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C R IT E R IA O F F E D E R A L W E L FA R E E X P E N D IT U R E S : A LA W Y ER ’S V IEW Alanson W. Willcox, former general counsel, Federal Security Agency In a discussion of criteria of Federal expenditures for health, edu cation, and welfare, the role of the lawyer must be a minor one. Constitutional considerations have become of minimal importance as limiting factors in the formulation of policy. I t still needs emphasis, however, that the breadth of congressional authority is not universally apprehended, and that policy decisions may, for th at reason, be more restrained than they need be. Federal expenditures for the provision of benefits or services to individuals are of two kinds; grants-in-aid to the States, on the one hand, and direct Federal action, on the other. In the case of grantsin-aid, the lawyer must content himself with urging that, as a general rule, legal considerations (including “States rights,” if legal rights are implied by the phrase) should have little to do with the shaping of broad national policies. In the case of the one general program of direct Federal action, the national system of social insurance, legal or quasi-legal considerations are more immediately involved, and the lawyer may properly recommend, as a criterion of congressional action, a meticulous respect for the integrity of the contributory system and the complete and faithful carrying out of the promises made to contributors. U ntil 20 years ago, no one could say with assurance th at expendi tures for the health, education, or welfare of the people at large were within the powers conferred upon the National Government by the Constitution. Grants had been made to the States, both of land and of money for education, and, occasionally, of money for other puroses; but even these grants, which left operating programs in the ands of the States, could claim to exist only by constitutional suffer ance.1 And even if grants-in-aid for these purposes were valid, a circuit court of appeals and two Supreme Court Justices were able to hold, as late as 1937, that direct Federal expenditure for the wel fare of the aged invaded the constitutional prerogatives of the States and violated the 10th amendment.2 Certainly, the powers of the Na tional Government in this whole area were hemmed in by doubts. The doubts were set at rest by the Social Security cases.3 Those E y 1 Massachusetts v. Mellon 2 6 2 U . S. 4 4 7 (1 9 2 3 ) . A tta c k s o n g r a n ts - in - a id f o r m a te r n a l a n d c h ild h e a l th w e re d is m is s e d on ju r i s d ic tio n a l g ro u n d s . I n th e c o u rs e o f th e o p in io n , t h e C o u r t in d ic a te d p la in ly t h a t n o c o n s ti tu tio n a l r ig h t s o f th e S ta te s w e re v io la te d , b u t th e b a s ic q u e s tio n o f th e sco p e o f t h e n a tio n a l p o w e r o f e x p e n d itu r e w a s n o t re a c h e d . aDavis v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co., 89 F . 2 d 3 93 ( 1 s t C ir. 1 9 3 7 ), re v e rs e d in Helvering v. Davis 301 U . S. 6 1 9 (1 9 3 7 ) . J u s tic e s M c R e y n o ld s a n d B u tle r b a se d t h e i r d is s e n t fro m th e re v e r s a l o n t h e 1 0 th a m e n d m e n t. 8Helvering v. Davis, supra; Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U . S. 5 48 (1 9 3 7 ) . T h e s e c a s e s w e re d e cid ed b y th e s a m e 9 J u s tic e s w h o h a d in v a lid a te d so m u c h e a r ly N ew D e a l le g is la tio n ; a n d i t is s ig n ific a n t t h a t 7 o f th e m ( in c lu d in g S u th e r la n d a n d V a n D e v a n te r ) c o n c u r re d in t h e d e c isio n s o n th e p r in c ip a l c o n s ti tu tio n a l is su e s . 1038 , ECONOMIC GROWTH AN D STABILITY 1039 decisions established the power o f expenditure as a separate power o f the National Government, coequal with the other powers enumerated in the Constitution, and specifically held that congressional action in this area is not invalidated by the 10th amendment and must prevail over any inconsistent policy o f the States. The full significance o f these decisions has been slow o f acceptance; we find the Congress, as recently as 1953, speaking o f health, education, and welfare as fields which “ may be” constitutionally the primary responsibility o f the States.4 One cannot quarrel with the assignment o f this responsibility prim arily to the States i f the assignment is made on grounds other than constiutional, but, once the power o f the National Government was established, there ceased to be reason to attribute to the Constitu tion a preference fo r State action to provide public benefits or public services. A national government created to promote the general wel fare, and empowered to raise and spend money fo r that purpose, can not be relegated, a priori, to a secondary role in