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November 5, 2015

Loan-Loss Provisioning
Lakshmi Balasubramanyan and Constantine Madias

Banks maintain reserve accounts to offset losses they
incur on defaulted loans. How banks determine the
level of these reserves, and how reserves are accounted for on the balance sheet, is guided by accounting standards that became the subject of debate
during the recent financial crisis. One issue discussed
is the provisioning approach by banks; does it lead
them to under contribute to reserves during good
times, consequently forcing them to build up reserves
during economic downturns? In this article, we document this timing problem with a look at some data for
US banks over the past few decades.
The reporting rules that banks follow are designed in
part to prevent managers from using reserve accounts
to adjust the level (or timing) of the earnings they
report. The balance of the reserve account, commonly
known as the allowance for loan and lease losses
(ALLL), does not have any impact on the bank’s
earnings. However, when banks add to the reserve
account, in a process called loan-loss provisioning, it
reduces reported earnings and consequently shareholders’ equity. The accounting profession prefers this
approach because it produces financial statements
that reflect companies’ current situations more accu-

Provision for Loan and Lease Losses
(All FDIC-Insured Institutions)
Millions of dollars
80000
70000
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0

1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014

Note: Shaded bars indicate recessions.
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation/Haver Analytics.

rately. But financial regulators, who are more focused
on the safety and soundness of banks, prefer an
approach that helps banks accumulate an adequate
supply of reserves before they are needed.
The number of problem loans typically rises during
economic downturns, as do provisions for loan losses.
For example, during the Great Recession of 2008 to
2009, the level of net charge-offs rose to historically
high levels, amounting to over $50 billion. Provisions
for loan and lease losses spiked sharply during the
recession, going from under $20 billion in 2007 to
over $70 billion in 2008. In all likelihood, banks were
increasing their loan-loss provisions at a time when it
was more difficult and costly for them to do so.
Loan-loss provisions represent the bank’s expectation
of future loan losses, while net charge-offs are actual
losses. During the 2008 financial crisis, loan-loss
provisions as a percentage of net charge-offs hovered
around 187 percent. In the 10 years prior, it had averaged 110 percent. Though elevated during the Great
Recession, the level does not compare to that of the
savings and loan crisis from 1986 to 1995. In 1987,
the ratio was well over 500 percent.

Net Charge-Offs
(All FDIC-Insured Institutions)
Millions of dollars
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0

1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014

Note: Shaded bars indicate recessions.
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation/Haver Analytics.

Loss Provision as a Percentage of Net
Charge-Offs (All FDIC-Insured Institutions)
Percent
700
600
500

One measure that has returned to pre-crisis levels is
the ratio of end-of-period annualized loan-loss provisions to assets, which gives an idea of asset quality.
In the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, this
ratio was between 0.4 percent and 0.8 percent. During
the financial crisis, it rose to over 2.1 percent. Since
2013, it has been 0.2 percent.
The Financial Standards Accounting Board (FASB) is
in the process of introducing new rules for loan-loss
provisioning. The old approach (incurred loss), which
does not allow banks to recognize loan losses until
the actual default has occurred, will be replaced with
a forward-looking, expected loss approach. While the
size of the losses will not likely change, the timing of
their appearance on the balance sheet will. The new
expected loss approach will entail more discretion on
the part of bank managers.

400
300
200
100
0
1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014
Note: Shaded bars indicate recessions.
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation/Haver Analytics.

End-of-Period Annualized Loan-Loss
Provisions as a Percentage of Assets
(FDIC-Insured Community Banks)
Percent
2.5
2.0
1.5

References
Balla, Eliana and Andrew McKenna, “Dynamic Provisioning: A Countercyclical Tool for Loan Loss Reserves,” FRB-Richmond Economic Quarterly,
Fall 2009, Volume 95 (4), Pages 383-418.
Balla, Eliana, M.J. Rose, J. Romero, “Loan Loss Reserve Accounting and
Bank Behavior,” March 2012, FRB-Richmond Economic Brief, EB12-03.

1.0
0.5
0
2002

2005

2008

2011

Note: Shaded bar indicates a recession.
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation/Haver Analytics.

2014

Lakshmi Balasubramanyan is a research economist in the Banking Policy and Analysis Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
She is primarily interested in the industrial organization of banking, the impact of banking regulation on bank behavior, and real estate
finance.
Constantine Madias is an intern in the Credit Risk Management Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
Economic Trends is published by the Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
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