View original document

The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.

1
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

The Economy in Perspective

Imagine
(with apologies to John Lennon)

I

magine strong expansion,
It’s easy if you try,
There’d be no unemployment,
Just think what you could buy,
Imagine all the people
Living well today...
Imagine budget balance,
It isn’t hard to do,
Adjust the rate of spending,
Adjust the revenue,
Imagine all the people
Living without debt...
Imagine there’s no trade gap,
I wonder if you can,
No need for strain with China,
No need to peg the yuan,
Imagine all the people
Sharing all the world...

FRB Cleveland • November 2003

You may say I’m a dreamer,
But I’m not the only one,
Price stability has happened,
No one thought it could be done.

2
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Inflation and Prices
12-month percent change
4.00 CPI AND CPI EXCLUDING FOOD AND ENERGY

September Price Statistics

3.75

Percent change, last:
2002
a
a
a
1 mo. 3 mo. 12 mo. 5 yr. avg.

CPI
3.50
3.25

Consumer prices
3.00

All items

3.3

3.1

2.3

2.5

2.4

Less food
and energy

0.6

1.5

1.2

2.1

2.0

2.50

Medianb

1.6

2.4

2.0

2.8

3.0

2.25

2.75

Producer prices

2.00

Finished goods

3.4

3.4

3.5

2.0

1.2

Less food
and energy

0.0

1.3

0.2

0.9 –0.5

1.75
1.50
CPI excluding food and energy

1.25
1.00
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Annualized quarterly percent change
5 ACTUAL CPI AND BLUE CHIP FORECAST c

12-month percent change
4.25 CPI AND TRIMMED-MEAN MEASURES
4.00

Median CPI b

3.75

4

3.50
CPI
3.25

3

Highest 10%

3.00
Consensus

2.75
2
2.50
2.25
1

2.00

Lowest 10%

1.75
0

1.50
CPI, 16% trimmed mean b

1.25
1.00
1995

–1
1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

1995 1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

FRB Cleveland • November 2003

a. Annualized.
b. Calculated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
c. Blue Chip panel of economists.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland; and Blue Chip Economic Indicators, October 10, 2003.

The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose
at an annualized rate of 3.3% in September, down from August’s 4.0%
annualized increase. Energy prices
continued their steep ascent: After
rising 2.7% in August, the CPI’s energy
index increased 3.0% in September.
The Labor Department attributed this
primarily to gasoline prices, which
spiked up 6.3% in the month.
Eliminating the volatile energy and
food components from the CPI, however, suggests that price pressures

remain subdued in September. The
CPI excluding food and energy, or
core CPI, increased at a 0.6% annualized rate. The median CPI and 16%
trimmed-mean CPI, measures of
inflation that exclude the most
extreme price changes, also rose
modestly, at annualized rates of 1.6%
and 1.7%, respectively. In contrast
to the unadjusted CPI, all three
of these measures, on a year-overyear basis, have trended downward
throughout 2003.

The Blue Chip panel of economists’
CPI forecast suggests that prices will
continue to rise at an annualized rate
of about 2% through the next five
quarters. Individual panelists’ forecasts fall within a range of about 1.5
percentage points: The most optimistic expect the CPI inflation rate to
be approximately 1.4% by the end of
2004, while the most pessimistic expect it to be about 2.7%.
Core CPI inflation has been falling
for about two years. Dividing the core

(continued on next page)

3
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Inflation and Prices (cont.)
12-month percent change
3 CORE CPI GOODS AND CONSUMER
GOODS IMPORT PRICE INDEXES

12-month percent change
5 CORE CPI GOODS AND SERVICES
4

2

CPI core services

CPI core goods

3
1
2
CPI core goods
0

1

0
–1
–1
Consumer goods imports a

–2
–2
–3

–3
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Nondurables
Apparel and
footware
Other
Durables
Household
goods
Recreational
Home
entertainment
Other

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2000

2001

2002

2003

12-month percent change
15 MAJOR CURRENCY INDEX

Prices of Consumer Goods Importsa
Share,
percent

1995

Percent change, last
b
b
3 mo.
12 mo.
36 mo.

