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SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic Projections

April 29–30, 2008

Table 1: Economic Projections of Federal Reserve Governors and Reserve
Bank Presidents 1
2008

2009

2010

Central Tendencies
Real GDP Growth
January projections

0.3 to 1.2
1.3 to 2.0

2.0 to 2.8
2.1 to 2.7

2.6 to 3.1
2.5 to 3.0

Unemployment Rate
January projections

5.5 to 5.7
5.2 to 5.3

5.2 to 5.7
5.0 to 5.3

4.9 to 5.5
4.9 to 5.1

PCE Inflation
January projections

3.1 to 3.4
2.1 to 2.4

1.9 to 2.3
1.7 to 2.0

1.8 to 2.0
1.7 to 2.0

Core PCE Inflation
January projections

2.2 to 2.4
2.0 to 2.2

1.9 to 2.1
1.7 to 2.0

1.7 to 1.9
1.7 to 1.9

Real GDP Growth
January projections

0.0 to 1.5
1.0 to 2.2

1.8 to 3.0
1.8 to 3.2

2.0 to 3.4
2.2 to 3.2

Unemployment Rate
January projections

5.3 to 6.0
5.0 to 5.5

5.2 to 6.3
4.9 to 5.7

4.8 to 5.9
4.7 to 5.4

PCE Inflation
January projections

2.8 to 3.8
2.0 to 2.8

1.7 to 3.0
1.7 to 2.3

1.5 to 2.0
1.5 to 2.0

Core PCE Inflation
January projections

1.9 to 2.5
1.9 to 2.3

1.7 to 2.2
1.7 to 2.2

1.3 to 2.0
1.4 to 2.0

Ranges

1. Projections of real GDP growth, PCE inflation and core PCE inflation are fourth-quarter-to-fourthquarter growth rates, i.e. percentage changes from the fourth quarter of the prior year to the fourth quarter
of the indicated year. PCE inflation and core PCE inflation are the percentage rates of change in the price
index for personal consumption expenditures and the price index for personal consumption expenditures
excluding food and energy, respectively. Each participant's projections are based on his or her assessment of
appropriate monetary policy. The range for each variable in a given year includes all participants'
projections, from lowest to highest, for that variable in the given year; the central tendencies exclude the
three highest and three lowest projections for each variable in each year.

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SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic Projections

April 29–30, 2008

Table 1a
Economic Projections for the First Half of 20081

Central Tendencies and Ranges

Central Tendency

Range

-0.5 to 0.5

-0.5 to 0.6

3.5 to 4.0

3.0 to 4.4

2.1 to 2.4

2.0 to 2.5

Real GDP Growth
Total PCE Inflation
Core PCE Inflation

Participants’ Projections
Projection
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Real GDP Growth
0.0
-0.4
-0.5
0.5
-0.5
0.5
-0.1
0.0
0.4
-0.4
0.0
-0.4
0.2
0.0
0.6
0.0
0.5

Total PCE Inflation
4.0
3.8
3.6
3.3
3.8
3.0
3.6
4.0
4.4
4.0
3.5
3.8
3.5
3.7
3.9
3.8
3.5

1. Growth and inflation are reported at annualized rates.

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Core PCE Inflation
2.3
2.1
2.1
2.4
2.2
2.2
2.4
2.2
2.4
2.2
2.0
2.2
2.3
2.2
2.2
2.3
2.5

SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic Projections

April 29–30, 2008

Table 1b
Implied Economic Projections for the Second Half of 20081

Central Tendencies and Ranges

Central Tendency

Range

1.0 to 1.9

0.5 to 2.9

2.5 to 3.2

2.3 to 3.6

2.2 to 2.4

1.7 to 2.7

Real GDP Growth
Total PCE Inflation
Core PCE Inflation

Participants’ Projections
Projection
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Real GDP Growth
1.6
0.8
2.9
2.5
0.5
1.5
1.1
1.0
1.2
1.6
0.4
1.0
1.6
1.6
2.4
1.6
1.9

Total PCE Inflation
2.6
2.4
2.4
2.3
2.8
2.6
2.8
3.6
2.6
2.6
3.3
2.6
3.1
2.5
2.9
2.6
3.5

Core PCE Inflation
2.3
2.1
1.7
2.4
2.2
2.2
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.2
2.2
2.4
2.7
2.2
2.2
2.5
2.5

1. Projections for the second half of 2008 implied by participants' April projections for the first half of 2008
and for 2008 as a whole. Growth and inflation are reported at annualized rates.

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SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic Projections

April 29–30, 2008

Table 2: April Economic Projections
Respondent Year

GDP Growth Unemployment Rate Total PCE Inflation Core PCE Inflation

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008

0.8
0.2
1.2
1.5
0.0
1.0
0.5
0.5
0.8
0.6
0.2
0.3
0.9
0.8
1.5
0.8
1.2

5.4
5.7
5.8
5.6
5.6
5.6
5.7
5.5
5.7
5.7
6.0
5.7
5.5
5.5
5.3
5.5
5.5

3.3
3.1
3.0
2.8
3.3
2.8
3.2
3.8
3.5
3.3
3.4
3.2
3.3
3.1
3.4
3.2
3.5

2.3
2.1
1.9
2.4
2.2
2.2
2.4
2.3
2.4
2.2
2.1
2.3
2.5
2.2
2.2
2.4
2.5

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009

2.8
2.5
3.0
2.7
2.0
2.6
2.4
2.0
2.0
2.3
1.8
2.4
2.3
3.0
2.7
2.0
3.0

5.2
5.6
5.5
5.3
5.8
5.7
5.6
5.8
5.4
5.7
6.3
5.2
5.5
5.2
5.2
5.3
5.2

2.0
1.9
1.7
2.2
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.8
2.4
2.0
2.3
2.0
2.1
1.8
1.7
2.1
3.0

2.0
2.0
1.8
2.0
2.0
2.0
1.9
2.1
2.2
1.8
1.7
2.0
2.1
1.9
2.0
2.1
2.2

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SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic Projections

April 29–30, 2008

Table 2 (continued): April Economic Projections
Respondent Year
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010

GDP Growth Unemployment Rate Total PCE Inflation Core PCE Inflation
3.0
3.1
2.6
2.7
3.0
3.0
2.6
2.8
2.0
3.2
3.2
2.9
2.5
3.0
3.4
2.5
2.7

4.9
5.3
5.2
5.1
5.6
5.4
5.3
5.5
5.3
5.4
5.9
4.9
5.5
4.9
4.8
5.0
5.0

1.8
2.0
1.8
1.7
1.8
1.9
1.8
2.0
2.0
1.8
1.5
1.9
1.8
1.7
2.0
1.9
2.0

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1.8
2.0
1.8
1.7
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.8
2.0
1.7
1.3
1.9
1.8
1.7
2.0
1.9
1.5

SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic Projections

April 29–30, 2008

Chart 1: Central Tendencies and Ranges of Economic Projections*
Real GDP Growth

Percent
7
6

Central Tendency of Projections
Range of Projections

5
4

•

2
1
0

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Unemployment Rate

2010

Percent
8
7
6

•

4
3

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

PCE Inflation

2010

Percent
5
4

•

2
1
0

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Core PCE Inflation

2010

Percent
5
4
3

•

2
1
0

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

* See notes to Table 1 for variable definitions.

