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EIGHT YEARS WITH
WILSON’S CABINET

WOODROW
from

th e

w o o d

WILSON

e n g r a v in g

.m o th y c o le

A F T E R T H E P O R T R A IT B Y J O H N S . S A R G E N T
C O P Y R IG H T . A R T H U R

H. HARLOW &

EIGHT YEARS WI TH
W I L S O N ’S C A B I N E T
1913

1920

With a Personal Estimate of the President

by
D A V I D F. HOUS T ON

■

In Two Volumes

VOLUME

G A R D EN C IT Y

DOUBLEDAY,

NEW YO R K

PAGE
1926

& COMPANY

COPYRIG HT, 1 9 2 6 , BY DOUBLEDAY, PAGE
ft COM PANY.
ALL RIG H TS RESERVED.
PR IN TED IK T H E U NITED STATES AT T H E
COUNTRY L IF E PR ES», GARDEN CITY , N . T .

FIRST EDITION

AUTHOR'S NOTE
The material in this workfor the most part deals with the
author's own experiences and gives his views on problems
which were discussed in Cabinet meetings, or his treatment
of events with which he had direct contact and of which he
had personal knowledge. The record was made the day of
the event, except that in respect to broad movements it was
made at the end of an appropriate period, which accounts
for the differences in tenses.
The record is a partial one only, for the author noted only
the more novel or striking happeningsfalling under his direct
observation or jurisdiction, and it is necessarily partial be
cause he made no attempt except incidentally or occasionally
even to indicate the views or to deal with the activities of other
members of the Cabinet. He offers it, not as a complete or
balanced account of the events, but as a contemporaneous
record which may help tofill in the picture of eight important
years and be of value to the historian.

CONTENTS
VOLUME I
PAGE

CHAPTER

E ven ts L

II.

III.

Secretary

p p o in t e d

I n a u g u r a t io n

B a l t im o r e C o n v e n t io n

e a d in g u p t o

9x3

g r ic u l t u r e

r e s id e n t

il s o n ,

......................................................

IV. T h e T a r i f f ...................................................................4 7
V. F o r e i g n P r o b l e m s ..................................................... <q
VI. T h e F e d e r a l R e s e r v e A c t ...............................80
VII. C h o o s in g

F ederal R

th e

C it ie s

eserve

VIII. O u t b r e a k o f t h e W a r ...................................... 112
IX. B r y a n ’ s R e s i g n a t i o n ..............................................13 0
X.

X I.

XII.
XIII.
XIV.
XV.
XVI.
XVII.
XVIII.
XIX.
XX.

ip l o m a t ic

G a r r is o n R
Po

l it ic s

r if t in g

otes an d

ow ard

C a b in e t ’s V ie w s

l l ie d

r e s id e n t ’s

A g r ic u l t u r e

149

19 9

..................................... 2 1 7

on th e

233

..................................... 253
M i s s i o n ............................... 267

essage

ropaganda

the

P r e s id e n t G o e s

rogram m e
a

efen se

........................................................................... 188

a t io n a l

..................................................... 16 4

e s ig n s

g r ic u l t u r a l

a r

301

....................................... 329

P a r is

347

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Woodrow W i l s o n ..................................

Frontispiece
FACING PAGE

The first meeting of President Wilson's Cabinet . . .

EIGHT YEARS WITH
WILSON’S CABINET

EI GHT YEARS W I T H
W I L S O N ’S CAB I N E T
CHAPTER I
EVEN TS LEADING UP TO BALTIM ORE CONVEN TION

Colonel House Suggests Cabinet Position— Vicarious Imitation
to Become Secretary of Agriculture

N THE spring of 1912, as the political parties began
to plan their programmes and strategy for the election
of that year, I was more than normally interested in
the political situation and its developments. I had
always been interested in public affairs and, since the be
ginning of my college days, had devoted myself to the
study of private and public law, American and compara
tive government, history, and economics, and had special
ized for three years in the Graduate School of Harvard in
government, taxation, banking, international payments,
budgets, and industrial history. Afterward I lectured on
these subjects for eight years in the University of Texas.
Then I became exclusively entangled m executive work
and was turned aside from my original purpose to prac
tise law.
During my years of preparation, I was a close observer
of political developments. There was nothing, however,
in the ideals, practices, or leaders of either party which

commanded my admiration or aroused my enthusiasm till
the nomination of Grover Cleveland by the Democrats,
in 1884. I watched with great satisfaction the triumph
of good government under his leadership in that year and,
as good luck would have it, I cast my first vote for him
in 1888. In a sense, I have been voting for him ever since.
I was not surprised at the defeat of Cleveland in 1888
or at his success in 1892. During the last campaign, I
was at Harvard and had the very great advantage of wit
nessing the struggle in eastern Massachusetts. It was a
stimulating, liberalizing, and reassuring experience to hear
and to know such leaders and champions of real democracy
as William Everett, Nathan Matthews, John E. Russell,
William E. Russell, Richard OIney, and President Eliot.
The last I recall particularly as a participant at a ratifica
tion meeting of Cleveland’s nomination in Boston some
time before the election. He was the last speaker where
there were more able speakers than I had ever before seen
or have since seen at any one time, and what he said made
a lasting impression on me. He had, as he said, a message
to young men, and it was in substance this: Democracy
is a very difficult form of government. To be successful
it must be based on an intelligent and thoughtful citizen
ship. But it is difficult for the masses to get all the nec
essary facts underlying public issues, and to digest and
interpret them. It is of the first importance that they
have frank, intelligent, patriotic, and, above all, courage
ous leaders to aid them, men who have an eye single to
the public interest and who would scorn to mislead the
people or to use government for private or personal ends.
Grover Cleveland had demonstrated that he was such a
leader, and young men should show their civic interest
W

and patriotism by casting their first ballot for him.
Above all, they should do their own thinking and be in
dependent.
I shall never forget President Eliot as he stood that
evening before the huge audience. I realized what it
meant at that time for the President of Harvard to stand
forward as the advocate of a Democratic candidate.
There was an element of the spectacular in his appear
ance, and he was most impressive, as he, the leader of
learning in America, as noble a figure, perhaps, as America
has produced, took his position near the front of the plat
form, standing as straight as an Indian, with heels to
gether, hands clasped in front, without a gesture, and in
rich tones and effective, precise English made his appeal
to an audience which listened so intently that one could
almost have heard a pin drop.
When Cleveland was overwhelmingly elected, I had the
feeling that, if the Democrats could and would adhere to
his policies and discover and uphold leaders of his type,
they would have an indefinite lease of power. But this
was expecting too much; and it actually became clear,
before the end of his Administration, not only that the
expectation would not be realized, but that the Democrats
would not have the wisdom to recognize a good thing
when they had it, and to remain loyal to their leader and
to sound causes. The reversal of attitude was tragic
and dramatic, and finds its explanation, such as it is, in
a situation which had rapidly come to a head but which,
in part, was due to influences or forces of long standing.
The character of our currency, which had never been
satisfactory and had been in debate since the very founda
tion of the Union, and which for years had been dealt with

timidly and in a spirit of weak compromise by both parties
up to Cleveland’s Administration, had, because of declin
ing prices after the panic of 1893, come acutely to the
front. The “ Light in the West” appeared and the West
and South were blinded by it. William Jennings Bryan
rose up as the champion of the free coinage of silver at
sixteen to one. “ The people shall not be crucified on a
cross of gold,” he cried. The masses in the South and
West for a time lost their heads. They got a glitter in
their eyes. They ceased to think and began to feel, and
the principles and purposes of the Democratic party were
obscured. The issues for which Cleveland stood and on
which he was swept into power were forgotten. The
people of the nation, after an interval sufficient for re
flection and study, supported the cause of sound money,
as they always have in a pinch; and the opponents of free
silver triumphed.
The Republicans returned to power without the in
spiration and high purposes which had called the party
into existence, and resumed their former policies and prac
tices. It was charged that the “ Old Guard” had once
more, and more firmly, resumed its control of the party
and of the nation’s affairs, and had become more con
spicuously than ever an agency of “ special interests,” a
tool for putting profits into the pockets of the rich. Re
forms, it was asserted, should not be undertaken, because
they might hurt business.
When Theodore Roosevelt succeeded to the Presidency
after the death of McKinley, a new spirit was for a time
infused into our national life and policies. Roosevelt was
astute and aggressive. He knew the value of direct ap
peal to the people, and he lost no opportunity to address
W

them over the heads of the bosses. There were few issues
he did not touch upon; and he lectured from his high ros
trum on everything from modified spelling and race suicide
to international peace and the government of backward
races. While his noise-making capacity was greater than
his sense of direction, he succeeded in securing the enact
ment of a number of meritorious measures, and he effected
improvements in the domestic and foreign services of
the government. But his largest contribution was the
awakening of great numbers of Republicans to a need of
committing and holding their party to policies and prac
tices more in the interest of the whole body of the people.
This was a valuable contribution; but it was not obvious
to some of the leaders of the party who continued in power
when Roosevelt’s second term expired and he made his
pilgrimage abroad, leaving his friend, Judge Taft, to guide
his party.
Everybody had a right to expect excellent things of
Mr. Taft. He was known to be a lovable man, an upright
and public-spirited citizen, and a good lawyer and judge.
Roosevelt had said that Mr. Taft was the best man he
knew for Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and also for
President of the United States. Apparently, he had
made a good Secretary of War and a good administrator
in the Philippines. It was not known how much power of
leadership, sense of direction in politics, and initiative he
had.
Mr. Taft was elected, and soon thereafter it began to be
asserted and believed that not he but the “ Old Guard”
was the real leader and President; that it had learned
nothing; and that it was once more playing its old game
of making laws and administering them for special inter

ests, or, as Roosevelt called them, “ the corrupt interests,"
on the theory that if these interests were made to prosper,
they, in turn, would pass some of the prosperity on to the
masses— a theory which Cleveland savagely attacked in
his fourth annual message of his first term, dated Decem
ber 3, 1888, saying: “ He mocks the people who proposes
that government shall protect the rich and that they in
turn will care for the labouring poor. Any intermediary
between the people and their government, or the least
delegation of the care and protection the government
owes to the humblest citizen in the land, makes the boast
of free institutions a glittering delusion and the pretended
boon of American citizenship a shameless imposition.”
The regular Republican party, under the leadership of
the extreme conservatives, drifted toward defeat. Igno
rant of the course of public sentiment, or ignoring it, it
continued its efforts to hold its machine together through
traffic in offices, and persisted in its policy of erecting
higher and higher tariff barriers. It placed the PayneAldrich measure on the statute books, which carried rates
to the highest point ever reached in our history; and this
more than forty-three years after the Civil War; and Mr.
Taft was unfortunate and misguided enough to inform the
people in his Winona Speech that the measure was the
best of its kind ever enacted and was a compliance with
the demands of the people.
In 1912, Mr. Taft was renominated. Mr. Roosevelt
immediately made a savage assault on him and the regu
lar Republicans, charging that the nomination had been
brought about by the manipulation of delegates, and
that the rank and file of the party had been betrayed.
He and his followers bolted and organized the Progressive
[6]

party. With great show of emotion, the Progressives met
in convention and nominated their idol for the Presidency;
and there followed a campaign of great fury and noise.
This, in substance, was the indictment: Both old parties
are worse than useless. There is nothing good in them.
Both are the playthings of professional politicians— mere
time servers. They furnish only a nominal government.
The real government is “ the invisible government of the
corrupt interests, by the corrupt interests, and for the
corrupt interests.” The Progressives only can save the
nation. Their Moses will lead it into the Promised Land.
Clearly the chance of the Democratic party had come.
Would they seize it? If they nominated a man of charac
ter, vision, and high purpose, if they could find and select
a second Cleveland, they would win; if they could not or
would not, then Roosevelt would run away with the elec
tion; for it was clear that independent men of all parties
were tired of the old gangs and their futilities.
More and more the best element of the Democratic
party was turning its gaze in the direction of New Jersey
and its high-minded and courageous Governor, Woodrow
Wilson; but the old leaders of the party, thinking that the
split in the Republican ranks made Democratic victory
certain, were clamorous for one of their own kind who
would play the game. Champ Clark, a typical Missouri
politician, was their man. They no more were aware of
the drift of public thought than were their fellow Republi
can professionals.
When the Democratic Convention assembled in Balti
more, the issue was Woodrow Wilson. It was Wilson
versus the bosses— the enlightened element of the party
against the machine. It was Wilson against Champ

Clark— or, if neither, perhaps Bryan. Bryan had not
stopped running; and while it was his sharp challenge to
the bosses and his opposition which made Wilson’s nomi
nation inevitable, it is by no means certain that he in
tended or expected such an outcome.
During the interesting struggle in this Convention, I
was in northern Michigan, anxiously watching the course
of things, but with no thought of any bearing it might
have on my fortunes, and no desire to become involved
actively in political life. I had begun to see a great deal
of one of the finest citizens of St. Louis, a Democrat of the
Cleveland type, Rolla Wells. In our frequent contacts,
we constantly discussed the situation and particularly
the developments in Baltimore. We were of the same
mind. Finally, when the Convention adjourned over
Sunday, Mr. Wells came to my house in Wequetonsing
and said that he wanted to consult me about sending a
telegram to each member of the National Democratic
Committee. He showed me one which he had written.
It ran as follows:
M ack , T aggart,

S u l l iv a n ,

C ole,

and

G o l t r a and

O th ers.

Baltimore, Md.
Clark cannot now carry Missouri, nor the country at
large. Wilson can. Why not exercise political sanity
in taking advantage of a rare opportunity by nominating
a scholarly statesman and a conservative progressive,
namely Woodrow Wilson, who can be elected?
I told him by all means to send it. He did so. It was
a courageous thing for him to do, as the entire Missouri

[8]

delegation was backing Missouri’s favourite son. Mr.
Wells remarked that he was burning his bridges behind
him. I reminded him that he had been doing that all his
life, and added that he had got himself into trouble, but
not into the kind he apprehended— that he would before
long be called upon to render a national service in some
important position.
I was not surprised when, a few days later, Mr. Wells
came to see me bringing a telegram asking him to take
the treasurership of the Campaign Committee. He said
that he did not want the position. He gave good reasons
for wishing to decline the offer, but after some insistence
from Mr. Wilson, he accepted it from a sense of duty.
After Mr. Roosevelt’s nomination, there was much dis
cussion in our summer colony of the outcome of the elec
tion. Several influential Republicans asked me for my
opinion and, much to their astonishment, I said emphati
cally that Wilson would be elected, that Mr. Taft might
carry Vermont, but that I would not concede it to
him.
Neither at this time, as I have said, nor for a number of
weeks after the election was I dreaming that I would be
called upon to take any part in the conduct of affairs.
But in December, 1912, when I was in New York, Colonel
House, whom I had known for many years, asked me if I
would consider going into the Cabinet. I did not take
the inquiry very seriously. He suggested the Treasury.
I told him that, while my interests had been in economics,
banking, finance, and financial history, I thought that the
President-elect should get someone for the Treasury who
was better known to the business world and who already
had its confidence. He then asked if I would consider

the Interior or the Commerce Department. I replied
that if I were called upon to take anything, I would prefer
the Department of Agriculture, the one great develop
mental department of the government. He seemed sur
prised, but when I emphasized its fundamental impor
tance to the nation, he indicated that he understood and
appreciated my attitude. When I left him, I dismissed
the matter from my mind as far as I could.
But, in January, the matter was brought up again. I
received a letter from Mr. House, dated January 1 3 ,I9i3>
asking me definitely if I would consider a Cabinet position.
He wrote:
145 East 35th Street,
New York City.
I was at Princeton last Wednesday night and had a
most interesting time.
Do you remember our talk last year about a Cabinet
place? Are you still of the same mind, and would you
accept one if it were tendered?
The Governor has settled none of these places even in
his own mind yet, but I would like to know your feeling
in regard to the matter as soon as it is convenient for you
to let me know.
When Andrew D. White was President of Cornell he
was appointed Ambassador to Germany and his Trustees
gave him a four years’ leave of absence. Could not this
be done in your instance?
With warm regards and best wishes, I am,
Your very sincere friend,
E. M. H o u s e .
January 13th, 1913.

Again, on January 18th, Colonel House wrote me that
Governor Wilson had spent Friday night, the seventeenth,
with him, that they had talked much about me, and that
he had no doubt that the matter about which he had
written on the thirteenth would be arranged. He said
that it was important that he see me on the twenty-second
or twenty-third, or in no event later than Friday the
twenty-fourth. He expected to leave Sunday for Florida
to see Mr. Bryan.
I replied that the possibility of Governor Wilson’s ask
ing me to take a place in his Cabinet seemed to me to be
so remote that I could scarcely allow myself to entertain
it; that it would be very difficult for me to leave St. Louis;
that I hoped I would not be called upon to determine the
question; and that I thought the Governor could discover
somebody else who could afford to serve.
When I was in New York early in February, I saw Mr.
House several times. He brought up the Cabinet matter
again. I asked him if the situation was at all serious so
far as I was concerned, and he replied that it was very
serious— that my name was one that the Governor no
longer debated; that it was setded in his mind; but that,
of course, he ought to have the right to change up to the
last moment and would reserve the right to do so. I told
him that I hoped he would change, but that evidently the
matter was very threatening and that I ought to be free
to discuss it with Mrs. Houston and the President of the
Washington University Corporation in confidence. To
this he assented.
On my return to St. Louis, I mentioned the matter to
Mr. Brookings. He was not surprised, but seemed to be
worried. He was good enough to say that he did not see

[n]

how he could get along without me, but that he thought
I might render great service as head of a department and
also as an adviser in financial, economic, and governmental
matters.
On February 12th, I received the following telegram:
Savannah, Ga.,
Feb. 11, 1913.
I am writing you to-day at the suggestion of our friend.
You may now confer with your board in the strictest con
fidence I am sure they will be patriotic and make the
sacrifice There is too much of public importance in
volved to admit of but one decision.
E. M. H o u s e .
The following is the letter referred to:
St. Augustine, Florida.
Confidential.
My

dear

F r ie n d :

I am just in receipt of a letter from the Governor asking
me to return for a final conference on Thursday. He
then adds: “ Meantime, would you be kind enough to
sound H. of St. Louis on the Secy, of Agriculture for me?
On that case I am clear and my choice made; but I think
it best for you to open the matter with him, if you will
be so kind.” You must accept. Your duty was never
clearer. You do not know, as I do, how much of value
to the country is involved. It is more than the one de
partment that is at stake, and if you should fail us now,
I should feel as if I had worked in vain. You may now
have a more general conference with your friends, but
please be firm and let them know that a higher duty now
[12]

calls. I would appreciate an early answer, and if you
could veil a telegram so that its meaning would be clear
to me alone that would be better. I am leaving in a
few moments for New York.
Yours faithfully,
E. M. H o u s e .
After reflection, in view of the fact that I had only a
few years before assumed my position in St. Louis and
some important projects were at a critical stage, and of
the further fact that I had limited means, I wrote that
I did not see my way clear to leave and asked that another
man be found. A prompt reply came to the effect that
the President-elect wanted me in his Cabinet, that his
plans would be thrown out of gear if I declined, and that
I must accept. I answered by telegram that I would
accept, if it was understood that I might retire at the end
of two years without embarrassment if I decided that I
ought to return to St. Louis. I added that the Adminis
tration would probably be made or marred in two years,
and that I could in all likelihood get into shape within that
time such ideas as I had. The reply came immediately
that my suggestion was entirely acceptable. It was as
follows:
New York City,
February 15.
Our friend was with me when your telegram came, and
I am glad to tell you that it is entirely satisfactory. It
has made me very happy. Please see that absolute se
crecy is maintained.
E. M. H o u s e .
And so it was fixed.

C H A P T E R II
APPO IN TED SE C R E T A R Y OF A G R IC U L T U R E

Previous Acquaintance with Wilson and House— Joining the
Cabinet Without Direct Word from the President— Surprise of
Governor Francis and Logan Waller Page

FELT greatly honoured to be asked to join the Presi
dent’s Cabinet and to serve as Secretary of Agricul
ture, but for financial reasons it was a serious business
for me to go to Washington in such a capacity. I
knew that I could scarcely live in ordinary decency on the
salary and on what little private income I had, and I did
not like the idea of using my savings or of going into debt.
But I felt that we were justified in going at least for a
short time.
The financial problem is one which every man of limited
means has to face who is called upon to serve the people
in an important position either at home or abroad. We
have made it possible only for men of comfortable income
without undue sacrifice to serve the government in the
more exacting positions and to do their appropriate and
decent part in the social life of the places where they are
stationed; and yet, we call ourselves a Democracy. The
trouble seems to be that we fool ourselves in this as in
some other matters, and that our standards are set by
those who do not concern themselves about the require
ments of a position, or who seem to think that to live up
to the standards of simple decency is to be undemocratic.

If Democracy is the best form of government, it certainly
has a right to clothe itself in seemly fashion. Our present
practice is as unfair and scandalous as it is menacing.
However, as George Washington emphasized the impor
tance of a different attitude and practice in 1796 and little
has been done to modify them to date, I am not optimistic
about an early change. His words are worth noting and
spreading. In his last Annual Message, he said:
“ The compensations to the officers of the United States
in various instances, and in none more than in respect to
the most important stations, appear to call for legislative
revision. The consequences of a defective provision are
of serious import to the government. If private wealth is
to supply the defect of public retribution, it will greatly
contract the sphere within which the selection of character
for office is to be made, and will proportionally diminish
the probability of a choice of men able as well as upright.
Besides that, it would be repugnant to the vital principles
of our government virtually to exclude from public trusts
talents and virtue unless accompanied by wealth.”
* I was not apprehensive about the work of the office or
my general duties. I had been more or less in touch with
the Department of Agriculture for a number of years, and
had been dealing with the problems which it had to con
sider. I knew that its main function was to promote
more efficient production, to improve the processes of
marketing, to create better credit facilities for the farmer,
to make rural life more profitable and attractive, and to
make more of the benefits of modem science accrue to the
rural population. In that way only could we be sure of
retaining in the rural districts a sufficient number of con
tented, efficient, and reasonably prosperous people. I

was aware, too, that the farmers’ more acute problems
were in the field of economics, and in this field I was par
ticularly interested. It was one which the economists, as
a rule, had neglected. In a word, I knew that the task
was one of the conservation of*men and women and boys
and girls in our rural districts, and that it required higher
intelligence and better practices. Walter Page was fully
aware of the nature of the problem, and, therefore, I
wanted to see him appointed to the position, and said
so. Later, I discovered that he was urging me for the
place. I wish I had been able to prevail. I had said
that the Department was the one great developmental
agency of the government, and that it would interest me,
and I believed it would interest Page more than any other
man. It was the call which came to head this depart
ment under a chief like Mr. Wilson that made me willing
to interrupt my work in St. Louis, which afforded a great
opportunity to do something constructive in a section of
the country in which it was well worth doing.
As yet I had heard nothing directly from the President
elect, himself. I had not seen him for a number of months.
I had not known him very long personally, but I had
known him intimately through his writings, addresses, and
acts. I knew that he was trained in government, politics,
and university administration; that he could think straight
and clearly and could express his thoughts in excellent
English; that he had high ideals and an unwavering faith
in the American people; that he believed that most great
reforms came from below and not from above; that with
him government was an instrument for public service and
ends and not for individual or class profits; that he would
stand for the best things in domestic and international
[16]

life; and that we would think in similar terms on most
questions. I believed that he would want the right thing,
that he had great capacity for discovering what was right,
and that he had the courage to follow his conclusions no
matter where they might lead. I knew another thing:
I knew that he was of Scotch and English ancestry and
that he had been brought up in a Scotch Presbyterian
atmosphere of the purest sort.
I had known members of his family intimately. His
uncle, Dr. James Woodrow, was a professor in the old
South Carolina College when I was a student there from
1885 to 1888. He was one of the ablest, most versatile,
and most accomplished men I have ever known. I have
known only a few other men who approached him in the
ability to use graceful and precise English. He spoke
French, German, and some Italian, and read Hebrew,
Greek, and Latin easily. He had studied and taught
physics and chemistry; and when I was in college, he
lectured to us on geology, zoology, and physiology. Also,
he taught theology in the Seminary in Columbia, edited
the Southern Presbyterian, and was a director in several
financial and industrial concerns. He later became
president of the college. The first time I saw Woodrow
Wilson was in his uncle’s house in Columbia. I saw him
only for a few seconds, but I never forgot him.
It was years before I met Mr. Wilson again. M y next
meeting was in St. Louis, when he was there to make an
address before a St. Louis Club. I had the honour of
introducing him. I was greatly impressed with the sub
stance of his address, and more so with the manner of it.
My third meeting with him was also in St. Louis, after he
became Governor of New Jersey. This time he came to

speak before some learned society. I did not hear his
address, but I met him at a luncheon at the St. Louis
Club, where he made a brief talk to a group of university
men. I remember only one thing, and that is that he
made a rather sharp assault on experts on economics and
politics, and expounded his theory that progressive im
pulses came from the people, and that he would look to
them for support for reforms. I thought at the time that
his remarks about experts were severe and unnecessary,
and that he was getting, or had got, more out of his brief
dip into politics than there was in it.
The only doubt I had about Mr. Wilson at the time was
as to the extent of his executive ability, particularly his
capacity to see a great many things in a short time, to
dispose of them promptly, and to do team work. I said
to Mrs. Houston, in Michigan, just after he was nomi
nated, that I had some apprehensions about his executive
ability, as it had seemed to me that, while he had been
mainly right at Princeton, he had created unnecesasry
friction and had finally failed to carry his point except
with resulting disorganization. I raised the question
whether or not the same trait, whatever it was which
hampered him in Princeton, might not plague him in
Washington.
My fourth and most interesting contact with him was
at a dinner at Colonel House’s in December, 1911. This
was at the time when he was being placed before the
people for the Presidency, especially by George Harvey.
Colonel House had written to me asking me when I was
going to be in the East again, saying that Governor Wilson
wanted to have a talk with me. He added that he would
give a small dinner at his house where the Governor and
[18]

I could talk without interruption. The dinner was ar
ranged for early in December. I went to see Colonel
House early and found out what was in the air. It was
desired that Governor Wilson and I have a talk especially
on the tariff, taxation, and currency.
Governor Wilson came in early also, and the three of us
were by ourselves for a little while. Colonel House asked
Wilson if he had seen George Harvey and how matters
came out. The Governor, as I remember, said that he
had had a talk with Harvey who asked him whether or not
he thought it was true, as some had said, that his constant
advocacy of him in Harper's Weekly was calculated to do
him more harm than good; that reference was made to
the suggestion that Harper's was supposed to be under
Wall Street influence; and that he told Harvey frankly
that he thought perhaps the constant urging of his name
by one journal was doing some harm. Harvey, he added,
said then that he would let up and seemed to look at the
matter in the right spirit. The impression left on my
mind was that the matter had been frankly and amicably
discussed between two friends who were interested in the
same thing and concerned only as to the best course to
pursue.
After dinner, the Governor and I went aside in a corner
of the room and were left alone for an hour or more.
He asked me first what I thought ought to be done about
the tariff and the currency.
I told him that I was in favour of a tariff for revenue
and that, of course, the Democrats ought to come out
strongly for a drastic downward revision. I added that,
while I realized that the tariff must have the right of way,
I considered the currency question the more important

and urgent of the two; that tariff discussion nearly always
produced some industrial and financial disturbance; that
in the existing partial depression, it might cause no little
trouble; and that I should like to see a currency system
provided before the tariff was taken up so that any storm
could be more easily weathered. I said again that I
recognized that this was tactically impossible, but that
there was no reason why the two should not be projected
at the same time and pushed to completion very nearly
together. He said: “ I am not an expert in economic or
financial matters. In these things I shall have to get
much advice. What would you do?” I answered: “ To
make a long story short, I would take the Monetary Com
mission bill, which had many good points, and decentral
ize the system it sought to provide; I would modify it to
make its machinery simpler and more acceptable in the
matter of control; it is too complex and not sufficiently
popularly or governmentally controlled.”
After we had discussed both topics, the Governor asked
me if I would not send him a brief on each subject. I
promised that I would do so, and when I went back to
St. Louis I prepared the briefs and sent them to him.
When I told the Governor that I would prepare the briefs,
he said: “ Please do not expect me to use the matter in
my statements at great length or in the form in which
you give it. I cannot deal with questions in that way.
I want all the facts and interpretations of them I can get.
I shall try to digest them— to get my thought permeated
with them; and then I shall try to paint a word picture.
I do not like to speak for over twenty or thirty minutes.”
I said to myself: “ That is the artist in him.”
After the last communication came from Colonel House,
[20]

telling me that my proposal to go to Washington for two
years was satisfactory to Governor Wilson, I had nothing
more to indicate that I was to be in the government up
to the time I started for Washington, except some cards
to certain functions and a note from Governor and Mrs.
Wilson, from Trenton, N. J., inviting Mrs. Houston and
me to lunch at the White House at 1 30 o’clock, Tuesday,
March 4th.
Colonel House, through whom my negotiations with
Governor Wilson had taken place, I have known for many
years. I first met him when I went to Austin, Texas,
from Harvard, in 1894, to lecture on economics and gov
ernment at the University of Texas. I quickly con
tracted a great respect and admiration for him. He was
then living in Austin, within a few blocks of where I found
lodgings.
I soon discovered that Colonel House was very much
interested in political affairs and that he was one of the
most influential figures, especially for good, in the state.
He had directed the campaigns of several governors, in
cluding Hogg, Culberson, and Sayers, and was easily
their most trusted and useful adviser. His assistance was
sought by them particularly when they got into tight
places, and it was always cheerfully and unselfishly given.
His interest in the whole business was unselfish. He had
no ax to grind. He was human and liked the game, and,
no doubt, the sense of power, and he knew how to play
the game, but his first aim was to secure the best attain
able thing for the people. All the public men knew that
he wanted nothing and would take nothing; and they had
no fear or jealousy of him.
He did his part adroitly and unobtrusively. He never
[21]

attended a political convention and disliked crowds.
He was never known to make a political speech. As a
rule, he saw only the leaders, and few of them at a time,
and usually at his own office or residence and on his own
terms. He impressed me as a most useful and valiant
citizen. He could have had any position at the disposal
of his state, but he would consent to have his name men
tioned for none.
My contact with Colonel House did not end when I
left Texas. He had already contracted a migratory habit
influenced by the seasons. When it began to get hot in
Austin late in the winter or early in the spring, he would
migrate to New York; when the heat overtook him in
New York, he would retreat to Magnolia or Manchester,
Massachusetts. From there he would make a longer
flight to Europe; and then, at the opportune moment, he
would begin the return movement. I not infrequently
encountered him at one or more of his resting places.
In the course of his travel back and forth, Colonel
House spent considerable time in New York. There he
began to form contacts with leaders in civic affairs; and
during the months preceding the campaign of 1912. he
became intimate with such men as E. S. Martin of Life,
and Walter Page. He also became acquainted with
Governor Wilson, in whom he quickly became greatly
interested; and Governor Wilson as quickly discovered the
value of Colonel House as an adviser. The two became
intimate friends, and Colonel House was established as
one of the Governor’s small circle of trusted counsellors
poetical aids. As usual, he did his part quietly and
effectively.
Mrs. Houston and I left St. Louis for Washington on the
[22]

Governor’s Special, Sunday, March 2d, at 12:28. I had
intended to take the regular twenty-four-hour Pennsyl
vania train at 12:20, and had made reservations on it for
Mrs. Houston and myself. I had neglected to ask the
agent not to put my name on the Pullman card. Mr.
Francis, son of Governor D. R. Francis, saw it and rang
me up over the telephone to ask me if I could not go on
the Special at 12:28. I thought it would be simpler to
accept, and I did so. Governor Major, Ex-Governor
Francis, Ex-Governor Folk, National Committeeman
Goltra, and lots of colonels were on board. All the leaders
whom I met were very polite to me, especially Governor
Francis, whom I knew well, and Governor Major; but
none of them regarded me as a person of any political con
sequence. I wondered if they would show more interest
the next day when rumours began to spread, as I knew
they would.
I had been asked to say nothing about the fact that I
was going to be in the Cabinet, except in strict confidence
to the few people to whom, for official reasons, I was com
pelled to speak; and I strictly observed the request. No
body was looking in my direction for material in their
Cabinet making, and no mention had been made of me
as a possibility.
I was particularly sorry, after I got on the train, that
I did not feel at liberty to speak to Governor Francis, for
reasons which will appear. He was, as I have intimated,
an old friend of mine. He was also a member of the
Board of Directors of Washington University.
I soon discovered that the Governor had something on
his mind. He sat down by me the first afternoon and
asked if I knew Mr. Wilson. I told him I did. He asked

if I knew him well. I replied that I did. He inquired if
I had seen him lately. I said: “ Not for several months.”
Then, sensing trouble, I asked him to excuse me, as I
wanted to see if Mrs. Houston was ready to go in to dinner.
After dinner, the Governor came to me again and asked
more questions about my relations with Mr. Wilson. Had
I been in college with him? How long had I known him?
Had I had any communication with him daring the cam
paign? I answered each question fully and then excused
myself to join Mrs. Houston.
The next morning, after breakfast, I joined Mrs.
Houston in our compartment. She greeted me with a
smile and an injunction not to talk very loud. I asked
her what was troubling her. She said that she had just
had an amusing experience; that she was resting, almost
napping, after a somewhat sleepless night, when she began
to hear two men talking in the adjoining compartment.
One of them she thought from his voice was Governor
Francis. She heard him say that apparently the Presi
dent-elect had not yet selected his Secretary of Agricul
ture; that he was anxious to see President Waters, of the
Kansas State College, appointed; and that he thought he
could land him at the last moment with the aid of Senator
Stone and Speaker Clark. She said she could not avoid
hearing that statement, but that, when the conversation
continued in rather loud tones, she left the compartment.
A little while later, Governor Francis again joined me.
Again he turned the talk to Mr. Wilson. Did I say that
I had seen him recently? Did I expect to see him soon
after I reached Washington? Did I know the men who
were particularly close to him ? I answered each question
in the affirmative, and then beat a hasty retreat. Perhaps

I ought then to have told him that I was going to be in
the Cabinet, but, at the moment, it seemed to me that I
ought to observe the request made of me to say nothing.
When we got to Washington, Mrs. Houston and I
went immediately to our hotel. The Governor hurried
away in another direction. As I learned next day, or
that afternoon, he went immediately to the Capitol to see
Speaker Clark and Senator Stone to take up the task of
landing Waters. A reporter of the St. Louis Republic,
the paper in which the Governor was interested financially,
met him and asked him if he knew that Missouri was to
have a member in the Cabinet. The Governor said:
“ Not yet. Who is it?” The reporter answered: “ Hous
ton.” I do not know what the Governor’s comment was,
but I can imagine it. My guess is that he used words to
this effect: “ I do not believe it. Houston was on the
train with me all the way from St. Louis. He would have
said something to me about it.”
When he got to the Capitol, he asked Stone if he knew
Missouri was to have a representative in the Cabinet.
Stone said: “ No; who is it?” Francis replied: “ Houston.”
Stone flashed out with: “ Who the hell is Houston?”
Francis enlightened him.
Before I had finished dressing, Francis rang me up and
said: “ You are the meanest man in America.” I laugh
ingly asked what had changed his opinion. He said:
**You need not try to keep the matter a secret any longer.
The report is all over town. I am coming up to see you.”
When he came to the hotel, I told him all about the matter
and how distressed I had been that I had not felt free to
tell him long before. He accepted the situation grace
fully. He said that if he had known that I would take

the place or that I was being considered for it, he would
have been glad to do everything he could do to assist.
He gave his paper and the reporters a very complimentary
statement about me. Later he gave me a dinner at the
Metropolitan Club.
Another incident grew out of my reticence in the matter.
No person in the Department of Agriculture, itself, had
had any intimation that I was to be the head of it until
the third of March. I had met many of the chief officers
of the Department, including the secretary and the chief
of the office of Public Roads, the man who had created and
developed it, Logan Waller Page, who was an old Harvard
friend of mine. I had written to him telling him that
Mrs. Houston and I would be in Washington during the
inauguration and asking him if he would be kind enough
to reserve quarters for us at a good hotel. He wired that
there were no rooms at the Shoreham or the Raleigh, that
no hotel would let quarters for less than a week; that all
the prices were outrageous; but that he had reserved a
room at the Powhatan which he thought might be com
fortable. He had also taken the precaution to get us
some tickets for seats on Pennsylvania Avenue, where we
might sit to view the parade.
Late on the morning of the third, Secretary Wilson
called his staff together to say farewell to them after
many years of association. During the meeting, he asked
if anybody had authoritative news as to his successor.
Nobody said anything for a few seconds; and then Doctor
Galloway said that he had heard a somewhat direct state
ment that a man of the name of Houston, of St. Louis,
had been selected. The Secretary asked what Houston
it was. Galloway replied: “ The Houston who was at
[26]

one time President of the State College of Agriculture of
Texas. You met him when you visited Texas, and you
saw him several years ago in Washington when he attended
the meeting of the Association of Land Grant Colleges.”
Page quickly recalled my correspondence with him. He
put two and two together, and Sam Blythe reports that
he exclaimed: “ Give me air and plenty of it and put me
on the ’phone instantly. I know now that Houston is
going to be Secretary of Agriculture. And think of it!
I have reserved a couple of cots at the Powhatan for him
and Mrs. Houston and bought them seats along the Ave
nue so that they may have a chance to see the parade!
Get me that Powhatan clerk and help me to get the best
rooms in the hotel.” A few minutes before one, at any
rate, Page appeared at the hotel serene and satisfied,
having succeeded in getting us comfortable quarters; and
expressed his joy that I was to be associated with the
Department and his work.
At the hotel, we were kept very busy greeting old friends
and acquaintances, including Albert Burleson and J. W.
Gregory, whom we had known so well in Austin. Both
had only a little while before heard that I was to be in
the Cabinet, and they had called to express their satisfac
tion. Mrs. Burleson, Mrs. Gregory, and Mrs. Houston
had known one another for many years, all having been
born in Austin.
Tuesday morning, March 4th, the day of the Inaugura
tion, the newspapers carried a list of the names of the
members of the new Cabinet; but there still seemed to
be some doubt about one or two names. This was re
solved later in the morning when the Senate assembled for
the exercises of the day. It is customary for those who

are to constitute the new Cabinet to be placed together
in one corner of the Senate Chamber— many eyes are kept
on that corner. Before the Senate convened, ten of us
were in our corner, and it was officially demonstrated that
the published list was correct; but as yet we had no
official status. We were where we were by courtesy.
Mr. Bryan was the busiest person in the group, and ap
parently one of the happiest; but McAdoo, Daniels,
Burleson, and Lane, were running him a good race. I
was kept busy receiving the congratulations of my old
friends from the states where I had lived— Missouri,
Texas, and North and South Carolina. Each state was
polite enough to say that it claimed me. Politically,
Missouri, in Washington especially, was a trifle backward,
but letters and telegrams began to pour in from my
friends in St. Louis.

C H A P T E R III
THE IN AU G U RATIO N OF PRESIDENT W ILSO N , I 9 I 3

The First Cabinet Meeting— Contrast Between Wilson and
Bryan— Wilson on Patronage— The Six-power Loan to China

UESDAY, March 4th, marked the beginning of
the first Democratic Administration since March
4, 1897, when Cleveland finished his second term.
It was significan t that the first Democrat to follow
Grover Cleveland was a man who, I believed, would illus
trate Cleveland’s best qualities and add a few admirable
ones of his own.
The day was fine, just a trifle cloudy. It was balmy.
Washington never looked prettier. Flowers were begin
ning to make their appearance. As usual, there were
great crowds in the city, and a holiday spirit pervaded
it.
We first witnessed the exercises in the Senate. The
oath of office was administered to new Senators and to
the Vice President-elect. Marshall made a brief address,
in the course of which he caused the dignity of the Senate
to crack a little by comparing it to a bridle with blinders.
At the appointed time, we filed out with the Senate pro
cession to the stand where th e President-elect was to take
the oath. Mr. Wilson and the President, Mr. Taft, were
soon in evidence. The latter looked well but appeared
to be much more solemn than usual. Mr. Wilson was
self-controlled, but he seemed to me to show signs of

strain. The sight from the stand was inspiring. Almost
as far as one could see in every direction, there were
people— men, women, and children. The West Point
Cadets and the Annapolis Middies were drawn up near
the stand protecting a large vacant space. At a com
mand, they opened avenues, and this great space was
quickly flooded with the plain people, who thus really
had the position of honour, as was proper. O f them Mr.
Wilson was thinking; to them his message was addressed;
their voice was the one for which, in the years to come, he
would listen; and theirs was the only dictation he would
tolerate. He would administer the government with an
eye single to their interest, the interest of the whole people.
There would be no “ intermediary’' between the people
and their government.
As the President delivered his Inaugural Message, I
became definitely impressed with the thought that, in
writing it, he had had two men specifically in mind—■
Jackson and Lincoln. He evidenced their attitude toward
the people and the same faith in them. Two of his sen
tences were reminiscent of Lincoln: “ This is the high
enterprise of the new day: To lift everything that con
cerns our life as a nation to the light that shines from the
hearth fire of every man’s conscience and vision of right” ;
and, “ The feelings with which we face this new age of
right and opportunity sweep across our heartstrings like
some air out of God’s own presence, where justice and
mercy are reconciled and the judge and brother are one.”
Lincoln closed his first Inaugural Message with these
words: “ The mystic chords of memory, stretching from
every battlefield and patriot grave to every living heart
and hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the
bo]

chorus of the Union, when again touched, as they surely
will be, by the better angels of our nature.”
To me the significant statements in the address were
these:
“ There has been a change of government. What does
the change mean? It means much more than the success
of a party. The success of a party means little except
when the nation is using that party for a large and definite
purpose. No one can mistake the purpose for which the
nation now seeks to use the Democratic party. It seeks
to use it to interpret a change in its own plans and point
of view. The great government we love has too often
been used for private and selfish purposes, and those who
used it had forgotten the people. Our duty is to cleanse,
to reconsider, to restore, to correct the evil without im
pairing the good, to purify and humanize every process of
our common life without weakening or sentimentalizing it.
We have made up our minds to square every process of our
national life again with the standard we so proudly set up
in the beginning and have always coined in our hearts.. . .
“ The firm basis of government is justice, not pity.
There can be no equali ty of opportunity, the first essential
of justice in the body politic, if men and women and chil
dren be not shielded in their lives, their very vitality, from
the consequences of great industrial and social processes
which they cannot alter, control, or singly cope with.
Society must see to it that it does not itself crush or
weaken or damage its constituent parts. The first duty
of law is to keep sound the society it serves. . . .
“ This is not a day of triumph: it is a day of dedication.
Here muster, not the forces of party, but the forces of
humanity. Men’s hearts wait upon us; men’s lives hang
bO

in the balance; men’s hopes call upon us to say what we
will do. God helping me, I will not fail them, if they will
but counsel and sustain me.”
And thus a great nation changed its government! And
how orderly it all was, and by well-established law and
custom, after all the turmoil, extravagant utterance, and
heated passions. And this, too, in the face of the fact
that the new government was a minority government,
Mr. Wilson having received 2,350,000 less votes than had
all his opponents combined. I could not help thinking
that the lesson ought to be a very impressive one to the
representatives of those nations where changes of govern
ment are frequently not only accompanied by violence
but are the products of violence. Most so-called Repub
lics and Democracies are shams and farces, and the peoples
of few nations are capable of conducting a Democracy.
We need to take great pains to see that our people are
kept up to the standard; and to this end that they are not
too greatly diluted with elements which lack, and probably
are temperamentally incapable of acquiring, the requisite
aptitude, states of mind, and habits of thought and action.
We do not need to fill up the nation immediately, anyhow.
We have already been too long in the hands of real-estate
agents and people who want what they call cheap labour.
They little consider how expensive a thing it may be in
the long run. They, in fact, do not think at all. They
simply feel something about their present comfort or
profits.
After the Inaugural Ceremonies, we drove immediately
to the White House, where we lunched. There was a
large company present, including all the members of the
new Cabinet and their wives. I spoke to the President
[32]

but there was no chance to do more than to offer my
congratulations and good wishes. He made no reference
to the fact that he had invited me to be in his Cabinet,
or that he expected me to be associated with him, and so
I still had no word— personal, direct word— from him
about the matter. From the luncheon, we went to the
President’s stand to view the parade, which was an inter
esting spectacle. The most striking figure in the parade
was the Governor of Virginia, Governor Mann, I think
it was, a large, white-haired, dignified gentleman, who rode
a beautiful gray horse. The horse seemed to sense the
importance of the occasion and to be determined to do
credit to his state. The Governor was a graceful rider.
He and the horse seemed to be parts of a harmonious
whole; and as they passed the President’s stand, the
Governor saluted with a charming wave of his large hat
and a low bow in which the horse seemed to join.
The most amusing and ridiculous figure was Governor
Sulzer, of New York, who, riding a prancing horse, was
bowing with great energy to the left and to the right to
the lines of people who really ignored him.
About ten o’clock, Wednesday morning, March 5th,
I was called on the telephone by Tumulty at the Executive
Offices, who said that the President wanted to have an
informal meeting of those who were to be in his Cabinet
in the Cabinet room at eleven o’clock. We had not yet
taken the oath of office, and the meeting necessarily had
to be informal. The actual heads of departments and,
therefore, those who could have attended a formal Cabinet
meeting were the hold-over Republicans.
This was to me a very interesting call. ’ Naturally, I
was not a little affected by it. There was to me an ele

ment of unreality about the situation. It seemed that I
was taking part in a play. It is a novel thing to be about
to become a part of a great government. Very many
Americans have this novel experience, since we have no
governing class which stays in public life. Men partici
pate for a while in the administration of the nation’s
business, and then, as a rule, disappear permanently.
This is one of our sources of weakness.
I went to the Executive Offices a little before eleven
o’clock. There were still many visitors in the city; and
they were thick on the sidewalks near the White House
and about the White House grounds. They eagerly gazed
at everybody who went into the White House just as I
would have done; and, in fact, as I seemed to feel myself
doing. I seemed to be two persons, one of them going
in to take his place at the conference table of the President
of the United States, the other watching him from the
side lines.
When I appeared at the main door of the Executive
Offices, the attendants, by some magic, recognized me,
and one of them conducted me to the door of the Cabinet
room. This room is on the right of the President’s office
at the end toward the White House. It is rectangular
and is sufficiently large to hold comfortably the long broad
table at the end of which the President sits with five mem
bers of the Cabinet on each side arranged in order of prece
dence, that is, according to the date of the creation of the
departments, as follows: the Secretary of State on the
right, the Secretary of the Treasury on the left, next to
the President, then the Secretary of War and the Attorney
General, the Postmaster General and the Secretary of the
Navy, the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of

Agriculture, and the Secretary of Commerce and the
Secretary of Labour.
When I reached the Cabinet room I found there most
of my associates. Josephus Daniels appeared to be
hugely enjoying the experience. He was having sensa
tions at the rate of a dozen a minute. He came toward
me, exclaiming: “ Isn’t it great? Isn’t it wonderful?”
Secretary Redfield also was having numerous palpita
tions, with Burleson and Garrison as close seconds.
McReynolds, Lane, and William B. Wilson were taking
the experience calmly. McAdoo, I imagined, was saying
to himself: “ How in the mischief did I get here and what
am I doing?” And Bryan!!
The President slipped in quietly, looking very trim,
alert, and well, greeted us charmingly, and took his seat
at the head of the table. He acted as naturally as if he
had been doing the same thing all his life. He was not
in the least nervous. He seemed to have a firm grip on
himself and on the situation. I felt that he knew where
he was going and how he proposed to get there. I recalled
that he had been studying government all his life, and that
he had had several years of experience as Governor of
New Jersey. There was no mark of the recruit about
him.
After a brief pause, he said: “ Gentlemen, I thought we
had better come together and talk about getting started
on our way.”
After a few good stories and some witty remarks from
tbo President, Bryan, and others, we discussed when we
should take the oath of office. It was agreed that as
many as possible should be sworn in that afternoon, if the
Senate had acted and confirmed our nominations. Each

of the others said that, in conformity with custom, the
head of his department had called and had asked his pleas
ure about assuming his duties. As yet I had had no word
of any kind from Secretary Wilson of the Department of
Agriculture. Some matters of patronage were mentioned,
but nothing of consequence was considered. The Presi
dent decided that the first regular Cabinet would be held
the next day, Thursday, at eleven o’clock.
As I sat at my place at the table, I found myself looking
constantly at the man at the big end of it and at the man
at his right, his Secretary of State. I had long known
and watched both of them. I knew that they were about
as different as it was possible for men to be. I had
watched Bryan for more than twenty years. My atten
tion was first called to him when he made a speech on the
tariff in Congress about 1892. Some time afterward, I
was visiting in Darlington, S. C. I called to see an old
friend, Congressman George W. Dargan. This gentleman
belonged to one of the old Carolina families and to the old
school, and was one of its finest types. He was a charm
ing man, a fine lawyer, and a student of affairs. He had
great self-respect and, therefore, great courage. He was
one of the best representatives South Carolina or any
other state ever had. He was a Cleveland Democrat.
Nearly every precinct in his district, after the free-silver
movement got well under way, instructed Mr. Dargan to
vote for the free coinage of silver at sixteen to one; but
he not only did not do so; he made one of the three best
speeches against the proposal that were heard in Congress
during that struggle. Of course, he was left at home in
the next election, much to the loss o f the state and the
nation.

The first meeting o f President Wilson’ s Cabinet in 1913

Harris & Ewing

When I saw Mr. Dargan, I spoke of the Mr. Bryan who
had made a speech on the tariff and asked him what he
thought of him. He answered: “ He has a fine voice and
a good presence, but he really doesn’t know anything at
all.” I was to be reminded of this opinion many a time
— the first time in Fort Worth, Texas, early in 1895, when
I heard Bryan for more than two hours on the silver ques
tion. I discovered that one could drive a prairie schooner
through any part of his argument and never scrape against
a fact or a sound statement.
Well, this man was now sitting on Woodrow Wilson’s
right as his Secretary of State— on the right of the man
who had leaped into the place which Bryan had tried
for twenty years to reach. He had never been suc
cessful, or tried out, in anything except in speaking or
writing; while Wilson excelled him certainly as a writer
and had demonstrated his ability also to act and to act
wisely. Wilson, I reflected, is a student: Bryan is not.
Wilson searches for facts, masters them, and interprets
them. He knows history and has its teachings at his
command. Bryan has never been a student. He has
natural ability, but is untrained. He does not examine a
question with a view to get all the pertinent facts, tr
analyse them, to interpret them, and to draw the fair and
sound conclusion from them. Rather, he has impulses,
mainly in the field of morals, and is constantly on the
alert to get something which has been represented to him
as a fact to support or to sustain his impulses. Wilson has
a keen sense of direction; Bryan an uncanny sense for the
wrong direction. Both, I believe, are men of high char
acter and good intentions. Bryan, I believe, is honest.
I think he is merely ignorant and unpractical. They are

among the best public speakers in America, each in his
own field: Bryan shining before a popular audience, Wilson
before a discriminating one. Both are religious— Chris
tians of a type now somewhat rare.
1
Which of these men will be the master? Which will
dominate? There is no real doubt in my own mind. If
there had been, it would have been dispelled within the
first few minutes of our meeting. It is apparent that Mr.
Bryan is setting out to follow the President’s lead. He is
obviously gentle natured, unsophisticated, and deferential
to the office— unless he is playing a game. He seems to
be happy in his position, the second he has held in the
Federal government.
Not having heard from Secretary Wilson, I sent word
to him that, if it would be convenient to him, I would take
the oath of office Thursday morning at ten o’clock. He
replied that he would make the necessary arrangements.
When I appeared at the office of the Secretary at the
appointed time, I found him, the Chiefs of the Bureaux,
a delegation of Missourians, headed by Governors Francis,
Major, and Folk, and Edward Goltra, National Com
mitteeman, and a few of my old friends.
The oath was administered by a notary public attached
to one of the divisions— the affair was distinctly informal,
and, in a sense, casual. I appeared at the office without
anybody to vouch for me. I had no credentials in my
hands. My commission had been signed, but I did not
have it in my possession. In fact, up to that moment
I had no direct word from the President, oral or written,
that I was to be the Secretary of Agriculture. In such
fashion I became head of this important department of
the government.

At the close of the function, after the visitors disap
peared, Secretary Wilson spoke to me about a number of
the employees of his immediate office and said that, if I
wished to retain them, I would find them efficient and
loyal. I told him that I did not expect to make any
changes. Fortunately, nearly all the positions in the
Department are in the classified service; and there is
little chance for the office seeker. As the Secretary was
leaving, I offered him the use of the Department carriage
and team as long as he remained in the city; but he de
clined it, saying that he would not need it. He looked at
me an instant and whispered: “ You can save half your
salary, if you make up your mind to do so.” That was
the Scotsman in him. I knew that I could not do so,
because I knew that I could not live as he lived. The
Secretary, who was a widower, had restricted quarters in
an inconspicuous apartment hotel and did little or nothing
in the way of entertaining.
I discovered that there were two perquisites attaching
to the office: several carriages and pairs of horses, and
flowers from the greenhouses of the Bureau of Plant In
dustry. It is customary for the Bureau to send some of
its flowers about twice a week to the houses of the mem
bers of the Cabinet, of the Vice President, and the Speaker.
A t eleven o'clock, Thursday, March 6th, I attended our
first regular Cabinet meeting. First of all, we had to
submit to being photographed by about fifteen photog
raphers. They were a persistent lot and kept up a steady
fire till the President became impatient and told them
thatrwe had had enough.
After they left, he said that he was rem nded of a very
irascible man of erratic habits and dangerous practices

who became converted at a revival. The necessity of his
being patient and restraining his temper had been em
phasized by his spiritual adviser. He made a mighty
resolution to control himself. Several days later, in a
meeting of his old associates over which he was presiding,
the discussion grew very heated; vehement protests were
made against some of his rulings. Finally, members be
gan to throw things. For a time, the convert maintained
his poise, but when a few particularly decayed eggs
reached him, he drew out his revolver and shouted:
“ This damn Job business is going to last just two seconds
longer.”
In looking over the Cabinet group as the pictures were
being taken, several things occurred to me. It was not
a bad-looking group of men. The President, Bryan,
McAdoo, McReynolds, Garrison, and Burleson, would
be noticeable in any crowd. It had very few well-known
figures; in fact, only three, the President, Bryan, and
McAdoo. I decided without much difficulty that it was
not a particularly able group of men— Cabinets seldom
are. Those immediately preceding, on the whole, were
noticeably weak.
As we settled down, the President quietly remarked:
Gentlemen, I shall have to give my attention to the
graver problems of the nation, and I shall not have time
to see the swarms of people who want office. I shall have
to ask you to sift the applicants for me and to make your
recommendations. I think I owe this to the people.”
He said this as simply as if he were telling us that he
would have to drink several glasses of water before break
fast; but its significance was obvious. The President will
have time to do his work. The heads of departments will
[40]

be strengthened before Congress and the public. It was
clearly the right course to pursue. I knew that I would
not be bothered much with office seekers because there
are only four or five officers in the Department of Agricul
ture who are not in the classified service, that is, who are
not appointed for merit: the Secretary, the Assistant
Secretary, the Chief of the Weather Bureau, the Solicitor,
and a private secretary or two. I determined not to
bother with people seeking places in other departments.
I have made it a rule not to take the initiative in any
matter falling under the jurisdiction of another depart
ment and to try to be of assistance only when my aid was
sought.
The Postmaster General brought up some of his troubles
in connection with appointments. He said: “ Mr. Presi
dent, I shall not present the name of anybody who fought
you.” The President did not wait to get exactly what
Burleson had in mind. He quickly answered: “ It makes
no difference whether a man stood for me or not. All I
want is a man who is fit for the place, a man who stands
for clean government and progressive policies.” This
was a blow straight from the shoulder. It was electrify
ing. It was only what I expected from Woodrow Wilson.
That night, Bryan asked me if I was not shocked by that
statement by the President. I said: “ I was not shocked.
I was thrilled and pleased.” Burleson evidently had in
mind men who had fought the President on personal
grounds and who might be personally antagonistic to him.
Bryan thought he included Republicans.
(The Postmaster General was, from the beginning to the
end, an advocate of the merit system. President Taft
had covered the fourth-class postmasterships as well as

their occupants in the classified service. The fourth-class
postmasterships were retained in the classified service,
but an executive order was issued by President Wilson,
requiring the positions to be filled as the result of competi
tive examinations conducted by the Civil Service Com
mission. The Postmaster General, in his report for 1913,
emphasized the fact that the Post Office Department is
essentially a business institution, and that the merit
system should be adhered to, to secure the very highest
standards of efficiency in the conduct of its affairs. In
1914, he recommended a change in the law so that thirdclass postmasters might be appointed by the Postmaster
General under the merit system. In 1915, he extended
his recommendation to cover second-class postmasters.
On his recommendation, the President, in 1917, by execu
tive order required that vacancies in the first-, second-,
and third-class postmasterships should be filled as the
result of open competitive examination. In 1919, the
Postmaster General pointed out that the Department had
gone as far as it could in placing appointments on the merit
basis, and that it remained for Congress to enact legisla
tion extending the system to include postmasters in offices
of the Presidential classes. He again recommended the
necessary legislation. In his Annual Report for 1920, he
returned to the subject and renewed his recommenda
tion.)
Bryan is an old-fashioned partisan. If he were Presi
dent he would flood the departments with his henchmen;
and all his friends look alike to him. Each one is equal
to every other one. He has no sense of discrimination.
His appointments would wreck the government, if it could
be wrecked. He smilingly remarked that we need not be

surprised if he asked us to find places in our departments
for his supporters. He said that he was in a different
position from any of us— that 6,000,000 people had voted
for him for President three times and many of them would
like to serve the nation.
That afternoon, he carried out his thought in my
direction by writing me a note asking me if I could not
find a place for “ Coin ” Harvey. He could not have tried
it on a less susceptible person. I had been opposed to
the free coinage of silver proposal from its inception, and
had regarded “ Coin ” Harvey and his Financial School as
huge jokes. Of course, I had no place for the candi
date.
Speaker Clark also made an effort to have me appoint
a nonentity to the important position of Solicitor of the
Department of Agriculture. He brought the man with
him into my office to see me. I explained to him that the
Department had the second largest law force in the
government; that there were many important laws to
administer; that the position was a sensitive one; that it
was very close to me personally; and that I could not se
lect any one who was not a good lawyer and who I did not
know from personal experience was clean and courageous.
I said that I already had a man in mind whom I intended
to appoint if he would accept, but that he might decline.
I said: “ Will this man stand his ground under fire?” He
replied: “ He will stand it if you will back him up.” I
immediately responded: “ He will not suit me. I want a
man who will stand if I run.”
A t the Cabinet meetings Friday and Tuesday, March
the 7th and n th , the disturbed conditions in certain
South American countries came up for discussion. The

President on Tuesday read a statement which he had
prepared, on the Latin-American matter. This interested
me at this time particularly because it clearly indicated
that the President was going to be his own Secretary of
State. I do not know to what extent the President had
consulted Bryan, but Bryan had not presented the matter;
and the President did the reading. Bryan listened with
a smile on his face and nodded approval as the President
read. Several members were inclined to think that no
statement was called for and that we might be looked upon
as amateurs. The President said that something had to
be said, that the agitators in certain countries wanted
revolutions and were inclined to try it on with the new
Administration. He intimated that he was not going to
let them have one if he could prevent it.
The President and Bryan were thinking of handing the
statement to the diplomats of all the Latin-American
countries. I asked why they wanted to offend Chile and
Argentina, and suggested that they might as well call in
the Ministers from Rumania and Bulgaria. I pointed out
changes I thought ought to be made in the phraseology
and urged that the statement be given to the press. This
was assented to.
At the following meeting, Friday the 14th, an interest
ing matter was brought up by Mr. Bryan. He said that
he had had a visit from a group of representative New
York bankers who wished to know what the attitude of
the Administration would be toward the Six-power Loan
to China by banks of the countries mentioned. He had
no very clear notion of the proposal. It was suggested
that he present the matter at the meeting on Tuesday the
18th. He did so, saying that the proposal was that our
[44]

banks should join banks of the other nations in lending
money to China, largely to pay the army, that certain
antiquated taxes were to be pledged to meet the payments
of interest, that the matter was to be supervised by foreign
agents, and that it was to be understood that, in case of
difficulty in collecting, our army and navy might be used
to make a demonstration. There was only one opinion,
and that was that the Administration would not give its
approval, thus reversing the position taken by the Taft
Administration just before it went out.
The Pres dent had prepared a statement to be used.
In it he mentioned certain nations by name and by im
plication, and rather severely criticized them. Several
of us suggested modifications, and finally it was in shape
satisfactory to the President and to the members of the
Cabinet. After we had suggested the changes toning
the statement down, the President remarked that we were
clearly an anti-acid society.
The President gave his Chinese Loan statement to the
press, instead of sending it through the State Department
to foreign governments. At the meeting on Tuesday,
March the 25th, he referred to the matter and said that
it was a mistake to have given it to the press before its
receipt by foreign governments, but the oversight was not
serious. The Japanese Ambassador had called upon him
and asked to know his “ full mind” on the matter.
This Loan policy was one phase of Knox's diplomacy.
It is a question whether it would have resulted in any good
for China.
The President remarked that social matters seemed to
constitute the chief serious business for the greater part of
Washington and indicated that he would have to limit his

indulgence in them. He said: “ While I am not ill, my
health is not exceptionally good, and I have signed a
protocol of peace with my doctor. I must be good.”
He added that his health was really better than it had
been.

