View original document

The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.

Meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee
August 20, 1996
A meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee was held in the
offices of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in
Washington, D.C., on Tuesday, August 20, 1996 beginning at 9:00 a.m.

PRESENT:

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Ms.
Ms.
Mr.
Ms.

Greenspan, Chairman
McDonough, Vice Chairman
Boehne
Jordan
Kelley
Lindsey
McTeer
Phillips
Rivlin
Stern
Yellen

Messrs. Broaddus, Guynn, Moskow, and Parry,
Alternate Members of the Federal Open Market
Committee
Messrs. Hoenig, Melzer, and Ms. Minehan, Presidents
of the Federal Reserve Banks of Kansas City,
St. Louis, and Boston respectively
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

Kohn, Secretary and Economist
Bernard, Deputy Secretary
Coyne, Assistant Secretary
Gillum, Assistant Secretary
Mattingly, General Counsel
Prell, Economist

Messrs. Lang, Lindsey, Mishkin, Promisel, Rolnick,
Rosenblum, Siegman, Simpson, and Stockton,
Associate Economists
Mr. Fisher, Manager, System Open Market Account
Mr. Ettin, Deputy Director, Division of Research
and Statistics, Board of Governors
Messrs. Madigan and Slifman, Associate Directors,
Divisions of Monetary Affairs and Research and
Statistics respectively, Board of Governors
Ms. Low, Open Market Secretariat Assistant,
Division of Monetary Affairs, Board of
Governors

-2-

Mr. Connolly, First Vice President, Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston
Mr. Beebe, Ms. Browne, Messrs. Davis, Dewald,
Eisenbeis, and Goodfriend, Senior Vice
Presidents, Federal Reserve Banks of San
Francisco, Boston, Kansas City, St. Louis,
Atlanta, and Richmond respectively
Ms. Krieger, Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank
of New York
Mr. Sullivan, Assistant Vice President, Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago
Mr. Bryan, Consultant, Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland

Transcript of Federal Open Market Committee Meeting
August 20, 1996
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. The first item on the agenda is approval
of the minutes of the July 2-3 meeting. Would somebody like to move
them?
VICE CHAIRMAN MCDONOUGH.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Move approval.

Without objection.

Peter Fisher, you

are on.
MR. FISHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be referring to
the two pages of color charts distributed this morning. [Statement-see Appendix.]
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Peter, I think we have all been aware of
a tendency that seems to go against our theoretical preconceptions. I
am referring to occasions when we have seen a significant rise in
long-term interest rates, which one would presume would have a firming
effect on the dollar. Yet, what obviously was happening on some days
was that heavy sales of dollar-denominated securities were made in
part against purchases of foreign currencies, and the dollar weakened
as a result. Have you been able to segregate those episodes in which
the rise in U.S. interest rates dominated what happened to the dollar
in the foreign exchange market or alternatively the sale of securities
denominated in U.S. dollars to purchase other currencies was the
dominant force in determining the exchange rate for the dollar?
MR. FISHER. We have not tried systematically to segregate
those episodes. We have observed the phenomenon that you referred to,
and that is something we could try to do, although it is quite tricky.
I think the causation tends to run in both directions at times such as
those you are referring to. So I am not sure-CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. What is required here is that sales of
securities denominated in U.S. dollars occur against purchases of
foreign currencies. The mere sale of U.S. securities does not in and
of itself have any impact on the dollar. Is there any additional
evidence related to those episodes that could conceivably give us some
insight into which way the pressures on the dollar would emerge or do
we face a hopeless task if we try to disentangle those market
episodes?
MR. FISHER. I do not want to be quoted as saying it is
hopeless, [laughter] but it may be akin to looking for a needle in a
haystack.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

You will look nevertheless.

[Laughter]

MR. FISHER. It will be quite a challenge. Let me think
about that, and maybe Don Kohn and I can come up with ways to sort it
out. It really is tough to do much better than to talk to as many of
the major market participants as one can and get a sense of what they
were seeing major accounts doing. Sometimes those accounts are
liquidating bonds and moving out of the dollar at the same time, and
sometimes they are not doing it coincidentally, but the effect may be
the same if they are doing it over a period of time.

8/20/96

I strongly share the impression that bond markets are traded
more and more each year as we think foreign exchange markets are
traded, that is, as a collection of currencies. Traders are
consistently thinking that if they move out of one currency or
government bond maturity, they will move to some other currency or
maturity automatically. It is not automatic in the sense of being by
rote because traders do make a conscious decision as to what to move
into. So, we think people are trading bond markets as if they were
currencies but it is very hard to pin that down.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Could we at least look at the Desk's
records to identify these episodes and see what proportion were
associated with a weakened dollar and what proportion with a
strengthened dollar?
MR. FISHER.

Yes, we will.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
the trends are.

That might be helpful just to see what

MR. KOHN. We can certainly look at the daily correlations,
Mr. Chairman, to see how the bond and the exchange markets were
moving. I think it is still true, though Charles Siegman may want to
comment on this, that over time the dollar and interest rates tend to
move together. But there is a lot of ceteris paribus behind that
tendency, and it certainly does not happen all the time and every day.
Certainly, real interest rate differentials might be the relevant
issue.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. On the famous Fridays once a month, we
get a lot of evidence of spikes in both directions, and that might be
a useful laboratory to see what happens.
MR. SIEGMAN. Don's comment about real interest rates is
obviously important. If other news in the market is interpreted in a
way that leads to rising inflationary expectations, then long-term
interest rate movements need not necessarily affect the dollar.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
Fisher said. Jerry.

You are really confirming what Peter

MR. JORDAN. I want to turn to domestic operations, Peter.
Looking at the daily information you reported and your problems over
this intermeeting period, it seemed to me that there were at least
three significant parts of the story that were not mutually
independent. But I could not tell from your reports which was the
most important part of the story from the standpoint of this
Committee. A part of the story simply seems to be what is going on
with sweep accounts and reserves, which created one type of problem.
We now have a survey to help us figure out the implications of the low
level of bank balances in reserve accounts. But I don't know what to
make of the other two parts of the story. One of them is the
reference to foreign currency outflows, possibly Russian demand for
U.S. currency, which reduced the supply of bank reserves. But it also
seemed at times that there was something going on in the domestic
economy such that the derived demand for bank reserves associated with
the growth of bank credit was coming out differently than you
expected. That is quite a different matter. If we failed to

8/20/96

interpret correctly the demand for bank reserves coming from the
expansion of bank credit, then we would make the kind of mistake that
was made back in the 1970s of misreading underlying forces. That is
exactly the opposite of a reduced supply of bank reserves coming from
foreign demand for our currency. If we failed to accommodate that,
that would be the opposite type of mistake. Do you have a sense or
feeling of the relative importance of those?
MR. FISHER. Let me try to answer that, and I invite Don to
jump in after I have made the first stab. Your three factors were
sweep accounts, demand for currencies from overseas, and then just
general demand for reserves.
MR. JORDAN.

Derived from bank credit growth.

MR. FISHER. Right. The nexus that we have been looking at
is really the first and third together. As sweep accounts continue to
"sweep" the nation, the level of vault cash that is applied to bank
reserves becomes much more important. What we are observing here is a
weekly, moving phenomenon, with Friday flows in and out for weekends,
and we are experiencing some difficulty in tracking total required
reserves as vault cash becomes a larger and larger, and in some cases
a dominant, share of the reserves of major banks. So, I would link
your first and third points. I do not know if we have any sense--I
look to both Sandy Krieger and Don Kohn--that there are other sources
of demand for reserves that are giving us a problem of interpretation.
We are certainly focusing on this one. Don, maybe you want to
comment.
MR. KOHN. President Jordan, with respect to the third
factor, I think the evidence for unexpected demands for money and
credit or intermediation services through the banks is not strong in
this period. If anything, money growth in July came in weaker than we
were expecting. While it strengthened in August, it is still growing
along a very moderate track. So I do not think we are seeing a
situation in which we are having trouble assessing developments, other
than the problems that Peter mentioned of the week-to-week and day-today demands for excess and required reserves. I do not think we see a
situation in which we are persistently underestimating the demands for
reserves because money supplies are coming in stronger and it looks as
if we are accommodating a perhaps inflationary increase in liquidity.
That is not a situation that we have seen, if that is what you meant
by your third point.
MR. FISHER. This week-to-week, day-to-day problem is clearly
something we are spending a great deal of time focusing on. I think
this episode reflected a unique confluence of events; everything
conspired against us at the same time. But we are still focusing
nonetheless on how to track the week-to-week changes.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Any further questions for Peter? If
not, would somebody like to move to ratify the operations of the
Domestic Desk?
VICE CHAIRMAN MCDONOUGH.

So move.

8/20/96

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Without objection. You may remember
that at our last meeting, Bill McDonough and I were sent on a mission
to the BIS to discuss the issue of swap arrangements
I thought I would bring the Committee up to
date on our discussions and suggest where I think this leaves us in
terms of moving forward on the range of issues we discussed at our
last meeting. I assume that Bill will want to make some remarks of
his own shortly.

Based on these conversations, it is my view that we should
set aside the issue of the discontinuation of the swap network for the
moment. We should return to this matter when a better opportunity
presents itself, such as when the European Central Bank is established
and we have to decide what to do with our swap lines with the
participating national central banks whose currency will soon be the
euro. On the current timetable, a decision on stage three of EMU
would be taken no later than the spring of 1998. If it were positive,

8/20/96

the European Central Bank would come into existence soon thereafter,
although it would not start operating until January 1999. Thus, we
would return to this issue in the spring or summer of 1998.
On the matter of authorizing the Desk to do reverse RPs with
foreign central banks, our discussion last month revealed that there
are a number of aspects of this issue that the Committee would like to
see addressed in the context of a concrete proposal. Those aspects
include: (1) the principles that should guide the Desk in using such
authority; (2) procedures that would be followed in activating the
authority; and (3) whether there should be a pre-established list of
countries with which the Desk would stand ready to operate. My
suggestion is that the staff should develop a concrete proposal,
perhaps with some options or alternatives, that would address these
issues and others that were raised in our discussion at the FOMC
meeting in July. My expectation is that the Committee would be able
to consider the proposal at our September meeting or at the latest in
November. Bill, would you like to add anything to this?
VICE CHAIRMAN MCDONOUGH. Mr. Chairman, I share the view
that, since the swap lines are essentially anachronistic, it would
have been better if we had had a more receptive response
But certainly your
report on our meetings with them is absolutely accurate both in
content and tone. Since those conversations took place in July, the
atmosphere of the European foreign exchange markets and the future of
EMU have become a little more troubled and troubling. I think that if
we were seen to be trying to dismantle the swap network at this rather
delicate time, if that house of stone or house of cards should fall,
we could be deemed responsible, which would not be in our best
interest. So, I believe that maintaining silence and assuming that
the swap lines are harmless even in the worst of cases is very much in
our interest. Whereas I was rather hopeful at our last meeting that
we could get rid of the swap lines, what has happened in the meantime
in addition to our conversations indicates that this is not the right
time to dismantle them.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. We have to be careful not to allow what
are essentially financial anachronisms to continue to embody
themselves in our financial system. Were these swap arrangements a
potentially dangerous or malignant problem, one could trade off the
concerns of
against other considerations. But that does
not seem to be the problem. So long as we pledge ourselves to review
these arrangements and hopefully to dismantle them in an appropriate
timeframe, we probably will have done about as much on this question
as I think we can at this time.
VICE CHAIRMAN MCDONOUGH. I very much agree with that. I
would hope that the staff could do their work so that we would be in a
position to discuss the reverse repos in September. As I mentioned at
the last meeting, I think the likelihood of our using a reverse repo
capability would be very, very low, and we would make sure that there
were all kinds of protections against ill-advised use of it. But the
fact that the Desk is not authorized to use that financing instrument
with foreign central banks has taken on a life of its own that I think
is a bit of a problem for our relations with some countries,
especially in Asia. Therefore, our having the power even if we did

8/20/96

not plan to use it, I think, would serve our interests better than our
swap lines which are an anachronism. The fact is that 20 years ago
when the Committee considered the use of RPs with foreign official
accounts, nobody thought we would need reverse repos, and that is why
the Desk does not have the authority to use them. It is not because
anybody went through a thoughtful exercise and said, "this is an
inappropriate power for the Desk to have."
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. There are, however, foreign policy
considerations involved here.
VICE CHAIRMAN MCDONOUGH.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
Governor Lindsey.

Exactly, yes.

Which I think the staff will address.

MR. LINDSEY. Mr. Chairman, I agree that this is not the time
to dismantle the swap lines, but I have a question as to whether there
really is ever going to be a good time. The establishment of the
European Central Bank is not a foregone conclusion, although the odds
may favor it. It is also unclear who is in and who is out. Even if
all of Europe is included, that does not do anything for our Japanese
swap line. So, I am not sure that we have identified an appropriate
time as a target date to get rid of these arrangements. While this
may not be the moment, it would be nice to have a little more comfort
that there is a time when we think it definitely will be appropriate
to revisit the issue.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. I think we will revisit this issue
during the spring of 1998. At that point, we may conclude that the
EMU is active, alive, and the ECB is about to happen. Because so many
of our swap lines are with those EMU countries, we will have a window
to reshuffle all our central bank financing arrangements. If it does
not happen that way, we will have to address this issue anyway, and I
would suspect we may just decide to drop the whole swap line network
at that time.
MR. LINDSEY. Let us think about what the ECB is going to
look like in 1998. I do not have the complete list of countries that
we have swaps with, but I would wager that some will be in and some
will be out.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. That may be, but the ones that will be
in will provide an opportunity for us to readdress the issue. We can
use that as the vehicle.
MR. LINDSEY. Would it not be even more disruptive if we
started to talk about getting rid of the swap lines at a time when,
say, there was a great debate as to whether France or Britain met the
criteria--I am just using that as an example--and we had some of
Europe in and some of Europe out when the decision was made to go
ahead with the ECB? We would encounter all the delicacies and
ramifications of European politics if we raised this issue then. I
would think that, if anything, that would be an even more sensitive
time than the present.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. It is conceivable that you may be right.
I doubt it myself, but I think our conversations with

-7-

8/20/96

MR. LINDSEY.

That is, not now?

