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Meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee
February 7-8, 1989

A meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee was held in
the offices of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in
Washington, D.C., on Tuesday, February 7, 1989, at 3:00 p.m. and
continuing on Wednesday, February 8, 1989, at 9:30 a.m.
PRESENT:

Greenspan, Chairman
Corrigan, Vice Chairman
Angell
Black
Forrestal
Heller
Hoskins
Johnson
Kelley
LaWare
Parry
Seger
Messrs. Guf fey, Keehn, Melzer, and Syron, Alternate
Members of the Federal Open Market Committee
Messrs. Boehne, Boykin, and Stern, Presidents of the
Federal Reserve Banks of Philadelphia, Dallas, and
Minneapolis, respectively
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

Kohn, Secretary and Economist
Bernard, Assistant Secretary
Patrikis, 1Deputy General Counsel
Prell, Economist
Truman, Economist

Messrs. Beebe, Broaddus, J. Davis, R. Davis,
Lindsey, Siegman, Simpson, and Ms. Tschinkel,
Associate Economists
Mr. Sternlight, Manager for Domestic Operations,
System Open Market Account
Mr. Cross, Manager for Foreign Operations,
System Open Market Account

1. Attended Wednesday session only.

Mr. Coyne, Assistant to the Board, Board of Governors
Mr. Ettin, Deputy Director, Division of Research and
Statistics, Board of Governors
Mr. Promisel, Senior Associate Director, Division of
International Finance, Board of Governors
Messrs. Hooper, Madigan, and Stockton, Assistant
Directors, Divisions of International Finance, Monetary
Affairs, and Research and Statistics, respectively,
Board of Governors
2
3
3
Messrs. Brayton, Duca, and Rosine, Economists, Divisions of
Research and Statistics, Monetary Affairs, and Research
and Statistics, respectively, Board of Governors
Mr. Keleher, Assistant to Governor Johnson, Office of
Board Members, Board of Governors
Mr. Wajid, Assistant to Governor Heller, Office of
Board Members, Board of Governors
Mr. Gillum, Economist, Open Market Secretariat, Division
of Monetary Affairs, Board of Governors
Ms. Low, Open Market Secretariat Assistant, Division of
Monetary Affairs, Board of Governors
Messrs. T. Davis, Lang, Rolnick, Rosenblum, and Scheld,
Senior Vice Presidents, Federal Reserve Banks of
Kansas City, Philadelphia, Minneapolis, Dallas,
and Chicago, respectively
Messrs. Burger and McNees, Vice Presidents,
Federal Reserve Banks of St. Louis and Boston,
respectively
Ms. Krieger, Manager, Open Market Operations,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York

2. Attended portion of meeting relating to the Committee's discussion
of the economic outlook.
3. Attended portion of meeting relating to the Committee's discussion
of the economic outlook and its longer-run objectives for monetary
and debt aggregates.

Transcript of Federal Open Market Committee Meeting of
February 7-8, 1989
February 7, 1989--Afternoon Session
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. I'd like to start by welcoming back Dick
Syron, who I understand was here during the tranquil days of 1981 and
1982.
I trust his return is an omen.
MR. SYRON.

There's no information for forecasting in that.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
MR. SYRON.

We appreciate that and we thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. I guess you can't legally at this stage
approve the minutes. You weren't there; you never heard them.
Somebody else try it.
VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN.
MR. KELLEY.

I'll move it.

Second.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Without objection. We'll start with the
report on foreign currency operations. Mr. Cross.
MR. CROSS.

[Statement--see Appendix.]

If not,
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Any questions for Mr. Cross?
may I have a motion to ratify all transactions undertaken by Mr. Cross
since the last meeting?
VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN.
MS. SEGER.

So move.

Second.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Without objection. We'll move on to
domestic open market operations.
Mr. Sternlight.
MR. STERNLIGHT.

[Statement--see Appendix.]

If not,
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Questions for Mr. Sternlight?
may I have a motion to ratify his transactions since the December
meeting?
VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN.

So move.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Without objection. Now we'll move to
the chart presentation of Messrs. Prell and Truman.
MR. PRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
packet of charts here with a red title on it.
Appendix.]
MR. TRUMAN.

You should all have a
[Statement--see

[Statement--see Appendix.]

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Governor Johnson.

2/7-8/89

MR. JOHNSON. Just one question: On this first alternative
forecast, what happens in a case where you don't have compensating
money growth to try and stay on the base line real GNP forecast and
you have an unchanged dollar?
MR. TRUMAN. Well, in that case, of course, you would get
more current account improvement, a better performance of prices, and
a little less--about 1/4 percent per year less--GNP growth.
MR. JOHNSON.

What's the improvement on the price side?

MR. TRUMAN. Oh, the difference I think is about 0.2 percent
a year for both years, 1989 [and 1990].
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Governor Heller.

MR. HELLER. I have a couple of questions.
First, you are
showing compensation going up rather rapidly in 1990--plus 6 percent-but then you are showing personal consumption expenditures going up
only 0.9 percent. What's happening there--the saving rate?
MR. PRELL. Well, job growth is much slower; thus, you're not
generating the nominal income fast enough to offset the more rapid
increases in consumer prices.
MR. HELLER.
MR. PRELL.
increase is.

The 6 percent?
I'm not sure what the nominal personal income

MR. HELLER. No, no.
From the charts it looks like
compensation is going up 5.7 or 5.8 percent--whatever it is, I don't
know.
MR. PRELL.
SPEAKER(?).

But we have very slow employment growth.
You get zero.

MR. STOCKTON. You get about 5 percent consumer price
inflation as well as what's pushing down the overall growth in real
disposable income.
MR. HELLER. The second question was: Foreign prices are
falling rather rapidly in the forecast in 1990, and in view of the
fact that foreign monetary growth right now is a lot higher than it is
in the United States in virtually all countries except Switzerland
what's their magic?
MR. TRUMAN. I think their magic is that with this slightly
higher money growth they have had a lower level of [inflation] on
average to begin with more recently--with a few important exceptions
like the United Kingdom--and we are projecting a tightening of
monetary policy in those countries. Also, for this two-year period,
not including 1990, they get some benefit from the depreciation of the
dollar that we're assuming in the forecast relative to their present
In addition, these, are year-over-year
underlying level of inflation.
comparisons, and they would be coming off these artificial factors

2/7-8/89

that in 1989 tend to boost the price level up in Germany and Japan.
Therefore, the year-over-year comparison exaggerates the decline.
MR. PRELL. Governor Heller, just to clarify: those figures
were compensation for hourly wages. We have total nominal disposable
income rising just over 6 percent. If you take off just over 5
percent consumer inflation you're down to about 1 percent income
growth in real terms.
MR. HELLER. Okay. The last question: On chart 18, the next
to the last chart, you have a lot faster growth abroad under the
unchanged dollar forecast.
Presumably that would mean higher U.S.
exports, yet the current account gets a lot worse?
MR. TRUMAN. Right, because it [unintelligible] it more than
exports. There's no doubt about that: [faster] growth abroad does
boost the growth of exports in this period.
I might add-MR. HELLER.

But the two U.S. growth paths are exactly the

same.
MR. PRELL.

That's right.

MR. TRUMAN. That's right, but that's by assumption. To the
extent that you get more exports, the easing of monetary policy
required to keep the U.S. growth path on the same line is less; so
that's part of this compensated-MR. HELLER.

No.

I'm sorry, I don't get it.

MR. TRUMAN. To the extent that's correct--that without the
dollar's decline there is more growth abroad--that by itself has a
partial effect in that it generates more exports.
MR. HELLER.

More exports?

MR. TRUMAN. Growth [abroad] itself does generate more
exports. To the extent that that produces more demand for U.S. goods,
the experiment offsets that by having less monetary expansion in the
United States to compensate for the exports that would otherwise be
there.
MR. HELLER.

So imports--

SPEAKER(?).
Net exports are falling a lot faster than the
current account [unintelligible] U.S. GNP is held on track by
offsetting [unintelligible] export increase with the exception of
investments due to lower interest rates.
But the real
[unintelligible] decline of exports [unintelligible] increase of
foreign real exports, but raise the GNP level. They measure this
from-MR. TRUMAN.
Governor Heller.
MR. HELLER.

Well, in fact, it puts the two factors together,

I'm ready to give up.

2/7-8/89

MR. TRUMAN. The growth of exports is lower in this forecast
even though income abroad is higher because they gain more on the
price side than they lose on the income side.
MR. HELLER.

It all goes on the price effects?

In fact,
Prices are actually washed out.
MR. TRUMAN. Yes.
probably a better way of thinking of it is that the level of real
exports is lower in the alternative than in the base line because that
improved price competitiveness has a greater effect on exports than
the gain in faster growth abroad.
MR. HELLER.
exports were up.

Sorry.

I thought I heard you say initially that

MR. TRUMAN.

No.

MR. HELLER.

Now you're saying exports are

[not]

up--

MR. TRUMAN. A partial effect of higher income is to put
exports up.
A partial effect of a stronger dollar is to put exports
down. The net effect is negative for exports.
MR. HELLER.

Okay.

MR. TRUMAN.

Sorry for the confusion.

MR. HELLER.

I find it hard to see, but--

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Governor Angell.

MR. ANGELL. Bob, I think the reason you have trouble with
that is the same reason that I have trouble--because there is a basic
inconsistency in the whole process, which makes all the results
backwards to me. And that is, the faster money growth that you have
there should be associated with a higher value of the dollar rather
than the opposite.
In other words, what we have here is the use of a
construct that says in order to keep things the same you grow M2 at a
faster rate. And by strange reasoning if you grow M2 at a faster rate
you'll have a lower value dollar.
MR. PRELL. If you looked at the exchange rate implications,
as I suggested earlier, of that faster money alternative that I have,
that showed-SPEAKER(?).
MR. PRELL.
MR. JOHNSON.

If interest rates are fixed.
You have that dollar depreciation.
That's why I asked that first question.

So, that makes everything backwards for those of
MR. ANGELL.
us who had seen that relationship as the [unintelligible] one.
MR. JOHNSON. That's why I asked my first question about the
result if we didn't compensate on the money side.

2/7-8/89

MR. PRELL.

This is compounding degrees of uncertainty, let's

say.
SPEAKER(?).

Yes.

MR. HELLER.

Well, it certainly succeeded.

MR. BLACK. You know, it certainly would help to have this
[analysis] sent out a little ahead of time so that we could reflect on
it a bit. That's a lot to digest in that short a period of time.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Bob.

MR. PARRY. On a somewhat narrower topic: I agree, Mike, that
the nondefense capital goods orders are really good indicators as far
as capital spending is concerned. But would it be better perhaps to
try to take some of the lumpiness out of aircraft and parts as opposed
to excluding it?
Because it is an important factor with regard to
capital spending. I know it's very lumpy but maybe if you averaged a
couple of months you'd get a better picture.
MR. PRELL.
I don't think so, President Parry, because I
think the value of this indicator is relatively short run. The lags
that one measures in the relation of orders to shipments tend to be a
matter of several months. And in the case of aircraft, with the
current situation being what it is, the lead times are so long that
the placing of orders has no meaningful-MR. PARRY.

So it's not a lumpiness.

MR. PRELL. That's apart from the fact that there are lots of
intermediate goods in there--parts [for example]--and a lot of that
goes to exports.
It's an even bigger problem there than it is for
translating the other orders to business fixed investment.
So,
there's a great deal of slack for that.
MR. MELZER. Mike, is the main difference in terms of your
deficit assumptions--I forget what chart that was on-MR. PRELL.

Second chart.

MR. MELZER.
Second chart. Is that based on the difference
in interest rates--primarily that 6.3 percent or whatever the former
Administration had been using versus what we are projecting?
MR. PRELL. That is a good deal of the story.
In 1990 that
is worth roughly $25 billion of the difference, all other things
equal, between the Administration and Greenbook budget assumptions.
MR. MELZER. One thing that strikes me in looking at this-and to some extent I agree with Bob Black that it's hard to absorb all
the implications of these alternative forecasts--but you get the
feeling that maybe our economic policy mix is really not what it ought
to be.
And that sort of puts you in a fog.
I think this is a
rhetorical question but, is there a way of positioning what we're
doing that puts us in a better posture in that regard? Because there
are a lot of things that come through in this that we could get blamed

2/7-8/89

for: the [unintelligble] deficits, stalling out of the trade
adjustment, you name it. And the politics become very tricky.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Greatly.

Governor Seger.

MS. SEGER. Maybe I'm missing something, but as you go
through the alternatives is there one that would be comparable to,
I don't mean-say, just freezing in place today's policy stance?
MR. PRELL. If you mean by that the federal funds rate, that
is the "more money" alternative.
MS. SEGER. Yes. But
thinking of.
And maybe I have
reserve pressures would do.
I
upward pressure on rates. But
going to be the status quo.

I guess that wasn't quite what I was
the wrong view of what holding today's
sense that that might put a little more
maybe your "more money" alternative is

MR. PRELL.
It was intended to answer the question: What if
short-term interest rates don't rise?
MS.

SEGER.

Okay, thanks.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. That's all right.
you were finished or not. President Keehn.

I didn't know whether

MR. KEEHN. Mike, a question on chart 5 on the consumer
durables: Is the decline in the red line solely attributable to a
decline in car sales from, say, 10.6 to 10.2 million units, or in fact
does the slump of that line also imply some pickup in [unintelligible]
of consumer durables?
MR. PRELL. We have non-motor vehicle durable goods
increasing 3 percent in 1989 and then flat in 1990.
MR. KEEHN.

What comprises the end of 1989 number?

MR. PRELL. Within the durables?
level of disaggregation on this.

We have not done a greater

MR. KEEHN. I guess the question is: With home starts down,
does that fit in it?
MR. PRELL.
It fits in to some degree. There is some
relationship there, though if you just look historically to the simple
econometric relation you find it's pretty loose. In 1988 we had 6
percent growth of durables other than motor vehicles.
So that [1989
rate] is a significant slowing. This level of housing activity is
still enough to generate some reasonable demand and then there is all
the replacement demand for appliances and furnishings and so on. So
it wouldn't fall entirely in that type of-How much of the base line
MR. JOHNSON. One last question:
Do you
forecast for real growth is accounted for by net exports?
know?

2/7-8/89

MR. PRELL. In 1989 it's a very small part; in dollar terms
net exports improve $22 billion and GNP is improving $122 billion-that's roughly 1/2 percent on GNP. In 1990 net exports are accounting
for roughly 3/4 of that 1 percent growth.
MR. TRUMAN.

The actual increase is not as much as implied

for-MR. JOHNSON.
depreciation?
MR. TRUMAN.

I've forgotten: what's the implied dollar
Over the entire 8 quarters it's 13 percent in

nominal terms, 10 percent in real terms.
MR. PARRY.
MR. TRUMAN.

Most of it in the second

[year]?

Well, a little more in the second year because

the first quarter is gone.
MR. SYRON. Mike, given what Ted has said in here and what
was said about oil prices in the Greenbook that we got earlier, one
always makes point estimates but what's your view of the symmetry of
Particularly, I'm referring to the
the risks on the inflation side?
staff inflation projection and the forecast for compensation in the
first and second halves of 1989 given what was [happening] in the last
half of 1988.

MR. PRELL.

I must say that in terms of absolute levels these

movements in the compensation numbers over 1988 give us some real
problems in judging where the takeoff point is.
There was an

extraordinarily low increase in compensation per hour in the first
quarter of the year; whether the fairly sizable numbers in the second
half were just offsetting a seasonal adjustment problem we can't say.
In essence, we are discounting the level at the end of the year, and
we have a very mild acceleration, as we perceive it, in compensation
per hour over the forecast period. As I said, we think this is a
reasonable forecast. I guess I would see the tail of the distribution
being longer on the up side than on the down side at this point. It's
hard for us in this kind of economic environment to see a sizable
shortfall from this compensation forecast. But one can see a larger
range of risks, I think, on the up side. As a best estimate, this is
our shot.
MR. STERN. Mike, with regard to the slowing in auto sales
that you have in here: Is that due principally to a squeeze on income
or is it the effects of the age of the stock of vehicles on the road?
MR. PRELL. Well, a lot of cars have been bought in recent
years but that hasn't brought the average age of the stock down to low
levels by any means. I'm not sure we totally understand the scrappage
rates that we're seeing--whether there really has been an improvement
in the quality of automobiles and they last longer or what. I think
we have a fairly sizable decline. The automobiles are declining more
than light trucks and vans, which we have not yet incorporated in our
tables and are now almost half as large as the car sales. So that's
something worth recalling. The main factors are the slower income and
employment growth. One couldn't point to the interest rate increases
we have here as having a tremendous effect on automobile sales. It's

2/7-8/89

more the general atmosphere of confidence and the growth in purchasing
power that is behind this decline.
MR. FORRESTAL. Mike, one of the assumptions you made was
that the weather will cooperate and that crop yields will be normal.
In the event that didn't happen and we have a drought situation
similar to the one we had this year, would 1990's GNP drought
adjustment likely be negative?
MR. PRELL.

1990's or 1989's?

MR. FORRESTAL.

Well, 1989.

MR. PRELL. If you had a crop year like 1988 in [1989 or]
1990, all other things equal, it would subtract 0.7 of a percent or so
from output and would get you very close to zero.
I think the bigger
concern--one that we just don't know how to cope with in terms of
inserting something in this forecast--is that in many areas, although
it's spotty, there seems to be a shortage of soil moisture. The
reports about winter wheat are not particularly encouraging. And with
inventories of many of these grains and soybeans and so on as low as
they are, we can't afford to have anything like the 1988 crop if we're
going to stay anywhere near this inflation path. It's likely that we
will see much more sizable food price increases than we saw in 1988.
So I think it's something that's hard to cope with in monetary policy
terms and economic forecasts here. But it is something that one could
be concerned about.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Well, we can supply liquidity!