THE TARIFF

Wilson's Message Delivered in Person— The Sugar Lobby—
Farmers' Demands fo r Treasury A id

HE tariff formed the chief topic of discussion
at the meeting Friday, March the 28th. The
President read his message and smilingly asked:
“ Are there any object ons?”
The tariff bill, the Underwood bill, had already been
definitely formulated and approved by the President.
Two of its principal features were the wool and woollens
schedules and the income tax. The President said that
the party was united on the tariff and divided on the
currency. He said that the party pledge on the tariff
must be kept, and that it would be necessary to get the
party behind a wise currency measure. He added that it
was possible that the Administration would work its ruin
trying to serve the real interests of the people. He
thought it was possible that a hostile state of mind might
develop; that the next election might be lost; but that
there would be a reaction. One member was opposed
to his making any reference to the currency. The Presi
dent and the rest of us, except Bryan, emphatically dif
fered. The President said that he would deal with the
currency problem. It was interesting to me to watch
Bryan while we were discussing currency. He said noth
ing. I asked myself what he was thinking and what he
would do. Many were predicting that if the Administra-

tion took a firm stand for a sound currency system, Bryan
would break with the President and resign. As I watched
him, I formed the impression that he would subordinate
his views on specific economic issues.
The President referred to his message as a very innocent
document. He said that he was considering delivering it
in person. This greatly interested me. It would be a
return to the practice inaugurated by Washington and
abandoned by Jefferson, who was a poor speaker. No
man would revive it with a better chance of success than
Mr. Wilson. It is singular that Roosevelt did not think
of it and do it.
One of the members of the Cabinet suggested that, in
view of the industrial situation, the Administration ought
to go slowly in the matter of reducing the tariff. The
President said that a number of people had urged caution.
He added: “ This reminds me of a cartoon in a Western
paper. It pictures a great beast of a man standing over
me saying: ‘ What do you mean by meaning what you
said?’ I must say now what I said before election.”
This is a somewhat new note in American political life.
It is refreshing. I fear that a man who thinks straight,
means what he says, says what he means, and continues
to say it, may possibly puzzle the politicians. It is too
honest and simple for many of them to accept it.
The President referred to the rule he had made that he
would see no office seekers; and remarked that he intended
to adhere to it. He told us that, the day before, a man
had got in to see him on pretext of public business.
After a few minutes he informed me that he desired to
be appointed Governor of the Canal Zone. I simply said:
Good-morning, sir/ and went to my office.”

At the Cabinet meeting, Tuesday, April ist, it was re
ported that representatives of a group of banks had been
asked if they would agree to an extension of time of their
loan to China. They said that they would be glad to
cooperate with the government “ so far as was consistent
with sound business.” This caused much amusement.
It was a slap at the Chinese Loan attitude of the Adminis
tration— an intimation that it was amateurish and senti
mental in business matters.
The matter of the recognition of China was raised.
Apparently, Russia had suggested that we follow her lead
in China just as she followed our lead in Mexico. The
suggestion was dismissed without discussion. It was
pointed out that the Chinese Assembly would meet
Tuesday, April 8th, and that the convening of this body
would furnish a suitable occasion for action. The Presi
dent was anxious to act as soon as possible, because he
wished to see China establish a stable government and he
was afraid that certain great powers were trying to pre
vent her from doing so. I suggested that we had no
means of knowing what course the Assembly would take,
and that it would be better to wait for more light.
Somebody raised the question as to whether we had
any assurance that China would really establish a republic
and could operate one. The President remarked that,
after years of study, he had only one final conviction on
government, and that was that the same sort of govern
ment was not suitable for all nations.
This matter was again under consideration at the meet
ing, Friday, April 4th. It was agreed that we should
await further developments in China.
The President said that he had had a death grapple with

the sugar people. Evidently the sugar people got killed.
The question of the tariff on sugar had been put up to
him. He thought that free sugar was not fair imme
diately. A duty of i per cent, on raw sugar after the
differential had been subtracted had been proposed, and
this for a period of three years. The Democrats would
still be in power at the end of that time and could take
what further action they saw fit. He was willing to stand
for this; and if it was not accepted, then he would insist on
free sugar. If this was not accepted, there would be no
single bill, but a number of schedules and the wreck of the
party would follow.
At this time, a representative of the sugar interest called
to see me at my office. He was stupid enough to ask me
if I would not go before the Committee on Ways and
Means and ask it to retain the duty on sugar. I said:
“ Your request is most surprising. Of course I shall not
go before the Committee. It has not requested me to do
so. It is not likely to request me to do so. If it should,
I would urge it to reduce the duties.” He was insistent.
He began to argue the matter. I told him that it was
utterly out of the question for me to comply with his
request. He began to urge the matter again when I in
terrupted him and told him that he did not seem to under
stand plain English. I finally told him he would have to
excuse me as I had important business to attend to.
Two days later I received a letter from the person say
ing: “ I greatly enjoyed my visit to your office a few days
ago socially, but I was greatly disappointed from a busi
ness point of view. Heretofore, I had always found in
the Secretary of Agriculture a sympathetic friend of the
farmer.”- I replied: “ If to follow without question the

suggestion of a representative of one of the most highly
protected industries of the nation is to be a friend of the
farmer, you may write me down as one of his greatest
enemies. I resent your note and your attitude.” A few
days later I received an apology.
The Japanese question, the President said at the meet
ing Tuesday, April 8th, was again becoming very trouble
some. The Japanese were taking offence at the purpose,
and especially the wording, of the proposed California law.
The objectionable part was the declaration about aliens
who did not declare their intention of becoming citizens.
Such persons could hold no title to land. The Japanese
could not become citizens. Apparently, California is
bent, not only on preventing more Japanese from settling
in her borders, but on getting rid of those she has. She
asserts that she will not have a large number of people of
a race radically different from the mass of Americans. I
sympathize with California in that purpose if she seriously
holds it; but on this point I have my doubts. I have
talked to numbers of Californians, and have found that
many of them object to the Japanese, not only because they
are radically different, but also because they are efficient,
thrifty, ambitious, saving, and unwilling to remain “ mudsillers.” It is their economic ability, in part, which they
dread. Many of these same people tell me that they
would not object to Chinese, because they are thrifty,
will work for little, and are content to remain in humble
stations. They object to Negroes, not because they are
of a different race, but because they, as a rule, are of
low mental capacity and lazy. Those who take such a
position are not thinking primarily of the welfare of the
state in the long run, but of their profits and comfort. I

think it highly unfortunate that there should be anywhere
in this nation large groups of other peoples such as Ne
groes, Chinese, or Japanese. It is not a question mainly
of superiority or of inferiority, but one of hopeless differ
ence. They cannot live side by side to the advantage of
both races; and intermarriage, I believe, tends to produce
unhappiness and, if one race is inferior, to reduce the
population to its level.
The Californians do assert that the Japanese are objec
tionable on other than economic grounds: that they are
unmoral and should not be in contact with white girls and
boys in schools. They do not say that this is true of the
better class of Japanese, but of those who try to settle in
California.
The difficulty in handling the situation is great. The
Japanese assert that their honour as a nation is involved;
but the state of California has power to make land laws
affecting natives and aliens. Such laws are found in
Texas, Arizona, New York, and perhaps in other states.
The trouble with the proposed California law is that it
discriminates against the Japanese. Another trouble, ac
cording to Lane and other Californians, is that there are
in California demagogues who, even if it should cause seri
ous embarrassment, would not hesitate to make political
capital out of this situation.
The discussion was interrupted because the President
had to leave at twelve o’clock to go to the Capitol to read
his Tariff Message. I had a distinct sensation when this
departure was brought thus sharply to my mind. I recog
nized both its political and historical significance. Some
members of the Cabinet seemed to be a trifle shaky about
the venture. The President showed no sign that he was
[5 2 ]

aware, as of course he was, that anything unusual was
about to happen.
The President regards himself as the head of his party
and its political leader. He believes that he can lead
better, can get nearer to Congress, and convey his mes
sage more impressively to the people by delivering his
message in person. He is right; and his example will
probably be followed till we get a President who is timid
and a poor or indifferent speaker.
Most of the members of the Cabinet went to the Capitol
to hear the President read his message. I reached the
House just before the Senate filed in. Its members were
given seats on either side in the front rows. The Vice
President, as usual in joint sessions, sat with the Speaker.
Each officer, on behalf of his body, appointed a committee
to wait upon the President and to conduct him to the
floor. Members of the Cabinet occupied seats to the
left of the Speaker’s desk, looking toward the body of the
House. Diplomats and the public crowded the galleries.
Speaker Clark, Wilson’s defeated rival for the Democratic
nomination, was in his place.
There seemed to me to be a distinctly tense atmosphere,
as if strange things were about to happen. Members of
Congress appeared to be a trifle nervous, and something of
a chill pervaded the air. Some members of Congress,
I thought, had a sullen look. Suddenly the President of
the United States was announced and the Speaker rapped
loudly with his gavel. The whole body stood up. The
President, looking, I thought, a trifle pale and tense,
quickly entered with the Committee, stepped upon the
Speaker’s stand in the space between the Vice President
and Speaker at the rear and the secretary or reading clerk

in front, and turned to greet the Vice President and the
Speaker. Then he faced the body and began speaking;
and thus it was happening again for the first time since
November 22, 1800, when Adams delivered his fourth
annual address.
The beauty of the President’s English was instantly
felt; and his first sentences relieved the strain and made
for easier feeling. They were:
“ I am very glad indeed to have this opportunity to
address the two Houses directly and to verify for myself
the impression that the President of the United States is
a person, not a mere department of the government, hail
ing Congress from some isolated island of jealous power,
sending messages, not speaking naturally and with his
own voice— that he is a human being trying to cooperate
with other human beings in a common service. After this
pleasant experience I shall feel quite normal in all our
dealings with one another.”
The message was short. It pointed out that the tariff
burden should be lightened; that, while the whole face of
our commercial life had altered, tariff schedules had re
mained the same or had moved in the direction they had
been given when no large circumstance of our industrial
development was what it appeared to-day, and that our
task was to square them with the facts. Tariff legislation
had wandered very far afield. We had passed beyond the
notion of protecting industry. We had come to hold
that it was entitled to the direct patronage of the govern
ment. We were giving to each group of manufacturers
what they thought they needed to maintain a closed
market. We had built a set of privileges and fostered
monopoly, “ until at last nothing is normal, nothing is

obliged to stand the test of efficiency and economy, in
our world of big business, but everything thrives by con
certed agreement.
“ We must abolish everything that bears even the sem
blance of privilege or of any kind of artificial advantage,
and put our business men and our producers under the
stimulation of a constant necessity to be efficient, eco
nomical, and enterprising, masters of competitive su
premacy, better merchants and better traders than any
in the world.” The object of duties henceforth must be
to promote effective competition. We must accomplish
our purpose without reckless haste. We must build up
our foreign trade. We more than ever need an outlet for
our energies.
“ We can render the nation a service in more directions
than one. We are to deal with the facts of our own day.
We begin with the tariff. Nothing should obscure this
undertaking. Later, currency reforms will press for ac
tion.”
The next time I saw the President was at Cabinet meet
ing on Friday, April n th . When he came in, I congrat
ulated him on his address and on the success of his
personally appearing before Congress. He thanked me
and smilingly remarked: “ Congress looked embarrassed.
I did not feel so.”
It would be interesting if this step of the President
should lead to another— the appearance in both Houses
of members of the Cabinet to participate in discussions
and to answer questions. I hope that it will not. I much
prefer the present practice of having them appear before
committees to express their views and to aid in shaping
legislation* unless we are willing to go the whole distance

and adopt a responsible government system, the parlia
mentary system. Nothing will be gained by trying to
mix the two. We cannot get the advantages of the par
liamentary system without taking everything that goes
with it; and this would mean changes of a very radical
nature for which our people are not ready. Such a sys
tem is more democratic in that it imposes scarcely any
check to the expression of the will of the people. It
would be more in harmony with our claims that we are a
democratic people capable of governing ourselves, but it
is not likely to be seriously considered now.
The presence of members of the Cabinet on the floor of
either House, so long as they are not selected from the
majority and responsible to Congress, would not greatly
expedite business or improve the situation. They could
not be accepted as leaders and might be subjected to an
annoying hazing. Furthermore, many Cabinet officers
would make a rather sorry spectacle of themselves in ex
position and debate. Certainly, the majority of those in
all the Cabinets I have knowledge of would. If the prac
tice were adopted, the President would have to take
parliamentary leadership and capacity to speak and to
handle a difficult crowd more largely into account in select
ing his aids, and in doing so might have to subordinate
other essential qualities, such as administrative capacity.
Good speakers are seldom men of great executive ability.
It is a question in my mind whether the President can
long continue to be the formal head of the government,
the chief of his party, and the leader of Congress. It may
be a task too great for any human being to stand up under;
and Congress will resent his attempt to lead it. He must
at least have the Presidency better organized. He should

[56]

have as his first aid one of the ablest men in the country,
and under him three or four men of exceptional ability,
one to see that problems affecting a number of depart
ments are dealt with promptly and in the right fashion,
one to establish the necessary contacts with Congress and
the public, including the press, and the other to supervise
the executive offices. The President should ask Congress
to authorize him to do this and to give him money enough
to pay a respectable salary to each of them, that is, a
salary of from $25,000 to $40,000.
If the President’s own party is in power in both Houses
and he is willing to be a gentle leader of Congress, if he is
willing to play the game of the professional politician, he
may at times bend Congress to his purpose, especially if
he is inclined to use patronage as a bribe; but otherwise
he is likely to have trouble. And if the opposing party
is in power in one or both Houses, an absurd situation,
which is the rule rather than the exception, the President
is certain not to be able to lead. At critical junctures,
when the President has been a strong character and has
seriously tried to lead, the Congress has refused to follow
and chaos has resulted At such times there have devel
oped difficult situations, menacing, humiliating deadlocks
or defeats; and not infrequently there have appeared, in
the President's own party, groups which were more hostile
to him than were many of the opposing party. We need
only recall the administrations of Jackson, Johnson, and
Cleveland. After the “ Light in the West” appeared,
many Democrats came to dislike Cleveland more than
they disliked Republicans, and more than Republicans
disliked him. And it may well be doubted whether, if
Lincoln had lived, he would not have suffered a worse

martyrdom at the hands of his party, led by Thaddeus
Stevens and Charles Sumner, than he did at the hands of
Booth. Congress, and particularly the Senate, does not
like a “ boss.”
I brought up the matter of the drift of legislative pro
posals in Congress in the field of agriculture, the tendency
to appropriate great sums of money to the farmers out of
the Treasury or to grant bounties directly to the states.
I mentioned especially the proposals to lend the farmers
$2,000,000 out of the Treasury at 4 per cent., to appro
priate to the states large sums for extension work, and
also for public roads. I said that we must meet these
crude measures with those which were carefully consid
ered and on sound lines. To this the President assented
and told me to proceed to frame them.

CH APTER V
FOREIGN PROBLEMS

Bryan's Trip to California on Japanese Question— Possibility of
War— The Mexican Problem Looms up

OREIGN problems continued to occupy much
time and thought. China was again pressing for
attention. After much discussion, it developed,
as the President remarked, that it was the sense
of the meeting that China should be recognized if the
Assembly convened in regular and orderly session on
April 15 th. This was to be done through the Secretary
of the Legation in Peking.
At the ensuing meeting, on April 15th, the President
said that he had been giving much thought to the matter
of Panama Canal tolls and that he was inclined to be
against the existing exemption of American ships on both
economic and moral grounds. I quickly expressed my
concurrence. Bryan was inclined to oppose the repeal of
the exemption. He feared that the railroads wanted tolls
charged for their own ends! He thought they could, in
that event, either secure more traffic or increase their
rates!
The situation was especially difficult. The Democratic
party had declared for exemption, possibly on Bryan’s
initiative, and this made it embarrassing to act. The
President was in favour of rescinding the action outright,
frankly and immediately. He did not wish to suggest

arbitration. The Senate, he thought, was probably
against either course. Mr. Bryce had suggested that the
President make a statement favouring arbitration, if the
law could not be repealed, but this was regarded as un
reasonable.
Foreign questions were uppermost at the meeting,
Friday, April 18th. China had not been recognized.
The Assembly had not organized. Most of us urged that
we wait further developments and information, but
Bryan was in favour of immediate action. The President
decided that the matter should be deferred.
On Tuesday, the 22d, when the Japanese question was
raised, Bryan asked if it would not be possible to have the
matter submitted to a referendum in California. This
was opposed because of the known attitude of the Cali
fornia people and the danger of intemperate discussion.
Asked what his opinion would be on a proposal to insert in
the law the phrase, “ ineligible to citizenship,” Mr. Bryan
said: “ I would oppose the insertion of that phrase, unless
the President has a different opinion. In that case, I
might have another opinion. I am here solely to help and
to carry my part of the burden.”
The President spoke of having asked Mr. Bryan to go to
California. Mr. Bryan said that he was far from being
anxious to go, but that he would do so if the President re
quested him to go. It was then decided that he should
make the trip, if the Governor was favourable to it, and
that the Governor should be sounded. We were not hope
ful that the California situation could be improved; but
it was thought that Japan would be convinced that the
Federal government was friendly and disposed to do all
it could.

Bryan went to California, and at the Cabinet meeting,
April 29th, a dispatch from him was read in which he
placed before the President a hypothetical statement and
asked for his views. The President declined to give an
swers to hypothetical questions and reaffirmed his posi
tion. Mr. John Bassett Moore was in Bryan’s chair.
He expressed the opinion that the United States courts
could set aside a state law against alien holding of land.
At the meeting after Bryan’s return from California, he
gave a detailed account of what happened and stated his
impressions. Politically, he asserted, there was every
thing to aggravate the situation. The Democrats in their
platform had demanded the enactment of an exclusion
law. They had made a hot fight and had forced the Re
publicans to declare themselves. They had put them on
the rack.
The protest of the Japanese Government was read.
Its terms were strong. They asked the Federal Govern
ment to declare the California Jaw invalid. They de
manded prompt and decisive action, terming the law
obnoxious, discriminatory, unfair, unfriendly, and in vio
lation of the treaty. The offensive character of the pro
test was something of a shock, especially in view of what
the government had done and was doing and of Japan’s
own laws against aliens.
There was much doubt as to Japan’s real purpose and
meaning. Some thought that the protest was for home
consumption; others that Japan wanted trouble before the
Panama Canal was opened. It was asserted that Japan
was in too great financial straits to enter into a fight with
the United States. I expressed the view that poverty
constituted no reason against her fighting if she wanted
[61]

to fight— that history furnished many instances of nations
waging war when they seemed to be down and out finan
cially, and waging it successfully. I added that I credited
Japan with some sense and therefore did not believe that
she seriously intended to go to the limit. As to the fear
expressed that Japan could take the Philippines and land
an army in California, I said jokingly that I would almost
be willing to whip her to make her take the Philippines,
and that I would eat every Jap who landed in California
as part of an invading force.
Bryan again suggested a California referendum. This
was passed over. The President called the Japanese
statement unfair— all treaty rights were specifically safe
guarded in the law itself. It was agreed that it would be
unwise to publish the statement, as it would inflame the
public. Bryan was authorized to tell the Japanese Am
bassador informally that the language used was objection
able, especially the words referring to California.
The President suggested that Bryan take particular
pains to attempt to form an opinion from the Japanese
Ambassador’s manner and expressions how much there
was in the protest. If Japan meant what she said, it was
impossible to exaggerate the seriousness of the situation.
A few days after his confirmation by the Senate, as I
was walking on Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White
House, I met our new Ambassador to the Court of St.
James’s, in the person of my old friend, Walter Hines
Page. He was just coming through the gate from the
White House grounds. As he came toward me, he was
smiling. He gave one of his characteristic chuckles and
said: “ Doesn’t it beat the devil?” I asked him what the
joke was. He replied: “ I am. Did you see that fellow
[62]

come out of the White House grounds a few seconds ago?
Did you notice the people staring at him ? Did you see
me among them looking at him with my mouth open?
They tell me I am that man— that I am the Ambassador
from the United States to the Court of St. James’s. It
isn’t true. It’s a dream. It’s worse; it’s a joke. I can’t
get used to this sort of show.” I told him that I had been
functioning for nearly two months and that I could not
get rid of the feeling that there was more appearance than
reality in the experience.
At this meeting, I was reminded of a somewhat similar
experience. Before Page’s appointment was announced,
about March 28th, I went to New York on business. For
a few days before my trip, there were rumours in the press
that Page might be selected by the President to go to
London. I knew that he expected to do so and would,
unless some unexpected change occurred. After I got
through with my mission, I called Page up to tell him I
would drop in to see him, and incidentally I said: “ Have
you packed your trunk?” He asked: “ What do you
mean?” I replied: “ You know what I mean.” He said:
“ Are you serious? Is there really anything in these
rumours?” I told him there was so much that he would
soon be on the high seas. He asked me to stay where I
was and said that he would join me in a few minutes.
When he came into my room, he said: “ But it can’t be
true. I have heard nothing direct from the President.”
I told him I had been in the Cabinet for a number of
weeks, and had seen the President a number of times,
and that I had not yet had any word from him about my
taking the position. He said: “ Do you mean to tell me
that he did not write you asking you if you would take the

position and that he has not said a word directly to you
about it?’5 I told him that he had guessed right and that
he might be on his way to London without any word from
the President, himself. But he said: “ I can’t go. I
can’t get away. I have some new important matters in
hand.” I replied that I could not go to Washington; that
I had had some very important undertakings which stood
in the way, and had said so, but that I had been in Wash
ington for some time. “ But,” he insisted,.“ I can’t
afford to go. The thing will cost a lot of money. The
salary will not pay house rent. The mission would
bankrupt me.” I told him that I had said that I could
n©t afford to go to Washington; that I had no money to
speak of; that I knew it would be impossible for me to
live in Washington as a member of the Cabinet ought
to live on the salary; but that I had been wrestling with
the enterprise for some time. I added: “ I know nothing
has been said to you. Nothing may be said to you by
the President himself. I know that you cannot leave
your business. I am sure that you cannot afford it, but all
the same, you will soon be in London, and you had better
be packing. You cannot afford not to go. You are the
very man for the place. You will understand and like the
British, and they will understand and fall in love with
you.”
“ That is another story,” he said. “ Come on. Let’s go
out to Long Island and talk to Mrs. Page about the matter.
She will be very much interested in what you say.”- We
went. We got nowhere. I left for Washington the next
day. About two or three days later Page received a
message from the President telling him that he wanted
his services, and, of course, Page accepted.

On May 13th, the Japanese protest was further con
sidered. It had been revised. The words which were
offensive to California had been omitted, as had the de
mand that theFederal Government declare the Jaw invalid.
It was reported that Great Britain had called upon the
Japanese Ambassador to see that something was done to
allay feeling in his country.
The President asked advice on his answer to Japan, if he
decided to make one, adding that he thought that Japan's
case was a very weak one.
The possibility of war was discussed. The President
thought that there would be no war, and that it would
be mischievous to hint that there might be, but that, of
course, we should keep our eyes open. Daniels gave his
naval staff’s analysis of the situation. The Japanese
could take the Philippines, Hawaii, and Alaska, as we
were not prepared. The President said that they might
do so, but that they could not keep them— that eventually
we would have our way. This, I said, might depend on
the plans and ambitions of European nations and whether
they would interfere for reasons of their own on Japan’s
side. The President reiterated his view that there would
be no war.
A t the following meeting, May 16th, the President pre
sented his draft of an answer. I pointed out an apparent
contradiction in one place. The statement regretted
that Japan should regard the California law as creating
“ unfair discrimination.” The next sentence practically
admitted that we thought so too by indicating that we
had tried to get California to forego or radically to alter
the law. The necessary alterations were made.
The President pointed out that the law itself, by very

position and that he has not said a word directly to you
about it?’5 I told him that he had guessed right and that
he might be on his way to London without any word from
the President, himself. But he said: “ I can’t go. I
can’t get away. I have some new important matters in
hand.” I replied that I could not go to Washington; that
I had had some very important undertakings which stood
in the way, and had said so, but that I had been in Wash
ington for some time. “ But,” he insisted,.“ I can’t
afford to go. The thing will cost a lot of money. The
salary will not pay house rent. The mission would
bankrupt me.” I told him that I had said that I could
n»t afford to go to Washington; that I had no money to
speak of; that I knew it would be impossible for me to
live in Washington as a member of the Cabinet ought
to live on the salary; but that I had been wrestling with
the enterprise for some time. I added: “ I know nothing
has been said to you. Nothing may be said to you by
the President himself. I know that you cannot leave
your business. I am sure that you cannot afford it, but all
the same, you will soon be in London, and you had better
be packing. You cannot afford not to go. You are the
very man for the place. You will understand and like the
British, and they will understand and fall in love with
you.”“ That is another story,” he said. “ Come on. Let’s go
out to Long Island and talk to Mrs. Page about the matter.
She will be very much interested in what you say.”- We
went. We got nowhere. I left for Washington the next
day. About two or three days later Page received a
message from the President telling him that he wanted
his services, and, of course, Page accepted.

On May 13th, the Japanese protest was further con
sidered. It had been revised. The words which were
offensive to California had been omitted, as had the de
mand that theFederal Government declare the law invalid.
It was reported that Great Britain had called upon the
Japanese Ambassador to see that something was done to
allay feeling in his country.
The President asked advice on his answer to Japan, if he
decided to make one, adding that he thought that Japan’s
case was a very weak one.
The possibility of war was discussed. The President
thought that there would be no war, and that it would
be mischievous to hint that there might be, but that, of
course, we should keep our eyes open. Daniels gave his
naval staff’s analysis of the situation. The Japanese
could take the Philippines, Hawaii, and Alaska, as we
were not prepared. The President said that they might
do so, but that they could not keep them— that eventually
we would have our way. This, I said, might depend on
the plans and ambitions of European nations and whether
they would interfere for reasons of their own on Japan’s
side. The President reiterated his view that there would
be no war.
At the following meeting, May 16th, the President pre
sented his draft of an answer. I pointed out an apparent
contradiction in one place. The statement regretted
that Japan should regard the California law as creating
“ unfair discrimination.” The next sentence practically
admitted that we thought so too by indicating that we
had tried to get California to forego or radically to alter
the law. The necessary alterations were made.
The President pointed out that the law itself, by very

precise statement, was based on the theory of necessarily
conforming to the Treaty, and purported to conform to it;
and that, in any event, if it did not conform to it, it was
invalid. This was a matter for the courts, and the Japa
nese had the same rights before them that Americans
have. They could ask no more.
Again the possible course of Japan was considered.
The President stated that he had not seriously entertained
the thought of such a criminal possibility as war till
Thursday, the 15 th, when he noticed the extreme pertur
bation of the Japanese Ambassador. It was possible that
this was due to his fear of what might happen to his home
government. Garrison stated that he had canvassed the
matter of defending the Philippines, and that the War
Council, while thinking war a remote possibility, thought
we ought to be prepared, and that Manila could be de
fended for a year, if some ships then in Chinese waters
were sent to Manila. These could prevent the Japanese
from crossing the neck of land.
Garrison intimated that our views on military matters
were not particularly valuable— that his Board of Army
and Navy Officers were the people who were competent to
pass on such things. At this, Bryan flared up for the
first time. He got red in the face and was very emphatic.
He thundered out that army and navy officers could not
be trusted to say what we should or should not do, dll we
actually got into war; that we were discussing not how to
wage war, but how not to get into war, and that, if ships
were moved about in the East, it would incite to war.
Several members said that they could not see why we
could not move our own ships from where they were to
our own ports. My view was that we could, but that the
[66]

real question was whether the ships could get to Manila
and could be of any real use if they did.
The President said that he would direct the ships to stay
where they were and would do so, knowing full well that
there would be bitter criticism if war should come and he
had not done everything possible to prepare for it.
At a garden party at the White House a day or so later,
Bryan thanked me for not getting excited at the Cabinet
meeting. He added: “ There will be no war. I have seen
the Japanese Ambassador, and I am letting the old man
down easy.”At lunch after Cabinet meeting, May 20th, we dis
cussed the tariff and particularly the duty on sugar. All
seemed to think it a mistake for Congress to place a threeyear limit on the one-cent sugar rate. It was believed
that it would injure domestic producers without benefitting the consumer. Lane thought that it would result in
the Democrats losing the Senate and possibly the House.
It was noted that lobbyists, and particularly sugar
lobbyists, were everywhere. It was impossible to move
around without bumping into them— at hotels, clubs, and
even private houses. They are pests, but they seem
worried. They are not making their usual headway.
Somebody pointed out that all our discussions, or nearly
all, had been over foreign matters; that domestic problems
of importance such as the tariff and currency were never
raised by the President. Lane, in particular, was critical.
I pointed out that the President had evidently and of
necessity given his thoughts primarily to pressing foreign
questions, that he regarded this as his particular field, one
in respect to which he had unusual powers and responsi
bilities, that he was evidently depending upon the heads of

departments initially to handle domestic economic ques
tions each in his particular field, and that he compli
mented us by presenting many matters for discussion and
advice while some heads of departments did not. The
President always welcomed such topics, but he did not
have them immediately in hand. The truth is that the
two important domestic measures at the time, the tariff
and currency, are under the Treasury and that McAdoo is
a solitaire player. He possesses many of the qualities of
leadership. He is self-reliant and has dash, boldness, and
courage, but he does not cultivate Cabinet team work and
does not invite discussion or suggestion from the Cabinet
as a whole.
In reference to the sugar situation, I had come to certain
definite conclusions after thoroughly canvassing it with
experts of the Department of Agriculture. Briefly stated,
they were that Louisiana farmers ought not to be en
couraged to grow sugar exclusively; that they should grow
it only as an incident and not as a main or the sole
reliance, and that beet sugar should not be produced unless
as an incident in diversified farming except in California,
Montana in places, Colorado, Idaho, and Wyoming. The
Louisiana climate is not favourable for sugar production.
It is too damp. There is not enough sunshine. The sugar
content of the cane is low. The season for milling is too
short, being about six weeks as against five months in the
tropics. Labour is not efficient and is not well supervised;
and the business methods are not good. Louisiana would
be vastly better off in the long run if she would resort to
diversified farming, specializing in live stock for which ex
cellent foundations exist or can be laid.
In like manner, except in the states mentioned; beet
[68]

sugar cannot be produced to advantage. There are per
manent disadvantages. There is no need of protecting
people against nature or simply to permit them to make a
profit out of an undertaking to which they happen to take a
fancy. Only in the mountain states are the conditions fa
vourable to a high sugar content in the beets. There with
good farming, with decent treatment of growers by the
manufacturers, who have good machinery and good busi
ness methods, sugar can be produced and distributed
through a large area at a reasonable profit in competition
with foreign sugar, without artificial aid.
Mexico loomed up at the Cabinet meeting, May 23d, as
an ugly problem. Several members expressed themselves
as being in favour of the recognition of Huerta. The
President and Bryan were opposed to recognition. I em
phatically opposed it as immoral. I asserted that the
Huerta government was bad both in origin and in pur
pose, that neither Huerta nor his crowd had any interest in
the Mexican people; and that recognition would probably
make us indirectly responsible for a large loan to Huerta
which would fasten him upon the Mexicans. It was re
plied that he would get the money anyway and hold the
people down, and that, if he did so and suppressed the
revolutionists we would have to recognize him. I said
that this would not necessarily follow and that, if it did,
we would not be responsible for him. It was agreed that
Bryan should sound the English and French ambassadors,
to see if their governments were back of the loan and to
warn them that they could not enforce a loan guaranteed
by a pledge of customs duties.
The provision of the Sundry Civil bill containing a
proviso exempting labour and farm organizations from

prosecution with the aid of the $300,000 carried by it for
the Department of Justice was referred to. Apparently
the President had said to two Senators that he would not
veto the bill because of the provision. I made an em
phatic protest against the item as vicious in principle. In
a way, the provision was harmless because it exempted
the two sorts of organizations from prosecution, if they
did not do unlawful things, with the use of the amount
carried in the item. The Department, of course, had other
funds. My objection was primarily that the motive
was bad, that there was an appearance of deception, and
that, if it meant anything, it was against justice and equal
ity.
On Saturday, three of us met at lunch and agreed that
the President ought to send for the two Senators and tell
them that he had acted hastily in saying that he would ap
prove the bill with the item in it and that he would not
sign it.
At the next meeting, on May 27th, this matter was im
mediately brought up. Several of us urged that the bill
be not signed; or that, if the President thought that in the
circumstances he had to let it become a law, he file with
it and publish a statement pointing out his objection to
such legislation, that in reality it did not permit the or
ganizations to do anything other organizations could
not do, and that the law would be enforced against all
alike.
Subsequently, I prepared and sent to the President a
memorandum, adding the thought that the practice of
amending a general statute of long standing in this way
was vicious; and that Congress should by separate legis
lation deal with labour and farm organizations, defining
[70]

their relation to the public and limiting their field of opera
tions to legitimate undertakings. The President replied
that he preferred not to argue the question in his note.
I read with delight the statement given out by the
President on the lobby. It was short and to the point.
He said:
“ I think that the public ought to know the extraordi
nary exertions being made by the lobby in Washington to
gain recognition for certain alterations of the tariff bill.
Washington has seldom seen so numerous, so industrious,
or so insidious a lobby. The newspapers are being filled
with paid advertisements calculated to mislead the judg
ment of public men not only, but also the public opinion
of the country itself. There is every evidence that money
without limit is being spent to sustain this lobby and to
create an appearance of pressure of opinion antagonistic
to some of the chief items of the tariff bill.
“ It is of serious interest to the country that the people
at large should have no lobby and be voiceless in these
matters, while great bodies of astute men seek to create
an artificial opinion and to overcome the interests of the
public for their private profit. It is thoroughly worth
the while of the people of this country to take knowledge
of this matter. Only public opinion can check and de
stroy it.
“ The government in all its branches ought to be re
lieved from this intolerable burden and this constant
interruption to the calm progress of debate. I know that
in this I am speaking for the members of the two Houses,
who would rejoice as much as I would to be released from
this unbearable situation.”
The effect of this statement was immediately noticeable.

The crowd scattered like rats, and business could be trans
acted without interference from the pests.
On June 6th, the second Japanese note was brought
before us by the President and the Secretary. It con
tended that the courts would not be satisfactory; that
the law violated the Treaty and was adverse to good re
lations; that California could not confiscate property; that
the objection did not rest wholly on economic grounds;
that Japanese were not naturalizable; and that the situ
ation was mortifying to Japanese. The President said
that the Counsellor would examine the whole matter;
that, if necessary, the question could be taken to the
courts; and that if the Japanese had suffered damage,
the United States might make good the amount.
It was agreed that there would be no further regular
meetings till fall, and that we were subject to call.
Mexico continued to be a disturbing factor; and there
were many people in this country who for purposes of their
own were trying to get us to go into Mexico. Certain papers
even carried the story that five great powers had notified
us that if we did not intervene, they would. The President
did have in mind the possibility of attempting mediation.
Mediation was tried. Lind, of Minnesota, a singular
choice, one of Bryan’s friends, was sent to Mexico.
Huerta seemed to be about at the end of his rope. He had
got a loan of $30,000,000 from bankers, but he could not
get any more. It was doubtful if he could hold his own
even with recognition by the United States, and with the
aid of a further loan.
Congress plodded on with the tariff as its steady regular
business; and the Committee on Banking and Currency of
the House was busy shaping a currency measure.

On June 23d, the President appeared before a joint
session of Congress and delivered his address on the cur
rency. He pleaded for a banking system which would be
elastic with the control vested in the government, “ so
that the banks may be the instruments, not the masters,
of business and of individual enterprise and initiative.”
On August 27th, he appeared again before Congress,
this time to keep it in touch with the Mexican situation
and his policy. He pointed out that there was little pros
pect of peace in Mexico under the existing provisional
authorities. Their control over territory was growing
weaker and was contracting. We had volunteered our
good offices through Mr. Lind, but our proposals were
rejected. They were rejected, he thought, because the
Mexican authorities did not realize the spirit of friendship
of the American people and their sober determination
and because they did not believe that the present Ad
ministration represented the people of the United States.
This left them isolated and without friends who could aid
them. We must give the situation a little more time to
work itself out.
In the meantime, everything we do must be rooted in
patience. “ Impatience on our part would be childish,
and would be fraught with every risk of wrong and folly.
We can afford to exercise the self-restraint of a really
great nation which realizes its own strength and scorns to
use it. It was our duty to offer our active assistance.”
The door was not closed against further cooperative action
if opportunity should offer.
He stated that, while he would omit nothing to safe
guard the lives and interests of Americans in Mexico,
he would urge them to leave the country, because there

would be hazard to them while the country was upset.
He would act under the law of March 14,1912, to see that
neither party received aid from the United States. He
would forbid the exportation of arms or munitions to any
part of Mexico.
Several of the great governments of the world had given
the United States their support in urging upon the pro
visional authorities the acceptance of our good offices.
“ All the world expects us in such circumstances to act as
Mexico’s nearest friend and intimate adviser. . . .
If further motive were necessary than our own good-will
toward a sister republic, and our own deep concern to see
peace and order prevail in Central America, this consent of
mankind to what we are attempting to do, this attitude of
the great nations of the world toward what we may at
tempt in dealing with this distressed people at our doors,
should make us feel the more solemnly bound to go to the
utmost length of patience and forbearance in this painful
and anxious business. The steady pressure of moral
forces will before many days break the barriers of pride
and prejudice down, and we shall triumph as Mexico’s
friends sooner than we could triumph as her enemies—
and how much more handsomely, with how much higher
and finer satisfactions of conscience and honour!”
This message was intended no less for the jingoes in
this country, the oil interests, the American public, South
America, and Europe than for the Mexicans themselves.
It was a policy of “ watchful waiting.”
On October 3, 1913, President Wilson approved the
Tariff Act, known as the Underwood-Simmons Act.
Thus the Democratic party kept its first and most specific
pledge to the people of the nation. Thus the discontent

of the people over the practice of legislating for, and under
pressure from, special interests, which had been growing
for years and was intensified by the failure of the Re
publicans in 1909 to keep their promise to revise the tariff
downward, found expression. It was the fruit of effective
cooperation of the Democrats under the skilful and de
termined leadership of a man who knows where he wishes
to go and how he proposes to get there. It is the first
instance, so far as I recall, at least for many years, in
which the rates insisted upon by the Senate were lower
than those agreed to by the House; and the first in which
the legislation was not substantially dictated by the Con
ference Committee. It is also the first in fifty-six years,
or since 1857, to carry generally decidedly lower rates,
although it had been the expectation after the Civil War
that the rates imposed during that struggle would be
materially reduced. The average rate on dutiable goods
was lowered from a little more than 40 per cent, to a little
less than 33^ per cent.
The notable features were these: Schedule K, embracing
wool and woollens, was revised. Wool was put on the
free list; and the rates on woollens were reduced from one
half to two thirds; those on cottons, from one third to one
half; and large reductions were made in the Schedule on
food imports, with a view to lower the cost of food. The
Act particularly discriminated against luxuries in favour
of necessities. Many increases were made in the free list,
and many substitutions of ad valorem duties which could
be more easily understood were made for specific and
mixed rates.
If no great disturbance occurs, such as a great war, this
measure will be followed in time by further enactments

carrying still lower rates. If a great explosion should oc
cur, rates will again be increased, and the whole miserable
fight will have to be made once more.
Even more important than the reduction of customs
duties was another feature of the law: the direct tax on
incomes. The struggle to get such a tax as a permanent
part of our Federal system of taxes was a very long one.
Such a tax was imposed in 1862. It was apportioned and
proved to be undesirable. It was repealed in 1872, and
we were left with a system of indirect taxes, mainly on
consumption. Another income tax was imposed in the
Tariff Act of 1894, but it was declared unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court. Finally, the Seventeenth Amend
ment to the Constitution was ratified, and the way
was open for the adoption of a direct income tax. Very
properly, the tax was made progressive; and thus the
foundation of a sound Federal tax system was laid. It
remains to be seen whether those who prefer to have in
direct taxes which the people cannot so easily estimate, who
fear that use will be made of direct taxes to take from the
better-to-do classes a fair percentage of their income, and
who wish to insist particularly upon higher customs duties
for protection, will seek to repeal the income tax when
they come into power, as they repealed direct taxes after
the Civil War to make place for high protective duties.
There will, on the other hand, be those who will desire and
try to use the income tax as a levelling measure rather than
as a revenue measure without regard to equity. They will
have to be controlled by those who believe in equal justice.
On October 27,1913, the President, in an address before
the Southern Commercial Congress at Mobile, Alabama,
took occasion to state the Administration’s friendly in

176]

terest in, and attitude toward, the Latin-American nations.
He pointed out the dangers to these states from their
policy of granting concessions to foreign capitalists. The
danger, he said, was that foreigners securing concessions
were apt to dominate their domestic affairs. These
states, he believed, were about to witness an emancipation
from such subordination. “ They have had harder bar
gains driven with them in the matter of loans than any
other peoples in the world.” We must prove ourselves
their friends upon terms of equality and honour. “ You
cannot be friends upon any other terms than upon the
terms of equality. You cannot be friends at all except
upon the terms of honour.” There is something behind
all this which is dearer than anything else to the thoughtful
men of America. “ I mean the development of constitu
tional liberty in the world. Human rights, national in
tegrity, and opportunity, as against national interests—
that, ladies and gentlemen, is the issue which we now have
to face. I want to take this occasion to say that the
United States will never again seek one additional foot of
territory by conquest.” He added that he knew what the
response of America to his programme would be, because
America was created to realize such a programme. “ This
is not America because it is rich. This is America because
it has set up for a great population great opportunities of
material prosperity. I would rather belong to a poor
nation that was free than to a rich nation that had ceased
to be in love with liberty. But we shall not be poor if we
love liberty, because the nation that loves liberty truly
sets every man free to'do his best and to be his best, and
that means the release of all the splendid energies of a
great people who think for themselves.”

There were no meetings of the Cabinet from the sixth
till the latter part of September. At the meetings during
the fall, nothing of a novel nature was discussed. No
change was made in the policy toward Mexico. In his
First Annual Message to Congress, the President touched
upon the situation and stated that he would not alter his
“ policy of watchful waiting.”
“ There is but one cloud upon the horizon. That has
shown itself to the south of us and hangs over Mexico.
There can be no certain prospect of peace in America until
General Huerta has surrendered his usurped authority in
Mexico; until it is understood on all hands, indeed, that
such pretended governments will not be countenanced or
dealt with by the Government of the United States. . . .
Mexico has no government. The attempt to maintain
one at the City of Mexico has broken down, and a mere
military despotism has been set up which has hardly more
than the semblance of national authority. . . . Even
if the usurper had succeeded in his purposes, in despite of
the Constitution of the Republic, and the rights of its
people, he would have set up nothing but a precarious
and hateful power, which could have lasted but a little
while, and whose eventual downfall would have left the
country in a more deplorable condition than ever. But
he has not succeeded. He has forfeited the respect and
the moral support even of those who were at one time will
ing to see him succeed. Little by little he has been com
pletely isolated. By a little every day his power and
prestige are crumbling, and the collapse is not far away.
We shall not, I believe, be obliged to alter our policy of
watchful waiting.”
There was much uproar among certain elements in the

United States over this policy of watchful waiting. There
were many who were anxious to see Huerta recognized.
They thought that if he were supported he might sustain
himself, restore order, and become a second Diaz. That is
unlikely; and those who think that Diaz was a great asset
to anybody except the Concessionaires and a small ruling
class in Mexico have always seemed to me to be mistaken.
The biggest indictment against rulers like Diaz and his
associates everywhere in the world, and there are many
such in eastern Europe, Asia, and Central America, is that
they scarcely have the intelligent interest in the masses
of the people that a good farmer has in a good hog. They
do nothing, plan nothing constructive, to train the people
little by little to better ways of living and action. Why,
after so many centuries, are 80 per cent, of the people in
countries like Russia, and a large per cent, in countries like
Mexico, illiterate, able neither to read nor to write?
What real concern have the ruling classes in Rumania or
Prussia, the great landlords, for the welfare and develop
ment of the rank and file? I understand the difficulty of do
ing much in a short time for such people as the Mexicans.
It would take generations to bring them very far along the
road to self-government and higher living; but they will
never get anywhere unless they have leaders who have
the right attitude and are willing to try to lay the founda
tion. A good police force in Mexico, a system which
would give the masses an interest in the land and in their
products, an elementary vocational educational system,
and an agricultural agency such as our Federal Depart
ment, would work great changes in Mexico within a rea
sonable time.

THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT

Bryan's Ability to Understand Finance— Indiscretions of Cabi
net Members— The President’s Patience

HE President, in his message, stressed the
need of early action on the currency measure,
asking the Senate to concentrate its whole energy
upon it till it was successfully disposed of.
He then pointed out the need of better credit facilities
for farmers.
“ The pending currency bill does the farmers a great
service. It puts them upon an equal footing with other
business men and masters of enterprise, as it should; and
upon its passage they will find themselves quit of many of
the difficulties which now hamper them in the field of
credit. The farmers, of course, ask and should be given
no special privilege, such as extending to them the credit of
the government itself. What they need and should ob
tain is legislation which will make their own abundant and
substantial credit resources available as a foundation for
joint, concerted local action in their own behalf in getting
the capital they must use.
“ It has, singularly enough, come to pass that we have
allowed the industry of our farms to lag behind the other
activities of the country in its development. I need not
stop to tell you how fundamental to the life of the nation
is the production of its food. Our thoughts may ordinar-

[80]

ily be concentrated upon the cities and upon the hives of
industry, upon the cries of the crowded market-place and
the clangour of the factory, but it is from the quiet inter
spaces of the open valleys and the free hillsides that we
draw the sources of life and prosperity, from the farm and
from the ranch, from the forest and the mine. Without
these, every street would be silent, every office deserted,
every factory fallen into disrepair. And yet, the farmer
does not stand on the same footing with the forester and
the miner in the market of credit. He is the servant of the
seasons. Nature determines how long he must wait for
his crops and will not be hurried in her processes. He may
give his note, but the season of its maturity depends upon
the season when his crop matures, lies at the gates of the
market when his products are sold. And the security he
gives is a character not known in the broker’s office as
familiarly as it might be on the counter of the banker.”
Poetic and true!
In connection with the discussion of rural credits, I will
give two incidents which enabled me finally to determine
to my satisfaction Bryan’s mental make-up. I had been
studying him, as I have indicated, since 1896. I had been
puzzled about him, but had been slowly arriving at an
estimate. These incidents fixed him for me once and for
all.
There had been appointed as a member of the Rural
Credits Commission to visit Europe a very energetic
person, one of those people who, like the beetle, mistake
energy for efficiency. He was a sort of professional
organizer. He was constantly constituting bodies or com
mittees, which he used with a noise out of all proportion
to their influence, to impress Congress and the public.
[81J

He could make more noise than a coyote. There are
many similar characters in Washington, and they usually
flourish under the guise of farmers’ friends.
The Commission had been given an appropriation by
Congress to meet expenses. The person who was most ac
tive thought the allotment was too small. He wanted more.
He was quite a plunger and a grandiose person. He knew
that there was an appropriation in the State Department’s
budget for the International Institute of Agriculture at
Rome. It was customary for us to send a delegation to
Rome each year, the Secretary of State handling the ap
propriation and calling upon the Secretary of Agriculture
to select the delegates. Mr. Bryan was ignorant of this.
The busybody on the Commission came to me and asked
if I would designate to the State Department his Com
mission as the delegation to Rome. I told him I would
not, as I thought it was too large and not properly con
stituted for such a purpose, that I would suggest a few
experts from the Federal Department and the Land
Grant institutions. He left much disgruntled. A little
later, my secretary came in and said he understood that
the Secretary of State had agreed to designate the Com
mission as the delegation to Rome. I told him I would see
about the matter at Cabinet meeting. When I saw Bryan
talking to the President at the meeting that day, I spoke
of the matter, saying that it would not do to have that
body selected for the reasons I have indicated, and for the
further reason that Congress had given it all the money
it wanted it to use and would resent, and properly so, its
using two funds. The President said it should not be
done. Bryan looked puzzled and said that he would take
the matter up.

A few days later, my secretary came in again and said
that he understood that the commissions had been made
out in the State Department for the members of the Com
mission as delegates. I asked him to get for me on the
telephone the officer who had them in hand. He did so,
and I told the officer not to issue the commissions, or,
rather, not to send them to the President, till I could again
see the Secretary and the President, and that I would as
sume all the responsibility. When I saw the President
and Mr. Bryan, I stated the facts and insisted that the
commissions be not issued. The President said they
would not be. Bryan said: “ Why, I thought the matter
was all right. Senator ----- ,” giving the name of a
Senator whose name was nearly the same as the busy
body’s, “ came to me and assured me that the thing was
all right and that the delegation should be designated.”
I told him that he was being fooled, that it was the busy
body himself and not Senator----- , and I reminded him
that the President had agreed a few days before that the
delegation should not be appointed. I had to intervene
again before the matter was finally settled; and then
Bryan asked me if I would not let him name a man from
the Land Grant Institution in his home town as one of
the delegates. As a matter of fact, he had power to name
all the delegates. I told him that his man was a suitable
man, and that he might be selected.
The busybody was persistent. From the middle of the
Atlantic, he sent a wireless to the Department, requesting
that the Commission be allowed the thousand dollars of
the appropriation from the State Department’s item.
This incident throws light on Bryan’s administrative
capacity.

The other incident, or series of incidents, was this:
It was my custom to keep the President informed of the
principal undertakings of the Department of Agriculture
and of the course of legislation in the field of rural life.
A bill had been introduced in Congress to lend the farmers
two billion dollars out of the Treasury at 4 per cent. I
mentioned the matter and said that, although it was an
unwise measure and class legislation, I was afraid it was
making headway. “ Why shouldn’t Congress lend the
farmers money out of the Treasury at 4 per cent.?”
Bryan asked belligerently. “ You have created the Na
tional Banking System” (he referred to the National
Bank Act) “ in the interest of bankers and lend the
bankers money at 1 per cent. Why not lend the farmers
money at 4 per cent.?” This would have got a yell from
a country audience. I said: “ I seem to have been labour
ing under a misapprehension. I understood that the
National Bank Laws were passed to assure good and safe
banking in the interest of the public, and that, not wishing
to keep public funds tied up in the Treasury, we permit
the banks to take the trouble and go to the expense of
keeping them for us subject to withdrawal on demand,
and make them pay us 2 per cent, for the trouble.” I
then outlined the kind of legislation I thought we should
have in the field of rural credits, giving the essentials of a
good farm loan act. Bryan sat back in his chair with a
satisfied smile. Ten days later, I mentioned the vicious
measure again, indicating the terms. Bryan said: “ Why
not lend the farmers----- ” I gave my explanation again
and he subsided, apparently pleased. A third time, the
same thing occurred. When I finished, Bryan asked me
if I would write out my statement for him. I did so that

afternoon very carefully, taking four typewritten pages,
and sent it over to him by a messenger. In the course of
two hours, he called me up and said: “ This is fine. May I
use it?” I replied: “ Yes, it is yours. Use it when and
where you please.” In due course, I received a marked
copy of his paper, the Commoner, and I found my state
ment printed as his leading editorial, which was all right.
I felt that I had done a good job, an educational one. I
had the thing nailed down.
I was too optimistic. At the next meeting of the Cabi
net, when the matter came up again, and I stated that it
had made progress, Bryan chirped up with: “ Why
not----- ?” I said: “ Good Lord!” and gave it up.
When the currency bill came up in the Senate, cer
tain Democratic Senators were not sympathetic. They
aligned themselves more or less with the Republicans.
They were disgruntled over appointments. In view of
certain political happenings in New York, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, Maryland, and elsewhere, these Senators be
gan to swing around. The Democrats, becoming weary of
partisan tactics of the Republicans who were professing
to be very non-partisan, held a caucus and decided to put
the currency bill through promptly. It was clear that it
would go through as the President wanted it.
For several meetings of the Cabinet after it became clear
that the currency measure was safe, there was much dis
cussion as to what measures to take up next. It was sug
gested that it would be desirable to let the country get its
breath, to let it adjust itself to the new tariff and currency
legislation. There had been and was an industrial chill
due to world-wide causes. It had spread over the world.
I was of the opinion that we should take no step till some

readjustments had occurred and the currency system could
be organized. I thought it better to make haste slowly.
We might lose what we had secured if we tried to run too
fast; and I said as much to a number of members of the
Cabinet and at Cabinet meeting. If we went a little
slowly for a while, we might be able to make a certain
goal even more quickly in the end.
At the Cabinet meeting Tuesday, December 16th,
statements were made by several of us along the lines just
indicated. When we finished, Bryan said very cleverly:
“ I agree with everything you say, but with nothing you
mean. There are only two times when the problem you
raise, what to do about trusts, should not be touched:
one is when business is good, the other when business is
bad and ought not to be made worse.” He insisted that
the party keep its promise on trusts as it was keeping
those on currency and the tariff.
The matter of railway rates was considered at some
length. It was agreed that the situation ought to be met
squarely and promptly. One of the members (Lane)
said that some of the rates on certain goods were too low.
They had been made in the interest of owners of industries
along the line: Those he said should certainly be raised,
but those on all competing roads would have to be raised
also. Bryan, with a surprised look, asked why. He ap
parently could not see that if they were not, the competing
roads would get all the business and the others would die.
It was agreed that the matter was one for the Inter
state Commerce Commission and that it should either
raise or reclassify rates or insist on greater efficiency in
management. It was agreed that no pressure of any sort
could be brought to bear on the Commission. The im[86]

propriety of approaching it or its members was recog
nized.
For some time some members of the Cabinet had been
doing no little speaking on many topics, one in particular
talking for the edification of social groups in Washington.
Also, notwithstanding the fact that Cabinet members are
supposed to say nothing about Cabinet discussions un
less the President desires someone to make a statement,
and that the publishing of anything be otherwise left en
tirely to the President, one or two members had persisted
in letting things out. Newspaper men always waylaid
us and tried to get hints. Most of us kept our mouths
shut, but a few could not do so. They were in constant
touch with the newspaper men, either after Cabinet meet
ings or at other times. Apparently, they could not resist
the temptation to be obliging.
As I went to Cabinet meeting Friday, December 19th,
the President sent word to me that he would like to see me
for a moment. When I stepped into his office, he said
that he wanted me to do him a little favour. He was, he
remarked, embarrassed by the fact that one or two mem
bers of the Cabinet who I knew were talking too freely
about matters of a non-departmental nature in respect to
which naturally he had to assume the immediate respon
sibility. He thought they ought to be more guarded and
ought to advise with him as to whether it was opportune
to discuss such matters and as to his policy and purposes.
Again, he said: “ I am embarrassed by the fact that one
or two members seem to be unable to refrain from telling
everybody what happens in Cabinet meetings. I wish to
advise with the Cabinet freely. Some things cannot be
given publicity; at any rate, at once. It is important to

consider what shall be said, and how and when. I ought
to have the privilege of determinining this. The discus
sions should be free and full. If they cannot be kept
within the family, leaving it to my discretion when and
what to give out, it will make it difficult for me to canvass
confidential matters as I should like.” I told him that I
understood the situation and exactly where the trouble lay.
I said that I would raise the two questions in the meeting
and give him an opportunity to express his views as em
phatically as he wished.
At the proper time, I brought up the two matters and
asked the President if he would not state his wishes for
our guidance. He did so pointedly. The members gen
erally quickly agreed that it was not desirable to talk on
general policies unless they were requested by the Presi
dent to discuss them. It was also understood that what
was to be given out be left to the President.
It was clear from what the President said to me that he
knew the members who were chiefly responsible for talk
ing on the outside about Cabinet matters. One of these
it seemed made it a point to cultivate the press. He was
particularly strong before its representatives on matters
as to which he had no responsibility. And so he gets
much advertising. As a matter of fact, he is of very little
help in a discussion. He listens to gossip, attaches im
portance to it, and labours under the impression that he
must cultivate Senators and Congressmen to get measures
through; and, if they fail, he usually ascribes it to the fact
that some member is offended. He has no great adminis
trative ability and gives too much of his attention to
general matters over which he has no control.
The President is amazingly considerate. He is even
[88]

more amazingly patient and tolerant. I admire his abil
ity to restrain himself at times. I wonder that he does
not explode sometimes when he has to listen to a lot
of ill-considered, confused, and irrelevant advice. How
refreshing his clear, concise, and well-expressed views!
Generally, he takes the initiative only in his special field,
that of foreign affairs, but he is ready to discuss any matter
presented from any quarter and have any questions
raised about foreign matters or anything else. He de
pends on heads of departments to take the initiative in
matters under their jurisdiction and leaves them the ut
most freedom in bringing matters before the Cabinet or
in acting on their own judgment. He evidently desires
that they shall assume full responsibility and bother him
only when in their judgment it is essential. If a head of a
department is competent, if he has first-rate executive
ability, he can spare the President much time and worry.
The trouble is that the average head of a department is
not highly competent and has not first-rate executive
ability. Not one man in a hundred occupying a high posi
tion anywhere has first-rate administrative talent. If
Presidents of the United States had more efficient aids
and were better served, they might live longer. But some
Cabinet officers who have executive ability do not spare
the President as they should. They like to keep them
selves in the President’s thoughts and before the public,
and to appear to the public to be high in the President’s
counsels. A surgical operation is the only remedy in such
cases.
In thinking of a head of a department as an executive,
one must bear in mind not only the routine handling and
determination of a vast variety of internal departmental

matters, including the selection of higher officials, which
is a matter of first importance, but also contacts with
Congress, the initiation or discussion of legislative pro
posals, and constant conferences with members of the
House and Senate, running errands and acting as mes
sengers for constituents. One must remember also the
many demands made by visiting individuals and delega
tions from all parts of the nation with matters of little or
of great importance— great at least to them— and also
the insistent pressure from all sorts o f organizations to go
somewhere and speak, or look at something, or open some
thing. If a head of a department knows especially how to
handle his problems before Congress; if, for instance, he is
able to look ahead and frame a better bill than anybody
in Congress can get up, and defend it, and if he can and
will dispose of visiting delegations effectively, he can ren
der the President aid and relief.
Also, if he is able and well informed and has good judg
ment, he can be of great value to the President in Cabinet
discussions. In proportion as he lacks such qualities, he
merely contributes to the Presidential wear and tear and
is a liability instead of an asset. I think, on the average,
about one third at least must be liabilities.
The impossible has happened. To-day, Tuesday,
December 23d, the currency measure became a law. The
President approved it a few minutes after six o’clock in
the afternoon. It was passed by a Congress dominated
by the Democrats, two thirds of whom had been unsound
on currency questions and a majority of whom can
scarcely be said to have understood what the measure
meant and would accomplish. The majority of the Re
publicans had also had an unenviable record on the cur

rency. Bryan and several other members of the Cabinet
had supported free silver, as had the Vice President,
Marshall, the Speaker, Champ Clark, and many Demo
cratic Senators. The measure itself was the result of the
labours of many men, extending over a long period, but
its passage at this time in its present form was due to
Woodrow Wilson, ably supported by McAdoo, Glass, and
a few others.
This was the second great Administration victory. It
was the culmination of efforts for a sound national bank
ing system extending over one hundred and twenty-four
years. The First National Bank of the United States
served the country well from December, 1791, till its
charter expired in 1811 and Congress declined to extend it.
Politics, ignorance killed it. It closed its doors at a
critical juncture. The war with Great Britain began in
18 ia, and there being no banking system, and the fiscal
arrangements being defective, specie payments were
suspended in 1814. Chaos reigned till after the Second
Bank of the United States began operation in 1816.
Politics played havoc with this Bank during Jackson’s
Administration, and it died when its charter expired in
1836. It continued to operate for a time under a charter
from the State of Pennsylvania; but chaos in banking
again reigned. The Crisis of 1837 developed, and the
Bank itself suspended specie payments in that year. It
suspended again in 1838, and a third time in 1841. Its
process of liquidation covered fifteen years. The govern
ment had ceased to be a shareholder, its stock having been
paid off at a premium. The private shareholders lost all
their holdings, as did its president. There was no real
banking system for many years.

