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APPENDIX

Notes for FOMC Meeting
August 20, 1985
Sam Y. Cross

The dollar dropped further since your last meeting, falling
about 6 percent against most Continental currencies and nearly 3 percent
against the yen. It is now about 17-18 percent below the peaks of last
February.
Ever since the release of June U.S. employment data just before
your last meeting, market sentiment towards the dollar has become
progressively more bearish. Economic statistics released since then
have been seen as confirming the slow pace of U.S. growth. Most
exchange market participants have thus ceased to expect a strong reacceleration in the third quarter that might soon reverse the dollar's
downward trend. In addition, the dollar's support from an image of
strong U.S. leadership in economic policy has eroded, particularly after
the failure to achieve a persuasive budget-reducing compromise before
Congress adjourned in July. Public statements by Administration
officials, saying that they would like to see the dollar fall more, may
have contributed to the bearish tone of the dollar.
The view prevails that the Federal Reserve will avoid any
significant tightening of its monetary policy stance so long as the U.S.
economy looks so weak. Under these circumstances, the dollar did not
rise in response to recent evidence of rapid growth in the monetary
aggregates. Even last week's release of an oversized $5.3 billion
increase in M1 had virtually no effect on dollar exchange rates.
So far at least, there seem to be few signs that an early
pickup in U.S. inflation is expected, with expectations influenced by
oil and other world commodity prices.
The weakness of the dollar appears even more significant if one
takes account of the fact that U.S. interest rates have been rising
while interest rates in Germany and elsewhere have been declining.
Interest rate differentials favoring the dollar over the mark have
thereby widened during the period by about a percentage point. In
response to the dollar's decline in the exchange market, there have been
some feelings that foreign investors might become less willing to
acquire more dollar-denominated securities, or that they would do so
only on a hedged basis, and a concern that if foreign capital flows into
the United States subsided U.S. interest rates would rise. But the
substantial degree of foreign participation in the latest Treasury
refunding has, at least for the time being, apparently mitigated fears
of large-scale withdrawal of foreign investors, particularly Japanese
investors, from U.S. securities markets.
A significant feature of the recent period has been the
relative buoyancy of the German mark. The mark has risen against most

European currencies since the realignment of the EMS over the weekend of
July 20-21. That realignment provided effectively for a 7.8 percent
devaluation of the Italian lira relative to its EMS bilateral central
rates, and roughly a 4 percent depreciation in terms of market rates
with other EMS member currencies. The devaluation of the lira led to
some fears of further EMS realignments and has generated the hedging of
investments denominated in the French and Belgian francs-- currencies
which have been attractive for investment because of their high interest
rates, but which could be regarded as candidates for devaluation in a
future realignment.
The German mark and the Dutch guilder have generally benefitted
from these EMS hedging operations. This strength shows through as these
two currencies tend to gain across the board even as interest rates are
pushed steadily lower by their central banks. Last week's
announcements that discount and Lombard rates in these two countries
were lowered by 1/2 percentage point were thus taken in stride, with
some market participants even viewing them as a sign of renewed
confidence in the German mark's strength relative to the dollar.
The pace of foreign central banks' interventions to buy dollars
has slowed since the Italian devaluation, as several EMS central banks
have had to sell both dollars and marks to support their currencies
within the joint float. Still, the dollar's fall has received
cushioning over the period since your July meeting from central banks'
net purchases of about $1.6 billion in dollars to add to their reserves-and also from their net sales of $3.8 billion equivalent of German
marks.
Mr. Chairman, the only operation I have to report is the
repayment by Argentina last Thursday of the first installment of its
drawing on the $483 million facility that was established with the
support of twelve monetary authorities last June. The U.S. Treasury was
repaid half of the $142.9 million Argentina had drawn on its swap
arrangement, leaving the other half to be repaid by September 30. The
entire twelve-country facility now has $230 million still outstanding,
of $460 million that was initially drawn. The Argentine repayment
followed action by the IMF's Board approving a new Fund standby of SDR
1.18 billion.