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Not now.
It may well be that when we review that again in the
spring of 1998, if that is our plan, we will at that point conclude
that we face such a mess that we will bite our tongue, so to speak,
and say nothing about the issue. My guess at this stage is that the
probabilities of the swap network disappearing by mid-1998 are well in
excess of 50 percent. If I have my way--I have a vote, you have a
vote--it will be gone. But there is obviously more here than merely
the question of financial arrangements. Indeed, the financial
arrangements would no longer be relevant if the issue inadvertently
turned into a diplomatic hassle. Yes, President Jordan.
MR. JORDAN. I have a question and a suggestion also. In
your recommendation that we put this aside for two years, could you
elaborate for us on Mexico and maybe Canada too with regard to the
arrangements that we have with them?
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. I think the NAFTA arrangements are
essentially independent of this issue, and because they involve a
different issue we will evaluate them completely separately from the
other swap lines.
MR. JORDAN. Okay. Then, concerning what happens two years
from now, I know this Committee cannot bind the Committee two years
from now, but in the past we have been in the situation where the
presumption was, it seems to me at least, that we would continue such
arrangements unless somebody bore the burden of persuading the
Committee that it was the time to end them. At this point, I would
like to have at least a presumption of a soft sunset provision that
says the swap arrangements will be terminated two years or so from now
unless somebody makes a compelling argument that they should be
continued. Such an understanding would reverse what I sense is the
environment that we are in now. I know it would not be binding two
years from now, but it would help my comfort level a great deal if the
general view of this Committee was that we should not renew the swap

lines after two years.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. I certainly do not want to take a vote
on this question. But if you are asking me personally, I agree with
you.
MR. JORDAN.

Good.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Broaddus.

MR. BROADDUS. I was going to make basically the same point
that Jerry Jordan did, Mr. Chairman. I understand the timing problem
currently, but I think Larry Lindsey is right. It is very difficult
to find a convenient time to do this. I am concerned that we are
going to continue to drift with this issue, and I was happy to hear
your response to Jerry's question. Two years is a long time down the
road. Maybe we can take an opportunistic approach to this issue as
well.
[Laughter]
If there is an opportunity and circumstances change

-8-

8/20/96

or it looks as if we might be able to make progress sooner, I would
not hesitate to do that.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. It is conceivable that something may
happen. The EMU may break down. Events may differ from what we
expect. We all know the types of changes that can occur in the
international financial system, both planned and otherwise, and
circumstances could alter that system. All I am saying is that this
issue will be back on our agenda no later than the spring of 1998.
Any further comments on this issue? If not, let us move on to Mike
Prell.
MR. PRELL.
Mr. Chairman.
MR. SIEGMAN.
MR. PRELL.

Charles Siegman will start us off this morning,
Thank you.

[Statement--see Appendix.]

[Statement--see Appendix.]

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. It had been the conventional wisdom in
the business community that a strike tends to be inflationary in the
sense that it creates an artificial degree of pent-up demand. That
demand gets unleashed when the strike terminates and potentially
induces some acceleration of economic activity that would not have
occurred without the strike. Are you aware of any systematic analysis
of that hypothesis?
MR. PRELL. I am not aware of any. Certainly, in this
particular set of circumstances, were there not to be a major damping
of underlying demand trends--and I do not see why that would
necessarily occur from a strike of plausible duration--the attempt to
make up the lost production to meet the pent-up demand for autos would
press pretty hard on capacity. The GM strike in March, as we have
seen, created some turbulence in the data, and GM had to press
production pretty hard after the strike. In that recent period, we
did not see major price increases in the auto industry. So, the
bottleneck there does not seem to have resulted in a lot of
inflationary pressure.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
can occur?

What is the earliest date that a strike

MR. PRELL. Our understanding is it would not occur before
the expiration of the contract, which I believe is September 14. So,
we presumably will have some information around the time of the next
meeting. The strike target is, as I gather, to be announced on August
22.
SPEAKER(?).

August 22.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Minehan.

MS. MINEHAN. My memory on the subject of strikes is short
because I have not been coming to these meetings for very long, but I
was struck by the number of times the notion of a "strike" appeared as
a factor underlying the analysis in the Greenbook, particularly in
Part II. There were references to strikes that had just ended and to
the potential for a strike in the auto industry. I am wondering

8/20/96

whether the principal effect of strikes is not so much their near-term
impact on economic activity or inflation but rather their longer-term
impact on people's perceptions of the relative power of labor unions
versus management despite the decline of membership in labor unions in
this country. It's an impact that is occurring in an environment in
which there seems to be a great deal of concern about whether Wall
Street, shareholders, and management are enriching themselves at the
expense of workers' standards of living. So, I am wondering whether,
even if a strike does not have an immediate inflationary impact, its
potential to affect even nonunion relationships between labor and
management may be significant going forward.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. That would depend on how the strike came
out, whether, for example, it was a significant management victory.
MS. MINEHAN. Yes. But just the fact that a strike occurred,
I think, is something that is-CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Well, I wonder. That is not so clear to
me. There have been significant strikes in the past where evident
union defeats had a very damping effect on labor unions. For example,
the flight controllers' strike, which was quashed, did more to
suppress union power than almost anything else in the 20th century.
MS. MINEHAN. Yes, but I think that was in an environment in
which people generally felt that unions were detrimental to the
overall competitiveness of U.S. industry. They may still feel that
way, but I think there is much more of a feeling now that the wage
earner is the one who is bearing the brunt of efforts to improve U.S.
competitiveness.
MR. PRELL. I would just note that in this auto industry
situation there also are peculiarities that people will be focusing on
in terms of whether the union is able effectively to set a pattern
after they have negotiated an agreement with one of the auto makers.
I think there are major questions about the mechanics of this
negotiation process with the three auto makers. So, there will be a
lot of grist for the analytical mills that look at how labor relations
work.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Jordan.

MR. JORDAN. I want to ask Mike Prell two questions. But
first let me comment on what we have heard on the strike issue from
auto supply companies and competing firms in our area. Maybe you have
been hearing some similar or perhaps different things, Mike. Our
contacts tell us that for General Motors, if they decide to take a
strike, it will be a "no lose" situation in the sense that they must
be victorious or they will have to break up the company. There is a
very strongly held view among some of the firms in the industry that
for General Motors this is a life-and-death situation because their
costs are so much higher than Eaton's and TRW's and some of the auto
supply parts companies that they absolutely must get concessions. It
really does not matter to them what Chrysler and Ford get. GM needs
significant concessions to survive in this view.
I have two questions, Mike, and I think they are unrelated.
The first has to do with what Charles Siegman had to say about the

8/20/96

-10-

second-quarter numbers. Typically when we get surprises and revisions
of numbers there is one of these two responses: Either they carry
forward in the same direction or they produce mirror image offsets in
the subsequent period. What is your tentative judgment about the
implications for the third quarter and the second half based on the
firmer numbers you now have for the second quarter, which are
different in some respects from what you thought they were going to be
at the time of the May Greenbook? If you want me to, I will let you
respond to that before I ask the second question.
MR. PRELL. There is little I can say at this point because I
do not really know the details of these revised data. One obvious
implication is that, if our estimates are correct, we will have
stronger final sales and stronger output. We also will get the same
kind of inventory level that we estimated before, which suggests that
inventory positions may be even leaner relative to sales than we had
anticipated. Obviously, that might have some favorable implications
going forward. Now, we are not talking about night and day
differences, but we would lean in that direction. We also want to
look for whatever evidence of export trends there may be in these
data, and we shall have to make a careful assessment of that.
Charles, maybe you know more.
MR. SIEGMAN. Again, we have few details. For example, with
respect to the composition of the decline of more than $2 billion in
imports, about one fourth is accounted for by automobiles, and
automobile exports went up a little. Inventory movements play a role
in this sector. We just do not know how that will work out. Imports
of industrial supplies also declined $700 million. This is not a sign
of economic strength. Again, we are looking at very preliminary
information, but eyeballing the monthly trade data from the beginning
of the year, it now looks as if the large May import number may have
been the outlier because it was relatively high. The number we have
right now for June is similar to that for most of the other months of
the year, but that again is the first impression.
MR. JORDAN. The other question, Mike, has to do with
Greenbook projections for the period. I was struck by the increase in
nominal GDP of about .3 percentage point from the last half of this
year to the end of 1997 with the same assumed federal funds rate. I
noticed that starting with the fourth quarter of 1994, your four- to
six-quarter projections for nominal spending associated with an
unchanged funds rate were remarkably stable. This is the first
instance where you raised nominal spending growth with a given funds
rate. I tried to find in the Greenbook or in your briefing this
morning why you now expect, given an unchanged funds rate, spending
growth to be more rapid for the next year and a half.
MR. PRELL. This nominal GDP change is so small that it is
going to be very hard to pin down all the factors that go into it from
different directions. I don't think there is a major story here
because, as I have said before, we do not approach the forecast in
terms of taking interest rate assumptions and from that drawing
directly a forecast of nominal GDP. It is a complex process. There
has been a reassessment of some of the price series and relationships
that have crept into the analysis. We do have a situation where we
have a bit more inflationary pressure because of (1) a lower starting
point for the unemployment rate, (2) the minimum wage hike, and (3) we

-11-

8/20/96

are impressed by the wage data in the first half of the year that are
tending to push us to a forecast that has a little more of an
inflationary cast. Given the nominal funds rate, we have a little
more inflation and a monetary policy that is a little more
accommodative as measured by real interest rates. If you put these
things together, they end up producing a nominal GDP path that is a
little higher even with essentially the same real path.
MR. JORDAN. I have thought about that linkage, but the
problem with that response is that I cannot convince myself that it is
not circular. If you assume that we have had an inflation surprise,
for whatever reasons, and you now think inflation could be higher than
you previously thought--and as a result real interest rates would be
lower than you previously thought--that does not necessarily lead to
higher nominal spending growth. In my framework, that means we could
have higher velocity growth, and I do not see that happening from this
dynamic of higher inflation and lower real interest rates.
MR. PRELL.

We have a monetary accommodation implicit in our

forecast.
MR. JORDAN.

Then you are saying faster money growth.

MR. PRELL. We let the money stock be whatever it will be.
Whether it actually comes out faster in our forecast is also a
function of how the recent developments have influenced our views of
the money demand relationship. We do not have faster money stock
growth in this forecast.
MR. KOHN. That is based primarily on the observation that
the incoming money growth data are a little weaker than we had
anticipated.
MR. JORDAN. You have to have a budget constraint and central
bank money in your framework, so you are telling me that velocity
growth is going to be higher. I don't see how that follows from this
linkage.
MR. PRELL. What we assume is that monetary growth will
accommodate the maintenance of a nominal funds rate in the face of the
growth of aggregate demand.
MR. KOHN. The way we go about this is entirely endogenous.
As you know, a nominal interest rate, particularly one that is the
Committee's target, is not a nominal anchor. I think that the process
that Mike described is exactly what went on.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Parry.

MR. PARRY. Mike, revisions in the Greenbook forecasts
prepared for recent meetings have been quite small. But I think they
have been in the direction of raising the rate of inflation and to
some extent, I guess, the level of real GDP. In light of that, could
you comment on the likelihood that the slowdown during the forecast
period will be enough to relieve inflationary pressures?
MR. PRELL. We do not think there is enough of a slowdown in
our forecast to relieve inflationary pressures. Basically, what we

-12-

8/20/96

see is that the evidence on wage behavior in the first half of this
year supports the view that we are operating at a level of resource
utilization that is incompatible with maintenance of a steady rate of
inflation in the economy. We are not in such tight conditions,
particularly looking at the capacity utilization side of the picture
as well as the labor market side, that we would anticipate, absent
external shocks, a very rapid pickup in inflation. But we would
expect some gradual updrift.
MR. PARRY. The change in the forecast in the last couple of
meetings and some of the comments in Part I of the Greenbook, which I
must admit I found striking, seem to suggest that you see the
prospects of a more favorable outcome as probably lower now than you
did at the time of the previous meeting or the meeting before that.
MR. PRELL. I think our confidence in our assessment of the
implications of this level of resource utilization has grown with the
latest wage figures.
MR. PARRY.

I see.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Thank you.
President Moskow.

MR. MOSKOW. Just getting back to the potential for a strike,
someone in the auto industry described this period to me as the calm
before the storm since nothing really happens until later this week
when a target is selected. The key issue, of course, is outsourcing
for General Motors. They manufacture a lot more parts themselves, as
we all know, and they need to get more flexibility in outsourcing
these parts. Of course, the selection of the target is important
because if GM is not selected, Chrysler will be. Chrysler could agree
to some provisions that would not hurt Chrysler but would hurt GM in
terms of this outsourcing issue because Chrysler does so much
outsourcing. Compensation increases do not appear to be an issue
here. The unions already have a cost-of-living escalator in their
agreements; no one is really talking about changing that. They have
profit sharing already. The profit sharing agreement for Chrysler
workers has paid them very high benefits recently. Of course, the
last time they negotiated, they won a lump sum payment and there is a
high probability they will get that again. But that does not go into
the base of the compensation.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Stern.