The Civil War came on. Specie payments were
promptly suspended and were not resumed till 1879.
The national banks provided for by the Act of 1863 in
time furnished partial relief, but they did not and could
not prevent panics and public hardships. There were
panics in 1873, 1893, and 1907- The advocates of un
sound currency continued to be active and came very
near to committing the nation to the vicious policy of free
coinage of silver at sixteen to one and prevented any real
reform till the passage of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913.
It is interesting that, when this act was passed, Bryan,
who was the head and front of the forces of unsound cur
rency and money, was in the Cabinet. He had a large
following still in the country and in the Congress, and there
was much question as to what his course would be and
whether a measure could be adopted if he was in opposi
tion. He was certainly less of a danger in the Cabinet
than he would have been on the outside. The story of
how his support was secured is one for others to tell. It
is said that, because the act provided for the issuance of
notes through the Federal Reserve Board, he acquired the
notion that the act really incorporated his theories and
that he, therefore, was willing to stand for it. What could
be more strange than that Bryan should have been a
conspicuous member of the administration which gave the
nation its first sound currency system?
Whether the system will survive is, of course, a question.
Whether it can be kept out of politics or politics can be
kept out of it remains to be seen. The ignorant and the
demagogues we still have with us. The test will come in
some period of great stress. If prices should fall and
many people, for causes over which banks have no control,

should come to grief, there will be those who will ascribe
their ills to evil designs of whose who direct the system.
It will be pictured as the monster “ who plays upon the
hopes and fears of the masses of the plain people.” We
shall then see what we shall see. We shall see whether we
have developed enough popular intelligence and courage
ous leadership to save us from our folly. We shall see
whether we have learned anything from experience.

Touring the Country with McAdoo— Strength of Boston, Rich
mond, and Texas— Weakness of New Orleans, Baltimore, and
Washingfon— President Urges Clayton Act

HE Federal Reserve Act contained a section
creating an organization committee, in part as
follows:

“ As soon as practicable, the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Comptrol
ler of the Currency, acting as ‘The Reserve Bank Organiza
tion Committee,’ shall designate not less than eight nor
more than twelve cities to be known as Federal Reserve
Cities, and shall divide the continental United States, ex
cluding Alaska, into districts, each district to contain only
one of such Federal Reserve Cities. The determination of
said Organization Committee shall not be subject to review
except by the Federal Reserve Board, when organized:
Provided, That the districts shall be apportioned with due
regard to the convenience and customary course of busi
ness and shall not necessarily be coterminous with any
state or states. The districts thus created may be re
adjusted, and new districts may from time to time be
created by the Federal Reserve Board, not to exceed twelve
in all. . . .
A majority of the Organization Com
mittee shall constitute a quorum with authority to act.”
The Committee, was directed to prescribe regulations

under which every National Banking Association in the
United States was required, and every eligible bank in the
United States and Trust Company within the District of
Columbia was authorized, to signify in writing, within
sixty days after the passage of the Act, its acceptance of
its terms and provisions. After the Committee had des
ignated the Reserve Bank Cities and fixed the limits of
the districts, it was its duty to notify the banks; and within
thirty days thereafter, each bank was required to sub
scribe to the Capital Stock of the Reserve Bank within its
district a sum equal to 6 per cent, of its paid-up capital
and surplus. If the subscriptions to the stock of the
Reserve Banks or any one or more of them was insufficient
in the judgment of the Committee to provide the re
quired capital, the Committee was authorized to offer to
public subscription such amount of stock in any one or
more districts as it might determine. If this failed, then
the Committee might allot to the United States such an
amount as it might determine.
When the Committee had established the districts, it
was required to file with the Comptroller of the Currency
a certificate showing the limits of each district and the
Federal Reserve City designated in each. Then, after the
minimum amount of capital stock had been subscribed
and allotted, the Committee was required to designate
any five banks whose applications had been received, to
execute a certificate of organization, and thereupon such
banks were to make an organization certificate specifying
certain things, such as the name of the Reserve Bank.
Upon the filing of such certificate with the Comptroller of
the Currency, the Reserve Bank was to become a body
corporate with the powers conferred by the Act. The

Committee was further authorized in organizing the banks
to call meetings of bank directors in the districts and to
exercise the functions of chairman of the Board of Di
rectors of each bank pending complete organization. It
was empowered, pending the organization of the Federal
Reserve Board, to make regulations for the admission of
state banks and to admit those which satisfied the require
ments.
Because of my long study of currency and banking and
of my great interest in the new legislation, I was glad to
be made by the law, as Secretary of Agriculture, a member
of the Organization Committee and therefore to have a
part in the preliminary work of organizing the new system
and getting it started. It had originally been suggested
that the Secretary of Agriculture be made by law a mem
ber of the Reserve Board. It was finally decided that it
would be unwise to do so. The Secretary of Agriculture
might be a man who would have no qualifications for
membership on the Board; and, as it had been decided to
make the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller
of the Currency members, it was thought, and wisely,
that a third member who was a political appointee would
overload the Board with politics.
McAdoo and I decided that the best and quickest way
for us to proceed was to make a trip through the country
to give all sections an opportunity to be heard and fully to
present their claims and such supporting data as they
might desire.
We arranged for hearings in New York and Boston
covering the week o( January 4th to the nth. The lead
ing bankers in both cities appeared, and a number of them
gave us their views. Some of them seemed not to have

given the law very careful study and were clearly not sym
pathetic with its plan.
I was particularly interested in the testimony of a
member of one of New York’s leading banking institutions.
I was presiding when he appeared. I asked him if he had
read the law. He said that he had and would be glad
to be of assistance to the Committee. This, in substance,
was the course of the conversation:
“ Have you decided how many banks should be creat
ed?” I asked.
“ I have,” he replied. “ I would create the minimum
number, eight. I would create a smaller number, if the
law permitted.” “ Why the minimum number?”- “ Be
cause there is not enough banking capital and surplus in
the nation to justify more,” he replied. I said: “ Are you
thinking of to-day or to-morrow?” He asked what I
meant. I said: “ Do you know how many people this
nation has gained in fourteen years?” He replied that
he had not looked it up. I told him that the increase had
been more than twenty-two millions. I asked: “ Do you
know how much the nation’s banking resources had in the
same period?” He answered in the negative. I said:
“ From about nine and a half to more than eighteen bil
lions.” I said that we must look to the future; and that
it seemed likely that the conditions would justify the
creation of at least eight banks. He said that he doubted
if as many as eight banks would pay. I then asked:
“ Have you thought where you would locate the banks?”
He said he had found it easy to locate a few— one in New
York, one in Chicago, one in San Francisco, and perhaps
one in New Orleans. “ What territory would you attach
to the New York bank?” He replied: “ Maine, New

Hampshire— the New England States, New York, New
Jersey— the Atlantic seaboard.”
I called his attention to the fact that this would take
up more than 50 per cent, of the national banking capital
and surplus and would leave the other districts rather lean.
He said that that was true and the area would have to be
restricted. I inquired why he wanted such a big bank in
New York. He replied that it ought to be as big as the
biggest private bank in the city so as to be able to hold its
own with it, to control discount rates, and to inspire re
spect abroad. When I called his attention to the fact
that the Reserve Bank would not be a competing bank,
that the law contemplated a national reserve of banking
power of at least $600,000,000 at the outset, distributed in
from eight to twelve centres, under the direction, in part,
of a central agency, that it would not be the function of
any one particular bank to control discounts by itself, and
that the foreign bankers would be very careful to analyse
the facts, and then inquired if he still thought there should
be a bank in New York of such overwhelming strength
he said that it was not essential and that a branch might
answer every purpose.
It was fairly clear that his thoughts were still running on
a great central agency and not on a decentralized system
such as the law contemplated. The New York bankers
as a whole did not expect a district larger than New York
State and parts of Connecticut and New Jersey.
There was a question in my mind whether the New
England bankers would want a bank in Boston or would
prefer to be attached to New York. It had been asserted
that the big New England banks really desired the latter;
but when we got to Boston, it became clear that nobody

would openly advocate this. A claim was put in for a
bank in Boston embracing in its district all New England;
but the bankers of western Connecticut requested that
they be attached to New York.
Our next hearing was held in Washington, with delega
tions from Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Baltimore, Washing
ton, West Virginia, Richmond, and North and South
Carolina. Each state appeared with its claim for a
Reserve Bank City, and one had two applications, Penn
sylvania. It became clear that the section from Virginia
to New Jersey was going to be difficult to arrange to the
satisfaction of many people.
On January 18 ,19i4,weleft for a long trip through the
Middle West, West, and South. We took a private car as
a matter of convenience and necessity as we had to travel
about ten thousand miles and make many stops. We held
hearings in Chicago, St. Louis, Kansas City, Lincoln,
Denver, Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, Los Angeles,
El Paso, Austin, New Orleans, Atlanta, Cincinnati, and
Cleveland. Usually, we held hearings throughout the
day and spoke at luncheons at noon and dinners in the
evenings. Everywhere the people were interested and
courteous. It soon appeared that city, state, and sec
tional pride was involved; and that we were in for a great
deal of roasting no matter what we decided. It also be
came obvious that if we created fewer banks than the
maximum fixed by law, the Reserve Board would have no
peace till that number was reached.
One of our objects in making the trip was to do some
educational work. There was no little misunderstanding
of the meaning and purposes of the law. McAdoo and I
therefore accepted all the invitations to luncheons and

dinners our schedule permitted. We explained in our
speeches and in our hearings the purpose of the act and
its probable operation. We pointed out the weakness of
the banking situation as it had existed, the fact that there
were no reserves when a pinch came, the drawing of re
sources from the country to New York where funds were
used to the limit, the failure of the attempt to secure a
satisfactory currency by basing note issues on a contract
ing national debt, the too exclusive attention which had
been given to banknotes, and the need of considering
checks and the whole credit structure.
I explained why we could not model our banking system
and practices on those of Europe, touching upon the size
of the country, its rapid growth, the constant movement
and change, and the difference in institutions and in “ the
character and habits of our people.” I have found few
people who have imagination enough to keep up with the
United States or the ability to understand the needs of all
sections of the nation, to know what is happening, and to
act intelligently on problems which arise from all quarters.
These considerations pointed to the desirability, not of a
single great central bank, but of a system of regional
banks under the direction of competent local business
men, functioning under the supervision of a central agency.
The difference between our banking habits and those of
Europe is marked and has a larger significance than is
commonly realized. Too much of the discussion of bank
ing in the United States has been in European terms and
by people who know Europe better than they know this
country. The habit of depositing and checking is rudi
mentary on the Continent of Europe. It is less so in
Great Britain, but there it is by no means so highly
[100]

developed as here. In 1913, for instance, the Bank of
France had $285,000,000 deposits with a note circulation
of $1,000,000,000, while we had deposits of $17,000,000,000
and a note circulation of only $725,000,000.
Checks serve in the main the same purpose as bank
notes. In the United States, the great mass of our trans
actions is effected through the use of checks. They are
of greater importance as credit instruments than bank
notes and yet we have in the past contented ourselves with
legislation to secure the safety only of our note issues; and
in the Federal Reserve Act no attempt is made to deal with
that part of our credit instruments created by state in
stitutions which remain outside the system. If great num
bers of state banks stay out of the system, obviously our
credit structure will be only partially safeguarded. In time
of financial distress this defect may well prove to be an ele
ment of great weakness and danger. The condition of
the state institutions may jeopardize our whole financial
structure and cause widespread suffering and distress.
We are too much given to deceiving ourselves, to sacri
ficing the essentials for appearances of freedom, and to
thinking that we can safeguard liberty by diffusing power
and obscuring responsibility. The Federal Government
ought to exercise supervision over all agencies that
create credit instruments which serve as media of ex
change. Checks, like banknotes, are money, or are rep
resentatives of money, and affect its value. Congress
cannot discharge its constitutional duty of coining money
and regulating its value as long as it permits state banks
with their enormous resources to carry on the business of
deposit and checking free from its regulation. As long
as it permits this, it will fail to live up to its constitutional
[101]

rights and duty. Our national financial system will be
unsound and unsafe till Congress does its duty. Its
power in this field is exclusive, as it is over interstate
commerce and therefore over interstate railway rates.
As every railway rate, with negligible exceptions, affects
interstate rates, Congress has exclusive power over all rail
way rates. National agencies should be nationally regu
lated. We gain nothing but trouble by reliance in whole
or in part on local bodies in such matters, just as we en
danger our interests and institutions by imposing upon
the Federal Government things which should be assumed
by the states.
Before we started on our trip, I had in a general way
run my mind over the country to see if I could locate from
eight to twelve banks, but without attempting to form
any fixed opinions. Of course, Boston, New York,
Chicago, and San Francisco, were obvious. In a some
what definite fashion, St. Louis, New Orleans, and Wash
ington were in my thoughts, with Baltimore and Phila
delphia as competitors with Washington. Richmond
scarcely occurred to me as a possibility. New Orleans
was doubtful, because I knew that Texas had relatively
little to do with New Orleans financially, and that the
banks to the east of New Orleans would not want to be
attached to her. I assumed that Texas would want to be
attached to St. Louis or Chicago. Atlanta and Nashville
I thought of as possibilities. I recognized that, if twelve
banks were created, we should have to give the South at
least two. I did not see how we could give her three
without making the districts unduly weak, or locating one
of them in St. Louis, and another in Louisville, Washing
ton, or Baltimore.

I had great difficulty in even tentatively indicating
more than seven reserve centres. Denver, Seattle,
Minneapolis, Cincinnati, Cleveland,Pittsburgh,Louisville,
and Omaha all claimed attention, but I could not at all
satisfactorily define their districts. There was nothing
west of Denver to speak of till California was reached, and
I knew that the banks to the east of Denver would look
eastward. Seattle seemed to be out of the question be
cause there was nothing at all west of it, and there was
nothing north of it. I suspected that Minnesota and
Iowa and Nebraska would really want to be attached to
Chicago.
I knew that we would have difficulty in arranging more
than eight or nine strong districts; and yet I felt that,
since the law permitted twelve, it might be better, as I
have said, to fix that number and be done with it.
Kansas City, I considered, since I knew that she served a
distinctive territory and constituency, but I felt that she
would probably not be selected, partly because she was
too near St. Louis, which was a larger and a more impres
sive banking centre.
I got a good many surprises. There was little en
thusiasm for St. Louis anywhere. The Southwest and
West— that is, most of Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, and
part of Arkansas— preferred Kansas City. I was not
surprised that nobody to speak of wanted Omaha. Port
land put in her claim, but I got the impression that her
leading bankers really preferred San Francisco. Denver,
as I expected, could not make a case. Nobody in par
ticular wanted New Orleans, and Louisiana had strik
ingly litde national banking capital and surplus.
Texas wanted neither New Orleans, St. Louis, nor
[103]

Kansas City. She wanted a bank of her own. Her lead
ing witness was very effective and alert. I said: “ Would
it not be best to attach Texas to some city to the north or
northeast, so that the district may be diversified, that is,
have both manufacturing and agricultural interest, with
the pressure more uniform throughout the year?” He
answered: “ There is something in that suggestion, but
where would you find the industrial part of the district,
west of Ohio and Pennsylvania? We might not kick if
you attached us to New York.” I asked: “ Why not at
tach you to St. Louis with Missouri ?” He quickly count
ered with this: “ Why not attach Missouri to Texas?
Why suggest that the tail wag the dog? Texas has more
national banking capital and surplus than Missouri by
$21,000,000 and much more state banking capital and
surplus, even though Missouri has both Kansas City and
St. Louis. Texas can take care of herself better than she
would be taken care of if she were tied to St. Louis, or
certainly better than St. Louis, or Chicago, or New York,
or all of them have taken care of her in the past. Texas
was all right herself in 1907, but she could not get her
balances from those cities. One bank in Chicago in 1907
had $100,000,000 of balances, but could lend only
$7,000,000; one in New York had $110,000,000, and could
lend only $10,000,000; and five reserve cities had
$145,000,000 from thirteen Southern states and could
make available only $39,000,000.”
He made a strong
presentation. He urged that a bank be located in Texas:
he did not care where especially, but preferred Dallas. El
Paso asserted that her fortunes were tied up with Arizona
and New Mexico and that she did not care so much where
she was attached as that she should go with those two states.
[104]

The case of New Orleans was almost pathetic. She
was a big and important city; and she felt that her position
and her past and future entitled her to a bank. It was
clear that her pride would be very much hurt if she were
not selected. As I have stated, I had thought of her as a
possibility, but the difficulties were even greater than I
had anticipated. Scarcely any banks wanted to be at
tached to her. Of 1,200 or more banks in the district sug
gested as her possible territory, only 51 did not protest
against being connected with her. Texas had three times
the banking power of Louisiana. She had 500 national
banks alone, while Louisiana had only 26.
Washington and Baltimore, to my surprise, made a very
bad showing. Banks to the north of them wanted to go
to Philadelphia or even more to New York, while those to
the south and west, as a rule, wanted Richmond. It was
difficult to discover that either Baltimore or Washing
ton did any substantial financing in the territory to the
south and southwest of them, while Richmond had
marked and growing financial and industrial ties. Balti
more’s loans in the South were reported to be only
$6,700,000, while Richmond’s were $35,000,000, and the
latter was not a reserve city. Furthermore, Virginia had
more national banking capital and surplus than Maryland.
North Carolina, South Carolina, and West Virginia, pre
ferred Richmond; and there was only one line of railways
connecting two of these states with Baltimore.
It was clear to me that within limits it did not make a
vast deal of difference, except in a few cases such as New
York, Boston, Chicago, and San Francisco, which cities
were selected. The considerations were those of conveni
ence, of railway, telephone, and telegraph facilities, the

drift of banking and customary practices. With these lim
its in mind, I associated also the thought that the districts
were so many reservoir agencies, under the general super
vision of the general staff, the Federal Reserve Board, which
could bring one or more districts to the aid of any other.
' There was a vast amount of state and city pride revealed
to us in the hearings; and to hear some of the speeches one
would have thought that not to select the city of the ad
vocate would mean its ruin and that of its territory. We
had floods of oratory, and particularly from Senators and
Congressmen who appeared, in many cases, for their states
and without much technical knowledge. They could
prove to their satisfaction in every case and to that of
their constituents that all roads led to their city and that
it was the supreme factor in its environment.
After a while, we determined that we had to do some
thing to save our time and our nerves; and we adopted a
simple but effective course. We were getting tired of
hearing over and over again things which we knew better
than any of our witnesses. So we did this: We would
state at the beginning of each hearing: “ We request that
you limit yourself to concrete matters peculiar to your
particular section. We do not wish anybody to repeat
what someone else has said. We shall read your full and
carefully prepared brief and examine your maps. We
are collecting a great deal of information in Washington.
We are familiar with the general situation. We will con
cede that your city is the centre of the surrounding country
and the most important one in it from your point of view.
We admire your fine local spirit and your loyalty. We
will concede all your oratory. Now, with this preface,
will you proceed in your own way?”
[106)

It was amusing to note the effect of this. It took much
wind out of some very big sails, which thereafter sagged
and flapped greatly. One further request put the finish
ing touch on oratory. It was that each speaker make his
statement sitting down, so that the audience could have
a better view.
One thing was quickly demonstrated, as we suspected
it would be, that is, that no one can be an orator sitting
down. We had an amusing illustration of this in New
Orleans. There we heard the claims of Louisville, and
that stalwart Blue Grass orator, Senator Ollie James,
appeared for his city, Louisville. When he came forward
McAdoo said quietly with a smile: “ Senator, will you be
good enough to take a seat and speak sitting down, so
that the audience may be able to see the Committee?”
The Senator complied and began talking. As he warmed
up, he unconsciously rose from his seat and put on more
steam. He began to work with his customary effective
ness which had been decidedly lacking before. We saw
that we were in for a long and eloquent address. McAdoo
interrupted and asked him if he would object to sitting
down again. He did so and vainly tried to go forward.
Finally he stopped and said: “ Mr. Secretary, I cannot
make a speech sitting down. I shall have to ask you to
let me stand, and I promise you that I shall be brief.”
We let him have his way, and he made a good address and
kept within limits.
When we got back to Washington on February 18th,
we decided to work out maps showing districts that we
thought ought to be created, with the Reserve City indi
cated for each, to do this separately, and then to meet and
compare maps and exchange views. We had had about

fifty maps presented to us by different individuals or
groups, but we quickly discarded all of them. We found
them impossible, revealing ignorance of conditions in
most parts of the Union, of lines of communications, cur
rents of trade, and banking habits. Most of these maps,
of course, were prepared to make a case for some city,
and, therefore, were not based on broad and disinterested
considerations. We have polled the banks directly from
the Comptroller’s Office, and the tabulation of the votes
or expressions aided us immensely, helping to confirm
opinions which we had developed during our trip.
I drew about thirteen different maps. I was not satis
fied with any of them, but I was willing to submit two for
consideration. I had finally settled on eleven districts,
leaving room for one later to be created for the Northwest,
which was developing very rapidly. When we met, I
found that McAdoo had a map providing for twelve dis
tricts which John Skelton Williams was willing to assent
to. Williams had very little to say, as he had not been
with us on our trip except for a few of the last hearings.
After a full discussion, I accepted the view that there
should be twelve districts.
When we came to matters of detail, we had to do some
adjusting. McAdoo and Williams were inclined to select
Cincinnati for the Ohio District. I insisted on Cleveland.
I pointed out that we could not send Pittsburgh to Cin
cinnati while we could send her to Cleveland, and that if
Cincinnati was to be the Reserve City, Pittsburgh should
go to Philadelphia, which would leave the proposed Cin
cinnati district too small. McAdoo agreed with me and
Williams assented. Arrangements which I preferred but
which were not accepted were these: Most of Wisconsin

and part of northern Michigan to go with Chicago, onlynorthwest Wisconsin and northwest Michigan going to
Minneapolis; northern New Jersey to New York, which
was opposed because the New York district without north
ern New Jersey had about one fifth of the national banking
resources; and western Connecticut to go with New York.
After reaching an agreement, we had our report pre
pared and published and then proceeded with the work of
organization.
During our absence in the West, the tariff and the cur
rency being out of the way, the President, who had been
giving much thought to the matter, on January 20, 1914,
laid before Congress his views on the trust question.
Bills covering the subject had already been prepared under
the direction of the Judiciary Committee of the House,
headed by Henry D. Clayton, of Alabama. The President
began by pointing out that public opinion had long been
directed to the matter of monopolies, and that the time
had come to give effect to that opinion. He emphasized
the important principle that successful legislation is the
embodiment of mature opinion and convincing ex
perience. “ Constructive legislation, when successful, is
always the embodiment of convincing experience and of
mature public opinion which finally springs out of that
experience. Legislation is a business of interpretation,
not of origination; and it is now plain what the opinion is
to which we must give effect in this matter. It is not
recent or hasty opinion. It springs out of the experience
of a whole generation. It has clarified itself by long
content, and those who for a long time battled with it and
sought to change it are now frankly and honourably yield
ing to it and seeking to conform their actions to it.
[109]

“ What we are purposing to do, therefore, is, happily,
not to hamper or interfere with business as enlightened
business men prefer to do it, or in any sense to put it
under a ban. The antagonism between business and
government is over. We are now about to give expression
to the best business judgment of America, to what we
know to be the business conscience and honour of the
land.”
Specifically, he pleaded for laws which would prohibit
interlocking of the personnel of directorates of great cor
porations. Railroads, particularly, should be released
from their subordination to great financial interests and
should hereafter be run solely as transportation agencies
in the interest of the public. “ The country is ready,
therefore, to accept, and accept with relief as well as ap
proval, a law which will confer upon the Interstate Com
merce Commission the power to superintend and regulate
the financial operations by which the railroads are hence
forth to be supplied with the money they need for their
proper development to meet the rapidly growing require
ments of the country for increased and improved facilities
of transportation.”
The country, he insisted, awaited a more explicit defini
tion of anti-trust law. It was afflicted with uncertainty
and “ nothing hampers business like uncertainty.” Busi
ness men demand “ something more than the menace
of legal process. They desire the advice, the definite
guidance, and information which can be supplied by an
administrative body, an Interstate Trade Commission.”
He might have pointed out that business men had fre
quently said that they found it exceedingly trying to
conduct their affairs with the frequent interruptions of
[no]

our court proceedings and were demanding that the gov
ernment inform them as to the “ rules of the game.”
Furthermore, he urged, punishments should fall, not
upon business itself but upon individuals who use business
instrumentalities to do things condemned by public policy
and sound business practice. “ Every act of business is
done at the command or upon the initiative of some as
certainable person or group of persons. These should be
held individually responsible and the punishment should
fall upon them, not upon the business organization of
which they make illegal use. It should be one of the
main objects of our legislation to divest such persons of
their corporate cloak and deal with them as those who do
not represent their corporations, but merely by deliberate
intention break the law.”
In this last suggestion, particularly, the President was
seeking to project into the national legislation a distinctive
feature of laws which, as Governor, he had succeeded in
forcing through the New Jersey legislature.

[in]

OUTBREAK OF THE WAR

Repeal of Panama Tolls— Mexico— The Coming of the War:
Its Effect on the United States— President Urges War Taxation
— Questions of Water Power, Shipping, and National Defence
— Disagreement with President on Immigration Restriction Veto

N March 5, 1914, the President appeared before
Congress and read his brief message on the re
peal of the law exempting American coastwise
ships from paying tolls at the Panama Canal.
He begged Congress not to measure his message by the
number of sentences it contained. He had addressed
to Congress no communication, he said, which carried
with it graver implications. The matter was one with
regard to which he was charged by the Constitution
with personal responsibility. The exemption, in his
judgment, constituted a mistaken economic policy and
a plain violation of a treaty with Great Britain con
cerning the Canal, concluded on November 18, 1901.
Whatever might be the view held in the United States,
the meaning of the Treaty was not debated outside the
United States. We ought to be too self-respecting to
interpret with a too strained reading the words of our
promises just because we have power enough to give us
leave to read them as we please. “ We ought to reverse
our action without raising the question whether we were
right or wrong, and so once more deserve our reputation
[112]

for generosity and for the redemption of every obligation
without quibble or hesitation.”
“ I ask this of you in support of the foreign policy of the
Administration. I shall not know how to deal with other
matters of even greater delicacy and nearer consequence
if you do not grant it to me in ungrudging measure.”
The President read this message to Congress without
having laid it before the Cabinet. We had discussed the
matter, as I have indicated, in the spring of 1913. He had
not mentioned the matter since that time. All of us were
somewhat puzzled by his reference to matters of even
greater delicacy and by the seriousness of his manner and
language. My guess is that he is meeting with resistance
in his handling of Mexican and other matters from Great
Britain, especially because she doubts our sincerity and
good faith; partly because of our action on the tolls
matter. I know that Page is constantly representing that
he is very little use in England because we do not take
the course which will show that we mean to be decent.
Lane thought that bringing up the repeal was bad politics,
that it would create resistance and block other more im
portant things. Bryan, who referred to the fact that the
Democratic platform had a plank opposing the repeal, had
discovered a way out to his satisfaction. The tolls exemp
tion was in effect a subsidy to American ships. The Demo
cratic platform declared against subsidies. There was a
conflict. The subsidy business was a long-standing prin
ciple; the tolls exemption was an occasional or passing
matter, and had been little considered, and could not be
said to embody a mature demand of the rank and file of
the party. The declaration in favour of tolls, therefore,
ought to yield to the plank against subsidies.

Mexico had for some time occupied very little attention
at Cabinet meetings, when an incident occurred which
brought it to the centre of the stage. This was the arrest
of a paymaster of the U. S. S. Dolphin and its boats’ crew
at the Iturbide bridge landing at Tampico, April 8, 1914.
The arrest was made by a subordinate officer. As he was
proceeding up one of the streets of the town, he was met
by a superior, who ordered him to return to the landing
and to await instructions. In an hour and a half, orders
came from the commander of the forces of Huerta in
Tampico to release the men. The commander apologized
and Huerta expressed regret. He explained that martial
law prevailed at the time and that orders had been given
that no one was to land at the bridge. Our officers had
not been notified of this; and, in any event, arrest of our
men was not the remedy. Admiral Mayo regarded the
action as a grave insult and demanded that our flag be
saluted with special ceremony. The demand was referred
to Huerta, who ordered a refusal to comply. President
Wilson, on April 14th, dispatched the American fleet to
Mexican waters. Notes were exchanged, and Huerta
agreed to salute our flag if we would return the courtesy.
The President declined and demanded an unconditional
salute by six o’clock in the afternoon of April 19th.
Huerta refused, and it was reported that a German
steamer with munitions of war was approaching Vera
Cruz.
Meantime, there had been other incidents, such as
the arrest of an orderly of the U. S. battleship Minnesota
and the interception of a message from our government
to its embassy in Mexico City, which indicated a studied
purpose of Huerta and his people to single out the United

States for insult. On April 20th, the President appeared
before Congress to ask its advice and cooperation. He
specifically asked its approval of the use of “ the armed
forces of the United States in such ways and to such ex
tent as may be necessary to obtain from General Huerta
and his adherents the fullest recognition of the rights
and dignity of the United States.” The President ex
pressed the hope that this country could not be forced
into a war with the Mexican people. They were not to
blame. They had no government. The conflict would
be only with Huerta and his adherents, if it came; and
our object would be only to have respect shown to our
flag and to restore to the people of Mexico the opportunity
to set up again their own laws.
The President was in Hot Springs, Virginia, when the
incident occurred. Admiral Mayo could quickly have
reached the Navy Department and have asked for in
structions before demanding a salute. I think he ought
to have been authorized to demand a salute, but I doubt
if it ought to have been possible for him to do so without
specific advice. In this case, it may lead to war which
would amount to very little. In other cases, such a
course might involve the nation and the world in a great
and prolonged war. Ought a military or naval com
mander to have the right to take action which would
lead two nations into war? I think not. The President
thought that even he ought to have the previous advice
and approval of the people’s representatives before he
took the logical and necessary step to make good his
support of Mayo’s demand.
The affair, in the absence of a demand by Mayo of a
salute, might well have closed after the apology of the

Tampico commander and the expression of regret from
Huerta, if the additional incidents had not occurred.
The situation was delicate. We had stated that Mexico
had no government. The arrest was made by an insignifi
cant officer who was promptly called down by his superior.
It was scarcely compatible with our dignity to make war
on a person, a usurper. There was nothing for the
President to do, however, after Mayo made his demand,
except to support him. Our position before the Mexican
people would have been an impossible one.
On April 21st, on orders from the President under pro
tection from the fleet, a force of Marines from the United
States warships landed at Vera Cruz, seized the Customs
House, and later occupied the whole city. Diplomatic
relations were promptly severed.
In connection with this affair, there happened at one
of the Cabinet meetings an interesting episode. It was
obvious that the situation was critical. The time had
come to take military action or to back down. It was
clear that Mexico could give us little effective military
resistance, but it was not known what the attitude of
certain great powers would be. In any event, a decision
to go into Mexico would mean loss of life. The President
was profoundly disturbed. He said with much feeling
that it was a terrible responsibility to decide on a course
which might take the nation into a war and cause the loss
of the lives of many men, and then he added suddenly:
“ If there are any of you who still believe in prayer, I
wish you would think seriously over this matter between
now and our next meeting.” This came with something
of a shock and sent us from the Cabinet room with decid
edly solemn faces.

The capture of Vera Cruz was followed by the severance
of diplomatic relations. The American charge d’affaires
was handed his passports. The special envoy, Mr. Lind,
had already abandoned his mission and was on his way
home. At this juncture, an offer of mediation was made
by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, the A. B. C. powers, and
it was accepted by the United States and Huerta. It is
difficult to see what they can accomplish beyond making
it clear to Pan-America that we have no selfish purposes
and that, if we go into Mexico, it will be because we cannot
avoid doing so, that we shall simply undertake to establish
order and set Mexico on her feet.
The whole Mexican situation is a mess. Huerta must
go; but when he does go, nobody can forecast what will
happen. Zapata, a bandit, is operating in the south and
is headed for Mexico City. If he gets in, things will
happen which will enrage the American people and the
world. Villa is making headway in the north, and seems
to be holding his men pretty well in hand in deference
largely to the wishes of his friend, General Hugh L. Scott.
Villa has an economic programme which has some merit
in it, but it cannot be carried out without grave trouble.
He intends to give the masses of the Mexican people some
interest in the land and in the fruits of their labour; but
they are densely ignorant and probably would make little
use of their opportunities. It will take generations to lay
the foundations of order and to develop and direct con
structive programmes which will bring the masses of the
Mexicans to the point where they can use land or run a
government; and the requisite number of intelligent and
forceful men in Mexico to furnish leadership is not in sight.
If Villa should get in there might be an unpleasant mo>

ment with Great Britain, because she notified us a month
ago that she would demand satisfaction of Villa for the
murder of one of her subjects.
It is possible that we may have to go into Mexico. We
are not dealing with people who think in our terms or in
those of most nations with which we have many dealings.
Early in the summer of 1914, we again abandoned the
holding of Cabinet meetings at the stated times with the
understanding that we would be subject to the President’s
call. I was much occupied with the affairs of the Depart
ment of Agriculture, to some extent with my duties as
a member of the Reserve Bank Organization Committee,
and other domestic problems.
On the second of August, 1914, I left Washington to
join Mrs. Houston the following day in Boston, as we had
accepted an invitation to spend a week or ten days with
friends at York Corner, Maine. The days immediately
following were full of rumours and excitement. Word
came that the German steamship, the Kronprinzessen
Cectlie, with a large stock of gold on board, had put into
Bar Harbor. The reason given was that war had formally
been declared by Germany, France, Belgium, and Eng
land.
I had watched the development of the trouble between
Austria and Serbia. I had noted with passing interest
the news of the assassination of the Austrian Archduke,
Francis Ferdinand, and his wife at Sarajevo, Bosnia, on
June 30th, Austria’s ultimatum to Serbia on July 23d, her
declaration of war against Serbia on July 28th, Russia’s
mobilization on the twenty-ninth, and Germany’s declara
tion of war against Russia the day before I left Washing
ton. But as I had had no rest for many months, and as
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there was no clear indication that the developments would
be brought very near home to us or that there was any
thing I could do if I remained in Washington, I decided
to take a short vacation.
There had been so much fighting and turmoil in the
Balkans that I had become accustomed to them. For
the moment, it looked like more of the same thing on a
larger and more serious scale. I had known that the
Slavs in the Southeast had been especially resdess since
the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1909. I felt
that Serbia had become more aggressive since the Balkan
wars, that she aspired to larger territory and was desirous
of securing the adhesion of parts of the Slavic peoples in
the Austrian dominions. It was clear that Austria would
hold on to what she had in order to have access to the sea.
The great trouble is that these nations have as their
leading motive, not so much the welfare of their people
as expansion of their territories and the enhancement of
their prestige and power, under the leadership of their
princely houses and their aristocratic militaristic adher
ents. The curse of central and southern Europe is the
desire of the reigning dynasties to expand their power.
To this end, they keep alive racial and national jealousies
and hatreds. The foolish mediaeval notion is rampant
that the prosperity of one state is a menace to every other,
and that military force is the only guarantee of safety and
greatness. There was no appearance anywhere of the
idea that the welfare of the people of Europe lies in the
nations* living together in neighbourly and Christian
fashion and that it is to the interest of all for each to keep
a clean national house and to help every other to make
its fullest economic and political contribution to civiliza

tion. The ruling classes are obsessed with a sense of their
own importance and regard the masses as so many cattle.
They boast of their superior civilization and have no
awareness that it means the maximum of ease and luxury
for themselves and the minimum for the multitude.
Politically, economically, and socially, Continental Eu
rope, with the exception of a few small countries, is still
mediaeval; and yet there are Americans who accept the
boast of this Europe that it is civilized while their country
is crude and common.
When I reached York, I saw from the papers that Ger
many had practically without a declaration of war taken
the offensive against France through Luxembourg and
had made a base proposal to Belgium, which the latter
had bravely spurned. Belgium’s heroic answer thrilled
me, but still the horror was not brought directly home to
me in all its tragic meaning. There came England’s ulti
matum and declaration of war; and I had a feeling that the
end of things had come. Figuratively speaking, I stopped
in my tracks, dazed and horror-stricken.
After a few days’ rest, I motored to Woods Hole, and
when I reached there I found a telegram awaiting me tell
ing me of the death of the President’s wife. I had had
no warning that her condition was serious, although I
had seen Doctor Grayson at rather frequent intervals
before I left Washington. The President himself had
given no hint that he was alarmed, although, as I after
ward learned, he and Doctor Grayson had felt since May
that the end was not far off. What a terrible strain for
the President during all the intervening days, and with
what courage and fortitude he faced the inevitable.
■ The effect of the war on industry and finance in this
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country in 1914 was terrific. There was a temporary
paralysis. The United States, by reason of her depend
ence on foreign ships, was either isolated or dependent
on the plans and necessities of foreign nations. It was
obvious that temporarily the farming sections, and par
ticularly the South, would be hard hit. Germany would
be cut off and would no longer take from three to three
and three quarter million bales of cotton. As chance
would have it, our crops were almost, if not quite, the larg
est in our history. Their movement had already begun.
In a short time, our warehouse and terminal facilities were
overrun. It was reported that more than fourteen hun
dred cars were on the tracks on the way to Galveston.
If the control of the sea had long remained in doubt, a
tremendously serious situation would have developed.
By reason of the fact that England and France not only
controlled the sea with their navies, but also had immense
shipping facilities, the movement of foodstuffs and muni
tions soon set up in volume, and relief was afforded in
certain directions.
The interruption of trade had an immediate effect on
the government’s revenues. Custom duties began to drop
greatly. In August alone there had been a falling off in
customs of more than ten million five hundred thousand
dollars as compared with the corresponding month of
1913The President, therefore, on September 4th, appeared
before Congress to urge additional legislation. He
pointed out the danger of delay and warned against re
liance on loans, the usual resort, especially of non-democratic countries, in time of emergency, and too frequently
of democracies.

I was particularly pleased by what the President had
to say on the wisdom of taxing. It is, in part, as follows:
“ And we ought not to borrow. We ought to resort to
taxation, however we may regret the necessity of putting
additional temporary burdens on our people. . . .
The country is able to pay any just and reasonable taxes
without distress. . . . The people of this country
are both intelligent and profoundly patriotic. They are
ready to meet the present conditions in the right way and
to support the government with generous self-denial.
They know and understand, and will be intolerant only
of those who dodge responsibility or are not frank with
them.” He closed by urging Congress to provide an ad
ditional revenue of $100,000,000 through internal taxes.
The elections occupied much of the time of the pro
fessional politicians through the latter part of September
and October of 1914. The results, on the whole, were
favourable, but not what I expected. I thought that the
Democrats would maintain a larger lead in the House.
However, they gained in the Senate and will have control
of it, at any rate till 1919. If conditions improve, they
should carry the elections in 1916.
The President, in his Second Annual Message to Con
gress, December, 1914, gave much time to a discussion
of steps which he thought should be taken to improve
production and transportation, especially by sea, which
had been so greatly deranged by war. He urged haste in
water-power legislation and pleaded for the prompt pas
sage of the shipping bill. The topic, however, which at
tracted most attention was national defence. There
were many who were urging large measures of prepared
ness. They were insistent on the creation of a regular
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army of considerable strength and the Secretary of War
apparently was committed to a marked enlargement of
the regular establishment. The President’s principal
points were these: We are not prepared for war in the
sense that we can put a trained nation in the field. We
shall never be ready in time of peace to do this as long as
we retain our present political institutions. We are at
peace with the world. Our independence and our terri
tory are not in danger. We are champions of peace.
“ This is the time above all others when we should wish
and resolve to keep our strength by self-possession, our
influence by preserving our ancient principles of action.”
We have never had a large standing army. “ We will
not ask our young men to spend the best years of their
lives making soldiers of themselves.” We will depend
upon a citizenry trained and accustomed to arms. We
should “ provide a system by which every citizen who will
volunteer for training may be made familiar with the use
of modern arms, the rudiments of drill and manoeuvre, and
the maintenance and sanitation of camps.”- We should
develop and strengthen the National Guard. More than
this would be a reversal of our policy. “ More than this
proposed at this time, permit me to say, would mean
merely that we had lost our self-possession, that we had
been thrown off our balance by a war with which we have
nothing to do, whose causes cannot touch us, whose very
existence affords us opportunities of friendship and dis
interested service which should make us ashamed of any
thought of hostility or fearful preparations for trouble.11
We shall take leave to be strong upon the seas in the future
as in the past. “ Our ships are our national bulwarks. But
who shall tell us what sort of navy to build? Who can tell

us what the changes we see going on will demand? But I
turn away from the subject. It is not new. There is no
need to discuss it. We shall not alter our attitude toward
it because some amongst us are nervous and excited.”'
The President’s closing words were eloquent. He pic
tured the tasks on which a nation’s energies might worthily
be expended. He unfolded the ideals of a great free na
tion. How different the situation of the world might be
if Europe had had for generations leadership in such di
rections! He said: “ To develop our life and our resources;
to supply our own people and the people of the world as
their need arises from the abundant plenty of our fields
and our marts of trade; to enrich the commerce of our own
states and of the world with the products of our mines,
our farms, and our factories, with the creations of our
thought and the fruits of our character— this is what will
hold our attention and our enthusiasm steadily, now and
in the years to come, as we strive to show in our life as a
nation what liberty and the inspirations of an emancipated
spirit may do for men and for societies, for individuals, for
states, and for mankind.”
The President had not read this message to us. When
I heard it, I had very mingled feelings. The rural credits
problem and the shipping act we had discussed. As to
the latter, I was more than doubtful. I doubted whether
we had reached the point in our economic development
when it would pay us to put capital and labour in shipping.
We have vast opportunities in other directions as evi
denced by our high productivity and high wages. I felt
confident that it would be foolish to attempt to develop a
merchant marine for international trade and retain some
of our trade restrictions. I was inclined to believe that
[124]

a merchant marine would be a very expensive luxury, or
necessity, and that we could justify the undertaking only
on grounds of national defence and preparedness. For
this reason, I urged that the use of the ships as possible
naval auxiliaries or as transports be emphasized. What
a pity we cannot have, without danger, the benefits of a
world division of labour and, in this instance, use the ships
of England, France, Germany, Italy, and other nations
for our overseas trade.
One of the two measures to which the President re
ferred as finely conceived I was by no means satisfied
with: the one dealing with water power. This had been
taken up by the Interior Department without consulta
tion either with me or with the Secretary of War, although
the Interior Department controlled only about 8 per cent,
of the nation’s water power, while Agriculture through
the Forest Service controlled about 42 per cent., and the
War Department, all our navigable streams. Lane had
called me up at the last moment to say that a committee
was going to hold a final meeting on water power in his
office and that he would like to have me presen t. I replied
that it was too late, that I was opposed to what the Com
mittee had in mind, that I could only express my opposi
tion, and that, in the circumstances, I had better stay
away. Incidentally, the bill proposed to take the juris
diction of all water power from the other two departments
and place it under the Interior. This, I believed, would
set up endless confusion and conflicts.
The national forests, in which there is 42 per cent, of
the water power, are in the Department of Agriculture,
where they belong. In these there are many important
activities, such as the regulation of grazing of millions of
[125]

animals, timber sales, reforestation, fire protection, rec
reation, and other uses; and these it would be difficult
to administer, if another department had jurisdiction
over waterways and water development. Of course, the
Interior Department’s answer was obvious: Transfer the
national forests to that department in which the parks
and public domain are administered. This would be a
crime. The Interior Department had the forests once.
They were steadily running down and were supporting
only about one million five hundred thousand animals.
Since the Department of Agriculture has had them, the
grazing has steadily improved and they are supporting
six or seven times as many animals. All the other features
of forest administration are agricultural— roads, refores
tation, insect control, and irrigation. And furthermore,
the personnel of the Agricultural Department is trained
for this work and is non-political, while that of the In
terior, except of a few bureaus like the Geological Survey
and Mines, is political and relatively inefficient. And,
furthermore, the Interior Department’s attitude and
record on conservation have not been and are not now
satisfactory.
As a matter of fact, instead of moving over the national
forests to the Department of the Interior, Congress ought
to transfer the national parks to the Department of Agri
culture and ought to empower that Department to regu
late grazing on the public domain. The solution of the
problem of administering water power will be found in
the creation of a Commission consisting of the three
Heads of Departments concerned: War, Interior, and
Agriculture.
I did not feel easy over the President’s remarks on na

[i*6]

tional defence. I agreed that “ in time of peace” the
American people would be indisposed to prepare for war
or to have a great standing army. I agreed that we are
now (1914) at peace with all the world, that our independ
ence is not now threatened, that we intend to live our
own lives, and that we want nobody’s territory; but I
could not forget that half the world was afire, and I could
not assent to the view that the war was one “ whose
causes cannot touch us.” I was particularly disturbed by
the declaration that we must depend in time of peril,
not upon a standing army, nor yet upon a reserve army,
but “ upon a citizenry trained and accustomed to arms.”
I assented to the view that we should have a trained
“ citizenry,” and I was far from being partial to a large
standing army, but in the circumstances I thought that we
should have something more than our small regular army,
scarcely more than a respectable police force in number,
and that we should not depend on volunteers. I thought
that we ought to enlarge our army, provide for the training
of more officers, develop a large reserve force, improve the
National Guard, and lay the foundations for an adequate
supply of equipment, munitions, and big and little guns.
At the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, January 26th, the
Immigration Bill again claimed attention. It had been
mentioned at the preceding meeting, and Secretary Wilson
had intimated that he was looking into the situation. At
this meeting, he had his comment prepared but did not
read it, as the President announced that he would veto
the bill. I do not know what the Secretary’s view is.
There was little discussion of the matter, as the President
had evidently already finally chosen his position.
I was against a veto and said so. The measure is not
[127]

an ideal one, but it would serve as a foundation and could
be amended. Immigration ought to be checked, and
particularly from the southeastern and eastern parts of
Europe. We are getting entirely too many people who
have no aptitude or qualifications for participating in our
political activities and may never acquire any. I think
we have overworked the asylum business. We may owe
some duty to people in less fortunate countries, but we
owe it to ourselves to see that our institutions are sound
and strong, and they will be menaced if the numbers of
those of radically different experiences and habits continue
to mount up, and particularly if they are permitted to
congregate in race groups in our great cities or even in the
rural districts. If we allow them to come, we should see
that they are dispersed.
These people furnish not only many of our worst agita
tors, but also very fruitful soil for the seed of revolution.
In their countries, they have been accustomed to resort
to violence to secure what they want; and wha,t they
sought at home we began with and have greatly extended.
At home they were governed by a minority, the ruling
class; and they do not know that things are reversed here.
They are easily deceived by names and appearances.
They do not know that the majority here can peacefully
secure anything it wants; that any cause can get a hear
ing; that all any advocates have to do is to convert the
majority to their way of thinking; and that, if they cannot
do so, they must hold their peace. They cannot under
stand that not to do this is treason to the majority, to
democracy, and they do not know that the American
people are not going to permit any misguided minority to
have its way by violence.

An educational test is not a wholly satisfactory test,
but it is one test. A people whose government has failed
to make provision for their development along educational
lines are written down by that fact as an unsatisfactory
people; and lack of education in such people seeking ad
mission here is at least symptomatic. The education test
is not merely a test of opportunity. It is also a test of
purpose and character. A people of the requisite charac
ter and purpose see to it that educational opportunity is
not lacking. This is true of individuals in large measure.
With us, sections where educational opportunity has not
been provided may justly be charged with measurable
lack of character, purpose, and will. Eighty per cent, of
the Russian people are illiterate. Millions of people who,
after centuries, will stand for such indifference and failure
on the part of their government and have not the initia
tive to do anything for themselves in an educational direc
tion, will stand for anything, and we do not need many
additions to our population from them.
A restrictive measure has passed Congress three times.
This evidences sufficient deliberation, and this last action
ought to have been acquiesced in. I do not assent to the
view indicated in the veto message that a measure should
not be accepted unless the people have previously given
their mandate on it.

b r y a n ’s

r esig n a t io n

Garrison Dissatisfied— The Sinking of the **Lusitania” —
Apathy in the West— Bryan Refuses to Face Issue— His Last
Attendance at Cabinet Meeting

ECRETARY GARRISON, for some time before
April, 1915, had been showing signs of restiveness,
but I was surprised when he came to see me and
told me that he was going to resign. He had his
resignation written and was set on sending it in. He told
me that he had found that he was not in sympathy with
the Administration. The atmosphere, he thought, was not
good. It was too Bryanistic. There was a strong note
of hostility to business. He was not in accord on Mexico.
He resented the attitude on preparedness.
Garrison, as usual, stated his views clearly and strongly,
but I thought that he took an extreme position. I
could not agree that the Administration was Bryanistic.
The President was doing the leading and Bryan the fol
lowing. There had been little or nothing new in respect
to policies since the fall, when Garrison made his speech
at Trenton which was a strong defence of the Administra
tion. He was not justified, I thought, in saying that his
defence views were not being given full consideration.
He was presenting them vigorously before the Congres
sional Committee, and it seemed not unlikely that they
would be accepted in the main.

Members of the Cabinet discussed Garrison’s case at
length among themselves. The opinion was that Garri
son’s attitude had no sufficient justification, that it was
too rigid, and that he was too impatient. I felt that it
was best that he should carry out his purpose and quit.
I did not see how he could remain in the Cabinet feeling
as he did, and, knowing him to be a gentleman of high
character and fine feeling, I was sure he would not stay
unless he could give his full and loyal support to the
President. I knew that, if he resigned, the partisan press
would make a great to-do about it, but I believed that
the tempest would be of short duration and would do little
damage. Most of the members thought it would be best
if Garrison resigned later. Burleson was strongly of this
view and presented his reasons at length. It was sug
gested to Tumulty that he tell the President that Garrison
might quit at any moment, and that it would be well for
him to have a strong man in mind to appoint immediately
upon his resignation, preferably an outstanding man from
New England, Ex-Secretary Olney, if he would serve.
In April, 1915, 1 left Washington for the West to make
a business trip through the national forests. I was in
southern California when the news came that the Lusi
tania had been sunk on May 7th. I instantly realized the
seriousness of this tragedy from the point of view of our
international relations. The press reports indicated that
a considerable number of Americans had lost their lives,
and raised the question as to whether the ship could be
regarded as a war vessel if the rumour that she carried
arms and munitions were true. I had a wire from a friend
asking for my views. I replied that I did not have suffi
cient information to justify me in forming an opinion.