meeting the needs o f the people. N a t io n a l a n d S tate P ow er The existence of a national power of expenditure for these purposes does not limit the authority of the States in any such way as does the national power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. I t follow s that the distribution o f welfare functions between Na tional and State Governments, and the shaping o f programs at both governmental levels, are matters for legislative determination essen tially uninhibited (except where discrimination is alleged) by con stitutional limitations.5 But, i f concurrent authority in the two levels o f government is not to lead to wasteful duplication o f effort or other anomalies, determinations by each o f the many legislative bodies in volved must be made with an eye to what is being done at the other governmental level. In this process o f mutual adjustment, Congress must necessarily take the lead, because Congress speaks with a single voice while the States speak with 48 different voices— whereas each State can adjust itself to a single national pattern, national legislation can hardly be adjusted to 48 State patterns. This political necessity for national leadership has been reinforced, in dealing with programs as costly as those addressed to health, education, and welfare, by the greater fiscal resources o f the Central Government. Not only, then, has the National Government in the past 20 years been placed on a constitutional parity with the States in the matter o f expenditures fo r the general welfare, but in a very real sense, it has been forced into a position o f primacy in blocking out those basic policies that are o f nationwide concern. On the record o f these 20 years it can fairly be said that Congress has recognized and in large measure discharged the responsibility thus 4 67 S ta t. 145. T h is w a s t h e a c t c r e a t in g th e C o m m issio n o n In te rg o v e r n m e n ta l R e la tio n s . 5 T h e s ta t e m e n t in th e te x t r e la te s to e x p e n d itu re s a s su ch , a n a n o t to a n c illa r y r e g u la to r y m e a s u re s s u c h a s c o m p u ls io n to a tte n d sch o o l, c o m p u ls o ry q u a r a n tin e o f in fe c tio u s d is e a s e , a n d th e lik e . E v e n w ith re s p e c t to e x p e n d itu re s th e r e m a y be a n o u te r b o u n d a ry to p e rm is s ib le le g is la tiv e a c tio n ; in v. th e C o u rt, p e rh a p s w ith a n eye to th e T o w n s e n d p la n , l e f t ro o m f o r s u c h a h o ld in g . E x p e n d itu r e s , o f c o u rse , m u s t be f o r a p u b lic p u rp o s e o r, in th e c a s e o f th e N a tio n a l G o v e rn m e n t, f o r th e g e n e r a l w e lfa re . T h e re is p ro b a b ly a ls o a c o n s ti tu tio n a l lim ita tio n , a n a lo g o u s to th e p r o h ib itio n o f d is c r im in a tio n , u p o n e x p e n d itu re s w h ic h e x a c t th e s u r r e n d e r o f c o n s ti tu tio n a l r ig h t s u n r e la te d to th e p u rp o s e o f th e e x p e n d itu re . See J u s tic e F r a n k f u r t e r c o n c u r rin g in p a r t a n d d is s e n tin g in p a r t in v. 3 39 U . S. 382, 4 17 (1 9 5 0 ). Helvering Davis, American CommunicationsAssn. Douds, 1040 ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY cast upon it, and has done so without abusing the enormous power which the social-security cases showed it to possess. The grant-in-aid has become the established mechanism through which the National Government has helped the States do better those things th at are within the competence of the States; while despite the power to do more, direct national provision of benefits or services (except to selected groups who are of special national concern) has been confined to a single program—long-term social insurance—which the States are not in a position to operate. There are many reasons, both objective and subjective, to prefer State and local programs for health, education, and welfare wherever they are practicable, and Congress has shown itself sensitive to these considerations; at times, some have thought, unduly sensitive. But Congress has been ever aware that a chief obstacle to adequate pro grams is their great cost in relation to State and local tax resources, and in the grant-in-aid it has found a happy device to enable these programs to draw upon the national fisc without converting them to national operation. Indeed, since Nation and States share the power and the responsibility to provide for the general welfare, the grantin-aid is an appropriate response wherever a need is widely felt and costly to meet. I t is a contradiction to urge, as is sometimes done, that a grant must be justified by some national interest distinct from the interests of the States; for the general welfare is itself, by constitutional mandate, a national interest. By the same token, objection