MR. PRELL. That observation seems to have closed down all
the discussion.
I want to express my appreciation!
SPEAKER(?).

You want a second or what?

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
think maybe I--

I no more believe that than you do.

I

MR. ANGELL. Mike, I guess I'm a little surprised at the food
inflation in '89 and '90, given normal crops and normal weather,
because with the decrease in set-asides ordinarily food price
inflation in the year after the drought should be lower than in the
year before the drought.
MR. PRELL.

The rate of increase?

I would have thought that somewhere there should
MR. ANGELL.
be a downward move in food prices--offsetting the '88 upward move--in
order for that historical relationship to hold true.
MR. PRELL. Well, as you know, we have about a 3-3/4 percent
And we're looking at, for
increase in food prices this year and next.
example,--

MR. ANGELL.
I'm wrong.

I'm sorry, I thought it was 4 percent but maybe

2/7-8/89

MR. PRELL.
I'm splitting it more thinly; it's a little below
4 percent. We're talking about consumer prices, excluding energy,
rising 5 percent or more. That is a considerable differential and not
out of line with that historical pattern to which you referred of the
relative movement in these inflation rates.
Beside the drought
effects there was already in train some tendency toward reduction in
cattle herds; and we're likely to see some considerable pressure on
meat prices that offsets the relatively small benefits you can get
from additional grain supplies, given the very large labor component
in most of those food prices.
MR. ANGELL.
Well, because of this discussion, I now hope
that the rainfall is normal so we can find out who's right.
But
that's my only reason for wanting normal weather.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Let me put forth the other side of the
question. New crop [unintelligible] positions in feed grains and in
food grains are well above normal. And built into the price structure
at this stage is still subnormal soil moisture. What happens to the
forecast, including the cattle cycle effect, if in fact from here on
in we get above normal moisture and it brings the forward prices down?
Does that make much of a dent in the consumer price structure or is
the cattle shortfall already enough to make that a likely occurrence?
MR. PRELL.
I think that's largely there and that it would
really take some tremendous moves in crop prices to move these overall
food price measures around. I think that's evident in what happened
last year.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
In other words, what we're really
looking at is more the unit labor costs in the distribution channels
than the feed grains that filter into the cattle-meat cycle.
MR. PRELL.
That's a very large ingredient.
the case. We have an authority here on the subject.
you have anything you want to add?

I think that's
John Rosine, do

MR. ROSINE. Well, it certainly would not be enough to drive
food price changes down into negative territory.
If we had a very
good crop year I think we could possibly have a drop in all grain
prices but a CPI food price increase, say, on the order of 1 or 2
percent, give or take a little--not enough to affect the overall price
outlook very significantly.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
couple of tenths?
MR. PRELL.
we got in 1988.

So, at most, on your total index it's a

A couple of tenths.

And that's essentially what

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
I don't want to force the conversation,
but has everybody completed their questions?
If so, we can move on to
Don Kohn--if you're prepared, Don.
SPEAKER(?).

We are

[unintelligible]--

2/7-8/89

-10-

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. My schedule reads differently from what
[We should] go to our
I think the Secretary's schedule shows.
I thought that came [before] you.
discussions on the economy.
MR. KOHN.

Well, I'll be happy to get

[my report]

over with.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. No, that would probably confuse us.
would like to start off?
Bob.

Who

MR. PARRY. Mr. Chairman, the Twelfth District economy
remains strong. For example, the District's unemployment rate is
However, Arizona is slumping because of
below the national average.

the construction downturn, which is likely to extend at least through
For
this year. In addition, there are signs of slowing during 1989.
example, labor shortages are slowing [output in] a few industries; I

guess the most extreme example of that would be in aircraft
manufacturing. Concern about the lack of rainfall is mounting in our
District, especially in California. Another year of drought would
really seriously hurt the District's agriculture. I think we have a
little different situation working in our District. Last year we
benefitted from the drought because we had almost all of our
agriculture handled through irrigation. But we have had two years of
drought and a third would be quite serious because the reservoir
levels are so low at the present time--and we're already halfway
through our rain year--that it actually could result in reductions of
water availability of 25 to 40 percent. So, we're looking rather
closely at the water situation, at least in the state of California.
The national economy, it seems to me, continues at a level of
activity above its sustainable potential. I believe that the recent
employment reports indicate upward pressures on wages and that the
underlying inflation rate seems likely to continue to build.
Moreover, if there is a depreciation of the dollar this year and next,
as is incorporated in the Greenbook forecast, that will add to
inflationary pressures as well. Our outlook for growth for the twoyear period is very similar to that of the Greenbook, although we may
have somewhat of a difference in the yearly pattern. In any case,
this growth and what I would say is a worsening inflation prospect
argue strongly, in my view, for continuing our recent strategy of
steadily tightening policy. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Black.

MR. BLACK. Mr. Chairman, our projections for 1990 pretty
closely parallel those of the Greenbook. We do expect slightly more
growth, but not quite enough to put us in the outlier column as has
sometimes happened in the past. And we expect a tad more in the way
of an increase in the consumer price index. As Mike Prell suggested
very well a while ago, more important than the specifics of the
forecast are some of the things that underlie it. And as we read the
economy the pressure on U.S. productive resources looks very, very
strong to us. This is evident, I think, in most recent statistical
data: real personal consumption expenditures ex-automobiles, for
example, were very strong; the nonagricultural employment figures for
January were very strong; and the theme report that we got on business
capital expenditures, which I found extremely helpful this time,
seemed to indicate strength. We're getting the same sort of

2/7-8/89

grassroots information from our contacts around the District.
one particularly interesting thing this time was a comment
who has been in the department store business
says that business

To us,

of

is really booming.

so it came as
something of a surprise to us.
Now, if we have this strong demand, as
is apparent to us, that naturally is going to put some upward pressure
on real interest rates.
And any attempt on our part to resist that
pressure through monetary policy is going to risk getting inflationary
pressures.
So we've assumed, like the staff, that our monetary policy
will not resist these things; rather we predicated our forecast on the
assumption that there will be a significant further increase in shortterm interest rates, and specifically some increase in the relatively
near future.
Now, if we do allow that increase to occur then we think
the risks are about equal on both sides.
If we don't let that
increase occur then we think the risks are on the up side of more
inflation than the staff has projected.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Melzer.

MR. MELZER.
Our forecast this time falls within the
parameters of the central tendency, which is a little unusual, I
think, for us in recent years.
We're at the low end on real GNP at 21/2 percent and at the high end on the CPI at 5 percent.
But we're
modestly higher in terms of unemployment at the end of the year.
Looking out into 1990, our forecast would be quite similar to what
we've seen from the Board's staff with maybe somewhat stronger real
growth--at about 1-1/2 percent--and the CPI continuing to be somewhere
around 5 percent.
So, no declines.
Looking out beyond that, even
though we didn't do projections, I think we'd expect the CPI to begin
coming down.
The big difference, however, between our forecast and
the Board staff's forecast is that we've assumed Ml growth of
somewhere in the 3 to 5 percent area to produce these essentially
similar results, whereas the Board staff's forecast I think has Ml
growth of zero in 1989 and I'm not sure about 1990.
Based on that, I
think I'd have to say that we view the risk in the Board staff's
forecast to be on the down side in terms of real growth.
Using our
methodology, if we drove that kind of assumption through [our model]
we would definitely have weaker growth--in fact, a recession.
In terms of what's going on in the District itself, we have
seen some growth in nonag employment for the most recent three-month
period and for the year.
For a long time I was reporting that our
employment was actually declining, so there has been some pickup.
But
[our growth rate] is still sluggish--about 1-1/2 percent versus 3 to
3-1/2 percent nationally. Manufacturing employment has picked up a
little more strongly but it's still slower than the national
[average].
Residential construction has shown some strength recently,
as has nonresidential construction, particularly in St. Louis
commercial office building construction.
But on a year-to-year basis
that's down quite significantly.
Reports on the retailing side
indicate, as expected, when we plot [them versus] a year ago that
nominal gains were about 6 to 7 percent.
I guess that's really all I
have to say.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Boykin.

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2/7-8/89

MR. BOYKIN. Well, Mr. Chairman, in the Eleventh District I
think you have to look at the Louisiana portion by itself because it
does seem that Louisiana is continuing to deteriorate, with the
If
unemployment rate there rising to about 10.4 percent in December.
you shift over to Texas and our part of New Mexico you continue to see
some improvement; it's modest and slower than the rest of the nation,
but at least it's going in the right direction. On a sectoral basis
the split is equally pronounced, with the energy and construction
industries still pretty weak and manufacturing and services continuing
to improve. The energy industry is performing as though the expected
price of oil is in the $15 to $16 range rather than the $17 to $19
trading range that we've seen over the last 8 weeks or so.
The
downturn in our construction activity now seems to be centered on the
nonresidential construction. As for agriculture, there is some
I guess we did not suffer quite as
mention of concern about drought.
much last year but we are beginning to have a little concern. Our
winter wheat is already hurt and we're hearing fairly pessimistic
reports from out in the farm areas. Overall, manufacturing continues
to improve.
In the first three quarters of last year, most of the
gains were centered on the more trade sensitive industries; we've now
seen that the less trade sensitive product lines are improving.
Retail sales have been improving in both autos and other goods.
Overall, we're looking for some strengthening of the regional economy
So, that does make us feel a little better.
in 1989 relative to 1988.
On the national scene, about the only place we really have
any difference with what Mike was saying is on inflation. We feel
there certainly is a little more inflationary pressure now and in
prospect than the staff is seeing.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Keehn.

MR. KEEHN. Mr. Chairman, with regard to the District, things
are very much unchanged since my report at the previous meeting and
that in itself may be significant. The outlook certainly continues to
No one that we talk to in any way thinks that we're
be positive.
likely to have a recession this year. There are some early comments
about the possibility of a recession in 1990 but those are the same
kinds of comments that we heard last year about 1989. Alternatively,
the general attitude is that we will not experience any particularly
I think the inflationary picture
rapid acceleration in growth either.
continues to be very difficult to assess. The common wisdom is that
we are going to see some escalation, particularly on the wage side;
yet the reports I get from companies are not necessarily consistent
with that common wisdom. The labor market continues to tighten. We
are continuing to hear comments about shortages of skilled labor. But
despite that, I'm surprised by how favorable the contract settlements
continue to be--[increases in] wages and fringe benefits of 3 to 4
And though labor attitudes certainly are
percent on an annual basis.
hardening, they have at least not yet begun to evidence themselves in
significantly higher settlements. The price side of the picture, I
Steel prices have now begun to
suppose as always, is quite uneven.
moderate. At this point many companies report that steel prices are
only now back to the prices that they were paying in 1980 and 1981.
So, though we've had a big escalation over the last two years, we're
now getting back to those levels that we experienced earlier in the
1980s.
But nonferrous prices are now beginning to accelerate again,
particularly copper, nickel, and to a somewhat lesser extent,

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2/7-8/89

aluminum. Chemical prices are moderating following the big increases
that we had over the last year or two, but pulp prices are beginning
to escalate pretty rapidly.
I don't sense any consistent pattern in
these materials prices. At one company that I talked to--it isn't a
very large company but it tracks these things very carefully--their
material price increases for 1988 came in about 2 percent higher than
1987.
For 1989 they had been forecasting an increase of .4 percent.
They very recently increased that from .4 to 1.3 percent, and that
increase is entirely in the nonferrous area. But despite the
increase, it is still lower than what they had in 1988.
Virtually
everybody continues to report very competitive conditions in the
marketplace. For finished products there are competitive pressures
that really make it difficult to pass price increases along, so there
seems to be some continuing pressure there.
With regard to the national outlook, our forecast is a bit
more modest than the Board staff's but pretty consistent with the
central tendency.
I think our difference with the Board staff's
forecast is partially timing, but a bit of it is also in this nonauto
durables area that I asked Mike about.
I continue to think that the
risks at this point are on the inflation side--continued upward
pressure on prices and, I do expect at some point, on wages.
As a
consequence, as we get into the policy deliberation we're going to
continue to need to exert more pressure to deal with that.
But having
said that, I also have the feeling that, given what we have done so
far, we are not necessarily behind the curve in dealing with the
inflation problem.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Forrestal.

MR. FORRESTAL. Mr. Chairman, the Sixth District's economic
activity is not very much changed from the last time I reported. We
are still showing strength in industrial production, as we have for
some time, but in addition we now have some strength in the retail
sector. The construction area remains pretty subdued and is weak.
The chemical, aluminum, and paper producers are operating at very high
rates of utilization, in many cases due to strong export orders.
We're expecting a new aluminum plant to open in Georgia and that's
rather an exception because most of the other producers we're looking
at seem reluctant to add very significantly to capacity. And in some
cases, such as in chemicals, they are actually looking for imports to
meet strong domestic demands.
Paper producers are fairly substantial
purchasers of modernizing equipment but are not adding significantly
to plant size. While we've seen some price increases announced,
particularly for chemicals, paper, and aluminum, it's not clear that
they are going to stick because there has been some customer
reluctance to accept them. So, we may see a rollback of some of those
price increases.
On the retail side, sales appear to have remained very strong
in January after what turned out to be a surprisingly good Christmas
season. Price discounting in the District was less prevalent than
last year, particularly in the post-holiday period. And inventories
are now quite lean. While retail demand is good and was good during
the holiday season, we did have over-expansion in this area and that
has led three chains in the Atlanta market to close during the last
few months. Office vacancy rates in the District seem to be a little
lower than elsewhere in the nation but on the housing side we are

2/7-8/89

-14-

seeing weakness both in starts and in sales.
That's evident in
several cities around the Southeast but especially in Atlanta.
Migration has proceeded at a lower pace than earlier in the expansion
due to strong labor markets elsewhere in the country; and builders who
had been planning for stronger population growth are now having some
difficulty. The weakness in demand for lumber resulting from the
housing weakness has been offset by stronger export sales that have
helped to sustain activity in the lumber industry. We're hearing
reports that wage gains are expected to be in the 4 to 6 percent area,
and there are going to be some important labor contracts up for
renewal this year. And we hear, as most other people do, that the
sharp increase in the cost of benefits is putting quite a bit of
pressure on costs generally. On the agricultural side, we too are
getting very nervous about the water situation. We've had a drought
in the Southeast basically for the last four or five years. And, we
have not had winter rains as we should have had and that is making
farmers and others extremely nervous.
This is anecdotal, but I've
also heard reports recently about increases in export prices by
manufacturers who seem anxious to take advantage of the profit
situation rather than to seek to expand market share.
I think that's
somewhat disturbing and [would concern me] if that were to become a
national trend.
On the national scene we have very few differences with the
Greenbook forecast. We might have some divergence in 1990 but not
very much. We continue to think that there is momentum in the
economy, that we are operating above our potential, and that the
vulnerability is on the inflation side.
So, while our inflation
forecast for 1989 is roughly the same as the one shown in the
Greenbook, my own personal view is that the economy is vulnerable to
higher prices rather than to lower.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Stern.

MR. STERN. With regard to the District economy, the
expansion in the District remains very solid at this point in time.
The fourth quarter probably turned out better than many people had
expected. Retail sales--these are [reports] from a major retailer-were distinctly stronger in December and in January than we might have
expected. And there is, by the way, a major expansion in the paper
industry underway in the District in a variety of locations.
Looking at the national economy, if I compare our model's
forecast to the Greenbook I would have to say that our model's
forecast is more favorable in the sense that it has somewhat more
rapid economic growth with basically stable rates of inflation--at
recent levels--and stable interest rates. Having said that, I think
there is a message there that's similar to the Greenbook message: that
is, that if you want to get the rate of inflation down it's going to
take more than prevailing interest rates to accomplish that--or at
least there is a relatively high probability that that's the case.
If
I look at the data as the Greenbook does on compensation, producer
prices, consumer prices, and so on for the last year I think there
clearly was a deterioration in the cost and price picture. My concern
is that that might well continue.
I would admit that to date we have
had less inflation than I would have expected, given the growth in the
economy and pressures as I perceive them on capacity. But having said
that, we still have more inflation than I would like to see.

2/7-8/89

-15-

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Boehne.

MR. BOEHNE.
The middle Atlantic states continue to be
characterized by a high level of economic activity. Labor markets are
getting tighter. Even in Pennsylvania the rate of unemployment is
well under the national rate for the first time in a long, long time;
New Jersey and Delaware have been there now for several years. Wage
increases tend to be higher than in the nation as a whole,
The most noticeable area of
particularly I think at the lower end.
softening is in the real estate area.
As far as the nation is concerned, I think the economy is
It has more of a head of steam than I thought a
growing too rapidly.
couple of months ago and perhaps hoped a couple of months ago. As a
result, the vulnerabilities to inflation seem higher to me now than
I think this kind of a situation
they did just a meeting or so ago.
does require a response from us, but that's the topic of tomorrow. As
for our forecast, we're within the central tendency although at the
upper side of that.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Governor Angell.

