t , the d i f f e r e n t i a l between

U.S. and the average foreign i n f l a t i o n r a t e has narrowed, b u t t h e U.S. r a t e
will remain higher than the foreign rate.

Second, the U.S. current account

is expected t o move i n t o substantial s u r p l u s , b u t the improvement i s not
expected u n t i l e a r l y 1980 and may well be viewed as temporary when i t comes.
T h i r d , while the s t a f f has assumed t h a t U.S. monetary conditions will be

l i t t l e changed i n the second half of 1980 from what they a r e today, we
expect over the projection period a f u r t h e r , general tightening of monetary
conditions abroad, implying a narrowing of i n t e r e s t - r a t e d i f f e r e n t i a l s

favoring dollar-denominated assets.

In reaching a judgment on the net

-5-

e f f e c t f a c t o r s , the s t a f f has projected, as I indicated e a r l i e r , t h a t
by the second half of 1980 the foreign exchange value of the d o l l a r will

be e s s e n t i a l l y unchanged from i t s average level i n May and June of t h i s
year.

Mr. Kichline will now conclude our presentation.

James L. K i c h l i n e
J u l y 11, 1979

CONCLUSION

--

FOMC CHART SHOW

The f i r s t c h a r t i n t h e l a s t s e c t i o n of your p a c k e t shows a p r o j e c t i o n of f u n d s r a i s e d by domestic n o n f i n a n c i a l s e c t o r s developed a l o n g w i t h
t h e s t a f f ' s economic f o r e c a s t .

Funds r a i s e d i n 1979 a r e p r o j e c t e d t o r e c e d e

from t h e peak l e v e l reached l a s t y e a r , and t o f a l l f u r t h e r i n 1980.

The

d e c l i n e i n t o t a l f u n d s r a i s e d t h i s y e a r i s a t t r i b u t a b l e t o reduced demands
by t h e f e d e r a l government, r e f l e c t i n g a s m a l l e r budget d e f i c i t and some
drawing down of c a s h b a l a n c e s t o m e e t f i n a n c i n g demands.

The emergence of

a l a r g e r budget d e f i c i t n e x t y e a r w i l l g e n e r a t e an i n c r e a s e i n T r e a s u r y
borrowing.

In p r i v a t e s e c t o r s , funds r a i s e d a r e p r o j e c t e d t o i n c r e a s e a

l i t t l e t h i s y e a r compared w i t h 1978, b u t heavy borrowing was a l r e a d y undert a k e n i n t h e f i r s t h a l f and borrowing i s e x p e c t e d t o d r o p Over t h e remainder
of t h e p r o j e c t i o n p e r i o d .

The r e d u c t i o n i n t o t a l p r i v a t e borrowing i s a s s o c i -

a t e d w i t h t h e weakness of economic a c t i v i t y a l o n g w i t h maintenance of a f i r m
monetary p o l i c y .
The household s e c t o r , shown i n t h e n e x t c h a r t , a c c o u n t s f o r about
t w o - t h i r d s of t h e d e c l i n e p r o j e c t e d i n t o t a l c r e d i t demands.

The s l o w e r

pace of housing a c t i v i t y i n t h e GNP p r o j e c t i o n a s w e l l as s l u g g i s h m a r k e t s
f o r d u r a b l e goods w i l l g e n e r a t e r e d u c e d consumer c r e d i t demands.

Total

household borrowing i s e s t i m a t e d t o have peaked i n t h e l a t t e r h a l f of 1978
and by 1980 i s p r o j e c t e d t o r u n around o n e - f i f t h below t h a t l e v e l .