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2008

2009

2010

SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic Projections

April 29–30, 2008

Uncertainty and Risks - GDP Growth
2(a): Please indicate your judgment of the uncertainty attached to your projections relative to
levels of uncertainty over the past 20 years.
Number of participants
15

Lower
(C)

Broadly
similar
(B)

Higher
(A)

2(b): Please indicate your judgment of the risk weighting around your projections.
Number of participants
15

Weighted to
downside
(C)

Broadly
balanced
(B)

Weighted to
upside
(A)

Individual Responses

Respondent

2(a)
2(b)

A
C

B
B

A
B

A
C

B
B

A
C

B
B

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April 29–30, 2008

Uncertainty and Risks - Unemployment Rate
2(a): Please indicate your judgment of the uncertainty attached to your projections relative to
levels of uncertainty over the past 20 years.
Number of participants
15

Lower
(C)

Broadly
similar
(B)

Higher
(A)

2(b): Please indicate your judgment of the risk weighting around your projections.
Number of participants
15

Weighted to
downside
(C)

Broadly
balanced
(B)

Weighted to
upside
(A)

Individual Responses

Respondent

2(a)
2(b)

A
A

B
B

A
A

B
B

A
A

B
B

A
A

B
B

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SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic Projections

April 29–30, 2008

Uncertainty and Risks - Total PCE Inflation
2(a): Please indicate your judgment of the uncertainty attached to your projections relative to
levels of uncertainty over the past 20 years.
Number of participants
15

Lower
(C)

Broadly
similar
(B)

Higher
(A)

2(b): Please indicate your judgment of the risk weighting around your projections.
Number of participants
15

Weighted to
downside
(C)

Broadly
balanced
(B)

Weighted to
upside
(A)

Individual Responses

Respondent

2(a)
2(b)

A
A

B
B

A
B

B
A

A
B

A
A

A
B

C
B

A
B

A
A

B
B

A
A

B
B

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SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic Projections

April 29–30, 2008

Uncertainty and Risks - Core PCE Inflation
2(a): Please indicate your judgment of the uncertainty attached to your projections relative to
levels of uncertainty over the past 20 years.
Number of participants
15

Lower
(C)

Broadly
similar
(B)

Higher
(A)

2(b): Please indicate your judgment of the risk weighting around your projections.
Number of participants
15

Weighted to
downside
(C)

Broadly
balanced
(B)

Weighted to
upside
(A)

Individual Responses

Respondent

2(a)
2(b)

A
B

B
B

A
B

B
A

B
B

B
A

A
A

B
B

A
A

B
B

A
A

B
B

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SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic Projections

April 29–30, 2008

Forecast Narratives

2(a). (Optional) If you have any explanatory comments regarding your

judgment of the uncertainty attached to your pro jections relative to levels of

uncertainty over the past 20 years, you may enter them below.

Respondent 1:
Higher uncertainty around GDP growth reﬂects the uncertainty about the evolution of ﬁnancial markets and
their eﬀects on spending. Higher uncertainty around prices reﬂects a sense we do not understand the reasons
for the persistent surprises on energy and other commodity prices and about the resulting feedthrough to
core prices. In addition, elevated uncertainty about the output gap translates into elevated uncertainty
about inﬂation.
Respondent 2:
N/A
Respondent 3:
Quantitative judgment based on standard deviation of FRBNY forecast distribution for GDP growth and
core PCE inﬂation relative to those reported in Reifschneider and Tulip.
Respondent 4:
Uncertainty rises near cyclical turning points. This time is similar.
Respondent 5:
There is greater uncertainty associated with my pro jections of GDP growth in comparison with the experience
of the past 20 years because of the severity of problems in ﬁnancial institutions and markets and questions
about the eﬀectiveness of ﬁscal policy stimulus. There is also greater than ”normal” uncertainty attached
to my pro jections of PCE inﬂation because of the volatility of energy and other commodity prices.
Respondent 6:
N/A
Respondent 7:
No Comments
Respondent 8:
N/A
Respondent 9:
N/A
Respondent 10:
N/A
Respondent 11:
I attach more uncertainty to the path of GDP and unemployment in recessions than in expansions. Under
appropriate monetary policy, the uncertainty surrounding inﬂation ought to be lower than it has been over
the last 20 years.
Respondent 12:
N/A
Respondent 13:
N/A

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April 29–30, 2008

Respondent 14:
The size and persistence of the ﬁnancial shock and housing cycle raise the forecast uncertainty for real
economic activity.
Respondent 15:
N/A
Respondent 16:
N/A
Respondent 17:
N/A

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April 29–30, 2008

Forecast Narratives

2(b). (Optional) If you have any explanatory comments regarding your

judgment of the risk weighting around your pro jections, you may enter them

below.