48.5

–0.40

0.20

–0.03

31.9
16.6

0.0
–1.18

0.71
–0.79

–0.23
0.27

46.2

–1.24

–0.,62

–1.18

20.3
10.8

–0.82
0.41

0.0
–0.10

–0.81
–0.97

10.6
4.5

–2.65
–3.74

–4.31
4.01

–3.65
2.42

10

5

0

–5

–10

All other

5.5

–0.88

–0.28

–1.41
–15
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

FRB Cleveland • November 2003

a. Excluding automotives.
b. Annualized.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Foreign Exchange Rates,” H.10,
Federal Reserve Statistical Releases.

CPI into goods and services shows
that both components, like the overall
index, have undergone disinflation
since early in 2002. However, rates for
core goods versus core services prices
have diverged during the last two
years: Disinflation has been even
more pronounced for core goods
prices than for core services prices. In
fact, whereas core services prices
have merely risen more slowly
throughout this period, core goods
prices have actually fallen.

Part of this deflation in core CPI
goods prices can be traced to the
prices of imported consumer goods,
which have been falling for more than
six years. In general, the prices of
durable goods such as home entertainment items have declined more
dramatically during this period than
the prices of nondurable goods such
as apparel and footwear. However,
these declines have been more modest in recent months; indeed, the rate
of deflation in imported consumer

goods prices has been lessening for almost two years.
Import prices depend partly on the
value of the dollar: When its value
falls, the dollar prices of imported
goods rise. The Major Currency Index,
a trade-weighted average of the dollar’s foreign exchange value against a
basket of the currencies of our major
trading partners, indicates that, on a
year-over-year basis, the dollar has
depreciated since early 2002.

4
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Monetary Policy
Percent
1.500 IMPLIED YIELDS ON FEDERAL FUNDS FUTURES

Percent
8 RESERVE MARKET RATES
7

Effective federal funds rate a

1.375
October 27, 2003

6
1.250

5
Intended federal funds rate b

October 28, 2003

August 13, 2003

1.125

4

September 17, 2003

3
1.000

Primary credit rate b

July 25, 2003

2
Discount rate b

June 25, 2003

0.875

1
0.750

0
2000

2001

2003

2002

Probability
1.0

Aug.

Oct.

Dec.

Feb.

Apr.

2003

June

Aug.

2004

Percent, weekly average
6.0
YIELD CURVE d,e

IMPLIED PROBABILITIES FOR ALTERNATIVE NOVEMBER
TARGET FEDERAL FUNDS RATES c

0.9

June

2004

5.5
August 15, 2003

No change

0.8

5.0

September 19, 2003

4.5

0.7

October 24, 2003
4.0

June 27, 2003

0.6
3.5
0.5

May 9, 2003

3.0
0.4

July 18, 2003

2.5
0.3

2.0

0.2

1.5
Rate cut of 25 basis points

Rate hike of 25 basis points

0.1

1.0
0.5

0
15

18

21 24 27
September

30

03

06

09

12

15 18
October

21 24

27

30

0

5

10

15

20

FRB Cleveland • November 2003

a. Weekly average of daily figures.
b. Daily observations.
c. Probabilities are calculated by using prices from options on November 2003 federal funds futures that trade on the Chicago Board of Trade.
d. All yields are from constant-maturity series.
e. Average for the week ending on the date shown.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Selected Interest Rates,” Federal Reserve Statistical Releases H.15; Chicago Board of Trade;
and Bloomberg Financial Information Services.

At its October 28 meeting, the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC)
kept the intended federal funds rate at
1%, stating that the “accommodative
stance of monetary policy, coupled
with robust underlying growth in
productivity, is providing important
ongoing support to economic activity.” Nonetheless, the FOMC said that
“on balance, the risk of inflation
becoming undesirably low remains
the predominant concern for the
foreseeable future,” and reiterated its
prior statement that “policy accommodation can be maintained for a
considerable period.”