MR. STERN. Mike, I agree with your characterization of the
productivity data, but I think the business community would take sharp
exception to it. Everywhere I go they talk about the tremendous
productivity improvements that they are achieving. I must say that I
am increasingly uncomfortable about our ability to reconcile the two
sources of information. I wonder if you have given that some further
thought and have any new information?
MR. PRELL. I've observed what you well know, that the data
certainly are supportive of the notion that there has been in the past
couple of years a continued quite rapid improvement in productivity in
manufacturing. We get reports from business executives that they can
produce as many widgets now as they did a few years ago with twice as
many workers then. I think the data are not completely inconsistent

-13-

8/20/96

with the reports we get anecdotally from the manufacturing sector. In
some of the nonmanufacturing sectors, we get into the difficult
problem of measuring the output, and it is conceivable that output
growth is being underestimated. The only caveat in this regard is
that, when we look on an aggregate level at what has been happening to
output and what has been happening to unemployment, the relationship
has held up reasonably well. We had some veering off seemingly in
1995, but we now seem to be pretty much back on track with that basic
Okun's law relation. Ultimately, we think that is of critical
importance because it tells us where resource utilization levels are
headed for given measured levels of output growth.
MR. STERN.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Are there any further questions for
Mike? If not, would somebody like to start the Committee discussion?
President Hoenig.
MR. HOENIG. Mr. Chairman, the economy in the Kansas City
District, like other parts of the nation, has slowed, in our case
from a very strong to a still strong rate of growth; it just is not as
strong as it was a few months ago. Our directors confirm the positive
tone in the region's economy, with many reporting healthy gains in
businesses throughout the District. The rail transportation industry,
for instance, is reporting solid gains in rail traffic, and operations
are at full capacity right now. The signs that regional growth has
slowed through the summer include indications in our latest
manufacturing survey of slower growth in output than in our previous
survey last spring. Construction contracts and housing permits,
consistent with data for other parts of the country, also have shown
some easing, but it has to be emphasized that the easing has been from
very high rates. On the agricultural side, grain producers continue
to do very well at currently high prices while the cattle industry is
still suffering somewhat. Our labor markets continue to be tight.
Reports of wage pressures, while still sporadic, are becoming more
frequent now, and we are seeing some efforts to address those
pressures through improved benefits. So, I think inflation prospects
are worsening somewhat in our regional economy.
On the national economy, we continue to see an outlook for
growth along the lines reported in the Greenbook. I do not see a lot
of differences in our projections and those in the Greenbook. We
agree with the Greenbook that, even if the expansion slows somewhat,
the rate of inflation will register a very modest 1/4 point increase
this year and maybe another 1/4 point next year, all other things held
constant. I think that is the outlook we have to deal with here today
or in the next few meetings. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Broaddus.

MR. BROADDUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Beigebook
summary this time starts off with a statement that the national
economy continued to expand in June and July, but it points out that
there was some slowing in some areas and in some sectors. I think
that characterization describes reasonably well what is going on in
our region. There are signs of slower growth in some sectors over the
last month or so. For example, the growth of consumer outlays for
durable goods other than automobiles appears to have decelerated a

8/20/96

-14-

bit, and there is some evidence from one of our regular monthly
surveys that the pace of manufacturing activity is a little softer
than it was earlier. But I would emphasize that this moderation in
growth is still a pretty tentative development at this point. At
least in our region, it may reflect in part the unusually wet summer
we have had. At this point, it is not at all clear how long this
trend will persist, if it persists at all. Moreover, I would make the
point that it is a moderation from a very robust rate of expansion in
the second quarter, as I know was the case in many other regions of
the country. Overall, most of the comments we hear from our directors
and other business contacts are still mainly upbeat. They suggest
that District business activity has settled into a groove at a very
high level of activity even if there has been some deceleration in the
rate of growth recently. There are still pockets of very robust
activity in certain parts and sectors of the District. For example,
on the commercial real estate side, the market for Class A office
space is very tight here in the Washington metropolitan area.
Whatever may be happening to housing nationally, residential
construction is really booming in West Virginia and there are a couple
of very large resort and hotel projects under way in that state.
Again, the bottom line is some moderation in the rate of growth in the
District, but the level of activity is still very high.
I emphasize this point about the level of District activity
because that, it seems to me, is where our focus ought to be in
looking at the national picture this morning. Given the greater-thanexpected growth of the economy in the first half, it seems to me that
the level of activity nationally is really quite high. It is
reflected in a number of ways, of course, but it is especially
apparent in the tightness of labor markets and the recent behavior of
wages. Consequently, even if the growth of aggregate demand
decelerates in the period ahead, as the staff points out in the very
first paragraph of the Greenbook and Mike Prell has repeated again
this morning, the pressure on resources is still likely to push the
trend rate of inflation up a bit, perhaps to above 3 percent over the
projection period.
To me, that is the central feature in the economic outlook
that we really need to focus on most closely at this juncture. If we
get an outcome like that, it will be inconsistent with our public
commitment to hold the line on inflation. Moreover, as I understood
the discussion that we had at the last meeting about our longer-term
price objective, while there was some disagreement around the table as
to whether we should try to push the trend inflation rate below 2
percent, there was general agreement that we ought to move in that
direction, and this projection is saying that inflation is going to be
moving in the opposite direction. It is true, of course, that the
latest incoming data suggest that the economy may be slowing somewhat
from the second-quarter pace. In particular, as we all know,
employment grew more slowly in July, but as was mentioned this
morning, there certainly are signs of strength in some of the data.
Initial claims are at a very low level in recent weeks, as Mike
pointed out. The Greenbook is projecting a third-quarter gain in
aggregate hours at a 2 percent rate. That's lower than the secondquarter pace but it's still above trend, which means that labor
markets are likely to tighten a bit further. Tighter labor markets in
turn could foster greater job security, and that raises some questions
about the extent and duration of the current softening in consumer

-15-

8/20/96

spending. But whatever the outlook may be and whatever the debate may
be about that outlook, the main point seems to me to be that even if
we do get a fairly sustained and marked deceleration in growth, we
still have an inflation risk that we need to be aware of and come to
grips with.
One final comment about wages:
I think we ought to be quite
concerned about the first-half pickup in the ECI. One can interpret
that pickup in several ways. I am inclined to interpret it as a
fairly straightforward bit of additional evidence that underlying
inflation pressures may be increasing at least to some extent.
Obviously, an increase in wages is not inflationary if productivity is
rising. Like Gary Stern, I hear a lot of anecdotal comments that
suggest productivity may be rising, but it seems to me that we do not
yet have any really compelling evidence that the trend rate of
productivity is rising. I guess it is also possible, along the lines
of the argument in Governor Yellen's paper that was distributed at the
last meeting, that the increase in the ECI reflects a corresponding
increase in the equilibrium real wage, perhaps because workers are
more secure in their jobs now than they were before. If that is
happening, then obviously that would not be inflationary in and of
itself. But in my view it would still constitute an inflation risk
since firms will try at some point to push those wage increases
through to higher prices if they can get away with it. They will
refrain from doing so only if they are forced ultimately to absorb the
increases. For my money, that is where the Fed and its credibility
come in. I think we need to insure that our policy stance will
maintain a pricing environment that is hostile to such pass-throughs.
I think we need to send the same message that a famous resident in Bob
Parry's District, Clint Eastwood, used to send, "don't even think
[Laughter] Thank you.
about it."
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Moskow.

MR. MOSKOW. That is a hard act to follow! [Laughter]
The
Seventh District economy is still operating at very high levels, but
it is expanding at a slower pace than in the first half of the year.
Housing starts and permits increased rather sharply in the Midwest in
July and partly made up for weather-related delays that we experienced
in June. Manufacturing activity in the District continues to be
strong and light vehicle production reached an expansion high in July.
Growth in consumer spending slowed considerably in July, but
information from retailers points to some pickup in early August. One
of our directors said the Olympics had a very real retarding effect on
retail sales, especially during the first week. He indicated that
sales have picked up since the Olympics ended, though the tempo is
down from earlier this year. While reports were mixed, other
retailers generally noted some sales improvement since July. Reported
auto and light truck sales for July were down sharply from June, but
July's 14.2 million pace exaggerates the degree of slowing in demand
for light vehicles for reasons that were discussed in the Greenbook.
So far in August, our reports suggest that sales have moved up to the
14.8 to 15 million unit range, assuming no special factors will
distort the numbers this month. This is consistent with the modest
slowing in sales that we have been expecting for the second half of
1996.

-16-

8/20/96

On employment conditions more generally, the news is the
same. Labor markets remain tight in the Seventh District and we
continue to experience unemployment rates below the national average.
Future hiring plans seem robust. We have an advance copy of
Manpower's latest national survey, which will not be publicly released
until next Monday, August 26, that shows stronger fourth-quarter
hiring plans relative to a year ago. The strength is fairly
widespread across industries and across regions of the nation. The
survey indicates the best holiday job gains seen in 13 years for
wholesale and retail employment. Recent reports from our contacts
continue to show an uptick in wage rates. Wages in the paper industry
are up 2-1/2 to 3 percent this year compared to 2 to 2-1/2 percent
last year. Wage settlements in the steel industry are under 3
percent, but these replace contracts with no wage increases at all.
As discussed in the Greenbook, the upcoming increase in the minimum
wage will affect entry-level and near entry-level wages. The
Greenbook analysis assumes that hourly workers earning over $6 an hour
will not be affected. However, one major retailer indicated that
their employees with wages of $8.50 an hour would be receiving wage
increases as a result of the minimum wage hike. So I think the
Greenbook is understating the impact for those employees earning over
$6 an hour.
More generally, on the price front most reports still
indicate that inflationary pressures are contained, but we have had
some scattered reports of more rapidly rising prices. In agriculture,
this year's harvest may not significantly ease the tight supplies in
grain markets, but very high grain prices are cutting demand from
abroad and from domestic users. The related cuts in livestock, milk,
and poultry production will extend the recent upward pressure on
retail food prices well into next year.
Turning to the national outlook, our assessment is similar to
the Greenbook's with economic growth over the next year and a half
returning to a pace near the growth in potential output. We expect
real GDP growth in the second half of 1996 to be in the range of 2-1/4

to 2-1/2 percent. But even this moderation in growth will likely
leave the economy's resource utilization at a rate high enough to
increase inflation, as Mike Prell and Al Broaddus mentioned in the
discussion. In other words, aggregate demand will exceed potential
output. We are already beginning to see some of these resource
strains reflected in recent compensation data. In addition to the
anecdotal reports that I mentioned, second-quarter ECI data suggest
rising wage and cost pressures, and I am concerned that the recently

favorable trends in benefit costs will not be sustained and that
growth in total compensation will increase even further.

As we

discussed last time, the risks to inflation are on the up side.

I

think the information that has become available since our last meeting
suggests that these risks remain on the up side and may even be
slightly higher than they were six weeks ago.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Parry.

MR. PARRY. Mr. Chairman, economic growth is strong in the
Twelfth District. In California, job growth picked up noticeably in
the second quarter, and the unemployment rate fell about 1/2
percentage point.
In July, the California unemployment rate edged
down further, and payroll jobs continued to expand at about the

-17-

8/20/96

second-quarter pace. Economic activity in the State of Washington
also is picking up as aircraft production rebounds and the software
business continues to be good. Job growth has continued to be
strongest in Nevada, Utah, and Idaho. In the second quarter,
employment growth in these three states was about 7 percent at an
annual rate, twice as fast as the accelerated 3-1/2 percent secondquarter pace for the nation. Employment growth in Oregon and Arizona
has continued in the 3 to 4 percent range, and we even have seen some
improvement in our laggard state, Hawaii, where economic conditions
were deteriorating until recently.
For the national economy, the recent news is consistent with
our forecast of a moderate slowdown in real output and employment
during the second half of this year. Thereafter, we expect real
growth to stabilize at around 2 percent in 1997, although our
projection is predicated on a slight tightening of policy over the
forecast horizon. However, the recent news is also consistent with
our general assessment that the economy faces an acceleration of wage
and price pressures. We have reached levels of labor and capacity
utilization that are inconsistent with steady inflation. Indeed, we
anticipate an acceleration of inflation in 1997 on the order of 1/4 to
1/2 percentage point in a wide variety of price and compensation
measures. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Minehan.

MS. MINEHAN. Mr. Chairman, while the economy may be slowing
somewhat nationally, that is a bit hard to see in New England right
now. Job growth is steady, unemployment rates in the region are low-a full percentage point below the nation--and pressures in the job
markets are growing as employers find it hard to hire skilled and in
some cases even clerical workers. Wage increases are picking up, with
increases of at least 3 percent the norm, and reports of up to 5
percent are not uncommon. However, inflation concerns remain low with
the expectation that wage increases will be offset by productivity
increases. Manufacturing conditions have improved. While jobs in
this sector continue to decline, New England's rate of decline is now
marginally less than that for the country as a whole. By some
estimates, the manufacturing job picture is better now than it has
been since the late 1980s. Our contacts in the manufacturing sector
are upbeat overall, with areas of particular strength noted in medical
supplies, furniture, and construction-related products. Construction
jobs also have grown at a good clip, in part reflecting an increased
pace of activity in the construction of Boston's Central Artery
project, which in nominal dollars is the most expensive highway
project ever undertaken in this country. Residential construction has
picked up as well. At least in the western suburbs of Boston, much of
this construction involves very high-end, high-priced single-family
homes. The commercial real estate markets are vibrant in many areas.
There has been virtually no new construction, and with growing
economic activity, conditions are markedly improved, especially in
Boston. This is true also in Portland, Maine and in suburban Rhode
Island as well as in a number of other suburban locations around the
District. Retailing remains highly competitive with disappointing
results for many. Tourism has been very strong, with a major influx
of foreign visitors.

-18-

8/20/96

District loan growth, as reflected in the data that we get
from five large banks that report monthly, continues to decline as it
has throughout 1996. However, this trend largely reflects the balance
sheet restructuring that has been going on at Fleet since the Shawmut
and the Nat West mergers. Officials at Fleet have indicated that
their balance sheet adjustments are over. Loan data for the District
as a whole, which tends to be heavily dominated by three or four
institutions, may soon start to reflect trends associated with
economic rather than acquisition activity.
Turning to the national scene, we agree with the Greenbook's
assessment that the expansion will slow, possibly to potential,
through the rest of the year. We also agree that the sources of the
slowdown lie in domestic demand, especially in the interest-sensitive
sectors of residential construction, consumer durables, and business
fixed investment. We are not quite as optimistic as we usually are
about the sources of foreign growth that are shown in the Greenbook.
We wonder, however, whether there isn't a certain amount of risk, and
I think Mike addressed this, that GDP growth will be stronger than is
reflected in the Greenbook in light of the recent declines in longterm interest rates, manageable levels of business debt, recent
moderation in the growth of consumer debt, the unknowable effects of
an inventory bounceback that may be even larger than is anticipated in
the Greenbook, and the continuation of rather buoyant equity markets.
Moreover, the risks that wage cost increases will push overall
inflation higher seem even greater than the risks that GDP growth will
be greater than we expect. Given the overall credibility of the
Greenbook forecast, we find possible and certainly credible the
assumption that price increases will be moderated by productivity
improvements at this point in the business cycle or by shrinking
profit margins, but we wonder whether there isn't a good deal of risk
in this area. Thus, we believe the inflation situation as measured by
the core CPI is likely to be marginally worse than is forecast in the
Greenbook if no adjustments are made to policy.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

MR. BOEHNE.

President Boehne.