Respondent 1:
Although ﬁnancial conditions have stabilized, a further sudden deterioration still seems more likely than
a sudden unexpected improvement, and hence the downside risks to growth and employment. For total
inﬂation, commodity prices seem more likely to rise unexpectedly than to fall, based on recent history. For
core, this upside risk is oﬀ set by the downside risk to growth.
Respondent 2:
On GDP growth, I do see more downside risk than upside risk, but by much less than my January pro jection.
Thus if the scale was more nuanced, I would have checked oﬀ something in between broadly balanced and
weighted to downside. Similarly on the unemployment rate, I would have checked oﬀ something in between
weighted to upside and broadly balance.
Respondent 3:
Quantitative judgment based on the diﬀerence between pro jection and expected value from FRBNY forecast
distribution.
Respondent 4:
I have revised down my growth forecast since January. Risks to growth are balanced relative to my new
forecast. Given the monetary policy accommodation in the pipeline and the year-to-date data on inﬂation
and inﬂation expectations, inﬂation risks remain to the upside.
Respondent 5:
N/A
Respondent 6:
It is still highly uncertain whether the economy has fully shifted into a recessionary regime, but the potential
for it do so is an important risk.
We could be wrong about the degree of persistence in the recent good news on core inﬂation. And the
current low level of gasoline margins suggests a risk of larger increases in consumer energy prices.
Respondent 7:
I believe the downside risks to the economy are nearly balanced with the upside risks to inﬂation.
Respondent 8:
N/A
Respondent 9:
N/A
Respondent 10:
Risks to total inﬂation are broadly balanced but perhaps a bit to the upside, due to possibility that increases
in energy and food prices may continue.
Respondent 11:
N/A

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Respondent 12:
N/A
Respondent 13:
N/A
Respondent 14:
The severity of the ﬁnancial shock and housing collapse have consistently exceeded expectations and provide
some downside risks for real activity.
Respondent 15:
N/A
Respondent 16:
N/A
Respondent 17:
N/A

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SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic Projections

April 29–30, 2008

Appropriate Monetary Policy

3. Does your view of the appropriate path of interest rates diﬀer materially
from the interest rate assumed by the staﬀ in the Greenbook?

YES
14

NO
3

Respondent 1: Yes
Assumed a 25 bp decrease at this meeting followed by a period of stability and a gentle rise in 09 and 10 as
ﬁnancial conditions improve and the output gap closes.
Respondent 2: Yes
I condition on 25 basis point cut at the April FOMC meeting and possibly another 25bp by the June FOMC
meeting, then back up to 3.0 by early 2009.
Respondent 3: Yes
FFR target at 2.0% by the end of 2008Q2 at the latest. Then renormalized with the target rate at 3.5%
by end of 2009 and 4.25% in 2010. In the short-run the risks are to the downside around this path with a
similar magnitude to the model based probabilities shown in the Bluebook box on the likelihood of reaching
low rates, in the medium term they are more balanced.
Respondent 4: Yes
My policy path is considerably steeper than the Greenbook baseline policy path assumption. My forecast
calls for the funds rate to begin rising in 2008Q4, reaching 4.0 percent some time in 2009Q3, and remaining
there in 2010. In my view, in order to keep inﬂation from rising, the FOMC needs to be aggressive in taking
back the insurance it has put in place.
Respondent 5: Yes
I do not expect the Federal funds rate to decline quite as much in 2008 as in the Greenbook, and I expect
it to rise somewhat more in 2010 than the Greenbook pro jection.
Respondent 6: Yes
We’ve assumed a roughly ﬂat funds rate path for the rest of the year, followed by a rising path similar to
market expectations beginning in early 2009.
Respondent 7: No
N/A
Respondent 8: Yes

The appropriate near-term funds-rate path lies somewhat above the Greenbook assumption.

Respondent 9: Yes

Assume rates are lowered to 2% at upcoming meeting, and then increase slowly starting 4Q 2008

Respondent 10: No
N/A
Respondent 11: Yes
Appropriate policy would be designed to bring about 1.5 percent overall PCE inﬂation within a couple of
years. That is likely to require raising the funds rate later this year or early next year.
Respondent 12: Yes

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I assume some increase in the federal funds rate during 2009.
Respondent 13: Yes
I assume the federal funds rate remains at 2.25 percent through the end of this year. I then assume the
funds rate begins to increase signiﬁcantly in 2009 and returns to neutral by the ﬁrst half of 2010.
Respondent 14: Yes
I assume that the funds rate falls to 1-3/4 percent by the end of the current quarter (as in Greenbook) and
remains there until the second half of 2009. It gradually rises to 2-1/2 percent in 2009.Q4 and to 4-1/4
percent in 2010.Q4.
Respondent 15: Yes
The appropriate path for the Federal Funds rate involves more easing in the near term (roughly 50 basis
points of additional easing) than what is assumed in the Greenbook. Monetary policy then remains on hold
until late 2009. At that point, the Federal Funds rate starts to increase gradually, reaching 2 1 percent
2
by the end of 2010. The assumed accommodative stance for the Federal Funds rate provides the stimulus
necessary to bring the unemployment rate down to our estimate of the NAIRU by the end of the forecast
horizon. At the same time, the policy stance is consistent with achieving a target inﬂation rate as measured
by core PCE inﬂation of 2.0 percent.
Respondent 16: No
N/A
Respondent 17: Yes
My judgement is that the FOMC will need to raise interest rates materially, and sooner, than the path
currently pro jected in the Greenbook in order to achieve a goal of 1.5 percent on core PCE inﬂation in 2010.