to grants-in-aid based on “States rights” is an anachronism if it fails to take account of the Nation’s rights as well. A Congress which in meeting a substantial part of the cost contents itself with the imposition of a few basic standards as conditions of its aid ought to be credited with self restraint, not condemned for usurpation. Defense of the grant mechanism in principle should not belittle the difficulties that arise in its practical application. B ut whatever the shortcomings of existing grants, the mechanism is without doubt the best yet discovered6 to enable the Federal Government to participate in welfare programs without monopolizing them—an objective which seems to have motivated most congressional legislation in this area and to accord best with the people’s preference to have these matters dealt with near at home. T h e N a t io n a l S y s t e m of S o c ia l I n s u r a n c e The one outstanding and conspicuous exception to the policy of leaving welfare programs to State operation is, of course, old-age, survivors, and disability insurance.7 Given the present structure of 6 G r a n ts in k in d h a v e o c c a s io n a lly b een u sed , a s h a v e d e ta ils o f F e d e r a l p e rs o n n e l, to s u p p le m e n t c a s h g r a n ts . T h e ta x -o ffs e t dev ice in u n e m p lo y m e n t c o m p e n s a tio n is a s u b s tit u te f o r a g ra n t-in -a id , b u t is o n e n o t lik e ly to be re p e a te d in o th e r p ro g ra m s . 7 B e n e fits f o r v e te r a n s , r a ilr o a d w o rk e rs , a n d m e r c h a n t se a m e n a r e n o t t r u e e x c e p tio n s s in c e th e y a r e f o r g ro u p s o f s p e c ia l F e d e r a l c o n c e rn a n d c o u ld p ro b a b ly b e s u s ta in e d in d e p e n d e n tly o f th e g e n e ra l-w e lfa re c la u se — th e f ir s t u n d e r th e w a r p o w e r, a n d t h e o th e r tw o u n d e r th e c o m m erce c la u s e ( b u t see v. 295 U. S. 3 3 0 ( 1 9 3 5 ) ) . T h e H o s p ita l S u rv e y a n d C o n s tr u c tio n (H ill- B u r to n ) A c t is a p a r t i a l e x c e p tio n , in v o lv in g a c o m b in a tio n o f F e d e r a l a n d S t a t e a d m in is tr a tio n a n d re q u ir in g no S ta te fin a n c ia l p a r tic ip a tio n . T h e re a r e o f c o u rs e m a n y d ir e c t F e d e r a l e x p e n d itu re s in th i s field f o r o th e r t h a n th e im m e d ia te p ro v is io n o f s e rv ic e s o r b e n e fits to in d iv id u a ls , s u c h a s p a y m e n t o f th e a d m in is tr a tiv e c o s ts o f th e D e p a r tm e n t o f H e a lth , E d u c a tio n , a n d W e l f a r e a n d its c o n s ti tu e n t u n its , e x p e n d itu re s f o r r e s e a rc h , a n d th e like. RailroadRetirementBoard AltonRailway Co., ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY 1041 that system, relating benefits to lifetim e earnings as it does, the reasons fo r direct national operation are self-evident: Many factors most notably the m obility o f our population, would make operation o f State-by-State systems anything like old-age, survivors, and disability insurance quite impracticable. But the question runs deeper if we ask why the system is structured as it is, and the answer depends upon an understanding o f the nature o f contributory social insurance; for if, as some still assert is the fact, old-age, survivors, and disability in surance were nothing but a system o f taxing one group o f people and spending the proceeds fo r the benefit o f other groups o f people, there would be no fundamental reason that the needs o f these other groups could not be met by the States, with such Federal aid as Congress might deem appropriate. It is because social insurance involves a commitment fo r the long-term future that it must be constituted as it is, and thereby put beyond the range o f State action. Old-age, survivors, and disability insurance is o f course a system o f taxing and spending, but it is also something more than that. The best testimony on the latter point, more persuasive than any theoretical argument, is the insistence o f organized labor that payroll taxes be increased when benefits are enlarged. It is not usual to find organized groups o f taxpayers demanding that their taxes be raised, and when such a demand is made it is the strongest kind o f evidence that some thing in addition to the payment o f taxes is at stake. The something in addition, in this case, is the integrity o f contribu tory social insurance. The values which labor, along with most of the American people, sees in this system o f insurance have been too often stated to need more than the briefest o f restatements here. First in order o f importance, perhaps, is that contributory insurance enables people to earn their own way, which most prefer to asking fo r charity even from the State. It is not very important what