I added that certain things were clear to me. Nothing
could justify the sinking of a vessel carrying passengers,
except after visit and search, and, even if it were discov
ered that it was carrying contraband, except after seeing
that passengers and crew were placed in a position of
safety. I added that it was questionable wisdom for
Americans to sail on belligerent ships and run the risk of
involving their country in a serious situation, but that
they had a perfect right to do so. I advised reliance on
the wisdom and courage of the President.
I found that the sentiment in the West was strongly
with the President in his course The war seemed out
there to be far very away. Nobody was thinking about
intervention either in Mexico or in Europe. The people
were not seriously contemplating the possibility of our
becoming involved in the war in Europe; but, at the same
time, they wanted our rights safeguarded.
The morning I received the news of the sinking of the
L usitania , a delegation from Los Angeles with which I
had an appointment for breakfast and a trip into the
mountains, made its appearance. The members of the
delegation talked for a few minutes about the tragedy
without excitement, and then turned the discussion to
irrigation, citrous fruit, roads, water power, and forestfire protection, and did not again while I was with them
refer to the L u sita n ia . Nor did any reporter of any local
paper seek to interview me on the matter, and no citizen
brought it up during the remainder of my stay in the
West, which lasted several weeks.
I returned to Washington in time for the Cabinet
meeting Tuesday, June ist. Bryan was a few minutes
late. He seemed to be labouring under a great strain and

sat back in his chair most of the time with his eyes
closed.
The President read a draft of a proposed warning to the
Mexican factions. Lane thought the President ought to
make it clear that the government would get behind
another Mexican leader, Iturbide, and that steps ought
to be taken to get him in touch with financiers who would
back him. Bryan thought the way ought to be left open
to recognize one of the men, Carranza, who had been fight
ing so long for liberty, and not take up a man who would
probably play in with the reactionaries. Another member
suggested that we ought to have clearly in mind the steps
we would take in case nothing happened, and not commit
ourselves in the note to any individual. The President
seemed much surprised at the many and divergent sug
gestions, and said so with some emphasis, adding that the
note embodied what seemed to him to be the consensus
of opinion of the last Cabinet meeting. He asked for an
explanation of the “ singular change of mind.” Nobody
ventured to enlighten him.
I reminded him that I had been absent from the last
few meetings and expressed the hope that what I might
say would not be based on a misapprehension.
“ The note purports to be a solemn warning. From its
phraseology, the people would, of course, regard it as
such, and also as a change of policy. But I find no indica
tion of a change of policy and no hint that anything else
will happen. In effect it says: ‘ We have tried Carranza,
and hoped for something from Villa and others. They
have failed us. Now, we will look around and see if we
can find another promising bandit. Perhaps Iturbide
would do.5 This does not mean a change of policy. It is

a continuance of the present policy. We simply propose
to play our cards on a new man. I know the new man.
He is the best of the outfit I have seen, but I have no real
faith in him. Like most of his kind, he is vain and vain
glorious. I do not believe he can do anything. He has
not the right fibre, and if he prevailed he would do nothing
for the Mexican people. He wants to get in, not for their
sake, but for his own. To that extent I agree with Mr.
Bryan.
“ I have no faith in Carranza. He is dull and pig
headed. If he has any intelligence, he takes great pains
to conceal it. Villa is a roughneck and a murderer. He
is clearly impossible.
“ If you propose to back a new man, do not announce
a change of policy or issue a solemn warning. Simply
quickly go ahead, back him, and let the proper parties
know that you will approve their support of him. I
notice you conclude by saying that if the leaders do not
get together, you will turn elsewhere for suggestions.
What does this mean? Who will give them? This will
scarcely appear to be an adequate conclusion of a note con
veying a solemn warning and announcing a change of
policy. The people will have a right to believe that you
have definitely in mind a real solution of the problem and
are prepared to see it through. They will expect to see
you take drastic action if necessary. The people may or
may not now wish intervention, but they would have a
right to conclude from this statement that you have it in
mind in case your warning is not heeded.”
At this Bryan vigorously shook his head.
The President asked what I would suggest. I said:
“ Either do not issue the statement, or conclude it with a

definite intimation that if the Mexican situation does not
clear, you will be compelled to recommend to Congress
the steps which this government should take to bring an
intolerable condition of things to an end.-1 The message
was sent on June 2nd.
The President presented his draft of his reply to the
German note on the sinking of the Lusitania. The first
note had been sent while I was in California. In it we
had warned Germany that her measures could not “ oper
ate as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights of Amer
ican shipmasters or of American citizens bound on lawful
errands as passengers on merchant ships of belligerent
nationality; and that it [our government] must hold the
Imperial German Government to a strict accountability
for any infringement of those rights, intentional or inci
dental.’1 Our government assumed that the German
government “ accepted” as of course the rule that the
lives of noncombatants, whether they be of neutral citizen
ship or citizens of one of the nations at war, cannot law
fully or rightfully be put in jeopardy by the capture or
destruction of an unarmed merchantman, and recognize
also, as all other nations do, the obligation to take the
usual precaution of visit and search to ascertain whether a
suspected merchantman is in fact of belligerent nationality
or is in fact carrying contraband of war under a neutral
flag.” The objection to the German method of attack
against enemy trade “ lies in the practical impossibility
of employing submarines in the distinction of commerce
without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, jus
tice, and humanity, which all modem opinion regards as
imperative. . . . American citizens act within their
indisputable rights in taking their ships and in travelling

wherever their legitimate business calls them upon the
high seas, and exercise those rights in what should be the
well-justified confidence that their lives will not be en
dangered by acts done in clear violation of universally
acknowledged international obligations, and certainly
with the confidence that their own government will sus
tain them in the exercise of those rights.”
The note closed with an expression of confident expecta
tion that the German Government would disavow the
acts of which this government complained, make all possi
ble reparation, and take steps to prevent a recurrence of
them, and with a warning that this government would
omit no act necessary to its performance of a sacred duty
to maintain the rights of American citizens.
This note was signed “ Bryan.”
The German reply was unsatisfactory. It was insin
cere and cynical. It contained a statement to the effect
that a great liner had no right to sink so quickly merely
from the effect of a torpedo, that it must have resulted
from the explosion of ammunition, and that the Lusitania
had been armed. A final statement was reserved pending
the receipt of further information from this government.
Secretary Garrison urged that the rejoinder contain no
discussion of details or facts. Germany should be made
to say, first, whether or not she accepted the principle we
stood for. If she did not, there was nothing to discuss;
if she did, we could then canvass details with her.
One member wanted to know what we were going to do
about England’s interference with our trade. He wanted
a strong note sent to her protesting against her ille g a l
action in holding up our exports, particularly our cotton.
There was an instant objection to such a course from sev

eral members of the Cabinet. They strongly resisted the
proposal that our material interests be considered at the
same moment when we were discussing a grave matter in
volving human lives.
Bryan got excited. He said that he had all along in
sisted on a note to England; that she was illegally prevent
ing our exports from going where we had a right to send
them; and that the Cabinet seemed to be pro-Ally. All
the rest of the Cabinet strongly protested against a note
to England, and no note was sent. The President sharply
rebuked Bryan, saying that his remarks were unfair and
unjust. He had no right to say that any one was proAlly or pro-German. Each one was merely trying to be
a good American. We had lodged a protest with England
and might do so again at the proper time, but this would
be a singularly inappropriate time to take up such a matter
with her. Furthermore, he had had indications that the
control of shipping would be taken out of the hands of the
Admiralty, out of Lord Fisher’s hands, that there would
be Cabinet changes, and that our reasonable demands
would be met. Certainly, in any event, when we had be
fore us a grave issue with the Germans, it would be folly
to force an issue of such character with England. We
were merely trying to look at our duty and all our problems
objectively. He added that certain things were clear and
that as to them his mind was made up.
Here Bryan handed the President a note, and I said to
myself: “ That must be an intimation that he expects to
quit.” Apparently, it was something else.
Redfield said that Bryan was in error in saying that
England had actually stopped our exports. As a matter
of fact, he insisted, they are larger than ever and are

growing Bryan asked if that was not true only so far as
the Allies were concerned. We all instantly answered em
phatically in the negative, and someone suggested that
such interruptions as had taken place were due in no small
measure to the foolish action of some of our merchants
in trying to conceal contraband and of some of our ships
in attempting to evade the English regulations.
Bryan then asked, with a show of heat, if we thought
we ought to ask the English authorities what we might
do. We replied that the English regulations were framed
to expedite the shipment of non-contraband goods and
not to delay them. A certificate from the proper authori
ties exempted them from interference. We had to face
the facts of a difficult situation. We pointed cut particu
larly that our cotton had gone out in much larger quanti
ties than we had expected, in quantities almost equal to
those of the preceding year, that 8,000,000 bales would
have been shipped by July 1st when we had expected that
less than 6,000,000 would go. Sweden, Holland, Spain,
and Italy had imported 1,900,000 bales more than in the
preceding year; Italy 900,000 against 450,000; Sweden
732,000 instead of 44,000; and Holland 500,000 against
30,000. It seemed highly likely that much of this cotton
had found its way to Germany. It was true also that im
mensely larger quantities than usual of lard and foodstuffs
had gone to certain neutral countries, and the presump
tion was that much of it was for transshipment. These
facts seemed to make little or no impression on Bryan.
I suggested that the President in his note assume that
the German reply accepted the principle for which we were
contending. I added that Germany had delayed saying
so pending the receipt of information from us as to the
[138]

arming of the Lusitania and as to its carrying munitions,
and suggested that he give them the facts and reiterate
the demand of his first note.
As we left the meeting, I said to two of my colleagues
that Bryan would “ fly the coop” if the President showed
firmness toward either Mexico or Germany, or even if
Bryan became convinced that the President meant what
he said in his first note. Bryan evidently had not taken
the first note very seriously. He imagined, apparently,
either that nothing further would happen, or that Ger
many would comply with our wishes as a matter of course,
or that we would back down. I had the feeling after the
meeting that, if necessary to avoid trouble, Bryan would
be willing to tell Germany that we did not mean anything
by the first note and that she should not take it seriously.
On Friday, the fourth, we met the President in his study,
the old Cabinet room, in the White House proper. The
President spent several minutes looking up something and
a confused and somewhat tiresome discussion followed.
It tried the President’s patience greatly and tired him
perceptibly. It did not help him. I spoke to him for a
few minutes along the same line as at the preceding meet
ing, and several of us suggested that the main thing for
him to do was to stand by his first note. The meeting
did not last long.
The following day, Saturday, the fifth, at 12:15, the
President called me over the telephone and asked me what
I thought the settled sentiment of the Cabinet was. He
said that he had been able to get no clear notion of the
view of the body at the last meeting. I told him that the
general judgment was that his note was admirable and
needed only slight modification. I suggested that it

would be useless to .demand flatly that Germany give up
the use of the submarine, but that it was imperative that
he demand that she use it in accordance with the law of
nations and the dictates of humanity, and that she must
not imperil or destroy our ships, or endanger the lives of
our citizens travelling on ships on which they had a right
to travel. I suggested that he lay the emphasis on our
own ships and on the safety of our own citizens on what
ever ships they were lawfully travelling, and that other
neutral nations might be trusted to do their own protest
ing about their ships and citizens. I told him, also, that
one member was in favour simply of making Germany say
“ yes” or “ no,” without referring at all to the issue of fact
which had been raised. He said that that would not do
at all; that it was too technical a view.
On Sunday, June 6th, at the President’s request, I went
to the White House with McAdoo to see him. When he
came in, he said immediately that Bryan was going to
resign. I told him that I was not surprised; that I had
thought at the Friday meeting that Bryan’s note to him
was an intimation that he was going to quit, and that I
had said to McAdoo and Lane as we were leaving the
meeting that Bryan was going to “ fly the coop.”
McAdoo had seen Bryan Saturday. Bryan was in the
throes of writing his resignation. McAdoo told him that
it would not be fair to the nation, to the President, or to
himself to resign in the circumstances. The President
expressed some apprehension that, if Bryan resigned
immediately, it might create the impression among our
people and in Germany that the Administration wanted
trouble and was bent on forcing an issue. I said that I
thought that most of our people would put another inter[140]

pretation on it, and that nobody could understand the
psychology of the Germans. It was agreed that there
was no use or wisdom in trying to change Bryan's mind.
The President was confident that Bryan would resign
and was on personal grounds genuinely sorry. He said
that he had a real affection and admiration for Bryan, but
that he was doing wrong to quit in the circumstances.
The President asked us to think of a man for Bryan’s
successor, saying that he had canvassed the field and
could not hit upon a satisfactory outside man. He said
that Colonel House would be a good man, but that his
health probably would not permit him to take the place,
and that his appointment would make Texas loom too
large. He remarked that Lansing would not do, that he
was not a big enough man, did not have enough imagina
tion, and would not sufficiently vigorously combat or
question his views, and that he was lacking in initiative.
I agreed with him and said that I thought that Lansing
was useful where he was but that he would be of no real
assistance to him in the position of Secretary of State.
Both McAdoo and the President had a talk with Bryan
on Monday but there was no change in his attitude.
The Cabinet met on Tuesday, June 8th, at the usual
hour. Bryan was absent. We began discussing the re
vised note to Germany. There was further discussion of
the suggestion that the note ought merely to hold Ger
many to the principle involved without a reference to the
issue of fact she had raised. This point was soon passed
over, and then the question was raised as to whether the
note was sufficiently firm.
A t this point, the President was interrupted by a mes
sage. A few minutes later, another messenger came in,

and the President said: “ Gentlemen, Mr. Bryan has re
signed as Secretary of State to take effect when the Ger
man note is sent. He is on the telephone and wants to
know whether it would be desirable or agreeable for him
to attend the Cabinet meeting. Would it be embarrass
ing? What do you think?”
There was a general expression to the effect that his
presence would not embarrass any of us, that it would be
entirely agreeable to us for him to attend, but that he
ought to feel free to follow his own inclination.
In a few minutes, Bryan came in. All the members
stood up; there was no evidence of embarrassment in any
direction; the President greeted Bryan very graciously
and then we resumed our seats and the discussion.
Bryan, looking exhausted and appearing to be under a
great emotional strain, leaned back in his chair with his
eyes closed.
I took up the discussion and said in substance:
“ I find myself in some difficulty because your first note
is not entirely clear to me. I first read it when I was in
California, and I endeavoured then to discover just what
it meant.
“ In one place it says that this government cannot ad
mit that the German policy and measures can operate
as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights of American
shipmasters or of American citizens bound on lawful er
rands as passengers on merchant ships of belligerent na
tionality and that it will hold the German Government to
a strict accountability. In the next paragraph, it says
that we assume that the German Government accepts the
rule that the lives of non-combatants, neutral or belliger
ent, cannot rightfully be put in jeopardy by the capture
[! 42]

or destruction of an unarmed merchantman, and that it
recognizes the obligation to take the precaution of visit
and search to ascertain whether a suspected ship is in fact
of belligerent nationality and is carrying contraband under
a neutral flag. Lower down, the note says that the objec
tion to the present method of attack is the practical im
possibility of using submarines against merchant vessels
without violating the rules of justice and humanity.
“ How far do you propose to go? Do you demand that
Germany give up the use of the submarine in her efforts
to destroy British trade? You speak of the practical im
possibility of her using it in accordance with the rules of
justice and humanity. I agree that it is unlikely that she
can do so; but that is a matter she will have to resolve.
We can insist that she observe such rules, but can we de
mand specifically that she give up the use of this new
device? I do think that we can demand that she strictly
comply with the rule of visit and search. We can demand
that she make no mistakes and that she safeguard the
lives of passengers and crew. This war will present many
new problems. England is violating the three-mile
blockade. She is blockading at a distance. The longrange gun and the submarine make the three-mile rule
obsolete. If I were England, I would do just as England
is doing, and, if I were Germany, I would use the subma
rine if I could justly and humanely do so to stop English
trade. I would not, if I were England, let any supplies
of any sort reach Germany, if I could prevent it. It is
silly for the Germans to cry that England is starving her
women and children. It is impossible in modern war to
separate, in the matter of food and other supplies, the
civilian from the soldier. War now is the war of whole

can come only from the adoption of constructive measures
of a broader scope, from the restoration of peace every
where in the world, the resumption of normal industrial
pursuits, the recovery particularly of Europe, and the dis
covery there ol additional credit foundations on the basis
of which her people may arrange to take from farmers and
other producers of this nation a greater part of their sur
plus production.
One docs not pay a compliment to the American farmer
who attempts to alarm him by dangers from foreign com
petition. The American farmers are the most effective
agricultural producers in the world. Their production if
several times as great for each worker as that of their
principal foreign rivals. This grows out of the intelligence
of the American farmer, the nature of his agricultural
practices and economy, and the fact that he has the as
sistance of scientific and practical agencies which in re
spect to variety of activity, of personnel, and of financial
support exceed those of any other two or three nations in
the world combined. There is little doubt that the farm
ers of this nation will not only continue mainly to supply
the home demand but will be increasingly called upon to
supply a large part of the needs of the rest of the world.
What the farmer now needs is not only a better system
of domestic marketing and credit, but especially larger
foreign markets for his surplus products. Clearly, meas
ures of this sort will not conduce to an expansion of the
foreign market. It is not a little singular that a measure
which strikes a blow at our foreign trade should follow so
closely upon the action of Congress directing the resump
tion of certain activities of the War Finance Corporation,
especially at the urgent insistence of representatives of the

farming interests, who believed that its resumption would
improve foreign marketing. Indeed, when one surveys
recent activities in the foreign field and measures enacted
affecting the foreign trade, one cannot fail to be impressed
with the fact that there is consistency only in their con
tradictions and inconsistencies. We have been vigorously
building up a great merchant marine and providing for
improvement of marketing in foreign countries by the
passage of an export-trade law and of measures for the
promotion of banking agencies in foreign countries. Now
it appears that w*e propose to render these measures abor
tive in whole or in part.
I imagine there is little doubt that, while this measure
is temporary, it is intended as a foundation for action of a
similar nature of a very general and permanent character.
It would seem to be designed to pave the way for such
action. If there ever was a time when America had any
thing to fear from foreign competition, that time has
passed. I cannot believe that American producers, who in
most respects are the most effective in the world, can have
any dread of competition when they view the fact that
their country has come through the great struggle of the
last few years, relatively speaking, untouched, while their
principal competitors arc in varying degrees sadly stricken
and labouring under adverse conditions from which they
will not recover for many years. Changes of a very radi
cal character have taken place. The United States has
become a great creditor nation. She has lent certain
governments of Europe more than $9,000,000,000, and as
a result of the enormous excess of our exports, there is an
additional commercial indebtedness of foreign nations to
our own of perhaps not less than $4,000,000,000. There

were finishing our lunch, Bryan said: “ Gentlemen, this
is our last meeting together. I have valued our associa
tion and friendship. I have had to take the course I have
chosen. The President has had one view. I have had a
different one. I do not censure him for thinking and act
ing as he thinks best. I have had to act as I have thought
best. I cannot go along with him in this note. I think
it makes for war. I believe that I can do more on the
outside to prevent war than I can on the inside. I think
I can help the President more on the outside. I can work
to control popular opinion so that it will not exert pressure
for extreme action which the President does not want.
We both want the same thing, Peace.”
Each of us said some pleasant things to Bryan along
conventional lines. Lane said: “ You are the most real
Christian I know.”
Burleson expressed agreement.
Bryan continued: “ I must act according to my conscience.
I go out into the dark. The President has the Prestige
and the Power on his side.” Then he broke down com
pletely and stopped. After a few seconds he added this:
“ I have many friends who would die for me.”
I did not like these last expressions. They did not run
on all fours with his earlier ones. They did not square
with his statement that he and the President wanted the
same thing. The President wanted peace, but an honour
able peace. Bryan apparently wanted peace at any price.
He was, in effect, telling Germany and the world that we
had not meant what we had said, and that we would not
stand up for our rights. He was quitting under fire.
O f course, he could not logically refuse to sign the proposed
note after signing the first one. If he was in doubt, he
ought to have resigned when the first note was agreed
[146]

upon. The only explanation is that he had not thought
that the first note was dangerous, while this one, in his
judgment, meant trouble— that is, that Germany would
not accept our view and, in effect, back down. Therefore,
we must back down.
Bryan is mistaken if he thinks that he can promote his
programme on the outside and not be drawn into opposi
tion to the President. This will be impossible. He is
already in opposition. The only thing which can ease his
situation will be a conciliatory and satisfactory answer
from Germany, and this I am inclined to expect, because
Germany has some sense and she must know that her
game will be over if she forces us into the war. Nothing
which her submarines can do to the Allies will be at all
comparable to what we will do to her.
I expect to see Bryan take a stand against any increase
of armament, favour keeping our citizens off the seas, and
urge prohibition and woman suffrage. I shall not be
surprised if he urges these in the next campaign and in
sists that they be incorporated in the next Democratic
platform and that a candidate be selected who will be
generally known to have vigorously advocated them.
At nine o’clock, extras announcing Bryan’s resignation
and giving his letter and the President’s reply were cried
through the streets. There were great interest and excite
ment on all sides, the greatest, perhaps, since our arrival
in Washington.
The same evening, the President rang me up at my
home. He said he wished to read me certain passages of
the revised note to see whether his changes met the views
I expressed in Cabinet meeting. He read the passages,
and I told him that they fully embodied my suggestions,

of which the principal ones were: (i) that he make it
clear that we assumed that Germany did not raise a ques
tion of principle, (2) that he inform Germany that she
was mistaken as to the Lusitania's being in effect a British
naval auxiliary; (3) that he point out that a number of
her contentions were irrelevant; (4) that he again empha
size the point that we were contending for something
higher than rights of property or of commerce, namely,
the rights of humanity; (5) that he renew the representa
tions and warnings of the first note; (6) but that, in this
note, he limit his statements to the rights of American
shipmasters and American citizens and demand assur
ances that they will be respected.
This note was dated June 9th, and on this day Bryan’s
statement appeared. It was disturbing in its conception
and implications.
When the President’s note was published, it made
Bryan’s statement look silly. But Bryan talked inces
santly. The press, except the German part of it, was a
unit against him. It supported the President and the
cause of civilization and decency.

DIPLOMATIC NOTES AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Lansing Appointed Secretary of State— Diplomacy with Ger
many—-Garrison's Plan for Defence— The President's Change of
Mind— The Hay B ill

HE President left the city Thursday, the twentyfourth, and there was a notice in the late after
noon papers saying that Lansing had been selected.
Lansing will be the President’s Private Secretary
for Foreign Affairs. He will not be of much more assist
ance than he would have been as an expert in the De
partment. With the growing burdens, I do not see how
the President can stand the strain. He will have to do all
the thinking and planning. What a pity he could not
get a man like Ex-Secretary Olney.
The period from June, 1915, to the middle of December
was one of great and growing activity and strain; but, in
the field of foreign relations, there was no departure in
policy which caused or demanded much discussion or
consideration at the hands of the Cabinet, or which I felt
it particularly necessary to note. The happenings of
most moment were the development of the submarine con
troversy with Germany, the growing recognition of the
need of preparedness, the change of the President’s atti
tude as conditions became more critical, his struggle with
the pacifists in and out of Congress, the development of
the preparedness programme for the army and navy,

including the creation of the Council of National Defence,
the Garrison resignation incident over a difference as to
an important item, the strengthening of the financial
structure, and the election of 1916. Each of these I shall
touch upon in order.
Germany replied to this government’s second Lusitania
note under date of July 8th. She professed her sympathy
with our views as to the need of recognizing and enforcing
the principles of humanity. Her whole history, she con
tended, demonstrated that she stood and had always stood
for the freedom of the seas and peaceable trade. If the
principles had been traversed, she was not guilty. Eng
land had blockaded neutral coasts and intercepted neutral
trade with Germany, and had driven her to submarine
warfare. England was bent on starving Germany’s civil
ian population. She had been compelled to retaliate in
self-defence.
The Lusitania incident showed "with horrible clearness
to what jeopardizing of human lives the manner of con
ducting war employed by our adversaries leads.”- Britain
had obliterated distinctions between merchantmen and
war vessels by arming the former. If the German sub
marine commander had caused the crew and travellers
of the Lusitania to put off in boats before firing the tor
pedo, his own vessel would have been destroyed. “ After
the experience in the sinking of much smaller and less sea
worthy vessels it was to be expected that a mighty ship
like the Lusitania would remain above water long enough,
even after the torpedoing, to permit the passengers to
enter the ship’s boats” !! The explosion of munitions
defeated this.
But the German Government would do all it could to

prevent the jeopardizing of the lives of American citizens.
“ The Imperial Government therefore repeats the assur
ances that American ships will not be hindered in the
prosecution of legitimate shipping, and the lives of Amer
ican citizens on neutral vessels shall not be placed in
jeopardy.”- German submarines would be instructed to
permit safe passage to American ships if they were marked
with special markings and notice was given in advance.
American citizens did not have to travel to Europe on
enemy merchantmen. The United States could acquire
a sufficient number of neutral ships if her own were in
adequate. We might place under our flag four enemy
passenger vessels.
This note was unsatisfactory. It was offensive. It
paid no attention to our statement that the Lusitania was
not armed. It denied our right to travel on merchant
vessels of belligerent nationality and the need of assuring
the safety of passengers and crews. And it directed us
to mark our own ships as Germany dictated.
This reply was, of course, not accepted, and it was
necessary only to point out that it did not square with our
principles already stated and our former demands.
On July 21st, our third note was sent. It reminded
Germany that we could discuss Great Britain’s policy
with reference to trade only with her. If Germany could
not retaliate without injuring not only the property but
also the lives of neutrals she should discontinue her course.
Events had indicated that submarine operations such as
Germany had carried on in the war zone could be in sub
stantial accord with regulated warfare. It was hoped
that Germany would no longer refrain from disavowing
the wanton act of its naval commander in sinking the

Lusitania and from offering reparation for the loss of
American lives. This government could not accept the
suggestion that our vessels be designated as this would
be an acknowledgment of a curtailment and an abandon
ment of our principles. Friendship prompted us to say
that repetition by German submarines of acts in contra
vention of our rights would “ be regarded by the Govern
ment of the United States, when they affect American
citizens, as deliberately unfriendly.”
This note was followed by assurance from Germany
that she would so modify her submarine operations as to
remove our grounds of objection; but on August 19th, the
Arabic, a White Star liner, was sunk with the loss of Amer
ican lives. Before details were received, Bernstorff, on
August 24th, informed the Secretary of State that he had
been instructed to ask that this government take no stand
till after reports were heard from both sides, to say that,
in case any “ Americans should actually have lost their
lives, this would be contrary to the intention of the
German Government, who would deeply regret this fact,
and to extend its sincerest sympathies to the government
of the United States.”
On September 1, 1915, Bernstorff, referring to a con
versation with the Secretary of State, informed him in
writing that his instructions concerning his government's
answer to the last Lusitania note contained this passage:
“ Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warn
ing and without safety of the lives of non-combatants,
provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer re
sistance.” He added that this policy was decided upon
before the Arabic was sunk.
About a month later, on October 5th, the German Am

bassador reported to the State Department that such
stringent orders had been given to submarine commanders
that no recurrence of incidents similar to that of the
Arabic was considered possible; that in that case the com
mander thought the Arabic intended to ram him; that he
undertook to attack against his instructions; that his
government disavowed his act; and that it would pay an
indemnity for American lives. This was noticed with
satisfaction by Mr. Lansing, who said that he was ready
to negotiate for the amount of the indemnity.
Then followed the sinking of the Ancona in the Medi
terranean by an Austrian submarine on November 7 th;
our protest to Austria, and her unsatisfactory reply.
Finally, Austria announced that the commander of the
submarine had been punished.
The next incident to demand even more serious atten
tion, in view of the pledge of the German Government,
was the sinking of the Channel steamer, the Sussex, on
March 24, 1916. This followed the receipt of several
more notes from Germany explaining her submarine oper
ations and policy. Mr. Gerard was instructed by the
State Department on March 27th to ask Germany
whether the Sussex was sunk by a German submarine or
by one belonging to her Allies. Later, he was instructed
to make a similar inquiry as to the Dominion horse ship,
the Englishman, the Manchester Engineer, the Eagle
Point, and the Berwindale, having Americans on board
and having been torpedoed without warning between
March 16th and March 28th.
The answer came dated April 10, 1916. It was not
convincing as to any of the cases. In respect to the
SusstXy the most important, it was singularly unsatisfac

tory. It was even trivial. The German commander, it
was stated, had made a sketch of the vessel sunk near
where it was claimed that the Sussex went down. This
had been compared with a picture of the Sussex in the
Graphic and the two were found not to be identical!
The German Government was forced to assume that the
damage to the Sussex was to be attributed to another
cause. If the United States had facts which seemed to
conflict, it should communicate them to her and, if then
there was still a difference of opinion, it could be sub
mitted to a mixed committee of investigation.
The United States had the facts. It gave them in its
reply of April 18th. The Sussex had never been armed.
It was known to be habitually used only to carry passen
gers. It did not follow the route taken by troop or supply
ships. A careful investigation by United States naval
and military officers conclusively established the fact that
the Sussex was torpedoed without warning or summons to
surrender, and that the torpedo was of German manufac
ture.
The German Government, the note stated, apparently
failed to appreciate the gravity of the situation which had
resulted, not alone from the attack on the Sussex, but
from the whole method and character of submarine war
fare as disclosed from the unrestrained practice of her
submarine commanders for twelve months and in the in
discriminate destruction of merchant vessels of all sorts,
nationalities, and destinations.
The German Government had again and again given
its solemn assurances that passenger ships would not be
dealt with in such fashion; but no limit of any kind had
been set. The roll of Americans who had lost their lives

had grown month by month. The government of the
United States had been very patient. It had accepted
the assurances of Germany in good faith. It had made
every allowance for unprecedented conditions and had
been willing to wait till the facts were susceptible of only
one interpretation.
“ It now owes it to a just regard for its own rights to say
to the Imperial Government that that time has come. It
has become painfully evident to it that the position which
it took at the very outset is inevitable, namely, the use of
submarines for the destruction of an enemy’s commerce
is, of necessity, because of the very character of the vessels
employed and the very methods of attack which their
employment of course involves, utterly incompatible with
the principles of humanity, the long established and in
controvertible rights of neutrals, and the sacred immuni
ties of non-combatants.”
If it was still the purpose of Germany to prosecute re
lentless and indiscriminate warfare against merchant
vessels by the use of submarines, this government would
be forced to conclude that there was only one course it
could pursue. “ Unless the Imperial Government should
not immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its
present methods of submarine warfare against passenger
and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the
United States can have no other choice but to sever diplo
matic relations with the German Empire altogether.”
The following day, April 19th, the President appeared
before Congress to inform it fully and frankly concerning
the situation and its seriousness. He had taken this
course before, when the Mexican situation became acute.
He was anxious to omit nothing which might make Con

gress feel that he was more than willing to let it know
formally everything he knew and which might win its
support and that of the people for any necessary course of
action. He outlined the history of the controversy and
closed with a statement of the decision he had reached and
had communicated to Germany.
The note, the President’s appearance before Congress,
and the cordial support evidenced by it and the press of
the country produced results. On May 4th, the German
Foreign Office handed to Mr. Gerard a long note. It
denied that there was any incident which demonstrated
that German submarines were waging indiscriminate war
fare, insisted that their commanders had orders to con
duct operations in accordance with the general principles
of visit and search, but pointed out that no assurances had
been given with reference to enemy trade carried on in
enemy ships in the war zone, and that it could not dis
pense with the use of submarines against enemy trade.
Great Britain had forced her to resort to her present prac
tices. The government of the United States should ex
tend her principles of humanity to the millions of German
women and children whom the British by their course
were starving. But Germany, in the interest of peace
and friendship, would make further concessions. It had
therefore given orders to its commanders as follows:
“ In accordance with the general principles of visit and
search and destruction of merchant vessels recognized by
international law, such vessels, both within and without
the area declared as naval war zone, shall not be sunk
without warning and without saving human lives unless
these ships attempt to escape or offer resistance.”
However, neutrals could not except Germany, fighting
[156]

for her life, to restrict the use of her effective weapon if
her enemy is permitted to apply at will methods of warfare
violating the rules of international law. Accordingly, the
German Government was confident that the United States
would now demand that the British Government forth
with observe the rules of international law as laid down
in her note to Great Britain on December a8, 1914. If
this object should not be attained, “ the German Govern
ment would then be facing a new situation in which it
must reserve to itself complete liberty of decision."
And thus again Germany made a promise in one breath
and took it back in the next, promised as usual nothing
absolute, but promised everything, if an impossible condi
tion were satisfied. Great Britain was starving Germans,
if anybody. She was neither starving nor killing Amer
icans, while Germany was killing Americans. It was up
to Germany to deal with Britain for starving Germans,
that was something she ought to have foreseen as a possi
bility when she defied Britain in 1914 and violated her
pledge to Belgium. It was up to us to deal with Germany
for killing Americans. The note did not unqualifiedly
promise anything.
The President replied along these lines on May 8th.
He notified Germany that we would rely upon a scrupu
lous execution of her altered policy and that it could not
be made contingent upon the course of our diplomatic
negotiations with Great Britain. The respect for the
rights of Americans by Germany could not in any way be
made contingent upon the conduct of any other govern
ment. “ Responsibility in such matters is single, not
joint; absolute, not relative.”
And thus this controversy for the time being rested.

As the war progressed in Europe, and as the situation
became more acute, particularly in respect to our rela
tions with Germany, the thought of leaders throughout
the nation was directed more and more to our inadequate
military and naval preparedness.
When the war began, our regular army consisted of
4,701 officers and 87,781 men, including about 8,000 offi
cers and men in the Hospital and Quartermaster’s Corps.
Our mobile army was on a peace footing and had 2,935
officers and 51,444 men; our coast artillery had 758
officers and 17,901 men; and our mobile army in the
United States had 1,498 officers and 29,405 men. Our
regular reserve consisted of 26 men. Our only other
organized force consisted of 8,323 officers and 119,087
men in the militia who were required to attend twentyfour drills a year and to spend five days in the field.
The War Department, in 1914, recommended that the
existing organization be filled up by adding 1,000 officers
and 25,000 men, that the army be used as a school, turning
out men after twelve months who would constitute a re
serve, and that a reserve for the militia be constituted.
In December, the President, in his Annual Address, as
has been pointed out, took a stand against a large regular
army and advised reliance upon “ a citizenry trained and
accustomed to arms,” who would volunteer, upon a
strengthened National Guard, and upon a strong navy.
We should not alter our attitude “ because some amongst
us are nervous and excited. We shall wisely and sensibly
agree upon a policy of defence. . . . We shall learn
and profit by the lesson of every experience and every new
circumstance; and what is needed will be adequately
done.’1

Provision was made by Congress along the line of the
War Department’s suggestions of 1914 and the additions
were made to the army. In 1915, the total force consisted
of 5,023 officers and 102,985 men. Of this number 67,000
belonged to the mobile army and 20,000 to the coast ar
tillery, and 29,000 of these were on duty outside the
United States.
The War Department came forward with a carefully
considered plan for additional preparedness which was
strongly presented to the public for the first time by the
President on November 4, 1915, before the Manhattan
Club of New York City and in more detail by the Secre
tary of War in his Annual Report. The President, in his
Annual Address to Congress, December 7, 1917, formally
approved and recommended the programme advocated
by Secretary Garrison. In his address before the Man
hattan Club, he adverted to the European conflict, to
the facts that many of the greatest nations of the world
were involved, that the influences of the war were every
where in the air, and that our people everywhere were
asking how far we were prepared to maintain ourselves
against interference. "Our mission,” he said, “ is a
mission of peace, and we have it in mind to be prepared for
defence, to protect our security.” In his message to
Congress, he said that we would not maintain a standing
army except for uses which are as necessary in times of
peace as in times of war, and that it was no larger than was
actually needed in peace times; but we should have citizens
know how modern fighting is done, and therefore they
must be adequately trained and equipped. Our confi
dence had been that our safety would lie in the rising of the
nation to take care of itself, “ but war has never been a

mere matter of men and guns. It is a thing of disciplined
might.”
The programme contemplated an increase in the regular
army from 5,023 officers and 102,985 men to 7,136
officers and 134,700 men, a total of 141,836; the creation
of a continental army of 400,000 men, raised in three equal
increments, who would serve for three years with the
colours and then three years with the reserve; and a
strengthening of the National Guard. The raising of the
continental army would depend upon the patriotic feeling
of the young men and upon their willingness to volunteer.
In addition, a comprehensive plan for enlarging the navy
was suggested. Proposals were also incorporated looking
to the training of more officers through increased provision
for West Point and through cadet companies recruited
from the National Guard to be attached to regular regi
ments and trained with them, or through plans to
strengthen the military training in educational institu
tions throughout the Union. The National Guard was
to be developed, but it was not to be regarded as a first
line of defence. It could not satisfactorily be trained and
officered in time of peace by the Federal Government and
could be used in war only as provided in the Constitu
tion.
Secretary Garrison, following the guidance of the regu
lar army staff, was very pronounced in his views on this
point, and was equally strong in his opposition to the sug
gestion that the Swiss system be introduced into this coun
try. It was objectionable because it would require com
pulsory service, because it started with the public schools
and was dependent upon them, because it required a great
number of local officials controlled by a central authority
[160]

which we did not and should not have, and because the
Federal Government had no power over schools. The sys
tem would not be suited to his country.
The programme, when in complete operation at the end
of three years, would give us a force of 670,836 officers
and men, composed of a regular army of 141,832, a con
tinental force of 400,000, and a National Guard of 129,000,
to cost annually $182,234,500. It was proposed to spend
in four years $104,326,000 for material.
The acceptance of this programme by the President
involved a very marked change of mind on his part.
This he frankly avowed in the course of a trip through the
country beginning January 27th which he felt it necessary
to make to arouse the country and to get it to back up his
proposals in a reluctant Congress. At this time, Congress
had been in session nearly two months. The prepared
ness measures were having hard sledding. There was
much opposition to them in that body, and the people
seemed to be apathetic. There were those even who pre
ferred to surrender to Germany by warning American
citizens off the sea except in ships following routes pre
scribed by Germany.
In his first speech to the Manhattan Club of New York
City, January 27, 1916, the President referred to his
change of mind in this way: “ Perhaps when you learned,
as I dare say you did learn beforehand, that I was expect
ing to address you on the subject of preparedness, you
recalled the address which I made to Congress something
more than a year ago, in which I said that this question of
military preparedness was not a pressing question. But
more than a year has gone by since then, and I would be
ashamed if I had not learned something in fourteen months.
[161]

The minute I stop changing my mind with the change of all
the circumstances of the world, I will be a back number.”
He advocated the programme as the War Department had
drawn it and particularly pointed out that, while he be
lieved in making the National Guard stronger, he rec
ognized that it could not be a direct resource as a
national reserve under national authority. What we
ought to insist on, he added, is a body of at least a half a
million trained men who will be immediately available.
But, he interjected: “ I am not a partisan of any one plan.
I have had too much experience to think that it is right
to say that the plan I propose is the only plan that will
work, because I have a shrewd suspicion that there may be
other plans that will work.”There was another plan which was being very aggres
sively pushed, while a large faction was demanding in
sistently that there be no plan at all. The State Guard
advocates did not want the Continental force. Many
regarded this force with no compulsion back of it as even
less satisfactory than the federalized National Guard
would be.
It became clear that the whole programme of the Presi
dent would not go through, but that one could be passed
providing a larger regular army, 186,000 in place of
142,000, to be increased in time of war, a federalized Na
tional Guard of 425,000, the members of which were to
take an oath both to the United States and to the state,
a reserve corps of men discharged from the army and the
National Guard, and an officers reserve corps and an offi
cers’ training corps at colleges and universities. The
National Guard was to be uniformed, equipped, and
disciplined like the regulars, and its training period
[162]

to be increased. Of particular importance was the pro
vision that when Congress authorized the use of the
land forces, the President could draft all the members
of the National Guard and its reserve to serve through
the war.

GARRISON RESIGNS

Correspondence Between Garrison and the President— Mo
bilization on the Border— Creation of Council of National De
fence— War-time Revenues

HEN the President finally assented to the
Hay bill as a means of getting action, Secretary
Garrison resigned doubtless still being in gen
eral out of sympathy with the Administration
and conceiving that the President and he differed sharply
at this time on fundamental principles of national defence.
In view of the great advance in preparedness made in
this compromise measure, I could not understand why
he could not see his way clear to remain in his position.
Which plan, as an abstract proposition, was preferable,
I shall have to leave to military experts, but that the
President was wise in acting as he did I do not doubt.
It is debatable, certainly, whether, all things considered,
the plan adopted was not a better one than that proposed.
It provided for a larger regular army and made available
by draft a very large already organized force. At any
rate, the Secretary’s quarrel was more with the people and
with Congress than with the President. The President
evidently preferred the plan of the army staff. Otherwise,
he would not have advocated before Congress and the
people, but he was not so stubborn and cocksure as to be
willing to say that he would take that or nothing. If
[164]

he had done so, he might have failed to secure any satis
factory legislation and have more widely split his party.
The correspondence which passed between Garrison and
the President makes their positions very clear. One can
not fail to admire the President’s patience and courtesy.
These were the letters exchanged:
War Department, Washington.
January 12, 1916.
M y d e a r M r. P r e s id e n t:

In my judgment, we are facing a critical juncture with
respect to the military part of the national defence pro
gramme.
I am convinced that unless the situation is dealt with
promptly and effectively we can indulge in no reasonable
expectation of any acceptable result.
So far as the military part of national defence is con
cerned, there can be no honest or worthy solution which
does not result in national forces under the exclusive con
trol and authority of the national government. Any other
solution is illusory and not real, is apparent and not sub
stantial.
There is a perfectly legitimate field of discussion and
debate as to the means of obtaining these national forces.
The proportion thereof that should be the regular standing
army; that should be reserves of the regular standing army,
or should be drawn from the body of citizens for shorter
periods of national service than those in the regular stand
ing army, are all legitimate and proper matters for con
sideration, analysis, and discussion.
But there is absolutely no dissent from the military
standpoint from the conclusion that the only measure
[165]

of national defence that possesses any virtue is one which
produces national forces. From the beginning of the
government to this time, excepting during periods of
actual war, the acknowledged weakness and defect of the
situation arose out of the lack of any system producing
these Federal forces. The situation was rendered worse
by the presence of state troops, raised, officered, trained,
and governed by the states, that were assumed to be a
military reliance for the nation, when, in fact, they are
not, and can never be made to be. Under the Constitu
tion of the United States, these state troops must always
be governed, officered, and trained by the respective
states.
The very first line of cleavage, therefore, which must be
encountered and dealt with by the student of the situation
is between reliance upon a system of state troops, for ever
subject to constitutional limitations which render them ab
solutely insecure as a reliance for the nation, or reliance
upon national forces raised, officered, trained, and con
trolled by the national authorities. Upon this subject
there does not exist, and there cannot legitimately exist,
any difference of opinion among those who are unbiassed
and who believe in real national security and defence.
The policy recommended to you and adopted by you
squarely placed the nation upon the sure foundation of
national forces. If that policy is made effective by legis
lation, there will be secured to this country for the first
time a real, stable foundation for the military part of its
national defence. If, however, instead thereof a policy is
adopted based upon the state troops as the main reliance
of this country for its military arm, not only has no ad
vance been made from the deplorable and inexcusable situ[i ]

ation in which we have so long been, but an effective
block has been placed across the pathway toward a proper
settlement.
The adoption of such a policy would serve to delude the
people into believing that the subject had been settled,
and therefore required no further consideration upon their
part. It would, therefore, in my judgment, be infinitely
worse than an entire failure of all legislative enactment
upon the subject. The latter would at least leave it open
for future settlement.
I of course am not advised as to the statements of in
tention made by Mr. Hay to you in the conversation held
with you prior to your message to Congress at the opening
of the present session. I have always felt, and have so
expressed myself to you, that the situation in the Congress
was such that unless you personally exerted the power of
your leadership you would not obtain any worthy results
in this matter.
Mr. Hay has not made the declaration of his intention.
He announces that he does not intend to press for the en
actment of the military policy advocated in your message.
With respect to the regular army he does not purpose giv
ing us the organizations asked for and imperatively neces
sary if the Federal volunteers (so-called continental army)
are to be properly trained; he purposes adding a few
thousand men to the enlisted strength of the army in its
present organization, the adding of a few regiments of
field artillery to the existing organizations of the regular
army, the entire abandonment of the idea of a Faderal
force of national volunteers, and the passing of a bill
granting direct Federal pay to the enlisted men and officers
of the state troops.

In my judgment, the effect of the enactment of Mr.
Hay’s programme would be to set back the whole cause of
legitimate, honest national defence in an entirely unjusti
fiable and inexcusable way. It would be, in my judgment,
a betrayal of the trust of the people in this regard. It
would be illusory and apparent, without any reality or sub
stance.
There is, unfortunately, very little knowledge and very
little intense personal interest in any of the members of the
House concerning military affairs. Apart from the power
that always resides in every chairman of committee, Mr.
Hay has the additional power of dealing with a subject
concerning which the rest of the House has no knowledge,
and about which it has never concerned itself. In this
particular instance, his proposal of settling this matter by
voting money to the interested men and officers of the state
troops appeals to the direct personal political interests of
the members.
In these circumstances it seems to me to be perfectly
clear that, unless you interpose your position as leader of
the country on this great subject, the result will be the lam
entable one which I have just described.
It seems to be equally imperative that this interposition
should be immediate. If this proposed programme by
Mr. Hay is accepted by the Committee and by public
opinion and by the House as a solution of this vital matter
any position subsequently taken will be negligible, so far
as substantial, actual results are concerned.
The issue must be plainly and clearly drawn. It has
nothing whatever to do with the number of men to be
raised or with the means of raising them, as Mr. Hay
would have it appear that it has. It is between two ab[168J

solutely different systems, one of which is based upon the
nation undertaking upon its own responsibility the raising
and management of the national troops, and the other of
which leaves us in the position that we have always been
in since the institution of the government, to rely upon the
states doing this thing for the nation, a situation in which
the nation is relying upon a military force that it does not
raise, that it does not officer, that it does not train, and
that it does not control.
A mere statement of the situation shows that the two
different proposals are as wide apart as any two proposals
upon any subject possibly can be.
Mr. Hay’s proposal to include a draft or compulsory
provision so that at the outbreak of war the nation could
bring under its control these state troops utterly fails to
meet the essential objections to the perpetuation of the
militia system. The difficulty to be dealt with does not
arise out of the government not being able to take over
these troops in the event of war, but arises out of its in
ability under the Constitution to have the essential unity
of responsibility, authority, and control in the raising, of
ficering, training, and governing of its military forces.
If the public obtains the impression that Mr. Hay’s
solution is merely another means of accomplishing the
same end as your proposed policy, they will accept the
same and rest content that their desires have been properly
met. If, on the other hand, they are clearly and unmis
takably advised that to adopt the policy submitted by
Mr. Hay is to make a mockery of all that was worthy and
virtuous in the proposal of a proper military policy, and
that it is a delusion to consider such a solution as a real
reliance or security, then there is hope that we can obtain
[169]

results commensurate with the necessities of the case, and
with a self-respecting consideration and treatment thereof.
I cannot, therefore, too strongly urge upon you my view
of the imperative necessity of your seeking an occasion at
the earliest possible moment to declare yourself with re
spect to the matter and in doing so to make it clear beyond
peradventure that nothing excepting national forces,
raised by the nation and subject to its exclusive authority,
responsibility, and control, is any real settlement of this
issue.
Sincerely yours,
L i n d l e y M. G a r r i s o n .
War Department
Washington, January 14, 1916.
M y d e a r M r. P r e s i d e n t :
What you said to-day by way of response to my letter
of the 12th requires me to make my position perfectly clear
to you.
You stated that Mr. Hay told you that your proposal of
Federal volunteers could not be procured and that the
same end for which you were striving could be procured by
other means— by utilizing the procured by other means—
by utilizing the state troops as the basis of the policy,
and making appropriations of pay to the states conditioned
on Federal control of state troops.
You stated to him that you were not interested in any
particular programme or means of accomplishing the pur
pose of securing the men and would accept his proposal
if it accomplished that purpose.
Since the policy that was recommended to you and
adopted by you discarded as absolutely impossible a mili[170]

tary system based upon state troops and asserted that the
only possible basis for a military policy was national forces,
it is entirely clear that the proposals are diametrically
opposed to each other and are irreconcilable.
Those who are conscientiously convinced that nothing
but national forces can properly be the basis of a policy of
national defence cannot possibly accept a policy based
upon state forces. It not only does not in itself offer an
acceptable solution, but acts to prevent any proper solu
tion.
If those who are thus convinced are faced with the
necessity of declaring their position on the matter, they
can only show their sincerity and good faith by declining
to admit the possibility of compromise with respect to this
essential fundamental principle.
I am thus convinced; I feel that we are challenged
by the existing situation to declare ourselves promptly,
openly, and unequivocally, or be charged properly with
lack of sincerity and good faith.
We cannot hope to see our programme, based on this
essential principle, succeed if we admit the possibility of
compromise with respect to it.
Yours is the ultimate responsibility; yours is the final
determination as to the manner in which the situation
shall be faced and treated. I fully realize this, and I do
not desire to cause you the slightest embarrassment on my
account; if, therefore, my withdrawal from the situation
would relieve you, you should not hesitate for a moment
on that account.
Sincerely yours,
L i n d l e y M. G a r r is o n .
The President

The President’s reply was:
The White House,
Washington, January 17, 1916.
M y dear M

r. S e c r e ta r y :

I am very much obliged to you for your letters of
January 12th and January 14th. They make your views
with regard to adequate measures of preparation for na
tional defence sharply clear. I am sure that I already
understood just what your views were, but I am glad to
have them restated in this succinct and striking way.
You believe, as I do, that the chief thing necessary is that
we should have a trained citizen reserve and that the train
ing, organization, and control of that reserve should be
under immediate Federal direction.
But apparently I have not succeeded in making my own
position equally clear to you, though I feel sure that I have
made it perfectly clear to Mr. Hay. It is that I am not
irrevocably or dogmatically committed to any one plan of
providing the nation with such a reserve, and am cordially
willing to discuss alternative proposals.
Any other position on my part would indicate an
attitude toward the Committee on Military Affairs of the
House of Representatives which I should in no circum
stances feel at liberty to assume. It would never be
proper or possible for me to say to any committee of the
House of Representatives that, so far as my participation
in legislation was concerned, they would have to take my
plan or none.
I do not share your opinion that the members of the
House who are charged with the duty of dealing with
military affairs are ignorant of them, or of the military
[172]

necessities of the nation. On the contrary, I have found
them well informed, and actuated by a most intelligent
appreciation of the grave responsibilities imposed upon
them.
I am sure that Mr. Hay and his colleagues are ready to
act with a full sense of all that is involved in this great
matter, both for the country and for the national parties
which they represent.
My own duty toward them is perfectly plain. I must
welcome a frank interchange of views and a patient and
thorough comparison of all the methods proposed for ob
taining the objects we all have in view. So far as my own
participation in final legislative action is concerned, no
one will expect me to acquiesce in any proposal that I re
gard as inadequate or illusory.
If, as the outcome of a free interchange of views, my
own judgment and that of the Committee should prove to
be irreconcilably different, and a bill should be presented
to me which I could not accept as accomplishing the es
sential things sought, it would manifestly be my duty to
veto it and go to the country on the merits. But there
is no reason to anticipate or fear such a result, unless we
should ourselves take at the outset the position that only
the plans of the Department are to be considered; and that
position, it seems to me, would be wholly unjustifiable.
The Committee and the Congress will expect me to be
as frank with them as I hope they will be with me, and will,
of course, hold me justified in fighting for my own matured
opinion.
I have had a delightfully frank conference with Mr.
Hay. I have said to him that I was perfectly willing to
consider any plan that would give us a national reserve

under unmistakable national control and would support
any such scheme if convinced of its adequacy and wise
policy. More he has not asked or desired.
Cordially and sincerely yours,
W o o d r o w W il s o n .

Hon. Lindley M. Garrison,
Secretary of War.
Garrison on Wednesday wrote the President as follows:
War Department, Washington,
February 9, 1916.
M y d e a r M r. P r e s i d e n t :
Two matters within the jurisdiction of this department
are now of immediate and pressing importance, and I am
constrained to declare my position definitely and unmis
takably thereon. I refer, of course to the Philippine ques
tion and the matter of national defence.
You know my convictions with respect to each of them.
I consider the principle embodied in the Clarke amend
ment an abandonment of the duty of this nation and a
breach of trust toward the Filipinos; so believing, I can
not accept it or acquiesce in its acceptance.
I consider the reliance upon the militia for national de
fence an unjustifiable imperilling of the nation’s safety.
It would not only be a sham in itself, but its enactment
into law would prevent, if not destroy, the opportunity
to procure measures of real, genuine national defence. I
could not accept it or acquiesce in its acceptance.
I am obliged to make my position known immediately
upon each of these questions— in a speech on Thursday af

1*74]

ternoon upon the national defence question and in a com
munication to the House committee having charge of the
Philippine question. If, with respect to either matter,
we are not in agreement upon these fundamental princi
ples, then I could not, with propriety, remain your seeming
representative in respect thereto. Our convictions would
be manifestly not only divergent, but utterly irreconcil
able.
You will appreciate the necessity of timely knowledge
upon my part of the determination reached by you with
respect to each of these matters, so that I may act ad
visedly in the premises.
Sincerely yours,
L i n d l e y M. G a r r is o n .
The President.
To this letter the President replied as follows:
The White House,
Washington, February 10, 1916.
M y d e a r M r. S e c r e t a r y :
In reply to your letter of to-day, let me say:
(1)
That it is my own judgment that the action em
bodied in the Clarke amendment to the bill extending fur
ther self-government to the Philippines is unwise at this
time, but it would clearly be most inadvisable for me to
take the position that I must dissent from that action
should both houses of Congress concur in a bill embodying
that amendment. That is a matter upon which I must, of
course, withhold judgment until the joint action of the two
houses reaches me in definite form.
What the final action of the houses will be, no one can

[175]

at this time certainly forecast. I am now, of course, en
gaged in conference with Mr. Jones and others with regard
to the probable action of the House of Representatives
in this matter, and do not yet know what it is likely to be.
The one obvious thing, it seems to me, is the necessity for
calm and deliberate action on our part at this time, when
matters of such gravity are to be determined, and not
only calm and deliberate action, but action which takes
into very serious consideration views differing from our
own.
(2) As I have had occasion to say to you, I am not yet
convinced that the measure of preparation for national de
fence which we deem necessary can be obtained through
the instrumentality of the National Guard under Federal
control and training, but I feel in duty bound to keep my
mind open to conviction on that side, and think that it
would be most unwise and most unfair to the Committee
of the House which has such a plan in mind to say that
it cannot be done. The bill in which it will be embodied
has not yet been drawn, as I learned to-day from Mr. Hay.
I should deem it a very serious mistake to shut the door
against this attempt on the part of the Committee in per
fect good faith to meet the essentials of the programme set
forth in my message, but in a way of their own choosing.
As you know, I do not at all agree with you in favouring
compulsory enlistment for training, and I fear the advo
cacy of compulsion before the Committee of the House on
the part of the representatives of the Department of War
has greatly prejudiced the House against the proposal for
a continental army, little necessary connection as there is
between the plan and the opinion of the Chief of Staff in
favour of compulsory enlistment.
[176]

I owe you this frank repetition of my views and policy
in this matter, which we have discussed on previous oc
casions in the letters which we have exchanged and in
conversation. I am very much obliged to you for your
own frank avowal of your convictions. I trust that you
will feel no hesitation about expressing your personal
views on both these subjects on the two occasions to which
you refer, but I hope that you will be kind enough to draw
very carefully the distinction between your own indi
vidual views and the views of the Administration.
You will, of course, understand that I am devoting my
energy and attention unsparingly in conference with
members of the various committees of Congress to an
effort to procure an agreement upon a workable and prac
ticable programme. This is a time when it seems to me
patience on the part of all of us is of the essence in bring
ing about a consummation of the purpose we all have in
mind.
Very sincerely yours,
W o o d r o w W ils o n .

Hon. Lindley M. Garrison,
Secretary of War.
Upon receiving this letter, Mr. Garrison replied, tender
ing his resignation:
War Department,
Washington, February 10,1916.
M r. P r e s i d e n t :
I am just in receipt of yours of February 10th in reply
to mine of February 9th. It is evident that we hopelessly
disagree upon what I conceive to be fundamental princiM y dear

ti77l

pies. This makes manifest the impropriety of my longer
remaining your seeming representative with respect to
those matters.
I hereby tender my resignation as Secretary of War, to
take effect at your convenience.
Sincerely yours,
L i n d l e y M. G a r r i s o n .
The President.
The President’s letter accepting the resignation follows:
The White House,
Washington, February 10, 1916.
M y d e a r M r. S e c r e t a r y :
I must confess to feeling a very great surprise at your
letter of to-day offering your resignation as Secretary of
War. There has been no definite action taken yet in
either of the matters to which your letter of yesterday
referred. The whole matter is under debate, and all the
influences that work for clarity and judgment ought to
be available at this time.
But since you have felt obliged to take this action, and
since it is evident that your feeling in the matter is very
great indeed, I feel that I would be only imposing a burden
upon you should I urge you to retain the Secretaryship of
War while I am endeavouring to find a successor. I ought
to relieve you at once, and do hereby accept your resigna
tion, because it is so evidently your desire that I should do
60.
I cannot take this important step, however, without ex
pressing to you my very warm appreciation of the dis

[178]

tinguished service you have rendered as Secretary of War,
and I am sure that in expressing this appreciation I am
only putting into words the judgment of our fellow citizens
far and wide.
With sincere regret at the action you have felt con
strained to take,
Sincerely yours,
W o o d r o w W ils o n .

Hon. Lindley M. Garrison,
Secretary of War.
Assistant Secretary Breckinridge, following his chiefs
lead, tendered his resignation:
War Department, Office of the Assistant Secretary,
Washington, D. C., February 10, 1916.
M y d e a r M r. P r e s i d e n t :
The Secretary of War, Mr. Garrison, has just informed
me of the fact that he has submitted his resignation, to
take effect at your convenience.
I have been cognizant of each detail of the correspond
ence between yourself and him leading up to this action on
his part. I have subscribed to each statement of principle
made by him throughout this correspondence. I share
without exception his conviction, and, therefore, have ten
dered my resignation to take effect at your convenience.
Very respectfully,
H e n r y B r e c k in r id g e .

The President.
In accepting the resignation of Mr. Breckinridge, the
President wrote:

The White House,
Washington, February 10, 1916.
M

y d e a r B r e c k in r id g e :

I can quite understand why you deem it incumbent upon
you in loyalty to your chief to follow his example in tender
ing your resignation, and, since I have accepted his resig
nation, I am sure it will be your desire that I accept yours
also. I do so with genuine regret, because you have in
every way fulfilled the highest expectations and rendered
the country the most conscientious and efficient service.
It is with genuine sorrow that I see this official relation
ship between us brought to an end.
Cordially and sincerely yours,
W o o d r o w W il s o n .

Henry Breckinridge,
Assistant Secretary of War.
The Act embodying the compromise provisions was
approved June 3, 1916. Within a few days, the feature
whose effectiveness was most questioned was subjected
to a severe test. Partly because of the Mexican situation,
the entire National Guard was called out on June 8th and
by the 30th of that month, this force in the service of
the United States numbered 143,702 officers and men, of
whom 108,018 were on duty on the Mexican border and
35,684 in state camps.
Thus there had been secured the enactment of the most
important peace-time military legislation in our history.
The foundations which could be extended had been laid,
and the way was open for the development of the neces
sary machinery. Furthermore, the weakest part of the
force was in the course of receiving rigid training and dis[180]

cipline and the most valuable experience under trying con
ditions.
At the same time the navy was being put on a much
stronger footing. Even more striking measures for its
development were enacted by Congress. The Naval
Appropriation Bill for 1915 had provided for 2 battleships,
6 destroyers, 2 fleet submarines, 16 coast-defence sub
marines, and 1 fuel ship. It also allowed $1,000,000 for
an aviation corps and provided for a chief of operations
and a naval reserve.
The following year, much more liberal authorization
was given. A naval expenditure of $315,000,000 was
made available for the following programme: 10 battle
ships, 6 battle cruisers, 10 scout cruisers, 50 torpedo boats,
destroyers of the greatest practicable speed and radius of
action, 9 fleet submarines, 58 coast submarines, 1 specially
equipped submarine, 3 fuel ships, 1 repair ship, 2 destroyer
tenders, 1 fleet submarine tender, 2 ammunition ships, and
2 gunboats. It created an important Naval Reserve, a
Naval War Staff, and a Naval Flying Corps. It allowed
$705,611 toward the construction of a projectile plant,
$11,000,000 for armour plant, $18,223,523 for ammunition,
$480,000 for torpedo nets, $1,000,000 to begin new dry
docks, $1,600,000 to extend old ones, $500,000 for coal and
oil, $1,500,000 for research, $3,500,000 for aviation, and
about $1,500,000 for a naval militia.
But this was not all. The President, in his message of
December 7, 1915, spoke of “ the creation of the right
instrumentalities by which to mobilize our economic re
sources in time of national necessity.” He took it for
panted that he did not need additional authority to call
into consultation “-men of recognized leadership and
[181]

ability from among our citizens who are thoroughly fa
miliar, for example, with the transportation facilities of
the country and therefore competent to advise how they
may be coordinated when the need arises, those who can
suggest the best way in which to bring about cooperation
among the manufacturers of the country, should it be
necessary, and those who could assist to bring the technical
skill of the country to the aid of the government in the
solution of particular problems of defence. I only hope
that, if I should find it feasible to constitute such an ad
visory body, the Congress would be willing to make avail
able the small sum of money that would be needed to de
fray the expenses that would probably be necessary to give
it the clerical and administrative machinery with which to
do serviceable work.
“ What is more important is that the industries and re
sources of the country should be available and ready for
mobilization.”
There was suggested in these expressions a need which
received formal recognition in the Army Appropriation
Bill of August 29, 1916, nearly two months after the pas
sage of the National Defence Act. The Appropriation
Bill authorized the establishment of a Council of National
Defence, which should consist of the Secretaries of War,
Navy, Interior, Agriculture, and Labour. This body
was directed to nominate for appointment an Advisory
Commission consisting of not more than seven persons,
each having special knowledge in some industrial field
or being otherwise qualified, and to serve without com
pensation.
It was made the duty of the Council to supervise and
direct investigations and make recommendations to the

President and the heads of executive departments as to the
locating of railroads with reference to the frontier of the
United States, so as to render possible expeditious con
centration of troops and supplies to points of defence; the
coordination of military, industrial, and commercial pur
poses in the location of extensive highways and branch
lines of railroad; the utilization of waterways; the mobil
ization of military and naval resources for defence; the
increase of domestic production of articles and materials
essential to the support of armies and of the people during
the interruption of foreign commerce; the development of
sea-going transportation; data as to amounts, location,
method, and means of production and availability of mili
tary supplies; the giving of information to producers and
manufacturers as to the class of supplies needed by the
military and other services of the government, the re
quirements relating thereto, and the creation of relations
which will render possible in time of need the immediate
concentration and utilization of the resources of the na
tion. A large order, without doubt!
The first duty of the Council was to select men to be
appointed to the Advisory Commission by the President.
Many were canvassed and were discussed informally with
the President at Cabinet meetings. It happened that all
the men who were seriously discussed at one of the con
ferences were Republicans, so far as anybody knew, and
someone remarked jokingly that we had better be careful
or we would be accused of being too partisan. The men
finally selected, as it turned out, were, with one exception,
Republicans, though nobody at this or any later time
gave much thought to the political affiliations of any one
considered, and the President accepted the recommenda

tions of the Council. The Commission was constituted as
follows: Chairman, Daniel Willard, President of the Balti
more and Ohio Railroad, Transportation and Communica
tion; Howard E. Coffin, Vice-president of the Hudson
Motor Company, Munitions and Manufacturing and In
dustrial Relations; Julius Rosenwald, President of Sears,
Roebuck and Company, Supplies, such as clothing;
Bernard M. Baruch, Banker, Raw Materials, Minerals,
and Metals; Hollis Godfrey, President of the Drexel In
stitute, Engineering and Education; Samuel Gompers,
President of the American Federation of Labour, Labour,
including the Conservation of the Health and the Welfare
of Workers; and Franklin Martin, Secretary of the Ameri
can College of Surgeons of Chicago, Medicine and Surgery.
Each of these members was authorized to select staffs to
take immediate charge of the various subdivisions of the
work under his direction.
The most important officer provided for was that of
Director. He was to be the central administrative head
and the coordinator of all the forces and activities of the
organization. In December, this position was filled by
the appointment of Walter S. Gifford, o f the American
Telephone and Telegraph Company, a man of exceptional
organizing and administrative ability, keen intelligence,
and great energy.
Thus were securely laid the foundations of military pre
paredness.
But another important further step remained to be
taken. What was in mind and what had been decided
upon involved large expenditures. It was recognized
that, if war came, further stupendous burdens would have
to be borne and that a sound fiscal structure was essential
[184]

to the national security. The nation had never faced
a great emergency financially prepared. It had always
promptly suspended specie payments and laboured under
the disabilities imposed by an inadequate and unwise fiscal
policy. This was true in the Revolutionary War, the
War of 1812, and the Civil War.
A necessary vital step had been taken by the organiza
tion of the Federal'Reserve System to safeguard our bank
ing structure, and an important fiscal advance had been
made by the adoption of a direct income tax in the Tariff
Act of 1913. This law imposed a normal tax of 1 per cent,
on personal and corporation net incomes up to $20,000,
and supertaxes of from 1 per cent, to 6 percent, on net in
comes in six classifications of amounts in excess of $20,000,
$50,000, $75,000, $100,000, $250,000, and $500,000.
As has been stated, the President, on September 4,
1914, appeared before Congress and urged it to make pro
vision for additional revenues through internal taxes in
stead of through tariff increases or loans. He suggested
the need of raising $100,000,000 by such levies. Congress
responded by passing the emergency measure which the
President approved on October 22d. This act increased
the taxes on beer, wines, ales, tobacco, cosmetics, and
chewing gum, imposed special taxes on bankers, brokers,
theatres, and other amusements, and provided a schedule
of stamp taxes.
Again, in 1915, the President returned to the subject of
revenues in connection with his preparedness programme.
In his message to Congress, December 7 , 1 9 I 5 >he pointed
out that that programme for the fiscal year 1916-17
would require additional revenues of $93,800,000 and that,
if the Emergency Revenue Act of 19*4 an^ the existing

sugar duty were discontinued, the total estimated deficit
June 30, 1917, would be $235,000,000; or, if the Treasury
was to have a safe working balance of $50,000,000 and the
usual deficiency estimates were included of $12,000,000
for 1917, the total amount needed would be $297,000,000.
“ The obvious moral of the figures,” he insisted, "is that
it is a plain counsel of prudence to continue all of the pres
ent taxes or their equivalents, and confine ourselves to the
problem of providing $112,000,000 of new revenues rather
than $297,000,000.”
“ How shall we obtain the new revenue?” he asked. It
had been suggested that certain bonds already authorized
to reimburse the Treasury for expenditures on the Panama
Canal be sold. This he rejected. “ Borrowing money is
a short-sighted policy. . . .
It seems to me a clear
dictate of prudent statesmanship and frank finance that in
what we are now, I hope, about to undertake, we should
pay as we go. . . . We should be following an almost
universal example of modern governments if we were to
draw the greater part or even the whole of the revenues we
need from the income taxes. . . . What is clear is
that the industry of this generation should pay the bills
of this generation.”
I was delighted to see the President persist in his course
of having the nation safeguard itself from financial chaos
by reliance in full measure upon taxation. It was obvious
that the belligerents on the Continent of Europe were not
taking a wise course in this matter and that they were head
ing for trouble. Great Britain alone had taken the neces
sary steps.
Congress by resolution in December continued the
Emergency Act of 1914 and proceeded to devise further
[186]

measures which were embodied in the Act of September 8,
1916. This law doubled the normal income rate, increased
the supertax classes from 6 to 13, the rate rising from 1
per cent, to 13 per cent, on amounts in excess of $20,000,
$40,000, $60,000, $80,000, $100,000, $150,000, $200,000,
$250,000, $300,000, $500,000, $1,000,000, $1,500,000, and
$2,000,000, levied an estate tax of 1 per cent, on amounts
up to $50,000 and of from 2 per cent, to 10 per cent, on
amounts in excess of $50,000 to those in excess of
$5,000,000, placed a tax of i2§ per cent, on the net profits
of munition manufacturers, and fixed the normal income
rate on corporations at 2 per cent, and added 50 cents on
each $1,000 of fair valuation of capital stock.
The effects of these various revenue measures may be
indicated by the statement that, in spite of a decline
in tariff receipts, mainly on account of the war, from
$292,000,000 in the fiscal year 1913-14 to $226,000,000 in
the year 1916-17, the total ordinary revenues increased
from $735,000,000 to $1,118,000,000. In 1914, the cor
poration and individual income-tax yield of the Act of
1913 was $61,000,000; the emergency tax of 1914 gave
$52,000,000 in 1915, and the income taxes $80,000,000;
in 1916, their total was $209,000,000; and in 1917, the
Act of 1916 and the emergency measure yielded
$454,000,000; and what is of even greater importance, a
sound policy had been fixed and the machinery was in
operation and was developing.