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April 29–30, 2008

Forecast Narratives

4(a). Please describe the key factors shaping your central economic outlook

and the uncertainty around that outlook

Respondent 1:
The drag from housing abates slowly over the second half of the year and next year. Credit availability
remains very tight for a few quarters and improves gradually thereafter allowing the eﬀects of the low federal
funds rate gradually to show through to slightly above-trend growth. GDP growth is also helped over time
by the assumed leveling out of energy prices and by a continued boost from net exports. Lower house prices
and reduced credit availability weigh on consumer spending and the savings rate rises gradually. In the near
term, recessionary tendencies–evidenced in part by very depressed consumer and business conﬁdence– hold
down spending, but not by as much as in the Greenbook forecast.
Respondent 2:
I am getting somewhat more optimistic that we may have turned a corner in the credit markets and that they
will keep on improving. (However, I have been disappointed before and I would not count on this outcome..)
As a result of the better tone in the credit markets, I see less downside risk and a lower probability of a
serious adverse feedback loop developing. Nonetheless, the widening of credit spreads and the tightening in
the Senior Loan Oﬃcer Survey will make growth extremely weak in 2008 and will slow the recovery. This is
why I am slightly more pessimistic on output growth and unemployment than the greenbook.
With the current and pro jected slack in the economy and long-run inﬂation expectations around 2.0%
(they may be slightly higher today, but I think they will come down with the coming economic slack), I see
inﬂation coming down to 2.0% and remaining there for the rest of the forecast horizon. I do worry that high
commodity prices could cause inﬂation expectations to rise a little bit, but the current slack and downside
risks to economic activity would tend to lower inﬂation. Thus I see the risks around my inﬂation forecast as
being symmetric.
Respondent 3:
Our central pro jection has the US economy going through a mild recession in 2008H1. By the second half of
2008 growth recovers, aided by the preemptive path of monetary policy, various initiatives to foster market
functioning and ﬁscal stimulus. Growth remains near its potential rate through 2009-10 implying we see
only a narrowing rather than a complete closing of the output gap in this period. Although we judge the
economy will experience a mild recession or just skirt one as the most likely near-term outcome, the chance
of a mild recession turning into a more severe downturn is relatively high.
Within the central scenario the bulk of the correction in housing production will be completed by mid
2009 and residential investments large drag on GDP will be over. The decline in housing prices will continue
through the end of 2009 with about an 11% peak to trough drop using the OFHEO repeat sales index.
Outside of housing and autos we judge the inventories of US business to be relatively lean. Further, the
balance sheets of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms appear to be relatively robust for the onset of a recession. These factors
produce a very shallow recession with a somewhat tepid recovery. Net exports provide a boost to GDP
growth in 2008 and 2009. In the labor market we expect demographic changes, industry mix and, most
importantly, the lack of a very tight labor market at the business cycle peak to produce a labor market peak
to trough increase in the unemployment rate of less than 1.5 percentage points.
We pro ject a continued very gradual moderation in core inﬂation with total inﬂation running well above
core in 2008H1 due to higher food and energy prices but then moving in line with the core projection as
the forecast horizon increases. This path is based on inﬂation expectations remaining well-contained, our
assessment of the FOMC inﬂation objective, and the opening of an output gap in 2008 along with little
evidence of the pass-through of higher energy and food costs to labor compensation.

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April 29–30, 2008

The risks to our central projection are substantial. The main short-term one is that the ongoing tur
moil in ﬁnancial markets further restricts the supply of credit exacerbating contractionary forces which in
turn leads to a further tightening of credit conditions and so on. While the preemptive easing of monetary
policy and the new liquidity facilities provide some insurance against such an adverse feedback loop, it is
diﬃcult to know whether they will be suﬃcient given the uncertainty around house prices and the exposure
of the ﬁnancial sector to house price declines. Over the medium term a ma jor risk is that trend productivity
growth will be below our conditioning assumption. A related risk is a steeper-than-assumed rise of the per
sonal saving rate resulting from negative housing and stock market wealth eﬀects, if consumers assess future
prospects to be weaker either because of weaker productivity growth or because of a protracted contraction.
The eﬀects of these medium term risks might also be ampliﬁed by the fragile state of ﬁnancial markets.
For inﬂation, we see the risks as roughly balanced. There are risks on the downside if the recession is
deeper and longer than in our central scenario. However, potential pass-through of higher costs stemming
from higher energy and commodity prices, the decline in the exchange value of the dollar and a possible
lower trajectory for productivity raises some upside concern. Further, the behavior of some measures of
inﬂation expectations over the last few months suggests that private agents might have less conﬁdence in the
FOMCs commitment to price stability than in earlier periods in the 2000s expansion when total inﬂation
was running above core.
The combination of this risk proﬁle, the heightened uncertainty present in recessions and the ongoing volatil
ity in ﬁnancial and commodity markets produces elevated uncertainty around our central pro jection com
pared to typical levels.
Respondent 4:
The incoming data since January – in particular, readings on business ﬁxed investment, consumer spend
ing, and employment – have been somewhat weaker than expected in my January pro jection. In addition,
ﬁnancial disruptions have been wider spread and more persistent than incorporated in my January forecast.
Thus, I have revised down my forecast for growth and employment in 2008H1. I assume trend growth of 2.7
percent, but there remains considerable uncertainty around that number. I expect the economy to pickup
in 2008H2 and back to trend in 2009, as the eﬀects of the monetary accommodation already put in place
are felt, the housing correction stabilizes, and ﬁnancial market conditions stabilize. I assume a relatively
small impact of the tax rebates on consumer spending this year. In this forecast, I assume a long-run neutral
funds rate of about 4.0 percent. Given the monetary policy easing already in place, there may be more
upward pressure on core inﬂation in 2009 and 2010 than in my baseline forecast, and this would necessitate
a period of an above-neutral funds rate to restrain expectations and bring inﬂationary pressures back to a
rate consistent with my long-run goal.
Respondent 5:
Given the magnitude of problems in ﬁnancial institutions and markets, my outlook for ’08 and ’09 is inﬂu
enced signiﬁcantly by the ”headwinds” episode of the early 1990s as well as the evident recent deterioration
in the economy and the time required to work oﬀ excess inventories in the housing sector. However, I expect
that these problems will have diminished appreciably by 2010 and that the economy will expand at a pace
modestly above trend in that year. With appropriate monetary policy, I expect core inﬂation to decline to
an acceptable rate by 2010.
Respondent 6:
We asssume that ﬁnancial headwinds dissipate over the forecast period, but remain signiﬁcant enough to
hold growth below potential through the ﬁrst half of 2009. The speed at which the improvement takes place
is highly uncertain, and presents two-sided risks to the growth forecast.
Our base forecast has housing markets bottoming out late this year or early next year. There is a risk,

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however, that continued declines in housing prices and reduced credit availability could weigh more heavily
on construction.
The build up of a modest level of resource slack should help to oﬀset the eﬀects on inﬂation of higher
energy and commodity prices and the weaker dollar. The eﬀect of world-wide demand on commodity prices
adds considerable uncertainty to the inﬂation outlook.

Respondent 7:
Deterioration in consumer sentiment, higher energy costs, and a tightening of credit terms leads to a sig
niﬁcant slowdown in consumer spending that is only partially oﬀset in QII and QIII by the ﬁscal stimulus.
The inventory of unsold homes and ﬁnancial market uncertainty continue to weigh on the residential housing
market, dampening residential construction throughout 2008 and into 2009. Growth abroad continues to
contribute to improving net exports. However, deterioration of business sentiment, accompanied by more
restrictive ﬁnancial conditions, dampen nonresidential investment.
The risks to my outlook include a substantial further deterioration in ﬁnancial conditions, a weakening
in growth abroad, higher commodity and energy prices, and a potential upward drift in inﬂation expecta
tions.