PETER D. STERNLIGHT
NOTES FOR FOMC MEETING
AUGUST 20, 1985

Desk operations since the July meeting have been conducted against
a background of initially moderate, but then sharply strengthening,
growth in M1, appreciable strength in M2 and relative weakness in M3.
News on the economy was mixed, suggesting some growth but not really
much pick-up from the sluggish pace of the first half of the year.
Signs of inflation remained subdued, although the further weakening of
the dollar was a reminder that price pressures could re-emerge.

In this setting, operations were first directed at maintaining
about the same degree of pressure on bank reserve positions as was
sought before the last meeting--characterized by a $350 million level of
seasonal and adjustment borrowing in constructing the reserve path.

By

the beginning of August, with M1 pushing well above its new range, M2
also fairly strong, a softish dollar and moderate economic growth, a
very slightly less accommodative posture was adopted, with the path
level of borrowing placed in a $350-$450 million range.
level was used in path construction.

A $400 million

At the same time, the path level

for excess reserves was raised by $50 million to $700 million, making it
closer to the higher levels that have prevailed on average this year.
Using this more realistic level of excess reserves tends to reduce the
need to allow informally at times for higher excess reserve demand.
Taken together, the small path adjustments in borrowing and excess
reserves imply a very slight, barely perceptible, lessening of reserve
availability.

Indeed, the net effect is probably just to place the

intended degree of reserve pressure a bit closer to what most market
observers seem to have had in mind right along for the past couple of
months--that is, a borrowing level around $400-$500 million.

Borrowing averaged a relatively high $800 million in the reserve
maintenance period ended July 17, which included the last Committee
meeting date.

In part, that high level stemmed from the sharp borrowing

surge on July 3 which automatically carried over to the start of the new
period on Thursday, July 4.

To some extent, the high borrowing in that

period also reflected a bit of caution on the Desk's part in meeting
reserve needs when more vigorous action might have fed unwarranted
market anticipations of an easier policy tilt.
the time of the Humphrey-Hawkins testimony.

This was right around

In the July 31 period,

borrowing averaged a modestly-over-path $411 million while nonborrowed
reserves were even further above their objective as excess reserves ran
quite high.

The August 14 maintenance period saw borrowing average $481

million, also a little above the path level which was now $400 million.
Nonborrowed reserves in that case ended up slightly below path, again
partly because of relatively cautious reserve provision against a
backdrop of accelerating M1 growth.

So far in the current reserve

period (through the past weekend) borrowing is averaging about $565
million.

Federal funds averages for full two-week periods recently have
been in a range of about 7-3/4 to 7-7/8 percent, with daily trading
sometimes as low as around 7-1/2 or as high as 8-3/4 percent.

Thus far

in the current reserve period, which started on the heels of a fairly
tight close-out to the previous period and also began on the day of a
major Treasury financing settlement, funds have averaged about 8-1/4
percent, although trailing off to about 7-3/4 percent by late yesterday.
It's probably fair to say that in the perception of market participants,
the expected funds rate has firmed a shade in the past several weeks-from about 7-5/8 to 7-3/4 in mid-July to more like 7-3/4 to 7-7/8 or
even 7-3/4 to 8 percent more recently.

Desk activity was relatively light during the interval as reserve
availability relative to path shifted between moderate shortages and
excesses.

Outright System holdings were increased by a modest $328

million, reflecting purchases of about $600 million of Treasury
securities from foreign accounts partly offset by run-offs of Treasury
bills and agency issues.

The Desk arranged System repurchase agreements

on only one occasion but passed through customer repos about a dozen
times.

Matched sale-purchase transactions in the market were done just

once to drain temporarily redundant reserves.

Market yields rose moderately over the intermeeting period amid
shifting assessments of the outlook for the economy and monetary policy.
At the outset, there were narrowly divided views about the prospect for
further policy moves toward the accommodative side, but some of the
incoming news and reports on the Chairman's Humphrey-Hawkins testimony
led observers to downgrade the likelihood of near-term easing.
Disappointment with the budget process and the approach of the
Treasury's August coupon financing augmented the market's uneasiness.
Once rates had risen somewhat, the auctions went fairly well, aided
partly by reports suggesting continued sluggishness in the economy
rather than the second half pick-up anticipated by many observers.