MR. ANGELL. It seems to me that the most noteworthy
development in the U.S. economy has been the slow growth of the money
stock--no matter what measure you use--over the last two year's time.
Having watched those figures for many, many years it seems rather
unusual to have--if you take the staff's forecast through February,
for example--the growth rate [of M2] over a two-year period at an
annual rate of about 4.3 percent. The growth rate over the last full
year was about 4.3 percent and the growth rate over the last half year
I just have never seen such stable money growth
was about 3 percent.
I recall that in 1986 there was
of M2 in years of observing it.
considerable talk about whether or not the fast money growth was
actually going to offset the deflationary experience that we had. I
think there were quite a few of us who believed that it would. Maybe
it took a while to do it but when it did, it did it with a clear
impact upon both exchange rates and commodity prices. This time
around it seems to me that the flow of money growth is being reflected
in exchange rates much more rapidly, of course, than it is being
reflected in commodity prices. It has been a very puzzling
experience. As Don and Ted very well know, my own view is that if we
continue with growth of the money stock as we are forecasting, the
problem we may have in that environment--with regard to exchange
rates--is too strong a dollar. But I would think that that dollar
strength, in terms of overall economic developments, might provide the
slack needed; that might very well be the antidote that is needed.
Even though the drought maybe added not so much to the grain prices
but somewhat more to the vegetable and fruit prices, it seems to me
that the impact of the drought on commodity prices has delayed any
turning point signal by commodity prices. It looks to me as if we're
now getting a leading signal in commodity prices in that we're finally
getting a declining rate of change.
I don't mean by that that I think
monetary policy ought to be adjusted because, indeed, unless commodity
prices come down from the level where they now are I think we're quite
likely to build in a much higher rate of inflation in the wage
patterns that prevail.
The only way to escape that is probably by
having some decline in commodity prices.
But I guess I'm somewhat
encouraged by the trend of substitutes, such as ownership of other

2/7-8/89

-16-

currencies or ownership of gold. Frankly, I would feel still better
if the price of gold reaches $350 an ounce.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Hoskins.

MR. HOSKINS. The fourth quarter in the Fourth District
really was no surprise at all; it was similar to the rest of the year.
It has been a very consistent story throughout the year; our economy
didn't slow much during the summer and it didn't slow early in the
year.
Much like the situation in the unemployment rate there are
[unintelligible] for all of them for the first time in a long time.
That means service jobs but some on the manufacturing side.
In
discussions with manufacturers in the District we hear that they are
operating at very high levels but are very reluctant to add new
capacity. They are willing to run with higher inventories because
they are operating at levels that are going to result in more
breakdowns.
But they are not ready to make the investments yet.
The
only weakness in the District is in Cincinnati and that was the
football team!
MS. SEGER.
MR. HOSKINS.
MS. SEGER.

But look at what it did for the economy.
Pardon me?
Look at what it did for the economy--all the beer

sales!
MR. HOSKINS. We don't have much to say regarding the
Greenbook forecast, which is very similar to ours, particularly for
1989.
In 1990 we have a somewhat lower inflation rate than the
Greenbook because we think a change in compensation practices as well
as a continuous clearly announced policy with respect to inflation
[unintelligible].
As we look at it now, we think that will have some
favorable impacts in 1990 and going forward [if we] can do what the
Greenbook implies when dealing with interest rates.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Vice Chairman.

VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN. My general view of the economy, Mr.
Chairman, hasn't changed at all from what it has been at recent
meetings in that I still think the risks are distinctly asymmetric on
the side of too much growth and too much inflation. I still don't see
any compelling evidence--as a matter of fact I don't see much evidence
at all, at least at this moment--of the much needed moderation in the
rate of growth in the domestic economy in particular.
In terms of the
outlook for 1989, our forecast is very similar to the Greenbook
forecast, even in most of the details, insofar as real GNP growth is
concerned.
Our inflation rate is higher and indeed is a tad outside
the central tendency as listed in the charts.
[Our forecast for] 1990
is a very different story, which I'll come back to in a minute. But
leaving aside 1990, when I look at the situation right now I guess my
It is up a bit really for two reasons, and
anxiety level is up a bit.
they both relate to things that one could say about the economy and so
on in public and other forums. For example, I got very used to
saying, when asked--and I thought I could say it without my nose
growing--that the underlying inflation rate was in the 4 to 4-1/2
I don't think I can say that anymore without my nose
percent range.
growing. When I look at all of the wage and price data, especially

2/7-8/89

-17-

from the fourth quarter, I think we now have to say that the inflation
rate is, at best, in the 4-1/2 percent range. But certainly you'd
have to drop that 4 to 4-1/2 percent out of that statement to have any
credibility, much less--at least by my standards--intellectual honesty
with yourself. Indeed, I think the range of the conpensation-type
statistics, again with some emphasis on the fourth quarter, are
particularly [alarming] in that regard. The other thing that I think
we all parroted with some frequency in the recent past is a sense of
comfort with respect to the external adjustment process, both in terms
of what has happened and what lies out there in the future. And this
is where 1990 is looming very large in my thinking.
I don't consider that there's any such thing as a true
forecast for 1990, with all due respect, Mike. I think we can all go
through some arithmetic; and I think of it more as arithmetic than a
forecast. But if you look at the arithmetic that was done in New York
versus the arithmetic that was done here for 1990 you get a very, very
dramatic difference. While we have an economy that's growing at a
somewhat stronger rate than the Greenbook, we have the trade account
and the current account adjustment process not only stopping but
reversing: the trade deficit actually increases and the current
account deficit actually increases. Now, in an approximate sense, the
arithmetic reasons for that--I emphasize the arithmetic as opposed to
the forecasting--are fundamentally due to two things. Our foreign
growth assumptions are almost identical. We do have a relatively
small difference in the exchange rate: we have the real exchange rate
unchanged whereas Ted, I think, has something like an 8 percent real
depreciation. But that's not what really drives the thing. The big
difference is that in Ted's and Mike's numbers for 1990 they have a
very significant slowdown in the U.S. economy. When you look at their
numbers versus our numbers, it's not the exchange rate and it's not
the foreign growth that really makes the decisive difference in terms
of whether that external adjustment process can continue with at least
the right algebraic sign in 1990. That to me raises an even larger
question, which Tom Melzer touched on a bit when he made reference to
policy. And the question is: With anything roughly resembling the
kind of exchange rates that are in either of those sets of arithmetic,
can you get material progress over the next several years on an
external adjustment process without a significant slowing in the rate
of growth of the domestic economy? And if you can't, what does that
imply in terms of the risks of a significant accident of one kind or
another developing over that time frame?
I really think that the
horns of that dilemma are getting sharper and sharper, because if you
think of it in terms of the exchange rate it's quite clear what it
seems to imply. But the implications of that implication can be
pretty nasty in their own right in terms of domestic interest rates
and domestic financial market conditions. You can put it in the
context of financing requirements; even with Mike's and Ted's combined
1989-90 current account deficits of $240 billion, we end up 1990 with
net external liabilities in balance sheet terms of something like 13
percent of GNP. Those numbers are getting very, very large. So, Mr.
Chairman, I don't know the way out of this box but when I think out
beyond 1989 in the context of the kinds of issues that I just raised I
must say that I'm not as optimistic as others about the inflation
outlook. As I said, my anxiety level is getting pretty high.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Guffey.

2/7-8/89

-18-

MR. GUFFEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On the District level,
the District economy has continued to improve but at a slow pace-slower, certainly, than the national average. The recoveries in the
agricultural and manufacturing sectors continue and the higher oil
prices that have fallen out of the late 1988 OPEC agreement have
provided some stability to the energy sector.
In agriculture we are
concerned about another year of drought; a more immediate concern is
this cold weather.
For those livestock producers that rely upon farm
ponds, for example--since they were not replenished during the past
year and with the very cold weather those freeze solid--that means
there is no water. As a result, some livestock will be sent to market
under those conditions, which will accelerate this drawdown on the red
meat supplies in the future and push up prices perhaps.
With regard to the energy sector, while prices have firmed
somewhat, the uncertainty surrounding whether or not OPEC will be able
to fulfill the agreement still scares people away from investing
substantial sums and putting down new wells or exploring for new
reserves.
In the manufacturing sector there are two really notable
developments.
One is in the automobile manufacturing assembly area
where all of the plants--and Missouri, for example, would be the
second biggest assembly area in the [country] after Michigan--are
operating at a full two-shift operation. And there appears to be no
slowdown in demand. On the other hand, general aviation concluded
1988 with significant increases in their billings, generally as a
result of export demand for general aviation products.
The
interesting report on construction in the District is that the value
of nonresidential construction in the District rose rather sharply in
December and was about 33 percent above the year-earlier level. On
the other hand, residential construction has fallen slightly and is
By and large the financial
somewhat below the year-earlier level.
economic activity within the District is rather good with the
exception of those areas such as Oklahoma that have been depressed;
they are still sort of on the bottom with respect not only to
employment but also to overhang on nonresidential construction-commercial building, for example. But by and large the District is in
pretty good shape and continues to improve.
With respect to the outlook for the national economy,
adopting the interest rate projections that are used by the staff, we
come out virtually identically, with some minor differences. We have
consumption a little higher and inventories a bit lower during 1989.
But by and large we would be in the middle of the projections for the
Committee members as a whole. There is a concern, at least on my
part, with respect to prices--that is, inflation in the period coming
up.
In the services sector, for example, the benefits tacked on to
otherwise projected wage increases give a strong indication that the
I'd rather be
risk is for higher prices rather than lower prices.
ahead of the curve than behind the curve. And the increase in
interest rates that is incorporated in our outlook as well as in the
Board staff's outlook seems to be quite reasonable to me.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Governor Heller.

MR. HELLER. Thank you. I think we should probably look a
little at the longer horizon because we have to set up long-run
targets.
In the outlook projected in the Greenbook, about a year from
now you see a very, very [pronounced] weakening of the economy in

2/7-8/89

-19-

virtually every single sector except exports, which are still holding
up. Growth slows down to the less than 1 percent range, close to a
zero rate. The simulations that we've run also show that that holds
true as a pattern even if you hold current policy very much constant.
I agree with the comments made earlier that we are not behind the
curve as far as the financial markets are concerned. We have a very
strong dollar; we have some significant commodity prices actually
dropping; we have a yield curve that points to low inflationary
expectations. So that, combined with the very low monetary growth,
which Governor Angell already talked about at great length, makes me
think that we're actually looking at a significant slowdown a year
from now, or for the horizon that we can still influence--the next
quarter or two being in the bag. I have one other observation and
that relates to foreign concerns, especially in Europe. There's a lot
of concern about our tightening probably too much and the dollar
becoming too strong over the immediate period ahead, thereby impairing
the external adjustment process that is important for that. Thanks.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Governor Johnson.

MR. JOHNSON. I have a perspective similar to Governor
Heller's. I'm just looking at a lot of different things here. First,
on the unit labor cost side, I realize we've had some acceleration
this year; but looking at the charts on the handout we're not at the
rate that existed at the end of 1986. And then there was a
deceleration in 1987 with some fairly strong growth in the rate of
unit labor costs. So I don't think there's anything given about an
acceleration in unit labor costs. If you look at the pattern, it has
been fairly sawtoothed since 1984 on this chart; it doesn't show any
sign of any particular direction. Compensation is up because of nonwage compensation but I don't know whether that will continue. Wages
are still in pretty good shape, so I don't think there's any
accelerating trend on the wage front if non-wage compensation doesn't
continue to accelerate.
On the employment side, we've had some strong employment
numbers. But I went back and looked at some of the previous periods
and turning points. The obvious one is in 1984 when growth was very
strong in the first half and then the economy slipped down to 2-1/2
percent and then below 2 percent in the second half of the year. We
had payroll employment growth averaging over 300,000 all the way
through November, even after we hit the turning point; so I'm not sure
we're going to get any leading signals out of the employment numbers.
And there is something else interesting: over the two-year period in
which we averaged about 2-1/2 percent real growth average payroll
employment was about 240,000 per month. Now, that doesn't say a whole
lot for productivity growth, I admit; but still, I'm not sure what we
can read out of the employment growth numbers.
There are some other signs of slowing that I see even looking
at the charts. We have a much slower pattern of new orders, looking
at the charts in the nondefense capital goods area; I know that
excludes aircraft, but that's a volatile element we're assuming aside.
Vender performance has been improving. Export growth has slowed,
thank heaven; it has slowed from a rapid pace, but it certainly has
slowed. Surveys of plant and equipment spending for 1989 are lower
and that's showing in the numbers; from purchasing managers' reports
it certainly looks like things are slowing. And surveys of other

-20-

2/7-8/89

outside forecasts that have been made indicate that they're similar to
the Greenbook's, with some even a little weaker. But the important
thing is that most of them assume lower interest rate patterns even
from here. They certainly don't assume the interest rate path that we
have built into the Greenbook. The Bluechip forecast, which is sort
of a consensus forecast, has a similar pattern of growth in inflation
but that forecast actually has the funds rate declining later this
year. So, you get a similar path with a totally different set of
interest rate assumptions than ours.
Other people have pointed out the financial indicators. Real
M2 growth and nominal M2 growth are both very modest; real M2 growth
is even negative. The yield curve is inverted. Long bonds are quite
well behaved; long-bond rates are well below the funds rate,
especially on a coupon basis. There are certainly no signs of
accelerating inflationary expectations in the financial markets in
commodity prices, bonds, or the dollar. One thing that worries me a
good bit, too, is the fact that a critical part of the Greenbook
forecast is the dollar forecast. That depreciation in the dollar, as
I said, [accounts] for three quarters of a percent of the growth rate
in 1990 and that's assuming about a 10 or 13 percent dollar
depreciation. And that is assumed in spite of the fact that we're
assuming about a 1-1/2 percentage point appreciation in short-term
interest rates from current levels. Not only that, but the interest
rate appreciation we assume is not matched by foreign interest rates.
So I see no way, with relative interest rate appreciation in the
United States compared to other countries, that you can possibly have
I
a dollar depreciation with that kind of pattern of interest rates.
think if you turn that dollar path around you get a totally different
picture out of the Greenbook forecast. It was pointed out in some of
the alternatives--if you look at the one that assumes no change in the
dollar, and I wouldn't even bet on that with the kind of interest rate
path we have built into the Greenbook--that if you don't accelerate
money growth to offset the impact on the real sector you get
substantially weaker growth and moderation in the inflation rate from
these levels. That's a scenario that looks more plausible to me than
the one we have built in there. So I would say, trying to take into
account those lags and being conscious of some of these other
possibilities, that we ought to be very cautious about them.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Governor Kelley.

MR. KELLEY. Mr. Chairman, I have some concern about becoming
too much of a Johnny one-note in this Committee when I speak but I
would like to reiterate my point that we [should] look at monetary
policy in a very broad context of the overall picture of the United
States--its social and political and indeed international course and
the economic mix. I think there are some very major problems in the
United States, and indeed in the world, that could be severely
exacerbated if we are too aggressive, too fast: S&Ls, LDCs, the budget
deficit and what could happen to it under several different kinds of
scenarios. And I think that our anti-inflationary efforts, to which
we all subscribe, deserve to be considered in that larger context. In
the meantime, for now it seems to me that as far as inflation fighting
goes there are some pretty good things going on. The dollar is
behaving very well; the aggregates continue to be very slow, which is
good; everybody, I believe, is pleasantly surprised at the
sluggishness of inflation relative to what they might have expected

2/7-8/89

-21-

given what they saw going on a few months ago.
I'm not necessarily
convinced that it's baked in the cake that we won't continue to be
pleasantly surprised. In short, I think we very well may need to do
more as time goes on and, of course, we should watch that very
carefully. But for the moment it seems to me that things are going as
well as they could and we should be quite careful not to create more
problems than are already out there in the world, perhaps influenced
by this body but not directly under the aegis of this body.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Governor Seger.

MS. SEGER.
I just want to add a couple of points to those
made by Governors Heller and Johnson along the lines that some of the
forecasts of people on the outside seem to be somewhat different from
ours.
The purchasing managers' survey and the Bluechip forecast were
mentioned before. This morning I had breakfast with some business
economists representing a wide range of companies-forest
products company, a large energy company, two chemical companies,
these kinds of outfits--and to a person they don't see the capacity
shortages that we all wring our hands over.
They also certainly are
pleased that their businesses are doing well but they don't sense a
[boom] taking place.
They are expecting prices of the raw materials
that they will purchase this year to increase but at a mere fraction
of the increase of last year. And they also are expecting some
slowing down. One fellow who couldn't attend, the chief economist of
I mention this because we often mention
sent me a fax.
as an example of a rust belt outfit that shaped up and is
I'm certainly not going to read the whole fax but let
now doing well.
He said business has slowed down and is
me just read selections.
declining in housing-related construction, with about one-third of
models on allocation compared to well over one-half early last year.
The allocated models are large machines associated with a worldwide
mining boom. Industry is never tooled for these peaks; it would leave
too much idle capacity in softer times.
It's customary to stretch
delivery. Then he says that sales outside the United States are up 33
percent over the last year but that business is beginning to slow down
in Europe.
Then he talks about materials prices being up less than
the PPI and he expects that to continue; suppliers are asking for
bigger increases but their target is less than national inflation.
Also, I got something from the National Association of Home
Builders. They have a forecast of housing starts of 800,000--a figure
800,000 below ours for 1989--and a proportional decline in multifamily
versus single-family starts. And they are only assuming an additional
1/2 percentage point increase in long rates, specifically mortgage
rates. The third thing that I haven't heard people mention is the
impact of the restructuring.
It seems to me that I read that General
Motors is going to be closing a plant near Boston, so maybe that will
help the labor shortage there; that's going to throw about 3,000
people in [the labor pool].
And it takes 6 hamburger flippers to be
equivalent [in pay] to one of the jobs of those laid off. Xerox will
be laying off 2,000 in Rochester; that ought to help Jerry's area.
Also, I haven't heard anybody allude to the thrift mess and the impact
that might have on the overall economy.
I can't prove it, but I sense
that if it isn't handled promptly and smoothly there could be a
negative impact. Furthermore, as Mike Kelley suggested, if we tighten
too much--if interest rates move still higher--we could also make the
mess worse than it now is, taking some of the modestly solvent and

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2/7-8/89

profitable thrifts and throwing them over on the other pile. Also, to
reiterate, the monetary growth numbers are good; at least as I read
them, they are about the best since I've been here. I haven't been
able to quantify the impact of higher interest rates on monthly
installment loan payments as more and more variable rate loans are
used, but I just cannot imagine that it's not going to take place. We
now have had enough of a rise in the short rates to which many of
these instruments are tied that I would think [the rate adjustments]
would start kicking into effect and would produce higher monthly
payments. Maybe everyone who signed on to one of these instruments
had their monthly incomes advance as fast; if that's the case, they're
lucky. But for those who didn't, they aren't represented by
in their negotiations. Perhaps they will have to cover their
higher payments on these loans by cutting back on something else. So,
I guess I'm just not convinced that the forecast in here is in the
bag. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Governor LaWare.