The economy in the Philadelphia District appears

to be on a modest uptrend that has tilted down from a somewhat faster
pace earlier in the year. Manufacturing is growing but at a somewhat
slower pace. Delivery times, while lengthening in the spring, have
shortened more recently. Retail sales growth, quite healthy in the
spring, has eased during the summer months. Nonresidential
construction is flat and the pickup in residential construction
appears to be decelerating. Employment growth is improving slightly
and some labor markets are tight while others still have slack. Price
and wage pressures on the whole still seem to be reasonably contained
in the District.
Turning to the nation, at the last meeting in early July we
hoped that more information would help settle two questions--whether
growth would moderate to a more sustainable pace and whether wage
inflation indeed is beginning to accelerate. On the sustainable
growth question, I think the bottom line is that the weight of the
data suggests a moderating growth trend but how much moderation is far
from clear. On the wage question, the larger first-quarter gain was
repeated in the second. Once again, however, sizable wage gains were
offset by a small rise in benefit costs so that total compensation has

-19-

8/20/96

been rising at essentially the same rate in 1996 as in 1995. On the
whole, price pressures remain remarkably subdued for this stage of an
expansion. Reasonable people can easily come to different conclusions
about the outlook at this point. My hunch is that we may see
appreciable slowing in growth because of subdued personal consumption,
more modest growth in business fixed investment, and some slackening
in residential construction. At the same time, upward wage pressures
will not likely bubble up into upward price pressures as much as one
might think because of continuing offsetting smaller benefit costs and
strong competition for products and services. Nonetheless, in this
environment I think we need to continue to monitor demand and price
pressures very closely.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Guynn.

MR. GUYNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The economy of the
Atlanta District remains moderately strong. The big news over the
last six weeks, to no one's surprise I'm sure, has been the impact of
the Olympics. Some businesses in Atlanta and other Southeastern
cities were somewhat disappointed by the spillover effects. In
general, the level of spending during the Olympics was in line with
expectations of about $4 to $6 billion spread over six years. While
that spending was a nice bonus for our region and it left behind some
really desirable infrastructure that will be lasting in its impact, it
was really small potatoes when compared with just the Georgia economy
which generates over $160 billion in income per year.
District residential real estate markets generally can be
characterized as healthy though activity is now slowing after a oneyear growth spurt. Multifamily and commercial real estate markets
remain strong. I mention that because continuing growth in each of
these markets at both the regional and national levels bodes well for
the Southeast manufacturing sector, where the production of
construction materials and durables is significant. While the
forecast for durables production remains fairly good, our region's
important apparel industry continues to hemorrhage. In the second
quarter, year-over-year job losses totaled 42,000 for the combined
apparel and textile industries. While the goods-producing sectors are
expected to produce some new jobs over the last half of 1996, as will
be the case nationally, the majority of the new employment positions
will likely come from retail trade and services. The pockets of labor
shortages and related wage pressures that have continued to be
reported in parts of Georgia and Tennessee should be alleviated
somewhat by the tens of thousands of individuals previously committed
to Olympics-related construction and services. As those people seek
alternative employment opportunities, which clearly exist in the
District, we think we should have a smooth and rapid transition into
the post-Olympics period.
My outlook for the national economy has not changed
materially since our last meeting. While the economy seems to be
running with little slack in the labor markets, as evidenced by the
low unemployment rate and relatively high participation rate,
productivity seems to be high when we take account of anecdotal
information. Hence, any wage pressures can reasonably be viewed as
reflecting those productivity gains rather than an inflationary threat
that necessarily will be passed on to prices. At the same time there
are signs of the deceleration in activity that we have been

-20-

8/20/96

forecasting, although they may be preliminary at best. Many
fundamentals point to slowing investment and there are signs that the
predicted slowdown in housing is finally being realized. The earlier
buoyancy in consumer spending seems to be moderating and the saving
rate is edging up, at least marginally. I have to admit that
inventories are lean and consequently to the extent my expectations
for slowing in demand growth are disappointed, we will likely see an
immediate impact on domestic production. All things considered, I
still think we are in an enviable position with no major imbalances.
Real GDP growth will, I expect, average a little over 2 percent this
year and probably under 2-1/2 percent next year, and this is with the
broader-based measures of inflation continuing in my view under 3
percent. As at our last discussion, I'm unconvinced that our policy
stance currently is tending to make inflation worse. So, the
favorable news on employment and output is less worrisome to me than
it might be otherwise. My inflation forecast continues to show no
acceleration for 1996 once we take account of the effect of earlier
oil price increases, which seem to be playing out as we had expected.
Unlike the Greenbook, when we examine the likely effects of the
minimum wage legislation, we see no serious impact on inflation
expectations when we take account of recent evidence of the
substitution of capital for labor, productivity gains, competition,
and job restructuring. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President McTeer.

MR. MCTEER. The economy in the Eleventh District has
remained on a firm uptrend throughout the summer. Conversations with
our directors and other contacts suggest continuation of more of the
same, with some minor slowing during the remainder of the year. There
are two and possibly three areas of weakness in the District economy.
First, the drought is still a factor, but overall it's not exerting a
material impact on the regional economy. The semiconductor industry
has continued to weaken since the last FOMC meeting; unit orders for
semiconductors continue to fall. Some types like microprocessors and
digital signal processors have been in strong demand, but this has not
been sufficient to overcome the weak demand for memory chips. Several
Texas semiconductor firms have announced layoffs or hiring freezes,
with the result that employment at firms manufacturing electronic
equipment fell at a 6 percent annual rate in June. This industry
represents about 12 percent of Texas manufacturing employment and
1-1/2 percent of Texas nonagricultural employment. Construction of
single-family housing is still strong but most builders and real
estate contacts expect a noticeable slowing in the coming months as
the impact of higher mortgage rates begins to take hold.
Several sectors of the District economy have continued to
improve. Improvements in the Mexican economy have spurred retail
sales gains along the border, and we hear that affluent Mexican
shoppers are back in large numbers in the Houston Galleria area. The
energy sector continues to expand, with every available rig in the
Gulf of Mexico reported to be under contract. The anticipated
softening of housing construction may be a good thing because it will
free up badly needed resources for the construction of industrial
warehouse space, commercial real estate, and maybe a year from now a
rebirth of office building construction, which has been almost dormant
in our area for a decade. Vacancy rates in suburban markets have
fallen considerably in the last year or so, and office rents are

-21-

8/20/96

beginning to reflect the shortages of available space. A similar
churning in resource allocation is occurring in electronics
manufacturing. Falling chip prices have helped Texas computing
manufacturers. Advances in technology are beginning to reduce the
demand for paging devices and to boost that for personal
communications services devices. This has shifted the demand for a
wide range of workers to businesses located only a few miles away.
Overall, the national economy seems to be performing quite
well. I agree with the broad outlines of the Greenbook forecast. The
rate of economic growth will likely slow somewhat in the months ahead,
but inflationary pressures could begin to accelerate, although I don't
think that is guaranteed.
On the question of the inflation outlook, it is somewhat
surprising to me to see all the emphasis that people in this room
place on wage-push inflation, which I recall learning in school was
dependent on an accommodative monetary policy. The first line of
defense is productivity improvements and the second is Clint
Eastwood's "don't even think about it" monetary restraint.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Melzer.

MR. MELZER. Thanks, Alan. Tight labor markets continue to
be the rule in the Eighth District. The District unemployment rate
was less than 5 percent in both the first and second quarters, the
lowest since the 1970s. The strike of 6,700 McDonnell Douglas
machinists that began June 5 remains unsettled. The company has
maintained output so far with replacement workers. Anecdotal evidence
in a survey of more than 200 District enterprises indicates quite
persistent wage pressures. About one-fifth of the firms surveyed are
planning to increase prices in the third quarter and few are planning
cuts. District automotive output is expected to jump appreciably in
the fourth quarter, although much of this increase reflects the boost
that is normally associated with the introduction of new models.
Because of strong demand for models produced in the Eighth District
and increased capacity this year, the number of cars and light trucks
built in the District by Ford and Chrysler is expected to be 22
percent higher this year than last year.
Although the District economy is operating at a high level, a
variety of indicators suggests that growth is moderating, which is a
picture that we have heard described by a number of people around the
table. For example, year-to-date growth in District payroll
employment lags behind last year's pace. An exception is residential
construction where employment continues to grow at a vigorous rate and
permits are well above year-earlier levels. Loan growth at District
banks has decelerated from the high rates observed last year, matching
the national pattern.

The most recent Senior Loan Officer Survey

suggests that the slowdown may be partly due to a tightening of
lending standards. On the ag side, crops are in fairly good condition
across the District. The rice crop is down from a year earlier
because land has been diverted to other crops. Overall, harvests are
expected to be larger than last year, though down from the records of
two years ago. Nonetheless, District farm income should increase
substantially this year because low inventories are holding up prices
and federal outlays for farm income and price support programs will be
higher over the next few years under the new farm bill.

8/20/96

-22-

At the beginning of the year, the Committee took out an
insurance policy against the risk of a slowing economy. As events
have unfolded, the outlook is much better today than it was then.
Most forecasters see real growth holding close to the long-term trend
through 1997. In July, the Committee's central tendency forecast for
real GDP was a full half-percentage point above the estimates that we
presented in January. Because real growth in the second quarter was
above trend, forecasters naturally expect some slowing. Earlier
figures on retail sales and factory orders for July confirm that view.
There also was a decline in job growth in July and a decline in the
index of hours worked. It is worth noting, however, that 193,000 new
jobs in July, though down from the figures for earlier months, are
still well above the growth of the working age population of about
110,000 to 120,000 a month. All said, the real economy seems to be in
good shape entering the sixth year of the expansion.
Whatever the outlook may be for the real economy, we must be
concerned about the rising inflation trend. This rising trend can be
seen in the staff's projections. CPI inflation touched its low for
the current expansion in 1994, accelerated a little in 1995, and
according to the Greenbook, will accelerate a little more in 1996 and
yet a little more in 1997. CPI inflation was 3-1/2 percent at an
annual rate in the first seven months of 1996, up from 2-1/2 percent
over the 12 months of 1995. Last year, we could see signs of falling
inflation in August that showed up in the data in the second half.
This year all of the signs--tight labor markets, the prospect for
further increases in food prices, the pending labor negotiations,
inflation-jittery financial markets, fairly rapid growth in M2 and in
sweep adjusted Ml, and high levels of long-term interest rates
relative to current inflation--suggest that inflation pressures are
building. We have taken a risk this year by failing to respond to the
unexpected growth in both output and prices. We should not want
increasing inflationary pressures to get built into expectations as
happened in the late 1970s and again in the late 1980s. Absent the
kind of inflation credibility that announcement of a firm commitment
to price stability would give us, we need a strong response to signs
of incipient inflation pressures. As I read the Greenbook, these
signs are becoming increasingly clear. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Stern.

MR. STERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The District economy
remains healthy. I have been impressed most recently by strength in
many of the natural resource industries. Labor markets continue to be
tight and if anything they have tightened a bit further. They are so
[Laughter]
tight in fact that my kids have found jobs!
As far as the national economy is concerned, I read the
situation much like the Greenbook. Wage increases clearly are more
rapid. They are not offset currently by improvements in productivity,
and I think increased price pressures are likely to result.
I would like to comment briefly on an issue that has
intrigued me recently, though I must admit it is something that is
hard to quantify. It is the use of personal credit cards by small
businesses, by entrepreneurs, for business purposes. There is no
question that this is going on, and I strongly suspect that it is
increasing in volume and breadth. I say that because of the anecdotes

-23-

8/20/96

that I have been hearing; one just has to raise the subject to hear
from almost anybody in the small-business arena how they use their
credit cards for business purposes. It is not surprising given the
teaser rates that are available and the ease of credit card
applications as opposed to applications for small-business loans at
banks. I think the consumer credit data are being affected by this
phenomenon because the small-business people I talk to do not tend to
pay this borrowing down; they tend to roll it over from one teaser
rate to another and indeed to build up an increasing volume over time.
It does not mean that we ought to be sanguine about credit-quality
issues. Of course, that depends on whether we believe small
businesses are more likely to repay this type of borrowing than
consumers. I do not have any convictions about that. But I think it
does mean that when we look at consumer credit data relative to
something like disposable income, we may be getting a misreading of
credit exposure because the denominator is not quite right. What we
want to include in the latter is business revenues, business income,
or cash flow, or something like that. I have discussed this with Don
Kohn and I do not think we have much data on it, but it is something
that we may want to bear in mind as we think about some of these
credit versus income issues.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
magnitude might be?
MR. STERN.

No.

Do you have any idea what the order of

I really do not.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

These involve 15 or 16 percent interest

rates?
MR. STERN. No, not on the teaser rates. These are 5.9, 6.9,
8 percent rates, and they are available without any effort.
Applications just show up in the mail.
MS. MINEHAN. By using these cards, small companies can
offset considerable expenses that they otherwise may have. For
example, a small business may previously have had credit cards that
were being charged to the company's account and may have incurred
sizable clerical costs to reconcile the charges and various business
expenses. Diners Club, for example, will now give all of a small
firm's employees a credit card against the employees' own credit. The
firm avoids the need to reconcile charges. And if there are enough
employee names on the list, the firm does not have to pay the first
year's billing costs, and it can switch to another card and do that
fairly easily.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. It sounds like a decisively sound
business practice! Vice Chairman.
VICE CHAIRMAN MCDONOUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. At the
last meeting I reported that the Second District economy had been
expanding rather rapidly. It has continued to expand but at a
somewhat slower pace in recent weeks. From May to June, the growth of
payroll employment decelerated from 2.1 to 1.4 percent in New Jersey
and from 2.1 to 0.1 percent in New York State. June unemployment
rates were essentially unchanged at 6.3 percent in New York and 6.1
percent in New Jersey. Our retail trade contacts reported
disappointing sales in June and July after a very strong spurt in May.