Before the meeting, implied yields
on federal funds futures suggested
there would be no change in the
funds rate on October 28. Since the
September meeting, implied yields
have increased moderately across the
various maturities. Market participants
continue to foresee a constant funds
rate for the rest of this year and a
round of mild tightening in early 2004.
The decision to leave the federal
funds rate unchanged did not surprise
participants in the options market for
fed funds futures at the Chicago
Board of Trade; the day before the

October meeting, they placed a 92%
probability on no change. They had
increased their expectations of a 25
basis point increase in previous weeks
but reversed themselves in the days
just before the meeting.
The yield curve has shifted upward
slightly since the September meeting
(up 20 basis points for the three-year
rate and 10 basis points for the 10year rate). Ninety-day Treasury bill
rates, at 0.95%, remained slightly
below the intended federal funds
rate, as they have for several months.

5
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Money and Financial Markets
Percent, weekly
1.8 YIELD SPREAD: 90-DAY COMMERCIAL PAPER
MINUS THREE-MONTH TREASURY BILL
1.6

Percent, weekly average
7 SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES a
6

1.4
5

1.2
1.0

4
Three-month Treasury bill

0.8

3

One-year Treasury bill

0.6
0.4

2

0.2
1

Six-month Treasury bill

0
–0.2

0
1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Percent, weekly average
9 LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2003

2004

Percent, daily
12 YIELD SPREADS: CORPORATE BONDS
MINUS THE 10-YEAR TREASURY NOTE b
10

8

High yield

Conventional mortgage

8

7
6

20-year Treasury bond a
6

4
BB

5
2

10-year Treasury note a

AA
4

0

3

–2
1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

FRB Cleveland • November 2003

a. Yields from constant-maturity series.
b. Merrill Lynch AA, BBB, and High Yield Master II indexes, each minus the yield on the 10-year Treasury note.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Selected Interest Rates,” H.15, Federal Reserve Statistical Releases; and Bloomberg Financial
Information Services.

Short-term interest rates have been
trending downward since late 2000,
moving roughly in tandem with
changes in the federal funds rate. In
fact, the downward trend has moderated since late July, with yields on
three- and six-month Treasury bills
staying essentially constant during a
period when the federal funds rate
held at 1%. The one-year Treasury bill
rate has varied considerably more
during this period.
The spread between the 90-day
commercial paper rate and threemonth Treasury bill rate has increased

moderately since the end of August,
possibly because lower-quality issuers
began to reenter the market as the
expansion proceeded. After falling
for two consecutive months, total
commercial paper outstanding rose
during October.
Significant swings in long-term
interest rates have occurred in the last
couple of months. From early September to early October, long-term
rates fell between 40 basis points (bp)
and 60 bp. During the rest of October,
the 10- and 20-year Treasury rates
retraced most of that decline. The

uptick in the conventional mortgage
rate was accompanied by a decrease
in mortgage applications.
Yield spreads between corporate
bonds and Treasury notes have
trended downward since October
2002. High-grade, AA-rated bonds
show a risk premium of only 30 bp
over Treasury notes. The premium
on high-yield corporate bonds has
fallen nearly 6.5 percentage points
since a year ago. The decline in risk
spreads should facilitate the expansion of business fixed investment.
(continued on next page)

6
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Money and Financial Markets (cont.)
Trillions of dollars
6.8 THE M2 AGGREGATE

Percent, weekly average
3.0 IMPLIED INFLATION
10%

M2 growth, 1998–2003 a
12

6.2

2.5

9

10%

6
3

5.6

5%

5%

2.0

10%

0

5%
5.0

1.5
5%
1%

10-year Treasury minus 10-year TIIS yield

5%
4.4
5%

1.0

1%

1%
3.8

0.5
1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

1998

1999

2000

2001

Percent, weekly
5.0 TREASURY INFLATION-INDEXED SECURITIES

Index, monthly average
1,600 STOCK MARKET INDEXES

4.5

1,400

4.0

1,200

Daily
1,300
1,100
900

1,000

3.5
10-year TIIS yield
3.0

800

2.5

600

2.0

400

1.5

200

2002

2003

2004

Daily
800
S&P 500

700
600

S&P 100

700
500
June Aug.

S&P 500

500
400
Oct.

Dec.

S&P 100

1.0
1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

0
1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

FRB Cleveland • November 2003

a. Growth rates are calculated on a fourth-quarter over fourth-quarter basis. The 2003 growth rate for M2 is calculated on an October over 2002:IVQ basis.
Data are seasonally adjusted.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Selected Interest Rates,” H.15, and “Money Stock Measures,” H.6, Federal Reserve Statistical
Releases; and Bloomberg Financial Information Services.