MR. LAWARE. I agree with large parts of what several people
have said here. I share the skepticism with regard to how the dollar
can depreciate to the extent that it is forecasted to do, given the
kind of interest rate scenario that we've adopted. And in that
context then one begins to get worried about whether we can continue
to make the favorable progress in external adjustments without that
trend from the dollar. I agree with most of what Governor Johnson
said, but I'm a little more worried in that I think there has been
some lag with regard to prices and wages that we're beginning to see
bubble up. And I get worried that we may not be staying ahead of the
curve anymore in that connection--that we may see some real
inflationary pressures emerging from wages and prices that are now
beginning to come up as a result of things that have happened before.
So, that would argue for the constraint that is argued for here.
On the other hand, I'm very concerned about the fact that
there are some significant signs of a turndown in parts of this
operation. I think that the energy price forecast--and Ted and I have
talked about this several times--is a little dicey. That could be
higher. I'm concerned about the things that Mike [Kelley] talked
about; he and I have sounded kind of like a broken record in the
discussions between us over the last several meetings of this group on
those issues. The thrifts are not only going to get hit with this
interest rate increase but on top of that they are also going to get
an increase in their assessment under their insurance operations. So
I'm very concerned that in our zeal to try to reverse inflation that
we don't unconsciously create stagflation with a very low growth rate
or maybe even a negative rate, while at the same time we have these
other factors catching up with us and we see some real upward pressure
on prices and wages. So I'm with Governor Johnson; I think we ought
to be very cautious about what we do at this particular moment in
time.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Syron.

MR. SYRON. Let me start out with the thrift issue. First of
all, I think the point is well taken in terms of the effect of rates
in the short run on thrifts. Figures I looked at for the savings and
loan industry as a whole show about a negative 17 percent gap. So a

2/7-8/89

-23-

50 basis point increase in rates roughly costs them about $1 billion
of their capital. One could assume, under current circumstances, that
that translates roughly to what has to be done in terms of giving
assistance. But I think that there is a difference between the short
term and the long term in the sense that it doesn't obviate our need
to take steps that prevent inflation from getting further out of hand
as time goes on because--and I'm sure the staff has done some work on
this--you have the linear function of what it costs the thrifts as
rates rise. Also, many of the largest thrift institutions have hedges
that are humped in the sense that they may be feeling well protected
going out 150 - 200 basis points even when they get into residuals
going back, say, for 100 basis points.
But these hedges fall off a
cliff if one gets into a situation where you get very dramatic
So I think that's
increases, or decreases for that matter, in rates.
something that has to be factored into the equation when you're
looking at the thrifts.
What I have to say about our view of the real economy is
We have
probably quite redundant to what many other people have said.
very little difference with the Greenbook forecast. We do come out
somewhat higher on the inflation side; we come out actually slightly
out of the central tendency area on that. That has to do with the
impact we expect the rate of growth will have on the unemployment
rate. But to be honest, that's probably related in part to our own
experience in the region. We do feel that the risks are quite
asymmetric--that's the New England pronunciation for asymmetric, I
guess--but they're doubly asymmetric in the sense that we may get more
inflation and then we think the difficulties of dealing with these
issues may be harder if we get into an inflationary situation. But
this is to be discussed tomorrow.
As far as the region goes, we are seeing some softness,
relatively, in New England. Not to contradict what I said before, but
I think the reason that we're seeing some softness is because we
really had a boom for a long period of time. If you look at
Massachusetts for example--and Massachusetts is half of New England-per capita income in the state now is 123 percent of the national
average whereas in 1975 it was 103 percent.
If you were to adjust for
relative costs it really would have been below that. Consistent with
that, wages have been rising quite rapidly. When Bob [Boykin] talked
about Louisiana [I was reminded of] some work we had done looking at
manufacturing cross sectional data on hourly earnings versus the
unemployment rate in manufacturing. States that are the highest are
all the New England states.
Louisiana has to be one of the states
that was lowest, consistent with what he was saying. And the local
price level, if one wants to assign any real weight to that given the
smallness of the sample, shows that prices are rising at about a 6.3
percent overall rate in the greater Boston area. Now, I think it's
interesting that southern New England is doing much more poorly--or
it's starting to do more poorly--than northern New England, which
experienced some of this relative prosperity later on.
The only
industry that we have right now in southern New England that is doing
better than nationally is the construction industry, which happens to
come fairly late in the regional business cycle. And we do have a
quite soft real estate market. But the lessons--if there are any-that I draw from this for the national economy are that the problems
that we have in the region are the result of having grown very, very
strongly for a period of time at a pace that was not sustainable. And

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2/7-8/89

maybe that influences our view of the approach one should take to
policy nationally.
MR. LAWARE.
[unintelligible].
MR. SYRON.

I'm certainly glad you didn't pronounce it

I used to until last year.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Let me just add a few things relevant to
the meetings of the G-7, which I think relate in part to some of the
questions with respect to the international adjustment process.
The
thing I found rather surprising in the talk among the central bankers,
especially the ministers, is what I would call a relatively laid-back
attitude on the issue of the international adjustment process slowing
down. When the issue of reversal surfaced they clearly thought that
that would be a problem but few of them really were concerned about a
reversal and none about a slowing down, from which I conclude that
there is a fairly considerable willingness on the part of these
countries both in their private and public sectors to absorb
And I think, as Ted mentioned,
liabilities against the United States.
that they are sort of delighted with the surpluses and the effect of
the claims, especially the buildup of the claims, in an almost
I suspect, however, that a goodly part of
mercantilistic power sense.
that reflects the fact that the dollar instead of going straight down
and creating large capital losses has been kicking around over the
It's a two-way street. And
last year and has essentially been flat.
hence, the negative attitude toward holding dollar-denominated
I think the two
obligations I think has faded very dramatically.
upticks in the dollar in the summer and again here have created a
really clear change in the fears relative to the adjustment process.
It's very obvious that it can't go on indefinitely, but I think it is
an important short-term event which suggests to me that the type of
crisis that Jerry is worried about is not [likely] in the short term.
It's an intermediate problem and one which I think could lull us for a
while; but I do think we have to be a little careful about it.
Secondly, as Bob Heller mentioned, there is some concern
about the impact of the level of interest rates in the world--or more
exactly the level of U.S. interest rates and, therefore, the strength
of the dollar--because there is a vague laid-backness about the
stalling of the adjustment process. But there is a latent fear that
it could begin to reverse and I think that would accumulate into a
fairly significant set of concerns amongst finance ministers, and to a
much lesser extent central bank governors, who have been largely
supportive of general strengthening. The process I think is
I
particularly pronounced amongst the
--clearly they have been
certainly don't get it

foursquare about moving

interest rates up very sharply--nor

do I get it very much obviously in a number of the central banks. But
there's a vague mild division that's beginning to emerge--leaving
--between the finance ministers on the one side and the
central bank governors on the other with respect to the issue of
international monetary tightening. The central bank governors, I
think pretty much uniformly, have been very supportive of us; whereas
finance ministers, for reasons I don't have to get into, are less
But at the moment the issue is
enthusiastic about interest rates.
The only strong
really very mild; there are no strong reactions.
reaction I saw in the G-7 meeting was when

2/7-8/89

-25-

But the
rest of the session was relatively pleasant.
So at the moment I would
say that one finds a remarkable degree of tranquility in the
international outlook as perceived amongst the industrial countries.
And I do not get the impression from the governors that they are in an
aggressively tightening mode--in other words, after the Germans moved
on the Lombard and discount rates.
One gets the impression that the
sequence that occurred as a consequence of that has slowed down
somewhat, at least if you listen to the oral remarks.
I don't know
how long that is going to last and what it's saying, but one does not
get the sense of a continuous process moving.
It's getting close to
break time and I think we're pretty much on schedule, so I guess
there's no reason why we cannot meet as scheduled at 9:30 a.m.
tomorrow morning.
So, unless anybody has a problem-[Meeting recessed]

2/7-8/89

-26-

February 8, 1989--Morning Session
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Let me start off by requesting that each
individual President and Governor try to get a final revised forecast
for the Humphrey-Hawkins series to us prior to 3 p.m. on Friday,
If there is any difficulty--if
February 10 if that's at all possible.
there is some slippage, as I suspect is probable--let's try to get
them in as quickly as we can. That will save a lot of trouble and
work in the process.
MR. BOYKIN.

Mr. Chairman, has the date of the testimony been

set yet?
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Yes it has.
It's the 21st and 22nd. We
are now to a point where Mr. Kohn will discuss the longer-run ranges
for the aggregates.
MR. KOHN.
Appendix.]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

[Statement--see

Any questions for Mr. Kohn?

Lee.

MR. HOSKINS.
Don, in your discussion about the multi-year
problem, which I think you laid out nicely in terms of whether we
stick with 3 to 7 percent or go to something else, obviously there are
advantages on both sides.
One is that we can march down the
aggregates--at least the top end--consistently over time to
demonstrate to people that we're serious about our policy. But that
doesn't fit very well with the interest-sensitivity of M2 these days.
You might want to argue that if we get [unintelligible] centering the
1989 target on 2-1/2 percent and going from 1 to 4 percent or on 3-1/2
percent with 1 to 5 percent and then next year having to say that it's
going to go back to 3 to 7 percent or something like that--we have to
explain that.
In that context, if we were to choose to go that way,
did the staff consider going to multi-year targeting now instead of in
July?
We will do 1990, I think, in July.
So, if we were to go that
route, it might make some sense to put out two sets of targets.
If we
were going to go to one, would we adjust M2 to reflect the interestsensitivity?
MR. KOHN. We did not consider that, President Hoskins.
I
think there is something to be said for looking out over longer
horizons.
On the other hand, I remember the Committee discussion of
last July in which there was some resistance to setting ranges for the
next year because of the uncertainties involved in specifying those
ranges even 6 months ahead of time. So I think it cuts both ways.
It's really hard to know where you're going to be at the end of 1989
in terms of setting ranges that might be appropriate for 1990,
although we've taken our best guess in this forecast.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Black.

MR. BLACK. Mr. Chairman, Don did such an excellent job of
outlining various alternatives and he answered most any question I
might have. But I do have one little simple question that I'd like to
ask. Do you personally, Don, have more respect for the price
projections made by your big model or by your single-equation model
that stems from that very excellent memo we got back in November of

2/7-8/89

-27-

last year?

I guess that tells you which one I have the most respect

for.
MR. KOHN.

with Mr. Prell.

I have to see what's happening at my back here

But I actually--

MR. BLACK.

When you're winning something--

MR. PRELL.

I know where he lives.

MR. KOHN.

I think in terms of the short run--over the next

year or two--I would have more confidence in the staff's projections
for inflation on the grounds that they take account of certain factors
that are important.
I think the reason that the P star [P*] model, as
we call it, came in with lower inflation rates for the same money
growth is that it didn't take account of factors that are important in
the year-to-year rates of inflation. In this case I'm thinking of the
energy price impact on the early part of 1989 and particularly the
assumed dollar depreciation effect on prices in the latter part of
1989 and 1990.
Those things clearly aren't taken account of in that
P* model in which prices depend solely on money, adjusted for trend
velocity and output. So, I would have some confidence in that model
as giving some sense of where those money supplies might be taking us
over extended periods of time. But if you asked me which inflation
forecast I would have most confidence in for 1989 or 1990 I think I
would say the staff forecast, given the additional information they
bring to that forecasting process.
MR. BLACK.

I wouldn't want to--

MR. PRELL.
I would like to underscore that the comparison
you were making was not totally accurate in that the base line, or
what was presented in the Bluebook, is the staff's judgmental
forecast.
MR. KOHN.

Right.

MR. PRELL. We use the large models, in fact a combination of
several models, to create all the alternatives from that base line.
MR. BLACK. Yes, I realize that.
I didn't mean to
oversimplify.
I would have equal confidence for 1989 since they
project the same inflation figures that I did; there was very little
difference.
MR. KOHN. The lesson I took from the P* model was that if we
had M2 growth like we were talking about--in the 3-1/2 to 5 or 6
percent range or something lower--we would be putting some downward
pressure on the inflation rate over time more with strategy II than
strategy I. But even the staff's strategy, which doesn't give you
much of a payoff in the short run, is putting into place conditions
that will provide at least some payoff over the long run.
So when we
ran that model, even though the results weren't the same, I took a
little comfort in that, in my view, it didn't contradict the
underlying thrust of the staff forecast.
MR. BLACK.

They are pretty close.

2/7-8/89

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CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Governor Angell.

MR. ANGELL. Don, I noticed and was pleased that your longrun strategies really were based on M2, with hardly any discussion of
M3 or nonfinancial debt. Have you and your staff given specific
thought to dropping the M3 targeting?
MR. KOHN. We have not.
I think in the past the Committee
has found it useful to have more than one target given the different
kinds of information embodied in the different aggregates.
Obviously,
[we would] if the Committee were to instruct us that it was their
choice to go to one aggregate. But it seems to me that you would lose
a little information that you get from the growth of a broader
I would hesitate to focus so narrowly on
aggregate or credit or debt.
any particular aggregate in terms of announcing targets to the public,
even though we have keyed our forecasting exercises off either
interest rates or the exchange rate or M2 as a target variable.
MR. ANGELL. Mr. Chairman, I think I should stop now;
otherwise, it probably wouldn't seem like a question.
MR. KOHN.

Already I wonder.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Parry.

MR. PARRY. Mr. Chairman, at your July testimony I recall a
sense of the [Congressional] Committee that they wanted us to narrow
the range and also to choose the range where the midpoint was equal to
our forecast. How much pressure do you think there is for that and
how do you personally feel [about that]?
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Well, I think that may have been to a
large extent Senator Proxmire. I'll find out in a couple of weeks.
On the other hand, acquiescing to that would develop into a very tough
request. Rather than even suggesting that we thought they were
interested or even that we might try to meet that request, I would
just as soon go up there making believe I didn't hear anything and
then wait and see what happens.
MR. PARRY.

Okay.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Governor Seger.

MS. SEGER. I want to make sure I heard right what you were
saying about our long-term objective for monetary policy relative to
what the Humphrey-Hawkins Act had in mind. Are you suggesting that
we're not subject to their-MR. KOHN.
MS. SEGER.

No, no, not at all.
Okay.

MR. KOHN. In fact, I was trying to use that to reinforce the
notion that that's an appropriate long-run objective for the central
bank. The Humphrey-Hawkins [language] includes reasonable price
stability as one of the objectives of that Act.

2/7-8/89

MS. SEGER. But you said it doesn't have it as number one,
which is the way I saw the Act also.
MR. KOHN. Unfortunately, I guess, from that perspective it
says that one shouldn't necessarily hit that if it interferes with 3
percent unemployment. But it does list it in any number of places.
The whole sentence-MS. SEGER. Oh yes, I understand that. But it sounded as
though we were departing from what they had in mind, but maybe it's
just too early in the morning.
MR. ANGELL.

But that would be nice.

MS. SEGER. Oh you really want to be popular! My second
question is sort of a variation on my question yesterday about
covering a standstill policy. You say that alternative "I" here would
encompass the Greenbook forecast of further tightening, right?
MR. KOHN.

That's correct.

MS. SEGER. In our list of alternative forecasts, Mike said
that we had one that would be a continuation of the existing, or
constant--

MR. KOHN.

Constant nominal interest rates.

MS. SEGER.
MR. KOHN.

Yes, right.
He gave that in his briefing.
Okay.

MS. SEGER.

Where does that fit into these?

MR. KOHN. That would require faster money growth than even
the strategy III. For example, I think Mike said 7 percentage points
more M2 growth by the end of 1991, whereas this has only 3 percentage
points more M2 growth by the end of 1991.
MR. PRELL. The number we have here is 3/4 of a percentage
point faster in 1989 and 2-1/2 points in 1990 and then another 3-1/2
points in the next year.
MR. JOHNSON.

What velocity assumptions go with that?

MR. PRELL. No velocity assumptions go with it, but one could
calculate velocities roughly from these real GNP and price numbers
that we have here. Doing it rapidly in my head it looks like a drift
toward declining velocity.
MR. KOHN. My guess is that velocities would decline over the
next year or so as offering rates caught up to the flat market rates,
reducing opportunity costs and enhancing the demand for M2. Once that
equilibrium was reached then M2 velocity would essentially be
unchanged.
MR. JOHNSON.

MR. KOHN.

Right.

But it would decline over the--

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2/7-8/89

MR. PRELL. Yes.
I guess there would actually be a small
velocity increase in 1990-91.
MR. KOHN. It's probably a function of the way the model
cycles the offering rates and the market-MR. JOHNSON. But a decline in the rate of change--in the
growth rate of velocities--right?
MR. PRELL. Well, basically we've got stable short-term
interest rates, so we don't get any meaningful velocity movement one
way or the other. And as you look out over time--after you get
through the lagged effects of past interest rate changes moving the
velocity--as the stable rates are essentially reflected in the deposit
rates, you wouldn't expect big movements in velocity.
MR. JOHNSON.
I was just thinking that I would expect the
rate of growth maybe to settle down to the zero rate.
MR. PRELL.

Right.

MR. KOHN. Eventually it would end up there, yes.
But first
there probably would be an increase early this year, given the lagged
effects.
Then it probably would come off; I'm sure it would.
It
would have this humped shape as the offering rates caught up with the
[market] rates.
Possibly you'd find at some point a leveling off.
MS. SEGER. I still sense, though, that there's an option
missing here. You have number "I," which is your base line, which is
tightening, right?
You have number "II," which is additional
tightening.
MR. KOHN.
MS. SEGER.
MR. KOHN.
MS. SEGER.