p or tions o f the old-age, survivors, and disability insurance benefits are in fact earned by contributions; one can accept a generous bargain and keep his self-respect, as many find it difficult to do in accepting help labeled as “ charity” and available only on p roof o f poverty. Then, too, aside from its psychological importance, the absence o f a means test in old-age, survivors and disability insurance means that the benefits o f that system form a nestegg to which each person is free to add what he can through individual savings or private group arrangements— something that is automatically ruled out when bene fits are conditioned on poverty. Finally (and this is a point over looked by some and disputed by others) contributory social insur ance holds far greater assurance than any other system that the promised benefits will actually be paid when they fall due, whether their due date is next year or is 30 or 40 years hence. I f we are to enable men to plan their own economic futures and the economic security o f their families, i f we are to relieve men’s minds as best we can o f the haunting fear o f destitute old age, or destitution o f their dependents i f they should die, we must give the promises we have made them all the certainty o f fulfillm ent that is possible in a world o f fallible human beings. This the structure o f old-age, sur vivors and disability insurance is designed to do, and this it does better than any other system yet devised. Congress has repeatedly evidenced its judgment that the values of contributory social insurance outweigh in this instance the usual argu 1042 ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY ments for State or local operation of welfare programs, and the popular consensus is clearly in accord. But realization of these values could easily be jeopardized, either by lack of sufficient congressional vigilance in amending the statutes or by loss of popular credence in the promise which the statutes make. These dangers are not imaginary. The former hazard is illustrated by the proposal a few years ago to blanket in the millions of so-called unprotected aged and pay them minimal pensions from the trust fund—a proposal which, tempting though it was in other ways, would have undermined the contributory principle and destroyed the ration ale of payroll taxes. The other hazard loomed in the early days when the financing of the system was under attack as improper and even fraudulent—an attack which ought never to have been made and which, despite its constant reiteration, seems not appreciably to have impaired popular confidence in the system. Both these hazards have apparently been safely passed, but a new attack has developed which seeks to show that the system accords its present contributors no certainty that the benefits now promised them will not be curtailed or withdrawn in the future. I f contributors generally should come to believe this, the values of social insurance would be largely lost, and it would be a serious question whether we should not revert to State-administered programs of some sort. The essence o f social insurance consists in the assurance o f future payments. In old-age, survivors, and disability insurance this assur ance is effected, not by contracts with the contributors which might disastrously freeze the benefit structure, but by several aspects o f the system which in combination go about as far as to commit future Congresses as it is legally possible to go. In the first place, Congress has struck an implied bargain by the very fact o f imposing taxes o f a kind that would never be tolerated except as a quid pro quo for promised benefits— most conspicuously, by imposing an income tax with no personal exemption, a tax limited to earned income, a tax which excludes all income above $4,200 a year. It has imposed these special taxes in amounts sufficient, as far as can now be known, to pay the whole cost o f old-age, survivors, and disability insurance over the indefinite future, and it has dedicated the proceeds o f these taxes— fo r practical purposes, has dedicated them irrevocably— to meeting the cost o f benefits and administration. Finally, by labeling the sys tem “ insurance” Congress has made its commitment to the contribu tors explicit. Being a moral and political rather than a legal commit ment, it cannot be defined with precision, but it is hardly the less binding fo r that. Despite these considerations, the existence of any effective commit ment is challenged by some, who assert th at old-age, survivors, and dis ability insurance is no more than a method of taxing the present labor force and its employers for the use of those now on the benefit rolls, and that the system gives no assurance that people now working, or their survivors, will receive the promised benefits when their working days are ended. There is