Respondent 8:
– Credit-market headwinds will persist, delaying the economy’s return to normal growth.
– Globalization will provide support for the economy through net exports, and will help restrain wage
inﬂation, but also contributes to upward pressure on commodity prices.
– Oil and food prices continue to trend upward, as demand-pull forces dominate.
Respondent 9:
Signiﬁcant uncertainty for 2008 with respect to impact of ﬁnancial institutions weakness on broader economy
(credit channel)
Respondent 10:
1) Housing continues weak, with residential construction declines moderating over the year but still subtract
ing from growth till early in 2009 2) Consumption is restrained by high oil prices, housing price declines,
weakening labor market, tighter credit conditions, and poor sentiment. Together with housing, this leads
to negative growth in the ﬁrst half. However, ﬁscal stimulus package provides some boost in the second
half of 2008 3) With house prices declining, ﬁnancial conditions remain stressed for the rest of the year as
writedowns continue and bank capital becomes harder to raise. Tight credit conditions weaken not only
consumer spending and housing demand but also nonresidential construction 4) Net exports provide a boost
in both 2008 and 2009 5) A technical recession probably began around the beginning of 2008
6) Continued problems with credit quality, spreading outside of housing, keep credit tight into 2009. Growth
improves but remains below potential growth rate. Recovery is largely ”jobless”. 7) By 2010, above-trend
growth returns, but labor market recovers more slowly. 8) Major uncertainties and risks include the evolution
of the housing market, especially house prices, and the closely linked development of ﬁnancial conditions.
Risks are primarily to the downside.
8) Stabilizing energy prices, not-too-rapid food price increases, and a softer economy and labor market

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(slower growth in unit labor costs) reduce overall and core inﬂation beginning later this year. Uncertainty
about food and energy prices is the principal source of risk – balanced or slightly to the upside.
Respondent 11:
The economy has entered a recession, but it is likely to be shallow and brief by post-war standards. Housing
will continue to be a drag on growth this year, and business ﬁxed investment will decline this year as well.
Inﬂation is too high, and the public’s inﬂation expectations are inconsistent with successful monetary policy.
Respondent 12:
The key risks remain the housing market and ﬁnancial turmoil, and a negative feedback between the two,
that could result in a substanial slowing of consumption and more balance sheet pressure for ﬁnancial insti
tutions.
Respondent 13:
(1) I expect weak growth in the ﬁrst half of this year, with some pickup in the second half.
Near-term weakness is mostly due to continuing declines in residential investment and high energy prices.
Tight ﬁnancial conditions linger and restrain growth somewhat through early 2009. Strong export growth–
driven by a decline in the dollar and strong foreign growth–provides near-term support.
(2) Beginning in the second half of 2008 and continuing through 2010, I expect an economic recovery to
be driven by an accommodative monetary policy, the tax rebates to households, a less rapid pace of decline
in housing, and some decline in energy prices.
(3) I expect inﬂation to moderate gradually over the forecast horizon due primarily to a leveling oﬀ of
food and energy prices . Since I assume the eﬀect of slack on inﬂation is modest at best, I do not expect
near-term economic weakness to contribute to a rapid decline in inﬂation. In addition, since longer-term
inﬂation is driven importantly by long-term inﬂation expectations, I am concerned that the recent increases
we have seen in inﬂation expectations will limit the declines in actual inﬂation that I am expecting.
(4) Despite below trend growth, an accommodative monetary policy, higher energy and commodity prices,
and greater dollar depreciation pose upside risks to the expected moderation in core and overall inﬂation.
Respondent 14:
Financial conditions remain fairly tight with elevated risk spreads and some dislocations in credit markets.
Housing activity has shown few signs of stabilizing, labor market conditions continue to deteriorate, and
consumer and business spending have slowed. The economy may be contracting, and there are substantial
downside risks. Readings on headline inﬂation have been disappointing; however, inﬂation expectations
remain fairly well anchored. Going forward, weaker growth in the U.S. economy should generate more slack
in product and labor markets, thereby putting some downward pressure on inﬂation, and commodity prices
should level out.
I assume that monetary policy remains accommodative over the next year. Coupled with the ﬁscal stimulus
and growing exports, growth resumes in the second half of this year and rises above trend in 2009 and 2010.
The unemployment rate rises gradually through early 2009 and then begins to drop toward the NAIRU of
4-3/4 percent. Core PCE inﬂation declines gradually to 1-3/4 percent in 2010, which I view as consistent
with price stability. The funds rate falls to 1-3/4 percent and remains there for over a year before rising
gradually to its equilibrium rate of 4 1 percent by the end of 2010.
4
Respondent 15:
Growth in the ﬁrst half of this year has slowed signiﬁcantly, to an average pace of half of one percent. The

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ongoing retrenchment in residential investment is now coupled with weakness in consumer and business ex
penditures. High oil prices, declining household net worth, and a weakening labor market weigh heavily on
the consumer. Businesses have responded to the softness in demand and to the uncertainties characterizing
the current economic environment by trimming hiring and capital spending. The only demand component
now showing strength is exports, thanks to a weak dollar and a world economy that is still robust. The pace
of activity is expected to accelerate in the second half of this year. The ﬁscal and monetary policy stimulus
will provide an impetus to consumers discretionary spending, while the drag from residential investment is
expected to wane. Still, the economy is projected to grow at a pace slightly below potential, as monetary and
ﬁscal policy impart only a partial oﬀset to the unfavorable shocks buﬀeting the economy. In 2009, the econ
omy continues to grow near potential, notwithstanding the large monetary stimulus underway. Households
expenditures remain constrained by declining net worth associated with falling house prices, while residen
tial investment is still weak as builders continue to bring inventories into better alignment with sales. The
economy is then expected to grow signiﬁcantly above potential in 2010, when households net worth starts
to stabilize and the underlying monetary stimulus to all interest-sensitive components of demand becomes
more apparent.
The unemployment rate peaks at 5.3 percent over the second half of this year, and starts to decline de
cisively only in 2010. Near-term readings of inﬂation are expected to stay somewhat elevated, as some of
the increase in energy prices is passed through into core inﬂation. However, with increasing slack in labor
markets, inﬂation is expected to moderate, and settle at 2 percent by 2009.
Risks to economic activity continue to be skewed to the downside, and incoming data continue to feed
concerns that the economy may have fallen into a recession. While there have been improvements in ﬁnan
cial markets, conditions have yet to return to normal. Tighter credit markets, coupled with the continually
deteriorating housing market, have the potential to exert more restraint on spending than is currently embed
ded in our baseline forecast. In addition, the continued fragility in ﬁnancial markets leaves credit markets
vulnerable to event risks. A more pronounced decline in house prices than we are currently envisioning
could severely impair ﬁnancial markets functioning. The risks to the inﬂation outlook are broadly balanced.
Emerging slack in the labor market should wield downward pressure on wages and prices. We continue to
view the pass-through from oil and the dollar as fairly limited.
Respondent 16:
Disruptions in credit markets and continued weakness in real estate markets lead to zero growth in the ﬁrst
half of the year. The drag on economic activity from lingering problems in housing and ﬁnancial markets
gradually dissipates through the ﬁrst half of 2009, and this contributes to modest growth starting in the
second half of this year.
The possibility that ﬁnancial market turmoil could ﬂare up again, the possibility that nonresidential con
struction could deteriorate more rapidly than I expect, and the uncertain eﬀect of rising energy prices on
consumer and business spending convince me that the risks to real GDP growth remain weighted to the
downside.
Continuing energy and commodity price developments, and the eﬀect they might be having on inﬂation
expectations suggest that the risks on inﬂation are weighted to the upside.
Respondent 17:
The threat that the U.S. economy might enter a debilitating, depression-like state because of ﬁnancial market
turmoil has receded. There is still some residual probability associated with this event, but it is substantially
lower than it was earlier this year. This retreating probability is shaping private sector expectations for 2008
and 2009, leading to a more robust economy and a more worrisome inﬂation outlook than envisioned in the
current Greenbook.