Right.
And you have number "III,"

which is easing.

Number "III" was less money growth.
Well, at least that's what you read.

MR. KOHN. Excuse me, more money growth.
I didn't have a
constant interest rate option in here in part because Mike had one in
his briefing.
I thought rather than replicating the options I would
have one that was somewhere in between constant interest rates and the
staff's rising interest rate forecast. And that was my option three.
It's easier than the staff forecast but it does not keep nominal
interest rates unchanged from current levels over the near term,
although the movements in rates aren't very large. There still would
be some upward movement in rates over the year, but not much.
MS. SEGER.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Black.

MR. BLACK.
I was just going to indicate my support for what
Governor Angell was saying. But I'm wondering if the Humphrey-Hawkins
wording precludes our focusing on one aggregate since it says "provide

2/7-8/89

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for the rate of increase or diminution in aggregates" or something
like that.

MR. PRELL.

It says money and credit aggregates.

MR. BLACK.

Aggregates.

MR. PRELL.

You probably have to have a credit measure of

some sort unless you could persuade them that it was built into this.

It's in the text.
MR. BLACK. I guess, then, that you wouldn't have to have M3.
I thought maybe you would since it says money and credit. If you had
one of each I think you could meet the definition as such. I support
it even--

MR. PARRY. Except last July they wanted us to add one.
didn't want us to subtract one last year.

They

MR. BLACK. Yes, I know. But I was just thinking about the
correct thing to do [according to the Act], not what Congress wanted
[in July].
MR. MELZER.
MR. BLACK.
SPEAKER(?).
MR. BLACK.

You could swap the base for M3.
Yes, well-It could be M2 [unintelligible]

and credit.

I would favor that.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Hoskins.

MR. HOSKINS. Don, I have a question about your earlier
statement with respect to the credibility of Federal Reserve policy.
You said it was important that we have credibility and that we pursue
it; you said that we probably gained some credibility along the way as
judged by the financial markets. I guess I have some concerns about
not picking a specific objective over time. My concerns are as
follows and I'd like you to respond to them. We are asking the
markets and the public in general to trust us on two levels now: on
the objective and on how we're going to implement it. We have an
objective out there someplace called price stability that we may trade
off against anything else at any point in time. I think we might be
able to increase our credibility to some extent if we could at least
pin down the objective and then just ask them to trust us on how we
implement it, because we're having trouble with the aggregates or
interest rates or commodity prices.
MR. KOHN. I think we--the Chairman in particular in recent
testimonies--put out a very strong statement about our objective and
backed it with reasons why price stability is our objective, without
necessarily saying [we plan to achieve that] by the year 1993 or
something like that. In my view, it's a debatable point.
I raised
the issue in part to stimulate the debate. There are dangers in
putting out various specific objectives--2 percent or 1 percent or
even zero, whatever zero is in reality, by 1992 or 1993--because of
the problems that arise when you miss it, and so forth. So I think we

2/7-8/89

-32-

can continue to make strong statements and back it up with actions.
Ultimately, as someone was saying, credibility grows out of the barrel
of an open market operation. It's what we do more than what we say-read our actions rather than our lips--that sets scores on
credibility. And as we act over time with that in mind I don't think
there's a problem--or there's less of a problem.
MR. HOSKINS. Just one other comment. I think what Martha
was alluding to, if I'm correct, was that we are not paying sufficient
attention perhaps to the other parts in the Humphrey-Hawkins Act.
MS. SEGER. No, I was just picking up on what I thought Don
said was in the Humphrey-Hawkins Act. I didn't write HumphreyHawkins, but as it was written they put a higher priority on the
employment side of things and mentioned price stability. I was just
saying from Don's comment that it sounded to me as if we were
establishing priorities that were divergent from what Humphrey-Hawkins
had. That's all I was saying.
MR. HOSKINS. I would say we're consistent with it. If we
pursue price stability then we will pursue maximum employment. I
don't see any inconsistency there.
MR. KOHN.

That's the way it happens.

MS. SEGER. May I pick up on the credibility issue? It
bothers me to hear over and over again that we somehow or other just
have to satisfy the financial markets. I'm very respectful of the
financial markets but it's a big country out there and there are a lot
more Main Streets than there are Wall Streets. And I think the
screaming meemees up there shouldn't be the ones who dictate to us.
Establishing credibility is a much broader challenge. We have to
convince all sorts of people above and beyond the financial market
types even though they are the ones-MR. HOSKINS. That was the reason I mentioned financial
markets and the public.
MR. BLACK.
financial markets.

Right.

MS. SEGER.

Right.

MR. HOSKINS.
MR. BLACK.

You should have said the public and

I'll say it now.
You learned your lesson.

MR. ANGELL. Martha, this is the first time I've ever heard
anyone here act as if Mr. Greider in The Secrets of the Temple has the
right notion.
MS. SEGER.

I don't know; I'm not Mr. Greider.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Are there any further questions of Don?
If not, I would like to get the tour de table on people's views as to
where we should come out. I just marginally prefer staying where we
are, mainly, I must say because I'd like us to be able to go down
again next year. I like the sequence of going down but I'm not sure

-33-

2/7-8/89

it makes all that much difference which of these two we choose.
somebody like to start off?
Governor Johnson.

Would

MR. JOHNSON. Yes.
I'll start off by saying that I prefer
that same option for a couple of reasons.
One is that it's still a
full percentage point reduction in the midpoint of the range from what
we had last year, which I think is a stronger statement than we
normally make.
Going from a 4 to 8 percent range to a 3 to 7 percent
range is a strong statement by historical standards.
I realize that
M2 growth, certainly if the interest rate scenario that we follow ends
us being close to the Greenbook forecast, puts us closer to the bottom
of that range. But that interest rate path assumption is an extreme
case, in my opinion. And that's allowed for in the 3 to 7 percent
range; it still leaves us 1/2 percentage point above the [bottom of
the] range, based on our estimates of M2 growth. I think it's
possible that we may hit a peak in interest rates at some point this
year short of what the staff has forecast.
If interest rates
stabilize, or even fall because of some weakness in the economy or
whatever else we run into, we could see more M2 growth. Certainly
that would be offset by the velocity adjustments to that and we would
want to be able to allow for that.
It seems to me that a 3 to 7
percent range accommodates all those specific concerns. As Don
pointed out, the one thing it doesn't seem to accommodate is an even
tighter policy than may be allowed for in the Greenbook forecast.
In
that case, I think we'd see much slower M2 growth. But I think that
outcome is very unlikely and 3 to 7 percent or something like that
fits clearly into my point of view. I even think that's a pretty
strong statement in and of itself: 3 to 7 percent.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Governor Heller.

MR. HELLER. I agree with the Chairman. I think we should
consistently, gradually, lower the targets.
We shouldn't try to fine
tune the long-term ranges.
So I'd be in favor of the tentative
targets, alternative "I."
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Parry.

MR. PARRY. I would support the 3 to 7 percent as well.
What
would concern me about going to the lower range is if we had to raise
it next year.
I think that could be confusing to the public and the
Congress, especially since the Greenbook forecast--and our forecast as
well--is that inflation rates actually could be a bit higher in 1990.
So it seems to me that we would maintain an extra degree of
flexibility if we were to stay with the 3 to 7 percent range and try
to explain after the fact why perhaps it does end up in the lower end
of that range.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Yes, that's a good point.

Governor

Angell.
MR. ANGELL.
I also favor the 3 to 7 percent, although I
think one could make a case in the other direction. The reason that I
would stay at 3 to 7 percent is that it seems to me there is some
chance--I don't know whether the probability is 20 percent or what,
but there is some chance--that we will encounter a commodity price
deflation during 1989 or 1990.
If that occurred we might very well
have short-term rates of 9-1/2 percent and long-term rates of 8

2/7-8/89

-34-

percent. And I don't know how the monetary aggregates would respond
in that environment. Don, do you know what would happen? We would
get a slightly faster growth if we had that kind of twist, would we
not?
MR. KOHN.

Yes, I think so, right.

In 1990 or some time?

MR. ANGELL. Well, I don't know when and I don't know
whether; I'm just suggesting that possibility. And it seems to me
that it's very important that we not get in the position of having to
increase those ranges.
I do believe that long-run price stability
does require us at some point in time to move down to 2 to 6 percent
and maybe eventually to 1 to 5 percent.
But I really believe we
[should] get there by a slow and progressive, sound, patient stance-not by one which in a sense tries to whipsaw the events. So, I
believe there's a great deal of merit in our staying with the 3 to 7
percent.
I would remark in regard to M3 that I believe that the 4
percentage point range that we now have provides ample room for the
Committee to engage in its monetary policy actions. As far as I'm
concerned, having multiple aggregates is simply a way of not being
accountable. I can understand why the Federal Reserve at first did
not want to be accountable in regard to having too narrow a focus.
But I think it's misleading because I don't hear anyone who says that
they believe M3 is all that superior to, say, Ml.
I do believe that
we watch and monitor M1 and I'd prefer just to monitor M3.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Forrestal.

MR. FORRESTAL. Mr. Chairman, I come out somewhat differently
It's
I'd like to go back to the credibility argument.
on this issue.
apparent to me that our credibility is really very good, not only in
the financial markets but with the public.
I don't know how you
measure the public en masse but certainly they are represented by
those in the Congress and people in my District who really are giving
us high marks for monetary policy.
I think it's very important that
that credibility be maintained and I think the Chairman's recent
testimonies have certainly reinforced our credibility.
It's very
important that we continue to reaffirm our commitment to price
stability over time and that suggests to me that we need to lower the
ranges.
Granted, we did lower them 1 percentage point with respect to
M2 in July. But we have tightened policy since then.
It seems to me,
given the staff forecast for the growth of M2, that we could run the
danger--if we have to tighten further--of being below a range of 3 to
7 percent.
In order to have that flexibility my preference actually
would be 2 to 6 percent, but that may be a bit extreme in the short
run.
Just as an aside, it seems to me that using the 1/2 points
suggests a degree of precision that I'm not sure we have.
So, 2 to 6
percent would be kind of an ultimate preference for me; but I'd be
willing to accept what's described as alternative "II" in the
Bluebook, 2-1/2 to 6-1/2 percent.
I think that gives us two very
important things: 1) flexibility on the down side given the projected
growth of M2; and 2)reinforcement of our commitment to fighting
inflation. That really backs up with action what the Chairman said
earlier to the Congress. M3 I would leave at 3 to 7 percent, and I
agree with Governor Angell that it probably doesn't make that much
difference.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Melzer.

2/7-8/89

-35-

I
MR. MELZER. I favor the 3 to 7 percent [range for M2].
have one comment: Don, you pointed out the language in the directive
and I just don't know whether it's appropriate for us to be qualifying
I agree
all the aggregates in the context of the longer-term ranges.
with what you said in terms of intermeeting [developments] and how you
interpret them. But to some extent, that sort of runs in the other
direction. In other words we have put M1 on the bench; and if
somebody looks at this cynically, in effect, this language begins to
I think
put some of the broader aggregates potentially on the bench.
we already have the flexibility, should it become necessary, to miss
the target ranges--and that would most likely be on the low end this
year--and to explain it.
So I don't know whether I would add that
language there; that is the question I would raise.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Stern.

I think the case for alternative "II" is a strong
MR. STERN.
one.
Bob Forrestal made part of it: given the staff forecast of M2
and the GNP forecast and so forth, that does get us closer to the
center of that particular range. That is, if M2 is going to grow
something in the neighborhood of 3-1/2 percent, that range is just
more appropriate in its own right. But beyond that, we've had modest
growth in M2 in both 1987 and 1988. Against that background, it
doesn't seem to me that an upper end of that range as high as 7
percent for 1989 is appropriate. I must say, finally, that as far as
considering possible ranges for 1990 and what we might want to do next
But I think what
year, I don't know how that's all going to play out.
we can say with some confidence is that if we're committed to price
stability over time we're going to want to see modest growth in M2
I don't expect that we're going to run into
again in 1990.
difficulty. Therefore, if we move to 2-1/2 to 6-1/2 [unintelligible].
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Boehne.

MR. BOEHNE. Well, I think on substantive grounds it probably
doesn't make a lot of difference whether it's alternative "I" or
alternative "II" or something in between where we would lower the top
end or narrow the range. However, for posturing purposes, I favor
alternative "I" largely because I think it already has made a
statement.
Manley made that point and I also think alternative "I"
makes a statement.
It gives us room to move down next year, which I
think is important for longer-term targeting.
It just provides
additional flexibility. On the issue of whether we ought to have
fewer or more aggregates, we can have too many and have too few. I
think we're better off not to limit ourselves to one. We've been
doing this now for 13 or 14 years and over that period if we've found
out anything it is that what looks good in one period doesn't look so
good in another. As long as we can pick and choose internally it's
easier, I think, to deal with that than to try to go out and explain
why we add one or why we drop one.
I think the last 13 or 14 years
underscore the wisdom of having a bit of a buffet to choose from.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Black.

MR. BLACK. Mr. Chairman, I think you put your finger on it
when you said the question was really whether we would have to raise
the range the next time we look at it.
So, I don't feel very strongly
about either one of these alternatives. But I do have some preference

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2/7-8/89

for alternative "II" because I see the basic function of setting these
targets as being that of reassuring the public about our antiinflationary resolve.
If we assume we have to have a 4 percentage
point spread or something like that in the ranges because of the
sensitivity of M2 to declining interest rates or rising interest
rates, that suggests to me that what we're really after eventually is
And I
a range of about 1/2 to 4-1/2 percent or something like that.
think we're in a position now that we could take that additional step.
The upper part of the alternative "II" range would be 6-1/2 percent;
and if we could take these figures at face value on M2 that should
give us sufficient flexibility, even with a declining rate of growth
and a drop in short-term rates in 1990, to still hit this 5 percent
rate with some room to spare--and to hit the 6 percent in 1991 with
some room to spare. Like Gary Stern, I don't think we would really
I
have to end up raising that but it's not a do or die issue with me.
could go with either one, but I do have that preference because I
think we can take a good step now without much risk.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Syron.

MR. SYRON.
I favor 3 to 7 percent because of my personal
It seems to me, coming back to the
weighing of the alternative risks.
credibility issue, that the damage to our credibility if we stay with
3 to 7 percent and come in below the range this year is far less--I
shouldn't say far less--it is less than what the cost might be if we
In either case we would
were to have to raise the range next year.
So, I would favor staying with 3 to 7 percent and
have to explain it.
if we felt that it was possible, given unknown changes of velocity and
given what's going on in the financial markets, we might make a
comment about the thrift situation in what's said [in the testimony].
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Keehn.

MR. KEEHN. Mr. Chairman, for the reasons that I think have
been well covered I'd favor the preliminary ranges under alternative
"I." Having reduced the preliminary ranges as much as we did last
July, it seems to me that to reduce them further at this point has a
signal effect that may contain more than we intend. And if, as seems
likely, we end up in the lower part of the M2 range for the year it
seems to me that's an issue you can very well cover in your testimony.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Hoskins.

Yes, I'd like to associate myself with the
MR. HOSKINS.
comments of Gary Stern and Bob Forrestal in terms of their preference
I am troubled by
for something like 2 to 6 or 2-1/2 to 6-1/2 percent.
breaking with tradition; I think tradition is important. We've done a
good job in terms of marching the upper end of the M2 range down year
But in terms of
after year; I think there's a lot of value to that.
the substance of policy, given where the staff forecast says we've got
to go--and I concur with that forecast--then the range is skewed in
I would be comfortable, I guess, with "III" if
the wrong direction.
we were clear in the testimony that we were going to come out at the
bottom end of that range. And if we don't come out at the bottom of
the range we probably will not have tightened enough.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Guffey.

2/7-8/89

-37-

MR. GUFFEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think credibility is
important.
I think we've established credibility and it is important
to keep it. As I look at what we did in July in projecting for 1989-that is, taking a full percentage point off of both the upper and
lower limits--I'm not persuaded that hitting it again at this point
another 1/2 percentage point or so as, say, is suggested in
alternative "II" is either (1) necessary or (2) desirable, given the
staff's projections in the Greenbook. Lastly, it seems to me that the
opportunity to move down somewhat again next year, given what we hope
will happen, is important. And if we take that extra cut now I think
it limits somewhat our ability to go down next year given the
projection for somewhat greater growth in M2 through 1990.
So I would
stick with alternative "I," 3 to 7 percent.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Boykin.

MR. BOYKIN. Mr. Chairman, my preference would be for
alternative "II," primarily for the reason that we feel we would be at
If we really believe
the lower part of the [alternative "I"] range.
that, it seems to me we ought to establish a range that gets a little
more centered. Also, my impression is that there has been less
difficulty in explaining overruns than underruns. And, at least the
way I look at the long-run strategies--if you look at what happens to
inflation and if there is a relationship between money growth and
inflation--then it seems to me we aren't really doing very much over
the next three years or so where inflation is concerned. The comment
was that the rhetoric has been good because [unintelligible] and look
It seems to me that if we
at what we do as opposed to what we say.
also confirm what we say with what we actually do, then that enhances
our credibility. Keeping inflation at the current levels, or even at
projected levels as we're looking at it through 1991, seems to me
almost to create the impression that we're accepting that as the norm.
And I have problems with that.
So my preference would be to go to
alternative "II."
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Governor Kelley.

MR. KELLEY. Mr. Chairman, I favor alternative "I."
I think
that with the 4 percentage point bands we have plenty of room to
conduct policy either with number "I" or number "II."
For that reason
I wouldn't be upset with "II;" but in the interest of longer-term
flexibility in the out period, as you suggested early on, I think it
makes sense to move this in a more gentle manner.
I would also
restate what Governor Johnson said early on: if we do alternative "I"
here we are lowering it by 1 full percentage point, which I think has
plenty of message effect for now and leaves us the flexibility we'll
need to do more easily what may be necessary as time goes on.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Governor Seger.