no evidence th at the enormous popular sup port of old-age, survivors, and disability insurance has thus far been affected in the least by these contentions, but they have a superficial plausibility that makes them dangerous. One piece of this argument depends on a misapprehension of what was argued to the Supreme Court and decided by it in sustaining the ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY 1043 old-age insurance provisions o f the original Social Security Act. Those provisions, like all their subsequent modifications, consisted o f a taxing part and a spending part. Each part was attacked on various constitutional grounds and each was sustained. There the Court’s function ended; i f each part was valid, it was o f no concern to the Court that the two might be so dove-tailed as to constitute together a system o f contributory social insurance. Significantly, the word “ insurance” does not appear in the C ourts opinion. I f the com manded payments were valid taxes, it was o f no importance that they might also be properly described as compulsory contributions or pre miums; all taxes, indeed, are compulsory contributions. The Court neither affirmed nor denied that the system was social insurance, for that was none o f its concern. It is true that the Department o f Justice in its brief equivocated on this point, but since the point was not in issue this merely means that the Department confined its argu ments to the constitutional questions that were before the Court. It is hard to take seriously an attempt to use this brief, written 20 years ago by lawyers to whom social insurance was an unfamiliar concept, to support the thesis that Congress has for many years been misleading the people by calling the system insurance. A t any rate, the advocate purposes, the Court disposes; and the effort to disparage the system finds not a scintilla o f support in the opinion o f Mr. Justice Cardozo. Another facet o f the attack on old-age, survivors, and disability insurance is the contention that the system is not insurance because the benefit rights are created by statute rather than by contract, and because Congress has reserved to itself the right to amend or repeal the act. Ordinarily argument about definition would be o f only academic interest; obviously social insurance differs in a number o f respects from private insurance, and does not meet altogether defi nitions framed to describe the latter. In this instance, however, nomenclature is o f some importance because the word “ insurance” has been used by Congress presumably for the very purpose o f under scoring the commitment implicit in the operative provisions o f the statute. It is therefore pertinent to note that the United States Supreme Court has characterized as “ industrial insurance” some statutes which confer benefit rights.8 More recently the Court has held that a system o f disability pay ments established by an employer constituted health insurance although there were no employee contributions, the benefits were pay able from the employer’s own funds without the intervention o f an insurance carrier, the benefits varied with length o f service, and the whole scheme could be changed or terminated by the employer except for benefits to which an employee had already become entitled.9 The Court remarked that it was merely construing the term “ health in surance,” as used in the Internal Revenue Code, in accordance with “ its broad general meaning.” I f a private scheme o f this sort is insurance, it would seem quite clear that old-age, survivors, and dis ability insurance, the benefits o f which are fixed by the law o f the land, is entitled to be so described. * Grange Lumber Co. Rowley, 9names UnitedStates, v. 3 2 6 U. S. 295, 299, 3 03 (1 9 4 5 ) . T h e C o u r t re m a rk e d t h a t “ th e S ta te s u p re m e c o u r t h a s c h a r a c te r iz e d th e s y ste m * * * a s a n i n d u s tr ia l in s u r a n c e s t a t u t e h a v in g a ll th e f e a tu r e s o f a n in s u ra n c e a c t .” V. 353 U. S. 81. (1 9 5 7 ). 1044 ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY But it is said or implied that Congress, if it wished to create a system entitled to be called insurance, ought to have done so by con tract, and authority is cited that the United States cannot consti tutionally repudiate its contracts.10 Aside from the serious doubt that in a system o f compulsory insurance one Congress could thus bind its successors,11 and aside from the folly o f so doing i f it could, a contractual system would give no more legal assurance o f ultimate payment than does the present system— no assurance, that is, which the courts could enforce in the event o f hostile congressional action. F or a Congress bent on repudiating its insurance commitment could always withdraw the right to sue the Government and withdraw appropriations