POLITICS

The Conventions of ig i6 — Mr . Hughes as a Candidate— The
Record of the Democratic Party

yAS TH E time for the nomination conventions ap/%
proached (1916), there was much speculation
I
% as to whom the Republicans would select as
their candidate for the Presidency. It was a
foregone conclusion that the Democrats would name Mr.
Wilson. It was, of course, understood that Mr. Roosevelt
would like to be the candidate either of the Progressive
party or of the Republican, if he could not command the
support of both. It was equally clear that the Old Guard,
while it would manoeuvre to induce the Progressives not
to place a candidate in the field, would have nothing to
do with Roosevelt.
Mr. Justice Hughes’s name was being frequently men
tioned, but I personally felt that he would not be the
candidate. In the first place, I doubted if he would take
a course which might permit it to be said by anybody that
members of the Supreme Court might have political aspi
rations and that the Court was a stepping stone to the
Presidency. In the second place, I was influenced by
what he had said to me several months before when I sat
by him at a public dinner. In the course of our converse
tion, I spoke of his career as Governor of New York and
particularly of his political addresses in his campaign for
[188]

the governorship and during the Presidential campaign in
1912. I said: “ I imagine you must find the bench very
tame after what you have been through, and that you
really enjoyed much more the activity and excitement of
political life.” He replied, as I recall, that I could not
be much more mistaken about anything than I was about
him and his inclinations; that he had never enjoyed his
political activities, especially the speaking part; that he
hated political speech-making; that he was perfectly happy
on the Supreme Court and that he knew of nothing which
could induce him to abandon it and return to political life.
Never having attended a national political convention,
I decided to attend, not only the Democratic Convention
in St. Louis, but also the Progressive and Republican con
ventions in Chicago. In Chicago, I made the Chicago
Club my headquarters in daytime and spent part of each
day at the conventions. At the Club I frequently saw
members of the Old Guard, which, it was asserted, was
really steering the Republican Convention. This con
vention was uninteresting. Its main concern seemed to
be to keep the Progressives from nominating a candidate
and therefore to select some satisfactory person whom they
would support. I listened to the keynote speech of Sena
tor Harding. It was long, conventional, and dull; but he
seemed to be very much pleased with it and with himself.
He showed it by his manner and bearing.
The Progressive body seemed to be very much at sea.
The members were earnest and enthusiastic, but their
leaders, including Roosevelt, who was not present, ap
peared to be playing a game, which was to frighten the
Republicans into taking Roosevelt, if possible; or, if this
could not be done and the Republicans were willing to
[189]

take a reasonably good man, to dissolve the Progressive
organization and try to take the members over to the
Republicans. One incident in the game interested me and
caused me to place big question marks after the names of
some of the Progressive leaders.
A friend of mine came to me one day in the Chicago
Club and suggested that we go to the Progressive Conven
tion. He said he thought that there might be an interest
ing development; that a message had come from Roosevelt
which a Progressive leader had, and that it would be read
during the afternoon. We went early and took our places
in a box which had been put at our disposal. After a few
minutes, the chairman came forward and announced that
they were waiting for a message from their great leader;
that it would come at any moment; and that while they
were waiting they would listen to some speeches. After
each speech, he would announce that the message would
probably soon arrive and that another short speech would
be heard. Then he shifted and announced that, while
they were waiting for the message from their great leader,
they would take up a collection for expenses. After a
considerable sum had been subscribed, he came forward
and said that the message had come and that he would
read it. It stated that the great leader would not be a
candidate and asked the body to give its support to that
great Progressive, Henry Cabot Lodge! A more stunned,
whipped crowd, I had never looked upon. It was a
pitiful spectacle. It had been hoaxed.
When the Republicans nominated Mr. Hughes, I felt
that they had put up their strongest candidate and that
he would make an able and aggressive fight. He was
not hampered by any commitments in his party platform.
[190]

It was little more than a string of platitudes. It knew
no allegiance except to the Constitution, to the govern
ment, and to the flag of the United States.” It believed
“ in American policies at home and abroad.” This was
very informing! It might have been interesting if it had
professed allegiance to Germany or Ireland and expressed
belief in Italian policies at home and Japanese policies
abroad. It, of course, demanded just as much protection
as was necessary, and announced something which it could
not possibly know— that the Underwood Tariff of 1913
would have ruined industry and labour. It cried for
national preparedness, which many of its members op
posed during the spring, and informed the world that the
Administration had “ destroyed our influence abroad and
humiliated us in our own eyes.” It also favoured the
extension of woman suffrage, but preferred to let “ George”
do it.
The task of the Democrats in St. Louis was simple.
They had only to name Wilson and Marshall and to adopt
with minor modifications the platform outlined by the
President and carried to St. Louis by Newton Baker under
his vest, so careful was he of it. The platform, as adopted,
after setting out the record of the Administration, con
demned groups of all kinds which had as their object to
advance foreign interests, favoured the bill to create a
merchant marine, the enactment of a Child Labour Law,
a Budget System, Suffrage for Women on the same terms
as for men, and the granting of self-government to the
Philippines and territorial government to Alaska, Hawaii,
and Porto Rico.
I came away from these conventions with a feeling
of depression. They are not edifying spectacles, and they

are an offence to the ear and to reason. They seem to
indicate that the nation is still in the boyhood stage of its
development. They are distinctly inartistic, not to say
common and vulgar. The speeches delivered before the
audiences are full of the same sort of “ bunk” which char
acterizes and mars most of our political meetings. The
conventions are, in fact, the fountain sources of “ bunk.”
The demonstrations as a rule are forced, childish, and
trivial, and the extravagant utterances do not arouse the
partisan and they do repel the independent.
In all our party activities we are too partisan, too prone
to resort to sharp practices, and too much addicted to per
sonalities. The “ fiery orator” is still accorded an honour
which is not his due. As a rule, he is a person whose
physical energy and lung power are out of all proportion
to his mental power and to the number and soundness of
his ideas. Apparently, the masses like a good deal of
bunk and enjoy being fooled a large part of the time.
It would be a great relief if our conventions would adopt
a more decent and seemly procedure, one more in keeping
with their high purpose. It would be a greater relief if the
public would force party leaders to show a higher regard
for facts, to evidence a desire and demonstrate a capacity
to get the pertinent facts, to interpret them reasonably,
and to follow their conclusions regardless of consequences.
This would, of course, retire many of our leaders to the
shades of private life, but the public could survive their
disappearance. If nothing but the facts were set out and
fair interpretations of them were given, there would still
be sufficient differences of opinion to sustain at least two
parties. With increase in the number of independentminded men and women, it may be that a change will be
[192]

witnessed and that the right and sound course will come
to be regarded as the best politics. The party which can
see and will most frequently do the right thing undoubt
edly stands the best chance of commanding the support
of the American people and of perpetuating itself in power.
Unless our leaders, including the press, more fully realize
their responsibility and change their tactics, our experi
ment in democracy is likely to have hard sledding as our
population increases and our problems become more com
plex; and it may fail. It will be interesting to discover
whether or not women will stand for “ bunk” as men have.
As the campaign opened, I felt that the Administration
faced the people with a record, in both foreign and do
mestic matters, made in a time of exceptional difficulty
and delicacy, which on the whole was highly creditable.
The course of the government in respect to Japan, Mexico,
and Germany had seemed to satisfy most reasonable re
quirements and to meet the views of the great majority of
the people and of fair-minded and intelligent leaders of
thought. In the field of military and financial prepared
ness, the President had pressed matters about as far as it
was possible to carry them with any hope of having a
majority in Congress and the public back of him. Of
course, he had not satisfied the extremists and could not
hope to meet the demands of those who were making
them merely for partisan purposes and party gain. He
had “ sought to maintain peace against very great and
sometimes very unfair odds.”
He had nothing but disgust and anger for those citizens
who were “ bom under other flags but welcomed under our
generous naturalization laws to the full freedom and op
portunity of America, who have poured the poison of

disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life; who
have sought to bring the authority and good name of our
government into contempt, to destroy our industries
wherever they thought it effective for their vindictive
purposes to strike at them, and to debase our policies to
the uses of foreign intrigue. . . . It is possible to deal
with these things very effectually. I need not suggest
the terms in which they may be dealt with.” The
President had even greater contempt for native-born
citizens who “ had been guilty of disturbing the selfpossession and misrepresenting the temper and principles
of the country during these days of terrible war, when it
would seem that every man who was truly American
would instinctively make it his duty and his pride to keep
the scales of judgment even and prove himself a partisan
of no nation but his own.” He wished he might say that
there were only a few such men. But he could not.
“ There are some men among us, and many resident abroad
who, though born and bred in the United States and calling
themselves Americans, have so forgotten themselves and
their honour as citizens as to put their passionate sym
pathy with one or the other side in the great European con
flict above their regard for the peace and the dignity of the
United States. They also preach and practise disloyalty.
No laws, I suppose, can reach corruptions of the mind and
heart; but I should not speak of others without also speak
ing of these and expressing the even deeper humiliation
and scorn which every self-possessed and thoughtfully
patriotic American must feel when he thinks of them and
of the discredit they are daily bringing upon us.”
On such people, the President and the Cabinet did not
waste much thought. The attitude of the great mass of

the American people was the thing which concerned them,
and they had a feeling of confidence that if the people
were fully informed they would lend their support and
stand any test to which they might be subjected. The
President did not want "the question of peace and war
entrusted too entirely to our government.” He wanted
war, if it had to come, " to be something that springs out
of the sentiments and principles and actions of the people
themselves.”
But there was much more than the foreign policy and
preparedness issues on which the Administration could go
before the nation.
The Administration had a domestic record "of ex
traordinary length and variety, rich in elements of many
kinds, but consistent in principle throughout and suscepti
ble of brief recital,” as the President said in his speech of
acceptance.
It had kept its promises. It had dispersed the Lobby,
overthrown the "Invisible Government” against which
Roosevelt and more than four million Republicans ap
parently had protested, and had again established a free
and untrammelled government of the people.
It had set aside the Payne-Aldrich bill against which,
likewise, four millions of Republicans had risen in revolt,
had kept its pledge to the people to revise the tariff down
ward, and had enacted the Simmons-Underwood measure.
It had placed upon the statute books a national income
tax, long demanded by the country and approved at least
in principle by the best economic thought of the day.
The law providing for the Federal Trade Commission
whose creation the President had urged in January, 1914,
had been passed. Business had demanded that the

government let it alone or tell it what were to be the
“ rules of the game.” It was hampered by uncertainty
and needed a more explicit definition of the anti-trust laws.
But it needed something more than that the menace of
legal process be made explicit. Regulation by judicial
process was impossible. There was need of a piece of
machinery which might give legitimate and honest
business advice and guidance and protect it from the
unfair competition and practices of dishonest enterprises;
and this need was met by the establishment of the Trade
Commission.
More important still was the passage of the Federal
Reserve law and the organization of the Reserve System
which had already been subjected to a severe and unex
pected strain and had saved the nation’s banking system
from a breakdown.
Another commission of great potential usefulness had
been added or was about to be added: the Tariff Commis
sion. An experiment in the direction of a tariff board had
been tried under a provision of the Tariff Act of 1909, but
it had not demonstrated its usefulness and had raised
doubts as to the desirability of such a piece of machinery.
The President, himself, when it was first suggested that a
tariff commission be created, was emphatically opposed to
it. Several of us had brought the matter up early in the
history of the Administration. The President said that
the thing had already been tried and had failed. Again
we urged the idea, and again he resisted it. A third time
I suggested it. I stated that I was not foolish enough to
think that the tariff or any other form of taxation could
be taken out of politics, that I recognized clearly that
taxation was the sort of thing that constituted the very
[196]

essence of political difference, around which politics always
had revolved and always would turn, and that I was not
ms innocent as to believe that any Congress would ever
fully accept the conclusions of any administrative or in
vestigating commission on any matter of taxation, but
that I was convinced that such a txxly could be of great
service by gathering reliable data for the information of
the President, of Congress, and, above all, of the public.
I insisted that the matter was essentially one of public
sentiment, that the public was ignorant both of the prin
ciples and of the facts, and that, if it was informed, it
could no longer be imposed upon, and that tariffs could
no longer be framed in the dark and secret chamber of
conference committees in the interest of special groups.
When I finished, the President said: “ Well, if you
feel so strongly about it and are so fully convinced that
a commission will serve a useful purpose, why don’t
you send me a memorandum and try your hand at a ten
tative draft of a bill?” I told him that I would gladly do
so. The President soon wholly committed himself to the
idea and wrote a letter to Mr. Kitchin suggesting that his
committee take up the matter. In it he set out at some
length the purpose of such a body and the scope of its
duties along the lines of my statement, and in due course
the committee presented a measure which received the
sanction of Congress and of the President.
The President, himself, on at least one occasion referred
to his position in this matter and indicated that he had
changed his mind about it. In speaking before the Rail
way Business Association of New York, January 2 7 ,1916,
he said:
“ There is another thing about which I have changed

my mind. A year ago, I was not in favour of a tariff
board, and I will tell you why. Then the only purpose of
a tariff board was to keep alive an unprofitable contro
versy. . . . But the circumstances of the present
time are these: There is going on in the world under our
eyes an economic revolution. No man understands that
revolution; no man has the elements of it clearly in his
mind. No part of the business of legislation with regard
to international tradecan beundertaken until we dounderstand it; and the members of Congress are too busy, their
duties are too multifarious and distracting, to make it
possible within a sufficiently short space of time for them
to master the change that is coming. . . . There is
so much to understand that we have not the data to com
prehend that I for one would not dare, so far as my advice
is concerned, to leave the government without the ade
quate means of inquiry.”
In addition to this legislation, which for the most part
directly affected every interest and individual in the
nation, there had been enacted into law measures for the
improvement of agriculture and the betterment of rural
conditions which in number and importance exceeded the
record made in the preceding twenty or thirty years;
and these had been supplemented by an unusual body of
administrative improvements and extensions.

THE

ACiRICt'LTL'RAL

PROGRAMME

Dr. Knapp's Farm Demonstration Method Made National
policy— Reorganizing the Department —The Farm I Man Act—
The Federal Aid Road Act— A Political Speaking Tour

HIS programme, formulated during my first
year in the Department of Agriculture, was the
result of the best thought of men in the Depart
ment, in Congress, and in private life. It had
been executed, with one exception, substantially as
planned and in terms satisfactory to me and to the agri
cultural leaders of the nation. The one exception was
a measure for the improvement of rural sanitation and
health through the cooperation and joint support of Fed
eral and state authorities.
The programme was not suddenly or hastily conceived.
Members of the Agricultural Committees in both Houses of
Congress had been giving much thought to its leading fea
tures and had been securing the views of experts in the
Department of Agriculture and in the Land Grant College.
For many years I had been in touch with rural problems
and had developed very definite views as to the needs of
agriculture and the course which should be taken. I was
keenly aware of the fact that much could be done to im
prove the processes and methods of production, but I was
still more alive to the fact that greater problems presented
themselves in the fields of marketing and finance and that

in no small measure further profitable production waited
on the correct solutions of problems in those fields.
There was no question as to the ability of the nation to
produce a much greater volume of agricultural commodi
ties. Less than 60 per cent, of our arable land was under
cultivation, and of the land under cultivation not more
than 12 per cent, of it was yielding reasonably full returns.
Two important questions were whether or not the farmers
could secure credit on terms suited to their needs and as
favourable as those obtained by others with equally good
security, and whether they could distribute their products
more economically and at fair prices, at prices which paid
them to produce their crops.
Farming must pay. It is a hazardous undertaking at
best. It is important, not only to the farmer, but also
to the nation, that on the average his accounts show a
balance on the right side. But something more is neces
sary. Rural life must not only be profitable: it must also
be comfortable, healthful, and attractive. It is not suffi
cient that farming be profitable. In Illinois, for instance,
many farmers have made money, but the result in too
large measure has been that they have moved to town to
enjoy educational and social advantages, have held on to
their farms, refusing to sell, and have operated them
through tenants. The tenants have been given little or
no incentive to improve the farm or themselves, and the
landlords have taken too little effective interest in them
and have not contributed enough to the building up of
rural communities. As a consequence, Illinois is one of
the tenancy plague spots of the country.
The remedy involved better methods of production
through the use of good cultural practices, soil improve[200]

ment, plant and animal breeding according to the best
known principles, the control and eradication of plant
and animal diseases, the standardization of products, the
development of standard grain and cotton grades for use
in trading, more economical methods and processes of
marketing including the effective cooperation among pro
ducers, credit on more reasonable terms, good roads, and
modern schools.
The programme involved a conception of rural life as a
whole and its proper relation to the industry of the nation.
Up to J913, attention had been directed almost exclusively
to one side of agriculture, that is, to production. The
other great half, including finance and distribution, had,
relatively speaking, been ignored.
The time was ripe for action. The notion that a de
parture should be made had become fixed; and, very for
tunately, there was available for leadership of the forces in
Congress interested in agriculture, one of the best real
friends the farmers have ever had and one of the ablest
and most satisfactory legislators it has been my fortune to
know, A. F. Lever, of South Carolina. He was alive to
the needs of the farmer and was unwilling to play the
demagogue. He was skilful in handling measures in
committee and on the floor of the House, was willing and
anxious to get the best thought of the most competent
experts, and had the faculty in high degree of cooperating
with departmental and other leaders, including the forces
of the Land Grant colleges, in developing and framing
measures.
The Department of Agriculture, by reason of its great
number of able and loyal practical experts, was in position
to furnish guidance in matters of substance, and by reason
[201]

of its excellent legal staff, headed by one of the best and
soundest lawyers in the country, Francis Gordon Caffey,
was able to provide the requisite legal advice in drafting
measures. The following outline will give a sufficient
hint of what was accomplished in less than four years.
(1) Appropriations for the support of the regular activi
ties of the Department increased 50 per cent., or from
$24,100,000 to $36,130,000. Particular pains were being
taken to foster production through every promising ap
proach, and, especially, to increase the meat supply of the
nation.
(2) Realizing that the Department had in its possession
a vast store of information that should be conveyed to the
farmers and conveyed in such manner as to induce them
to apply it, that it had a constituency of nearly fifty mil
lion people, that it did one of the largest printing busi
nesses in the world, and that much of its matter was badly
organized and written, I took steps to place the informa
tion activities on a new footing.
The first thing I did was to invite Walter H. Page to
come to Washington to talk to the heads of services about
the need of writing bulletins in good plain simple English
— in fact, to translate their technical language into Eng
lish. He accepted and gave the group one of his charac
teristic talks. He began by telling the members that they
could not write; and to soften the blow, he added that
very few people in this country could write, that he had
to have at least 50 per cent, of the manuscripts submitted
to him by professors of English in leading universities re
written, and that he, in despair, had had to train a staff
of his own in order to carry on this business. Then he
very vigorously outlined what should be done.
[202]

Subsequently, the Department took three helpful steps.
It created the Office of Information; segregated the scien
tific matter for the scientists from the popular matter for
the farmers, and simplified its farmers’ bulletins, using
the briefest forms and the simplest and clearest English.
The Office of Information undertook to supervise the prep
aration of printed matter and particularly to facilitate the
securing of news items by all interested parties, including
the daily and weekly newspapers and the agricultural
journals. It was ascertained that the press would use
much material if it were furnished in readily available
form and that much of the timely matter bearing on urgent
situations would be sent by telegraph.
(3)
Furthermore, it was recognized that the printed
page was not the most efficient educational medium, but
needed to be supplemented by personal effort of sensible,
trained leaders in intimate contact with farmers and their
families and more particularly through the means of
demonstrations of good agricultural methods on the farms
themselves.
Experiments with the farm demonstration method had
been tried successfully on a small scale by the Department
about ten years before, and under the direction of a very
unusual man, Seaman A. Knapp, of Louisiana and Texas,
formerly of Iowa. About 1905, another very valiant
citizen, Dr. Wallace Buttrick, of the General Education
Board, came in contact with Doctor Knapp at my home at
the Texas State College of Agriculture and was much im
pressed by him and his methods and results. In a short
time, the General Education Board made a substantial
appropriation for the support of the work to be adminis
tered through the Department and this was increased
[203]

from time to time till, in 1913, it was spending for the sup
port of the cooperative undertaking a very large amount.
The funds of the Board and of the Department were sup
plemented by contributions from the state and the locali
ties, which was a wise feature of the plan, since self-help
in such matters is of the greatest value The Board’s
disinterested efforts were appreciated by the people and
helped to bring the work to the point where it was possible
to induce Congress to make a sufficient appropriation to
enable the undertaking to be taken over and supported
entirely out of Federal, state, and local funds, and to re
ceive the sanction of Congress in the most significant and
far-reaching single educational extension laws ever enacted
by any government. On May 8, 1914, the Agricultural
Educational Extension Act was approved by the President.
This measure did much more than to make an appro
priation. It incorporated a very helpful principle bearing
on the relation between theFederal and state governments.
It provided for close cooperation between the two juris
dictions, and thus removed the jealousy, friction, and
wasteful duplication of effort, which had been growing as
the activities expanded. The Act provided that no ex
penditure should be made out of Federal funds except to
execute plans previously mutually agreed upon by the
Secretary of Agriculture and the State College of Agricul
ture. This, therefore, meant more than cooperation.
It meant that careful joint planning would supplant im
pulsive and ill-considered action. It also meant the re
duction to the minimum of the pressure of local politics
and the development of a great piece of nation-wide ma
chinery under the direction of non-political Federal and
state agencies which would be of great assistance in time
[204]

of emergency as well as in normal times. It was con
templated that ultimately there would be placed in each
of the 2,850 rural counties ot the Union two agents, at
least, perhaps a man and a woman, and, in each state,
district specialists who would give advice in the more com
plex and difficult problems. Every state in the Union
acted quickly and accepted the measure.
(4) Before the measure just outlined was passed, the
Department had created a piece of new machinery in
tended to supervise investigational work in rural finance
and marketing. This was the Office of Markets and
Rural Organization. It began work with the modest
sum of $50,000, which by 1916 had increased to $1,200,000,
including the items authorized for the enforcement of new
marketing laws which were assigned to this agency. It
was the only organization of its kind in the world.
(5) It soon became evident that, in the interest of
efficiency, the work of the Department needed rearrang
ing. Certain changes were made quickly, but more radi
cal steps had to await Congressional authorization, and
this I asked for in the estimates submitted in 1913. It
was granted, and action followed promptly. The services
did not need any revolutionary alterations, but they were
susceptible of much improvement. The Office of Farm
Management and the Farm Demonstration work were
taken out of the Bureau of Plant Industry. The first
was attached to the Office of the Secretary and the second
to the Office of Experiment Stations, the name of which
was changed to the States Relations Service. It was the
intention to expand the work in farm management, re
directing it more along economic lines, and to assign to the
States Relations Service the administration of the Agricul[205]

tural Extension Act. Certain transfers of special activi
ties were made in the in terest of better coordination.
(6) Three pieces of legislation of great importance bear
ing on marketing were enacted into law. Two of them,
the Cotton Futures Act and the Grain Standards Act, had
as their main object to enable the producer to sell his prod
uct as nearly as possible for what it was, to get a fair
price for each part of it according to its character and
quality and to control the exchange transactions in such
manner as to eliminate certain abuses which had devel
oped.
The situation had been very unsatisfactory. Different
standards for cotton were used in the markets of the
South, and there existed nowhere definite uniform grain
grades. The local buyers knew the standards in use
and understood them; the producers did not, and it was
impossible to educate them to the use of a variety of stand
ards. There was not only no incentive to the farmer to
place a better product on the market; he was actually
penalized if he took pains to do so. Simple justice to the
producer and the welfare of the consumer as well dictated
that the situation be changed.
The third measure, the permissive Warehouse Act, was
intended to facilitate the safe storage of agricultural com
modities, the better distribution of satisfactory warehouses
throughout the nation, the financing of crop movement,
and the orderly marketing of products. It was expected
that, by the better business handling of storages under
license from the Department, warehouse receipts would be
issued which would be accepted by banks more readily as
collateral for loans.
(7) Two steps were taken bearing more directly on the
[206]

problem of enabling farmers to secure credit on more satis
factory terms. The first was a provision in the Federal
Reserve Act. The Federal Reserve Board was given
power to define the paper which would be eligible for dis
count, to make agricultural paper eligible, and to give it a
maturity of six months as against ninety days for ordinary
commercial paper. This difference was justified by the
fact that the farmers’ operations are seasonal, involving a
long turnover. As the President had aptly said: “ The
farmer is the servant of the seasons.”
The second step was taken by the passage of the Farm
Loan Act. The existing banking machinery was suited
to the needs of urban producers and dealers but not to
those of farmers. There was need of institutions, man
aged by men who understood and were sympathetic with
the farmers’ plans and needs, reaching out into the rural
districts and operating on terms demanded by the seasonal
character of their activities. It was apparent that farm
ers in many sections were being compelled to pay higher
rates of interest than were justified. On long-time loans,
they varied from about 5§ per cent, in older states like
Illinois, to 8^ per cent, or more in such states as Florida,
Oklahoma, and Montana, and on short-time loans from
7 per cent, to 14% per cent. Furthermore, there was no
satisfactory arrangement for obtaining loans on the
amortization basis. The need of stimulating agriculture
by enabling farmers to obtain loans for productive pur
poses at reasonable rates under intelligent and safe direc
tion was manifest. This need the new system, organized
on the model of the Federal Reserve System, was designed
to meet.
(8) The other measure which completed the programme

[207]

to the close of 1916 was the Federal Aid Road Act. Since
its beginning, the nation had had enlightened leaders who
recognized the imperative need of better highways and
of their development under expert central bodies. Wash
ington and Jefferson had spoken for the cause and had
used their best efforts to secure action, but with little
effect. In 1913, Virginia was still in the mud. It was
impossible in wet weather to go from Washington, the
capital of the nation, to Richmond, the former capital of
the Confederacy, safely or at all in an automobile. Only
a few Eastern states had either a rational highway organi
zation or many decent roads. In most of the states, road
building was under the jurisdiction of local bodies who
called out road gangs at convenient seasons and succeeded
in many instances in marring the roads by throwing up a
little dirt on them which the next rain converted into mud
or washed off.
It was estimated that, on the average road, it was cost
ing about twenty-three cents a ton a mile to haul a load,
while on a good road it would cost only about eleven cents.
And there was this further waste. Under the conditions
as they existed, the farmers had to haul when they should
have been ploughing or harvesting, while, under changed
conditions, they could haul when they could not get into
the fields. Good roads were a prerequisite, not only for
better distribution, but also for good schools, and for a
more healthful, comfortable, and attractive rural life.
They were as necessary for the city as for the rural dis
tricts; and yet there were people so short-sighted that
they raised strong objections because of the cost which
would be entailed.
Some of them, in particular in the older states like
[208]

Massachusetts and New York, opposed the legislation be
cause money would be taken from them to build up the
newer states. They were as irrational as are the people of
cities who object to expenditure of their funds in the
country surrounding them for schools and roads. They
do not see that their prosperity is dependent on that of
the back country, that, in fact, the back country makes
them possible and makes them prosperous as it prospers.
New England and New York are made by the rest of the
nation in large measure, and such of their funds as go into
the newer sections for such things as roads economically
planned and constructed are a direct investment for them
yielding them immense returns. It is likewise true that
the cost of good roads is negligible in comparison with that
of bad roads.
Of course, it takes much money to make good roads in
America, but it costs immeasurably more to have bad
roads; and good roads are part of a necessary programme
to retain in rural districts a sufficient number of contented
and efficient farmers to produce what the nation must have
if it is to grow and be strong. In view of the fact that the
Federal expenditure for roads is relatively small in com
parison with the amounts the states have been induced
to spend or to make available, and that the amount of
Federal funds which would be taken out of the older states
in excess of what they receive under their allotment is not
very great, the attitude of those who resist the highway
policy seems to be all the more petty and shortsighted.
The Act, like the Agricultural Extension measure, con
tained a provision intended to lessen the difficulties of
double jurisdiction and to minimize friction, waste, and
duplication. It made available a large sum of money,
[209]

hut stipulated that none of it should be expended except
upon plans, specifications, and contracts submitted by a
central highway body in each state and approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture, who would act through the Bu
reau of Roads. It required that the work, as it proceeded,
should be inspected by the Federal agents, and made it
necessary for the state to make available for road con
struction a sum at least equal to the Federal apportion
ment, and placed on the state the burden of maintenance.
The requirements that the work be done through the
Federal department, with its Bureau of Roads, the best
organization of its kind in the world, in cooperation with a
central state highway body, and that plans be carefully
worked out, were of peculiar importance and of farreaching consequence. All the states accepted the Act
within a very short time; and the first and most signifi
cant result was that central administrative agencies were
created in all the states under legislation which also met
all the other requirements of the law, including the
financial arrangements.
Such were the main achievements in the foreign and
domestic fields on which the Administration could go be
fore the country in its appeal for support.
The last week in September, I received a letter from the
Chairman of the Speakers’ Committee of the National
Democratic Executive Committee indicating that the
Committee expected me to give my entire time from the
first of October to the close of the day before the election
to the making of campaign speeches. In fact, he sent me
a schedule covering a considerable section of the country
which would have taken all my time for five weeks and
would have involved my absence from Washington for
[210]

that period. I replied that I would be glad to be of
service, but that I had my estimates to prepare and my
Annual Report to write, that I could not leave Washington
except for very short trips till after the fifteenth of October
but that from that time till the day of the election I
would be glad to speak wherever the Committee wished
to send me. In the meantime, I told him, I would speak
at places in such states as Ohio, Maryland, Pennsylvania,
and West Virginia, which I could reach overnight or at
week-ends. During the longer period, I told him that I
would prefer the parts of the country where independents
were numerous and where, therefore, there was a possibil
ity of making converts. I had no desire to speak merely
to Democratic partisans. They were already converted
and needed only to be aroused. I felt that somebody else
could more effectively serve that purpose.
I was convinced that the Democratic party could not
win the election unless it could command the support
of a large percentage of the independents, and that, if I
could do any good at all, it would be through an appeal to
them. I said this to the Chairman of the Committee. I
told him also that I doubted the wisdom of the members
of the Cabinet absenting themselves from Washington for
long periods and of their making very partisan speeches.
They would, of course, make party or administration
speeches; but, as it was very desirable that they secure the
attention and support of the independents, they would
more certainly accomplish the purpose by the exercise of
restraint and by a sound appeal to the public’s intelligence.
I learned later that these suggestions did not appeal to the
Chairman. In facc, I was informed, when I called at
headquarters in New York City after I had spoken for a
[211]

week in Connecticut, that he was irritated over the con
tents of my letter and had thrown it aside. This ac
counted for my delay in getting from the Committee a list
of speaking dates for the period after October 15th and
the imperfect arrangements which had been made for my
first four or five meetings.
It was finally arranged that I was to speak in Con
necticut, New York at central and northwestern points,
Ohio, and Indiana.
By the time I left Washington, the character of the
campaign had been pretty well defined. The Republi
cans, true to their platform, were presenting nothing con
structive. They were indulging in blanket criticisms and
in generalities as to what they would do if they won the
election. I was greatly surprised at the failure of
Mr. Hughes at the outset to make a strong appeal. I had
expected that he would be aggressive, keen, and skillful,
and I hoped that he would pitch his campaign on a moder
ate and broad plane. I could not see how he could offer
a very constructive programme, but I assumed that he
would at least be concrete and courageous. But his whole
programme, like that of the other Republican leaders,
seemed simply to be this: Anything to beat Wilson and to
get the Republican party back into power, and therefore
to pursue the course of least danger, avoiding offence to
anybody or to any element.
As a matter of fact, it was very difficult for Mr. Hughes
to take a concrete, definite line. He had a very unruly
team to drive. He had to steer between the views of men
like Penrose, Smoot, and Lodge, on the one hand, and
Progressives like William Allen White and Pinchot on the
other, and between the pro-Ally and the pro-German. He
[212]

had the impossible task of attempting “ to coordinate the
incongruous.” He had too many mental and emotional
patterns to match, and, like the chameleon which tried at
the same instant to match all the colours of a “ crazy”
quilt, he blew up.
Others had a similar awakening. Mr. Richard Olney,
Cleveland’s Secretary of State, writing about Mr. Hughes,
had this to say: “ Why did not the Republican Senators
resort to it (the filibuster against the eight-hour bill) and
get all the time for deliberation they wanted? What was
candidate Hughes doing that he did not make the wires
hot with messages to Washington, warning against the
law the seventy-four Republican Representatives who
voted for it, and urging the twenty-eight Republican
Senators to filibuster to the last ditch?
“ But neither he nor the Republican leaders generally
had the nerve to face the situation. With ample means
in their hands to prevent legislation until after due consid
eration, they elected that it should appear to be enacted
under coercion in order that after the great national de
liverance had been effected, they might object to the mode
of its accomplishment. A pettier and more ignoble game
of politics was never conceived. In comparison, and in
view of the sudden and extraordinary exigency sprung
upon the country, President Wilson’s course was charac
terized by both courage and common sense.”
Finding the Administration’s record of domestic affairs
uncommonly difficult to criticize, the opposition concen
trated its attacks upon the conduct of foreign affairs.
That field being largely in charge of the President himself,
the ordinary opposing political speaker naturally resorted
to personalities and found such epithets as “ weak,’-5

“ vacillating,” “ fatuous,”- “ insincere,” “ inconsistent,” and
“ un-American” only too feeble to do justice to his real
sentiments.

Mr. Hughes, in his campaign, made the impression on
me that he was lacking in imagination and in high con
structive ability; and I concluded that he was being badly
advised.
President Eliot felt the same sense of disappointment
in Mr. Hughes. In the Atlantic Monthly he wrote:
“ The most thorough search in the long essay in which
Mr. Hughes accepts the nomination will fail to find a
specific recommendation on any controversial matter.
The paper is filled with universally accepted statements
concerning the proper national policies and general de
scription of what ought to be done and ought not to be
done by national administration.
“ From the comparatively short passage on protection
and the proper regulation of industries it is impossible
to derive any exact information as to what measures Mr.
Hughes would support if he were elected.
“ Mr. Hughes’s most distinct announcement relates to
woman suffrage. Believing that inevitable, he declares in
favour of it now, but assigns as his reasons the bitterness
of women’s struggle for the suffrage and his apprehension
that a long-continued feminist agitation will obscure
normal issues. For a brave man, this seems a strange
submission to what he thinks destiny and an intemperate
agitation.”
President Eliot advised the voter to seek guidance in
the deeds of the Administration in comparison with those
of the four preceding administrations. He commended
its foreign policy and its preparedness programme, saying

of the latter that, in measures of preparedness, President
Wilson had gone further than any other American Presi
dent. He added: “ In regard to the provision of adequate
military and naval forces at whatever cost, President
Wilson is far in advance of the average American voter.
President Roosevelt’s martial temperament and emphatic
language brought little to pass.”
President Wilson, favoured by extraordinary circum
stances which he thoroughly understood, had brought
much to pass. He concluded with this striking statement:
“ The Democratic party has done such an extraordinary
amount of good work during the present Administration
that the period from 1912 to 1916 will be memorable in
the history of the United States.”
In my speeches, I summarized the achievements of the
Democratic party, particularly in the field of rural life,
pointed out the lack of constructive criticism and pro
gramme of the opposition, and touched upon a number of
topics which were being stressed by Republican speakers.
Some of the points I made are indicated in the extracts,
which I have inserted in Appendix I, to help give a pic
ture of the time.
Immediately after my return to Washington from Indi
ana, where I spent the last week of the campaign, two
days before the election, Tuesday, November 7th, I took
pains to get in touch with a high officer of the National
Democratic Committee to give him my impressions. In
substance, I said this to him:
“ The President will be reelected. The people know
that he has done a good job and they will not turn him
down; but the outcome will not be due to any excellence
of the Democratic organization as a whole or to the

efficiency of the Democrats as publicity experts. He will
be reelected in spite of the imperfection of the organization
locally and of the indifference of leading Democrats, es
pecially in Congress, in keeping the achievements of the
party before the public. The Republicans have the sup
port of the majority o f the publicity organs and have much
larger campaign funds than the Democrats, and the Demo
crats cannot hope to compete with them in general public
ity; but they do not even compete with them in directions
where funds are not required. They could very effectively
use the Congressional Record, but they do not do so.
Their opponents miss no opportunity to do so. They are
on the job every minute and make very effective use of a
free medium.

“ Furthermore, they do not rely so exclusively on in
tensive work during the few weeks preceding the election.
In my judgment, the Republicans will begin work the day
after the election. They will incessantly spread mis
representations as well as truth. They will organize
every precinct in America, and they will have the elec
tions of 1918 and 1920 won long before the nominations
are made. I apprehend that as usual the Democrats will
wait till it is too late and then depend on a whirlwind
drive. It is also a question how long they can stand pros
perity and continue to do team work and whether they
can stand much longer the strain of trying to follow a
leader who thinks as straight and objectively, who has so
little patience with personal politics and aspirations, and
who acts as courageously as Wilson does. I am not opti
mistic that they can or will, or that they will have the
foresight and energy to organize or the money to perfect
and support an organization.”

[216J

DRIFTING TOWARD WAR

The President's Peace Note— Disagreement with It — Unre
stricted Submarine Warfare— Sending Bemstorff Home

HEN we assembled in the Cabinet room at
half-past two, Friday, December 15, 1916, the
President promptly joined us. He had a docu
ment in his hand which he said he desired to
present to us for our criticism. He very pointedly asked
us to be very careful to say nothing about the note to any
body. “ Forget it,” he said, ‘*after you have heard it.
If necessary, say that there never was such a paper.” I
knew that he still had in mind what he had complained
of months before, namely, that certain members of the
Cabinet kept none of the Cabinet proceedings secret,
and that their heedlessness caused him no little em
barrassment. In fact, it was this singular conduct
which caused him to refrain from bringing matters to the
Cabinet which otherwise he would have been glad to
present; and yet, these very men with whom nothing was
confidential were the very ones who complained that he
did not bring more things before us.
The President referred to the German note of December
12th, in which Germany made a formal proposal “ to
enter forthwith into peace negotiations.” There had been
rumours of such a note, but there was nothing definite.
It turned out that the Central Allies desired neutrals to
[217]

transmit to the Entente Allies the information that they
desired peace and wished to know whether or not they were
desirous of entering into negotiations. The note was
thoroughly characteristic. It had an obvious self-assured
tone, and was so worded that, if the Allies had responded
favourably, Germany could have said to her people that,
since she was waging a defensive war, she had accom
plished her purpose and had come off victor.
The note which the President had prepared he pro
posed to send, not in reply or in response to this note of the
Central Allies, but in spite of it. For a long time he had
had in mind the matter of asking all the belligerents if they
wished to state or would state the terms on which they
might make peace. When he prepared his paper, he was
not thinking about this particular document of the Cen
tral Allies. He was really embarrassed, apparently, by
its appearance, but he was not to be turned aside from his
course. Others had had in mind some such plan as the
President proposed. More than a year before, Senator
Newlands had several times, in conversation with me,
very emphatically suggested that the Allies be sounded.
I assume that he took the matter up with the President,
but I do not know that he did so.
'Hie President said that he had come to the conclusion
that it was desirable to ask the nations to indicate their
views as to the terms on which the war might be con
cluded, and that he was fully conscious of the fact that
many people would represent that he was playing into
Germany’s hands. He read the note in full. In it he
took “ the liberty of calling attention to the fact that the
objects which the statesmen of the belligerents on both
sides havfe in mind in this war are virtually the same, as

stated in general terms to their own people and to the world."

He pointed out that, in measures to secure the future
peace of the world, the United States was as vitally in
terested as the belligerents, that it desired to cooperate
in the attainment of right ends when the war was over with
every resource, and that the war should be brought to a
speedy conclusion if civilization was to be saved a deadly
blow. The concrete objects for which the nations were
fighting had never been definitely stated. It was possible
that the warring nations were nearer together than was
supposed, and that a comparison of views might clear the
way for a conference, and that a permanent concord and
concert of nations might be immediately practicable.
It is to be noted that the President did not say in the
final note that the nations were fighting for the same things
but that the objects as stated by the leaders on both sides
to their people were in general terms the same, which is
a very different thing.
There was much discussion of the note. McAdoo and
I expressed strong doubts as to the wisdom of sending it.
We said that, in any event, it should not appear so soon
after the German note of the twelfth. McAdoo reiterated
his opposition to sending it. I urged that it be deferred
at least. I suggested that it would be resented and might
be regarded as an act of friendship toward Germany and
possibly as a. threat, and that, if anything was to be done,
the Entente Allies should merely be sounded to ascertain
whether or not such an inquiry would be agreeable to
them. The.President said: “ It may be wise to send noth
ing, but I will send this note or nothing.” With that I
sat back and said nothing* further.
I had it in mind to suggest modifications of certain
[219]

statements, but the matter seemed to be closed. I had
intended to suggest that if the note was to go forward he
should make it absolutely clear that he was not asserting
that he thought the belligerents were fighting for identical
things, but merely that the leaders on both sides appeared
to profess the same objects. This, I recognized, was what
the note did say, but I thought it should be brought out
more emphatically.
We adjourned without certain knowledge as to whether
or not the President would send the statement. I left the
city for New York, to spend the week-end. Of course,
I did not refer to the matter. The note appeared in the
papers Wednesday morning.
Soon after the note was published, when I returned to
Washington, I saw Maurice Low, correspondent of the
London Morning Post. He was very much disturbed and
angry about the note. He said to me that it would be re
sented by the Allies; that it was a peace move, that the
President had played into the hands of the Germans,
and that he had created a very delicate situation which
might become serious. I replied that he was unduly ex
cited. I protested that I could not speak for the President,
that I did not know all that was in his mind or that lay
behind the note, but that I presumed he had a faint hope
that, if the Allies and the Central Powers stated to the
world what they were fighting for, it might be discovered
that they were not far apart in what they would be willing
to set forth, and that a basis for a conference and peace
might be reached. I added that I had no such hope, but
that I was confident that the note would place the Allies
in a favourable tactical position. They would be able to
make a statement of their purposes, one which would ap[220]

peal to our own people and to the conscience of the world.
The Germans could not make any statement whatever, or,
at any rate, one which would not cause world-wide resent
ment. The further result would be the education or en
lightenment of the American people. They would be
brought to a fuller realization of the fact that the Allies
were waging a just war and fighting for a higher civiliza
tion. As we were profoundly affected, it was not inap
propriate that both sides should tell us directly and con
cretely what they stood for in their own way. Each
evidently valued our good opinion and wanted at least
our moral support. Low assented to this last statement
but asserted that we knew what each was fighting for and
that the Allies had stated their terms— “ full reparations,
complete restitution, and adequate guaranties.” I agreed
that they were fighting for these things and that they
ought to have them. “ Certainly,” I said, “ the Allies are
in the right— that is, Great Britain, France, and Belgium
are. I have been on their side since the first day the
Germans moved. They ought to win, and I believe they
will win, in the end; but I am not so blind as not to know
that they are not fighting merely for the three things
they proclaim. Their motives and purposes are very
complex. The British for a long time have been very
jealous of the growing commercial as well as of the growing
naval power of the Germans. Not unnaturally, they have
watched with apprehension the development of German
colonies. They are anxious about the Dardanelles, Asia
Minor, Egypt, and India. Great Britain intervened in
1878 to prevent the Turks from being driven out of Con
stantinople by the Russians. Great Britain, France, and
Belgium have acted nobly, but they have not acted from
[221]

single or simple motives, and when the war is over we shall
see evidence of the truth of it. If they win, we shall see a
great scramble. There have been other wars, and in all
of them there were complex motives and loud protesta
tions of unselfish aims.”
It will do the Allies no harm to state their purposes
again and more fully. Their terms will be approved by
most of our people. They will include the evacuation
and restitution of Belgium and France, the return of
Alsace-Lorraine, a new Poland, an enlarged Serbia, a
weakened Austria, the disappearance of the Turks from
Europe, and of Germany from Africa, the overthrow of
Prussian militarism, the safeguarding of backward na
tions, and some sort of international concert.
“ I believe that our people can be brought to join in
some concert of action based on just principles.” Low
interrupted me to say that our people would not join in
such an enterprise because they were too isolated and too
uninformed in international matters. I replied that they
could be educated; that they could be brought to support
a sound plan to underwrite a prevention of war; that they
would be willing to put the power of the nation back of
such a plan; but that they would have no enthusiasm for
larger military preparedness, for piling battalion on bat
talion or squadron on squadron, in a mad race for military
supremacy; and that they would not support the Allies
in a scramble for power or territory or aid in making it
possible for any one of them later to lord it over Europe or
over any other part of the world. The American people,
I added, would not welcome dictation even from one of the
Allies, and this nation itself did not wish to dominate any
body. It was sick of all that sort of mad business. It
[222]

merely wanted a clean national house for itself, peace
and law everywhere in the world, so that people every
where might prosper and nations might live together in
neighbourly fashion.
Low thought that it was more than doubtful whether
or not our people would ever cooperate with Europe in
any such fashion. A treaty would have to be made, and
the assent of the Senate would be required. The Senate
would not assent. Our Constitution stood in the way. I
expressed the belief that a plan could be worked out which
would not run counter to the Constitution, which would
still leave the ultimate determination of peace or war in
the hands of Congress, and which the people would sup
port. I asserted that it was a question of wise and
courageous leadership, a question whether the people in
such a matter would follow the leadership of the President,
Hughes, Taft, and Root, who seemed to be together on es
sentials. I added that, unless something of the sort came
out of the world tragedy, the sacrifices would have been
largely in vain and that I should be pessimistic about the
future.
Low left me, saying that he thought he would send to
his paper a statement giving the substance of what I had
said without in any way involving me.
He went to the British Ambassador and reported our
conversation; for when I got home the next afternoon,
Lady Spring-Rice was with Mrs. Houston. She said that
Low had spoken to her husband about our interview and
that the Ambassador was doing everything in his power
to place the note in a favourable light.
The reply of Germany, as well as that of the Allies,
confirmed my view. Germany stated no terms: She
[223]

merely offered to appoint delegates to a conference, which
was not at all what the President had suggested. The
joint note of the Allies, after protesting against the "as
similation” established in the American note between
the two groups of powers and saying that their objects
would not be given in detail until the hour of negotiations
outlined a number of adjustments which would be in
sisted upon, including the reorganization of Europe upon
a stable basis. Mr. Balfour himself wrote that a stable
peace could not be made till Germany was defeated, and
that three things were necessary for safety in the future:
plotting such as Germany had engaged in must end; the
Germans themselves must be brought to see that their
former unscrupulous, aggressive methods were wrong and
intolerable; and some international force must be created
to give sanction to law and treaties.
Apparently, Germany hoped to trap the Allies into a
peace which would spell victory for her, or failing that, she
proposed to resume unrestricted submarine warfare with
out running grave risk of drawing the United States into
the war. She was laying a predicate for such a course.
On January 16, 1917, I went to Cheyenne, Wyoming.
On my return trip, Tuesday the 23d, I picked up a paper
and found in it the President’s address to the Senate on
the duty of our government in the days when peace should
come and its terms should be fixed. The President had
said nothing before I left Washington about his purpose
to make this address to the Senate. His main points
were familiar. They had been made by him before in
various ways at different times, and had been a part of
his thought for many months.
It was not an easy note to interpret and it did not sur[224]

prise me that there was much criticism both of its sub
stance and of its phraseology. I could not presume to
know fully just what was back of it, but certain things were
clear. In guarded terms, he intimated his satisfaction
with the reply of the Allies and his disappointment over
that of Germany. He then projected his thought to the
period of adjustment following the end of the war and the
conclusion of treaties by the belligerents at its close. We
would have no voice at the time in determining the terms
of the peace, but something more, something larger would
be required to make the peace lasting and permanent,
something to be done by the nations in cooperation later.
We must indicate that we propose to use our influence
for such a concert of action, for a covenant of peace, an
underwriting to prevent another upheaval. This nation
must be educated and prepared in mind and resources.
He had outlined part of this address in his talk before the
League to Enforce Peace in May, 1916. The process of
education must continue. And further, if permanency of
peace was to be secured, the terms made by the belliger
ents must be just, and by speaking our view now we might
influence action in the direction of moderation and justice.
The New World must be considered by the belligerents
when they come to act. Mere terms of peace will not
suffice. Peace must be “ made secure by the organized
major force of mankind. It must not involve merely a
new balance of power. It must not be a mere crushing
of antagonists, a humiliating, hate-breeding peace. The
rights of small nations must be recognized and peoples
must not be handed about as so many cattle. There
must be freedom of intercourse among nations by land
and sea. Armament must be reduced and limited.

“ We must join the other civilized nations of the world
in this guarantee of peace; and, in doing so, we shall not
break with our traditions. We advocate extending our
Monroe Doctrine to all the world. This will be no en
tangling alliance or balance of power. It will be a com
mon concert of power for the welfare of the whole world.”
This was a logical sequence to the note asking the bellig
erents to state their terms. The major aim as I saw it
was, if possible, to commit them in advance of the out
come to a programme of moderation, to make it difficult
for either side later to think of new and extreme things to
demand, and in the second place, to win the people over
to the support of a just international concert of power
after the war. There was also, I imagine, in the Presi
dent’s mind, the possibility that we might be drawn into
the struggle; and he wished to warn the world and to have
our people informed as to what we would fight for.
So considered, I thought the address was noble and
timely, but I regretted the use of the phrase “ peace with
out victory” and the reference to the freedom of the seas.
I did not want to see a stalemate. I wanted to see Ger
many vanquished. I wanted to see terms forced upon
the Central Powers by the Allies, but I wanted, of course,
to see the terms just, reasonable, and designed to per
petuate peace. I realized the danger that the victor would
not be moderate and the value of cautions; and this I
supposed was what the President really meant to give.
I felt that the reference to the freedom of the seas was
unfortunate, because I had never heard any one even sug
gest how in time of war they could be free. They can
be free only when there is peace; and the only method I
have any knowledge of for keeping the seas free is to pre[226]

vent war among the great powers. No great nation in
time of war will fail to use its navy to prevent its enemy
from getting supplies or to protect its own. Free move
ment of all commerce in time of war is inconceivable.
The only remedy is to have no war.
On Friday, February 2, 1917, when I went to Cabinet
meeting, I realized that we might be facing the most mo
mentous issue in our experience and in the history of the
nation. I had heard a rumour that a German note had
come or was on the way, renouncing all her partial pledges
and recent practices and declaring her intention to engage
in unrestricted submarine warfare.
The note announced that beginning February 1st, a
new war zone would be established around Great Britain
and along the coast of France and Italy, and that any
ship found within it would be sunk without regard to life
or property. This zone extended 400 miles west of Ire
land and ran south to a point 900 miles west of Bordeaux.
The eastern half of the North Sea, a narrow strip on the
north coast of Spain, a space on Spain’s east coast in the
Mediterranean, and a lane to the coast of Greece were ex
empt. For Americans who wished to visit England, a
ship bearing a certificate from the government of the
United States that she carried no contraband, striped on
each side with three alternate red and white stripes a
meter wide, flying at each mast a large flag in white and
red, might sail along the fiftieth parallel to Falmouth in
Cornwall, provided she arrived on Sunday and departed
on Wednesday!!
This was the last word of a mad war lord— the farthest
limit of dictation. If we accepted it, we surrendered our
sovereignty and self-respect. When I heard its terms, I
[227]

knew that Uncle Sam would begin to take off his coat
and roll up his sleeves.
This note could have just one meaning for us. It
meant war and meant the beginning of the end for Ger
many. There had been rumours for some time that she
might pursue this course, but I could not believe that she
would be so stupid. There was no ground for believing,
in any event, that she would take such a course before the
beginning of spring. March 1st was the date suggested.
Why did she set February ist as the date, or why did she
make the decision at all?
Either she had really desired peace and thought she
could induce the Allies to make one largely on her own
terms and had been baulked, or she had made an insincere
bid for peace to lay a predicate for a barbarous method of
warfare, or she had made up her mind that, by the use of
the submarine, she could crush England quickly and then
deal with France before this country could make her power
felt. She could say to the neutrals: “ We wanted peace.
We tried to get it. Our adversaries are stubborn and
blind. They persist in their mad course. They are trying
to starve us. Two can play at this game. We are driven
to desperation. We must resort to extreme measures.
It is not our fault. Let the Allies take the consequences.
What else can we do? We cannot hold our hands and
tamely drift to destruction.” Or she was bluffing, which
was unlikely, or else she wanted by drawing us and per
haps other nations into the war to save her face, to say to
her people: '* 1 1 is no use. The world is against us. What
can we do? We must give in.”
The chances are that Germany’s leaders have made up
their minds that by using the submarine ruthlessly they

[228]

can starve England, get a quick decision, and dictate
terms. There are rumours that Germany has at last got
ready a large number of improved submarines, that she
feels that she can now do the job, and defy the world. It
is not unlikely that she was temporizing with us up to this
time because she was not ready, and that she is now pre
pared to practise what she before was afraid to do, that
she had no real intention of complying with our demands.
As we sat down, the President asked what we thought
should be done. “ Shall I break off diplomatic relations
with Germany?” He immediately followed this question
with a somewhat startling statement. He would say
frankly that, if he felt that, in order to keep the white
race or part of it strong to meet the yellow race— Japan,
for instance, in alliance with Russia, dominating China—
it was wise to do nothing, he would do nothing, and would
submit to anything and any imputation of weakness or
cowardice. This was a novel and unexpected angle.
Several of us immediately began to speak. McAdoo
did much talking. He was for prompt action. We must
act or swallow our brave words. Baker was much im
pressed with the President’s long look ahead, as was
Daniels. Redfield favoured action. Burleson, while re
minding us that the Allies were violating international
law, thought we should make good our warning to Ger
many and our implied pledge to our people. The Presi
dent observed that all these expressions were the result
of a natural impulse, but that they did not aid him greatly.
When it came to my turn to speak, I began by saying
that I was not apprehensive in the least about Japan, or
about Japan, Russia, and China combined; that they were
relatively weak intellectually, industrially, and morally;
[229]

and that at best, the danger from them was remote. I
continued:
“ We are now confronting a grave pressing menace.
Civilization is at stake. Justice and fundamental na
tional rights are involved. We must start from where we
are and take the next right step. Nothing worse can ever
befall us than what Germany proposes, and no greater
insult can be offered to any people. If we acquiesce, we
ought not to pose as a nation or as a free people. We
ought to invite the Kaiser to set up as our permanent
dictator. I have heard of nothing which Japan stands for
which I would not prefer. If we are capable of submit
ting, Japan or anybody else who would take us ought to
have us. WTe would not be worth saving. Granting that
the Allies have violated law and are not free from selfish
ness, normally, essentially they stand for law and order.
I am for asserting our rights, for standing with the Allies,
for doing our part for our sake and for humanity.”
The President said: “ Very well. That does not reach
far enough. What is the proposal ? What is the concrete
suggestion? What shall I propose? I must go to Con
gress. What shall I say?”
I replied: “ Do not wait to set out a full programme.
Immediately sever diplomatic relations and let come what
will. Tell Congress what you have done. Say that you
propose to protect American lives and rights. If neces
sary, ask for additional authority. Let our merchant
vessels arm. Let Allied vessels come freely into our
harbours. Aid the Allies with money, and, if necessary,
with the army and navy. These things would, of course,
involve action by Congress, including a declaration that a
state of war exists, but such action is not necessary for a
too]

severance of diplomatic relations and the arming of our
merchantment for defence.” After a little more discus
sion, we adjourned.
Saturday morning, I received a telephone message from
the White House that the President would address Con
gress. I hurried up to the Capitol and listened with
interest to his address announcing the severance of dip
lomatic relations.
And thus Bernstorff and his objectionable and perni
ciously active aids were set upon their way; and I thought
that the former went with no misgiving as to what his
walking papers meant. I believe he had warned his
government against dragging us into the struggle. He
knew the power of this country and I think he realized
that what the submarine might do to England would be
negligible compared to what we would do to Germany.
He apparently was confident that Germany would win if
this country was not drawn in.
In fact, Bernstorff tried to convince himself and others
that Germany had already won. About two weeks be
fore he was sent home, I went to a luncheon given by a
friend of mine at his home and, much to my surprise, I
found Bernstorff among the guests. After we went into
the smoking room, I was sitting a few feet from Bernstorff
and overheard him say to his companion, who seemed to
be quite sympathetic: “ Of course, you know that Germany
has won the war.” This was a trifle too much for me,
and so I quickly interposed and said: “ That is very in
teresting. How do you figure it out?” “ Why, can’t
you see,” he replied, “ that Germany’s armies are on for
eign soil everywhere and cannot be driven back? If they
move, it'will be forward. At worst, it can only be a stale

mate.” “ No,” I said, “ I cannot see it. Military history
has been my hobby for thirty years. I seem to recall that
more than one army has surrendered on foreign soil. Two
British armies surrendered in this country. I remember,
too, that Robert E. Lee, for four years, almost, marched
back and forth from the Rappahannock to the Potomac
and beyond, and then suddenly surrendered. There are
strange parallels in history. And then you must not
forget what Napoleon said about the English.” “ What
did he say?” he asked, with much show of interest. “ He
said,” I told him, “ that the English never had sense
enough to know when they were beaten.” Bernstorff
showed no resentment over what I said. He made no re
ply. We separated and I left the party.