8/20/96

-24-

Growth in permits for the construction of new homes slowed in June,
and realtors reported similar softness in existing home sales for the
July and early August period after a robust second quarter. In
contrast, the commercial office market continued to improve. Growing
demand for office space in the absence of new construction pushed June
vacancy rates lower throughout the greater New York metropolitan area.
Regional price pressures have remained subdued. The 12-month
gain in the New York-northeastern New Jersey CPI was just 2.7 percent
in July compared with a 3 percent rise in the national index. That
continued a 3-year trend of relatively lower regional price inflation.
Going forward, we believe that expansion will continue in
District. The government restructuring in our District states is
slowing this year. The drag on job growth from manufacturing
continues, but it is less than it was in the past. Modest overall
growth continues, and as we look ahead to next year, we think that
government restructuring will slow even further, manufacturing
declines will moderate, and we will continue to have strength in
business and consumer services. So, the District economy looks as
it is beginning to behave better than it has since the 1990-91
recession.

the
job
the
if

We have, however, what may wind up being a rather difficult
problem for New York State coming from the welfare reform bill to be
signed this week. The New York constitution is unique among state
constitutions in that it requires that the state provide and I quote,
"aid, care, and support of the needy."
So, it looks as if some of the
effects of the welfare reform bill simply cannot take place in New
York State. The state is at least as litigious as any other part of
the country, and therefore it is almost certain that because the state
constitution says the needy have to be taken care of, lawsuits will
seek to prevent the state and the cities from making any changes. The
level of welfare is already higher than that for the nation. In New
York State, 17 percent of all children receive AFDC. That compares to
about 14 percent at the national level. The maximum benefit in New
York City is $577 a month for a family of one adult and two children.
That compares to $367 as a national average. So, we could have a
situation in which the already fairly severe fiscal problems of New
York State and New York City could be aggravated. What one does not
know is whether there will be migration caused by changes in welfare.
The scholarship on the subject says that people do not in fact migrate
because of differentials in welfare payments, but we could get into a
situation that does not involve a differential as such but rather
migration from a state with no welfare payments for a family to New
York State, which would be constitutionally required to provide
welfare support. We do not know exactly what this is going to do to
the state's economy. As of now, the political leaders of the state
seem to be rather quiet on the subject.
Turning to the national economy, our forecast is somewhat
different from that of the Greenbook on both growth next year and not
surprisingly, therefore, the effect on the CPI. We have fourthquarter-to-fourth-quarter real growth slowing to 1.7 percent in 1997
as compared to the Greenbook's 2.1 percent. We have the overall CPI
at 3.1 percent; the Greenbook has it at 3.3 percent; and we have core
CPI creeping up and touching, although not passing, the 3 percent
level in the fourth quarter of 1997. Our forecast is based on an

-25-

8/20/96

assumption that, looking at the employment cost index, there will be a
gradual upcreep in wage inflation and that the sharp reduction in the
growth of benefits that the economy has been enjoying will at least
slow down. We have the growth in benefits plateauing, and I think
that any model used for a forecast should include such assumptions
rather than ones that are more optimistic.
The board of directors at the New York Fed, which is a
particularly interesting board that includes a very good cross section
of strong-minded, bright people, is of the very strongly held view
that the forecasting models are missing what they think are two
changes affecting the performance of the economy. First, with regard
to benefits, their very firmly held view is that the rise in benefit
costs will continue to drop. At most in their view, we will have a
respite in which there may be a bit of a slowdown in the reduction of
benefit cost increases. But they hold very strongly to the view that
the managements of firms will have to continue to reduce benefit
costs. They will do it by pushing those employees who are not yet
under managed care onto that health care system and then forcing the
providers to rationalize further. The net result will be to keep
benefit costs dropping. Again, we have not assumed that in our
forecast, but it is a very firmly held conviction by my board members
and one that I have difficulty not sharing.
The other thing that they think we are missing relates to the
view that if there is some increase in wage costs, at this stage of
the business cycle it would not be wise to assume that we would be
rescued from its effect by high productivity growth. They are very
strongly convinced that business simply is not being run in a way that
assumes business managers will pass on rising costs by increasing
their prices. Quite to the contrary, the people running businesses
are aware that the only shock absorber is a reduction in
profitability. Since business executives are not hired by their
stockholders to have their firms' profitability squeezed, they are
going to work even harder, as in the benefits area, to make sure that
their businesses continue to be rationalized. Therefore, cost
pressures will simply not occur and will not be passed on in
inflation. If you were to listen to these wise people, you would say
that the trend in the inflation rate will in fact continue to be down.
I do not know if that is likely to be the case. I don't think it is
certain enough by any means that one should put it into any kind of
official forecast. But since in our view the present stance of
monetary policy is not creating an inflation problem, one would not
have to believe any portion of what my board members believe to
conclude that rising inflation is not a problem. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Jordan.

MR. JORDAN. Thank you. I had been thinking fairly
positively, feeling pretty good, about things since our last meeting
in early July. Then, over the weekend, I got a call from my tenant in
Los Angeles who said he had lost his job and was breaking his lease
and moving to New Jersey. Then I read the Greenbook and that
depressed me further. So, I am not quite sure whether the change in
my mood since July is affecting my view as to what is the right thing
to do at this point.

8/20/96

-26-

In agriculture in our region, this will be a down year for
farm income. There was a fair amount of crop substitution. Farmers
were able to plant more crops than they earlier thought they would be
able to, but the yields are going to be down and the price effect is
not going to compensate. So farm income is expected to be down, and
the banks in the farm areas expect some pressures to come from that.
One of the issues that we kept hearing about through the
spring and into the early summer, even at the last meeting of our
board of directors, was concern about speculative excesses, especially
in the high-tech sector. But with the sharp overall adjustment in the
prices of high-tech stocks on the Nasdaq earlier this summer, that
concern has pretty much vanished from the reports we are hearing. We
deliberately went out to see if we could find stories of other forms
of speculation that might be symptoms of inflationary excesses in the
real estate sector, whether with respect to construction or bidding up
land prices, and we simply did not find evidence of that in our
region. We likewise have focused a fair amount of attention on the
auto situation because of the very widely held view that GM is
building inventory, that it wants a strike, and that it plans to take
a strike to get some very significant changes in work rules. But we
also are hearing about a fair amount of militancy on the labor side as
well. I am not sure how all that will net out. We asked people what
was being done by businesses or by anybody in their communities in
response to the possibility that there will be a GM strike. A lot of
our communities are very heavily influenced by General Motors. The
responses were that nothing was being done. So, I am not sure what
the effects of a strike would be if that assessment is correct.
The steel industry says that its orders are flat. Orders for
steel-producing equipment to renovate and expand domestic facilities
are down very significantly and are expected to decline further in
1997 because of what is characterized as looming overcapacity in the
domestic flat-rolled steel sector of that industry. However, exports
of steel-making equipment are very good. Our contacts also believe
that the recent increase in steel imports will fall off so that
domestic demand will be relatively flat going into next year.
District employment is mostly expected to be flat at very low
levels of unemployment, and there is little talk of wage pressures in
spite of continuous reports of tight labor markets in large and small
communities. We have heard some interestingly mixed views about the
minimum wage increase. One surprising response from two different
sources was that the perceived adverse effect on retail and fast-food
companies, which would expand less or possibly contract in some cases,
would be offset by increased applications for employment at other
firms. Contacts at investment and bank branching companies said they
were looking forward to the minimum wage hike because it would mean
that more people would be applying for their job openings. In
construction, a labor leader
said that union halls were empty but that
was not leading to wage pressures. He said the response of workers to
this situation is not to look for higher compensation.
When we asked what was happening around the region as a
result of tight labor markets--and we confirmed the responses in other
ways--we were told that business firms simply were postponing projects
throughout Ohio in particular and also in central Kentucky and to a

-27-

8/20/96

lesser extent in parts of eastern Kentucky. Businesses mainly are
saying at this point that they are not going to get the projects
finished anyway before bad weather sets in, so they are just planning
ahead for next spring. Their expectations now are that in 1997
construction will continue to be very good in our part of the country.
In banking there are consistent reports throughout the region
that loan growth is slowing, including housing and auto loans. I
don't know to what extent the auto loans may reflect the decline in
auto sales that we saw in July--these reports may be lagged--but the
reports provide consistent indications that bank lending has softened.
There also has been some deterioration of credit quality. Both the
bankers on our three boards of directors and our community bank
advisory council have told us a lot of stories about poor credit
quality. Some banks were doing spot checks on credit ratings. A
consulting firm that is now offering this service went back and
rescored all the consumer credit files of a bank and found a very
sharp drop in the scores of the same individuals compared to two years
ago. The main reason for the drop was the credit card debt that these
consumers had incurred in the interim. All the bankers reported
slower payments, higher delinquencies, increased bankruptcy filings,
and larger allowances for chargeoffs as they finish out the year. The
thinking about 1997 is that the volume of credit extensions will be
down, the quality of accounts will worsen, and bank profitability will
decline. So, they are in a negative mood about that. It's the sort
of thing that Governors Lindsey and Kelley cited as a potential
development earlier in the year. It seems to me from what we are
hearing that such concerns are now becoming more common.
Let me turn to some remarks about the national economy. We
have heard this morning about the hope that real growth will slow. In
one sense, I hope that real growth does not slow down. If it turns
out that the investment boom that we have had for some 3 to 4 years
has strengthened productivity more than is being assumed, then we
could enjoy more output growth without the concerns that we all feel
about inflation. But if we are going to experience slower output
growth over the balance of this year and into 1997, then of course we
need slower growth in the demand for that output. The arithmetic of
the Greenbook is that inflation is going to increase and that is why I
was disturbed by the upward revision in nominal GDP. Even though it
is only .3 percentage point, the higher nominal spending growth
continues for the next six quarters. If we are right in assuming that
output growth is going to slow because of capacity constraints and if
the assumption is right that nominal spending growth is going to
increase for whatever reason, then we have baked rising inflation into
the cake and that is unacceptable.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Governor Kelley.

MR. KELLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the fourth quarter
of 1994 the unemployment rate dropped rather precipitously from 6

percent and above, where it had been for some time previously, down
into the 5-1/2 percent range where it has been ever since. It also
was right around that time that capacity utilization in manufacturing
began to drop from its peak of around 84.3 down into the low 82s. For
the past eight quarters, including this one, we have been pretty close
to living in an economic nirvana. GDP growth has been right on trend:

4 quarters over 2 percent, 1 quarter at 2 percent, 3 quarters under 1

8/20/96

-28-

percent. The economy has been operating either at or very close to
capacity with very little, if any, gap between potential and actual
output. Unemployment has been steady at around 5.5 percent, capacity
utilization as I noted has been declining slowly, inflation is flat to
down, core CPI has averaged 2.85 percent. If it turns out that the
core CPI has been overstated by a percentage point or so, that means
that we have been even closer to an economic nirvana. Other measures
such as the deflator and the chain indexes have been lower in absolute
levels but the trend has looked the same. The expectation going
forward in the Greenbook is for more of almost the same through 1997:
capacity utilization steady at 82 percent, unemployment steady at 5.4
percent, and GDP growth right on trend at 2.1 percent. At least that
is close enough to trend for government work. Government work, you
know, is defined as measuring with a micrometer, marking with chalk,
and then cutting with an axe.
[Laughter]
But there is one big
difference in the forecast that we have been discussing. That is that
inflation will start to rise, and that is projected to start to happen
right about now. The Greenbook shows the core CPI moving up to 3
percent this quarter and to 3.2 percent next year. That would
represent a half percentage point jump in a year's time, and I presume
that if the forecast were extended, the trend would continue to be up
from there, ceteris paribus. Now, that certainly would not be
acceptable to me or probably to anyone else in this room. And I am
afraid that the .3 percent increase that we got in the CPI in July
could be a harbinger of things to come.
If we are going to get this rise in inflation, how would it
happen? We have been discussing all morning that it would be through
rising compensation costs that would get passed upstream into prices.
If that is going to happen, several things in some combination have to
occur. First, the rising wages obviously have to drive unit
production costs up materially. We do see that beginning to happen,
possibly through the ECI and certainly the new minimum wage law. But
the increase in production costs will have to be high enough to
overcome productivity growth, which I continue to believe is under
measured, and the flatter benefit costs that the Vice Chairman spoke
about a few minutes ago. That certainly could occur. There is no
doubt about that. But the other question is whether some pricing
power will begin to re-emerge in the economy. We still have a world
with a lot of slack in almost every economic sector. There still
seems to be fierce competition everywhere in the domestic economy. I
have not heard of any easing in the consumer's fierce resistance to
price increases. Also for this to happen, it would have to imply that
business would be able to refuse to compromise their very strong
profit margins. Historically, of course, they have compromised them
when they needed to. I suppose that it would also imply the
likelihood or need for a lower dollar. These conditions for pricing
power to re-emerge are not in view insofar as I can see.
Nevertheless, could all of this come together and perhaps
result in an inflationary surge? Yes, indeed; I do not think there is
any doubt about that. But can we be confident that is what will
happen, especially very soon or starting now? On the basis of the
long-term historical record, I think we probably would be persuaded
that that is in fact extremely likely. But on the basis of
developments over the past two years, it is a little more difficult to
be convinced. It is quite possible that we could roll on along like
we are for some time. I do not know how long, certainly. What

-29-

8/20/96

happens then is virtually anyone's guess in such a period.
Admittedly, that is a very sanguine outlook, and frankly I am not a
bit comfortable with it. It is dependent almost entirely on an early
and substantial slowdown in the expansion, and I have a special
concern in that regard given the possibility of a new inventory surge.
But the slowdown has to happen if that happy outlook is to ensue. It
seems to me that the risks are distinctly on the up side, but for the
moment I would say let us continue to give it a chance.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Governor Meyer.