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Forecast Narratives (continued)

4(b). Please describe the key judgements and assumptions aﬀecting your

economic projections in the third year.

Respondent 1:
growth in y*=2.5; inﬂation of 1-3/4 percent is acceptable.
Respondent 2:
Long-run inﬂation objective at 2% on PCE deﬂator, NAIRU at 4 3/4% and potential GDP same as in
greenbook.
Respondent 3:
We assume that long-term inﬂation expectations are between 2-2.5% for the CPI and the FOMC’s inﬂation
objective to be 1.5-2.0% for the PCE deﬂator and 2-2.5% for the CPI. Potential growth is 2.6% (in 2010 the
retirement of baby boomers begins to have a perceptible impact on labor input), and that the output gap
opens in 2008 and narrows in 2009-10. Our extended forecast also includes some implicit judgments about
the likely ranges for the NAIRU and the neutral policy rate. Those judgments put the neutral policy rate
in the region of 3.75% to 4.75% absent the current disruptions in ﬁnancial markets and the NAIRU between
4.5% to 5%.
Respondent 4:
Real output is growing at about a trend pace of 2.7 percent in 2010, the unemployment rate is about at its
natural rate of 5 to 5.25 percent, and inﬂation is running slightly above my long-term goal of 1.5 percent. As
mentioned in 4(a), monetary policy easing may lead to upward pressure on core inﬂation and raises the risk
that inﬂation expectations begin to move upward. If this happens, monetary policy would have to tighten
more in 2009 than in my baseline forecast and possibly remain above a neutral rate in 2010 to keep inﬂation
from rising.
Respondent 5:
The ﬁnancial headwinds will have diminished signiﬁcantly by 2010 and the adjustment in housing will be
largely complete, permitting the underlying resilience and ﬂexibility of the economy to show through. Mone
tary policy will have precluded any material deterioration in inﬂation expectations or appreciable acceleration
in core inﬂation.
Respondent 6:
We expect growth to run somewhat above the rate of potenial, which we place at 2.6% per year. Our forecast
has unemployment falling over the year, but remaining above its natural rate, which we place at 5.0%.
Respondent 7:
I have deﬁned appropriate policy over this horizon as one that is consistent with achieving PCE inﬂation
slightly less than 2 percent and I have adopted assumptions for labor productivity and employment growth
that are consistent with potential GDP growth of 2.6 percent.
Respondent 8:
The unemployment rate remains elevated, due to the stretched-out credit cycle.
Respondent 9:
On path of returning to trend levels, but not at steady-state at end of projection period. Tax policy and
trade policy uncertainty expected to impact 2010 economic perfomance negatively.
Respondent 10:
The inﬂation projections in 2010 reﬂect my views of the levels of inﬂation that combine a reasonable approx

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imation to price stability (allowing for measurement error) with some buﬀer against zero-bound problems.
The growth estimate for 2010 is above my estimate of potential growth, which is in the vicinity of 2.7,
as it reﬂects a cyclical recovery. Likewise, the unemployment rate for 2010 is above my estimate of the
NAIRU (around 4.8) because employment will lag the recovery.
Respondent 11:
Trend growth in GDP is about 2.7 percent, and overall inﬂation would average 1.5 percent under appropriate
policy. Ongoing increases in energy prices will result in a divergence between overall and core inﬂation.
Respondent 12:
My judgments and assumptions are largely consistent with those described in the Greenbook, except that I
assume the federal funds rate is higher in 2009 and 2010.
Respondent 13:
(1) Economic growth returns to potential in 2010. Demographic changes contribute to a fall in potential
growth in 2009 and 2010. Potential growth is estimated to fall from 2.7 percent currently, to 2.6 percent in
2009 and 2.5 percent in 2010.
(2) Core PCE inﬂation remains slightly above desired levels in 2010.
(3) Monetary policy begins to tighten aggressively in 2009 and reaches neutral by the ﬁrst half of 2010.
Respondent 14:
In 2010, my forecast shows inﬂation that is consistent with price stability. By the end of 2010, real GDP
growth, the unemployment rate, and the real funds rate are all near their long-run sustainable levels.
Respondent 15:
Potential GDP growth is 2

1
2

percent. The NAIRU is 4

3
4

percent. The target inﬂation rate is 2.0 percent.

Respondent 16:
In making these pro jections, my staﬀ and I have taken on board the housing assumptions in the Greenbook,
and assumed the slight backing oﬀ of oil prices implied by futures markets. We have, however, assumed a
less dramatic decline in employment than in the Greenbook and a smaller ﬁscal stimulus impact.
Respondent 17:
The 2010 numbers place output growth at the steady state rate and core inﬂation at target. Overall PCE
inﬂation remains elevated because of longer-term relative price changes in the energy sector.