While some commentators have expressed concern about money supply
growth, a more prevalent view seems to be that we are experiencing more
of the same kinds of developments that marked the first half of the
year--calling for toleration rather than sharp reaction to the outsize
money growth.

Few observers are inclined to dismiss money growth

entirely, though, and a number see its strength as at least a reason not
to expect an easing.
The Treasury raised about $15 billion of new cash over the period,
including $11.5 billion coupon bearing issues--with over $10 billion of
that in the record-sized August refunding.
about 20 to 35 basis points in yield.

Coupon issues rose a net of

With the market tending to do a

little better after the refunding auctions, all three new issues are
currently at premiums over their issue prices.

Treasury bills meantime, rose about 20 to 35 basis points for key
issues, while the Treasury raised about $3-1/2 billion in the bill
market.

In yesterday's auctions, 3- and 6-month bills sold at average

rates of 7.14 and 7.28 percent compared with 6.92 and 7.00 percent
shortly before the last meeting.

CD rates rose a bit more than bills

despite light issuance, possibly reflecting a bit of increased quality
or liquidity concerns.

Those concerns have also arisen in the Federal

agency market, where Farm Credit System paper has encountered somewhat
increased spreads against Treasury issues following press reports of
weakness in the Farm Credit System.

And in recent days, concerns about

a privately insured Maryland thrift and its mortgage marketing
subsidiary were also a factor in the market.

Turning to a concern regarding the Desk's relations with the
Government securities market, I'd like to mention that we've been giving
attention recently to the procedures by which dealers qualify to become,
or remain, primary dealers.

We have had standards for this, but we are

planning some modifications.

For one thing, we expect to clarify at

what point we would be prepared to regard an aspiring primary dealer as
a "serious prospect" from whom we would want to receive daily reports
for closer monitoring purposes before designation as a primary dealer.
Right now there are roughly a half dozen firms approaching that "serious
prospect" stage.

A couple of those firms, incidentally, are Japanese,

and this is generating some discussion about comparability
for foreign firms in the U.S. and Japanese markets.

of access

Our past approach

has been one of national treatment--viewing foreign and domestic firms
alike in applying our standards--and in fact, foreign firms have been so
informed on various occasions.

I should note, too, that several primary

dealers already are foreign-owned, although these came about through
foreign acquisition of on-going U.S. operations.

In any event, as

noted, there has recently been increased discussion of the subject, both
in the market and on the official side.

J.L. KICHLINE
August 20, 1985

FOMC BRIEFING

The

staff

forecast

for

this

Committee looks about the same as that
We

still

expect

in

the

presented

rate.

That

show

to

a

July.

expansion

through

halt.

but

those

to GNP as both the drag from reduced

Unfortunately,

we

in

net

exports

have no statistical

evidence on the behavior of inventories or the trade
for

the

context of an expected slowing in growth of

inventory investment and the deterioration
come

in

moderate

domestic final demands from the first half pace,
demands

of

real GNP this quarter and next to rise at

around a 3 percent annual
occurs

meeting

sector

the current quarter, and the limited data available for

other sectors do not yet provide

a

clear

picture

of

the

course of the economy.
In

the

industrial

sector

there seems to be some

firming of activity, with the index of industrial production
rising

.2

percent in July after an upward revised increase

of .3 percent in June.
across

a

materials,

variety

of

excluding

Small production gains were reported
areas
the

in

both

business

final

equipment

sectors where weakness has been apparent.

products and
and

energy

Moreover, there

- 2 also

has

been

a

noticeable

manufacturing jobs during
quite

sizable

slackening

the

cutbacks

past

earlier

two

in

in

the

months

loss of
following

the year.

Outside of

manufacturing, employment in other sectors picked up in July
and

total

payroll

employment

little larger than the

average

rose

nearly 1/4 million--a

monthly

gains

during

the

first half of the year.
These
of moderate
entails

employment

growth

in

gains are, of course, supportive

consumer

spending.