MR. MEYER. Thank you. We clearly are still struggling with
the same two questions that occupied us at the last meeting. First,
is the economy slowing or likely to slow quickly enough to trend to at
least stabilize the unemployment rate at the current level? Secondly,
is the current level of the unemployment rate definitively below NAIRU
so that it ensures a trend toward higher inflation? The Greenbook
gives us an optimistic answer to the first question and a pessimistic
answer to the second. The data available since the last meeting gave
me a little more confidence in my answer to the first question but
still left me with uncertainty about the second.
There has been a lot of mention around the table already of
the risks of higher inflation as a result of that uncertainty. But I
hope that we won't ignore the fact that the slowdown has the potential
to allow the economy to sustain trend growth at the current level of
unemployment with modest, stable inflation at least for some period.
While the persistence of the slowdown is hardly assured, the data that
have become available since the last meeting provide evidence of
slowing that we could only anticipate then. This certainly reinforces
my confidence in the slowdown projected by the staff, and that is also
very consistent with the consensus of private sector forecasters. So,
I think a provisional "yes" is in order for the slowdown scenario. Of
course, what we are talking about here is really a knife edge--slowing
just to trend. So we obviously are going to have to revisit this
issue and adjust as necessary.
The real key is the second question; that is the heart of our
problem. The staff forecast answer to the second question is as
follows:
The unemployment rate is already below NAIRU and will remain
so after the projected slowdown, resulting in a gradual, persistent
deterioration in inflation. The minimum wage increase is an
ingredient in the staff forecast of higher inflation, but it is a
spice not the substance. The fundamental source is the conviction
that the current unemployment rate is incompatible with stable
inflation. The problem we face in acting on this forecast is that the
pattern of rising inflation that it projects going forward should have
been under way for some time and in fact is not yet evident. The data
available since the last meeting, while somewhat mixed, did not alter
this interpretation. The staff views the benign inflation environment
in recent quarters as a temporary aberration relative to longerstanding regularities. Technically, the excellent inflation
performance is a mirror image of poor model performance. The forecast
of higher inflation going forward simply reflects confidence that this
model error will diminish or disappear. But it is very hard to
dismiss the fact that the extraordinary performance of inflation in
recent quarters raises serious doubts about the estimate of NAIRU
compared to what it was in earlier periods. As a result, my answer to

-30-

8/20/96

the question of whether or not the current unemployment rate is below
NAIRU has taken into account not only the estimate of NAIRU based on a
longer period, but also the details of the inflation performance over
the last couple of years. Indeed, estimation techniques that weigh
the more recent data more heavily suggest that NAIRU has declined
recently and may be close to 5-1/2 percent today.
The inflation picture is even more impressive than many
acknowledge. More broad measures of inflation have declined than have
appreciated; they show no signs of broad-based acceleration and in
many cases even hint of ongoing disinflation. Consider particularly
the recent patterns in the chain measures of the GDP price index, the
gross domestic purchases price index, and the PCE price index. The
inflation rate in each case is about 2 percent over the past year and
below 2 percent if it is measured net of food and energy components
when that breakdown is available. Each of these measures posted a
lower inflation rate over the year ended in the second quarter than
over the preceding year. At least for the available core measures,
each of these inflation measures was near its recent low in the second
quarter. The CPI in contrast is closer to 3 percent than 2 percent,
and there is less evidence of ongoing deceleration. But even for the
CPI, both overall and core inflation rates were lower over the four
quarters ended in the second quarter than over the previous year. The
ECI data do challenge us, and we are seeing some signs of higher
wages. I think we ought to take into account that, given the slowdown
in the rise in benefit costs, some increase in wage pressures should
be passing forward the benefits that firms have received from those
lower benefit costs. So, we want to focus on total compensation, not
just on wages. There has been some edging up in compensation; it is
fairly small so far, and given the projection of some compression in
profit margins, it is also quite compatible with stable inflation at
least for some time.
In case all this may seem too optimistic, let me end with a
cautionary note. There has been some discussion around the table of
the potential, or even the reality, that we are already facing fast

productivity growth or that we might see some in the future or that
faster productivity growth might offset any increase in compensation.
My reading of the data leaves me somewhat concerned about that
interpretation. Productivity growth over the last three years has
been very low, below 1 percent. If we look at the productivity trend
over that three-year period--when, after all, the economy has been
growing at a rate averaging close to what we thought was trend over
that period--one would think that productivity growth during that
period also would be close to trend. In that case, we might reach the
judgment that the productivity growth trend is a half percent rather
than a percentage point. I think we need to monitor this path very
closely. But if the trend rate of productivity growth has in fact
downshifted, then the growth of potential will turn out to be much
slower than the Greenbook projects. The slowing in growth that will
be required to reach trend will need to be more aggressive and less
certain, and the price inflation that we should expect from the
current trend in nominal compensation will be greater. But for now,
steady as she goes.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Governor Phillips.

8/20/96

-31-

MS. PHILLIPS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. At the last meeting
I thought we would have more information by now. We certainly have
more data, but it is not clear to me that we have much more real
information. We are into the sixth year of this expansion and,
depending on how we measure them, we have had either two or three soft
landings. We are now coming off a strong second quarter. People
around the table have discussed whether we are either in for another
soft landing or a continuation of relatively strong growth. I must
say that I am quite impressed by the unanimity around the table in
terms of the outlook, which seems to be settling on the notion of
moderating growth. Clearly, the factors pointing to further growth
that we have been citing over the last couple of meetings are still in
place. In fact, I think some of those factors have solidified.
Financial markets generally continue to support growth. With the
decline in long-term rates, the yield curve has come into a flatter
and more normal alignment. We have had some excitement in the equity
markets during the intermeeting period, but much of the correction,
particularly in the blue chips, has reversed itself and there has been
substantial recovery. If we were to have additional correction or a
sideways movement, that probably would be a healthy development in
that it would allow earnings to catch up. So, I think the equity
markets remain a quite reasonable source of capital. Banks generally
appear to be providing ample credit and they seem to be adjusting
their credit terms to changing circumstances. Inventories are in
reasonably good shape. Growth in business investment is down from
1994 and 1995, but this sector of the economy is still a contributor
to the expansion. As long as people are working, I do not think that
we will see a big pullback in consumption expenditures.
On the inflation front, a lot of people have commented on the
surprisingly good inflation numbers, and I think that performance is
particularly notable in view of the length of the current expansion.
We have had an uptick in some of the indexes, although it can be said
that food and energy largely explain the increases in the CPI, the
PPI, and the prices of crude materials. The core indexes all show
improvement in the last twelve months over the previous twelve months.
We do not get as many readings on the deflators, which are broaderbased indexes, but they also show improvement over the last twelve
months.
Where do we go from here with respect to inflation? The
outlook for energy prices is considerably improved. I think that food
prices remain a risk. Labor cost pressures are firming and are likely
to remain a risk. With regard to the recent ECI data, it is hard for
me to believe that aggregate compensation costs can be held down
forever by improvements on the benefits side. I hope the members of
President McDonough's board of directors are right and that we are on
an ever downward trending slope in the benefits area, but I have to
tell you that I am skeptical. I can certainly understand why some of
the benefit costs may go down. State unemployment insurance costs
surely could go down, but improvements in other components seem
unlikely to be sustainable. Assuming that at some point we do not get
further improvement in benefit costs, total ECI is going to be
exerting more pressure than we currently are seeing. The question
will be whether business is going to absorb these cost pressures
either through the traditional squeeze on profit margins or through
improved productivity. I am sure that I do not want to wade into the
productivity measurement morass. The recent performance of inflation

-32-

8/20/96

leads me to believe that the economics profession does not have a good
handle on productivity measurement. I am sensitive to the comments by
manufacturers that we must be doing better than the estimated 1
percent trend in productivity improvement. But in case the statistics
are right, we still have the profit-margins safety valve. As much as
business managers do not want to report declining profits to their
boards of directors, they have had to do so on occasion. So profit
margins remain a safety valve.
In sum, we have had additional confirmation of an economy
that is on a sustainable growth path or even better. There has not
been any significantly bad inflation news since our last meeting, but
I have to say that the risks remain on the up side.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Governor Lindsey.

MR. LINDSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think Governor
Phillips said it well when she said we have more data but not more
information, and maybe that is good. I have two observations. The
first is on the business use of credit cards, which I think is
certainly happening. In fact, small businesses have always used
credit cards as a means of finance, and that use has expanded. It has
expanded in part because a lot of the small businesses that are
created now involve people who had lost their previous jobs through
downsizings or are now in a relationship with their employers that
involves consulting. As a result, it is natural for these people to
go to credit card financing. However, that is not necessarily a basis
for optimism.
First, if the entrepreneur is not careful, the apparent 6.9
percent or other low rate of interest is in fact quite expensive
financing because, if the entrepreneur is mingling private consumption
debt with business debt, the IRS will quickly disallow the deduction
of the interest. For example, for a middle class entrepreneur, a 6.9
percent credit card debt is like a 10.8 percent business loan. That
tax consequence has not been featured in Money Magazine or on the
front page of the business column of the Wall Street Journal, but I
think entrepreneurs will be finding out about it soon if in fact that
is what they are doing.
Second, with regard to the riskiness of credit card debt, it
is important to recall that the proprietary type of income is in the
personal income numbers. There is no real capital behind what these
people are doing. They are basically in the service sector. There
may be a computer in the business; but we all know what the resale
market for computers looks like, so there is no significant amount of
capital behind what they are doing. In a sense, they are giving
themselves a consumption loan, but they call it a business loan, and
they pay themselves higher salaries than otherwise with the difference
in interest. The result is no different from anyone else running up a
credit card debt to buy, say, a vacation. So, I think Gary Stern's
point is well taken, and if anything I think we should be a little
more concerned about small-business-based financing than we are about
general financing with credit cards.
As far as the economic data are concerned, we are going to
get more data and we may or may not get more information in the
intermeeting period. Where I would think that we have a risk,

-33-

8/20/96

however, is not in the U.S. economy. I think our risk will stem from
the activities of our good friends located not far from the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York in the Second District and our compatriots
around the world returning from the beach and looking for a source of
money to be made. In fact, there is a great deal of money to be made
in speculating on the European Monetary Union or nonunion or whatever.
In that regard, there are two obvious events and probably a lot more
that are not obvious. One is the French budget, which will be a fake
and everyone knows it. The question is, how much of a fake? That
should cause a little instability with regard to the franc/mark
convergence. The other event--to call it an event really is not fair
--is the Italian government, which provides an ongoing spectacle.
France and Italy both are risky. I think there will be lots of bets
on both the franc and the lira and maybe on the Spanish peseta that
will tend to push money into marks. For some reason that I am not
fully comprehending, the consequence is not just a mark/franc gain or
mark/lira gain. The dollar tends to lose when the mark appreciates.
I think this situation is risky for us for two reasons. The first is
a long-run fundamental reason and that is that a weaker dollar will
result in a net stimulus to the U.S. economy at a time when we really
do not need any extra stimulus. The greater risk is that it will
tempt policymakers to intervene. I think that would be a serious
mistake. We should be ever vigilant in watching the data come in, but
I see that as the key piece of information that actually poses a
policy risk for a potential intermeeting move.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Governor Yellen.

GOVERNOR YELLEN. I had naively hoped that with the long
intermeeting interval and so many key data releases that the fog of
uncertainty hovering above the forecast might lift by the time of this
meeting. Unfortunately, as many of you noted, the body of incoming
data has provided only modest illumination with respect to the two
fundamental issues that cloud the outlook. Those are, as many of you
have indicated, whether aggregate demand is poised to slow toward
trend and whether core inflation is in the process of accelerating.
My answers to these questions really are identical to those of
Governor Meyer.
On the first issue, I agree with him and many of you and with
the analysis of the Greenbook. It seems to me that most labor market
and demand-side indicators along with the Beigebook and other
anecdotal reports do offer tentative evidence pointing to a slowdown
in demand growth beginning this quarter. But, unfortunately, the
extent and timing of the moderation in demand remain highly uncertain
and significant risks remain. I would enumerate two. With inventorysales ratios at relatively low levels, a surge of inventory investment
with attendant multiplier-accelerator feedbacks seems to me to be a
definite upside risk. Another risk is from the stock market. Present
market valuations appear to be based on earnings expectations that are
highly optimistic. Market participants could easily be disappointed,
particularly if productivity performance is disappointing and wage
pressures intensify, thereby setting the stage for a very significant
correction.
With respect to the inflation outlook, my opinion is little
changed from last time. Labor markets clearly remain tight, but
unemployment has not decisively broken out of its recent range. And,

-34-

8/20/96

as Governor Meyer emphasized, broad measures of price inflation are
still declining. If one smoothes through the noise, it seems to me
that the trend toward a more rapid pace of wage and salary growth is
quite firmly established. At the same time, growth in benefit costs
remains well contained, at least thus far, and I also found the Vice
Chairman's comments about the prospects here a hopeful sign. The
bottom line is that we have a very mild acceleration in the pace of
nominal compensation growth, which is of course what matters to unit
labor costs. In spite of this uptick, though, nominal compensation
growth still remains well below the pace that historical econometric
relations would be predicting, and the uptick may thus simply reflect
a rebound toward a more normal level. So, assuming that productivity
growth recovers somewhat toward its past trend of roughly 1 percent-and I agree that is a significant assumption--or that profit margins
erode somewhat, I think that the present pace of compensation growth
should be consistent with stable inflation rates in broad measures of
product prices.
Now, suppose someone, and that someone is not I, firmly
adheres to the view that the economy is currently operating at NAIRU
and not below it. Can one point to anything in the recent pattern of
wage and price behavior that would provide strong evidence against
that view? Here I would agree with Governor Meyer; I think the answer
is no. On the other hand, historical evidence strongly suggests that
NAIRU is higher than 5.4 percent, so it would be both dangerous and
foolish to discount the possibility that the modest uptick in
compensation that we are now seeing is the beginning of a process
that, if left unchecked, will lead to gradually accelerating
inflation. I think the minimum wage increase does compound the risks.
When I reviewed the transcript of our last meeting, I found myself in
strong agreement with the way Governor Kelley summarized the situation
and, of course, with what he said today. Last time, he noted that "it
is very correct to be suspicious of the notion that this time things
have changed because assuming that is a classic trap and frequently a
loser's cry."
I completely agree. He then went on to reason, as he
did today, that there are actually very strong indications that things
have indeed changed. I also agree.
[Laughter] In other words, I am
"conflicted." I consider the Greenbook inflation forecast pessimistic
simply because it assigns virtually no weight to the possibility that
things have changed.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Governor Rivlin, top that.