But, a s

shown i n t h e bottom p a n e l , h o u s e h o l d l i q u i d i t y - - m e a s u r e d by the p r o p o r t i o n
of income n o t committed t o d e b t s e r v i c e - - i s

only expected t o s t o p eroding

i n s t e a d of e x p e r i e n c i n g t h e u s u a l c y c l i c a l i n c r e a s e ; the e x p a n s i o n of
d i s p o s a b l e income i s r e s t r a i n e d w h i l e household borrowing remains q u i t e

-2h i g h , p a r t l y r e f l e c t i n g some c o n t i n u e d p r e f e r e n c e f o r goods and d e b t p o s i t i o n s i n a h i g h i n f l a t i o n environment.
C o r p o r a t e borrowing, shown i n t h e t o p p a n e l of t h e n e x t c h a r t , i s
p r o j e c t e d t o d e c l i n e a p p r e c i a b l y from t h e peak reached i n t h e f i r s t h a l f of
E x t e r n a l f i n a n c i n g needs a r e e x p e c t e d t o f a l l as i n t e r n a l l y a v a i l -

t h i s year.

a b l e funds c o n t i n u e t o grow w h i l e e x p e n d i t u r e s on i n v e n t o r i e s and f i x e d
c a p i t a l moderate.

Long-term f i n a n c i n g i s p r o j e c t e d t o rise o v e r t h e p r o j e c -

t i o n p e r i o d a s f i r m s fund p a r t of t h e h i g h volume of s h o r t - t e r m d e b t taken
on r e c e n t l y .

T h a t f u n d i n g w i l l l e a d t o some improvement i n b a l a n c e s h e e t

r a t i o s , shown i n t h e bottom p a n e l .

However, t h e s t r e n g t h e n i n g of balance

s h e e t s i s much less t h a n t h a t which o c c u r r e d i n 1975 and 1976, r e f l e c t i n g a
v a r i e t y of f a c t o r s i n c l u d i n g t h e avoidance of s h a r p c u t b a c k s i n c o r p o r a t e
spending t h a t would accompany a deeper r e c e s s i o n , and t h e absence of wides p r e a d f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t would g e n e r a t e p r e s s u r e s t o l i q u i f y .
Firm f i n a n c i a l c o n d i t i o n s w i l l t e n d t o r e s t r a i n improvement of
b a l a n c e s h e e t r a t i o s of d e p o s i t a r y i n s t i t u t i o n s , shown i n t h e n e x t c h a r t .
A t b o t h conunercial banks and s a v i n g s and l o a n a s s o c i a t i o n s t h e e r o s i o n of

s e l e c t e d b a l a n c e s h e e t r a t i o s i s expected t o moderate o r h a l t , b u t a r e t u r n
t o more u s u a l r a t i o s a t a t i m e of c y c l i c a l downturn seems u n l i k e l y .

This

r e s u l t r e f l e c t s t h e maintenance of f a i r l y s t r o n g c r e d i t demands r e l a t i v e t o
i n f l o w s of t r a d i t i o n a l s o u r c e s of funds.

T h a t is, i n t e r e s t r a t e s remain

w e l l above f i x e d i n t e r e s t r a t e c e i l i n g s and under t h o s e c o n d i t i o n s i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e n o t f l o o d e d w i t h r e l a t i v e l y low c o s t funds.
The n e x t c h a r t shows i n t e r e s t r a t e s thought t o be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h
the projection.

In t h e l a t t e r h a l f of t h i s y e a r and e a r l y n e x t y e a r t h e

T r e a s u r y b i l l r a t e i s e x p e c t e d t o f a l l t o around the 8 - 1 / 4 t o 8-1/2 p e r c e n t
a r e a , about a p e r c e n t a g e p o i n t less t h a n t h e a v e r a g e rate i n t h e f i r s t h a l f

.

-3 of 1979.

Given a c o n s i d e r a b l e pickup i n growth of nominal GNP n e x t y e a r

and a t t e m p t s t o h o l d M-1 growth t o 6 p e r c e n t , t h e b i l l r a t e i s e x p e c t e d t o

r i s e l a t e r i n 1980.

I n long-term m a r k e t s , s t r o n g demands f o r f u n d s , h i g h

i n f l a t i o n r a t e s , and l i t t l e change i n s h o r t - t e r m i n t e r e s t rates a r e e x p e c t e d
t o r e s u l t i n maintenance of bond r a t e s n e a r r e c e n t levels.
The l a s t c h a r t i n t h e package d i s p l a y s t h e r e s u l t s o b t a i n e d from
model s i m u l a t i o n s employing 1 p e r c e n t a g e p o i n t f a s t e r or s l o w e r M-1 growth
t h a n i n t h e 6 p e r c e n t base f o r e c a s t .