The

forecast

expansion in real personal consumption expenditures

of only about 1-1/2 to 2 percent over the projection
which

is

income;
first

expected

period

roughly to track the path of disposable

this is a marked departure from developments in
half

of

the

this year when consumer spending rose at an

unsustainable 5 percent annual rate.
The monthly data
generally

available

1/2

percent

preceding month.
sales

consumer

spending

point to sluggish behavior in recent months.

July, retail sales excluding
rose

on

although
The auto

autos
this
sector,

and

nonconsumer

followed
however,

For
items

drop in the

a

saw

domestic

of 7-1/2 million units annual rate in July--1 million

below the level earlier in the year when foreign

cars

were

in short supply--and sales slipped further in the first part
of August.
various

It's a bit difficult to sort out the

impact

of

influences on auto sales, such as the off again and

- 3 on again financing incentive programs and most recently
auto-haulers

it to say that the forecast

Suffice

strike.

includes some near-term rise

the

domestic

in

car

sales

from

levels along with continuing moderate gains in other

recent

consumer spending similar to that in July.
The housing sector has
thought would be the case.

been

weaker

than

stability

of

single-family

months.

It still seems

respond

soon

to

to
tax

has

been

in

starts

over

the past several

that

the

single-family

the

virtual

starts

should

earlier decline in mortgage interest

rates, and the generally

about

We have been

weakness in the multi area given very high rental

vacancy rates, but the surprise

thought

had

Housing starts dipped in July in

association with a fall in multifamily starts.
expecting

we

favorable

market

influences

are

outweigh the negatives, such as the uncertainty
reform

and

tightened

mortgage

lending

and

insurance standards.
The business investment sector is an area where the
latest data are for the month of June.
and

shipments

for

capital

nondefense

In that month orders
goods bounced back

while outlays for nonresidential structures weakened.
and

other

expected
continued

data
during
growth

These

are viewed as consistent with developments
the
in

second

half

equipment

of

the

spending,

year,

namely

primarily

replacement and modernization purposes, and a small

for

decline

in structures spending as the boom in office building fades.

- 4 In

sum,

expectations

of

real

growth

around

percent annual rate over the balance of the year still
the best bet to us.

3

seem

However, if we are wrong, the signs now

available suggest near-term growth likely would be less than
expected

rather

than

more.

For

wages

and

forecast is unchanged, and recent information
suggest

prices
continues

the
to

inflation rates this year will be close to those of

a year ago with some uptick next year in response to a lower
foreign exchange value of the dollar.

FOMC Briefing
SHAxilrod
8/19/85
The conflict between signals for policy given off by the

monetary aggregates and the economy has, unfortunately, not become less
intense since the July meeting.

Incoming economic data have not been as

vigorous as might have been hoped.

At the same time the M1 money supply

has shown no real sign of slowing into the newly adopted 3 to 8 percent
range for the second half of the year.

M2 remains a little

above the

upper end of its long-run range for the year, while M3 is well in the
middle of its range.
The monetary aggregate with the most pronounced property as a
leading indicator of GNP is M1.

We have examined various lead times

from 3 to 9 months using data for the past six years.

In terms of simple

correlations betwen the change in M1 and the change in GNP since 1979,
a lead time of 6 months, or a bit less, seems to work best on average;
longer lead times of up to 9 months also showed some positive relationships, particularly for predictions outside the period of the 1980
credit control program.
at best.

All of the relationships were, of course, loose

But for what they were worth, they would suggest that GNP

growth should be picking up markedly in the third quarter, and should
also be strong in the fourth quarter, given the strength of M1 thus far
this year.
However, as Jim as noted, we have no evidence so far for such
a strong pick-up in GNP and are not projecting one.
indeed, it

In the third quarter,

is probable that the drop in velocity of M1 will be even

sharper than in the first and second quarters.