MS. RIVLIN. Let me put a slightly more positive cast on the
same facts. It seems to me that we are being a little hard on
ourselves. Actually, we should be fairly pleased not only with the
way the economy is performing, but with our general understanding of
it as expressed at the last meeting. There may have been no definitive data during the intermeeting period, but at least there have been
no surprises. Everything that has come in has been pretty consistent
with what we thought. In July, we knew that the economy clearly was
growing above its potential, that labor markets were very tight, that
there was beginning to be some indication of wage acceleration but
offset by the behavior of benefit costs, and that there was little or
no evidence of accelerating price inflation. We were all a little
queasy about the forecast of a slowdown because we could not see the
slowdown anywhere in the available data. It was not happening yet,
and there were two big questions. One was, would the slowdown in fact

8/20/96

-35-

occur and begin to be evident? And the more fundamental question was,
could we continue to run labor markets this tight without incurring
accelerating inflation? To put it more technically, was there a NAIRU
and where was it? Was it indeed lower than we had thought? The
inflation risk was clearly there. It seems to me that by August most
of the statistics have come in on the track that we thought they
would. The evidence of a slowdown also seems to be supported by the
anecdotal or regional information that we have heard around the table.
Labor markets are still tight, and we have had a little more evidence
of wage pressures but no evidence yet of price pressures. The minimum
wage is a new law as of today when the President signs it, but it
really is not new information. We knew about the minimum wage when we
were here last time, indeed since spring. If it was not built into
the actual Fed forecast, it certainly should have been on our minds
when we were talking about what to do because we knew the minimum wage
legislation was going to happen. So, it does seem to me that we
structured the problem about right. We see an economy probably
growing at about what we think is potential. We still do not know
whether we can sustain the currently low level of unemployment for
very long without escalating wage pressures.
I was struck by the fact that President McDonough was the
only one who mentioned the other big bill being signed by the
President this week, namely, welfare reform. That legislation not
only threatens to put a good deal of pressure on state governments,
and not just in New York, but it also puts in strong relief the
problem of how tight labor markets can be. If we are going to be
successful in integrating some of the welfare population into the
labor force, it is important that we keep labor markets pretty tight.
So, erring on the side of not precipitating a recession, without
taking on a serious risk of inflation, still seems particularly
important for that reason, not just right now but over the next
several years. My reading is that we still have the big question,
given that the expansion is slowing, as to whether labor markets are
too tight. The wage information is inconclusive, and I see no reason
for losing our nerve when we see things coming in about on the track
that we expected.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
go into recess?

Thank you.

Do we have coffee?

Shall we

[Coffee break]
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Mr. Kohn.

MR. KOHN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There must be something
in the water here! I began my briefing exactly as Governor Meyer
began his and Governor Yellen began hers, but it diverges thereafter.
I will cut through the first part of my prepared text a little.
[Statement--see Appendix.]
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Questions for Don? If not, let me see
if I can summarize and review where we are. I think we are in general
agreement that there is some evidence, at least at the margin, of a
slowing in the expansion from the frenetic pace of earlier in the
spring. Homebuilding is beginning to soften, but I think the
softening is modest at best at this moment. Certainly, the permits

8/20/96

-36-

and backlog data that came out with the starts figures for July
suggest that further significant erosion in starts does not appear
likely in August. Motor vehicle sales clearly were lower in July, as
was pointed out by Mike Moskow and in the Greenbook. A very
significant part of the decline in July was the result of the
unilateral action on the part of General Motors to curtail very
significantly its fleet sales. General Motors has been concerned
since the strike earlier this year that its inventory structure was
inadequate to supply both its fleet sales markets and its retail
markets. For obvious reasons, it chose to support its retail markets.
Nonetheless, motor vehicle sales this summer clearly are a tad softer;
and a not insignificant weakening in used car prices, especially the
ratio of used car prices to new car prices, is suggestive of a
softening market. So, I think a judgment that light motor vehicle
sales will be coming back in August, seasonally adjusted, is the
correct view, but it clearly is not one that implies a surge.
As a consequence of the weakness in sales and especially in
fleet sales, inventories of motor vehicles were built up at a fairly
significant pace in July. There also is evidence of some buildup of
inventories in the non-motor vehicle, nonfarm area. One can pick up
some evidence of this in anecdotal and state-level data and also from
models using C&I loans and commercial paper to address the question of
inventory investment. The evidence is still very marginal and most of
the inventory data that we have for the third quarter clearly relates
to motor vehicles, but I think there is no reason to disbelieve the
projection of a significant uptick in inventory investment that shows
up in the Greenbook for the third quarter. One potential explanation
of the low initial claims and insured unemployment figures may well be
that we are getting some production for inventories in the third
quarter. We are not, however, seeing any of the elements that
indicate a rush to build because we are not getting the usual signs of
delivery tightness, stretching out of lead times, and shortages of
various goods that tend to be associated with that phenomenon. Those
are the types of problems that would induce a significant increase in
safety stocks and bring on the kind of accelerated inventory
investment that creates the major problems we have seen in the past.
What seems to be involved here is not an increase in safety stocks,
but an inadvertent drawing down of inventories to levels that are
excessively lean at any existing safety stock level. Therefore, I
think stocks are being built up at this stage, and that could suggest
a somewhat higher GDP than one would normally expect. Indeed, it is
probably one of the reasons why there has been an upward revision in
the Greenbook's third-quarter GDP estimate.
Consistent with a basic slowing of the expansion, though
without any evidence of weakness or cumulative erosion, is the fact
that domestic operating profit margins finally appear to be
flattening. But the data do, nonetheless, suggest that those margins
remain high. If you were to believe the individual "bottom-up"
earnings forecasts of the securities markets, you would find that
difficult to believe. However, I think there is some merit to
Governor Yellen's suggestion that earnings forecasts are very likely
to be discouraging because all the people who do the buildup from
individual estimates are getting higher domestic operating profit
earnings than those who are doing it from the top down.

8/20/96

-37-

I think the reason for this is that we are getting mixed
evidence with respect to productivity gains. This is crucial because
if we disaggregate the total GDP data and separate manufacturing from
all other sectors, we end up with the very interesting issue that we
were discussing at the break. In the non-industrial area of the GDP,
we are simultaneously getting a very significant increase in unit
labor costs--in the 4 percent area--and a very dramatic rise in
operating profit margins. I suggest to you that while those are
reconcilable arithmetically, and indeed the data will reconcile, we do
not get the sense that everything will be coming out exactly the way
that the markets presume. We are getting anecdotal reports of
productivity improvements in the manufacturing and industrial area
even when we move a lot of the temporary worker hours from the
services area into the manufacturing area, which is where they should
be. So, manufacturing productivity is strong; it squares with the
anecdotal information. Profit margins are rising in manufacturing but
less so than in nonmanufacturing. Something has to change in this
data system, and I am frankly curious to see how it ultimately will
come out at the end of the day.
The flattening of profit margins on the presumption that that
is indeed happening is consistent with the expectation that the
expansion in the capital goods market will gradually slow down. Yet,
there is no doubt in my view that it is premature to assume that the
economy is backing off its unsustainable rate of expansion. Product
markets do not exhibit much pressure; that is, we are not getting any
pronounced upside pressure in industrial commodity prices, lead times
are dull, and inventory shortages do not appear to exist.
Nonetheless, there exists a tautness in labor markets that has been
there all year long, and I think, as has been discussed at length
around this table, the crucial inflation question that we confront is
on the labor side. Our difficulties lie with the issue of tight labor
markets leading to increased wage pressures not offset by productivity
improvements. The issue that the Vice Chairman raised with respect to
benefits is one that I, too, hear out on the hustings. That is, while
everyone acknowledges that the sharp deceleration in the cost of
health insurance benefits largely reflects the dramatic shift from
fee-for-service to managed care, it is apparently not correct to
presume that the end of the adjustment will occur when we reach the
point where 98 percent of workers are in managed care. There has been
dramatic pressure from the business community to move from fee-forservice to managed care. When that is completed, they are going to go
straight at the managed-care providers the way the Vice Chairman
suggests. Whether they are successful or not remains to be seen, as
Governor Phillips quite appropriately suggests, but I do not think the
automatic elimination of further containment of benefit costs is
necessarily an obvious forecast.
Nonetheless, with the U.S. economy operating at high levels
and very little evidence of cumulative weakness in recent data, the
risks are and remain unquestionably on the high side. It would not
take much to induce strong final demand that would require an
accelerated inventory buildup coming from safety stock concerns. This
is the type of development that occurred in 1994 but is not as yet
showing any signs of emerging. Consumer confidence unquestionably is
high, and the balance sheets of households, with the obvious exception
of the debt problems in some of the middle-to-lower income households,
are in very good shape.

-38-

8/20/96

While there appears little upside margin, alternatively it
would not take much softening to reduce pressure on markets and even
labor markets with a lag. As I indicated in my Humphrey-Hawkins
testimony, I believe we are at a key juncture where small changes in
macro demand can tilt the economy in wholly different directions with
different outlooks. Current forecast error ranges easily encompass
either scenario. The economy has eased since the Humphrey-Hawkins
testimony but only marginally, and it would not take much to put us
back in a tightening situation. Certainly, the declines in initial
claims and unemployment insurance are not encouraging in this regard,
though that may be, as I indicated earlier, a reflection of
temporarily higher production in order to replenish perceived depleted
inventory levels. I would suggest that is more likely the case if
indeed it is showing up in the aggregate numbers rather than any
evident upsurge in final demand. Of course, while it is true at least
in the retail area that we are getting somewhat better chain store
numbers for August, the sales figures for the week ended August 17th
that came out this morning tilt down again. The chain store numbers
do appear to be modestly better seasonally adjusted for August than
for July, but it does not appear to me to be a big deal, and the
improvement does not fully reverse the weaknesses that were apparent
in both June and July retail sales data.
As far as policy is concerned, if the economy is in the
process of growing at an unsustainable pace or moving in that
direction, raising the federal funds rate only 25 basis points is not
going to help much at this stage. Fifty to seventy-five basis points
would more likely be required. Although the real funds rate is only a
shade off its peak for this cycle, a much larger increase should not
be necessary if indeed we have moved toward an unsustainable pace of
economic growth. Had we been in a firming mode this year, it would
seem prudent to me to tack on an additional 25 basis points at this
meeting, as we did under not dissimilar circumstances in early 1995.
But any upward move at this point implies a reversal of trend, which
the markets will quickly price in, reflecting our increased
credibility. They believe we have insights that they do not have; and
my suspicion is that is a dubious proposition to say the least.

The

one scenario that I would very much like to avoid is our reversal of
the trend and moving the funds rate upward just as the economy is in
the process of measurably slowing down. As I indicated in July, our
policy stance is not sufficiently out of line currently to require
that we move quickly. I had expected that conditions by now would
dictate the reversal of trend, but as a consequence of evidence
suggesting some slowing in the economy, the case has become less
compelling than I thought it would be. I believe that we can
prudently hold off for a while to assess developments to make a
determination of whether or not the economy is moving at an
accelerated pace or gradually beginning to ratchet down. Nonetheless,
if we do choose alternative B, which is the one I would like to

propose, I trust we will continue our asymmetric bias.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
MR. LINDSEY.

Governor Lindsey.

I support your proposal.

VICE CHAIRMAN MCDONOUGH.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Yes, I support the proposal.

President Boehne.

-39-

8/20/96

PRESIDENT BOEHNE.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

I support your proposal.

President Broaddus.

PRESIDENT BROADDUS. Mr. Chairman, as I said earlier today,
my main focus has been on the second of the two questions we have been
looking at. The possibility clearly laid out in the staff forecast is
that the trend inflation rate is set to increase even if there is some
further slowing in the growth of demand. Given this situation, I
still favor some tightening of monetary policy. I think there is
already ample evidence that the level of economic activity warrants
what I would describe as a moderate mid-course correction to reverse
at least part of the easing that was undertaken last winter. I must
say that I was impressed by Don Kohn's comments about inertia and the
potential cost of waiting to take this action. I recognize that the
financial markets are not looking for any tightening action today and
that such an action would be a surprise. But it seems to me that such
an action could be quite beneficial to the atmosphere of the markets
in the weeks ahead. The markets have been, it seems to me,
exceptionally edgy over the last intermeeting period. They know there
is an inflationary risk, and they are not sure how or when we are
going to deal with it, especially given the fact that we have not
acted to date. The situation and the atmosphere are almost
reminiscent of the early part of 1994, after we made our initial move,
when the markets were still waiting for the other shoe to drop. Only
this time they are waiting for the first shoe to drop. A 50 basis
point move today would essentially drop both shoes. You suggested in
essence in your comments that the markets would likely conclude that
such a move would be all or nearly all that would be required if in
fact the expansion continues to decelerate. So a 50 basis point move
would be what I would favor today. Beyond any longer-term settling
effect it might have on the markets, a relatively decisive action like
this would put everybody on notice that we firmly intend to keep our
commitment to hold the line on inflation. It would be a very clear
signal for anyone who needs it. Finally, while I still think a 50
basis point move is the better move, in this case a quarter of a loaf
is better than none. So if 1/2 point is not acceptable, I would
recommend that we consider doing 1/4 point. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Stern.

MR. STERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe that the
risks to economic performance are on the high side in the sense that
the stage is set for more wage and price inflation than is desirable
and perhaps than market participants expect. To be sure, the price
data so far this year can be read favorably, but I know I am preaching
to the converted in saying that we have to be forward-looking. There
has been a lot of discussion of productivity and, of course,
productivity is important; it matters for a lot of things. But the
productivity performance notwithstanding, whether we have mismeasured
it or not, we do know for sure that output growth so far this year is
unsustainable because employment growth thus far this year has been
roughly twice the sustainable growth of the labor force. Initial
claims data suggest that this may be continuing. There are also signs
that aggregate demand, in fact, is moderating. But the evidence is
preliminary on this score, and it is not at all clear that it will
moderate to a degree that will significantly change the labor market
conditions I just described. Given the risks as I perceive them,

-40-

8/20/96

waiting to act might damage our credibility, and more importantly in
my view, might well make it more difficult for us to contain
inflationary pressures. This could ultimately produce circumstances
that would threaten the ongoing expansion of the economy. Moving
modestly toward restraint now would seem to entail relatively little
risk to economic performance and moreover could start us down the road
that over time would not just contain inflationary pressures but could
set the stage for some reduction in them. I would think that would be
a prudent course of action and favorable for the long-term health of
the economy.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Parry.

MR. PARRY. Mr. Chairman, although the pace of economic
activity seems to be slowing as expected, my best estimate is that the
level of activity will remain somewhat above its long-run potential.
The economy's capacity and the effects of worker insecurity on wage
pressures, of course, are subject to uncertainty. In my opinion and
that of the Greenbook, we face rising inflation. The inflation
increases projected by the staffs at our Bank and the Board imply that
the current level of short-term rates will cause inflation to
accelerate through the forecast horizon and beyond. I am persuaded by
this year's pickup in labor costs and the projected increase in all of
the inflation indexes in the Greenbook. Therefore, I believe it is
prudent to raise the funds rate by at least 25 basis points.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Vice Chairman.

