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Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 8/21/2020

Henry C. Wallich
December 17, 1974
Report on BIS Meeting - December 9, 1974
The BIS meeting on December 9 covered an unusually wide
range of topics.
The Eurocurrency Committee examined the BIS' current effort
to collect more complete data on banking claims on developing countries,
which is going forward satisfactorily, and the assembly of information
on regulatory and supervisory practices, which has been virtually
completed.

Some dissatisfaction was voiced with delays in the collec-

tion and dissemination of Eurocurrency data.

Attention was drawn to

the interest of the International Monetary Fund in entering this field,
and suggestions were made for expediting data handling at the BIS.
The governors' meeting discussed and adopted a proposal for
the creation of a new staff committee to deal with problems in the area
of bank liquidity, solvency, and related matters.

Each central bank

would nominate two staff representatives, one for regulation and supervision and one for data gathering, who would meet from time to time
under the chairmanship of George Blunden of the Bank of England.
Exchange of information, rather than harmonization of national practices
is to be the objective.

The new group would parallel in some respects, but

not compete with or supersede, the committee of regulators and supervisors of EEC countries now functioning under the chairmanship of Albert
Dondelinger of Luxembourg.

Governors Mitchell and Wallich talked to

Mr. Dondelinger and sought to make arrangements to bring his group to
Washington for an exchange of views some time early next year.

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Governor Richardson said that he was contemplating a letter
addressed to the London banks on the subject of their foreign exchange
operations.
Governor Mitchell discussed the structure of U.S. bank regulation and supervision, making clear the diversity of arrangements and
by implication, the difficulty of any coordination with procedures abroad.
He also described the foreign banking legislation put forward by the
Federal Reserve Board, indicating that it had had a good Congressional
and public reception.

There were no adverse comments.

There was a brief discussion of U.S. gold legislation and
Treasury activities with respect thereto.

In setting these forth,

Governor Wallich broadly followed the testimony of Chairman Burns before
the Gonzalez subcommittee on December 5, without taking a pronouncedly
negative attitude toward U.S. policy or raising the specter of
possibly alarming consequences.

Very few questions were asked.

The most interesting discussion concerned the recent announcement of the German Bundesbank that they would expand the monetary base
at a rate of 8 per cent for the next year.

The purpose of this policy

announcement was stated to be to give the government, labor, and business
a fixed frame of reference for their planning with respect to wage and
price setting and financing.

Dr. Emminger explained the derivation of

the growth rate of the monetary base, which makes allowance for foreseeable rates of inflation, real growth, and changes in the relation of
the base of the money supply and the money supply to GNP.

The base was

Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 8/21/2020

chosen in preference to M 1 because M 1 in Germany has proved to be less
stably related to GNP than the base.
In the discussion, questions were raised concerning the ability

of the Bundesbank to stick to its targets, the possible effects of a
rigid limitation of base growth upon the ability to intervene in
exchange markets to keep the mark from rising, and the effect on
interest rates.

It was noted that, for a country with a large inter-

national sector like Germany, the new policy seemed to give a remarkably
high priority to domestic considerations.

A somewhat extreme formulation

of the policy, not by a German representative, was that the Bundesbank

was telling the labor unions what nominal GNP was going to be and was
leaving it to them how they wanted to split it between price increases
and real increases.