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Forecast Narratives (continued)

4(c). Please describe any important diﬀerences between your current economic

forecast and the Greenbook
Respondent 1:
see last sentence of 4(a)
Respondent 2:
Not a big diﬀerence. I see a somewhat slower recovery because I think the eﬀects of the ﬁnancial disruption
will take a long time to dissipate and will be a drag on growth.
Respondent 3:
We pro ject higher trend growth of hours worked mainly because we assume that the secular decline in the
labor force participation rate will occur later and more slowly than in the GB. We assume lower inﬂation
persistence than does the GB.
In terms of short-term forecast details, consumption growth is stronger in our central projection than the
GB in 2008H2 partly as we see less weakness in services. This stronger consumption proﬁle produces a
smaller positive contribution from net exports to growth. In our central projection the higher policy rate
assumption leads to a slower rate of depreciation in the exchange value of the dollar.
Respondent 4:
I assume the labor force grows 0.8 to 1 percent per year. Nonfarm payroll employment growth declines by
about 30 thousand jobs per month on average in 2008, and rebounds to around 120 thousand jobs per month
on average in 2009 and 2010. In 2009 and 2010, the economy is growing at about trend.
Respondent 5:
I am less optimistic about 2009 than the Greenbook, largely because of the anticipated eﬀects of ﬁnancial
headwinds. As a consequence, I have a somewhat higher rate of unemployment in 2009 and 2010.
Respondent 6:
As noted above, we have not assumed that the economy has necessarily shifted into a recessionary regime.
Respondent 7:
I forecast a less severe downturn for GDP in 2008, a more modest recovery in 2009, and a less robust growth
rate in 2010.
Respondent 8:
The economy is slower to resume normal growth than is forecast in the Greenbook, and headline inﬂation
moderates more gradually.
Respondent 9:
Expect materially weaker growth in 2009
Respondent 10:
Slightly more optimistic on potential growth, due to higher projection for MFP.
Respondent 11:
The path of monetary policy after mid-year is the main diﬀerence. I believe inﬂation is unlikely to subside
at an appropriate pace without rate increases later this year or early next. A ﬁrmer policy path results in a
more subdued recovery.

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Respondent 12:
Broadly similar.
Respondent 13:
My near-term outlook for real GDP and unemployment is less pessimistic than Greenbook and my outlook
for inﬂation is less optimistic. These diﬀerences lead to very diﬀerent policy paths, with Greenbook’s path
for the federal funds rate substantially below my assumed path.
Respondent 14:
My forecast shows slightly faster growth than the Greenbook in 2008 and 2009, in part because of an assess
ment of more impetus from the ﬁscal package and slightly faster growth of potential output. The forecast
unemployment paths in those two years are similar, but I foresee the real economy converging to long-run
values by the end of 2010, rather than in 2012 as in Greebook. I am also slightly more optimistic on inﬂation.
Respondent 15:
Our forecast for the real economy is more optimistic than the Greenbooks in 2008. While the Greenbook is
envisioning a recession, our outlook calls for a growth recession. Diﬀerences in the inﬂation outlook are the
result of our lower implied sacriﬁce ratio once the economy moves considerably away from full employment,
and of a higher inﬂation target than the one implicit in the Greenbook.
Respondent 16:
Because we pro ject somewhat less near term weakness in labor markets, our near-term GDP forecast is not
as pessimistic as in the Greenbook. Our longer term forecast does not incorporate a signiﬁcant bounce back
in growth, and so GDP growth only gradually returns to trend. We also see somewhat more inertia in the
inﬂation rate going forward.
Respondent 17:
Relative to the current Greenbook, this forecast envisions a stronger real economy and a more challenging
inﬂation scenario. The path for the federal funds rate could not remain essentially ﬂat for 2.5 years in this
forecast if the 2010 outcomes are to be achieved.

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Forecast Narratives (continued)

4(d). Please describe the key factors causing your forecast to change since the

pro jections submitted ahead of the January FOMC meeting.
Respondent 1:
the credit restriction is more severe and the housing decline–both activity and prices–is steeper. For inﬂation,
the resulting larger output gap is oﬀset by higher energy and food prices than anticipated in January.
Respondent 2:
Although I am a little more upbeat than at the March FOMC, credit market conditions deteriorated more
and the economy has turned out to be substantially weaker since the January pro jections. This caused me
to lower my growth pro jections and to raised my unemployment pro jections.
Respondent 3:
At the time of the January pro jections we expected the US economy to skirt a recession with little growth in
the ﬁrst half of the year but a strong rebound in the second half, which is a similar pattern to the develop
ments in late 2006 though mid 2007. The further deterioration in labor markets, the lack of any stabilization
in housing and the large increase in energy prices along with the continued ﬁnancial turmoil and declines in
conﬁdence have increased our assessment of the probability that the US economy will experience a recession
in the ﬁrst half of 2008. Further, we have lowered the strength of the recovery in 2008H2 and 2009 relative
to January as we expect that tighter ﬁnancial conditions and higher energy and commodity prices will weigh
on US consumers and producers. At the same time the downside risks to this weaker central forecast have
increased with additional evidence of a potential adverse feedback loop between ﬁnancial conditions and the
real economy.
Incoming data since January have led to little net change in our core inﬂation forecast in the near term
but higher energy prices have driven up the near term forecast for total inﬂation. We have slightly increased
our medium term inﬂation pro jection to reﬂect the higher levels of energy, food and commodity prices and
the decline in the exchange value of the dollar. A range of models of inﬂation suggest that the higher total
inﬂation of the last few months is unlikely to persist partly due to well-contained inﬂation expectations, as
well as subdued labor compensation and the pro jected slowdown in the US economy.
The policy path underlying our central pro jection has been reduced in the near-term since January but
we have not altered the assumed path for renormalization of real interest rates in 2009-10. Given our pro
jection of a weaker recovery this implies a tighter stance of policy in 2009-10 in the medium run relative to
standard policy rules than our January path.
Respondent 4:
The incoming data since January – in particular, readings on business ﬁxed investment, consumer spend
ing, and employment – have been somewhat weaker than expected in my January pro jection. In addition,
ﬁnancial disruptions have been more wider spread and more persistent than incorporated into my January
forecast. Thus, I have revised down my forecast for growth and employment in 2008H1. Monetary policy
easing has been more aggressive than I assumed in my January forecast. I assume the FOMC begins raising
the funds rate in 2008Q4 as I did in my January forecast, but from a lower level. Monetary policy easing
risks unanchoring inﬂation expectation so the funds rate needs to increase over the forecast horizon to 4.0
percent by 2009Q3.
Respondent 5:
There are only two material changes, both of which are reﬂected in the 2008 forecast. The weakness evident
in the economy currently has led to a reduction in real growth for the year and greater unemployment than
expected previously. And PCE inﬂation is expected to run higher than earlier anticipated because of devel