VICE CHAIRMAN MCDONOUGH. Mr. Chairman, I am persuaded by
your explanation of what is going on and the situation we find
ourselves in, but I am chastened by Don Kohn's presentation of the
risk of an excessively slow reaction to a policy requirement. I
support your proposal. I think that a 25 basis point increase in the
face of a market expectation of no action would be extremely risky in
that it would absolutely assure the market that it would be 25 plus 25
plus God knows when that would end, and this would tank every market
that I can think of. When we move, it would seem to me that the move
should be 50 basis points and that we would try to explain it as a
recalibration of monetary policy. That is fairly risky in that I am
not sure that there would be three people outside this room who would
believe it. But at least to me it makes more sense than to do 25 and
to start what would definitely be interpreted as the installment plan.
I think the economy is at that balance point at which--as you
suggested, Mr. Chairman--a move of policy now with the assumption that
we know all kinds of things we really do not know, would be very
likely to produce an excessive market reaction, which could very well
tilt the economy into much slower growth than is either desirable or
appropriate. So, recognizing that the risks are on the high side and
therefore the directive should be asymmetric, the better judgment now
is to maintain the fed funds rate at its present level. Therefore, I
support your recommendation.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Jordan.

MR. JORDAN. I agree with your characterization of the
situation and the kind of decision that we are faced with, Mr.
Chairman, and I agree with the remarks that the Vice Chairman just

-41-

8/20/96

made. I thought we were correct in our use of the installment plan to
lower the funds rate the last three times we did so after it had
peaked at 6 percent. I do not think that we would be correct in
starting off on an installment plan now because we would be saying
that we misjudged the economy and the inflationary pressures--that we
should not have been cutting the funds rate in the first place, and we
have to roll it all the way back up to 6 percent. That would be a
very, very strong message.
I want to explain to the staff of this Committee what it
would take to persuade me that they are right about the outlook. I
will put it in the form of a challenge. I will not blame you if you
do not like the way I am going to characterize this, [laughter] but
what you have said to me is that the minimum wage increase is
expansionary for the economy. You have said that raising the minimum
wage and other wages carries through to higher prices, lowers real
interest rates, and therefore expands the economy at a faster pace.
Thus, if we raise the minimum wage to $10, we will have a roaring
boom. This just defies credibility to me. So, I have to judge my
policy decision on the basis of a disbelief in the Greenbook forecast
for nominal spending. I do not even believe the real part, but the
nominal part bothers me more because of its direction. I cannot get
away from the idea that the purchasing power of the dollar has
something to do with the dollar and the supply and demand for it, and
that what we are trying to do is to stabilize the value of the dollar.
I would like to have a definite time horizon for when we are going to
stabilize the purchasing power of the dollar and keep it there. When
I see your recent numbers and the projection of central bank money
growth accelerating, I have to be concerned. But I have a great deal
of trouble separating out what is going on in the demand for foreign
uses of our currency, that component of central bank money, and the
contraction in the reserve balance component of it. I would have to
assume that the demand for reserves is contracting even faster than
the supply of reserves in order to conclude that we are seeing greater
inflationary pressure. I think there is no evidence for that. If you
have evidence and you can convince me, then I would change my mind.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
MS. MINEHAN.

President Minehan.

I ask myself, what are we doing here?

[Laughter]
SPEAKER(?).

That's a pretty good question.

Do you have an

answer?
MS. MINEHAN. Yes, I have an answer to that. We are trying
to keep the economy on track. We are trying to keep inflation low so
as to provide the best atmosphere for economic growth. This is not
easy to do, and we have not always been very successful at it. But we
have been more successful over the last 10 years and particularly over
the last 5 years than we had been in earlier years. Part of that is
because we have tried to put an emphasis on being forward-looking.
Looking back over the long run, it seems to me that most of the times
when we could with 20/20 hindsight characterize the Fed as having made
an error, it was mostly on the side of waiting too long, as Don Kohn
has mentioned, and then having to move harder than we would have had
to otherwise, clamping down and feeding into the business cycle. I
probably have the name of this philosopher wrong but I think it was

-42-

8/20/96

Santayana who said that "those who ignore the lessons of history are
doomed to repeat it."
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
MS. MINEHAN.
that.

You are correct.

Good, I am glad.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
[Laughter]

The last time I spoke to him, he said

MS. MINEHAN.
You are older and wiser than I am, Mr.
Chairman! Now, it may be that the experience of the last 8 to 10
quarters is a signal that the economy is changing. But we are
starting to see wage pressures and we are starting to see a flattening
out, if not an upturn, in most of the broad measures of inflation. In
this environment, I do not think we can be quite as sanguine as many
have suggested. I think we need to be very humble about our forecasts
of the GDP slowdown being enough to guide this rather large and
cumbersome plane totally on instruments without human intervention, at
least at this point in time. I think we need a course correction. I
think we need to step in and start steering this economy a little bit.
Now, it seems to me that if, in the expectation that the expansion
would be slower, we adjusted policy in 25 basis point increments, then
we could start to steer it against an upside threat in small
increments as well. It might be that the markets will overreact, but
I think that overreaction would be short-lived. I do not necessarily
believe that they would think we are all knowing because many of them
have seen the same trends that we see in some of the data. I am
conscious of the fact that a lot of what we are getting from the
markets has more to do with how they think we are going to react
rather than how they think we should react. If some uptick in the
markets, particularly to the extent that it increases costs, takes
them back up to perhaps where they were earlier in the year, that
might be helpful in restraining some of the possible sources of
overshooting that might be in the GDP forecast.
So, I would agree with those who recommended a course
correction at this point. I could go with 25 basis points.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Guynn.

MR. GUYNN. Mr. Chairman, I support your recommendation.
Although it is difficult to judge the stance of policy with any great
precision, it is still my sense that with our current policy and the
slowing of economic activity that we are beginning to see, we likely
will be able to sustain a pace of moderate growth without a pickup in
the broader-based measures of inflation. Consequently, I would have a
preference for keeping the current funds rate of 5-1/4 percent in
place and giving things a chance to play out a bit more. I am
certainly comfortable with the asymmetrical directive.
Having said that, I again would like to join those who
continue to urge us to do additional study and debate, both inside and
outside the System, on the costs and benefits of a policy aimed at
moving inflation rates still lower. Current circumstances and those
likely to be immediately ahead may in fact provide us an excellent
opportunity to pursue such a policy.

-43-

8/20/96

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Hoenig.

MR. HOENIG. Mr. Chairman, I believe that we should increase
the federal funds rate now at least 1/4 percent. As I read the
evidence, inflation is not slowing. I think that is a fact and that
the indications are that it will rise. I would also argue that even
small but persistent increases in inflation over time can have a
fairly dramatic effect on the purchasing power of the dollar when
compounded. Also, in the context of our currently strong economy and
the objective of sustaining growth over the long term--and I recognize
that policy involves balancing risks--I believe that a small increase
now would bring more benefits in terms of moderating the inflationary
pressures that are facing us than the risks it would incur of
accelerating the economic slowdown that is worrying us to some degree.
I think it would be prudent for us to take this action now. The
economy can afford this action, and I think the long-term benefits
would be greater for us.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
MR. KELLEY.

Governor Kelley.

I support your recommendation, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Governor Rivlin.

MS. RIVLIN. I support your recommendation, Mr. Chairman. It
seems to me that to move up now, when we did not in July and when we
have seen evidence of the slowing of the economy, would be a very hard
thing to explain and would risk a different kind of credibility. You
said in your Humphrey-Hawkins testimony that we expected the economy
to slow. Now we are seeing that it is, and suddenly we would be
moving in a direction not suggested by that slowing. Clearly the
risks of inflation are there. We have to remain vigilant. I still
believe it is possible that we will not have to move; I do not think
that is the general view around this table. The general view seems to
be that it is a question of when rather than whether. We will know
more as time goes on. It is more likely that we will have to move at
some time if this economy does not slow more than predicted by the
Greenbook, but I believe we have time to make that decision.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Melzer.

MR. MELZER. Thanks, Alan. With respect to the stance of
policy, I would say with some conviction that I do not think it is
restrictive and quite likely it is accommodative, whether we look at

the growth rates of monetary aggregates or a funds rate that has not
moved in the face of rising market interest rates. I think the risk
is that inflation will move higher and perhaps more importantly, it
will move higher from a level that I think is already unacceptable.
We ought to be moving closer to price stability, not moving away from
it. As a result, I would favor an increase in the funds rate today
and, for reasons that have been stated by others, an increase of 50
basis points.
Let me just make a couple of other comments quickly. I think
we are suffering from the fact that we do not have a nominal anchor
for monetary policy. We do not seem to have a way to make a judgment
about what the stance of policy is and relate that to a longer-run
inflation outlook. As a result, I think we have become excessively

-44-

8/20/96

focused on what is happening with respect to growth as opposed to
looking at inflation. I think our actions have in fact been
asymmetric. We have tended to show in our actions in recent months
more concern about the prospect of slowing growth than we have about
rising inflation, let alone getting inflation lower. I think we have
gotten away with it so far because a good bit of credibility has been
built up over the last 5 or 10 years, and for good reason. But if our
indicator of the time to move is seeing the whites of inflation's
eyes--I have not heard anybody explicitly say that, but I worry about
that sometimes--when we get to that point, we will have lost a good
bit of credibility and will probably be looking at a very ugly end to
this expansion just to contain inflation, as others have said.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
MR. MCTEER.

President McTeer.

I support your recommendation.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Governor Phillips.

MS. PHILLIPS. Mr. Chairman, I also support "B" asymmetric.
My suspicion is that at some point we are going to need to tighten,
but to me the timing is not clear. If the expansion continues at an
above-trend pace, the inflationary pressures are bound to prevail. On
the other hand, if productivity is better than the historical levels,
the move could be deferred. So it seems to me for now that "B"
asymmetric is the right move.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Governor Yellen.

MS. YELLEN. Mr. Chairman, I support your recommendation. I
continue to consider the inflationary risks biased to the up side. I
believe we have agreed that regardless of whether we prefer
opportunistic or deliberate strategies, we should resist any sustained
uptick in inflation. I support that policy. I also think Don Kohn
has properly warned us that if we are actually below NAIRU and fail to
act, all we will end up doing is buying more output and more jobs now
at the expense of less output and fewer jobs later, in effect adding
to cyclical fluctuations rather than mitigating them. Ordinarily, I
would prefer a preemptive approach to controlling inflation rather
than, as Tom Melzer put it, simply waiting to shoot until we have seen
the whites of its eyes.
Nevertheless, I think the current situation is unusual. In
spite of the apparent inflation risk, which has been present now for a
considerable time, inflation has been declining, not increasing, and
now demand finally appears to be moderating. So, the level of
uncertainty about the future course of inflation under current policy
settings is extremely high. And particularly because a move today
would constitute a change of direction and a surprise to the public
and to financial markets, I would prefer to have a slightly higher
degree of confidence that a policy change is actually needed before
making one. In situations where forecast uncertainly is extremely
high, I, at least, find it appealing to look for some guidance from
the recommendations of sensible feedback rules, so I would simply
reiterate what Don Kohn pointed out, which is that the funds rate
judged by Taylor's Rule or other simple benchmarks is now at quite a
reasonable level given current levels of unemployment and inflation.
On the other hand, the rule definitely calls for a policy adjustment

8/20/96

-45-

if either of two things occurs: first, if the degree of labor market
slack declines appreciably, presumably because demand fails to slow as
we anticipate; or second, if broad inflation measures rise. Under
those conditions, I would certainly support a tightening of policy.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Governor Meyer.

MR. MEYER. Mr. Chairman, I also support your recommendation
that we make no change in policy at this meeting and retain an
asymmetric directive. This position reflects my willingness to
support trend growth at full employment with stable modest inflation
in the near term, patiently awaiting opportunity down the road for
renewed progress toward price stability. I simply am not persuaded at
this point that the current policy setting is inconsistent with stable
inflation. Given the lags in response to monetary policy,
particularly when it comes to inflation, it is often prudent to move
to change policy on the basis of forecasts, and that is the challenge
that the staff forecast presents to us today. But my willingness to
move preemptively in this case has to be conditioned by what seems to
me the inconsistency in the story that the current unemployment rate
is too low to sustain stable inflation, given that we have seen stable
inflation for the last two years. So at this point, I think it would
be prudent to hold the line and wait for additional data.
Nevertheless, I think there are risks of higher growth and there are
undoubtedly risks that inflation at the current unemployment rate
might move up. Therefore, I think the asymmetric directive is very
reasonable. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

President Moskow.

MR. MOSKOW. Mr. Chairman, I support your recommendation for
a "B" asymmetric directive, but as I mentioned in my comments, I am
concerned about the labor cost pressures exceeding productivity. I
also am concerned about the potential for allowing some upcreep in
inflation to be built into the economy late this year and in 1997. Of
course, waiting makes the September and the November meetings very
crucial decision points.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Would you, Mr. Secretary, read "B"

asymmetric.

MR. BERNARD. The wording is on page 13 of the Bluebook:
"In
the implementation of policy for the immediate future, the Committee
seeks to maintain the existing degree of pressure on reserve
positions. In the context of the Committee's long-run objectives for
price stability and sustainable economic growth, and giving careful
consideration to economic, financial, and monetary developments,
somewhat greater reserve restraint would or slightly lesser reserve
restraint might be acceptable in the intermeeting period. The
contemplated reserve conditions are expected to be consistent with
moderate growth in M2 and M3 over coming months."
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

Call the roll.

MR. BERNARD.
Chairman Greenspan
Vice Chairman McDonough

Yes
Yes

President Boehne

Yes

-46-

8/20/96

President Jordan
Governor Kelley
Governor Lindsey
President McTeer
Governor Meyer
Governor Phillips
Governor Rivlin
President Stern
Governor Yellen
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
September 24th.

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Thank you.

The next meeting is Tuesday,

VICE CHAIRMAN MCDONOUGH. Can I make one correction?
Earlier
in our discussion, I asked Don Kohn and Peter Fisher to come forward
with the reverse repo recommendation in September. Actually, it makes
more sense to do it in November.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.

So be it.

We adjourn for lunch.

END OF MEETING