THE CABINET’ S VIEWS ON THE WAR

McAdoo Strong for Action— Burleson: “ We Are at War”—
Baker for Universal Service— Letter of President Alderman of
the University of Virginia

N TUESDAY,February 6th, at Cabinet meeting,
the situation of our American merchantmen oc
cupied attention. Of course, they had a right
to go to sea, but would they exercise it, or would
they tie up in our ports? Would it be right to allow
them to take risks if they wished to do so? Should we re
quire ships to observe their mail contracts? It was sug
gested that the Postmaster General tell such ships to use
their discretion. I said that, if this was done, they should
be told that they might arm for defence and that the gov
ernment should advise them of their rights— that it was
necessary that they be told the policy of the government.
Some said that the government ought not to give any ad
vice. Others insisted that the situation was highly ab
normal and that to the shipowners should not be left the
responsibility of deciding the course of action. It was
decided that they be told that their rights were just the
same as if Germany had said nothing, and that they could
arm for defence.
At the meeting on Friday, the 9th, it was clear that the
shipping situation had not been cleared up. The ships
were not sailing. They were showing every sign of in12331

terning. They wanted further assurances and protection.
They wanted the United States to furnish arms and gun
crews. They could not otherwise get satisfactory guns or
efficient marksmen. It was suggested that we had power
to sell, lend, or give guns to them and to furnish crews.
The question of convoy was raised. Baker said that in
offensive merchantmen should not be exposed to danger.
It would be better to send naval vessels along and have a
clear test. It was customary to convoy and to guarantee
the safety of goods. We had to adjourn without arriving
at a final decision.
On Tuesday, the 13th, the shipping matter was again
immediately taken up. McAdoo was strong for action.
It would be folly to play into Germany’s hands by per
mitting our ships to tie up in ports. It was urgent that
they sail, and therefore that they be armed and provided
with trained gun crews without delay, and, if wise, be
convoyed. The question was raised as to the adequacy
of arming or convoying or both. It was asserted that
speed and manoeuvring would be the best protection, but
it was recognized that guns and crews were also desirable.
The President said that Governor McCall of Massachu
setts had called and had advised that the government go
slow. The people would approve delay for careful con
sideration. They did not wish precipitate action.
McAdoo was insistent. The President said that he
could not act as suggested, using a government instru
mentality, without going to Congress. Action might pre
cipitate war, and he did not wish to force the hand of
Congress. It was its province to determine the matter of
peace and war. McAdoo contended that the President had
power to take the course indicated, that delay would be

dangerous, and that if trouble came from exercising our
plain rights in the face of Germany’s illegal and offensive
dictation, the people would gladly face the consequences.
I agreed that action was necessary, and that the first
step was for the President to go to Congress and to go as
soon as possible. Several supported this view, and the
President assented.
On Friday, the 16th, the question was once more dis
cussed. The situation was more embarrassing and critical
but no determination was reached.
The following day, at the meeting of the Council of
National Defence, I had a talk with Lane. We agreed
that it was necessary that the President do something.
I discussed the situation with Baker. I said that the time
for action had come. We could no longer play into
Germany’s hands. “ It is obvious that the freedom of our
nation and of the world is at stake. We should side with
the Allies promptly and wholly. They are not unselfish,
but their brand of selfishness is much better than that of
Germany. I would rather see this nation side with the
Allies, go down to destruction with them if necessary, and
disappear from the map as a nation, than to see it exist and
prosper subject in the slightest degree to the dictation of
an arrogant mediaeval tyrant and his supporters.”- Baker
assented.
On the 23d, we again brought up the matter of arming
ships and the necessity of the President’s going to Congress.
McAdoo was emphatic in expressing his opinion that ships
ought to be armed. The President ought to go ahead,
Congress or no Congress. Action, prompt action, was
demanded. It was no time for hesitation and slow courses.
The President seemed to be somewhat netded by Mc

Adoo’s insistence and emphatic manner and language.
He said that things were being suggested which he had no
right or power to do as a constitutional executive and some
were apparently willing for him to assume the role of a
dictator. He added that, no matter what happened, he
would do nothing which savoured of dictatorship— that
the government would continue to be one of law.
I supported the view that there should be no further
delay, that the ships should be armed, and that the
President should go immediately to Congress and ask its
support.
The President inquired what I thought he should say to
Congress and what form of support he should seek. I
replied that he should lay the situation before that body,
point out how, on account of the uncertainty and danger,
our commerce was being destroyed, and say that since
Germany had plainly warned us that she would sink our
ships if they went about their business in lawful manner,
it was not right that we should ask them to sail unpro
tected, and that Congress should authorize him to furnish
them with guns and crews and any other necessary safe
guards.
There was much discussion. I insisted that it was
time to act. We had to face facts. We could not afford
to let Germany dominate us or cut England off and then
crush France. We would be next on her list. If she
starved England, we alone would stand for law and order
in the world. Germany would demand an abject sur
render from England. She would demand her fleet and
would take her colonies and a huge indemnity. She
would be the mistress of the world, and her arrogance and
ruthlessness would know no bounds.

The President, I felt, agreed with everything we said,
but appeared to take an attitude of resistance to make us
prove the case; and it was natural and wise that he should
do so, seeing that the final responsibility was his and
that it was a terrible thing to lead a great nation into such
a war. I felt confident that he held the same views that
we did.
Monday morning, the 26th, word was sent to me at my
office that the President would address Congress and that
it would be best to say little about it. After reviewing
the situation, the President remarked that the tying up
of our ships was Complete so far as we were concerned and
was what the Germans desired, but that no overt act had
occurred. It was clear, however, that if our ships were
spared it would be because of restraint unexpectedly ex
ercised by German commanders and not because of their
instructions. The situation was fraught with the gravest
dangers. Necessity for action might come at any mo
ment, if we were to defend our elementary rights. " It
would be most imprudent to be unprepared.”
The session and term of Congress were about to expire.
He desired its “ full and immediate assurance of the au
thority” which he might need at any moment to exercise.
“ No doubt,” he said, “ I already possess that authority
without special warrant of law, by the plain implication
of my constitutional duties and powers; but I prefer, in
the present circumstances, not to act upon general im
plication. I wish to feel that the authority and the power
of Congress are behind me in whatever it may be necessary
for me to do. We are jointly the servants of the people
and must act together and in their spirit, so far as we can
divine and interpret it.

"No one doubts what it is our duty to do. We must
defend our commerce and the lives of our people in the
midst of the present trying circumstances with discretion
but with clear and steadfast purpose. Only the method
and the extent remain to be chosen, upon the occasion,
if occasion should indeed arise.”
It was devoutly to be hoped that it would not be neces
sary to put armed forces into action anywhere. The
American people did not desire it. They would under
stand the spirit in which he was now acting. He desired
that the belligerents also should understand it. He was
the friend of peace and meant to preserve it for America
as long as he was able. He was not proposing war or
steps leading to it. War could come only from the wilful
acts and aggressions of others. He could not forecast
the form or method of action. The people would trust
him to act with restraint. He desired that Congress
authorize him “ to supply our merchant ships with de
fensive arms, should that become necessary, and with
the means of using them, and to employ any other instru
mentalities and methods that may be necessary and ade
quate to protect our ships and our people in their legiti
mate pursuits on the seas.” He was not thinking merely
of material interests. He was thinking also of rights
of humanity without which there was no civilization.
“ I cannot imagine any man with American principles at
his heart hesitating to defend these things.”
And yet, when the bill embodying his views was pre
sented, there was so much objection that its failure seemed
likely. There were two factions in temporary or perma
nent opposition. The regular Republicans led by Lodge
Criticized the President on the one hand for pursuing a

vacillating policy, and on the other for usurping power.
The pacifists, headed by La Follette, were opposed to any
resistance. Nothing could induce them to yield. I asked
Captain Bill McDonald, the Texan Ranger, who happened
to be in Washington at this time, what he thought ought
to be done. He said: “ I would give La Follette a swift,
hard kick where it would do most good and take his to
bacco away from him.”
The opponents, led by La Follette, filibustered till the
end of the session and defeated the measures; and during
this time an amendment was proposed by Cooper, the
ranking Republican member of the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, to prohibit the arming of munitions ships.
It received 124 votes in its favour to 295 against it. This
was not the unanimity which the President so much
desired or the spirit which he had a right to expect from
American citizens, particularly from those who held
positions of power. The regular Republican leaders
themselves had held a caucus on February 23d and had
decided to filibuster to defeat necessary measures in order
to force the President to call an extra session of Congress
after the Inauguration, another disturbing and petty ex
hibition of partisan spirit in the face of a grave national
crisis.
The action of the opposing forces ought to have been
a sufficient answer to those who complained that the
President was not moving fast enough; and his frequent
appearance before Congress to take the members into his
confidence should have been a complete refutation of the
assertion that he had usurped or desired to usurp power
and to make himself something of a dictator— a stupid
partisan misrepresentation.
to ]

The President properly characterized the action of the
filibuster group in the Senate. He stated that while 500
of the 531 members of the House were ready to act, the
Senate could not act because a group of 11 Senators said
it should not. “ The Senate of the United States is the
only legislative body in the world which cannot act when
the majority is ready for action. A little group of wilful
men, representing no opinion but their own, have rendered
the great government of the United States helpless and
contemptible. The only remedy is that the rules of the
Senate shall be so altered that it can act.”
On Inauguration Day, March 5th, I saw the President
in his room in the Capitol and talked with him about
the Senatorial filibuster. I asked him whether he was
about to be inaugurated President of the United States or
Poland. He knew what I meant and instantly answered:
“ Poland.” He commented on the vanity of La Follette
and the slipperiness of Stone.
In his Inaugural Address, the President devoted his at
tention almost exclusively to the foreign problems. The
chief thoughts in his mind were the part that this nation
should be ready to play when the war ended, the possibil
ity of our being drawn into the struggle, and the high need
of unity and genuine patriotic spirit.
“ We are making our spirits ready for those things,” he
declared. “ They will follow in the immediate wake of
the war itself and will set civilization up again. We are
provincials no longer. The tragical events of the thirty
months of vital turmoil through which we have just passed
have made us citizens of the world. There can be no
turning back. Our own fortunes as a nation are involved,
whether we would have it so or not.” He pointed out
[040!

again the things we would stand for in peace or in war.
Upon such a platform we could stand together.
“ And it is imperative that we should stand together.
We are being forged into a new unity amidst the fires
that now blaze throughout the world. In their ardent
heat we shall, in God’s providence, let us hope, be purged
of faction and division, purified of the errant humours of
party and of private interest, and shall stand forth in the
days to come with a new dignity of national pride and
spirit. Let each man see to it that the dedication is in
his own heart, the high purpose of the nation is in his own
mind, ruler of his own will and desire. . . . The thing
I shall count upon, the thing without which neither coun
sel nor action will avail, is the unity of America, an
America united in feeling, in purpose, and in its vision of
duty, of opportunity, and of service. . . . For my
self, I beg your tolerance, your countenance, and your
uni ted aid. The shadows that now lie dark upon our path
will soon be dispelled, and we shall walk with the light
all about us if we be but true to ourselves— to ourselves
as we have wished to be known in the counsels of the world
and in the thought of all those who love liberty and justice
and the right exalted.”
The Congress having failed to take action on the re
quest of the President that it lend its support directly to
the arming of our ships, the President, after asking for an
opinion from the Attorney General as to his powers in
the matter and receiving one to the effect that he had the
power to act, directed that guns and gunners be placed
on merchant ships, and an announcement was made on
March 9th that this would be done.
At Cabinet meeting, Tuesday, March aoth, the Presi

dent said that he had two matters or questions on which
he wanted our advice. Should he call Congress in extra
session before April 16th, the date set? What should he
say to it? He reviewed the situation and remarked that
it might look as if he were calling the body together to
tell it what he had done. Doubtless, he had power to do
more. Unquestionably, Germany had committed a num
ber of overt acts. He had directed that the ships be
armed. He could spend and was spending $i 15,000,000.
The War and Navy departments are very active. What
is the next step? He paused. No one else seemed in
clined to say anything, so I began:
“ To answer both questions, it is necessary to decide
whether we wish to do more than has been done and what
it should be. I think we should do much more. Ger
many is now making war on us. She has been making
war on us for some time, sinking our ships, even our empty
ships homeward bound, and killing our citizens. We see
what she is trying to do against us in Mexico. We ought
to recognize that a state of war exists. What can we do?
We can get a big army and navy started. We can further
prepare financially. We are organizing industrially.
First of all, find out from the Allies just what aid we can
most quickly and effectively give. The quickest way to
hit Germany is to help the Allies. The thinking of many
of our people is crude. They are discussing only a large
army, and that as if it were part of a permanent policy.
That is one thing— a long way off. We shall need a large
army quickly, but in the meantime, we must give other
help. Get supplies to the Allies. Help with our navy.
Hurry up with submarines and submarine destroyers.
Build ships, multitudes of ships for freight, very fast ships,

not necessarily big ones. Extend liberal credits to the
Allies. Send to France regulars who can be spared from
training our new army. Send them ‘to return the visit
of Rochambeau.’ ” I said that I was quoting the French
Ambassador with whom I had dined Sunday. He had
said to me: “ I do not know whether you will enter the
war or not, but if you do, we shall not expect you— and I
am sure that I am speaking the sentiments of my govern
ment— to send any men to France except a detachment,
for sentimental reasons, to return the visit of Rocham
beau. We shall want you to aid us mainly on the sea and
with credits and supplies.”
Baker said he thought that immediate steps should be
taken, or that the country would demand that immediate
steps be taken, to raise a great army and that universal
training be inaugurated. I added that I was in favour of
both, but that in the meantime other things could be done.
I suggested that Congressional sanction would be required
for the things I thought should be done. It should first
of all recognize that a state of war existed. Even if that
step was not to be taken, it was desirable to have the
Legislative branch in thorough understanding and accord
with the Executive. We were drifting. Why delay two
weeks? Call Congress and ask it to declare that a state of
war existed, to pass the necessary legislation, and to vote
the needed appropriations or authorizations. There
could be no halfway measures. War could not be waged
mildly.
McAdoo spoke to the same effect, indicating many do
mestic matters which would need immediate attention.
Lansing said little or nothing, as usual. Wilson, Secretary
of Labour, said that he had reluctantly made up his mind

that action had to be taken. We were at war. Congress
should be called to declare that it existed. Gregory and
Baker and Redfield expressed the same opinion. Lane
said nothing. Burleson and Daniels had not spoken.
The President said: “ Burleson, you and Daniels have
said nothing.”
Burleson replied quietly: “ We are at war. I am in fa
vour of calling Congress at the earliest moment. ”
Daniels gave us the views of the naval experts.
The President said that the principal things which had
occurred since he had last addressed Congress which dif
fered, except in degree, from what had been discussed,
were the Russian Revolution, the talk of more liberal in
stitutions in Germany, and the continued reluctance of
our ships to sail. If our entering the war would hasten
and fix the movements in Russia and Germany, it would
be a marked gain to the world and would tend to give
additional justification for the whole struggle, but he could
not assign these things as reasons for calling Congress at
an earlier date. The justification would have to rest on
the conduct of Germany, the clear need of protecting our
rights, of getting ready, and of safeguarding civilization
against the domination of Prussian militarism.
I remarked that he would not have to determine the de
tails of his address or his exact recommendations till a
few days later, but that what he had said was sufficient.
The entire Cabinet was definitely in favour of going to
the mat with Germany and of going immediately and with
all the nation's power.
Events moved very rapidly. In a few days, the Russian
Revolution was under way; the British were advancing
up the Tigris; and the railroad strike was called for Satur

day but was postponed for forty-eight hours, when con
cessions were made.
Of these things, the Russian Revolution was the most
important, dramatic, and far reaching. The question is
whether it will stick and whether the new government
can and will wage war effectively against the Germans.
Another question is whether or not the revolutionary spirit
may not extend to Austria and Germany and assist in
undermining the morale of the people in those countries.
Certainly, it will abate their fear of the Russians. The
Russians ought to be able to carry on. The Church is
with the Revolution. Russia got rid of serfdom peace
ably. Her people have experience, especially in local
cooperation. She ought to be able to push the war.
France waged war successfully, after her revolution,
against a large part of Europe. But France had to fight
for her freedom. The Russians may say that they have
won their freedom and that there is nothing to be gained
by fighting longer.
On Wednesday, the 21st, the President called Congress
to meet on April 2d. At the Cabinet meeting, Friday,
March the 23d, the time was consumed in discussing rou
tine matters of preparation, particularly with legislation
which it would be necessary for Congress to pass.
Next day, March 24th, there was an important meeting
of the Council of National Defence. Much excellent
work had been done by the various agencies of this body,
and reports of progress were received and considered.
The Advisory Committee said that it desired to go on rec
ord in favour of getting ready an army of 1,000,000 men
and of universal military training. It was stated that the
President’s thought seemed to be that the regular army

should be raised immediately to its full quota, that the
militia should be thoroughly prepared, and that we should
have 500,000 volunteers. If volunteering failed, we
should resort to conscription. We were not in position to
waste time debating a permanent policy. It might be a
waste not only of time now, but of time after the war
closed, because the nations might be induced to disarm
in large measure.
The majority of the members of the Council strongly
objected to the volunteer idea and advocated the draft.
One member questioned the wisdom of resorting to the
draft and another emphatically opposed it.
I advocated compulsory training. I strongly objected
to volunteering on the ground that it was undemocratic
and wasteful. It is unjust to allow those to fight our bat
tles who have the vision to see and appreciate the issues,
and the character and patriotism to offer their lives; and
to permit those who are slow to remain in security. We
cannot afford to have our most eager men swept away as
England did. Volunteering is unjust. It is also inade
quate and unsafe in modem war, especially where great
numbers have to be raised and trained quickly. It has
been ruinous in every other war in which we have en
gaged. It is likewise much more costly in dollars and
cents. Compulsion alone permits the requisite selection
of men and their designation for tasks which are essential
and for which they are best fitted.
The Chairman, Secretary Baker, said that he would
present our views strongly to the President.
At Cabinet meeting, Friday, March 30th, we had a long
discussion of the handling of the interned German ships.
The opinion was unanimous that their crews ought to be
[046]

taken off and that the vessels should be requisitioned.
The discussion turned on the method of taking the crews
off quietly and suddenly. Any other nation but this and
England would have taken them off directly by the use of
soldiers or marines. But we had to do the thing legally
or under the guise of legality. It was suggested that the
Department of Labour could act under the Immigration
Laws on the assumption that the aliens were in our ports,
that they could be admitted to the United States, and
could then be interned!! This seemed to be a feasible
course, and it was agreed that the army and navy might
cooperate with the immigration authorities in the task.
The President raised the question of the sentiment of
the country. It was our view that the country would be
back of the government in a declaration that a state of
war existed. I made a report as to the state of mind in
the Middle West. On Tuesday, I had read to the Cabinet
this letter from President Alderman of the University of
Virginia:'
University of Virginia, Charlottesville,
Office of the President,
March 22, 1917.
Hon. D. F. Houston,
Department of Agriculture,
Washington, D. C.
My

dear

ou sto n :

I quite appreciate your position, and we will simply
hope that you can come. With all your burdens, no one
should expect much from you.
I do wish I could talk with you about the world situa
tion. I think about it all the time. I believe it to be our
[2 4 7 ]

duty, as a nation now, as a matter of self-interest, as a mat
ter of national honour, as a matter of future world in
fluence, and as a matter of keeping quick and vital the
national spirit and the national conscience, to go to war
with Germany, unless the present control of the German
Government sees fit to cease its methods of crime and
aggression.
Of course, we are at war with Germany, or rather, they
are at war with us. You know my admiration and con
fidence and affection for the President. In the first place,
his knowledge of the real facts goes far beyond anything
we outsiders can appreciate; and, in the second place, he
has great power of analysis, calmness of judgment, cool
ness of mind, and a great background of knowledge and
understanding. I never permit myself to criticize him,
even as a friend, because I have a feeling that in the end
it will be shown that he is right. I can understand his
aversion to carrying a nation into war that does not want
to be carried into war. But he never said a truer thing
than when he said that no great war could hereafter occur
without our participation. In my judgment that applies
to 1917 as well as to some future date.
The President has been patient; he has been reasonable;
he has preserved our dignity and honour; but I do not
think it can be done longer without a frank resort to force.
Personally, of course, I have never drawn a neutral breath
since August i, 1914. I believe that the victory of the
present German system would mean the deadliest blow
that democracy has ever received in its splendid progress
in human society. I believe our destiny is not to serve the
world at this juncture by a soft mediation, but by the use
of righteous force at the decisive moment to help turn the
[248]

tide as between the ideals of democratic society and the
ideals of autocratic society; and if we do go to war, I pray
we shall go at it like practical people, seeing war as war,
and using every weapon and forming every alliance, tem
porary though they may be, and taking every step that
can in honour be taken to achieve a victory for democracy
and end the present mad condition of affairs in the world.
If it means expeditionary force, large numbers of destroy
ers, participation in the active fighting in the war zone,
we should go to it under the best advice our experts can
give. If it means credit and food and all sorts of economic
aid, then that is the direction to take. Delicacy and dally
ing do not go down with the Prussian. Force and fear
are his controlling motives, and he understands no psy
chology that is not tied up with these impulses. I confess
it is the situation after the war, no matter which way the
tide turns, that makes me feel that we should go in for
thoroughgoing reorganization of our life on a basis of
defensive preparation. This, of course, is against all of
my predilections and traditions, but I have been driven
to it by the unfolding of events.
I thought these people might be bluffing, as they are
great bluffers, until the sinking o f the last three ships. I
am in favour of universal service, and I believe the coun
try wants action now. The country trusts the President.
They know that he is a patriot with a vision and with a
heart, but if he should now act simply, direcdy, forcefully,
the heart and pride and spirit of this whole nation will
rise to his leadership and to his call in a way that might
astound him in its devotion and purpose.
It is time now, I believe, to sound the tocsin, and no man
can sound it, if he so wills, so effectively as the President.

I wish I could talk with you about this matter. One
cannot dictate without consciousness that he is speaking
ineffectually about such a great matter.
Give my love to Mrs. Houston and to Charlie Crane,
if he is in reach.
Faithfully yours,
(Signed) E. A. Alderman.
President.
I added that it was unnecessary for me to say again that
I thought the time for debate had passed and the time for
strong, vigorous action had come— that I fully agreed with
Alderman.
It was recognized that there would be a great many dis
affected individuals, and that precautions which had al
ready been discussed and taken, such as the guarding of
railways, tunnels, ports, and important buildings, should
be followed up and strengthened. It was also, however,
confidently believed that no situation would develop
which could not be readily handled.
We adjourned, feeling confident that the President
would recommend the declaration of the existence of a
state of war, and that the nation would pledge all its re
sources to the prosecution of the struggle to a speedy end.
As we were leaving the Cabinet meeting, someone asked
me what I would do if the President should decide not to
take up Germany’s challenge or to go before Congress.
I replied that I was not in the least apprehensive about
the course he would take, and that there was no use in
wasting time speculating about the matter. I added
that, if by any chance he should not act, there would be
such a fundamental difference of attitude on a vital issue
[250!

that the only decent course open to me would be to
resign and let the President put somebody in my place
whose views accorded with his. I suggested that it
would be very unfortunate even to raise such a question
or to refer to it on the outside, as rumours would quickly
spread that there had been or was any doubt whatever.
In the afternoon, when I got back to my office, feeling
that the President in the hour of his great trial and re
sponsibility would not object to a word of sympathy and
support, and to comply with my promise to send him a
copy of Alderman’s letter, I wrote the following note, en
closing the letter:
March 30, 1917.
D ea r M r . P r e s id e n t :

I am sending you Alderman’s letter. I promised to
leave it with you but neglected to do so.
Alderman, as usual, expresses himself very admirably.
He says many things that we here think and feel. I think
it is strikingly true that the great mass of the American
people trust you. They trust you so completely that they
have not thought it necessary to advise you. They have
assumed that you know the situation and the facts better
than they do. I think that the overwhelming sentiment
is in favour of going forward and of taking a strong course.
The only alternative to a strong forward course is to recede
from our former position, to shut ourselves off from inter
national affairs, and to confine ourselves within our own
borders. This is impossible. One result would be to
run the risk of leaving democracy to the tender mercies
of the Central autocracies. I do not believe that we can
niorally longer throw the responsibility for safeguarding

civilization on England and France. The time for debate,
as it seems to me, has passed. I believe that the course
of action you wish the country to follow should be out
lined not in passionate, but yet in very strong and forceful
terms. “ It is time now, I believe, to sound the tocsin.”
I know the case is difficult to state, and yet I believe it is
a very strong one.
Faithfully yours,
D. F. H o u s t o n .
The President,
The White House.

TH E

W AR M ESSAG E

Its Dramatic Setting— Chief Justice White's Approval—
Methods of Meeting Crisis— Organization of the Food Supplies
of the Country
ONDAY evening, April 2d, will stand out in my
mind as the date of the most dramatic scene I
ever witnessed and of the most historic episode
in which I ever had any part. That evening,
the President, at half-past eight o’clock, appeared before
the Joint Session of Congress to advise that body to de
clare that the recent course of Germany was nothing less
than war against the government and the people of the
United States.
The Hall of the House of Representatives was crowded.
The floor was occupied by the members of the House and
the Senate, the Diplomatic Corps, the Supreme Court,
and the Cabinet. The Cabinet was seated as usual in
the front seats at the left side of the Speaker’s desk and
the diplomats were placed immediately back of the
Cabinet. Seats for the Supreme Court had been placed
in the pit in a half circle just in front of the Speaker; and
the members of that body were in their places on either
side of the Chief Justice. The galleries were packed.
There was an air of tenseness and expectancy. The
President had been escorted to the Capitol by a body of
cavalry to protect him from possible annoyance by paci-

fists who had tried to bank themselves around the ap
proaches to the Capitol. This was a very unusual incident
and added to the tenseness of the occasion.
As the President entered, he was given an ovation. As
I was standing with the others while the demonstration
lasted, I glanced around and bowed to Spring-Rice and
Jusserand, who were expectant and happy.
The President began reading as soon as quiet prevailed;
and, as he proceeded, I found myself watching Chief
Justice White, who sat a very short distance in front and
to the left of me. I knew what his reaction would be,
but I did not anticipate that he would show his emotions
so strikingly. Several times I had talked to him about the
war. Shortly after England entered the war, he came up
to me one evening at a social gathering, put his hand on
my shoulder, and said in a low voice: “ I wish I were thirty
years younger. I would go to Canada and volunteer.”
He listened with interest to the President’s review of the
submarine controversy. When the President said: “ The
present German submarine warfare against commerce is
a warfare against mankind,” he gave a vigorous nod. He
repeated it when the President added: “ It is a war against
all nations. . . . The challenge is to all mankind.”
He listened with evident satisfaction to the statement
characterizing armed neutrality as ineffectual, as “ likely
only to produce what it was meant to prevent,” and as
practically certain to draw us into the war without either
the rights or the effectiveness of belligerents. But when
the President said: “ There is one choice we cannot make,
we are incapable of making: We will not choose the path of
submission,” he did not wait to hear the rest of the sen
tence. He was on his feet instantly leading the Supreme

Court and the entire assembly. His face was a study.
It worked almost convulsively and great tears began to
roll down his cheeks. From that moment to the end he
was vigorously applauding everything. He had a pro
found realization of the issues at stake and particularly
of the part England had played in the world, of the
meaning of her institutions, and of the menace to the
world of her overthrow by Germany. He knew what war
meant, having been a soldier in the Civil War, and he was
willing and anxious to stand the horrors of war again for
vital principles.
From time to time, also, I looked at the next most in
teresting figure in the audience, John Sharp Williams.
He, too, was a study. He sat, huddled up, listening atten
tively and approvingly, with one hand to his ear, removing
it frequently for an instant, just long enough to give a
single clap, for fear of missing something. And he was
well advised, for no other address to a legislative body
was ever better worth listening to. Its words rang
then and they will continue ringing for many years to
come.
The President did not omit to indicate methods and
measures. In particular he approved the “ principle of
universal liability to service” and the meeting of the ex
penses so far as was equitable “ by the present generation,
by well-conceived taxation. . . . It is our duty, I
most respectfully urge, to protect our people so far as we
may against the very serious hardships and evils which
would be likely to arise out of inflation which would be
produced by vast loans.” He drew a distinction between
the German people and their government just as he had
between the Mexicans and theirs; and he found added hope

[2551

E IG H T Y E A R S

W IT H

W IL S O N ’ S C A B IN E T

for future peace in the heartening things that had hap
pened in Russia in the few preceding weeks.
It was particularly interesting to me to hear him say
that his own thought had not “ been driven from its habit
ual and normal course by the unhappy events of the last
two months” and that he “ had exactly the same things in
mind” that he had when he addressed the Senate in
January. He had been preparing to meet the change in
circumstances and had systematically indulged in a cam
paign of education of this nation and of the world.
This message was striking in its boldness and complete
ness. It was obvious that it would greatly impress and
stimulate our people and hearten the Allies. It was
worth many battalions.
As I passed the President, after the session had ad
journed, I congratulated and thanked him and remarked
that if it was any comfort to him I could tell him that I
had been watching the Supreme Court, that it had on the
spot unanimously given him a favourable verdict as to
the constitutionality of his proposal and as to the right
eousness of his cause, and that it would give a favourable
verdict on any proposal necessary and designed to
beat the Germans. He smiled, thanked me, and passed
on.
When, on April 6, 1917, the existence of a state of war
with Germany was declared by Congress, this country
was facing an unsatisfactory situation in respect to its
supply of foods and feedstuffs. The production in 1916
of the leading cereals, com, wheat, oats, barley, rye, buck
wheat, rice, and kafir was comparatively low, aggregating
4.806.000.000 bushels, as against 6,010,000,000 for 1915*
4.983.000.000 for 1914, and 4,884,000,000, the annual
[256]

average for 1910-1914. The wheat crop of 1916 especially
was strikingly small. It was only 639,886,000 bushels
as compared with the record production for 1915 of
1.026.000.000. with 891,000,000 for 1914, and with the
average for the five years 1910-1914 of 728,000,000. It
was certain, too, that on account of adverse weather con
ditions, the output of winter wheat for 1917 would be
greatly curtailed. The world production of wheat for
1916 also was unsatisfactory, and the prospects for the en
suing year were not good. The situation was no better in
respect to another conspicuously important food product,
the Irish potato. The yield of this crop for 1916 in the
United States was only 285,437,000 bushels, while for
1915 and 1914, respectively, it was 359,721,000 and
409.921.000. For the period 1910-1914 it averaged
360.772.000.
Even in normal times public attention fixes itself par
ticularly on the supply of wheat. In time of war it does
so much more intensely. Wheat is peculiarly important
from a military point of view. Because of the wheat
shortage here and elsewhere and of the large foreign de
mand, apprehension and, in some quarters, hysteria devel
oped. The supply of meats and of poultry and dairy
products was somewhat larger than in the years immedi
ately preceding, but the foreign demand was great and in
creasing, and exports were steadily rising. It was obvious
that the supply of feedstufFs would not be normally
abundant, and that it would be difficult to maintain the
usual number of live stock and practically impossible
within a reasonable time to increase it. Then, too, com
petitive purchasing by foreign agencies on a large scale
of all food products was prevalent, and speculation was

rife. Prices were mounting rapidly and conditions of liv
ing were becoming more difficult.
It was recognized, even before we entered the war,
that the food problem was serious and that constructive
action was necessary. The Department of Agriculture
accordingly had taken steps to allay unnecessary appre
hension, to promote economy and thrift, to secure fuller
conservation of farm products and of foods, and to insure
increased production of all essential agricultural commodi
ties. The many agricultural agencies of the nation began
to direct attention to these problems and to cooperate
effectively with the Department. The increased need of
this nation and of the world for food from our farms and
the importance of greatly increasing production were em
phasized. In the South, in particular, where effectivework
had been done for years to secure a diversified agriculture
and greatly to increase yields of staple commodities,
and where unusual opportunities to increase food prod
ucts were presented, a special campaign was conducted
by the Department in cooperation with agricultural col
leges and other agencies, with the effective aid of the daily
press, agricultural journals, farmers’ associations, bankers,
and other business men. Many pertinent bulletins and
circulars were distributed. The farm-demonstration ma
chinery was fully utilized. More energetic action every
where was taken to combat plant and animal diseases.
In January, 1917, appeals were sent to the South to help
feed the nation, to supply its own necessities so far as
possible, and to produce a surplus of foodstuffs. It was
utged especially that each farm family make a home
garden, plant enough com to last the family and the live
stock for a year, raise sufficient oats and other small grain
[258]

to supplement the corn, as well as the necessary hay and
forage crops for the live stock, produce the meat, poultry,
and dairy products required by the family, and at the
same time devote adequate attention to cotton as the
main money crop.
In February, special emphasis was laid on the necessity
of raising beet seed on a large scale to make certain a larger
supply of sugar beets. It was pointed out that, before the
war, the beet-sugar industry had been almost wholly de
pendent on Europe for its seed supply, and that superior
seed could be produced in this country, which could be
further improved by selection and breeding. About the
same time, a warning was issued to cattle owners to make
arrangements for the proper feeding of their cattle until
spring, in order toprevent heavy losses in breedinganimals.
In each instance suggestions as to the methods to be fol
lowed were offered.
In March, it became certain that a large percentage of
wheat in the West and Pacific Northwest had been winter
killed. Information as to the course to be pursued was
issued to the farmers of the winter-wheat section. It was
suggested that, where the crop had been not more than
half killed, it might be advisable to let the remainder grow,
but that some other food crop should be started without
delay.
In the meantime, I had appointed a committee of
specialists of the Department to study the whole agri
cultural situation and to make recommendations. On
March 27th, an appeal was made to farmers to adopt
measures to secure maximum returns from the farms.
Special attention was directed to the necessity of careful
seed selection, of controlling plant and animal diseases,

and of conserving farm products through proper storage,
canning, drying, and preserving. On April 5th a special
plea was made for an increased production of corn and
hogs, and on April 7th the farmers were urged to increase
the output of staple commodities as well as of perish
ables.
On April 4th, two days before a state of war with Ger
many was declared, I telegraphed to the state commission
ers of agriculture and presidents of the Land Grant
colleges— the official agricultural representatives of the
several states— inviting them to a conference in St. Louis
on April 9 and 10, 1917. Editors of farm journals were
asked to meet at the same place on April nth. It was
thought to be highly desirable to secure the views of the
official agricultural representatives of the states and of
other leaders of agricultural opinion. There was a gener
ous response to the invitation. Very many of the state
commissioners of agriculture and representatives of nearly
all the agricultural colleges east of the Rocky Mountains
were present at the two-days*‘ meeting. Sixty-five offi
cials represented thirty-two states. On the third day,,
about seventy-five representatives of the agricultural
press were present. A similar conference for the states
west of the Rocky Mountains was held at my request at
Berkeley, California, on April 13th, under the leadership
of President Benjamin Ide Wheeler of the University of
California.
At the St. Louis conference, the entire agricultural situ
ation presented by the emergency was thoroughly dis
cussed. The major problems considered were the pro
duction of sufficient foods and feedstuffs, not only for this
country, but also for the nations of Europe with which we

were associated in the war, the conservation of farm prod
ucts and of foods, the mobilization of farm labour, the
regulation of storage and distributing agencies, and the
further organization of all the nation’s agricultural in
strumentalities— national, state, and local. A compre
hensive programme for execution under existing law and
for additional legislation was unanimously adopted. This
programme was communicated to the Berkeley conference,
which concurred in it. It is noteworthy that, in two days,
the agricultural leaders of the country drew up a pro
gramme the wisdom of the essential features of which has
not been successfully questioned and the substantial part
of which was embodied in two bills. The prompt and
effective handling of the situation was made possible by
reason of the fact that the American people, generations
before, had wisely laid the foundations of many agricul
tural institutions and had increasingly liberally supported
them. The nation was fortunate in having had in exist
ence for many years, for the purpose of promoting scienti
fic and practical agriculture, its Federal Department of
Agriculture, and a department of agriculture and a LandGran t college in each state, as well as great farmers* or
ganizations. It is further interesting to note that two
of these agencies, the Federal Department and the LandGrant colleges, had their national official recognition and
their real origin in another period of stress— in 1862— in
two acts of Congress approved by Abraham Lincoln.
It was recognized as of special importance that the
views and cooperation of the great farmers’ organizations
of the nation and of leading individual farmers be secured.
Representative farmers were therefore invited to come to
Washington on April 23d to give advice and to make rec[261]

ommendations. They included mainly officials of the
National Grange, the Farmers’ Educational and Cooper
ative Union, the Gleaners, and the Farmers’ National
Congress. The American Society of Equity was invited
to send a representative. It was unable to do so, but
proffered its cooperation.
In the meantime, pending action by Congress, the Fed
eral Department of Agriculture, the state departments, the
I-and-Grant colleges, and other agencies actively devoted
their attention to the immediate task in hand. Working
in close cooperation with one another and with the
farmers’ organizations throughout the nation, they im
mediately took steps to execute that part of the plan
which had reference to a more perfect organization and
coordination of the nation’s agricultural activities. The
task was promptly undertaken of promoting in each
state, in connection with the state council of safety, the
organization of a small central division of food production
and conservation composed of representatives of the
State Board of Agriculture, of the Land-Grant College, of
fanners’ organizations, and of business agencies. It was
suggested, also, that similar bodies should be created in
each local subdivision, and all were requested to devote
their energies to the problem of increasing the production
and conservation of food supplies and of promoting more
orderly and economical marketing. Copies of the rec
ommendations of the St. Louis conference and of those
made to the Senate on April 18th were sent to the Gover
nor of each state. It was urged that attention be given
immediately to the perfecting of agricultural organizations
along the lines indicated.
As a further step in organization, the Council of Na[262]

tional Defence on April 5th invited Mr. Herbert Hoover
to return to this country to advise with the Council in
reference to the domestic handling of food supplies and
the most effective ways of assisting the European nations
with which we are cooperating to satisfy their food ne
cessities.
At the Cabinet meeting, Friday, April 13th, immedi
ately after my return from St. Louis, I asked the Presi
dent to make an appeal through the agricultural press to
the farmers of the nation to increase their production and
to practise conservation. He said that it was a good sug
gestion, but that perhaps it would be better to make a
broad appeal to all classes, that he would draw up one,
that if I would furnish him agricultural material, he would
incorporate it, and that I might segregate the parts bear
ing on agriculture and send the matter to the farm
papers. I decided to telegraph the entire appeal to such
papers, and when an advance copy reached me before its
appearance on April 16th, it was wired to all the leading
agricultural journals. The paragraphs addressed to the
farmers were as follows:
“ These, then, are the things we must do, and do well,
besides fighting— the things without which mere fighting
would be fruitless.
"W e must supply abundant food for ourselves and for
our armies and our seamen not only, but also for a large
part of the nations with whom we have now made common
cause, in whose support and by whose sides we shall be
fighting. . . .
“ I take the liberty, therefore, of addressing this word
to the farmers of the country and to all who work on the
farms: The supreme need of our own nation and of the
[263]

nations with which we are cooperating is due abundance
of supplies, and especially of foodstuffs. The importance
of an adequate food supply, especially for the present year,
is superlative. Without abundant food, alike for the
armies and the peoples now at war, the whole great enter
prise upon which we have embarked will break down and
fail. The world’s food reserves are low. Not only during
the present emergency, but for some time after peace
shall have come, both our own people and a large propor
tion of the people of Europe must rely upon the harvests in
America. Upon the farmers of this country, therefore, in
large measure, rests the fate of the war and the fate of the
nations. May the nation not count upon them to omit
no step that will increase the production of their land or
that will bring about the most effectual cooperation in the
sale and distribution of their products? The time is
short. It is of the most imperative importance that every
thing possible be done and done immediately to make
sure of large harvests. I call upon young and old alike
and upon the able-bodied boys of the land to accept and
act upon this duty— to turn in hosts to the farms and
make certain that no pains and no labour are lacking in
this great matter.
"I particularly appeal to the farmers of the South to
plant abundant foodstuffs as well as cotton. They can
show their patriotism in no better or more convincing way
than by resisting the great temptation of the present price
of cotton and helping, helping upon a great scale, to feed
the nation and the peoples everywhere who are fighting
for their liberties and our own.
“ The Government of the United States and the govern
ments of the several states stand ready to cooperate.

They will do everything possible to assist farmers in se
curing an adequate supply of seed, an adequate force
of labourers when they are most needed, at harvest time,
and the means of expediting shipments of fertilizers and
farm machinery, as well as of crops themselves when har
vested. The course of trade shall be as unhampered as
it is possible to make it, and there shall be no unwar
ranted manipulation of the nation's food supply by those
who handle it on its way to the consumer. This is our
opportunity to demonstrate the efficiency of a great De
mocracy and we shall not fall short of it!
“ This let me say to the middlemen of every sort,
whether they are handling our foodstuffs, or our raw ma
terials of manufacture, or the products of our mills and
factories: The eyes of the country will be especially upon
you. This is your opportunity for signal service, efficient
and disinterested. The country expects you, as it expects
all others, to forego unusual profits, to organize and expe
dite shipments of supplies of every kind, but especially
of food, with an eye to the service you are rendering and
in the spirit of those who enlist in the ranks, for their peo
ple, not for themselves. I shall confidently expect you to
deserve and win the confidence of people of every sort
and station. . . .
"Let me suggest, also, that everyone who creates or
cultivates a garden helps, and helps greatly, to solve the
problem of the feeding of the nations; and that every
housewife who practises strict economy puts herself in the
ranks of those who serve the nation. This is the time
for America to correct her unpardonable fault of waste
fulness and extravagance. Let every man and every
woman assume the duty of careful, provident use and ex[265]

pcnditure as a public duty, as a dictate of patriotism which
no one can now expect ever to be excused or forgiven for
ignoring. . . .
“ The supreme test of the nation has come. We must
all speak, act, and serve together!’1

THE ALLIED WAR MISSION

Balfour's Tennis at Sixty-Nine— Joffre's Account of the Bat
tle of the Marne— Balfour’s Estimate of Washington— Secretary
Baker's Task and Abilities
N SUNDAY, the aid of April, the English Mis
sion, headed by the Right Honourable Arthur
James Balfour, arrived in Washington. It had
been expected as early as Tuesday, the 17th, but
nothing was known about its movements by the public till
the night of its safe arrival in an American port. The
day was beautiful, fresh, clear, and sparkling. Crowds
began early to line the streets along which the Mission was
to pass from the station to the McVeagh house on Six
teenth Street. I was deeply moved as I thought of what
was back of it and of its significance. I was particularly
glad to have another opportunity to see Mr. Balfour, and
to see him in this country.
Mrs. Houston and I decided to walk up Sixteenth Street
with our two younger children, Helen and Lawrence, to
see the procession and to witness from the sidewalk the
reception of the Mission by the people. As we passed the
French Embassy, however, Madame Jusserand, who was
in the balcony of the Embassy, saw us and asked us to join
her. We did so and viewed the procession from the bal
cony. We waved our handkerchiefs as Balfour passed,
[267]

and Lansing, who was in the carriage with him, seeing us,
called his attention to our little group, and both he and
Balfour bowed.
I had my first meeting with the members of the Mission
at the President’s dinner to them at the White House.
When I was introduced to Balfour, I told him that I had
the advantage of him in at least one respect— that I
had seen him a number of times and had heard him speak
day after day in the House of Commons in the summer of
1909 during the Budget debate. He asked quickly:
“ What Budget debate?” I answered: “ The debate on
the Lloyd George Budget in 1909.” At first he seemed to
have difficulty in turning his thoughts to anything so far
removed from the war, so far back in the ancient days
before the war, but after a few seconds he said: “ Oh, yes,
I remember. How things have changed in a few years!
That seemed like a very important measure then. We
were much stirred over it. But England has passed far
beyond it. England has proceeded very far on the way
toward Socialism since 1914.” I told him that I remem
bered very clearly one passage between him and Asquith
on an interesting and difficult question. It was this: Bal
four, who was sitting, or rather lounging, on the front oppo
sition bench, slowly unfolded himself, stood up, and said in
substance: It fills me with amazement that the Chancellor
of the Exchequer should entertain the stupid notion that
land is the sole source of the unearned increment. There
are many sources of the unearned increment. There was,
we may say, a struggling village and in it, on a corner
where the principal streets crossed, a chemist’s shop.
There was also in the village a struggling country physi
cian. The village has become a great manufacturing
[268]

city. The chemist’s shop has become a great and pros
perous establishment and the physician, through no par
ticular effort of his own or increase of skill, has become a
specialist with a greatly increased income. Would the
Right Honourable Gentleman undertake to say that the
increased profits of the proprietor of the establishment and
the much larger income of the physician were earned?
He then gave a number of other instances of a similar
nature; and in all of them I thought he was apt and right.
I was curious to hear what the government would say.
Lloyd George was absent and Asquith replied. He said:
“ I desire to thank the Right Honourable Gentleman for
calling the attention of the House to the wide applica
bility of a sound principle. It so happens that the govern
ment do not now need all the revenues which would accrue
from attaching the tax to all the sources of the unearned
increment, but I desire to assure the Right Honourable
Gentleman that when the government need the revenue
they will spread the tax.” That was all. How different
it would have been if the same question had been raised
in our House of Representatives! Either the matter
would not have been followed up or it would have given
rise to long-winded speeches which would have greatly
clouded the issue. Mr. Balfour had forgotten all about
the matter. I told him that I was much impressed by the
fact that, while I spent parts of nearly every day for
more than two weeks in the House of Commons, I had
not heard a speech— I had heard only brief talks by mem
bers, or conversations between members, who seemed to
know what they were talking about and how to express
their views in a few words. I told him that I knew that
then the House was sitting in committee of the whole and
[269]

that the same sort of interchange occurred in our small
House committees but not in the whole House.
Another incident I mentioned as we continued to dis
cuss the matter. I gave it as an illustration of the same
thing. It was when a member got up and criticized the
government for proposing to lay a tax on “ ungotten”
minerals. He argued that it would or might result in a
dead loss to the owners or force the premature or undue
exploitation of the nation’s mineral resources. I thought
he was right and wondered what the government would
say. They said nothing then, but next day they came in
with an amendment to levy a tax on royalties.
I told him that for several days I had had great difficulty
in getting access to the House on account of the limited
number of seats in the gallery but that, through a friend,
I had met the Secretary of the Budget League, who was
very civil to me and gave me a card of introduction to
Lloyd George, who very kindly sent me two tickets of
admission to the House, one of which I gave to Colonel
House. These tickets admitted us to the floor immedi
ately back of the members, separated from them only by
a rod which runs across one end of the hall. I had an ex
cellent opportunity to hear the debates. I could not
take Mrs. Houston, as the suffragettes were then picketing
the House and were indulging in rowdyism, and no ladies
were allowed.
Mr. Balfour had forgotten all about such matters, in
cluding the suffragettes.
He asked me if I was impressed with any of the mem
bers. I replied that I had been particularly impressed
by Lloyd George’s agility, by Ure and Cecil, and by As
quith. I said that I had heard Austen Chamberlain
[270]

several times, and that, while he seemed to know his
subject, he had great difficulty in expressing himself, that
he was not fluent. I told him this: “ Mr. Asquith was
speaking. Suddenly I turned to Colonel House, who was
with me, and said: ‘ Shut your eyes a moment and listen!’
He did so. 1 I asked: ‘What American is speaking?’ He
replied, after an instant’s hesitation, ‘ President Eliot,’- who
was the one I had in mind. Their tone, accent, and
phraseology were strikingly alike.”
Before we separated I said: “ You are an Englishman.
I know you want to take exercise every day. I should
like to organize a conspiracy to see that you have an op
portunity to do so. It would give me pleasure to take
you to Chevy Chase every afternoon for a round of golf.”
"Would you play tennis?” he asked with some eagerness.
I replied that I was a trifle old for such sport, but that I
would do my best to interest him. Mr. Balfour was then
only sixty-nine years old, nearly twenty years older than I
was. But he was youthful compared with the veteran
who had caused me to take up tennis after I had stopped
playing it for several years. In August, 1914, at Woods
Hole, Massachusetts, I played a number of games of golf
with Richard Olney, Cleveland’s distinguished Secretary
of State. He played a very good game and, notwi thstanding the fact that I walked fast, he kept up with me and
did not delay the game. Still, I was feeling some concern
for him till, at the end of a round of eighteen holes, he
turned to me and said: “ This is all very well, but I much
prefer tennis. Will you play tennis with me?” He was
then only seventy-nine years old, and he played a very
good game in doubles. Mr. Balfour, when I told him
about Mr. Olney, seemed to be cheered up and remarked
[271]

that when he got to be seventy-nine he would challenge
Mr. Olney.
In passing, I may say that, at the time I was playing
with Mr. Olney in 1914, 1 expressed my regret that he had
not accepted President Wilson’s tender of the Ambassa
dorship to the Court of St. James’s in 1913. Mr. Olney
replied that if he had known that the war would break
out and that the job would be a man’s job, he would have
accepted, but that, at the time the tender was received,
it looked as if the position would mean little except a
round of social functions and the exchange of diplomatic
platitudes and that he had no stomach for such things.
The French Mission, headed by Viviani, reached the
United States Tuesday, April 24th, and proceeded to
Washington. There was much excitement and enthusi
asm in the city over its appearance, and an intense eager
ness to see the Hero of the Marne, General Joffre. The
streets were lined. I watched the procession from the
sidewalk near the Cosmos Club.
The people gave Viviani a friendly greeting but its at
tention was centred on Joffre. They gave him an ovation.
A mighty roar announced his approach. As he passed
where I was standing, he was on his feet in the automobile
with his hand at salute.
I met the party in the evening at the President’s dinner.
I had a very distinct thrill as I walked forward to shake
hands with the man who had won the greatest battle of
modern times. I realized that I was about to greet a man
about whom historians would write for centuries as others
had greeted Caesar and Napoleon. He did not look like a
conqueror or a military hero. He looked like an amiable,
placid, stolid grandfather. His bulk and poise were the
[172]

outstanding things. I made up my mind to ask him about
the Marne. There was one great military figure whom
I would question about his achievement. I had often
wanted to stand face to face with one. In the next world
I hope to confront in similar fashion Alexander, Hannibal,
Caesar, Marlborough, Cromwell, Napoleon, Washington,
and Lee and Grant.
I began by saying that military tactics and strategy
had been my hobby for thirty years, and that I hoped
he would forgive my presumption in asking him about
his great victory. He replied that he would gladly an
swer any question I wished to ask him.
I said: “ Where did you get Manoury’s army?”
He replied: “ I quickly assembled it by calling up widely
dispersed units.”
“ How widely dispersed ? From what parts of the line ?”
“ From below Nancy to Amiens,” he replied.
“ The reporters,” I remarked, “ said that his army went
out from Paris in motors.”
“ That made a good headline,” he answered. “ Only
about 5,000 men went out of Paris in motors, and it would
have been much better if they had marched. The motors,
many of them, broke down, and there was much confusion,
and some of them got to the front too soon. It was not
well.”
I asked him to tell me if I had a correct notion about
Foch’s movements in the centre. He inquired what my
conception of them was. I gave it as quickly as I could,
and he told me that it was substantially accurate. I then
said:
"W hat was the most critical point or position in your
line?”

He answered: “ Every position. If any point had been
broken, there might have been serious trouble. If the Ger
mans had gone through below Nancy there would have
been trouble. If Foch had not held, there would have been
serious trouble. Every point in a battle line is critical.”
McAdoo, who was listening, said: “ What is your feeling
about the fighting which is now raging in the west? Do
you think Haig and Nivelle will make headway? Are
you optimistic?”
He replied simply: “ I am not there,” meaning that he
would express no opinion about movements he was not in
touch with.
At dinner at the French Embassy, I met the Mission
again. I talked at some length to Colonel Requin, who
seemed to be an expert on strategy. I asked him more
particularly about Foch's tactics. I told him I under
stood that his right had been pushed back, that his centre
was giving ground or was threatened, and that then cer
tain gaps in the Prussian line (due to the leaching of the
line to the right to protect positions weakened by Von
Kluck’s turning movement) were reported, and that
Foch had ordered the 42d and Moroccan divisions on his
left to attack.
He replied: “ That is correct. I conveyed the order.
I was on staff duty.”' This was getting pretty close to
headquarters.
Saturday afternoon, I had my first game of tennis with
Mr. Balfour. Malcolm, one of his aids, and Frank Polk
completed the doubles. We played five sets. Mr. Bal
four had a good stroke and a long reach and got very good
results when he could reach the ball, but he had trouble
when he had to run for it. When he had to make anything

of a run, he usually failed to make a return, and then
invariably he exclaimed: "Too old— idiot. I am very
angry. I must keep my temper.” After the game, Mrs.
Houston and Mrs. Hamlin joined us, and we had tea at
the clubhouse. We gave Mr. Balfour a big comfortable
chair. He was the picture of content and was very re
luctant to drag himself away and return to town and the
business of getting on with the war.
The following day, Sunday, April 29th, was a beautiful,
crisp spring day. It had been set aside for a trip on the
Mayflower to Mount Vernon, where both missions were to
pay homage to Washington. Mount Vernon was exqui
site. The trees and flowers were at their best. The dog
wood trees were particularly beautiful and greatly im
pressed Mr. Balfour, who told me that he would plant
some of them in England if he found that they would
probably live there. Washington’s Tomb was especially
beautiful, covered with wistaria at its best, with the
American, British, and French flags flying above it.
The scene and ceremonies at the Tomb were most im
pressive. Viviani delivered a brief but eloquent oration.
Then Balfour read a brief statement which was to be left
with the British wreath. When he finished) Joffre said
that he saluted a great soldier. He and Viviani stepped
inside the Tomb and he stood rigidly at salute while
Viviani placed the artistic French wreath. Then followed
Balfour and General Bridges and a similar affecting
ceremony.
When this function was over, the whole party went up
to the House and made a thorough inspection. As we
returned, walking down the slope with Balfour, I said,
pointing to the Tomb: “ You cannot imagine what an

appeal it made to me— I have long studied English and
American history and institutions— to see you, the last
of the English conservatives, stand reverently before the
tomb of Washington and to hear you pay a tribute to a
successful rebel.”
“ Why,” he quickly replied, “ he did more for us than
he did for you.”
“ Meaning----- ?” I said.
“ Yes, meaning,” he said, interrupting me, “ that he
taught us how to deal with colonies.”
And I added: “ The fruits are the loyalty and sacrifices
to-day for the Empire of all the Colonies; and there could
be no finer testimony to the essential justice and wisdom
of Britain’s rule.” He assented to this and thanked me,
and said that he hoped that our two great nations would
always be friends and work together to promote the true
and highest interest of humanity.
I had the good fortune to see much of Mr. Balfour
during his stay in Washington. I saw him a number of
times on business matters, particularly on matters per
taining to food supplies, but I came to know him better
through our contacts on the tennis court, where I met him
many afternoons with Malcolm, or Sir Eric Drummond,
and Frank Polk. I had the pleasure also of meeting him a
number of times at official or social functions, and he was
always interesting and sometimes unexpected. At a
dinner at Frank Polk’s I was sitting on his right. As the
dinner ended, he pushed back his chair, looked at me a
moment, and said:
"Am I dreaming?”
I replied: “ You have the reputation of being a dreamer
at times. What is troubling you now?”
[276]

He answered: “ Am I dreaming or is it true? They tell
me that you have already passed a draft act. We have
not after three years. Canada has not. They tell me
that you have already registered nine millions of men, that
you have organized a number of officers’ training camps,
and that Congress has authorized or is about to authorize
an expenditure of $21,000,000,000. Is it true or am I
dreaming?”
I replied: “ Unless I am dreaming, it is true.”
“ I must, of course, accept what you say,” he answered,
“ but I do not believe it.”
It was not strange that he could not take it in. The
draft was enough, and the figures for particular items of
expenditures were startling: For ships, $1,900,000,000; for
aviation, $640,000,000; for torpedo-boat destroyers,
$350,000,000; for army subsistence and supplies,
$860,000,000; for clothing, camp, and garrison equipment,
$581,000,000; for transportation, $597,000,000; for medi
cine, $100,000,000; for mobile artillery, $158,000,000; for
ordnance stores and supplies, $717,000,000; for heavy
guns, $850,000,000; and for ammunition for the same,
$1,807,000,000!! This was part of what the President
meant by pledging our fortunes, and it was a source of
comfort to Mr. Balfour and his associates; and they greatly
needed comfort, for things were looking exceedingly black
for the Allies at the time, in spite of our entry into the war.
Mr. Balfour and his colleagues reflected in their appear
ance, manner, and conversation the gloom that hung over
their country and the Allies: the submarines were playing
havoc with shipping, and it did not seem impossible that
Great Britain might be cut off—-horrible thought; Russia
was going to pieces; and things were going badly with

Nivelle and Haig. America must hurry and she was
hurrying, so much so, in fact, that she was getting in her
own way.
From the time of our entry into the war, every regular
and every emergency agency in Washington was cease
lessly active in the task of organization and of prepara
tion; and this task, which was incredibly difficult, was
prosecuted with zeal and, on the whole, with intelligence.
There was, of course, much annoying gossip and hurtful
criticism in Washington, and particularly in the Senate.
Some Senators, as usual, wished to get in the limelight and
did no little harm by insisting upon senseless investiga
tions. Efforts were made to get the President to create
a non-partisan Cabinet. This failed, and then proposals
were made to constitute a Congressional committee on
the conduct of the war. There was nothing new in this.
It was the same old story. It had been tried in the Civil
War and had miserably failed. Congressional committees
on the conduct of war have been and always would be
nuisances, pure and simple. A change to a non-partisan
regular Cabinet would have served no good purpose; and,
as a matter of fact, the scheme which was developed was
far better, namely, that of creating special services to deal
more freely with emergency war activities, such as the
War Industries Board, the Railroad Administration, the
Shipping Board, the Food Administration, the War Trade
Board, and the Fuel Administration. The heads of these
agencies constituted a sort of second Cabinet, and the
President wisely adopted the practice of meeting the regu
lar Cabinet one day in the week instead of two, and of
holding conferences with this emergency Cabinet at least
one day in the week.