available for the payment o f benefits, as it did in order to prevent windfalls when the Supreme Court affirmed the inviola bility o f gold-clause bonds.12 The right to do these things cannot be relinquished by Congress, and contractual rights, no matter how inviolable, become hollow when there are no funds to meet them and no right to sue for their enforcement. Contributors are and in the nature o f things must be dependent on Congress, and not on the courts, for the ultimate protection o f their insurance rights. The points thus far discussed provide no more than a smokescreen fo r the one real argument, that the reservation o f power to amend or repeal the benefit provisions o f old-age, survivors, and disability in surance makes the congressional promise embodied in those provisions illusory. The power to amend would almost certainly have existed though it had not been expressly reserved, but in any case its existence was and is essential in a system as vast and complex as this. In the 22 years since their enactment the original provisions have been changed many times and almost beyond recognition, and there is no reason to suppose that finality has even been approached. These amendments have redounded to the very great benefit o f the contribu tors to the system; indeed, the increase o f benefits as the cost o f living has risen means that social insurance has afforded a degree o f economic security, when measured by the purchasing power o f the benefits, that private insurance cannot equal. But change in the benefit structure may involve something other than a simple increase in amounts, and a grave problem is posed when ever the process o f amendment leads to the abrogation or reduction o f benefits previously promised. Can such action be reconciled with the underlying commitment im plicit in old-age, survivors, and disability insurance ? The answer depends basically on whether the action is taken as a necessary incident to an improvement o f the system, and thus accords with the basic purpose fo r which the power o f amendment was re served. Eepeal in 1939 o f the provision o f the original Social Secu Lynch UnitedStates, 10 v. 292 U . S. 571 (1 9 3 4 ) . T h e o p in io n in th i s c a se it s e l f la rg e ly r e f u te s th e c o n te n tio n f o r w h ic h th e c a s e is c ite d , f o r i t p la in ly re c o g n iz e s t h a t if C on g re s s h a d u n d e r ta k e n to w ith d r a w th e r i g h t to su e , th e C o u r t w o u ld h a v e b e e n co m p e lled to r e a c h a d iff e r e n t c o n c lu sio n . 11 P a y m e n t o f a t a x w h ic h o n e is le g a lly r e q u ire d to p a y , u n lik e th e v o lu n ta r y p a y m e n t in v o lv e d in th e L y n c h c ase , o r d in a r ily d o es n o t c o n s ti tu te s u c h le g a l c o n s id e ra tio n a s is e s s e n tia l to th e f o r m a tio n o f a v a lid c o n tr a c t. A p ro m is e o f b e n efits in c o n s id e ra tio n o f th e p a y m e n t o f ta x e s w o u ld th e r e f o r e p re s u m a b ly be le g a lly re p e a la b le . P o s sib ly C o n g re ss c o u ld m a k e a b in d in g p ro m ise in c o n s id e r a tio n o f th e p e rfo r m a n c e o f w o rk in c o v e re d e m p lo y m e n t, b u t i t see m s u n lik e ly t h a t th e S u p re m e C o u r t w o u ld e x te n d th e d o c trin e o f th e L y n c h c a s e to a n a r r a n g e m e n t in w h ic h th e p ro m ise e h a s r e a lly s u r re n d e re d n o th in g . 12 49 S ta t. 938, 31 U. S. C. 7 7 3 ( b ) , 773 (c ). ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY 1045 rity A ct by which persons dying without qualifying for monthly benefits should receive a generous refund raised no significant objec tion, because there were substituted survivors’ benefits o f greater value to nearly all concerned, but even so it was fortunate that the change could be made before “ money back” rights had built up to any great size. This change was clearly an improvement, and its desir ability illustrates the need for an element o f flexibility in the congres sional commitment even though a handful o f people may suffer a minor loss. The same cannot be said, unfortunately, o f amendments with respect to deportees and convicted subversives which, even in the relatively temperate form in which they were finally enacted, smack more o f punishment than tliey do o f any true purpose o f the insur ance system. Somewhere between these two stands the curtailment o f the rights o f nonresident aliens, which illustrates a potentially seri ous problem for the future. No one could have objected very strenu ously i f it had been decided originally that nonresident aliens who had been in this country only a short time should not receive the bonanza which it was felt necessary to provide generally to those who have been in covered employment only briefly. But once the