A l l of t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s p r e s e n t e d p r o -

v i d e a p a t t e r n of slow r e a l growth a f t e r 1979, h i g h r a t e s of i n f l a t i o n , and
r i s i n g unemployment.

Developments so f a r t h i s y e a r - - p a r t i c u l a r l y

energy

p r i c e and s u p p l y d i s r u p t i o n s and l a r g e r t h a n a n t i c i p a t e d food p r i c e i n f l a t i o n - - h a v e r e s u l t e d i n a c o n s i d e r a b l e s e t b a c k t o a c h i e v i n g a p a t h of m o d e r a t e
economic growth and s u b s t a n t i a l l y r e d u c e d r a t e s of i n f l a t i o n .

For monetary

p o l i c y a l o n e c h e r e seems t o be l i t t l e i n t h e way of p o l i c y o p t i o n s which
would y i e l d s u b s t a n t i a l l y improved r e s u l t s d u r i n g the n e x t y e a r o r two.

But

p o s s i b l e outcomes f o r a l t e r n a t i v e monetary p o l i c i e s c o u l d w e l l b e a l t e r e d
i n coming months; t h e r e s p o n s e of t h e economy t o u n c e r t a i n e n e r g y developments
i s f a r from c l e a r and t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n may w e l l u n d e r t a k e i n i t i a t i v e s t h a t

change t h e c o u r s e of economic events.
To a s s i s t i n the d e l i b e r a t i o n s t h i s morning y o u r a t t e n t i o n m i g h t b e
d i r e c t e d t o t h e a d d i t i o n a l t a b l e d i s t r i b u t e d t o you w h i c h compares t h e s t a f f ' s
forecast t o revised administration forecasts.

The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n f i g u r e s .

a r e scheduled t o be r e l e a s e d on F r i d a y and a r e c o n f i d e n t i a l u n t i l t h a t t i m e .
A s can be s e e n , growth of nominal GNP i n 1979 i s a p e r c e n t a g e p o i n t lower i n
the staff forecast

due p r i n c i p a l l y t o weaker r e a l GNP.

The s t a f f a l s o f o r e -

c a s t s a slower pace of e x p a n s i o n i n r e a l GNP i n 1980 and a p p r e c i a b l y h i g h e r
i n f l a t i o n and unemployment.

CONFIDENTIAL (FR) CLASS 11-FOMC

Material for

Staff Presentation to the
Federal Open Market Committee
July 11, 1979

-

-

MONETARY POLICY

=

Growth of M-1 averages 6 percent (without ATS)
in 1979 and 1980
Interest rates move lower into early 1980 and rise
over balance of forecast

FISCAL POLICY
Unified budget expenditures of $494 billion
in FY 1979

Unified budget expenditures of $542 billion
in FY 1980

OIL PRICES
OPEC average price of about $21 .OO per barrel
effective Mid-1979; price increases in 1980
amounting to about $2.00 per barrel

FEDERAL BUDGET*

r

Billions 01

ars

i

-

500

100

300

-

1980
Admin. FRB

I

1970
*Fiscal years

I

I

1972

I

I

1974

I

I

1976

I

200

514 509
542 542
20%
33

Receipts
Expenditures
Deficit

I

1978

I

198

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Thousands

ONFARM EMPLOYMENT
-

of workers

lex,
I00

INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION

1

Average Monthly Change
-

I400
150

300
145
200

140
100

I
H2

H1

1978

(I1

1978

02

1979

1979

REAL RETAIL SALES

r

Billions of
1972 dollars

1

OUSING STARTS
-

Millions (

its
1.2

46
45

2.0

44

DOMESTIC AUTO SALES

43

1 .a

Millions of units

1.6

1

I-

b j l !
1978

1979

1.4

I
1978

1979

Change from previous period,
annual rate, percent

r

REAL GNP
1972 Dollars

I
1974

I
1975

I
1976

I
1977

I
1978

I
1979

1980

-

7

- 96

-

- 94
- 92
- 90

I

I

MICHIGAN SURVEY RESEARCH CENTER

-

- 90

- 60

- 70

I

I

-

-

- 23

-

:J
- 22

- 21

I

I

/-.