Moreover, even on a

two-quarter lagged basis--comparing M1 two quarters ago with GNP projected

for the third quarter--it appears that M1 velocity will now be negative,
declining by about 4-1/2 percent at an annual rate.
We cannot explain this recent weakness in velocity as well as
we could in the first half by standard estimates of the effects of interest
rate declines.

There probably is still

some lagged impact of earlier

rate declines at work, but the growth in M1 over the past four months has
been significantly greater than our models would predict.

Some explana-

tions were offered in the blue book, including a brief summary of the
rather diffuse results of a survey we made of 40 banks with exceptionally
large demand deposit increases.
Since midyear, however, demand deposits have not been the
cutting edge of M1 increases, though they have not yet shown a tendency
to reverse some of the previous unusual surge.

It

is NOW accounts that

have been the main propelling force, with the increase divided between
regular and super NOW accounts about in proportion to their share in the
total of NOW accounts.

We are also observing a similar accelerated rise

in straight savings accounts and MMDAs,

while the outstanding amount of

small time deposits has been declining since midyear.

Yield spreads

between time deposits and the other more liquid balances are narrower
than they were this spring, though still

noticeably favorable to time

deposits and widening slightly in the past two months.

Thus, the very

recent rise in M1 appears to reflect a shift in the distribution of
saving toward more liquid deposit balances, at least partly in response
to the relatively less wide interest differential.
If M1 is

responding to interest rate behavior, that should be

picked up in the interest rate variable of our models.

That the model

is nonetheless underpredicting M1 recently would indicate that the rate

elasticity in the model may not be large enough in the current institutional
environment.

Or if

one believes the model's interest responsiveness, one

might conclude that recent growth of liquid balances reflects a shift in
the demand schedule because of economic uncertainties or some fear of
capital loss on alternative investments with a less favorable interest
rate outlook in the future.
While the recent strength of M1 may be laid at the door of
savings behavior, and even though the predictive power of M1 for GNP
seems in abeyance so far this year, it may be difficult to downplay M1
more in terms of policy if and as it
range for the second half.

remains well outside the adopted

The question at issue would be the credibility

of the Fed's targeting procedure and whether inflationary expectations
would worsen.

In a clearly weak economy, there would probably be little

chance of such an adverse expectational response if money were permitted
to run very strong without resistance.
are not so clear.
clearly weak.
It

Present economic circumstances

The economy does not appear strong, but it

is not

The behavior of the dollar is also a complicating factor.

seems to be on a declining course, which would be welcome over the

longer run, but combined with continued strong money growth could well
give off'inflationary signals--again unless the economy is clearly weak.
Finally, whether the budget process will in the end yield as much restraint
as promised is uncertain.
Against such a background, the staff has presented three alternatives.

The one providing the greatest probability of moving within the

M1 long-run range by the fourth quarter

--

C

--

calls for a distinct

firming of money market conditions over the weeks ahead.

It

likely would

weaken the economy further, though with potential long-run advantages for

-4making more progress in curbing inflation.

At the opposite extreme,

alternative A probably would just about assure growth of M1 well above
the FOMC's target for the second half of the year.

Pursuit of that

alternative seems to us most consistent with a view that the economy is
currently weak enough to require the support of distinctly lower market
interest rates.

The middle alternative B calls for essentially the same

policy as over the past few weeks, capturing the slight degree of tightening
that has developed.

The odds on attaining the upper limit of the long-run

range for M1 under that approach do not seem particularly high to me,
though one might come reasonably close.
In general, Mr. Chairman, there is the real possibility that the
Committee cannot both have a very satisfactory real economy over the near
is no doubt still

too early to be

term and attain its M1 target.

It

reasonably sure about that.

We could well experience extremely weak

behavior of M1 in subsequent months, as has occurred in the past after
large increases, or even over the balance of this month.

Or

monetarist-type predictions of strengthening GNP could be realized as
we move into the fall.

The need for such additional evidence tends to

argue either for standing pat as of now or for making quite modest
policy adjustments--e.g. not going to the extremes of A and C--with
the direction depending on the Committee's judgment about whether the
greater risk over time, looking ahead further than the immediate
future, is on the side of inflation or of economic weakness.