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Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 5/27/2020

BOARD

OF GOVERNORS
OF THE

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
WASHINGTON, D.C.
20551

April 9,

1969

CONFIDENTIAL (FR)

TO:

Federal Open Market Committee

FROM:

Mr.

Holland

There is enclosed a copy of a memorandum to the Committee

from Governor Maisel dated April 7, 1969, and entitled "Recommendation
on Report of Treasury-Federal Reserve Study of the U.S. Government
Securities Market."

It is expected that the memorandum will be

discussed at the next meeting of the Committee in conjunction with
the contemplated discussion of the Report, copies of which were

distributed earlier.

Robert C. Holland, Secretary,
Federal Open Market Committee.

Enclosure

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BOARD OF GOVERNORS
OF THE

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

Office Correspondence
To

Federal Open Market Committee

From

S. J. Maisel

Date April 8, 1969
Subject: Recommendation on Report of
Treasury-Federal Reserve Study of the
U.S. Government Securities Market

I suggest that the report of the joint Treasury-Federal Reserve
Study of the U.S. Government Securities Market be carefully edited to make
clear that it is concerned only with the technical functioning of the
U.S. Government securities market.

This is only one, and many would con-

sider a minor one, of the many objectives of Federal open market operations.

While a careful reading of the report may make clear its narrow scope of
reference, there are numerous places particularly in the discussions of
purchases and sales of coupon and agency issues where it is possible to

obtain an impression that the report is analyzing and discussing general
Federal Reserve policy objectives.
I also suggest that the conclusion of the report, namely, that
"Under current market circumstances, outright operation in
Federal agency securities would not facilitate, in any material
way, the achievement of System reserve objectives."

be tabled until such time as a committee, to be established, reports on
the relationships between agency purchases and general Federal Reserve

policy objectives.
I believe my concern with adoption of the present report can be
made clear by contrasting the discussion leading up to the assignment of

this topic to the study group and the statement of the assignment as outlined in the report with the analysis actually contained in the report and
the report's conclusions.

Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 5/27/2020

TO:

Federal Open Market Committee

At the FOMC meeting of March 1, 1966 (pp. 38-39), I raised
the general question of amending the continuing authority directive to
authorize System transactions in agency issues.

The FOMC agreed that

the fundamentals of the subject might well be considered by a joint
System-Treasury committee to study the Government securities market.
At the November 1, 1966, meeting Mr. Mitchell in advocating outright

transactions pointed out:
"Mr. Mitchell reiterated his view that the Committee
should go further now. In his opinion authorizing outright

transactions would be consistent with the position the Board
had taken at the time the legislation was under consideration
in Congress, and it would be appropriate on other grounds
also. He did not think the Committee would be trying to influence the prices of agency issues in any manner other than
that in which it now influenced Treasury security prices.
The Committee put funds into some sector of the market to
achieve monetary objectives--which might be defined in terms
of reserves, money supply, total deposits, interest rates,
or other variables. He saw operations in agency issues as a
further means of achieving monetary objectives."

This statement was followed again by general agreement that
the fundamental questions surrounding outright purchases of agency
issues should be studied by the joint committee.
In the report of the study group, this general charge was sum-

marized as follows:
"In view of the permissive legislation and the development
of the Agency market, consideration needs to be given as to
whether Federal Reserve outright transactions in Agency
issues, including FNMA and Export-Import Bank participa-

tion certificates, would further System objectives, help
to develop a broader Agency market, and enhance public policy objectives generally."

Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 5/27/2020

TO:

Federal Open Market Committee

In the following paragraph of the report certain public policy
objectives are spelled out in the following manner:
"(2) Among the more important market reasons advanced for
System outright operations in Agency issues (including PC's)
are: (a) such issues are in effect debt of the U.S. Government,
are in practice as risk-free as direct U.S. Government debt,
and therefore should be treated on the same basis as direct
Treasury debt by the Federal Reserve; (b) a willingness by the
System to undertake outright transactions in all Agency issues,

on a limited basis, would increase the marketability of the
issues, would tend to place Agency issues on a more common footing with direct debt of the Government, insofar as investors
are concerned, and would reduce somewhat the interest rate
spread between Agencies and direct Federal debt; (c) Agency
issues are sometimes in such large supply, relative to market
demand, that they lead to over-all credit market pressures

which might be most expeditiously moderated through Federal
Reserve operations in the Agency market; (d) such operations
may at times provide a degree of needed support to areas, such
as housing, that might be under undue temporary pressure; and

(e) Agency issues may be a useful supplement to open market
operations in direct Treasury securities at times--when, for

example, the floating supply of Treasury issues is temporarily
thin."
In the discussion which follows, however, it is clear that the

joint committee did not consider as its charge nor did it analyze the
general questions of public policy raised in the FOMC discussions of
this matter nor even the narrower issues contained in the above quotation
from the report itself.
Rather the analysis of the report deals with only one aspect
of the general problem--that summarized in paragraph (9) on page 100:
"Under present circumstances, operational difficulties
would be encountered by the Trading Desk in executing transactions for System Open Market Account. The size of individual
Agency issues is generally quite small in comparison with

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TO:

Federal Open Market Committee

Treasury coupon issues,¹ and as a consequence the amounts of
individual issues that can be readily bought or sold in the
secondary market tend to be correspondingly limited. An attempt by the System to conduct transactions in the amounts
that are customary in Treasury coupon issues--and meaningful
from the standpoint of System objectives--could therefore
have a disproportionate impact on prices and yields in the
Agency market. The availability and size of Agency issues
would make it most difficult for the System to undertake more
than token operations if undue market dominance is to be

eschewed.
¹

The average size of an Agency issue is about $300 million
compared with $2-1/2 billion for the typical Treasury
coupon issue."
This shift in emphasis primarily to a consideration of the

existence or non-existence of technical problems in contrast to a care-

ful weighing of the costs and benefits to over-all policy objectives
becomes even clearer in paragraph (1) of the conclusions of this section
(page 101).

The first sentence says

"System open market operations must, of course, be conducted
with a view to the furtherance of the monetary and credit

policies of the Federal Open Market Committee."
On the other hand, while not clear the second sentence seems to define
System reserve objectives as merely equivalent to the functioning of
the U.S. Government securities market.

It is this far narrower sentence

which is carried forward to the conclusion of the entire report:

"...under current market circumstances, outright operations
in Federal agency securities would not facilitate, in any
material way, the achievement of System reserve objectives."

Authorized for public release by the FOMC Secretariat on 5/27/2020

TO:

Federal Open Market Committee

To summarize my concerns:

(1) Many readers of the report may

feel that the System fails to differentiate among public policy objectives;
System objectives; System reserve objectives; and the techniques whereby
the System handles day-to-day relationships with the market.

Clearly

this is not the case.
(2) The report contains no analysis of whether or not System
public policy objectives would be enhanced by outright purchases of agency
issues.

It includes in its statements a partial list of the public and

monetary policy objectives that some believe would be enhanced by such
operations, namely,
"...(b) a willingness by the System to undertake outright trans-

actions in all Agency issues, on a limited basis, would increase the marketability of the issues, would tend to place
Agency issues on a more common footing with direct debt of the
Government, insofar as investors are concerned, and would reduce somewhat the interest rate spread between Agencies and
direct Federal debt; (c) Agency issues are sometimes in such
large supply, relative to market demand, that they lead to
over-all credit market pressures which might be most expeditiously moderated through Federal Reserve operations in the
Agency market; (d) such operations may at times provide a
degree of needed support to areas, such as housing, that might
be under undue temporary pressure; ...."
However, it does not carry out an analysis of these or other objectives.
It states that System operations might have important price effects and

perhaps cause other technical difficulties.

It fails, however, to relate

the possible disadvantages of such technical difficulties to the gains
for public and System policy objectives that might arise from the purchase

of agency issues.