,','
-

1
'
I
I
I
I
I

I

-f--/"j

- 9

- 8

- 7

REAL NEW ORDERS
Nondefense Capital Goods
I--

I&

Total

Billions of 1972 dollars

1

h

A

- 13

-

I

I

1976

- 11

Machinery
I

9

-

7

I

I

1977

-

1978

1979

1973 03 Pre-Recession Peak
.

1980

87 8%

-.

- 85

\

\

I/
L

\\

\
\
\

- 80

”\

’*\%_,

I

I

I

I

2

-

:/

- 150

-

--c-.

-.-.------.

- 130
- 110

I

I

I

I

-

MANUFACTURES’
INVENTORIES
Annual rate, billions of dollars AUTO STOCKS
-

Millions of units

1

Change in Book Value

1.4

-.
1.2

1.o

.8

.6

I -

1977

1978

1977

1979

1978

1979

-

-

1972 Dollars, NIA Basis
-

- 20

BUSINESS INVENTORIES RELATIVE TO SALES

I

I

I

I

I

DEPOSIT GROWTH
AT THRIFT
INSTITUTIONS

Change from previous
period, annual rate,
percent

OUTSTANDING COMMITMENTS AT
SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATIONS
Billions of dollars

i
-

r

1 r
16

i-

36

12

32

8

28

4

1977

1978

24

1977

1979

I

1

1978

1979

HOUSING STARTS

Millions of units

2.0

1.5

1.o

0.5

1

I
1974

I
1975

I
1976

I

I
1977

1978

I
1979

1980

REAL GoV’T- * PURCHASES
OF GOODS AND SERVICES

Change from previous periods
annual rate, pe
-

?nt

5.0

2.5

+0
-

t

2.5

I
1974

I

I
1976

I

I
1978

REAL GOV’T. * PURCHASES
AS A SHARE OF GNP

I
1980

P

r

t

nt

23

22

21

20

19

1974

*

1976

Federal and Stale and Local

1978

1980

REAL GNP

c

Index, peak quarter
-

i00

Cyclical Comparison
108

104

100

96

LABOR MARKET

Change from previous PI
annual rate, mil

IIIIClVlLlAN LABOR FORCE
W EMPLOYMENT

i

0

2

+

-0

I

I
1974

1975

I

I

1976

I

I

1977

1978

1979

1980

UNEMPLOYMENT RATE

Per cent

- 8
)/f

- 7
/
/
/
/

- 6

//
/

- 5

I

1974

I

1975

I

1976

I

1977

I

1978

I

1979

I

1980

I

UNIT COST INDICATORS
Nonfarm Business Sector

Change from year earlier,
annual rate, per cent

-

-

- 10

compensation per hour

c--

8

I

I
1974

I

I

I

1976

1978

1980

4

2

+
0
2

1974
-

1976

1978

198

2

8

d

I

I

I

I

I

PRICES
-

-

nt’

-

.O

-

!O

\
&

20

-

10

annual rate, per

-znergy

I/\
I

\
\

I

\

\

\
\
\

\

\
1
\

\
\

\
\

\

\

\

I

N
I

I

I
1976

1977

I

1978

1979

1980

Change from year ea ?r,
annual rate, per1 It

Food

-

0

+
0
-

I

I
1976

1977

I

I
1978

1979

1980

GROSS BUSINESS
RODUCT PRICES
-

I

1976

Change from year earlier,
annual rate, percent

1

I

1977

I

1978

I

I

1979

1980

AVERAGE PRICE OF
APORTED OIL
-

Dollars per

el

FOREIGN
IFLATION*

Q4lQ4 percentage c

?