The heads of these emergency bodies were selected, like
all other individuals who served the nation during the war,
with reference solely to their fitness and without any
thought of their political connections. Many, if not most
of them, as it happened, and most of their assistants, as
it chanced, were Republicans, such as Brookings, Willard,
Rosenwald, Gifford, Hoover, Stettinius, and Schwab.
And, for the first time in our history, the civil part of the
government did not hamper or attempt to control military
and naval operations. The chief military and naval
officers, like Pershing and Sims, were selected on expert
recommendation for their ability in their particular fields
and were given a free hand so far as their particular tasks
were concerned. In France, in military matters, Pershing
was supreme. What he decreed and recommended was
accepted, so far as circumstances permitted, and officers
whom he desired were given him and none others. The
civil government made it its duty to try to see that the
army and navy got what they needed.
Of course, mistakes were made, many of them. It was
singular that more were not made; but, as a high French
officer, with characteristic wit, said to Mrs. Houston,
when she remarked that we seemed to be making many
mistakes, we did not invent any: the Allies had anticipated
us.
One source of difficulty was the rapid shifting of events
and conditions and the changing demands of the Allies.
These changed week by week and almost day by day.
At first, the Allies did not seem to expect us to send any
considerable number of men to Europe. I have already
referred to the statement of the French Ambassador to
roe made just before we entered the war, to the effect that

his government would not expect us, if we entered the
struggle, to send men to France, except a detachment to
return the visit of Rochambeau. I understand that
Joffre, himself, when he came over, did not at first make
any urgent request that a large number of men be sent
across, and that it was not till after the breakdown of
Russia became apparent and things were going less satis
factorily on the Western Front that he made an appeal for
men, and then for only 500,000.
Later, the cry came for more men and still more men,
and for ships and still more ships. And then demands
would come for certain sorts of guns and supplies, and
almost immediately an appeal that we do not bother
about these and instead send something else. The Allies
would supply big guns, or machine guns, or airplanes, or
something else. Do not stop for these. Hurry up with
something else— come on!
Many men— in fact, everybody in a responsible position
— had difficult tasks, but next to the President, the man
in Washington who seemed to me to have the most difficult
one was Secretary Baker.
His is really an impossible task, but I believe that he is
meeting it with rare courage and intelligence. I have had
a good opportunity to see him in action. The Council of
National Defence meets in his office three or four times a
week for from one to three hours. Many problems are
raised and discussed. No member of the Council shows
more alertness, or better judgment, or more courage than
he does. And then, his military advisers as well as his
civil aids are constantly coming in— the military through
one door, the civil through another— that is the game—
with matters for him to decide; and I am impressed with
[280]

the quickness and soundness of his decisions. If Baker
were six feet high and weighed 200 pounds, he would now
be regarded as a great Secretary of War. Whether he
can get away with it with his short, slender, boyish stat
ure, I do not know. He will in time. Incidentally, the
last thing he thinks about is himself.
In June, 1917, thinking that there was need of a more
concrete statement of what the German menace meant to
us and to the world, that those who were attempting to
enlighten the public were as a rule ignorant of what was
behind the German mind and were indulging too much in
platitudes, I prepared and published two statements sum
marizing the history of the submarine controversy and
explaining the Prussian autocracy and its mediaeval foun
dations and political philosophy. They were used by the
Committee on Public Information and are given in Ap
pendix II as part of the story of the period.
On the evening of December 6th, in response to an in
vitation from the Economic Club of New York City, I
delivered an address on “ Steps to Victory.” I made this
address partly because of the vast ignorance of the public
of what the government was doing and had done, and the
consequent apparent success which was attending the
efforts of mean partisans and malicious obstructionists to
misrepresent those who were fighting the war and to ham
per their efforts. The address, which is inserted as Ap
pendix III, may serve to give a hint of the situation at the
time and to indicate in part the progress which had been
made. I would direct attention particularly to my in
sistence at the time on the need of a unified command as
a prerequisite to victory, and the necessity of a resort to
drastic taxation as a means of preventing inflation with

all its attendantevils,and the hardships which would other
wise be encountered in the period of peace following the
victory over the Germans which I felt sure was not very
far off. I had insisted on both these in our councils from
the moment I knew we were going into the war and, for
that matter, had from the outset wondered why the Allies
could not recognize the supreme necessity of both.
On the eleventh of March, at the request of the Com
mittee on Public Information, I left Washington on a
speaking trip through the Southwest and the South. I
was informed that I would be joined in the Southwest by
a French officer who would speak for France. Our first
joint meeting was held in Dallas, Texas. We spoke also
in Houston, Texas; Shreveport and New Orleans, Louisi
ana; Jackson, Mississippi; Birmingham, Alabama;Atlanta,
Georgia; Tampa and Jacksonville, Florida; and Columbia,
South Carolina. Each of us had a set speech. We varied
it just enough to meet local situations and developments.
Neither had had time to prepare anything. We had to
do the best we could under extreme pressure.
I had asked a stenographer to go with us to look out
for our tickets and railroad and hotel accommodations and
to take down what each of us said at the first two or three
meetings. His name was McPherson. He was, perhaps,
the best stenographer in the Department of Agriculture
and had been exempted from the draft because he was
needed in Washington. He was invaluable to us on the
trip. When we returned, he came to my office, gave me
a copy of what each of us had said during the trip, and
handed me his resignation. I said: “ What does this
mean?” He replied: “ I must get into the trenches
at the front.” “ But,” I said, “ you are needed here.”
[28a]

“ That may be,” he answered, “ but I must get to the front.
I am going to Denver to say good-bye to my mother, and
then I am going to make an effort to get to France im
mediately.”
I accepted his resignation and wished him good luck.
The day after he left, I had a telephone message from the
State Department to the effect that a first-class ste
nographer was needed at once in London to work for a
special mission, that it was understood that we had a few
excellent men, and it would be a service if we would
let one be sent across at once. “ Could I suggest one?”
I suggested McPherson. “ Would I get in touch with
him immediately and ask him to report?” I did so and
got this reply by wire: “ Greatly appreciate opportunity.
Regret cannot accept. Must get into the trenches.” I told
the State Department it would have to look elsewhere.
The address which I made at Fort Worth, Texas, and
which contains substantially what I said at each other
place, will be found in Appendix IV.
The French officer who accompanied me was Lieutenant
Paul PSrigord, one of the rarest characters I have ever
known. He had come to this country a number of years
before the war, and as Professor of Christian Ethics had
taught in the St. Paul Seminary under the administra
tion, of Archbishop Ireland. Being of an inquiring turn
of mind, he had taken leave and had studied language
and sociology first at Minnesota, later at Chicago and
Columbia, and then at Harvard, where he was about to
take his Doctor’s degree when France entered the war.
He took the first ship home and volunteered as a chaplain
in the French Army. There were no vacancies, and he
immediately enlisted as a private in an infantry regiment
[283]

and was in time to fight at the battle of the Marne. Later
he fought at Vimy Ridge, Ypres, and at other places, and
finally at Verdun. He was gassed, wounded, temporarily
blinded, buried under earth torn up by shell explosions,
and was rescued and restored to health. After we entered
the war, he was sent over to assist in training troops, but
one day he made a speech to the boys in camp. One of
the men connected with the Committee on Public In
formation heard him and, recognizing that he would be a
greater asset as a speaker than as a trainer of troops, sug
gested that he be drafted for this service.
I have never heard a more effective speaker. He made
no attempt at oratory. He always stood erect at the
front of the platform with his hands on the hilt of his sword
which stood straight in front of him resting on its point
on the floor. He had a most winning manner and sym
pathetic voice, and spoke in quiet conversational tones,
using good simple English with just enough accent to give
it piquancy and charm. He had his audience under his
control, making it laugh or cry at will. I heard him more
than a dozen times. I am not usually accused of wearing
my feelings on my sleeve, but I could not keep my face
straight the last time any more than I did the first. I
shall let these excerpts from his address speak for them
selves:
“ Now, my friends, before I begin my little talk I must
comply with the request of your Secretary of War. When
I left Washington a short time ago, he told me that he had
quite a little trouble with this young American Army.
It seems that in this army every boy wishes to be an
officer. They are all asking for commissions. Nobody
[284]

wants to be a private. As the Secretary made this re
mark, a well-known Irishman who was present, Hon. T. P.
O’Connor, of the British House of Commons, wittily
remarked, ‘ Why, Mr. Secretary, we have always had the
same trouble with the Irish people. We have never been
able to get up a band, because they all want to be leaders.’
So it is with this young American Army. But the Secre
tary, knowing how I got my commission, said to me,
‘ Lieutenant, wherever you go I want you to tell the boys
how you became an officer.’ So, not in the spirit of vain
glory, but merely to comply with the Secretary’s request,
I shall tell you how I got my commission. For you know
a soldier cannot be proud. If I were anything, I would
be ashamed, that is, ashamed of being alive. Most of
my friends are dead. Of the sixty officers who were pro
moted with me at the beginning of the war in my regi
ment, there are two to-day doing active duty. Forty-one
have been killed and the others are crippled for life. So,
whenever I speak of the war I am not proud of my own
achievements, for I have before me the vision of thousands
of boys, all much braver than I ever was or ever will be,
who have laid down their lives in defence of our cause.
I do not tell this in a boastful spirit, but merely to comply
with the request of a superior. When I went to France I
intended to serve in the army, of course, as a chaplain.
But when I arrived there I found all the vacancies filled.
At the same time, I realized that the provision made for
the spiritual and moral welfare of the army was not
sufficient. The boys needed comfort and help most
where they suffer and where they die, and that is in the
infantry and in the trenches, for the infantry in the
trcnches is doing most of the suffering and most of the

dying. So I enlisted as a private in the infantry so that
I could be with the boys when they suffered and when they
died. I would gladly have remained a private, but cir
cumstances imposed upon me greater responsibilities.
One day in February, 1915, we were in the region which
the Canadians have made famous by their bravery and
which is called the Vimy Ridge. You remember that the
Canadians have distinguished themselves there. You
remember, perhaps, that gas, that infamous weapon
used by the Germans, was first tried on the Canadians.
At that time they had no masks and, of course, the only
thing they could do was to run away, and so they did
when they saw their comrades falling and dying in agony.
We teased them about it, but they very cleverly answered:
‘That’s all right. The Germans beat the French, and
they beat the English, but when they tried to beat the
Canadians they had to give them gas first.’
“ At any rate, we were in the region of Vimy Ridge,
and one day a unit of the Imperial Guard broke through
our line. My battalion was billeted in a small town
near by, and as the Imperial Guard advanced, we were
called out to meet it and, of course, to stop it. My com
pany was that day the leading company of the battalion.
You no doubt recall that the French officers, at the begin
ning of the war, were not dressed as I am to-night. This
is a war uniform, which has been chosen because it
blends best with the landscape. At the beginning of the
war, we had a uniform which was black and red and which
made the officers very conspicuous. The German soldiers
had received orders to shoot the officers first and so, as
we came out of the small wood, each officer leading his
platoon, our officers fell deadly wounded. I was standing
[286]

by the side of my captain when he received a bullet
through his right lung. Taking his sword, the sword I
still carry with me, and which he had himself received
from his dying captain at the battle of the Marne, he
gave it to me, saying, ‘ Now, my friend, you must lead
the company, for I see all the officers have fallen.' So I
led the company and, thanks to the bravery of the boys
more than to any great military knowledge of mine, in a
brilliant charge they reestablished the French line, and
even did a little better than that, for they brought back
with them whatever was left of that Imperial Guard unit
when they got through with it. The next day, when the
general came to look us over, he came to my company and
asked me where my officers were. I told him they were
all dead. He said, ‘ Whence this sword?’ I told him my
captain had given it to me as a symbol of authority over
the men. Then, very graciously he answered: ‘ My friend,
you keep the sword, and you keep the company.’ That
is the way I got my commission. Now, the Secretary of
War tells me he has a commission in store for any one of
the boys who will go to France and try the same. So good
luck to you. . . .
“ And I must tell you a little story about two of my
private soldiers— ordinary peasants— down in Lorraine.
One day, I overheard one of them say to the other: ‘ They
tell me that the Maid heard voices. Do you suppose it is
true ?’ He shrugged his shoulders, turned to me, and said:
‘ What do you think, Lieutenant?’ I answered: ‘The
Maid must have heard some sort of voice; for she had an
inspiration to lead her country to victory and deliver
ance.’ And then he asked: ‘ Do you think voices can still
[287]

be heard?’ And before I could reply, the clear notes of
an American bugle rang out over the valleys of Lorraine
and I said: ‘ Listen! Voices can still be heard.’
“ . . .
So these boys go into the trenches for
about a week or ten days, and then they go back to nice
little villages where they may rest and come back to their
work refreshed. But at the beginning of the war we
were not so favoured, for we had to remain in the trenches
three or four or five weeks at a time, as we were practically
alone holding the entire Western Front. I remember
remaining on the battlefield of Verdun for twenty-one
days without ever getting a chance to wash. As I was
saying this to a little boy in Oklahoma the other day, he
looked at me smilingly and said, ‘ My, but weren’t you
lucky?’ We were not lucky, for, if you have had any
such experience you would know that if you stay away
from water for that length of time you soon have about
yourself a good deal more company than you would ever
care for. So it happened to the most respectable of us
in the French Army, and the government became very
much alarmed about it, so they decided they would send
the boys thus affected to a ‘ delousing hospital.’ The
first boys to be sent there came back with wonderful
reports. Just imagine! They had slept in a bed! Of
course, you all sleep in beds here, but not on the Western
Front. I don’t suppose I have slept in a bed more than
forty times in the last three years. These boys had slept
in a bed, had clean linen, good meals, and shelter, which
is quite an asset to an infantryman. Then all the boys
wanted to go to a delousing hospital, for it meant a week s
vacation. But in order to go, you had to qualify, and

[a88]

there was an examination. The boys who couldn’t
qualify, those who didn’t ‘ have them’ would go about and
ask their friends, ‘Have you got any?’ and if their friends
said, ‘Why, yes,’ then the other boy would say, ‘ Now,
won’t you please give me a couple?’ But the boys soon
got very wise, and they would say, ‘Oh, no, I am not
giving them away any more. I am selling them.’ So it
is that we had to stop sending the boys to a delousing
hospital. . . .
“ Now, my friends, I could go on telling you a good
many stories, but I have a more serious message for you, a
message which I deliver with the keenest of pleasure. I
bring to you the warmest greetings of the French Army.
The French Army, that valorous body of officers and men
who saved the liberties of the world at the Marne, at
Ypres, and at Verdun. For three long years that army,
although bleeding from a thousand wounds, having lost
more than one million of its best children for the sake of
democracy, was looking longingly at the manhood of this
sister Republic across the seas, without uttering a word of
complaint, but filled with a great fear, the fear that all
these sacrifices might be in vain. But, behold, one beauti
ful morning a new flag appeared above the trenches. Its
colours were well known to all. They were Red, White,
and Blue. There were stars playing in its folds, a symbol
of this nation's high purpose. Then a mighty voice
arose, from the Adriatic to the Atlantic, and that voice
spoke in all the known tongues of the world, ‘ Long live,
long live the United States.’ And that voice, do you
know whose voice it was? My friends, it was the voice
of heroes, heroes from every town and city of France,
[289]

every town and city of Italy, of England, of Scotland, of
Ireland, of Canada, of Australia, of New Zealand— from
every comer of the world in which there lives a libertyloving nation came that mighty voice, speaking love and
gratitude to you, the American people. It is an echo of
that mighty voice, a humble echo, of course, that I bring
you to-night. It was a happy day for me in which I saw
over our trenches the Stars and Stripes. . . .
“ Would you like to know what it is that, during this
great struggle, has kept France so brave and strong?
You might think it was her victories, for glorious they
were. And please, please never speak to a British or a
French soldier of German victories. There has never
been during this war such a thing as a great German vic
tory. Whenever the German Army has put up a clean,
decent, honest, and manly fight, every time she has been
defeated. Surely you, the strong and noble men of this
nation, are not going to call a victory the crushing of
Belgium; nor a victory the invasion of northern France
through a door we had left open because we relied on the
honesty of our neighbour; nor a victory the crushing of
Serbia; nor the crushing of Rumania a victory; nor a
victory the poisoning of the hearts and minds of the
poor Russian people, great big children that they are.
No, my friends, such are victories that no great nation,
neither the United States, nor England, nor France,
would ever want to see written in the annals of her people.
But it is not the victories of France that have helped her
most. Nor was it the fidelity of England, wonderful as
it has been. Here, I must pay a tribute to England.
You have not always been quite fair with England, and
[290!

we have not always been friends with England. We
have fought many a fight with her, but they were ever
chivalrous fights, and an English king was able to say of
France during one of our most bitter conflicts, ‘ our gentle
enemy.’ I know the wrongs of England, but to-day I am
bound to confess that England, especially in the person
of Lloyd George, stands, the friend, the knight, and the
defender of liberty, and of liberty for all nations. . . .
But it is not the fidelity of England that has helped France
most. Nor was it the wonderful devotion of Italy, nor
the thousand and one tributes of affection and gratitude
that came to her from every comer of the civilized world.
“ The sympathy of these United States has helped
France much during this struggle. For, long before you
came into this war officially, American boys, anxious to
pay the old debt you so graciously mention, but of which
France never speaks, came and volunteered in the most
illustrious unit of the French Army, the Foreign Legion,
and there they died the death of heroes. Others came
into our aviation corps, and I assure you, my friends,
they made their presence felt in the skies of Europe.
Others came as nurses, doctors, and ambulance drivers,
and they took care of our sick and our wounded with a
devotion unequalled even by our own nurses and doc
tors. More than that, as soon as the women of America
heard that there were orphans and widows in France,
they not only volunteered their money, but they sent their
very heart, their love, and they became mothers to these
orphans and sisters to these widows, a wonderful charity
that has enabled them to go through this terrible crisis.
So that you may understand the better the impression
that has been made by this form of charity upon the minds
I291J

of the French people, just listen to this incident that
happened to me in France but a short time ago. My regi
ment was going through the city of Toul in Lorraine, the
place where the American boys now are. Whenever we
go through a village or city, the little boys of the place
follow the regiment, come up to us, and ask for the
privilege of carrying our rifle or our sword. A little
boy about eight years old came up to me and asked me
for my sword, so I gave it to him, and we became very
good friends. After a while, as every little boy will do to
the first stranger he meets, he began telling me all about
his family. He was very proud of his father, who had
been a captain in the infantry and had been killed at the
battle of the Marne. ‘ Since then/ he said, ‘ I have had a
godmother.’ That godmother to him was the most
wonderful woman in the world, as she was from that
mysterious and distant land across the sea. He said,
*Mother has told me I must love her because she has been
very good to us.’ I became more interested in the mat
ter, and I told him I expected to go to America very soon.
‘Oh,’ said he, ‘ if you go to America you must look up my
godmother. Her name is Miss McFadden and she lives
in New York City. When you find her,’ he said, ‘ you
must kiss her for me,* and I had to promise. I have been
in New York City and I have looked for Miss McFadden,
but I have not found her yet. If this is the impression
that has been made upon the minds of the children, you
may imagine what it has meant to the mothers.
“ . . . But, beautiful as these expressions of
sympathy have been, they are still not the thing that has
helped France most, not the thing that has brought her
the most comfort. What, then, is it? One morning a

[ 29 2 ]

mighty voice was heard coming from across the seas.
That voice, as it passed over the waves, seemed to take
with it some of the grandeur and solemnity of the ocean
itself. It was restating in the most sublime pages, in
immortal words, the rights of individuals and of nations.
It was branding with an indelible mark the criminal ag
gressors of mankind. It was placing the ends and aims
of this war on the highest moral level conceivable. It was
endeavouring to make this world safe for democracy. It
was the voice of a man whose patience and forbearance
have never been seen in the head of a powerful nation.
That voice was the voice of your illustrious President, Mr.
Woodrow Wilson.
“ I am not, as you well know, making a political speech,
but you, the citizens of this great nation, must know,
you are entitled to know, the love, the veneration, and
the respect with which the name of your President is
spoken to-day over the fields of Europe. And believe me,
wherever it is not spoken with respect, it is pronounced
with fear. . . .
" I am not saying all this, my friends, to beg love from
you for France. France would not permit it. But, while
I am not begging love for France, I must rise here against
a campaign which has been waged in this country to under
mine your confidence in that nation. I know, for ex
ample, you have been told that France was a faithless
nation. Have you not? Yes, many a time. Well,
you may believe what you have heard or read, but I must
believe what I have seen. Throughout this war I have
seen, in all their churches, that people praying as I have
seldom seen anywhere any people praying. I have seen

in the army, soldiers, officers, generals, the very highest
amongst them, such men as Castelnau, Foch, and P6tain,
beginning and ending their day with prayer. And I have
seen more than that. I have seen young men, thousands
of them, going ‘ over the top,’ as you say, to an almost
certain death, and doing it with divine simplicity, with a
smile on their faces as though they already saw their com
ing Saviour through that curtain of fire. Is that a faith
less nation?
“ Let me tell you the story of my brigade. You all
know what a brigade is. It is a unit made up of two
regiments, nearly six thousand men. You no doubt
remember that in July, 1916, the Crown Prince, that
great Prince who, up to that time, had succeeded in taking
nothing but portraits and furniture out of French homes
and castles, decided one day to take a city so that his
father could celebrate the fourteenth of July, our national
day, in a city. Of course, the only thing he could think of
taking was a French city. Very thoughtful of him. Of
course, we were equally anxious to keep him out, so the
general-in-chief called for the general commanding our
brigade and told him, ‘ General, I am not able to have at
Verdun reserves sufficient to support the attack of the
Crown Prince.' Unfortunately, there was but a single
road to Verdun and a single railroad, and these could be
broken easily. That brigade of ours was made up of the
Seventh and the Fourteenth Infantry. The general-inchief said to the general commanding our brigade, ‘ I
am going to ask your young brigade to go to the fort of
Souville,’ which was the last fort that remained between
the German lines and the city of Verdun, ‘ and those boys
must hold that fort for me to the last man until such time

as the reserves can be brought.’ The genera] command
ing our brigade called for me and said, ‘ Lieutenant, you
are for the boys both a chaplain and an officer, and I
think you had better tell them plainly what it means.
You understand what it means: it means the sacrifice of
our brigade.’ So we gathered the boys in an open field
and we held a service there for the repose of the souls of
those who had died in the previous battles. I spoke to
the boys and I told them frankly, as a soldier must, what
their mission was, told them of the trust and confidence
that France was placing in them, and tried to make them
realize that, although they were going up there six thou
sand strong, very likely only a few would return. I
asked all of them who wanted to receive my blessing to
kneel down, and the six thousand boys knelt down to
receive the priest’s blessing. I cannot begin to tell you
how I felt as I was blessing those young boys, all of them
between eighteen and twenty-four. Most of them were
going to their graves, and I did not even know whether I
should come back myself.
“ At any rate, we all went up cheerfully to the fort of
Souville. Three days before the attack the shelling began,
such shelling as I have never seen before, such concentra
tion of fire that the landscape which we knew the evening
before, the next morning was so changed that we thought,
during the night, in some mysterious manner, we had
moved into another place. After the shelling came the
gas, wave after wave, cloud upon cloud, so as to kill the
boys that might have survived the shelling. On the
morning of the thirteenth, in the most confident fashion,
came up the first German unit, about a brigade. They
came up the slopes of the fort, confident that no human

being could have survived the shelling. We saw them
coming, and when they reached the edge of the plateau
we charged down and crushed them at the foot of the hill.
About twelve o’clock a new unit came up and that unit
met with the same fate. About three o’clock another
German unit came up in the last effort, but the boys were
so tired that an entire company of that German unit
entered the fort. The general called for me and said to
me, ‘ Lieutenant, what are we going to do? The Germans
are in the fort and the reserves are not coming.’ I said,
*General, come and see the boys. They are all willing to
die. That is all France can expect of them, and they are
begging to be given the chance to charge once more.’
They did charge once more. They put their whole heart
into it, and in a great effort they drove back that last
unit and made prisoners the Germans that had entered
the fort. About five o’clock the reserves came, and the
city of Verdun was saved. The Crown Prince, who had
his mail sent to Verdun, did not get it there. It had to
be sent back to him with the notice, ‘ Has not yet arrived.’
“ These boys had gone up to the fort six thousand
strong. Fifteen hundred of them came back. When they
came down, their first request was that we should hold a
service of thanksgiving for the wonderful protection they
had enjoyed. And yet people tell you that France is a
faithless nation. . . .
“ And do you know what it means to go ‘ over the top’ ?
To go over the top means this: One day you receive the
order of attack. You have to leave your trench, jump
over barbed-wire entanglements under the terrible fire of
machine guns, nice little weapons that fire about eight
[296]

hundred shots a minute, and under the fire of heavy artil
lery, and then run through No Man’s Land and jump into
the enemy’s trench. The enemy is waiting for you there,
rifle and bayonet in hand. You have to overpower him,
take his trench away from him, and then run to another
trench, and so on, until you fall dead, wounded, or ex
hausted. When I tell my boys, ‘ To-morrow we are going
over the top,’ I see these boys for a while lost in a dream.
And what is the dream? Why, the dream is of home, far
away, and in that home a father, a mother, or a wife and
children, their hopes, their loves, their ambitions. I can
see the heart of these boys clinging fondly to the things
they love. But after a while, looking into those eyes
again, I can read grim determination, and I realize that
victory has been won in the hearts of these boys. Al
though they love the people and things they have left
behind, still they love their country more. And the next
day, when I go over the top, I do not have to look back
and see whether my boys are following me, because I had
read it in their eyes the day before.
“ In order to make that supreme sacrifice, there is one
thing needed: These boys must feel that the whole na
tion is backing them. Remember, to-morrow there will
be thousands of your boys going over the top. The whole
nation is living in them and by them. Of course, those
boys will go over the top anyway, because they are brave
boys, but if you at home do not appreciate the value and
the grandeur of their sacrifice, they will go over the top
with agony in their hearts and they will say, ‘ Here we are,
giving up all, and the folks at home do not care. They do
not know. They do not understand.* I assure you, my
friends, it is not pleasant to die for people who do not care.

“ As to the boys you are sending over there, do not
worry. Of course, they are going to suffer. Of course,
some of them will die, but believe a soldier, it is sweet to
suffer and it is easy to die when you suffer and die for a
great cause. And if it be sweet to suffer and easy to die
for the French flag, how much sweeter and easier it must
be to suffer and die for your flag, the fairest of all the
flags of all the nations. Do not worry about the recep
tion your boys are getting yonder. I saw the first Ameri
can boys arriving in Paris, and the reception extended to
them was such as to make all the French mothers jealous,
for we, the boys of France, have never been thus received
in our own capital city.
“ As to the boys who are going there to stay, for some
will stay, please take this message home with you and give
it to anybody within your reach: The number of American
boys who are going there to sleep for ever will depend
upon your loyalty and your support. To the mothers of
those boys I wish you would say what I went the other
day and said to the mother of the first American boy to
fall on the fields of France when I brought her some
flowers in the name of the French Army. Tell them that
the mothers of France, with empty hearts now, will take
their places by the graves of their children. I know that
the little boys and the little girls of France will go and
gather the fairest flowers of our land to place on these
graves with their best prayer. And if you ever go to
France after the war, you will see that France lovingly
guards your sleeping boys. You will not be able to tell
which is the grave of an American boy or of a French boy,
for they will all be taken care of with the same love and
the same gratitude.”

This was the best speech I heard during the war except
the President’s War Address; and the little story about the
"voices’' was the prettiest story.
Several incidents happened on the trip which I cannot
pass over. When we were travelling from Houston to
Shreveport over the Houston, East and West Texas Rail
road, through a section somewhat out of the beaten track,
noticing that at the stations there were usually pretty
fair size crowds, I said to Perigord: “ These people proba
bly have never seen a French uniform. Let’s go out and
let them have a look at one.” He cheerfully acquiesced
in my suggestion. At the next stop, we got out. The
crowd showed much interest and gathered about the
lieutenant. Looking around, I saw a man well past mid
dle age. I suggested to the lieutenant that we go over
and speak to him. We did so. The man did not seem to
be especially cordial. In fact, he appeared to be em
barrassed. After a few seconds, somebody touched me
on the arm and motioned me aside. He said: “ I am an
officer of the Department of Justice. That man you are
talking to is under a $10,000 bond for obstructing the
draft. He is a violent pro-German.” I thanked him,
called Perigord aside and repeated what the officer had
told me. He smiled and said: “ Oh, well, who knows?
We may have made a Christian out of him.”
At Shreveport, as usual, Perigord told his little story
about the French boy and his godmother, Miss McFadden,
whom he charged Perigord to locate when he reached New
York and to give his love and to kiss for him, if he found
her. After the meeting, two very pretty girls dressed in
their Red Cross uniforms, who had been sitting in a box
with six or eight of their fellow workers, came on to the

stage locked arm in arm and, approaching Perigord, sa
luted him as he looked at them, and said with a jaunty
and daring air: “ Lieutenant, we are Miss McFadden.”
Perigord was equal to the occasion. He paid them a fine
compliment in the best French manner and said: “ Oh!
But I am only the Secretary’s orderly. The honours
must go to him.”
At Jackson, Mississippi, much to my surprise, I found
in the afternoon papers an attack on France, in which
the French people were represented as being faithless and
irreligious. I showed it to Perigord just before we went to
our meeting. He looked grieved, but said nothing. Dur
ing his speech which followed, without breaking the thread
of his thought and without specific reference to the article,
he told the story of his brigade at the siege of Verdun.
When he finished, his audience was in tears.
On our way from Jacksonville to Columbia, the news
reached us that the great German drive had broken the
Fifth British Army. I was much worried, because I had
been told repeatedly and had come to believe that, while
the Allies might not break through the German line, there
was no danger of the Germans making a dent in the Allied
line. I felt that I should have very little heart in my ap
pearance before the Columbia people that evening. I
spoke to Perigord about the matter. He was serious but
superbly confident. He said: “ Don’t you worry, my
friend. They will not win. The brave American and
English and French boys will beat them back. It may
be the beginning of the end for the Germans.”

boo]

THE

P R E S ID E N T ’ S P R O P A G A N D A

His Attack on German Morale— Undermining Confidence in
the German Government— Cabinet Discussions of Foreign Policy
— The Armistice

ENERALLY speaking, after we entered the
war, there were few new matters of broad
policy which had to be discussed in Cabinet
meeting till the fall of 1918. Action was what
was demanded, and action was the order of the day,
rapid action, and everybody was working at top speed.
Every department and every agency had its hands full
trying to furnish the necessary support and supplies to the
army and navy and to get men to France. There was
endless consideration by every agency and department
of measures which would further the military activities of
the nation. It would be hopeless even to attempt to give
a hint of what was thought and done.
In the meantime, the President was giving much atten
tion to the psychology of the situation, to the possibility
of influencing the minds of the people of the Central
Empires and of causing a weakening of their will to con
tinue fighting, by picturing the aims of their rulers and
masters and contrasting those of this nation. The power
which had brought war and destruction to the world was
not, he assumed, the German people, but the ruthless
masters of that people. There could be no peace with an

ambitious and intriguing government. We could not take
the word of the present rulers of the German people as a
guarantee of anything that is to endure, “ unless explicitly
supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and
purpose of the German people themselves as other peoples
of the world would be justified in accepting. . . . We
must await some new evidence of the purposes of the great
peoples of the Central Powers. We are not the enemies of
the peoples of the Central Powers— they are not our ene
mies. They did not originate this war. We are vaguely
conscious that we are fighting their cause as some day they
will be. They are in the grip of a sinister power. The
whole world is in the grip of that power. The military
masters of Germany have never regarded nations as peo
ples— men, women, and children of like blood and frame
as themselves, for whom governments exist and in whom
governments have their life. But now those masters
see very clearly to what point fate has brought them. If
they fall back, their power will fall to pieces like a pack of
cards. It is their power at home they are thinking about
more than their power abroad. It is that power which
is trembling. Deep fear has entered their hearts. If they
fail, their people will thrust them aside. A government
accountable to the people will be set up. If they succeed,
they are safe, and Germany and the world are undone.
America will fall within their menace. But they will make
no headway. It rests with us to break through their hy
pocrisies. We have only one choice. We have made it.
Woe be to the man or group of men that seeks to stand in
our way in this day of high resolution when every princi
ple we hold dearest is to be vindicated and made secure
for the salvation of nations, including Germany herself.

Once more we shall make good with our lives and fortunes
the great faith to which we were born, and a new glory
shall shine in the face of our people. Germany has said
once more that force and force alone shall decide whether
Justice and Peace shall reign. There is but one response
from us: ‘ Force, force to the uttermost, force without
stint or limit, the righteous and triumphant force— which
shall make Right the law of the world, and cast every self
ish dominion down in the dust.’ ”Brave words these for the dark days from June, 1917, to
the middle of April, 1918, and a bold prophecy considering
the collapse of Russia, the havoc of submarines, and the
state of things on the Western Front! And much of
the spirit and words of the men of the days of our Revolu
tion and of those who humbled the Stuarts! Evidently
there is something else in this man for those to study who
thought they had much ground for criticism of him when
he said: “ There is such a thing as a man being too proud
to fight. There is such a thing as a nation being so right
that it does not need to convince others by force that it is
right.” Evidently there were more ways of interpreting
these statements than one.
But he was ready “ to discuss a fair and just and honest
peace at any time that is sincerely purposed— a peace in
which the strong and the weak shall fare alike.” In spite
of appearances, the President believed that that time was
not far off. He apparently never let the thought enter
his head that we should fail. Like Lincoln, he held firmly
to his belief in the might of right, and he knew also the
power of this nation and believed, I think, that, if neces
sary, it alone would overcome Germany. “ As, God
willing, it assuredly will be,” and “ the eyes of the people

have been opened and they see,” and “ the hand of God
is laid upon the nations,” and “ he will show them favour,”
were of the essence of his thinking and faith. But there
was need of a look ahead, because of the possible effects,
not only on the enemy, but also upon ourselves and the
Allies. There must be a permanent peace and therefore
a just peace. The minds of men must be influenced in
right directions before the end was too clearly seen and
uncontrolled ambitions were let loose. The war would be
simple, pure tragedy and horror if passion prevailed and
there was not permanent gain secured— if once more there
was to be a mere carnival oi looting and grabbing, a
display of greedy national self-seeking. Therefore, the
President bent much of his energy to the unfolding of
worthy national aims and the terms of a just settlement
and a secure peace. Time and again, he raised his voice
and took Congress into his confidence, seeking its support.
And already there were discordant voices, particularly in
the Senate, partisan voices of men who apparently were
thinking more of themselves and the fortunes of their party
and of humbling Woodrow Wilson than they were of the
vast issues involved. One of them in particular, occupying
a position of peculiar strength, apparently cherished such
personal hatred of the President that it would have been
impossible for him to take a clear view of things, even if
he had not been so constituted as to make it impossible
for him to entertain a generous emotion or a constructive
thought. The air was charged with misrepresentation;
and especially from the first of March, 1918, a ceaseless
campaign was waged in Congress and outside to inject
poison into the public mind. This was obvious to those in
Washington who were observant, but it was not patent

to the great body of the American people of all shades of
political opinion who were patriotically bent on winning
the war. They did not perceive it, and they would not
have credited it; but it was a fact and furnished some
justification for the appeal which certain leaders urged the
President to make for the return, in 1918, of a Congress
which would support him and which he did finally make, to
the dismay of many of his warmest supporters and to the
irritation of many other high-minded men and women.
There are those who smiled at the President’s assump
tion that the German rulers and not the German people
were responsible for the war, at his attempt to fasten in
their minds the fact that they were being led in false di
rections to their injury, and at his assertion that no peace
would ever be made with them. Senator Lodge seemed to
be one of these. As late as October 6, 1918, he regretted
the President’s discussion with the German Government
and his inquiry whether Maximilian represented merely
the constituted authorities, saying: “ I do not understand
what he can possibly represent except the constituted
authorities, which represent the German Empire and peo
ple, unless a revolution has occurred of which the world
has as yet no knowledge.” We shall see. I shall be
greatly surprised if the President’s messages do not
have a marked effect among the people of the Central
Empires and on the course of the war.
The President's course in outlining terms of a just peace
seems to be received with approval by the public, and his
suggestion of a plan to underwrite future peace runs along
the lines of the proposals of leaders such as Taft and Roose
velt; but there appears to be apprehension in certain quar
ters lest the President get too much glory from the war and

still greater fame if peace comes. Partisanship is on guard
to see that his achievements do not redound to his or to his
party’s advantage!!
On October 4th, Prince Maximilian had become Chan
cellor of Germany. He immediately asked the President
“ to take steps for the restoration of peace, to invite the
Allied governments to send delegates to negotiate, and in
order to avoid further bloodshed, to conclude an armis
tice.” He accepted President Wilson’s outlined terms.
The latter asked for further light and added that he would
propose an armistice only on condition that the Germans
retire from Belgium and France. On October 12th, the
Germans replied, saying that they would immediately
evacuate occupied territory, and that they accepted the
fourteen points with the understanding that only details
would be negotiated. They added that the govern
ment was in agreement with the great majority of the
Reichstag, and spoke in the name of the German
people.
The President, in his repiy of October 14th, was very
specific on several points. The process of evacuation
would be left to the Allied military advisers. There must
be absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees
of the military supremacy of the armies of the United
States and of the Allies in the field. The wanton and out
rageous practices of German forces on land and sea must
immediately cease. “ It is necessary also, in order that
there may be no possibility of a misunderstanding, that
the President should very solemnly call the attention of the
government of Germany to the language and plain intent
of one of the terms of peace which the German Govern
ment has now accepted. It is contained in the address

I306]

of the President delivered at Mount Vernon on the Fourth
of July last. It is as follows:
“ ‘ The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere
that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice
disturb the peace o f the world; or, if it cannot be
presently destroyed, at least its reduction to virtual impotency.’
“ The power which has hitherto controlled the German
nation is of the sort here described. It is within the
choice of the German nation to alter it. The President’s
words, just quoted, naturally constitute a condition prece
dent to peace, if peace is to come by the action of the Ger
man people themselves. The President feels bound to say
that the whole process of peace will, in his judgment, de
pend upon the definiteness and the satisfactory character
of the guarantees which can be given in this fundamental
matter. It is indispensable that the governments associ
ated against Germany should know beyond a peradventure
with whom they are dealing.”
The German reply of October 20th said that, in accept
ing the proposal for evacuation, the government had
started from the assumption that the procedure should be
left to the judgment of military advisers. To the Presi
dent’s fundamental condition for peace, it said: “ Hitherto,
the representative of the people in the German Empire
has not been endowed with an influence on the formation
of the government.
"The Constitution did not provide for a concurrence of
representation of the people in decisions of peace and
war. These conditions have just now undergone a fun
damental change. A new government has been formed
in complete accord with the principle of the representa

tion of the people, based on equal, universal, secret, and
direct franchise.
“ The leaders of the great parties of the Reichstag are
members of this government. In the future, no govern
ment can take or continue in office without possessing the
confidence of a majority of the Reichstag.
“ The responsibility of the Chancellor of the Empire is
being legally developed and safeguarded. The first act
of the new government has been to lay before the Reich
stag a bill to alter the constitution of the Empire so that
the consent of the representative of the people is required
for decisions on war and peace.
“ The permanence of the new system is, however, guar
anteed, not only by constitutional safeguards, but also
by the unshakable determination of the German people,
whose vast majority stands behind these reforms and de
mands their energetic continuance.
“ The question of the President— with whom the governmentsassociated against Germany are dealing— is therefore
answered in a clear, unequivocal manner by the statement
that the offer of peace and armistice has come from a
government which is free from any arbitrary and irre
sponsible influence, is supported by the approval of an
overwhelming majority of the German people.”
At Cabinet meeting, Tuesday, October 22d, the Ger
man note which appeared in the papers on Monday was
the main subject of discussion. It had come over the
wireless. The President remarked that he had not seen
the official copy— that it had not been received. Just
then, Lansing came and told us that the message came
to his office just as he was leaving.
The President said that he would like to have our re[308]

actions on the note. Nobody spoke for a few seconds.
Then someone made a brief statement, asserting that
everything depended upon the nature of Germany’s in
tentions and the President’s faith in them.
I asked why Germany had approached this country
alone— why she did not approach the Allies as a whole, or
France, or England— why she did not send the same mes
sage to each. Did she think she could produce friction?
Did she think this country was a little less than neutral and
not quite belligerent ? Did she think she had fooled us for
two years and might do so again ? Did she think she could
produce friction and impair our military effectiveness?
The President answered that it appeared to be techni
cally sufficient that he had announced terms which Lloyd
George and Allied sentiment indicated acceptance of, and
that the Germans, knowing the facts, had addressed him
as the author of the statement of terms. It was possible
also that Germany regarded this nation as the only one
which desired nothing except peace and justice and the
one which would take a reasonable attitude.
I pointed out that the German suggestion that her
military advisers agree with ours and those of the Allies
as to evacuation, arrangement of forces, and indication of
positions, was highly objectionable. This, I said, should
not be entertained for a second. Our military chiefs
should decide the terms, give them to the Germans, and
demand their unconditional acceptance. These should
include military guarantees, such as the surrender of arms,
and the occupation by the Allies of such places as Metz,
Cologne, and S trassburg, not only pending evacuation,
but also through the peace negotiations and till the terms
dictated to them were fulfilled.

I suggested that, while the political adjustments which
had evidently been made were reassuring, they did not go
far enough. Taking away from the military crowd the
power of making or continuing war and making the minis
try responsible to the Reichstag were not sufficient. The
Reichstag had had little real power and had not been really
representative of the German people. It was or had been
three fourths Prussian. It represented the great land
owners and big business interests, and was conservative—
Junkerish. There had been no redistricting since 1871,
and the urban liberal elements had been largely shut out.
Furthermore, the Bundesrath had too much influence
over the Reichstag, and the Kaiser, or whoever exercised
his power, could muster twenty-one votes in the Bundes
rath and control that body and the lower house— could
block any change. To make sure that the military lords
were under control, it would be necessary, I thought, to
know that the following things had been or would be done:
(1) That new districts were arranged honestly for the
election of members to the Reichstag;
(а) That the Constitution and power of the Bundesrath
be changed and its influence over the Reichstag be de
stroyed;
(3) That the Emperor’s veto— the Executive veto
power— be modified;
(4) That the three-class voting system for the Prussian
Diet be changed and extended suffrage be adopted with a
secret ballot;
(5) That the Prussian Upper House be reformed, and
(б) That a ministry in Prussia and in the Empire be
created, responsible to the legislative bodies.
It was objected that this would be an unwarranted in

terference with the right of the German people to select
their own government. I answered that they had never
had that right, and that I wanted to confer it upon them,
and, for that matter, that the President had already inter
fered, and properly, when he said in former notes that he
would not deal with the Hohenzollerns or any others who
had arbitrary power over the matter of peace and war.
I added that, if Germany complied with the President’s
demands, she would have to do substantially what I sug
gested; and, furthermore, that we were treating with
an untrustworthy enemy and had a right to dictate
terms.
The President observed that it would carry us too
much into technical detail to go fully into the matter in a
note. I replied that I realized that; but that details
were of the essence of the matter, and that I would make
certain that Germany understood that rearrangements in
detail in conformity with the assurance given would be
insisted upon, and that we understood what they should
be.
Burleson said that the Germans did not know the mean
ing of democracy, and that he would be satisfied with
nothing short of abject surrender with absolute military
guarantees. He would require the Germans everywhere
to lay down their arms, and would not leave the terms to
Foch, Haig, and Pershing. They might be too lenient.
This brought a roar of laughter, but Burleson stuck to his
guns.
The President said that he was not going to discuss
terms with the Germans. He would simply give them
his decision. He asked what impression we thought the
note had made on the American people. What would

their attitude be? Baker answered that the newspapers
reflected the views of the people. I agreed that they did
on the note, that the people were a unit, and would not be
satisfied unless the terms were drastic, but that they
would trust him and accept his lead.
The President remarked that doubtless the press re
flected the views of the people of the East, but asked if it
did those of the people of the West. “ Yes,” I answered.
“ I have recently been as far west as the Rockies. The
people in the West want the war to end, but not till it
ends right. They want the matter settled once and for
all. They want no more menace from Germany. They
would be willing to leave the matter of an armistice and
its terms to Pershing, Haig, and Foch.” I spoke of a man
whom I had met in Cutbank, Montana, about fifty miles
from the Rocky Mountains. I had gone there in con
nection with the work of lending money to the farmers
in the drought-stricken area. I had found the country
desolate. It was in the midst of its second year of drought.
The country was brown and bare. The people had made
little or nothing for two years. Some of the farmers were
leaving their homes. Cutbank was dead. It was dusty
and grimy. There was little or no business activity. As
I was sitting in the lobby of the little hotel, people, as
they passed by, would stop and gaze at me. Finally a
small, dried-up, rather shabby elderly man came in and
took a seat near me. I supposed he had a hard-luck story
which he wanted to tell me or that he wanted some of the
government’s money. But nothing of the sort. He be
gan to talk about the war. I soon found that I could
tell him little or nothing new. He was familiar with its
origin, understood its causes, and was acquainted with its

progress. As I was getting ready to leave to take the
train, he said:
“ I have three sons in France at the front. They are
all I have. I cannot reasonably expect to get them all
back. I hope I may get two or one of them back, but
whatever happens, they are my contribution to my
country’s cause and to the cause of civilization. What
I ask is that they do not give themselves in vain. Let
them stay till the war ends right, till the thing is settled
once and for all, till a permanent peace can be made, and
men may go about their business free from apprehension
and disorder, till the nations can take steps to see that
there shall never be another tragedy like this. See that
they do not die for anything less worth while. Fix the
matter so that neither Germany nor any other nation
can ruin the world.”
I added another little story which Lieutenant Perigord
told me about a ranchman whom he met at Great Falls on
a speaking trip after he left me. After his speech in Great
Falls, he said, a tall, splendid specimen of a man, about
fifty years old, dressed in plains’ fashion, came up to him
and said that he wanted to shake a Frenchman’s, a
French officer’s, hand. “ I expressed my gratitude to
him,” Perigord said, “ and asked why he was so kind. * 1
felt that I must see you,’ the man replied. ' I have travel
led fifty miles to see you and to hear you. Do you know
this place?’ he asked, showing me a card which had a
picture of a little French cemetery near Vimy Ridge. ‘ I
do not know the cemetery,’ I said, ‘ but I know Vimy. I
was wounded near there when the Germans made their
gas attack. What is it?’ ‘ They tell me,’ the man an
swered, *that my only son is buried there. After England

declared war, he went to Canada and volunteered, and
fought for many months, and then I received word that
he was dead and had been buried near Vimy.’ ‘ Well, my
friend,’ I said, ‘ you take it very bravely.’ *Oh, well!’
replied the man, *this is no time for weakness. But when
the war is over and we have won the victory, I am going
to France and find my boy’s grave and lie down on it and
have a good cry. What I want is assurance that his death
will be justified in the issue. The war must not stop till
the Germans are soundly whipped and things can be so
arranged that the world will not have to go through this
sort of thing again. Get the right sort of terms and get
the nations to arrange guarantees that disputes can be
settled without resort to war, and peace can be long con
tinued. This is what my boy died for.’ ”•
This, I said, was what I found everywhere.
Baker spoke of a soldier who had come back and said
that the matter must be settled right and firmly this
time, as he did not have time to go to Europe every ten or
fifteen years to lick the Kaiser.
I gave another instance of the spirit found in Montana,
which certainly was staggering under as heavy a load as
any other state in the Union. On the train from Cutbank
to Havre, as we were discussing the situation and the
loans we were making, I noticed that two of the trainmen
were listening and taking a deep interest in what we were
saying. This was rather unusual for flatrmen and brakemen.
Finally, one of them said: "W e are farmers.’*
I answered: “ You don’t look like it. You look like
trainmen.”
“ We are, temporarily,” he replied, “ but normally we are

farmers. We made nothing last year except a little wheat
for seed, and we had to get jobs to help us support our
families.”
“ Have you applied for a loan?” I asked.
“ No,” he answered, “ I do not expect to. I can pull
through. With what I am getting from the road, I can
feed my family and stock. Next spring, the road will give
me a vacation. I shall go home and work as long as I
am needed. Then I will come back to the train. I can
work it out in this way. If you have any money to lend,
let the boys have it who cannot get away or get other jobs.
It will save their farms for them. Don’t bother about
us. We have got to work together to lick the Kaiser and
see this war through to the right end.”
McAdoo thought that the President ought to take the
matter up with the Allies, not with the Germans. “ The
President,” he added, “ ought not to have to consider such
a matter as that before him in an atmosphere of passion;
and the air about us seems to be charged with it.” Funny
to have McAdoo advising caution and moderation!
“ We had better be careful,” he asserted, “ how we decide
matters at this juncture. There are more sides than one
to this matter of prolonging the war, if we can end it and
secure all that reason demands. We may as well face the
fact that the Allies and even we may not be able to finance
this war on its present scale— and it really means our
financing it— for two years more. The expenditures are
frightful, and I do not know where we can get the means
without wrecking ourselves.”
I remarked that there was another reason for not going
too far with the business of insisting that Germany be ab
solutely crushed and that the armies go to Berlin. That

might gratify us as a spectacle and satisfy our passions,
but it might not be of any value from a military point of
view and might involve vast additional expenditure and
loss of life. “ But the thing in my mind is that a situation
might develop where the obstacle to a just peace would not
come from Germany but rather from certain of the Allies.
Human nature has not been fundamentally changed by
the war. There have been other similar upheavals.
Nations are not going to be angelic when peace comes.
There will be much of the same old exhibition of national
ambitions and national selfishness. I have seen many in
dications already since the Allies have recovered from their
desperate situation last spring and have begun to realize
that they will win, that there will be a resort on the part
of some of them to the old mediaeval European practices
and struggles for advantage, under the guise, of course, of
seeking national protection. The tigers will be let loose.
I have already heard representatives of the Allies assert
that much must be demanded from Germany which would
certainly create conditions favourable to another hideous
explosion. As the collapse of Germany becomes more
certain, the demands of some of the Allies, particularly
of France, will probably become unreasonable. This
would be natural, but in the interest of world peace, they
will have to be held in check."
The President said that only Lloyd George and the Brit
ish Labour Party had expressed concurrence in the terms
he had outlined, that Clemenceau had not as yet, and
Italy had not. The English, he said, were giving trouble
on the matter of the freedom of the seas, and were asking
what he meant by it. He was not prepared to say more
than that private property seized at sea must be paid for,
[316]

and that there must be insistence on a few other points.
I added that what I had just said did not modify what I
had before insisted upon, that we should take military
guarantees which would give us an absolute hold on the
Germans to force evacuation and compliance with all nec
essary conditions and promises.
The President said that he thought he understood the
sense of the meeting, and that what he still wanted was a
suggestion as to the procedure.
I said I would tell Germany that I would transmit her
note to the Allies with the distinct statement that he would
advise that nothing be done except under such guarantees
as Pershing, Haig, and Foch would demand, and only
if they advised that an armistice be arranged— that he
could not trust people who had violated all their pledges.
I told the President that I would, of course, give Ger
many no hint of what I thought the Allies might or should
do. The President said that he hoped we would exempt
him from the necessity of taking up any other matter—
that his mind was all on the note and that he had none to
let on any other matter.
The President’s reply appeared in the press Wednesday,
October 23d. He could not decline, in view of the explicit
assurances of Germany, to take up with the Allies the
question of an armistice, but the only armistice he would
submit for consideration would be one which would leave
the Allies and the United States in a position to enforce
any arrangements entered into and to make a renewal of
hostilities by Germany impossible. He had transmitted
to the Allies his correspondence with the suggestion that
if they were disposed to effect peace upon the terms
and principles indicated, their military advisers and those

of the United States be asked to submit to their govern
ments the necessary terms of an armistice “ provided they
deem such an armistice possible from a military point of
view. The note further stated that the President felt bound to
point out why “ extraordinary safeguards” must be de
manded. Significant as the constitutional changes seem
to be, it said, “ it does not appear that the principle of a
government responsible to the German people has yet
been fully worked out, or that any guarantees either exist
or are in contemplation that the alterations of principle
and of practice now partially agreed upon will be perma
nent. Moreover, it does not appear that the heart of the
present difficulty has been reached. It may be that fu
ture wars have been brought under the control of the Ger
man people, but the present war has not been, and it is
with the present war that we are now dealing. It is evi
dent that the German people have no means of command
ing the acquiescence of the military authorities of the
Empire in the popular will; that the power of the King of
Prussia to control the policy of the Empire is unimpaired;
that the determining initiative still remains with those
who have hitherto been the masters of Germany. Feeling
that the whole peace of the world depends now on plain
speaking and straightforward action, the President deems
it his duty to say, without any attempt to soften what
may seem harsh words, that the nations of the world do
not and cannot trust the word of those who have hitherto
been the masters of German policy, and to point out once
more that in concluding peace and attempting to undo the
infinite injuries and injustices of this war, the government
of the United States cannot deal with any but veritable
*

representatives of the German people who have been as
sured of a genuine constitutional standing, as the real
rulers of Germany.
“ If it must deal with the military masters and the mon
archical autocrats of Germany now, or if it is likely to have
to deal with them later, in regard to the international
obligations of the German Empire, it must demand not
peace negotiations, but surrender. Nothing can be gained
by leaving this essential thing unsaid.”
This note was entirely satisfactory and covered all the
essential points emphasized at Cabinet meeting. It could
not have covered or referred to the point that it was desir
able to commit the Allies to the President’s terms which
the Germans accepted, but it is obvious that if the Allies
assent to the Armistice they will be morally bound to
conclude peace on the basis of those terms; and they will
accept them. They are what we are fighting for and
what they profess to be fighting for. If they do not ac
cept them or if they now appear to accept them and later
do not observe them, they will become obstacles to a
peace of justice and will violate faith. The President re
ferred to this phase of the matter in his discussion on
Tuesday.
Germany replied that she was awaiting armistice pro
posals and added: “ The peace negotiations are being con
ducted by a government of the people, in whose hands
rests, both actually and constitutionally, the authority to
make decisions. The military powers are also subject to
this authority.”'
At Cabinet meeting Tuesday, the 29th of October, the
President said that he wished to discuss the Austrian Note
which appealed for an immediate armistice on all fronts.

The question was raised at once as to whether there was
really an Austrian Government with which we could deal.
Hungary had set up an independent establishment, as
had the Slavs in the south. Poland was engaged in set
ting up a government and Czecho-Slovakia was repre
sented in Paris by Masaryk. It was certain that all these
factions except Austria and Hungary would seek to be rep
resented at the Peace Conference. At least they would
have to be considered and dealt with. An interesting
letter from the new Premier of Austria was read. It rep
resented that the new government of Germany was lib
eral and sincere and that it could be regarded as free from
the control of the old military power and could be trusted.
It urged that the German people be not humiliated as
they had been after Tilsit.
A letter was read also from a socialist observer in
Switzerland. He wrote that the German people trusted
the President of the United States and would throw out
the Hohenzollern crowd if he said the word. There was
danger of chaos, he added, if Germany was pushed too far.
Bolshevism was menacing, and the Russian Government
was sending funds into Switzerland, Sweden, and other
countries.
It was evident that Germany was going to pieces and
that there would be an armistice in a very few days, if the
Allied chiefs thought there should be one.
At Cabinet meeting, Tuesday, November 5th, the
President came in looking well and happy. He acted
as if a load had been taken off his mind. He appeared
to be less hurried and less under a strain than I had seen
him for years. He immediately announced that the terms
of an armistice had been agreed upon in France, and that
[320]

the Fourteen Points had been accepted with two interpre
tations, namely, that “ Freedom of the Seas” would have
to be exactly and satisfactorily defined, and that the res
toration of Belgium was to be understood to include fi
nancial as well as political restoration. The President
said that these two reservations were satisfactory to him.
Foch, the President said, was to dictate the terms of the
Armistice to the Germans. This he heartily approved,
just as he had agreed that it was essential that the Allied
chiefs should determine whether there should be an arm
istice at all. He expressed the opinion that Germany
would accept Foch’s terms. Her morale, he was con
vinced, was gone. He based his view, not so much on
what was said in Socialist papers as on the contents of the
Pan-German papers.
All the Cabinet agreed that Germany would have to
accept. I asked the Secretary of War if there was con
vincing evidence that the German Army had deteriorated.
He replied that there was not, but that German shells
appeared to be of inferior quality. I stated that I was
satisfied that the army had deteriorated and was con
tinuing on the down grade in point of morale, spirit, and
supplies, and that I thought the spirit of the people back
of the army was broken.
The President spoke at length of the possibility of
revolutions in Europe under the stress of conditions and
the influence of Bolshevist propaganda. He especially
referred to the presence of conspirators in Switzerland and
Sweden and to the report that the Russians had sent mil
lions of francs into these countries. He asked what should
be done. I immediately asserted that the Allies ought to
ask the governments of these countries to impound the
[321]

funds and expel the agents. The President said that
Clemenceau was not afraid of revolution in France and
that the Bolshevists themselves recognized that the French
people and the French cantons of Switzerland would stand
firm. Lloyd George, he added, thought that there would
be a difficult faction in England and Scotland, but that
the people as a whole would not be swept from their feet.
The President attributed the French attitude to the wide
diffusion of property. I added that they had also had
their dose, their revolution, that it had been a severe
surgical operation, and had laid foundations on which
further progress could be made by evolutionary processes
— by enlightened progressive measures. I pointed out
that England had preceded France by a hundred and
fifty years, and that, while she, too, had need of funda
mental changes, she could work out a fuller measure of
democracy, and a higher development of her people and
of their economic and social well-being by the process
of modification.
Of course, these countries have a long road to travel
before they reach the point at which America now stands
in the march to individual well-being and social and indus
trial democracy. Among other things, class distinction
and privileges under law or custom must go, and adequate
provision for the education of the masses of the people
must be made; and in England, some solution of the owner
ship, by a very limited number, of the soil on which forty
million people stand, must be found.
As for most of southern and eastern Europe, and, for
that matter, all Asia, Africa, and part of South America,
it may without extravagance be said that they are medie
val. They are in the raw. Illiteracy in them ranges from
[322]

30 per cent, to 93 per cent, and there has been, until re
cently, no sort of decent regard for the masses of the people
on the part of the ruling classes or the governments.
They have not recognized that the people are their great
est undeveloped resources and that, if they were devel
oped, they would have to concern themselves little about
the development of their material resources. Nor have
they realized that their conditions will be menacing and
unstable till their people are developed and have higher
standards of living.
This war will set the cause of the people measurably
further forward. There will be a large liberal deposit and
substantial gains in all Europe and particularly in the
nations of southern and eastern Europe, including not
only Russia, Rumania, and Serbia, but also Italy and
Spain, in which the illiteracy ranges from 33 per cent, to
60 per cent. But progress will be slow, particularly in the
Eastern nations. Russia, in a hundred years, may possi
bly get in sight of where we started. People forget how
long it has taken nations to perform a surgical operation,
get back to convalescence, and straighten out on the
course of rapid progress. It took England twenty years
to get rid of the first Stuarts and the Cromwells, twentyeight more to get rid of the restored Stuarts, and fix the
lines for orderly institutional development, one hundred
and forty-four more years to reform the suffrage in part
and fix the forms of parliamentary government, and the
end is not yet. It took France six years to get rid of her
kings and discover Napoleon, nearly twenty years to get
rid of Napoleon, fifty-five more to settle down to a
somewhat unstable Republican foundation, and she is not
yet at the point which, in her enthusiasm, she thought

she had reached in 1790. Russia and Rumania and
Serbia, and other countries, will move more slowly, be
cause their people are less fitted for self-government and
they have further to go.
It was said at the Cabinet meeting that many people in
France were speaking of a revolution there as a matter of
course. Many reasons were given, among them that the
stay-at-homes had monopolized everything. Apprehen
sion was expressed that force would have to be used to se
cure a redistribution. It was generally asserted that there
would be financial collapse and economic ruin. The for
mer, I said, was probable, but the latter was unlikely.
The President requested Lansing to talk confidentially
with our representatives with a view to see if European
governments would seize Bolshevist funds and expel agita
tors.
Nothing was said about the approaching election, partly
because of the overshadowing importance of the interna
tional situation, and particularly of the imminence of the
Armistice, and partly because no one had any uneasiness
as to the outcome, notwithstanding the fact that it was
obvious that certain Republican leaders, in spite of pro
fessions of non-partisanship, had been, both in Congress
and on the outside, unceasingly playing politics and seek
ing to win Congress. The leaders had skillfully set out
to poison the minds of the voters, playing upon the prej
udices and passions engendered by war measures, and
had actively and systematically organized every precinct,
while the Democrats had done little or nothing.
When I reached my office the morning of November
11 th, I received a message from the White House saying
that the President would address Congress at one o'clock.