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opments in energy and other commodity prices.
Respondent 6:
In line with the deterioration of the economy since January, our outlook has worsened somewhat.
Financial headwinds still constrain the outlook, but market functioning appears to have improved to some
degree.
The core inﬂation outlook has improved somewhat given the recent inﬂation data and the somewhat greater
projected slack in the economy.
Respondent 7:
A higher path for energy prices combined with a greater and more prolonged deterioration in the housing
market have resulted in a downward adjustment to my real growth pro jection in 2008. A modest boost to
economic activity stemming from ﬁscal stimulus is now assumed in 2008. Higher commodity prices, and
particularly energy costs, are now expected to exert greater upward pressure on the PCE inﬂation measure
in 2009. However, pass-through eﬀects to the core measures are expected to be contained by a slower growth
tra jectory.
Respondent 8:
Energy prices have been higher than anticipated, and the drag from residential investment has been some
what greater than anticipated.
Respondent 9:
Deeper weakness pro jected for credit channel
Respondent 10:
Data indicate that we may have switched regimes to a recession scenario, with a stronger cumulative down
ward dynamic. Consumption, employment data have weakened, although exports have helped IP and spend
ing on equipment and software somewhat. Financial crisis continues and will be an important drag, though
not necessarily worse than expected in January.
Respondent 11:
The data on employment, nonresidential construction and household consumption have been weaker than
expected, so I now believe that a recession has begun. Energy and food prices have increased more rapidly
than anticipated, and the rise in inﬂation expectations between January and early March was unexpected.
Respondent 12:
Since the last pro jection, we had reports relating to consumption, the labor market, and the housing market
that were softer than anticipated so I marked down GDP growth and marked up the unemployment rate in
2008.
Respondent 13:
Further weakness in housing and nonresidential construction, and signiﬁcant increases in energy prices, led
to a reduction in my near-term outlook for growth. Higher food and energy prices led to greater upward
pressure on overall and core inﬂation than I previously thought. In addition, based on discussions with my
business contacts, inﬂation psychology has worsened.
Respondent 14:
Despite easier monetary policy and greater ﬁscal stimulus than expected at the time of the January FOMC
meeting, I have lowered my forecast for 2008 real GDP growth by 3 percentage point. This reﬂects tighter
4
credit conditions, weaker housing and consumption data, and higher commodity prices (notably, a jump in

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crude oil prices of about $25 per barrel). Higher prices for food and energy are also largely responsible for
the upward revision in my 2008 PCE inﬂation forecast of of a percentage point. However, the pass through
of these higher prices remains fairly modest, and my core inﬂation forecast has risen only slightly.
Respondent 15:
The economy is currently weaker than we were previously projecting. Deteriorating labor market conditions
and widespread weakness in demand have increased the risk of a recession. In 2009 and 2010, headline GDP
projections are not too diﬀerent, but they are conditioned on a much more accommodative path of monetary
policy. The inﬂation outlook has not changed materially.
Respondent 16:
In general, we have kept the broad tra jectory of our January pro jections, though commencing from a lower
level for growth and a higher level for inﬂation. These adjustments were made as a result of incoming data
suggesting more real-side weakness and spillover from the ﬁnancial markets than we anticipated in January
along with dissappointing readings on inﬂation.
Respondent 17:
N.A.

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Chart 2(a): Distribution of Participants’ Projections (percent)
Real GDP
2008
April
Greenbook

Unemployment Rate
2008

Number of Participants

16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

January
Greenbook

April Projections
January Projections

0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.5

2009

April
Greenbook

January
Greenbook

April
Greenbook

0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.5

April Projections
January Projections

16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

4.9 5.0

5.1 5.2

5.3 5.4

5.5 5.6

5.7 5.8

4.9 5.0

5.1 5.2

6.3 6.4

16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

5.3 5.4

5.5 5.6

5.7 5.8

5.9 6.0

6.1 6.2

6.3 6.4

Number of Participants

January
Greenbook

4.7 4.8

6.1 6.2

April
Greenbook

2010
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

5.9 6.0

Number of Participants

January
Greenbook

4.7 4.8

Number of Participants

16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

April
Greenbook

2009

0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.5

2010

January
Greenbook

4.7 4.8

Number of Participants

January
Greenbook

Number of Participants

4.9 5.0

16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

April
Greenbook

5.1 5.2

Authorized for Public Release – 29 of 30

5.3 5.4

5.5 5.6

5.7 5.8

5.9 6.0

6.1 6.2

6.3 6.4

SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic Projections

April 29–30, 2008

Chart 2(b): Distribution of Participants’ Projections (percent)
PCE Inflation
2008

Core PCE Inflation

Number of Participants

January
Greenbook

April
Greenbook
April Projections
January Projections

1.5
1.6

1.7
1.8

1.9
2.0

2.1
2.2

2.3
2.4

2.5
2.6

2.7
2.8

2.9
3.0

2009

3.1
3.2

3.3
3.4

3.5
3.6

1.7
1.8

1.9
2.0

2.1
2.2

2.5
2.6

2.7
2.8

2.9
3.0

3.1
3.2

3.3
3.4

3.5
3.6

3.7
3.8

1.9
2.0

2.1
2.2

1.5 1.6

2.3
2.4

2.5
2.6

2.7
2.8

2.9
3.0

3.1
3.2

3.3
3.4

3.5
3.6

3.7
3.8

1.7 1.8

1.9 2.0

2.1 2.2

2.3 2.4

1.3 1.4

Number of Participants

1.5 1.6

1.7 1.8

1.9 2.0

2.1 2.2

2010

16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2.3 2.4

2.5 2.6

Number of Participants

April
Greenbook

1.3 1.4

16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

2.5 2.6

January April
Greenbook Greenbook

16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

January April
Greenbook Greenbook

April
Greenbook

January Projections

16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2.3
2.4

January
Greenbook

April Projections

2009

Number of Participants

1.7
1.8

Number of Participants

1.3 1.4

Number of Participants

2010

1.5
1.6

16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

3.7
3.8

January April
Greenbook Greenbook

1.5
1.6

2008

1.5 1.6

Authorized for Public Release – 30 of 30

1.7 1.8

16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

January
Greenbook

1.9 2.0

2.1 2.2

2.3 2.4

2.5 2.6

Full text of Federal Open Market Committee Meeting Minutes, Transcripts, and Other Documents : Meeting, April 29-30, 2008 : Summary of Economic Projections - Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic Projections

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