MS. SEGER. Now that I know the actual results [for the
economy] and also what happened to monetary growth in 1988, I'm
willing to support the preliminary ranges, which would be alternative
"I." For M2, of course, it does remove a full percentage point at
both ends of the [1988] range, which in my judgment is a sufficient
message to the doubting Thomases. Secondly, I would suggest that
we're measuring from a point that is below the midpoint; the actual
growth in 1988 came out below the midpoint of the range for last year.

-38-

2/7-8/89

And so it
measuring
from each
should be

seems to me we're picking up a little there, simply in
from a lower base. On M3, again, taking a half point off
end in conjunction with the full point off the M2 range
sufficient to convince our followers.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Governor LaWare.

MR. LAWARE. I support alternative "I" for most of the
reasons cited. But I can't refrain from making a comment on the
credibility issue. I think we miss some of the environment here if we
congratulate ourselves too much on the credibility that we presently
enjoy and assume that that's because we are seen as fearless inflation
fighters. We are seen and applauded for that only so long as nobody
else gets hurt in the process of our fighting inflation. If we were
to go out there and really beat inflation over the head and in the
process increase the unemployment rate or dump the economy in some
fashion I think that our credibility would disappear overnight.
People would forget that we were inflation fighters and label us as
the black knights who have ruined people's lives. So, I like the 3 to
7 percent range because I think it gives enough room for policy
alternatives in managing all these different variables in a time when
I'm still unconvinced, as I mentioned yesterday, about just what the
tea leaves are really saying.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Vice Chairman.

VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN. I would support the original
formulation that you put on the table, Mr. Chairman, with one caveat.
In round numbers--and Don you can help me with this--the midpoint of
the range for M2 implies an absolute growth of M2 of something like
$140 billion. Is it something like that?
MR. KOHN.

It must be something like that.

VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN. The caveat gets to this thrift
industry issue. The great bulk of money that was going to be
disintermediated out of the thrifts as a result of the Bush plan was
In fact, in the short run almost all
going to be brokered deposits.
of it would be brokered deposits. If those deposits are all in M2
because they're all under $100,000 but they all come from Wall Street,
I think it's quite likely that a very significant fraction of the
money that comes out of the thrifts due to the shrinkage of deposits
will not find its way back into depositories, or perhaps even into M2
instruments. And I think that somehow or other, Don, we're going to
have to try to figure out a way to keep track of that because it does
seem to me possible that if you think in terms of the absolute growth
of M2 of whatever it is, $140 billion-MR. KOHN.

It's $160 billion or so.

VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN.
SPEAKER(?).

Pardon me?

$161 billion.

VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN. --$161 billion, whatever. It's
quite possible, as I think about it, that that phenomenon could have a
significant effect on the dollar change that's implied here. I don't

-39-

2/7-8/89

know quite what that means but if we saw $30 or $40 or $50 billion
that's now in M2 through brokered deposits-CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

That could easily happen.

VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN.
MR. ANGELL.

Yes.

Here comes M2a.

VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN. I don't like to be difficult, Wayne,
but I think we've got to do something.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
I think what you're suggesting is that
in the Humphrey-Hawkins report and in testimony we ought to have a few
sentences on exactly that issue.
VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN. Yes.
But, Don, I think we ought to
try to figure out some way that we could try to keep track of that
because it's conceivable to me that-MR. KOHN. Well, we'll look into this a bit.
that it went into money funds, of course-VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN.

To the extent

It's a big part of the implied M2

growth.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
into money funds.

Well, a lot of that, I guess, would go

MS. SEGER. Yes, but commercial paper wouldn't be picked up
in M2 or T-Bills wouldn't be picked up in M2.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Oh no, no.

VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN.

Some money deposits are and some

aren't.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Yes. A good chunk is likely not to go
back into depository institutions, there's no question.
MR. KOHN. It's not clear what the preference was for.
If
they were looking for federally insured deposits then they would have
to go back to a depository institution.
VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN.

Yes, but it kind of--

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Well, they are looking at federally
insured deposits at a certain rate. It's the equivalent of getting-VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN.
of it, I think, is so important.

That's why this brokered money facet
I'm not sure that it's--

MR. GUFFEY.

What are the alternatives other than money

SPEAKER(?).

Treasury securities.

MR. GUFFEY.

Government securities.

funds?

-40-

2/7-8/89

MS.

SEGER.

Commercial paper, T-Bills.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Commercial paper.

MR. JOHNSON.
If it's the savings part of M2 it could just as
easily go into T-Bills.
MR. BLACK.

Right.

MR. JOHNSON.

It doesn't have to go into transaction

accounts.
MR. KOHN. We have made a small allowance for this,
indirectly, by presuming that the average offering rates on M2 remain
damped. And the average offering rates include, obviously, the
I doubt
brokered deposit offering rates and we factored that through.
that we've captured the full impact, as Jerry has implied, but-VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN. A lot of this stuff is not household
money. It's broken up into $100,000 pieces, but it isn't household
money; it's hot money.
MR. BLACK. Well, I think it's amply true what Jerry was
But they
saying about those [depositors] who initially come out.
spend that money buying something else; it moves into the hands of
So you've got to go beyond that and ask: What are
some other people.
And it might well come back into deposits
they going to do with that?
in some form.
MR. ANGELL. But don't jump to the conclusion that all the
$100,000 money is going to go, because with the present spread between
$100,000 jumbo CDs and the others it is still lower cost money for
institutions who really look at the brick and mortar costs of raising
So it's not all going to go in that-the other kind of CDs.
VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN.
discussion, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
important point.

I didn't mean to discombobulate this

Yes, but I think it's actually an

MR. PARRY. I think that an adjustment has been made. At
least in the quantitative work we did we got a faster growth of M2
I don't know the extent of it, but I think
just using the model.
there has been an adjustment made to reflect the fact that these
deposit rates, in terms of offering rates on M2 instruments, have been
very sluggish.
I don't know if you quantified the adjustments you
made but I think it was in there when you had the 3, 3-1/2-MR. KOHN. We ran a couple different types of simulations of
how these offering rates would behave and they all shaved about 1/2
percentage point or a little more off of our model forecast.
MR. PARRY.
MR. KOHN.

Right.
And that's the 3-1/2; it is about a half--

-41-

2/7-8/89

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. No, but Jerry's raising a different
point.
It's not an issue of what the forecast is; it's what the 3 to
In fact, one of the
7 percent means and how one interprets it.
elements involved in the forecast is that if we took M2 and grossed it
And I think
up for the thrift thing it would be higher in the cone.
that we are interpreting the 3 to 7 percent to mean the grossing up-making the adjustment for the loss of brokered deposits.
In other
Well, our target is 3 to
words, the question is: What is our target?
7 percent after we add back, I presume, an estimate of brokered
deposits. That's what it means.
MR. ANGELL. Mr. Chairman, I would also like to be included
among those who prefer a kind of strategy "II" with a 3 to 7 percent
range. That is, it does seem to me that it's important for us to
create expectations that--if conditions unveil as the staff has
forecast--we do anticipate staying very close to the bottom of the
range.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Well, before we vote, does anybody have
any problem with the directive language on pages 20 and 21 in the
Very specifically, what is the Committee's view of the
Bluebook?
alternative at the end of the middle paragraph on page 21?
MR. HELLER.

What if you just drop it?

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

You mean the paragraph itself?
We didn't have a Ml, so--

MR. HELLER.

Yes.

MR. KELLEY.

It has been repeated many times.

MR. HELLER.

Yes, repeated many times.

MR. ANGELL.

Yes, I think that's a good idea.

MR. HELLER.

So just drop it.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Anybody have any objection to dropping

it?
VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN. I have no problem dropping the M1
reference but I think the last sentence is still important.
SPEAKER(?).

Yes.

MR. ANGELL. Well, we could say "The behavior of all the
monetary aggregates will be evaluated...."
MR. JOHNSON.

Yes, that's an important sentence.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
sentence but drop the--

Okay.

Why don't we keep the last

MR. ANGELL. But do we want to say "The behavior of all the
monetary aggregates will be evaluated in...."
MR. JOHNSON.

Of the aggregates.

-42-

2/7-8/89

MR. KELLEY.

That's the

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

[unintelligible]

language.

Plural?

MR. ANGELL.

Right.

MR. HELLER.

The capitalized language.

MR. KELLEY.

Yes.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Taking a rough score it appears that
there is a significant weighting towards alternative "I," so why don't
I officially put that up for a formal vote.
MR. ANGELL. I guess I wonder why we're saying "establish."
We've never "established." Why wouldn't it be appropriate to say that
we lowered the ranges?
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

We don't do that?

MR. ANGELL. We don't say we've lowered the ranges, do we?
This is the first time that we've really officially lowered the 1989
ranges.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Well, tentatively we had; we just
published the 3 to 7 percent. Do you mean officially?
MR. ANGELL.

Well, those July ranges were just tentative.

MR. BOEHNE. What about "[The Committee] reaffirmed its
decision of last July to lower..."?
MR. ANGELL.

I like that.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

That's good.

MR. BERNARD. Reading, starting with the second sentence on
page 20: "In furtherance of these objectives the Committee at this
meeting reaffirmed its decision"--actually it wasn't in July it was in
late June--so it's "of late June."
MR. HELLER.
MR. BERNARD.
MR. HELLER.
MR. BERNARD.

Well, just "its decision."
Or "its decision to--"
"To lower."
--"to lower the ranges for growth of M2 and M3

to ranges of 3 to 7 percent and 3-1/2 to 7-1/2 percent, respectively,
measured from the fourth quarter of 1988 to the fourth quarter of
1989. The monitoring range for growth of total domestic nonfinancial
debt was set at 6-1/2 to 10-1/2 percent for the year." And on page 21
I take it that the sentence on Ml will be dropped and the paragraph
would continue: "The behavior of the monetary aggregates will continue
to be evaluated in the light of movements in their velocities,
developments in the economy and financial markets, and the nature of
emerging price pressures."

2/7-8/89

-43-

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Okay, call the role.

MR. HOSKINS. Point of clarification.
In terms of your
testimony, if we opt to put in this 3 to 7 percent is it with no
caveats?
Or is the testimony putting in the table and then [saying we
expect to] come out at the bottom of the range?
MR. JOHNSON.

I would prefer not to say that.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Say what?
I'm just trying to--.
I've
forgotten what we've done in the past.
Do we actually forecast?
MR. KOHN. We've often said that we expect growth in the
middle of the ranges.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
or instead of-MR. KOHN.

We have said in the middle of the ranges

Well, in the past when we put ranges out we have--

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Well, one of the problems in forecasting
where we expect M2 to be in the range is that it enables somebody to
work backwards to what our funds rate projections are. And I'm not
sure we want to do that.
MR. JOHNSON.

Well, let's--

MR. PARRY. Why don't you just spend a little time talking
about the potential impact of developments: the savings and loan
industry-I think that would be done in any
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Yes.
event.
But I think Lee is raising the question as to what we are
forecasting in the ranges that we're adopting.
MR. PRELL. Mr. Chairman, one could remark that we're low at
this point in part because of the lagged effects of previous interest
rate changes.
So that might give you some leverage to get some of
that--

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Well, I think that in the testimony we
will be discussing some of the aspects of where M2 is going. But I
don't think we want to be all that specific about where it relates to
our forecasts of policy from here forward. Now to the extent that
there are lagged effects, Lee, I think that does suggest that we're in
the lower end in the beginning no matter what. But I don't want to go
much beyond that.
MR. JOHNSON. You can always say that if it's necessary to
take interest rates higher we will end up at the low end or if
interest rates stabilize or go lower we'll end up in the upper part.
SPEAKER(?).

Why say that?

MR. JOHNSON. Well, we don't have to say it. But I'm just
saying that we could say there's some basis for why we would end up in
different places.

-44-

2/7-8/89

That explains why you have ranges in the first

MR. KELLEY.
place.

VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN. Having watched the Chairman on [TV]
the other night, I'm quite confident that he'll be able to--

MR. JOHNSON.

I'm not worried.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Mr. Chairman, there's one other phrase that I'd

MR. ANGELL.

like to call to the
Norm read--"and the
statement, it seems
prefer that to read

Committee's attention--the very last phrase that
nature of emerging price pressures."
That
to me, is a very defensive statement. I would
"and progress toward price level stability."

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
MR. BERNARD.
MR. ANGELL.

I'll mumble my way through!

I think that's an excellent suggestion.

"Progress toward price level stability"?
"And progress toward price level stability."

MR. HELLER. Well, since we're discussing it, don't we want
to move that further to the front end of that sentence?
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
MR. ANGELL.

No, I think that--

I think it has the finishing--

MR. BLACK. [If it is] first in the operational paragraph,
Bob, that may be sufficient. I agree with your sentiments, but in the
operational paragraph-MR. HELLER.

Well, just to make it consistent.

MR. BOYKIN. It seems to me that if we do that, which I would
favor, then on page 20 that very first sentence should say "The
Federal Open Market Committee seeks monetary and financial conditions
that will foster price stability"--we say "over time."
Why don't we
strike "over time"? Our objective is to foster price stability. And
then with what Governor Angell is suggesting that confirms it because
here we are setting our objectives. As for that "over time" we've
been at it a long time.
SPEAKER(?).

Time is running out!

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

I'd buy that.

MR. ANGELL.

I buy that, too.

MR. BOYKIN.

Really, we prefer--

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Can we take a formal vote?

MR. BERNARD.
Chairman Greenspan
Vice Chairman Corrigan
Governor Angell

Yes
Yes
Yes

2/7-8/89

-45-

President Black
President Forrestal
Governor Heller
President Hoskins
Governor Johnson
Governor Kelley
Governor LaWare
President Parry
Governor Seger
VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
That's an easy one.

Don, will you take up the short-term

part?
MR. KOHN.

You want me to take you to the coffee break.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
MR. KOHN.

We could manage to do that.

[Statement--see Appendix.]

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Okay. Thank you, Don.
coffee and then resume after a short break.

Let's break for

[Coffee break]
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
MR. MELZER.

Could we ask questions of Don?

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
MR. MELZER.

I'd like to start off with--

Oh, I'm sorry!

Certainly.

I didn't mean to cut you off.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

I just wanted--

It was unintentional.

SPEAKER(?).

Carry on.

SPEAKER(?).

Forget your question?

MR. MELZER.

Maybe I should!

SPEAKER(?).

I hope this is a good one.

MR. MELZER. Don, you talked about the instability of the
borrowing function. You mentioned that normally there's about a $400
million difference per 100 basis point difference--in terms of what's
transpiring now versus what historical relationships might have
produced. My question is: What is the potential for somehow really
getting a surprise?
In other words, I think the Desk has dealt very
effectively with the kind of instabilities we have had, but what is
the prospect of something much more dramatic than that in terms of a
change in the propensity to borrow? I wonder because the spread may
get to the point where banks figure, what the heck, we haven't had a
problem with discipline at the window. Do you worry about that at
all?

-46-

2/7-8/89

MR. KOHN. Well, not in the last six months or so. The
borrowing has been so low for wide spreads that for whatever reasons-and we talked about this last time--it is particularly the small banks
that are most surprising in the way they are staying out of the
window. Whether it's their liquidity, whether they're concerned about
the thrift crisis and do not want to be seen at the discount window
given concerns about depository institutions, or what, I don't know.
But I guess I don't have any expectations at all that that's going to
reverse on us with a big rush or that if it began to reverse we
wouldn't detect it pretty quickly and be able to take it into account.
MR. MELZER.

So you're not overly concerned about that

prospect?
window?

MR. KOHN.
No.

About a big rush of borrowing at the discount

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Governor Seger.

MS. SEGER. Would it be possible to make the case at this
point, given this continued uncertainty about the relationship, that
we should engage more directly in targeting fed funds rather than
having the flexibility in operations of the Desk?
MR. KOHN. Well, I would say that that's a decision for the
Committee. My proposal was that this flexible approach, which in
effect is a blending of the two approaches, continue. The Desk has
reacted, I think, when funds have gotten way out of line from
Committee expectations. But it hasn't [zeroed] in very closely on a
very narrow range for fed funds; it is also paying attention to the
borrowing function. But it isn't captive to it if it looks like it's
going to push the funds rate way out of whack with what the Committee
expects. So, it's an approach that I think has enabled us to have
more flexibility than the very narrow focus on the funds rate might
allow but at the same time hasn't gotten us too far away for too long
from what the Committee expects. Federal funds, as Peter said, have
been running the last couple of maintenance periods a bit over 9
percent. I think the last Bluebook said 8-7/8 to 9 percent; we're
talking about a difference of 10 or 15 basis points here, maybe. So I
don't think that's too far out of line.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Any other questions? Well, why don't I
start us off on the current policy recommendation problems. Having
looked at the economy for many years, I frankly don't recall an
economy that at least on the surface looks more balanced than the one
that we have--in other words one which is characterized by very little
evidence of excess inventory accumulation. We're not getting big
bulges in capacity or construction which would tend [unintelligible].
Order backlogs are relatively high and there's a certain momentum in
the economy that is very likely to carry us quite a good way. And I
must say to you that it's relatively rare, I think, that the outlook
is as favorable as it is at the current moment. One major worrisome
issue is clearly the acceleration in wage and salary costs that
emerged, really, in the fourth quarter and was partly confirmed in the
average hourly earnings index in January. Considering the fact that
the intermediate product gains in the wholesale price index, excluding
food and fuels, were running .6 or .7 percent but were not passing
through into the final goods prices--very largely because unit labor

2/7-8/89

-47-

costs as a major part of the markup between intermediate materials and
final goods prices were suppressed, and the unit labor costs were
suppressed largely because nominal wage and salary rates were soft--it
is possible that the last several months' movements in wages are an
aberration. But one obviously can't assume that in the context of the
unemployment rate and the tightness of the labor market where it is.
Nonetheless, we do find some interesting signals that are a
little puzzling. I think the economy clearly accelerated through
December; but in the last several weeks there were at least some
signals that are not consistent with the follow-through that we're
looking at. First of all the 408,000 employment increase, judging
from the seasonal factors employed in both construction and retailing,
is probably closer to about 250,000. If we make that adjustment we
may find that perhaps the February or March employment figures will
reverse and actually will [seem] weaker than, in fact, they really
are. Nonetheless, 250,000 is not a bad increase. It's solid and I
think consistent with all of the other elements. And we will be
publishing an industrial production index with an increase of about
1/2 percent for January. So, looking on the employment data side the
first quarter really looks, if anything, stronger than in the
Greenbook. But if you look at the January GNP from the product side
it clearly is a good deal weaker: we're not getting anything
resembling the income side, which is consistent with the employment
side. In other words, the income side in the GNP in the first quarter
is much stronger than is confirmed on the product side. And it's not
clear just how that is going to be resolved. I've been particularly
puzzled by the National Association of Purchasing Managers [NAPM]
January survey, which shows a relatively sharp decline in the rate of
increase in [coming] quarters. As best I can judge, that is not being
picked up in any material I see coming in from the various contacts of
the Banks. Nonetheless, that survey has been very reliable in the
past and has often been the first indication that we have had that the
climate of the economy is changing. I think that's really just too
little information to say very much about it. But it cannot be
dismissed very readily. Similarly, the insured unemployment data are
a little weaker. The figures that came out today showed a further
increase--

MR. PRELL.
forecast?