This left no doubt in my mind that the Armistice had been
signed. I had been disturbed at five o’clock Monday
morning by newsboys crying extras. I supposed that the
extras meant the Armistice. The conditions in Germany
and on the front, I believed, were such as to make it neces
sary for Germany to accept almost any terms.
I took steps to get a card of admission to the House for
Mrs. Houston, and she and I met and walked to the Capi
tol. The people were crowding into the galleries when we
entered the House, but the floor was rather empty, as
many members of Congress had not returned from their
electioneering trips. The diplomats were out in force.
When the President was announced there was great ap
plause. He quickly took his place, greeting the Vice
President and the Speaker, and then began his address.
At first his voice was husky and much less distinct than
usual. It seemed that the President either had a slight
cold or that he was labouring under a strong emotion or
partial exhaustion. He looked tired.
He had not read many lines of his message before it
became evident that the Armistice terms were about as
drastic as anybody had ventured to predict they would be,
or as any reasonable person could have desired. What
an answer to the silly creatures who were shouting that
the President would fix the terms and that they would be
very light on Germany!
The members of the Supreme Court were sitting imme
diately in front of the President, just as when the Pres
ident read his war message. Whether they approved the
verdict as they did the declaration in favour of war, I do
not know.
“ The war thus comes to an end,” added the President,

after outlining the terms, meaning, of course, “ The fight
ing thus comes to an end.” The trouble with war is that
it does not come to an end when the fighting ceases. The
fighting ended as the President, from the moment we en
tered, thought it would end,and as I felt sure it would. The
iron had entered the President’s soul when he took up the
sword. There was much of the Roundhead of the 17th
Century in him. He would smite the enemy and have
good execution of him, in the sight of the Lord, for the good
of his soul. He felt, as I did, that the world was not going
and would not go the Kaiser’s way, but the way of right
eousness and justice. I had been told that Foch had the
same faith in an overruling Providence and could not
imagine a German victory.
This armistice marks the turning point in one of the
world’s great epochs. It may be thought of in comparison
with the turning back of the Persians, the Fall of Rome,
the breaking up of the Feudal System, and the French
Revolution.
Europe, in certain respects, is still mediaeval in many
parts, but this war, with its victory for the Allies, will
bring great and beneficent changes. It will break the
strangle hold of the privileged classes and mark the be
ginning of a real march toward democracy, liberty, and re
gard for the average man. These things will not appear
in full measure in our day, but they will be set far forward.
The people have seen a vision, and they will not lose it.
The king business, the whole aristocracy business, will be
less flourishing. Many kings and princes will be turned
loose on the world. Some may return, but with impaired
prestige and power. Those that remain will feel lonesome
and will keep their eyes peeled and watch their step. It
[326]

would not be surprising if England has the last king. It
will be interesting when there is only one. He will be
“ all dressed up and nowhere to go.”
The whole city, the whole nation is celebrating; and
well it may. The horrible butchery of men and the crim
inal waste of wealth have ceased. The victory means
many things. It means or may mean the end of menace
from mediaeval-minded, irresponsible despots; the return
of Alsace-Lorraine to France; a number of new independ
ent states, such as Poland and Czecho-Slovakia; the re
covery by Italy of her natural boundaries; probably the
Turk out of Europe; a measure of disarmament; and a
scheme to settle disputes between nations without resort
to war in so many instances. And so the world slowly and
painfully progresses!
Speaking of new states, I saw Masaryk at the Capitol
and congratulated him on the outcome and the fact that
his country would be permitted to exist as a separate
power. He showed much emotion, but expressed con
fidence that his people would exhibit reasonableness and
ability to control their destinies. Masaryk will be a
powerful force for good in Europe. I also saw Demowski,
President of the Polish National Committee. I asked if
he thought that his people would exhibit the requisite
spirit of tolerance and teamwork. He replied that he
thought they would. I expressed my doubts, saying that
they had never done so. He replied that they would
have a severe test, but that they ought to be warned by
their former experiences. I added that, unless the new
small nations controlled their spirit of nationalism, re
frained from embarking on purely selfish particularistic
policies, and worked out together some form of economic
[327]

cooperation, they would commit economic suicide, impair
their productive forces, and retard the recovery of Europe.
He agreed. The danger is that they will not show the
requisite wisdom and forbearance and prove a curse to
themselves and to the world. It makes no difference
how people are grouped, how small nations are, provided
they work with other peoples in Christian and neighbourly
fashion, with intercommunity adjustments, as do the
peoples of the states of the United States. But it is going
to be difficult for the new nations to restrain themselves
and to cooperate effectively with one another and with
oldern nations; and they may become political and eco
nomic nuisances.

AGRICULTURE IN THE WAR

Division of Work Between the Department and Food Adminis
tration— Results of the Food Production Act— Agricultural Ad
visory Committee

HE part which the millions of men, women,
boys, and girls on the farms and the organized
agricultural agencies assisting them, including
the Federal Department of Agriculture, the state
colleges and departments of agriculture, and farmers’ or
ganizations, played during the war in sustaining this na
tion and those with which we were associated, is striking,
but altogether too little known and appreciated. On them
rested the responsibility for maintaining and increasing
food production and for assisting in securing fuller con
servation of food and feedstuffs. The satisfactory execu
tion of their task was of supreme importance and difficulty.
The conservation of available foods is one thing; the
increase of production along economic lines is quite a
different thing. It is prerequisite and fundamental. It
is one thing to ask a man to save; it is another to ask him,
confronted as he is by the chances of the market and the
risk of loss from disease, flood, and drought, to put his
labour and capital into the production of food, feeds, and
the raw material for clothing.
The work of the agricultural agencies is not much in the
public eye. There is little of the dramatic about it. The

millions of people in the rural districts are directly affected
by it and are in more or less intimate touch with it, but
to the great urban population it is comparatively unknown.
Usually people in cities devote very little thought to the
rural districts; and few of them, fortunately, in normal
times, have to concern themselves about the food supply
and its sources. The daily press occupies itself largely
with the news of the hour, and the magazines have their
attention centred chiefly on other activities. Conse
quently, the people in large centres have slight opportun
ity to acquaint themselves with rural problems and agen
cies. Although the nation has, in its Federal Department
and the state colleges and departments, agricultural
agencies for the improvement of farming which, in point of
personnel, financial support, and effectiveness, excel
those of any other three nations combined, very many
urban people, when we went to war, were unaware of the
existence of such institutions, and not a few representations
were made to the effect that an agency ought to be created
to secure an increase of production. These people saw
the windows of cities placarded and papers filled with
pleas for conservation, for investment in bonds, and for
subscriptions to the Red Cross. They wondered why
they did not see similar evidence of activity in the field
of agriculture. They did not know of the thousands of
men and women quietly working in every rural community
of the nation and of the millions of bulletins and circulars
dealing with the problems from many angles. They over
looked the fact that the field of these workers lies outside
of the city, and did not recognize that both the problem
and the methods were different.
On April 18th, I transmitted to the Senate certain pro

posals for increasing the production, improving the dis
tribution, and promoting the conservation of farm prod
ucts and foods. The suggestions were based in large
measure upon the programme adopted at the St. Louis
and Berkeley conferences. The Committee on Agricul
ture in each House soon afterward took the matter in
hand, held extensive hearings, and finally formulated two
measures. In the preparation of these, there were two
leading thoughts in mind. One was to speed up and add
to the activities of the Federal Department of Agriculture
and its cooperating forces. The other was to vest in the
President regulatory powers, in considerable part of a
commercial nature, to be exercised through an emergency
agency rather than through any existing department, to
deal with special and urgent national and international
food problems growing out of the war. After an extended
debate the two bills— the Food Production and the Food
Control— were passed by Congress and approved by the
President on August ioth.
The Food Production Act— “ an act to provide further
for the national security and defence by stimulating agri
culture and facilitating the distribution of agricultural
products”— to be administered by the Department of
Agriculture, carried an appropriation of $11,346,400 for
the following purposes:
The prevention, control, and eradication of the diseases
and pests of live stock; the enlargement of live-stock
production, and the conservation and utilization of meat,
poultry, dairy, and other animal products; procuring,
storing, and furnishing seeds for cash at cost to farmers in
restricted areas where emergency conditions prevailed;
the prevention, control, and eradication of insects and

plant diseases injurious to agriculture, and the conser
vation and utilization of plant products; the further
development of the cooperative agricultural extension
service; surveys of the food supply of the United States;
gathering and disseminating information concerning farm
products; extending and enlarging the market-news serv
ice; preventing waste of food in storage, in transit, or
held for sale; giving advice concerning the market move
ment or distribution of perishable products; investigating
and certifying to shippers the condition as to the sound
ness of fruits, vegetables, and other food products received
at important central markets; the development of the in
formation work of the Department; enlarging the facili
ties for dealing with the farm-labour problem; and ex
tending the work of the bureaus of Crop Estimates and
Chemistry, $650,000.
While the Food Production bill was pending in Congress,
detailed plans were formulated for carrying out its provi
sions as soon as it should become law. The Department
therefore was ready to proceed promptly and effectively
with their execution.
It was apparent that the Food Production and the Food
Control acts dealt with very closely related matters, that
effective cooperation between the Department of Agricul
ture and the Food Administration was essential, and that
needless duplication of effort should be avoided. It was
recognized that the relation between the two agencies was
intimate and fundamental; that it was impossible com
pletely to disassociate them, and undesirable to do so.
After a full conference, a satisfactory working agreement
was reached.
In a broad way, the Food Administration had as its

prime functions the control and regulation of the commer
cial distribution of foods and feedstuff's, that is, of products
which had reached the markets and were in the channels
of distribution or in the hands of consumers, their con
servation by consumers, and the elimination of waste,
through the employment of regular official as well as
volunteer agencies.
The Department of Agriculture continued to administer
the usual laws placed under its jurisdiction and assumed
the direction of the increased and varied activities pro
vided for by the Emergency Food Production Act.
It early became apparent that there would be no little
delay in framing and passing the necessary legislation.
Time was the essence of the situation. Prompt action was
necessary. It was essential that many of the recommen
dations included in the St. Louis programme should be
put into effect. Farmers already were in the field or had
made their plans for the season. The Department and
the state agencies therefore speeded up their work along
the most promising lines with the forces and funds at
their command. Projects not having an immediate bear
ing on the emergency were set aside in order that the
energies of the workers might be concentrated on the
main problems.
Assuming that Congress would enact, in part, at least,
the legislation desired to stimulate production and to
promote conservation, the Department of Agriculture,
in cooperation with the Land-Gran t colleges, undertook
the preliminary work of developing additional machinery
and agencies; and, in a number of states, these additional
agencies, including especially an extension of the farm
demonstration force, actually were put into operation.

It was recognized that the Cooperative Extension Sys
tem, with its combination of Federal and state adminis
trative officers and specialists, county agents, homedemonstration agents, farm bureaus, and other local
organizations, furnished a ready and effective means for
the nation-wide dissemination of the needed facts, as
well as for practical demonstrations of the best meth
ods of increasing agricultural production and securing
the most economical utilization of the products of
the farm. With remarkable promptness and unanimity,
these agencies addressed themselves to the important
problems of increasing and conserving the food supply
and cordially furthered the Department’s efforts in this
direction.
It would require a volume even to outline all the things
which were done by the Department of Agriculture. It
stimulated production, increasingly controlled plant and
animal diseases, reducing losses from the cattle tick, hog
cholera, tuberculosis, predatory animals, and crop pests,
and, in conjunction with the Department of Labour,
rendered assistance to the farmers in securing labour.
It safeguarded seed stocks and secured and distributed
good seeds to farmers for cash at cost; acted jointly with
the Treasury Department in making loans from the
President’s special fund to distressed farmers in droughtstricken sections; aided in transporting stock from the
drought areas; greatly assisted in the marketing of farm
products, and, under enormous difficulties, helped the
fanners to secure a larger supply of fertilizers. At the
direction of the President, it administered under license
the control of the stockyards and of the ammonia, fertilizer,
and farm-equipment industries.

The Department maintained intimate touch with the
War and Navy departments, the War Industries, War
Trade, and Shipping boards, and the Fuel and Food
administrations. Through the Bureau of Animal In
dustry, it not only continued to safeguard the meat supply
for the civilian population, but it also inspected the meats
used at the various cantonments, training camps, forts,
posts, and naval stations, and aided in the organization
of the veterinary corps. Through the Forest Service, it
rendered valuable assistance to practically all branches of
the government having to do with the purchase or use
of forest products and to many industries which supply
war material to the government, made a thorough study
of the lumber situation, aided in many directions the
Bureau of Aircraft Production and the Navy Department
in the execution of their aeroplane programmes, conducted
cooperative tests on a large scale at the Forest Products
Laboratory, and collaborated in the organization of the
forestry regiments. Its Bureau of Markets handled the
distribution of nitrate of soda to farmers for cash at cost,
cooperated with the War Industries Board in broadening
the channels of distribution and in stimulating the use of
stocks of low-grade cotton, and worked with the Food
Administration in the handling of grains and in other of its
activities. Its Bureau of Chemistry assisted other depart
ments in preparing specifications for articles needed by
them, aided the War Department in the organization of
its chemical research work and in making tests of fabrics
and supplies, worked out formulas for waterproofing
leather, and maintained intimate touch with the related
services of the Food Administration. The Department
collaborated with the War Department in its handling of

the draft, aiding it particularly in passing upon the exemp
tion of agricultural labourers.
An appropriation of $4,348,400 was made by the Food
Production Act for the further development of the Exten
sion Service. By the end of October, more than sixteen
hundred emergency demonstration agents, men and
women, had been appointed, making a total of approxi
mately five thousand cooperative extension workers,
including the specialists performing extension work, em
ployed through both state and Federal regular and emer
gency funds. This number was further increased as soon
as men and women with the requisite training and experi
ence could be secured. Nearly seven hundred and fifty
additional counties cooperated with the Department
under the Food Production Act in employing country
agents. The total number of men in the service acting
as country agents was about two thousand and many dis^
trict agents were designated to supervise their activities.
About thirteen hundred state, district, county, and urban
women home-demonstration agents were set to work.
Of the 600 women employed as emergency agents, 500
worked in counties, principally among farm women,
and 100 were assigned exclusively to urban communities.
More than one hundred additional assistants in boys’ and
girls’ club work were placed in the field.
It would be almost easier to tell what these men and
women did not do than to indicate the variety and extent
of their operations. They constituted the only Federal
machinery in intimate touch with the millions of people
in the farming districts. They were, therefore, able to
render great service to other branches of the government,
such as the Treasury in its Liberty Loan campaigns, the
[336]

Red Cross, the Young Men’s Christian Association, and
other organizations in their war activities, and the Food
Administration in its special tasks.
Conditions growing out of the war gave added impetus
to the already well-established policy of extending and
promoting local organizations to support, aid, and extend
the influence of the county-agent work. The number of
such organizations was rapidly increased throughout the
country. In the fifteen Southern states the number of
community organizations of farmers formed to aid the
county agents increased from 1,654, with a membership of
44,548, to 2,508, with a membership of 78,660. As in the
South, so in the North and West, impetus was given to
the organization movement already under way, and there
was an emphatic demonstration of the increased usefulness
of the county agent when backed by a supporting local
organization. In the thirty-three Northern and Western
states, the number of farm bureaus and similar local
organizations was increased to 374, with a membership of
98,654. The number of community clubs organized
among rural women in the South increased from 250 to
1,042, and 1,635,000 women and girls actually participated
in some form of emergency work.
The enrollment in the regular boys’ clubs in the South
was largely increased, and the total membership was ap
proximately 100,000. In addition, 20,000 boys were en
rolled to assist in war emergency activities. The boys'
and girls' clubs in the Northern and Western states
had a regular membership of 406,000 and an additional
emergency enrollment of 400,000. These clubs in all
sections of the nation were efficient agencies in the cam
paigns for promoting food production and conservation.

The passage of the Food Production Act made possible
a marked expansion of the machinery of the Bureau of
Markets. An appropriation of $2,52 2,000 was provided
for this purpose.
Realizing the importance of continued efforts to pro
mote the production of staple commodities and of making
plans promptly for the immediate future, in June I ap
pointed a committee of experts of the Department to make
suggestions for future action, especially with reference to
winter-wheat planting. The Committee considered the
problem from every angle and reached the conclusion that
a strenuous effort should be made to secure the planting of
an area that would, under favourable conditions, produce
a billion bushels of wheat in 1918. The Committee also
recommended that steps be taken to encourage the pro
duction of more than 83,000,000 bushels of rye, and that
the production of winter oats in the South should be in
creased to the extent that seed was available. This pro
gramme called for the planting of 44,634,000 acres of
winter wheat and 5,522,000 acres of rye, and was submit
ted by telegraph to the leading agricultural authorities of
various states concerned. As a result of their suggestions,
it was finally determined to propose the planting of
47,337,000 acres of winter wheat and 5,131,000 acres of
rye.
Through a number of channels, the Department pro
ceeded to bring the programme to the attention of the
grain farmers of the country and to seek their cooperation
in making the recommendations effective. It was pub
lished as a circular and also was given wide distribution
through the press and the Weekly News Letter; and a series
of conferences immediately was held by representatives of

the Department in each of the great grain-growing sec
tions of the country.
Following the publication of the programme and the
holding of the conferences, the Department carried on an
intensive campaign to emphasize the need for an increased
production of grain and the best methods to be employed
in obtaining the increases suggested.
The task of increasing the meat supply, necessarily a
slow one, was particularly difficult. Hogs and poultry
yield the quickest returns, and therefore urgent efforts
were made to increase their production. Special cam
paigns were conducted by the specialists in animal hus
bandry. At the same time, active steps were taken to
stimulate the production of beef and dairy cattle, and
specialists in sheep husbandry were assigned to duty in
the Eastern states to encourage the production of sheep
on farms.
A very material increase was brought about in the pro
duction of meat and wool on the forest ranges. In two
years, there were placed on the forests approximately
1.000.000 additional head of live stock, representing about
25.000.000 pounds of beef, 16,000,000 of mutton, and
4.000.000 of wool.
It was early apparent that in certain sections of the
country, particularly near the great industrial centres
in the North and Northeast and especially in the vicinity
of plants undertaking large war contracts for the govern
ment, there would be a marked shortage of farm labour.
It was obvious, too, that, on account of the abstraction of
labour through enlistments in the regular army and
through the operation of the draft law, difficulties would be
experienced in many sections of the Union. The situa

tion called for constructive action. A large army cannot
be constituted without causing inconvenience in many1
directions. It was clearly impossible to make exemptions
by classes and to admit no farmers to the army. Still, it
was highly important that agricultural production be in
creased. Military failure could arise no less from shortage
of foodstuffs than from shortage of ammunition or man
power. The task was presented of making the labour
remaining on farms more effective, of securing fuller
cooperation among farmers, and of utilizing on the farms
urban and rural labour not heretofore fully or regularly
employed. Past experience made it clear that labour
might be transferred from certain communities where the
seasonal pressure had passed to others and where the
need was immediate. It was known, too, that there were’
hundreds of thousands of boys in rural districts and villages
who might render useful service, and that the army of
boys and girls organized in agricultural clubs might be en
larged and its members employed in additional directions.
It was assumed that there were more than two million
boys between the ages of fifteen and nineteen years in the
cities and towns who were not engaged in productive work
vital to the nation, that many of these had had contact
with rural life, and that their services might be utilized
on the farms, especially in the harvest season.
The Departments of Agriculture and Labour and other
agencies immediately after the outbreak of the war under
took to furnish assistance. The War Department itself
held definitely in mind the thought of lightening the bur
den as far as possible by not calling to the colours those
essential for leadership and direction. Under the pres
sure of the first draft, it was difficult to work out satis[3 4 0 ]

factorily the underlying principle of selection. For the
future, a system of classification was adopted. The selectives were classified into five groups, indicating the
order in which they would be called to service. Skilled
farm labour was in Class 2, highly specialized agricultural
experts in agencies of the state or nation in Class 3, and
heads of necessary agricultural enterprises in Class 4.
The operation of this new arrangement removed many of
the difficulties previously encountered and, in reasonable
measure, met the demands of the situation.
It was realized that, after all was done, there would be
need of additional labour in many sections. The De
partment of Labour therefore undertook to study the
available supplies in towns and cities and developed its
system of employment agencies for this purpose. One
object was to secure information, which could be conveyed
to the Department of Agriculture and to state agencies,
as to available labour in urban centres and to have it
drawn upon for aid in farming operations in near-by com
munities. The Department of Agriculture assumed the
task of studying the supplies and needs in rural districts.
It arranged to place a man in each state in touch with the
State Council of Safety with the special duty of assisting
in the mobilization and organization of rural labour.
Under the provisions of the Food Production Act, thirtyeight farm-labour agents were appointed and devoted
their entire energies to the problem.
There was an unusually large demand for the publica
tions of the Department. More than 22,000,000 farmers’
bulletins, circulars, leaflets, posters, dealing with emer
gency problems of production and conservation and an
equal number of publications covering the regular activi
ty ]

ties of the Department making a total of approximately
forty-four million were published between April 1st and
the end of October. The special circulars and posters
were distributed largely through the county agents and
other cooperating agencies. Copies also were supplied to
official organizations, war committees, civic associations,
and patriotic clubs throughout the United States.
At the request of the Secretary of War and the Secre
tary of the Navy, the Department participated in pro-,
tecting our military and naval forces against unwhole
some foods. The Federal meat inspection service, which
for years has safeguarded the civil population of the
United States from bad meat in interstate commerce, was
extended to include the special supervision of the meat
supply of the American Army and Navy. The exami
nation, selection, and handling of meats and fats were in
expert hands from the time the live animals were driven
to slaughteruntil the finished productwas delivered in good
condition to the mess cooks. Inspectors were assigned to
the various cantonments, training camps, forts, posts, and
other places in the United States, where large numbers of
troops were assembled
In all the undertakings during 1917 and 1918 to in
crease the nation’s food supplies, the Department and the
state colleges and commissioners of agriculture worked
in cordial cooperation. The authorities and staffs of the
agricultural colleges in every state of the Union placed
their facilities at the disposal of the Department, supported
its efforts and plans with the utmost zeal, and omitted no
opportunity, on their own initiative, to adopt and prose
cute helpful measures, and to urge the best agricultural
practice suited to their localities. They not only re*

sponded promptly to every request made on them to co
operate in the execution of plans, but also liberally made
available to the Department the services of many of their
most efficient officers. Equally generous was the support
of the great agricultural journals of the Union.
Very much assistance also was rendered by the Na
tional Agricultural Advisory Committee, created jointly
by the Secretary of Agriculture and the Food Adminis
trator for the purpose of securing the views of farmers and
farm organizations, and of seeing that nothing was omitted
to safeguard all legitimate interests. This body, as a
whole and also through its subcommittees, studied the
larger and more critical agricultural problems confronting
the government, gave many valuable criticisms and highly
useful suggestions, and assisted in the several communities
in making known the plans and purposes of the Depart
ment. The Committee included, in addition to repre
sentative farmers, the heads of a number of the leading
farm organizations. It was composed of former Governor
Henry C. Stuart, of Virginia, a farmer and cattleman and
member of the price-fixing committee of the War Indus
tries Board; Oliver Wilson, of Illinois, farmer and master
of the National Grange; C. S. Barrett, of Georgia, presi
dent of the Farmers’ Educational and Cooperative Union;
D. O. Mahoney, of Wisconsin, farmer and president of
the American Society of Equity; Milo D. Campbell, of
Michigan, president of the National Milk Producers’ Fed
eration; Eugene D. Funk, of Illinois, ex-president of the
National Grain Association and president of the National
Com Association; N. H. Gentiy, of Missouri, vice-presi
dent of the American Berkshire Association; Frank J.
Hagenbarth, of Idaho, president of the National Wool

Growers’ Association; Elbert S. Brigham, of Vermont,
dairyman and Commissioner of Agriculture; W. L. Brown,
of Kansas, wheat grower and member of the State Board
of Agriculture; David R. Coker, of South Carolina, chair
man of the State Council of Defence, producer of improved
types of cotton; W. R. Dodson, of Louisiana, farmer and
dean of the Louisiana College of Agriculture; Wesley G.
Gordon, of Tennessee, demonstrator of better farming;
John Grattan, of Colorado, agricultural editor and cattle
feeder; J. N. Hagan, of North Dakota, general farmer
and Commissioner of Agriculture and Labour; W. W.
Harrah, of Oregon, wheat grower and director of the
Farmers’ Union Grain Agency of Pendleton; C. W. Hunt,
of Iowa, general farmer; H. W. Jeffers, of New Jersey,
dairyman, president of the Walker-Gordon Laboratory
Co., and member of the State Board of Agriculture; Isaac
Lincoln, of South Dakota, banker and farmer; David M.
Massie, of Ohio, general farmer and successful business
man; William F. Pratt, of New York, general farmer, agri
cultural representative on the Board of Trustees of Cornell
University, and member of the State Farm and Markets
Council; George C. Roeding, of California, fruit grower,
nurseryman, and irrigation farmer, and president of the
State Agricultural Society; Marion Sansom, of Texas,
cattleman, live-stock merchant, and director of the Fed
eral Reserve Bank at Dallas; and C. J. Tyson, of Pennsyl
vania, general farmer and former president of the Penn
sylvania State Horticultural Association.
The efforts put forth by the farmers to secure increased
production of plant foods can best be indicated in terms of
planting operations. The size of the harvest may not be
a measure of the labours of the farmers. Adverse weather

conditions and unusual ravages of insects and plant
diseases may partly overcome and neutralize the most ex
ceptional exertions. The farmer is in no small measure
the slave of the elements.
The first year of our participation in the war witnessed
the nation’s record for acreage planted in the leading
cereals and potatoes, 237,000,000 as compared with
210,000,000 in 1914, and for the five-year average, 19101914, an increase of 27,000,000 acres. It was 18,000,000
acres greater than that for 1916, by which time the stimu
lus of high prices had powerfully operated to bring about
unusual exertions. In 1918, the acreage was further in
creased by a half million; and yet, by this time, hundreds
of thousands of farm boys had been taken by the army
and navy. In fact, when the draft began to operate,
delegations of farmers came to see me to tell me that they
were willing to respond to our requests for increased plant
ing and to do anything they could to help win the war,
but that they did not see how they could do so if their
young men were taken into the army. They asked that I
see General Crowder and beg him to let their boys stay
at home. Of course, I declined. I told the delegations
that General Crowder would not and should not do what
they asked; that their boys would not be willing to have
me do what was suggested; that they would not want it
said that only the town and city boys were doing the
fighting; that they themselves really did not want what
they had come to ask; and that I was confident that they
would go home, take up the slack, and do more than they
were asked to do. I added that everybody would turn in
and help them at critical times, and that we would or
ganize men and women and boys and girls especially to

aid them during the planting and harvest seasons. They
made no reply. They went home and did the job.
In spite of the fact that the climatic conditions were ad
verse in 1917, especially for wheat, and in 1918 for corn,
the aggregate yield of leading cereals was larger in each
year than in any preceding year in our history except 1915.
It exceeded in 1917 the pre-war five-year average by
870.000.000 bushels and, in 1918, by 610,000,000.
Equally successful were the efforts to secure a larger
number of meat animals and an ampler supply of dairy
products and fats. The number of milch cows and other
cattle and hogs in 1918 was 138,400,000 as compared
with 115,000,000 in 1914, an increase of 23,400,000; and
the increase over the pre-war five-year average was
18.400.000. The increase in the number of pounds of beef,
pork, and mutton in 1918 over 1914 was 4,000,000,000
and, in the number of gallons of milk, 922,000,000. The
total value of all crops in 1918 was $14,222,000,000 as
against $6,112,000,000 for 1914 and $5,827,000,000 for
the five-year average, 1910-1914; and the value of live
stock on the farms was $8,284,000,000 as compared with
$5,890,000,000 and $5,318,000,000. Armies, they say,
fight on their stomachs. Our forces had no reason to fear
that theirs would be empty.

THE

P R E S ID E N T G O E S T O

P A R IS

The President Addresses Congress— Leavesfor France— Taft's,
Roosevelt's, and Lodge's Opinions on the League— The Presi
dent's Manchester Speech
HE Cabinet met at the usual time, Tuesday,
November 12th. It was the first meeting after
the election, but there was no reference to the
<election. We had more momentous things to
think about. There was much discussion of readjustment
and its necessities and processes and of the course of
change to a peace basis. The President read a docu
ment from a correspondent in Switzerland about con
ditions in Berlin. It stated that Bernstorff was back in
Berlin, and also Ludendorff, that the latter looked very
dejected, that he was on foot, as his automobile had been
taken from him, and that he was apprehensive that he
would be murdered, as many other German officers had
been shot.
Two evenings later, I dined at the Argentine Ambassa
dor’s and saw the Swiss Minister and his wife. The latter
had much to say to me about Bolshevist propaganda in
Switzerland, its responsibility for the Swiss strike, and its
dangers. I told her that I did not believe such crazy crea
tures could do much harm in Switzerland, that I had too
much faith in the Swiss people and in Swiss democracy,
and that Switzerland was farther along on the path of

political and economic well-being than Russia would be
in generations or than the Bolsheviki could conceive. I
added that one might legitimately be a Bolshevik or
anything else in Russia and some other places and still be
a reactionary in Switzerland and America, with their pro
gressive spirit, beneficent institutions, and general well
being. The Swiss Minister was called out of the room to
answer the telephone. When he returned, he announced
that the Socialist leaders had surrendered to the govern
ment. It appeared that the peasants, weary of the folly
of the extremists, had come to the assistance of the
authorities and had helped to make a quick end of the
matter.
The Argentine Ambassador and the Swiss Minister
discussed the Peace Conference with me after dinner.
They expressed an earnest hope that the President would
attend the Conference and that his views would prevail.
They thought that he only could exercise the necessary
restraining influence and get a peace which would last.
They further expressed the hope that neutral nations
which had all been seriously affected by the war might be
called in, especially when the time came for discussing
plans to prevent a recurrence of war.
Before the Cabinet meeting Tuesday, the nineteenth
there had been much discussion in the press and in Wash
ington as to the composition of the Peace Commission. I
felt confident thatHouse and Lansing would be on the body.
On Monday, the twenty-fifth,I was told that Mr. Henry
White was going as the Republican member. This, I
thought, would be a political blunder, because his appoint
ment would probably not satisfy the regular Republicans
in the Senate or elsewhere. It would not add the sort of

strength to the Commission which the political situation
demanded. His diplomatic knowledge and services could
have been commanded in some other capacity. I under
stood that his name was suggested and urged by Lansing.
It is evident that the President is bent on being the
Commission, just as he is his own Secretary for Foreign
Affairs, but, even so, he ought to have at his side the
strongest, most influential, and best-informed men from
both parties. Such men would render him great service in
Paris and at home after the completion of the Treaty.
At Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the twenty-sixth, the
President spoke of his intention to go to Paris. This was
his first mention of the matter to us. He said he thought
he ought to go to see that the negotiations took the right
direction, and that leaders in certain European countries
were urging him to attend the Conference. He added
that he was satisfied that everything would go well at
home and that, as he understood us and we him, he could
send brief messages when necessary with the assurance
that we could easily interpret them. On the other hand,
he observed that, if he remained in Washington, those who
were sent to Paris might not get his thought and that, in
any event, things would move so rapidly in Paris and be so
tangled that he might not be able to keep track of them at
a distance.
He remarked that he would have to return by March
and that, in the meantime, he could consider and dispose
of any measures passed by Congress, including any he
might have to veto, as he would have ten days after such
measures reached him abroad. He asked us to continue
Cabinet meetings and inquired if it would be agreeable
to us to have the Vice President preside. We immediately

[349]

responded that it would be a very acceptable arrangement.
The President stated that it had not been settled how
many delegates there would be or when the Conference
would begin. He said nothing about the membership of
the Commission.
On Saturday, November 30th, the papers contained
an announcement of the list of delegates. I do not regard
the Commission as a particularly strong or satisfactory
one. It means that the President is going to Paris to
stay, which I think is a mistake. He ought to go to
Europe, talk with the leaders, visit France, Belgium,
England, and Italy, make addresses in each country, can
vass matters fully with his delegates, and then come home.
The President would be stronger if he stayed at home and
passed upon the essential matters referred to him than he
will be if he goes to Europe and engages in the daily
wrangling. The very fact of nearness to the scene of
action may be a disadvantage to the President. He is
now all that he is plus something else, and his voice would
be mightier going across the ocean. Furthermore, if he
stayed here, he would have an opportunity to keep track
of the development of public sentiment and to confer with
leaders of both parties.
On December 2d, the President again addressed Con
gress. When I got to the Capitol before 12:30 there were
great crowds about the building and on the inside, as big
as any I had seen since the night of the war message.
Every seat on the floor of the House was occupied except
one reserved for the Chief Justice in front of the President.
All the diplomats were sitting in the body of the House
back of the Cabinet.
The President, when he began to speak, again seemed to

be hoarse and to be bothered by something. He first
dwelt on the closing of the war and the part played by the
different classes in the nation; and then he turned to the
processes of reconstruction. Incidentally, he endorsed
Secretary Lane’s hastily evolved soldier settlement scheme
— a scheme which I had turned down, which Lane had
not canvassed with me, and which was disapproved by
most agricultural leaders of authority in the nation. His
plan was not novel; in fact, it was as old as the Gracchi
and older. The Gracchi had a plan to enlarge the public
domain by limiting the amount of land private owners
could retain, adding the aggregate excess to the public
land, and dividing the increased acreage among the re
turned soldiers. As this would, they assumed, benefit the
rural districts, they planned to compensate urban dwell
ers by developing a grandiose system of public highways
so that agricultural products could be transported to the
cities, and by fixing the price of grain and selling it to
urban dwellers below the market. There are very few
things which have not been tried by somebody, some
where, at some time in the world.
The scheme had many defects, not the least of which
were that it contemplated developing desert, swamp, and
cut-over lands in remote sections, taking soldiers away
from their homes and friends at a time when there were
available near-by lands which could be secured. The
nation has not reached the stage in its agricultural develop
ment when it would pay it on a large scale to put water on
land in many arid sections or to drain the difficult swampy
places, and it is not now suffering from a lack of farmers
and underproduction of farm products.
Finally, the President announced that he intended to

135*1

go to Paris to join the representatives of the Allied govern
ments. He gave as his reasons that the Allies had ac
cepted as the basis of peace what he had outlined on Janu
ary 8,1918, as had Germany and her associates; that they
reasonably desired his presence to interpret and apply his
conditions; that there was no other business of such trans
cending importance; that our soldiers had fought for ideas
which he had sought to express; that they had accepted his
views as the substance of their own thought; and that he
owed it to them to see that there was no false interpreta
tion of our ideals and purposes, and to omit nothing to see
that they were realized.
“ It is now my duty to play my full part in making good
what they offered their lives to obtain. I can think of
no call to service which could transcend this. . . .
“ May I not hope, Gentlemen of the Congress, that in
the delicate tasks I shall have to perform on the other side
of the seas, in my efforts truly and faithfully to interpret
the principles and purposes of the country we love, I may
have the encouragement and the added strength of your
united support? I realize the magnitude and difficulty
of the duty I am undertaking; I am poignantly aware of
its grave responsibilities. I am the servant of the nation.
I can have no private thought or purpose of my own in
performing such an errand. I go to give the best that is in
me to the common settlements which I must now assist
in arriving at in conference with the other working heads
of the associated governments. I shall count upon your
friendly countenance and encouragement. I shall not be
inaccessible. The cables and the wireless will render
me availabe for any counsel or service you may desire of
me, and I shall be happy in the thought that I am con

stantly in touch with the weighty matters of domestic
policy with which we shall have to deal. I shall make
my absence as brief as possible and shall hope to return
with the happy assurance that it has been possible to
translate into action the great ideals for which America
has striven.”
When the President ended this appeal, many Re
publicans and some Democrats sat and looked sullen and
as stolid as wooden men. I wondered how, even though
they disapproved the President’s plan to go, they could
have so little magnanimity and feeling. The partisan
spirit which had been so much in evidence since March,
1918, and which had been so greatly stimulated during
the Congressional campaign is much in evidence. It is
menacing. I wondered if the President sensed it while he
was speaking, and if it would pursue him to Europe. It is
the obvious duty of every American to back him to the lim
it while he struggles in Paris against the violent and selfish
forces of Europe. He has the future welfare of the world in
his hands, if he is given loyal support at home. He has
the people of the world, if not the leaders, with him, and
he has no personal ends to serve. The people have caught
his vision, and they are ready for great things if their lead
ers are equal to their responsibilities and do not fail them.
The President sailed for France December 5th, three
days after his appearance before the Congress. His atti
tude as to his leaving this country was still one of re
luctance, but, nevertheless, he went with high hopes and
a great purpose. His main thought was to secure a just
peace. He knew that this would be difficult. He was
keenly aware of the fact that the pent-up passions of the
peoples of many nations would be released and that, as a

Frenchman expressed it, “ the tigers would be loose in
Europe.” He felt confident, however, that with the
united backing of this nation, with the economic position
which it had attained, which backing he had every right
to expect, he could accomplish a great deal. He was all
the more optimistic because the leading nations, including
Germany, had already accepted the bases of peace which
he had repeatedly outlined. In fact, his Fourteen Points
had been accepted as the foundation of the Armistice.
He was bent on securing a just peace and, therefore, a
reasonably permanent peace. He knew that no peace
could be permanent which was not measurably just. He
was not blind enough to believe that ideal justice could be
attained at the time and, therefore, he was eager to see a
league created and made a part of the Treaty which would
aid in effecting readjustments after passion had cooled
and a clearer sense of direction had been reached. In
short, he had gradually come to the conclusion that a
league of nations would be an essential part of any arrange
ment arrived at by the Peace Conference.
He, himself, had slowly arrived at a conclusion that it
would be necessary for the United States to partici
pate in an effective agency of this sort. This was evi
denced first by his reluctance to identify himself with the
League to Enforce Peace, which had been organized under
the direction of distinguished American leaders, a number
of whom were foremost in the ranks of the Republicans.
He did finally accept an invitation to address the first
assembly of the League to Enforce Peace, which was
held in Washington, May 27, 1916. At this meeting, he
dwelt on the fact that the nations of the world had become
neighbours, that it was necessary that they should agree to

cooperate in the common cause, and that they should act
on the basis of even-handed and impartial justice. He
emphasized three fundamental things: first, that every
people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which
it shall live; second, that small states should enjoy the
same respect for their sovereignty and their territorial
integrity that big nations insist upon; and third, that the
world has a right to be free from every disturbance of its
peace which has its origin in aggression and disregard of
the rights of peoples and nations. He believed that he
spoke the mind of America when he said that the United
States was willing “ to become a partner in any feasible
association of nations formed in order to realize these ob
jects and make them secure against violation” ; or, as he
again stated it, “ an universal association of the nations
to maintain the inviolate security of the highway of the
seas for the common and unhindered use of all the nations
of the world, and to prevent any war begun either contrary
to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission
of the causes to the opinion of the world— a virtual guar
antee of territorial integrity and political independence.”
There were present at this meeting such leaders as
Lodge and ex-President Taft.
The President had a right to feel great confidence that
his position, especially with reference to a league, would
be endorsed by the leaders of the League to Enforce Peace,
and by others, especially Republicans, who had been pro
moting this idea effectively for some time. He had a right
to expect support particularly from the two men who
afterward became his bitterest critics Lodge and Roose
velt. In his Nobel Prize thesis, Roosevelt had said:
“ The one permanent move forobtaining peace which has

1355]

yet been suggested with any reasonable chance of obtain
ing its object is by an agreement among the great powers,
in which each should pledge itself, not only to abide by the
decisions of a common tribunal, but to back with force
the decision of that common tribunal. The great civilized
nations of the world which do not possess force, actual or
immediately potential, should combine by solemn agree
ment in a great world league for the peace of righteousness.
. . . The nations should agree on certain rights that
should not be questioned, such as territorial integrity,
their right to deal with their domestic affairs, and with
such matters as whom they should admit to citizenship.
All such guarantee each of their number in possession of
these rights.”
Four years later, in his address on “ International
Peace” before the Nobel Prize Committee at Christiania,
Norway, May 5,1910, Roosevelt said that advance in the
direction of world peace could be made along several lines:
First, by treaties of arbitration; second, by further devel
opment of the Hague Tribunal; third, by checking the
growth of armament; and—
“ Finally, it would be a master stroke if those great
powers honestly bent on peace would form a league of
peace, not only to keep the peace among themselves, but
to prevent, by force if necessary, it being broken by others.
The supreme difficulty in connection with developing the
peace work of The Hague arises from the lack of any execu
tive power, of any police power, to enforce the decrees of
the court. In any community of any size, the authority
of the courts rests upon actual or potential force, on the
existence of a police, or on the knowledge that the ablebodied men of the country are both ready and willing

to see that the decrees of judicial and legislative bodies
are put into effect. In new and wild communities where
there is violence, an honest man must protect himself, and,
until other means of securing his safety are devised, it is
both foolish and wicked to persuade him to surrender his
arms while the men who are dangerous to the community
retain theirs. He should not renounce the right to protect
himself by his own efforts until the community is so organ
ized that it can effectively relieve the individual of the
duty of putting down violence. So it is with nations.
Each nation must keep well prepared to defend itself until
the establishment of some form of international police
power, competent and willing to prevent violence as be
tween nations. As things are now, such power to com
mand peace throughout the world could best be assured by
some combination between those great nations which sin
cerely desire peace and have no thought themselves of
committing aggressions. The combination might at first
be only to secure peace within certain definite limits and
certain definite conditions; but the ruler or statesman who
should bring about such a combination would have earned
his place in history for all time and his title to the grati
tude of all mankind.”
On May 27, 1916, at the same dinner at which the
President spoke, Lodge said this:
“ I know, and no one, I think, can know better than
one who has served long in the Senate, which is charged
with an important share of the ratification and confirma
tion of all treaties; no one can, I think, feel more deeply
than I do the difficulties which confront us in the work
which this league— that is, the great association extending
throughout the country, known as the League to Enforce

l357l

Peace— undertakes, but the difficulties cannot be overcome
unless we try to overcome them. I believe much can be
done. Probably, it will be impossible to stop all wars, but
it certainly will be possible to stop some wars, and thus
diminish their number. The way in which this problem
must be worked out must be left to this league and to
those who are giving this great subject the study which
it deserves. I know the obstacles. I know how quickly
we shall be met with the statement that this is a danger
ous question which you are putting into your argument,
that no nation can submit to the judgment of other na
tions, and we must be careful at the beginning not to at
tempt too much. I know the difficulties which arise
when we speak of anything which seems to involve an
alliance, but I do not believe that when Washington
warned us against entangling alliances he meant for one
moment that we should not join with the other civilized
nations of the world if a method could be found to dimin
ish war and encourage peace.
" I t was a year ago, in delivering the chancellor’s address
at Union College, I made an argument on this theory,
that if we were to promote international peace at the close
of the present terrible war, if we were to restore interna
tional law as it must be restored, we must find some way
in which the united forces of the nations could be put
behind the cause of peace and law. I said then that my
hearers might think that I was picturing a Utopia, but it
is in the search of Utopias that great discoveries are made.
Not failure, but low aim, is the crime. This league
certainly has the highest of all aims for the benefits of
humanity, and because the pathway is sown with difficul
ties is no reason that we should turn from it.”

It is particularly interesting to note that Senator Lodge,
adverting to Washington’s warning against entangling al
liances, expressed the belief that Washington did not for
one moment intimate that we should not join “ with the
other civilized nations of the world if a method could be
found to diminish war and encourage peace.”
It may be worth while recalling that the President had
repeatedly, both before the Senate and in other public
ways, not only indicated the fundamental conditions of
peace, but his belief that we should combine with other
nations to maintain peace. And at no time was there
uttered any warning by leaders on either side.
And yet, even before the President sailed, certain Re
publicans began to issue warnings and to utter threats.
They recalled that the Republicans had won the Congres
sional elections of 1918, insisting that this was a vote of
lack of confidence in the President, and that Europe
should bear in mind that he could not properly speak for
the people of the United States. On November 27th,
Roosevelt made a statement which, of course, immediately
found its way to the capitals of Europe. He said:
“ Our allies and our enemies and Mr. Wilson himself'
should all understand that Mr. Wilson has no authority
whatever to speak for the American people at this time.
His leadership has just been emphatically repudiated by
them. The newly elected Congress comes far nearer than
Mr. Wilson to having a right to speak the purposes of the
American people at this moment. Mr. Wilson and his
Fourteen Points and his four supplementary points and
his five complementary points and all his utterances every
which way have ceased to have any shadow of right to be
accepted as expressive of the will of the American people.

13591

“ He is President of the United States. He is a part of
the treaty-making power; but he is only a part. If he
acts in good faith to the American people, he will not claim
on the other side of the water any representative capacity
in himself to speak for the American people. He will say
frankly that his personal leadership has been repudiated,
and that he now has merely the divided official leadership
which he shares with the Senate.”
This was characteristic of Roosevelt. It was absurd
in theory and it was highly objectionable coming from an
American, and particularly from one who had been Presi
dent of the United States. Only a man of Roosevelt’s
type, animated by bitter personal and political hatred,
could have been guilty of such a grave error.
The President arrived at Paris on December 14th.
Almost immediately, he became absorbed in the cere
monies incident to his reception, and from December aist
through January 6th he was visiting the principal nations
with whom we were associated, and making addresses for
which the situation imperatively called. It was singularly
fortunate that for such purposes this country was repre
sented by a man who not only knew history and govern
ment, but also the higher things in the civilizations of the
countries he visited, and could touch with great skill and
confidence upon a great variety of problems. In France,
he spoke to the University of Paris, to the soldiers of the
United States at Humes, and at a reception given by one
of the French generals at Chaumont. In England, he
spoke at Dover, at Buckingham Palace, to a committee of
the National Church Council at London, to the League of
Nations Union, at the American Embassy in London, at
the Guild Hall, at the Mansion House, at a luncheon in

Manchester, and at the Free Trade Hall in Manchester.
In Italy, he made three addresses in Rome on January 3d
— at the Quirinal, at the Capitol, and to the Italian Parlia
ment. On January 4th he spoke to the Academy of the
Lencei and to the press representatives. On January 5th
he spoke in Genoa and made five brief addresses at Milan,
including an address to the League of Mothers and
Widows, and the Municipalite. In Turin, on January 6th,
he made three addresses, including addresses to the
Municipalite and to the University of Turin. Returning
to Paris, he again was called upon to make many addresses
including the one at the opening of the Peace Conference
on January 18th, one at the French Senate on January
20th, another at the Peace Conference on January 25th,
one to the delegation of the working women of France
the same day, one to the League for the Rights of Man on
January 28th, one to the delegation from the French
Society of Nations on February 12th, and another at the
Peace Conference on February 14th. Throughout this
entire period, of course, his thoughts were occupied with
the immediate problem ahead of him, involving intermin
able conferences.
Perhaps the most dramatic, in a way, of his general ad
dresses during this period was that at the Free Trade Hall,
Manchester, on December 30th. Here, because of his
knowledge of the economic forces that had operated here
for liberalism in England, he felt particularly at home, and
touched upon Manchester’s leadership in very graceful
terms. But the thing uppermost in his mind was the ut
terance just made by Clemenceau who, in a sense, had
challenged him, by making a plea before the Chamber of
Deputies in favour of maintaining the old doctrine of the
[361]

Balance of Power. Mr. Wilson accepted the challenge in
these words:
“ You know that the United States has always felt from
the very beginning of her history that she must keep
herself separate from any kind of connection with Euro
pean politics, and I want to say very frankly to you that
she is not now interested in European politics. But she is
interested in the partnership of right between America
and Europe. If the future had nothing for us but a new
attempt to keep the world at a right poise by a balance of
power, the United States would take no interest, because
she will join no combination of power which is not the com
bination of all of us. She is not interested merely in the
peace of Europe, but in the peace of the world. There
fore, it seems to me that, in the settlement that is just
ahead of us, something more delicate and difficult than was
ever attempted before is to be accomplished, a genuine
concert of mind and of purpose. But while it is difficult,
there is an element present that makes it easy. Never
before in the history of the world, I believe, has there
been such a keen international consciousness as there is
now. Men all over the world know that they have been
embarrassed by national antagonisms and that the in
terest of each is the interest of all, and that men as men
are the objects of government and international arrange
ments. There is a great voice of humanity abroad in the
world just now which he who cannot hear is deaf. There
is a great compulsion of the common conscience now in
existence which, if any statesman resist, he has gained the
most unenviable eminence in history. We are not obey
ing the mandates of parties or of politics. We are obey
ing the mandates of humanity. That is the reason why

it seems to me that the things that are most often in our
minds are the least significant. I am not hopeful that
the individual items of the settlements which we are about
to attempt will be altogether satisfactory. One has but to
apply his mind to any one of the questions of boundary
and of altered sovereignty and of racial aspiration, to do
something more than conjecture that there is no man and
no body of men who know just how it ought to be settled.
Yet, if we are to make unsatisfactory setdements, we must
see to it that they are rendered more and more satisfactory
by the subsequent adjustments which are made possible.
“ So that we must provide a machinery of readjustment
in order that we may have a machinery of good-will and
of friendship. Friendship must have a machinery.”
Immediately after his return to Paris from Italy, the
President entered actively into the work of formulation of
the Treaty including the Covenant of the League of Na
tions. On January 25th, he was accorded the privilege
and assumed the task of opening the discussion on the
League. He said, in part:
“ I consider it a distinguished privilege to be permitted
to open the discussion in this conference on the League
of Nations. We have asembled for two purposes, to
make the present settlements which have been rendered
necessary by this war, and also to secure the peace of the
world, not only by the present setdements but by the
arrangements we shall make at this conference for its
maintenance. The League of Nations seems to me to be
necessary for both of these purposes. There are many
complicated questions connected with the present setde
ments which perhaps cannot be successfully worked out
to an ultimate issue by the decisions we shall arrive at
[363]

here. I can easily conceive that many of these settle
ments will need subsequent reconsideration, that many
of the decisions we make shall need subsequent alteration
in some degree; for, if I may judge by my own study of
some of these questions, they are not susceptible of con
fident judgments at present.
“ It is, therefore, necessary that we should set up some
machinery by which the work of this conference should be
rendered complete. We have assembled here for the
purpose of doing very much more than making the present
settlements. We are assembled under very peculiar con
ditions of world opinion. I may say without straining
the point that we are not representatives of governments,
but representatives of peoples. It will not suffice to
satisfy governmental circles anywhere. It is necessary
that we should satisfy the opinion of mankind. The
burdens of this war have fallen in an unusual degree upon
the whole population of the countries involved. I do not
need to draw for you the picture of how the burden has
been thrown back from the front upon the older men,
upon the women, upon the children, upon the homes of the
civilized world, and how the real strain of the war has
come where the eye of government could not reach, but
where the heart of humanity beats. We are bidden by
these people to make a peace which will make them secure.
We are bidden by these people to see to it that this strain
does not come upon them again, and I venture to say that
it has been possible for them to bear this strain because
they hoped that those who represented them could get to
gether after this war and make such another sacrifice un
necessary.
“ It is a solemn obligation on our part, therefore, to make

permanent arrangements that justice shall be rendered and
peace maintained. This is the central object of our meet*
ing. Settlements may be temporary, but the action of
the nations in the interest of peace and justice must be
permanent. We can set up permanent processes. We
may not be able to set up permanent decisions. . . .
“ In a sense, the United States is less interested in this
subject than the other nations here assembled. With her
great territory and her extensive sea borders, it is less
likely that the United States should suffer from the at
tack of enemies than that many of the other nations here
should suffer; and the ardour of the United States— for
it is a very deep and genuine ardour—for the society of
nations is not an ardour springing out of fear or apprehen
sion, but an ardour springing out of the ideals which have
come to consciousness in this war. In coming into this
war, the United States never for a moment thought that
she was intervening in the politics of Europe or the poli
tics of Asia or the politics of any part of the world. Her
thought was that all the world had now become conscious
that there was a single cause which turned upon the issues
of this war. That was the cause of justice and of liberty
for men of every kind and place. Therefore, the United
States should feel that its part in this war had been played
in vain if there ensued upon it merely a body of European
settlements. It would feel that it could not take part in
guaranteeing those European settlements unless that guar
anty involved the continuous superintendence of the peace
of the world by the associated nations of the world.
“ Therefore, it seems to me that we must concert our
best judgment in order to make this League of Nations a
vital thing—not merely a formal thing, not an occasional

[365]

thing, not a thing sometimes called into life to meet an
exigency, but always functioning in watchful attendance
upon the interests of the nations— and that its continuity
should be a vital continuity; that it should have functions
that are continuing functions and that do not permit an
intermission of its watchfulness and of its labour; that it
should be the eye of the nations to keep watch upon the
common interest, an eye that does not slumber, an eye
that is everywhere watchful and attentive.
" And if we do not make it vital, what shall we do ? We
shall disappoint the expectations of the peoples. This is
what their thought centres upon. . . . The fortunes
of mankind are now in the hands of the plain people of
the whole world. Satisfy them, and you have justified
their confidence not only, but established peace. Fail to
satisfy them, and no arrangement that you can make will
either set up or steady the peace of the world.
"You can imagine, gentlemen, I dare say, the senti
ments and the purpose with which representatives of the
United States support this great project for a league of
nations. We regard it as the keystone of the whole pro
gramme which expressed our purposes and ideals in this
war and which the associated nations have accepted as
the basis of the settlement. If we returned to the United
States without having made every effort in our power to
realize this programme, we should return to meet the
merited scorn of our fellow citizens. For they are a body
that constitutes a great democracy. They expect their
leaders to speak their thoughts, and no private purpose of
their own. They expect their representatives to be their
servants. We have no choice but to obey their mandate.
But it is with the greatest enthusiasm and pleasure that

[366]

we accept that mandate; and because this is the keystone
of the whole fabric, we have pledged our every purpose
to it, as we have to every item of the fabric. We would
not dare abate a single part of the programme which con
stitutes our instruction. We would not dare compromise
upon any matter as the champion of this thing— this
peace of the world, this attitude of justice, this principle
that we are the masters of no people but are here to see
that every people in the world shall choose its own masters
and govern its own destinies, not as we wish, but as it
wishes. We are here to see, in short, that the very foun
dations of this war are swept away. . . .
“ I hope, Mr. Chairman, that when it is known, as I feel
confident it will be known, that we have adopted the
principle of the League of Nations and mean to work out
that principle in effective action, we shall, by that single
thing, have lifted a great part of the load of anxiety from
the hearts of men everywhere. We stand in a peculiar
case. As I go about the streets here I see everywhere the
American uniform. Those men came into the war after
we had uttered our purposes. They came as crusaders,
not merely to win a war, but to win a cause; and I am re
sponsible to them, for it fell to me to formulate the purposes for which I asked them to fight, and I, like them,
must be a crusader for these things, whatever it costs and
whatever it may be necessary to do, in honour, to accom
plish the object for which they fought. I have been glad
to find from day to day that there is no question of our
standing alone in this matter, for there are champions of
this cause upon every hand. . . •3
On February 14,1919, at three o’clock in the afternoon,
at the French Foreign (Mice, Quai d’Orsay, the President,
[367]

in the name of the commission constituted by the Peace
Conference, presented the report on a plan for the League
of Nations unanimously adopted by the representatives of
fourteen nations. This plan, of course, was the prelimi
nary draft and was before theConferenceforconsiderations.
Immediately after the presentation of this report, the
President left Paris for the United States, as he had origi
nally planned, to be present during the closing days of the
Congress in order to consider and sign or reject legislative
matters which demanded his attention.
Immediately after the terms of the preliminary draft
became known in this country, Senators began their attack
on it. They did not wait for the negotiations to be
concluded, which, under the Constitution so far as we
were concerned, were in the hands of the President.
They did not delay in order to get such explanations as
the President might see fit to make. On February 19th,
Senator Poindexter launched his attack. On the 22d,
Senator Reed made an assault on it. Four days after the
President landed in Boston, that is, on February 28th,
Senator Lodge delivered a speech against the plan.
As soon as possible after his arrival in Washington, the
President took steps to secure the views of such Republi
can leaders in private life as Mr. Root and Mr. Taft on the
draft of the Covenant. And when he received their criti
cisms, he gave assurance that their proposed changes would
be presented upon his return to Paris and would be
adopted. He also took pains to ask for a conference with
the Senate and House members of the committees on
Foreign Relations. He laid the Covenant before them
and asked for their criticisms. A number of the Re
publican senators, not including Lodge, who refused to

state his objections, pointed out what they regarded as
defects, including the omission of express recognition of
the Monroe Doctrine, the failure to provide specifically
that the League should not act on domestic matters, that
there was no expressed statement of the right of a nation
to withdraw, and that the right of Congress to determine
peace and war was not sufficiently safeguarded. The
President listened patiently to these expressions and gave
assurance that their views would be met.

END OF VOLUME I

Full text of Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet, 1913 to 1920 : with a Personal Estimate of the President : Volume 1

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