3
14

Consumer Prices

i
r’

I

f

I

B

20

I
I
I

I

d

16

6

12
4
E

2
4

1
1978

WEIGHTED AVG. EXCHANGE VALUE
March 1973=100
THE U S . DOLLAR*

1

FOREIGN
ROWTH*

Q4lQ4 percentage c

e

Real GNP

4

-

2

1977
*Average of G-10countries plus Switzerland using total 1972-1976 average trade

1978

1979

1980

U.S. MERCHANDISE TRADE
NON-AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS
Billions of 1972 dollars,

AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS

Billions of dollars,

-

1

Billions of 1972 dollars,
ratio scale

Billions of dollars,
ratio scale

40

-

30

80

20

_----.

60

Volume

Volume

c--

10

40

d
L
1980
1976
1978

I

I
1976

I

I
1978

I
1980

NON-OIL IMPORTS

OIL IMPORTS
Millions of barrelslday,
ratio scale

ratio
ss le.
-

r

Billions of 1972 dollars,
ratio scale

Billions of dollars,
ratio scale

80

40

,
,
20

1976

1978

1980

1976

1978

1980

MERCHANDISE TRADE AND
CURRENT
ACCOUNT BALANCES
-

-

-

Billions of dollars

- 20

Current Account

+0

I@*----

--

-

- 20

Trade &lance

- 40

-

I

I

I

I

1974

I

I

1976

1978

GNP EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES

1980
Billions of 1972 dollars

r

1

-

Bil Ins of 1972 dollars

Billions of dollars

20

0

-

0-------

20

/-10

:
8
'

+0

I
I

-

-

lo

+0

-

10 -

- 10

2t -

- 20

I

I

I

I

I

FUNDS RAISED BY
OMESTIC NONFINANCIAL §ECTORS
-

Billions of

ws

U S . Government
Private
100

300

200

-

100

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

HOUSEHOLDS
Billions of dollars

3orrowing

10

60

20

40

I
1974

I

I
1976

r

I

I
1978

I
19E
P-W
.

-

t

-

0

-

'a

Liquidity
Share of Disposable Income
For Other Than
Debt Service

----____.
-

t

76

L
,
1974

1976

1978

1980

CORPORATE FINANCE
Billions of dollars

r

1974

---7

1976

1978

1980

Liquid Assets to
Short-Term Liabilities

Short-Term
Total Debt

1974

1976

1978

1980

--

BALANCE SHEET RATIOS

-

ti0

Commercial Banks

Securities to
Earning Assets

-

30

c

25

..-----_-

-

_*_--*--_.

.20

-

I-

Savings and Loans

B

6

.4

I
1974

I

I
1976

I

I
1978

I
1980

INTEREST RATES
Pel

I 1970 I

I

1972

I

I

1974

I

I

1976

I

I

1978

I

I

19E

ONETARY POLICY ALTERNATIVES
3EAL GNP ( % )

*

1979

1980

1981

5 per cent M-1

-1.5

0

0.5

6 per cent M-1

-1.3

0.8

1.4

7 per cent M-1

- 1.1

1.3

2.5

5 per cent M-1

9.5

8.8

8.7

6 per cent M-1

9.6

9.0

9.1

7 per cent M - 1

9.6

9.1

9.5

5 per cent M-1

6.9

8.3

9.6

6 per cent M-1

6.9

7.9

8.7

7 uer cent M-1

6.8

7.6

8 .O

5 per cent M-1

9%

10%

103~

6 per cent M - 1

8 !h

9%

9%

7 per cent M-1

7 3L

8%

8 3h

PRICES (%)

UNEMPLOYMENT RATE ( % )

3 MONTH TREASURY BILL RATE ( % )

' M1 growth rates equivalent to those in the absence of ATS.
GNP implicit deflator measured from fourth quarter to fourth quarter.
Level end quarter of each year

Comparison of Staff and Administration
Economic Forecasts

Staff

I
_

1979
Administration

Staff

1980

Administration

Nominal G X ’ (percent
change Q I V to Q I V )

8.2

9.2

9.8

10.3

Real GNP (percent
change Q I V to OW)

-1.3

-0.5

0.8

2.0

GNP Implicit Deflator

9.6

9.8

9.0

8.1

6.9

6.6

7.9

6.9

(percent change Q I V
to Q I V )
Unemploymenr Rate (QIV,
in percent)