They didn't come out today, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. They didn't come out today?
They will come out when?
MR. PRELL.

Tomorrow.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
MR. TRUMAN.

That's a

Tomorrow, sorry.

And they will be weaker.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. The ones that are scheduled to come out
tomorrow do at least turn around the extraordinary tightness that
these data had suggested for much of 1988 through fairly recently.
So, we're in a position at this particular stage, temporarily at
least, where we're seeing no signs of general overheating in the sense
that lead times on materials are actually shortening. And, aside from
the wage pressures, which I indicated before are quite worrisome,
we're not yet getting any evidence of inventory acceleration or

2/7-8/89

anything that suggests that we're getting close to the peak of an
overheated economy that is about to tilt down.
My own impression is that we still have a way to go in
tightening. I think the evidence is much too premature to suggest-leaving the forecast mechanisms aside and just looking at the current
state of affairs--that this cycle of tightening that we've been
through is over. But, as Don mentioned, we are running into an odd
problem of limits to our policies--specifically, the fact that as our
credibility builds up and there is a general expectation that
inflation will not emerge despite some of its signs and what we are
getting is a nominal long-term rate that hasn't moved, a real longterm rate that probably has moved up only very modestly, and a problem
in that, in effect, we are restraining the economy very largely
It's very clear that
through higher real short-term interest rates.
we are restraining inventory accumulation, which is a short-term
decision. We obviously are restraining some elements in the capital
goods markets. But I'm not sure how much we are restraining (1) the
housing mortgage market or (2) the capital goods markets, because the
real cost of capital has not gone up that much. In part, that is a
reflection of an expectation both with respect to inflation premiums
and instability premiums that we will in fact contain inflation. And
that's in an odd way unfortunate in that to the extent the markets
believe that what we're doing is right it is making it more difficult
for us.
We are also running into problems with respect to how rapidly
we tighten because of the pattern of M2 growth with or without
adjustment for the thrift problem. The slowness of M2 is corroborated
by exchange rate pressures and the strength in the dollar which, by
any measures that we are involved with, should be somewhat less. With
the types of trade balances we are getting one would assume the dollar
What this
should not be exhibiting the type of strength that it is.
all suggests is the crucial importance of getting the federal budget
deficit down to assist in the process of economic policy--to suppress
the effect of demand elements that are involved and to enhance the
international adjustment process. This issue of getting the deficit
down is becoming increasingly mandatory, as we begin to run into
problems where it becomes clear that monetary policy cannot be the
sole tool with which we are functioning.
I conclude from all of this that the appropriate stance for
the next short-term period would be to start off with alternative "B,"
asymmetric, but with a recognition that, if the pressure on the dollar
that is now there stabilizes or falls and if the current mixed signals
such as the NAPM survey and the insured unemployment numbers do not
indicate early deterioration--in other words, if those signals are
reversed which is probably more likely than not--it would be wise for
the Desk to be instructed to move [borrowing] up $100 million maybe in
In any event, the period until the next
a couple of weeks or so.
meeting is seven weeks and I think this [outlook] is sufficiently
uncertain that I would request that we schedule a telephone conference
And it would be
at the end of this month to review where we are.
helpful, if events are changing in a manner that requires a conference
But I think
earlier, perhaps not to wait as long as that to do this.
we are at a point where--just judging from the analyses that I heard
here yesterday--there are enough differences within this Committee
with respect to the issue of fact as to what's going on that in a

2/7-8/89

-49-

period such as this more frequent consultation is important.
I think
it is very important for the credibility of this Committee to try to
find some consensus as best we can, because even though there's a
large bimodal distribution out there I think we're not that far apart.
And I think it would be very useful if we could find a means to
accommodate each other in such a way that we can have a policy that we
all can essentially go along with, though we all may not feel fully
comfortable with it.
So, I've said my piece, and I throw it out as a
potential set of motions which I'd be curious to get reactions to.
President Syron.
MR. SYRON.

Mr. Chairman, just a clarifying question if I

might?
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Yes.

MR. SYRON. In what you've essentially proposed--alternative
B in the Bluebook--the Bluebook notes that under that alternative some
of the recent rate increases might in fact slip back; we might see
some decline in rates under alternative B.
I take it that in the
approach you're talking about that you would not want that, absent
some signs of weakening in the real economy or some other events in
the international markets-CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Exchange rates.

MR. SYRON.
So I can say that under your proposal you would
not want to see a decline in rates in the short term?
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
MR. SYRON.

Yes, the funds rate.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
MR. SYRON.
MR. ANGELL.
targeting is it?

Do you mean the funds rate?

No, I would not.

Okay.
But that's not a commitment to fed funds rate

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

No, no.

MR. BLACK. He's just saying in the case of inconsistencies
between the borrowing level and the funds rate resolve doubts on the
side of borrowing.
MR. SYRON.

That's essentially correct.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Yes.
a signal of that particular kind.
MR. SYRON.

I think the markets would misread

That's my concern.

MR. MELZER. The funds rate would be 9-1/4 percent roughly?
What funds rate level would that be?
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

I'm sorry.

What?

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2/7-8/89

MR. MELZER.

Slipping back from what level?

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Where we are right now.

MR. MELZER.

9-1/4 percent?

SPEAKER(?).

9-1/8 percent.

MR. JOHNSON.

9 to 9-1/8.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. I would say probably 9-1/8 percent would
be closer. But Governor Heller has the floor.
MR. HELLER.
question but--

No, let that discussion finish first.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
MR. MELZER.

I have no

Did we clarify that?

Yes.

MR. HELLER. I just want to support the same position,
basically. I think real rates are already very high. Money growth is
slowing and we should be patient to see that through. The one area
where I may disagree with you just a little, if I heard you right, is
that you were expressing disappointment that investment wasn't slowing
faster than it actually is.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
MR. HELLER.

Capital investment.

Capital investment isn't slowing faster.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Well, you know--

MR. HELLER. Actually, I like to see high capital investment
because that fills the additional capacity that will hold down
inflation in the future.
it.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Well, there are two ways of looking at
There's good GNP and bad GNP.

MR. HELLER. I think that's good GNP and the more of it the
better it is.
Otherwise, I fully agree with what you said.
MR. BLACK. Our special theme reports suggested that would be
pretty strong, really, if I read that [right].
Is that the way you
read it?
I was very much encouraged by what that seemed to say.
MR. HELLER.
MR. BLACK.
MR. HELLER.

Yes.
And that's good GNP.
And that's good GNP.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Vice Chairman.

VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN.

Well, this is a tough one.

I think

part of this question of Federal Reserve credibility that has been
talked about an awful lot here is related, at least as I see it, to

2/7-8/89

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what I'd like to call institutional harmony. In the interest of
institutional harmony I don't want to rock the boat unduly and I think
I can support the spirit of what you've suggested. My druthers would
be rather distinctly to firm policy right now. But as I said, for
reasons of institutional harmony, I am prepared to try to support the
spirit of what you've said. But, for purposes of my conscience if
nothing else, let me just elaborate a bit further on my underlying
position. As I've said in the past, I try to view the process of
making policy here as a matter of balancing risks. That's the only
way you can do it. Now, I think it is possible, for example, that the
economy could slow down kind of on its own to a path that, even with
current policy, would be broadly consistent with Mike's forecast.

If

it did that I think it would signify that we are lucky as well as
good, because in my judgment it would take a clear stroke of luck to
produce that result--in the sense that I think the risks are on the
other side.

The second point that I feel I must emphasize is the
following: there has been a great deal of discussion around this table
about price stability and moving toward price stability. But as we
sit here the algebraic sign on the inflation rate is unambiguous--it's
It's not neutral, it's not minus, it's plus. The inflation
plus.
rate is going up. And Mike's forecast, which is undoubtedly the most
rigorous that is available to any of us, is saying that as best they
can judge, with current policy the inflation rate is going to go up
more. That's what the forecast says. We can all, and we do, have our
differences of judgment about it. But that's what it says. Now, I
have a bit of trouble reconciling the algebraic sign on the current
inflation rate as being plus. Mike's forecast is on the side of
rising inflation. I look at the financial variables and my problems
get more severe. Take the exchange rate. It seems to me that if you
either want or you have a strong dollar, given where we are right now,
then something else has to give at some point, because in my judgment

the external position that we have and that we have prospectively is
unsustainable. If it's not the dollar something else has to give.
Now what is that other thing going to be? It's going to be the
economy.
Indeed as I said yesterday, taking the long view, I have a
real question in my mind as to whether we can make sustainable

progress on the external adjustment side given any broadly acceptable
pattern of exchange rates without a significant and sustained slowdown
in the rate of growth in the economy. Now, we don't have to answer

that question today; but I think it's out there and it's going to have
to be dealt with sooner or later. So the exchange rate, at least as I
see it, creates quite a conundrum for us right now.
Then I turn to the yield curve. And I, like everybody else,
take an enormous amount of comfort from the yield curve and for what
it seems to imply about Fed credibility--both on Wall Street and Main
Street, in my judgment, Martha. But the crucial question about the
yield curve is: What does it tell us prospectively? What does it tell
us about the future? And I'm just not sure of that. I've looked at
yield curves over a period of time in the United States and in all the
other industrial countries and I'm just not sure. But I think the
crucial question that arises, whether it's based on experience in the
United States or elsewhere, is: Are recessions typically inflation
induced? In other words, does the responsive pattern of recession
that we've seen here and in other countries presage the recession?
Are they inflation induced in that it's the rise in the inflation rate

-52-

2/7-8/89

that gives rise to the tightening of monetary policy, etc.?

And is

that what ultimately trips the economy into recession?
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Excuse me. There's a significant
inventory acceleration accumulation component in it.
VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN. That is correct. But the crucial
question in my judgment--if that is correct which I think it is--is
does the yield curve in any reasonably satisfactory way tell us
anything about future inflation? And I think the answer is no it
doesn't. The yield curve either in the United States or elsewhere has
not been a reliable indicator of future inflation. Indeed, the
evidence seems to cut the other way. And if it has not been a
reliable indicator of future inflation and most recessions are
inflation-induced I am not prepared to bet the mortgage on the signals
that the yield curve are giving off right now, even though obviously
they are very welcomed, at least as we see them. So, I'm sure the
yield curve is telling us a lot of important things. I'm sure we can
and should both benefit from [unintelligible] but I don't think it's
reliable enough historically or intellectually to give me, at least,
enough confidence in terms of [extrapolating] from it to the inflation
rate and to other variables.
Now, the one variable on the financial side that I do have
some confidence in is the money supply, however defined. It is
intellectually not easy to look at the pattern of money growth that we
have had for basically two years now--I guess it's more than two
years--and say to yourself: Is that a pattern of money growth over a
long period of time that is likely to be associated with some further
dramatic escalation in the inflation rate? I think that is what is
giving me some pause. But as I said, Mr. Chairman, overall I can
support your position. But my assessment of the risks is that they
are a bit asymmetric in that direction; that, I think, is clear.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Governor Johnson.

MR. JOHNSON. Thanks. I also support what the Chairman said.
I'm comfortable with maintaining current policy but in an asymmetric
way. I still think the risks potentially are on the up side. I just
think that with the existing information there isn't any basis at this
time for further tightening. We may have to tighten further but I
think we ought to leave that to some sort of discretion, some sort of
judgment about how events unfold as time goes on. Based on today I
certainly don't see that as necessary, for a lot of the reasons that I
said yesterday which I won't go back over again. I do have a view,
though, that on the long end of the yield curve--even though the
nominal rate has come down--we have had a fairly significant
appreciation in long-term real rates. Now, there are different ways
to look at that and I don't want to suggest that any one way is better
than the other. My general view, though, is that there has been a
significant rise in long-term real rates. If you follow the Hoey
survey, it suggests that the 10-year bond rate has gone up 2-1/2
percentage points in real terms since mid-1987. And I don't think
that's insignificant. It depends on how much stock you put in the
Hoey survey; it's just one particular measure. But I think Don made a
good point in his briefing that the slowdown in corporate bond
issuance is also a pretty good indicator that long-term real rates are
not completely neutral in this whole process. People wouldn't be

-53-

2/7-8/89

cutting back on corporate bond issuance if they thought their internal
rate of return was better than the existing long-term yields. So, I
think that's a good point.
I don't think there's anything sacred
about the yield curve in terms of inflation expectations.
I think
basically all that says is that the markets are betting that shortterm rates in the future are going to be lower than they are today. I

think you really have to isolate more on the long bond itself to get
some sort of notion of what they're thinking.
It doesn't necessarily
mean lower inflation expectations; it does mean that they think the
short rates are going to be lower in the future for various reasons.
Maybe it's just that they think they are not going to keep up with

movements in the short rates. It's not the be-all/end-all of the
evidence; there's no doubt about that.
Putting it all together, I think you're absolutely right,
Jerry, about the dollar. Something does eventually have to give if
the dollar keeps appreciating. But I think the central point there is
that if the dollar does keep appreciating what will ultimately give is
the current account and the economy, to some extent. My point is that
if the dollar is going to be appreciating I don't see the scenario
that's in our Greenbook forecast. You would have a much weaker
economic picture under that kind of a scenario than you would under
one with dollar depreciation--and totally different implications for
the domestic economy and inflation rate. And that certainly leaves
you with a worsening current account in exports under those
conditions. That's some risk. But that leads me to want to be very
cautious at this time. And I think an asymmetric position is probably
the best one.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Parry.

MR. PARRY. Mr. Chairman, I would agree that there are
substantial uncertainties associated with economic prospects. But I
think there is enough certainty to support alternative C. I believe
that the level of economic activity is in excess of the full
employment [level] at the present time. I think that a constant level
of interest rates, even if it is for the next month or so, would
assure that for an even longer period. It seems to me that in that
kind of environment we know that inflationary pressures are building.
As a result, I would say that we ought to get about our business
promptly. It seems to me that it also would be much more difficult to
characterize monetary policy as being ahead of the curve if we were to
take no action now or, for that matter, over the next month. Thank
you.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Keehn.

MR. KEEHN. Mr. Chairman, you very well described what I
think is a very complicated and difficult current and prospective
situation; and in a broad context I'm in agreement with you. But
having said that, at the margin I think I'd have a modest difference.
I'm not saying that we are targeting fed funds. Nonetheless, if we
have an objective currently of, say, 9 or 9-1/8 percent, I think I'm
hearing from Peter and others that there is a market tendency to move
higher--I would think 1/4 or 3/8 percentage points in that direction.
If there is that kind of tendency in the market I think we ought to
support it and move up as those pressures continue to move up. There
is general agreement, certainly, that the risks here are on the side

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of inflation. The magnitude of the risks is something we can argue
about, but I think Jerry stated it very well: the risks are on the up
side. The underlying rate of the economic expansion is strong, I
think, and sustainable; therefore, I wouldn't necessarily do anything
that would hurt here but I sure would move up to the extent that we
can, consistent with what I think is an underlying tendency.
Therefore, I'd probably come down someplace between "B" and "C" and
would be inclined to move a little on the borrowing level now if that
would basically support this upward tendency in the fed funds rate.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Forrestal.

MR. FORRESTAL. Mr. Chairman, I think the point you made
about a consensus of the Committee is very important. And for that
reason I would entirely support your prescription for the economy over
the short term, particularly the asymmetric part. Having said that,
my preference would be to move at the present time.
I happen to
believe this forecast that the staff has come out with. And the
inflation projections through 1989 and 1990, in my judgment, represent
an unacceptable level of inflation. And achieving that level of
inflation implicitly suggests some tightening. What I'm concerned
about is that we're going to have to tighten down the road. And that
tightening might be more than we would like to have happen to contain
inflation.
In other words, it seems to me the longer we have this run
without taking more decisive action the more difficult our task is
going to be in the future. But at the moment I am content to agree
with your proposal.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Governor Seger.

MS. SEGER. Yes, I can support your recommendation, sir.
I
won't tick off all my reasons because most of them have already been
stated by someone or another.
I would just add one, and that is that
if we were to tighten further I think there would be copycat actions
coming from other countries. And I'm not sure that that would benefit
all the economies in the world long term. Also, with the dollar so
strong at the moment and our strenuous efforts to lead it down, it
just doesn't seem sensible to be putting further upward pressure on
interest rates at this moment.
So I would back your alternative,
which I believe is "B."
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Hoskins.