promise had been made to these aliens, its repudiation would probably have raised a good deal o f protest except for the fortunate coincidence that the victims were too far away to be heard. Let us suppose that certain dire but improbable prophecies should be borne out by the fact, and that the recently enacted disability bene fits should prove in the next few years to be disastrously expensive and entirely unworkable. Could a formula for their repeal be devised that would do substantial justice to the millions o f people who have made additional contributions from their pay envelopes for disability protection ? This is an extreme and unlikely case, but it illustrates the difficulty o f revising a commitment that will run, for many individ uals, 50 or 60 years into the future. Even the Congress can make mis takes, and in old-age, survivors, and disability insurance it has made the correction o f any excess o f liberality an extraordinarily difficult problem. It has been well said that the insurance system, though not con tractual in nature, is “ vested with the aura o f a contract.” 13 From all evidence, people generally are not in the least disturbed by the difference between a contract and an aura. The reason fo r this is not far to seek; it means simply that people have confidence in the Con gress o f the United States. A fter all, Congress has it in its power to honor or dishonor all fiscal obligations o f the Government, and the credit o f the United States is the best in the world. Surely those who foresee fiscal irresponsibility in the case o f social insurance have the burden o f showing grounds for their fears, a burden all the heavier because so many o f every congressional constituency have a stake in old-age, survivors, and disability insurance. I f improvements in the future require some modification o f existing benefit rights, as they may, we can trust to Congress’ sense o f obliga tion and sense o f fair play to assure that contributors are treated equitably. The greater danger lies in changes that may appear minor or even trivial, that injure only a few, or injure only those who for 13 S e c u rity , W o rk , a n d R e lie f P o lic ie s , H . R e p t. D oc. No. 128, p t. 3, 7 8 th C ong., 1 s t sess. ( W a s h in g t o n : G. P . O.. 1 9 4 3 ), p . 523. 1046 ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY one extraneous reason or another may not enjoy the sympathies o f the people at large. Here, the reserved power o f amendment may lure the Congress into actions which it would not consider i f there were a binding legal commitment, actions which find no warrant in the pur poses o f the insurance system itself. However politically innocuous such amendments may appear, however the ethical questions they raise may be resolved, they w ill exact a price far beyond their immedi ate significance i f they can be used to disparage in the public mind the Government’s undertaking to pay the promised benefits. Even the smallest seeds o f doubt could be dangerous, fo r no one can know that some may not land on fertile soil. W hat happens to a handful o f people, even unpopular people, can be held up by those who choose to do so as an example o f what might happen to the rank and file in a period o f financial stringency. No one can know at just what point public confidence might begin to be shaken, or what the consequences would be i f it were, but one probable consequence is that payroll taxes would become very unpopular indeed, ultimately perhaps too unpopu lar to survive. The risk is not worth taking, fo r the stakes are too high. There are people in positions o f influence who apparently still be lieve that the adoption o f compulsory social insurance was a mistake and have not given up hope o f effecting its abandonment, and pre sumably o f bringing about a return to the public-assistance approach as the only public aid available to those now within the ambit o f oldage, survivors, and disability insurance. Frontal assault on the insur ance system at the present time would be hopeless, and these dissenters have now hit upon its most vulnerable point, the lack o f a precise and definitive commitment fo r the future, in an effort to weaken public support fo r the system that they would like ultimately to see aban doned. Complacency in the face o f this attack would be unwise, for there is a color o f truth in the argument which, under some conditions, could render it effective. Congress itself is the only body that can render this destructive argument futile, and it can best do so by reject ing every amendment that would withdraw or curtail the benefit rights o f any person unless the amendment is required, and can be justified to the people, as a necessary incident in the continuing process o f strengthening and im proving the system.
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