MR. HOSKINS.
I have to ask myself, as I think everyone else
around the table does, where the risks are in this situation. What is
it going to cost us two years from now if we make a mistake now?
And
is the cost greater for being overly easy now relative to being overly
tight?
I don't see one structural problem--in the Southwest or with
the thrifts or internationally--that would be helped by having an
inflation rate of 5.7 percent, which I think is the rate for the CPI,
excluding energy, that Mike has in his forecast.
It seems to me those
problems will be made substantially worse. We'll have to move much
more aggressively with much higher interest rates.
In my view, it
would be simply a repeat of policy mistakes that we have made in the
past.
It seems to me that we could undo the cost of being overly
tight now relatively quickly if we needed to. We can't undo the
other.
It gets built in.
It's serious and it's unacceptable--not
just in the sense of the current inflation. What we're trying to do

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is get the maximum output for this economy. There is not a trade-off
between real growth and inflation. There isn't. It's
[unintelligible] in the very short run. So it just seems to me that
we ought to ask ourselves about those risks and then come out on the
side, at least from my perspective, of moving away from the approach
where the costs are enormous. I think now is the time to move. I'd
be in favor of alternative C.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Black.

MR. BLACK. Mr. Chairman, I'm very close to Jerry Corrigan
and very close to Lee Hoskins. A while ago I appeared to be
complimenting Don Kohn unduly at the expense of Mike Prell. But I'd
like to say that I think that Mike's forecast for the economy--the
need for increasing short-term rates--is probably absolutely accurate.
And I favor sooner rather than later. But there's always this risk
that we could do too much now. As far as this yield curve is
concerned, one reason it's the way it is [relates to] an expectation
on the part of knowledgeable observers that we probably will do some
further tightening fairly soon. So, I clearly come out in favor of
"C."
But there is this matter of institutional harmony that Jerry
mentioned a while ago. And given your commitment, Mr. Chairman, to
move to this in a couple of weeks or so I can go along with that. I'd
rather do it now but I can vote for that.
MR. HOSKINS. I want to clarify that. Is it a commitment to
move in a couple of weeks or to reconsider in a couple of weeks?
SPEAKER(?).

No, it's not.

MR. BLACK. Well, I meant to consider a move depending on
what the data say. And if they point in the other direction I
wouldn't want to move; I think it is very "iffy" right now. I'm less
convinced than most of my colleagues in Richmond that this has gotten
quite as far away from us as some people think.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Stern.

MR. STERN. Well, let me comment a little further about the
risks as I see them. I don't see much risk at this point in time,
with one caveat, to some further tightening. I personally wouldn't go
all the way to "C," but I would be inclined to go to $700 million
[borrowing] immediately. The only risk that I can really see of doing
that relates to external factors--the issue of external balance. And
I think the solution to that ultimately lies with a change in fiscal
policy rather than anything that we can do. Beyond that it does seem
to me that something between "B" and "C" is appropriate here and now.
As I say, I don't see much risk to the real domestic economy from such
a move. While I personally feel that inflation is already excessive
and probably will rise, we may be pleasantly surprised here; I'll
acknowledge that. But I don't see that an additional small move at
this point in time is going to [be harmful]; if anything, it's simply
going to help [produce] a pleasant surprise if we're fortunate. And
at best it will turn out to have been an appropriate action. I don't
place a lot of weight on it but there apparently is some expectation
in the market that some further tightening is imminent. And I don't
think we want to see rates slide back from where they are now.

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2/7-8/89

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Melzer.

MR. MELZER. Well, first of all, I'd like to make up for that
rude question before.
I'd like to reiterate the position I stated
earlier: first of all, I think inflation is too high; and secondly, I
think it's going higher.
On the other hand, I don't think it's
getting away from us or that it's going to get away from us if we stay
In addition,
on this course of monetary restraint that we've been on.
I feel that the only shot we have at long-term price stability--and I
would agree with Lee that that should be our goal in the long term--is
if we can get there with a more or less stable real economic
In other words, I don't think we're in a situation now
performance.
where it will be productive in terms of the long-run inflation fight
to run too close to the line in terms of a recession.
In formulating this view I think that, in a sense, it's all
too easy to ignore the narrow monetary indicators; that's not
something that gets a lot of discussion around the table. As a
result, there's a great temptation for [unintelligible] most recent
numbers we see and so forth. Obviously we should be looking at those.
But I think at inflection points that can really result in procyclical
policy, in easing too long or tightening too long. Having said that,
if you look at the reserve base and M1 as well as M2, we've been
looking at slow growth rates for two years with further slowing in the
In the
last six months or so--and particularly in recent months.
fourth quarter we had reserve growth that was barely positive; I think
the Bluebook showed that in the period from November through January
we were actually looking at a negative growth rate of 5 percent. And
the Board staff's forecast is assuming 0 percent reserve and M1 growth
Now, in my own view, that kind of policy is very
for all of 1989.
restrictive and I think there's a reasonable likelihood that that will
put the economy in a recession in late 1989 or 1990. As I say, the
reason I'm concerned about that is that the response in the other
direction is going to put us so far off of a sustained path of
monetary restraint that it could take us years to get back to the
I'm
I want to be clear on this.
position I think we're in right now.
not afraid, in a sense, to take a recession if that's what we have to
do.
I don't think you ever like to do that, to make that judgment.
But obviously if things have gotten out of control, in the end we have
And it
to be willing to run that risk for the very reasons Lee said.
becomes difficult later. But, as I said, I don't think that's where
There has been a lot of discussion but it seems that
we are.
important financial markets don't think that's where we are either.
Otherwise, why would the dollar be doing what's it's doing, and gold
doing what it's doing, and long Treasuries doing what they're doing?
My final point, which is more or less an aside, is that I
think the FOMC has done an excellent job in this period in terms of
moving early. But I wouldn't necessarily say that we have led the
markets.
I simply want to point out that if dramatic additional
tightening is undertaken at this time, we certainly don't have the
The constituencies, if you
fact that the markets are calling for it.
In a dramatic
will, that are represented there are supporting it.
move here--and I know that's not really on the table--in effect, we
would be really stepping out in front, which I don't think we've done.
Obviously, in pursuing a path of tightening there always are going to
be constituencies that are against that, as Governor LaWare referred
to before. But in this case where investors feel inflation is getting

2/7-8/89

away I just think one is in a better position--if one is responding to
pressures either in the foreign exchange markets, presumably backed up
by our foreign trading partners, or behavior in long-term securities
markets--to move against that background. Obviously, there's the
chance of doing that too late and never catching up; I understand
that. Anyway, that would lead me to a position where, really, I would
support "C" as stated--not "B" as stated.
MR. HELLER.

You woke us up.

MR. MELZER.

I figured I would.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Boehne.

VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN.

That was the apology.

MR. BOEHNE. Well, the issue is clearly one of weighing the
risks of too much versus too little tightening. Reasonable people can
I don't
differ on that and that's what we're seeing around the table.
think any of us can be overly sure, whatever we do, that it is the
Therefore, I think it is very relevant to ask the
right thing to do.
question: What are the implications of whatever we do today if we're
It is possible that we could do the wrong thing today. And it
wrong?
comes down to this: Is it more costly to unwind too much tightening or
I think that
is it more costly to make up for too little tightening?
this Committee has been in existence long enough and that there's a
pretty clear historical record, even though this group is much wiser
than our forefathers and mothers, that [the answer] is very, very
clear. It is more costly to make up for too little tightening. It is
If you lower interest rates
relatively easy to lower interest rates.
you don't cause a lot of unhappiness. Given the uncertainty, and on
top of that my assessment of the risks, I would move toward
I think it's a mistake to let interest
alternative C fairly promptly.
rates fall at this point. Temporizing makes sense for institutional
harmony for now and I think that's worth something. But I must say
that it makes me very uneasy about the future because I think
temporizing can be quite costly.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Governor Kelley.

MR. KELLEY. Mr. Chairman, I think this has been an excellent
discussion; there is a great deal to be said on both sides of these
issues.
It's not surprising in the light of all the ambiguity out
there; I think it's rather what one would expect. As I consider how
to come down on this issue, I'd have a great deal of concern if we
were doing nothing now--as everyone here would. But I don't think
that's the case.
For one thing, as I understood our expectations at
the last meeting we were expecting the funds rate to settle basically
on the shy side of 9 percent.
In fact, it has been on the plus side
of 9 percent.
So, to some extent, you could say that we already may
have gotten one extra tranche of tightening than we had expected to
I think it was
get at our last meeting. And I fully support that.
entirely appropriate and was well done.
Nevertheless, it has been
there. The aggregates are growing very slowly and I think that's
entirely appropriate; but I would be concerned if they went very much
slower than they are.
I think it makes some sense to try to hold them
around where they are.
The dollar has implications when it goes in
both directions but I think the way it's going now it is on the strong

2/7-8/89

-58-

side and supports an anti-inflationary stance. Whatever the yield
curve may be telling us, it is inverted enough that it is clearly on
the anti-inflationary side. So, I think we are moving cautiously and
appropriately and I am very comfortable supporting your proposal.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Syron.

MR. SYRON. I think, as Ed Boehne said very well, that we are
in a period of some substantial uncertainty and that one has to weigh
the symmetry of the risks. I fully agree with his analysis that it is
always easier to loosen later on than it is to tighten later on. The
staff forecast, which seems to me as good a forecast as one is going
to find any place, does have some worrisome implications in terms of
inflation, excluding energy, as one gets out beyond the forecast
period. So, in an unconstrained world I would tend to favor an
But I do agree strongly that
approach somewhere between "B" and "C."
it is important to communicate institutional harmony at this point in
time given the number of things that are going on. And I would be
comfortable with your position, given that you suggested that there
would be a consultation within a matter of a couple of weeks and that
there would be no decline, effectively, in market rates in the interim
period--that we wouldn't have sent a signal that we were going in the
opposite direction when that might have to be reversed within that
couple of weeks.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
MR. SYRON.

That would be a bad mistake.

So, I prefer a "B-" but am comfortable with "B."

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Boykin.

MR. BOYKIN. Well, Mr. Chairman, I find myself in the usual
dilemma when it comes to this point, given where I live all the time
except for a couple of days every seven or eight weeks here in
Washington. It's hard for me to rationalize being a little more
restrictive or a little tighter, given the risks of what that might do
to the Southwest since it seems that most of the problems have been
and are still pretty much centered down there. The arguments, I
think, have been well stated on both sides of the issue. Intuitively,
I would be in favor of moving toward "C" now. I'm not so confident of
that, though, that a two or three weeks' delay to get us a little
better reading on what's going on is that important. But I remain
concerned, as I indicated earlier in the meeting, about the level of
inflation and what appears to me to be a fairly timid approach to
reducing that in a fairly significant way. I just think it's too
high. But I would be supportive of the proposition that you put out.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Well, we still have President Guffey.

MR. GUFFEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Coming into the
meeting this morning I guess I was looking for something between "B"
and "C" on the short run, with some immediate movement toward "C"
following this meeting. In view of your plea for accommodation,
although I'm not a voting member, I could almost interpret your
proposal as being a "B-C" stance--taking a look at it again in a
couple of weeks. And from that standpoint it would be very acceptable
to me. I'd just like to lay on the table the way the tightening might
take place in the period ahead. I understand that using the discount

2/7-8/89

-59-

rate probably doesn't meet with much favor among those who have to
vote on it--that is, the Board members--given the comments that have
been made the last couple of days. But there is a time beyond which I
think we will not be able to move the discount rate and close any gap,
if that's a concern to anybody. When I talk about "B-C," a bit of
snugging now, I would like to consider that we could deal with a
discount rate [increase of] 1/2 percent and not let it all show
through--in other words, come to a funds rate level of something like
9-1/4 to 9-3/8 percent. The further you go, if indeed you believe the
staff's forecast, you've neutered yourself on using the discount rate
as an instrument, I think. And if we're ever going to do it, now
would be the time to do it, given the projection that I think most of
the people around the table believe.
LaWare.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. I'm still missing Governors Angell and
Would either one of you-MR. ANGELL.

I've never gone last.

MR. LAWARE.

I have the view of last time.

MR. ANGELL.

I've never gone last yet.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

You want to go last?

MR. LAWARE. I support your recommendation, Mr. Chairman. I
am skeptical about the possibility of unwinding some of these other
rates simply because we keep the present level of pressure on. I
suspect that in two or three weeks when we discuss this again we
probably will want to cinch it up a little. But I think that the
current suggested approach is a sound one.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Governor Angell.

MR. ANGELL. Yes. The staff's forecast, as I understand it,
is for a funds rate 150 basis points higher in the fourth quarter of
1989 than in the fourth quarter of 1988. Is that about right?
MR. PRELL.

About 150 basis points by a year from now.

MR. ANGELL. A year from now. If that does turn out to be
the path that we end up on, it seems to me that it would be somewhat
desirable somewhere in there to have a discount rate move. I would
not share Roger's enthusiasm for a discount rate move not showing
through. I tend to prefer to have discount rate moves really show
through the full amount when we do them. So it seems to me that's an
alternative that ought to be looked at. I do not favor that now, even
though I favored that in November and December; to me it's a question
of timing. And I just don't quite understand how matters of weeks are
that significant in regard to the long-run impact on inflation. Most
of what we know about inflation suggests that it takes quite a while
for it to show through. Indeed, if our analysis of commodity prices
is correct at all, we really can expect the CPI turning point some 7
to 9 months after we get a turning point in commodity prices. And any
turning point in commodity prices at this point is somewhat tentative;
it is not in the bag. So, I think we have a period ahead of us that's
going to be a period of some travail. I don't know where I'm going to
be at the end of the month. I would prefer, Jerry, to tighten when we

2/7-8/89

have some lack of super-strength in the dollar. It seems to me that
it would be somewhat more desirable to get our economy, in a nominal
GNP sense, to slow down by domestic [factors] rather than to get it
done by a lack of improvement of the external [side].
So, I believe
it's important that all of us keep something of an open mind as to
where we are at the time of the telephone conference call. I know I'm
going to. And if the conditions are such that we can make a move at
that time--and we're getting closer to impacting the second quarter's
money growth rather than the first quarter's money growth--and it
would appear that we're not running the risk of driving M2 to zero,
then that's the time to do it.
I believe it's a long-term patience
struggle. It is clear that I am more confident than some that the
monetary restraint, if in place, is the real measure. I just do not
know when interest rates are high or when they are low; I do feel very
confident about our maintaining a 3 percent growth path for M2. And
I'll be prepared under those conditions to vote restraint if it
appears that is what's necessary to keep M2 growth at the bottom of
the range. Thank you. So, my vote is yes for "B."
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Why don't we vote on that proposal, but
let's see if this language is correct.
MR. BERNARD. It reads: In the implementation of policy for
the immediate future the Committee seeks to maintain the existing
degree of pressure on reserve positions. Taking account of
indications of inflationary pressures, the strength of the business
expansion, the behavior of the monetary aggregates, and developments
in foreign exchange and domestic financial markets, somewhat greater
reserve restraint would or slightly lesser reserve restraint might be
acceptable in the intermeeting period. The contemplated reserve
conditions are expected to be consistent with growth of M2 and M3 over
the period from December through March at annual rates of about 2 and
3-1/2 percent, respectively. The Chairman may call for Committee
consultation if it appears to the Manager for Domestic Operations that
reserve conditions during the period before the next meeting are
likely to be associated with a federal funds rate persistently outside
a range of 7 to 11 percent.
MR. HOSKINS. Can I clarify one thing?
In the interest of
institutional harmony, when we meet in two weeks will a vote be taken?
MR. ANGELL.
MR. HOSKINS.

Two?

I thought it was the end of the month.

Well, end of the month.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. The telephone conference will be toward
the end of the month. The issue of a vote depends on whether we have
to change the directive. If we don't have to change the directive
then there isn't a vote. But that's the purpose of the conference
call: to develop-MR. BLACK. If we say "maintain" would that preclude our
letting the federal funds rate move up?
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Not that I know of, it wouldn't.

MR. JOHNSON. I assume that there's an implied management
approach by the Desk that goes with "B."
It's what Don reported on.

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Now, I don't know what that means. It means being more sensitive to
the funds rate but obviously there's some play in it.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

There has to be some play in it.

MR. JOHNSON. It doesn't mean any persistent upward pressure.
But I think everybody agrees it doesn't mean a decline in rates from
the current level.
MR. BLACK. And "maintain" would permit us to raise the
borrowing target $100 million?
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. The answer is yes; the instruction to
the Desk does permit the Desk to raise the borrowing target to $500
million in that the asymmetric language allows that to occur.
MS. SEGER.
call, right?

But not until it's discussed at the conference

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. No, the conference call is scheduled
basically later than that, unless we need to consult earlier.
MR. ANGELL. Look, I don't think we ought to be trying to pin
[the Chairman down].
If something happens and the Chairman agrees we
ought to have a conference call before the end of the month I think he
ought to call one before the end of the month. It seems to me this is
asymmetric language and asymmetric language should give the Chair some
freedom between now and a conference call.
MR. JOHNSON.

That's what's in there.

MR. BLACK. I wanted to make sure that we didn't preclude a
decision to raise the borrowed reserve target if the data indicated,
simply because we said "maintain" in here. And the answer is no.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
MR. JOHNSON.
MR. BLACK.

No.

This language provides for it.

Asymmetric language always means that.
I just wanted to be sure on that one.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Call the roll.

MR. BERNARD.
Chairman Greenspan
Vice Chairman Corrigan
Governor Angell
President Black
President Forrestal
Governor Heller
President Hoskins
Governor Johnson
Governor Kelley
Governor LaWare
President Parry
Governor Seger

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

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-62-

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. The next regular meeting date is March
28th, but we'll be talking, obviously, before then.
END OF MEETING