After increasing almost at doubledigit annual rates in June through
August, M2 fell at an annual 4.75%
rate in September and seems headed
toward a decline for October as well.
These decreases probably result from
a sharp drop-off in mortgage refinancing. Certain prepaid mortgage
balances are held temporarily in liquid deposits before being disbursed
to mortgage-backed securities holders. A decline in mortgage refinancing reduces these liquid deposits.
A measure of expected inflation can
be derived by subtracting the interest

rate on Treasury inflation-indexed
securities (a real rate) from that on
non-indexed Treasury securities (a
nominal rate). This measure can fluctuate markedly but has had a generally
upward trend throughout 2003. Participants in this market do not expect
deflation to be a problem over the
horizon of these securities.
Treasury inflation-indexed securities, which measure the economy’s
real interest rate directly, show a drop
of 50 bp in the last three months and
currently stand at 1.9%. The average

real interest rate from 1997 to the
present was nearly 3.4%.
The major stock markets fared well
in October, with the S&P 500 price
index gaining 1.8%. After hitting a
low in February, the S&P 500 was up
nearly 24% for the year to date. The
decline in real interest rates probably
has contributed to the year’s strong
stock market growth, as have the tax
cuts on capital gains and dividends
implemented in May. The substantial
stock market gains, as well as increased holdings of real estate, helped
(continued on next page)

7
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Money and Financial Markets (cont.)
Ratio
8 HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL POSITION

Percent of income
15

Four-quarter percent change
18 DEBT OUTSTANDING
15

7

Consumer credit

12

Home mortgages

12
Personal saving rate
6

9

5

6

9

6

3

Wealth-to-income ratio a

Nonfarm corporate business

3

4

0

3

0
1980

1985

1990

1995

–3

2000

1991

1994

1997

2000

Index, 1985 = 100
155 CONSUMER ATTITUDES

Percent of average loan balances
13 DELINQUENCY RATES

2003

Index, 1966:IQ = 100
115

12
11

135

Commercial real estate loans

105

10
Consumer sentiment, University of Michigan b

9
8

115

95

95

85

7
6

Residential real estate loans

Credit cards

5
4

C&I loans

75

75

3

Consumer confidence, Conference Board

2
55

1
1991

1994

1997

2000

2003

65
2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

FRB Cleveland • November 2003

a. Wealth is defined as household net worth. Income is defined as personal disposable income. Data are not seasonally adjusted.
b. Data are not seasonally adjusted.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Charge-Off and Delinquency
Rates on Loans and Leases at Commercial Banks,” and “Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States,” Z.1, Federal Reserve Statistical Releases; University of
Michigan; and the Conference Board.

buoy the wealth-to-income ratio over
the last few months. The personal saving rate, currently at 3.2%, is less than
half its 20-year average.
Home mortgage debt grew at brisk
double-digit rates in the first half of
2003, but the decline in mortgage applications in the second half may
dampen that growth. Cash-out refinancing of mortgages earlier in the
year helped homeowners pay down
credit card and other high-interest
debt, slowing consumer credit
growth markedly. Growth in nonfarm

corporate business debt remains
constrained, partly because rising
profits have lessened firms’ need for
external financing.
The delinquency rate on commercial and industrial loans moderated
during most of 2002 and continued
that trend into this year. Falling shortand long-term interest rates, along
with slower growth in corporate debt,
have facilitated firms’ repayment of
loans. Consumer credit delinquency
rates show similar improvement.
The Conference Board’s index of
consumer confidence rose slightly in

October, but survey respondents
expressed concern about their future
income levels and the weak labor
market. The share of respondents
who expect their income to increase
in the next six months is at a 10-year
low. Nonetheless, the expectations
component of the index did increase
slightly. The University of Michigan’s
consumer sentiment index also
increased in October, showing small
rises in the components for both
expectations and present conditions.

8
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

China’s Trade
Percent change, year over year
30 CHINESE AND U.S. PRICES

Yuan per dollar
8.50 NON-DELIVERABLE FORWARD
CHINA–U.S.EXCHANGE RATES a
Three months

25

8.25
Two years

Nine months

20

8.00

Chinese CPI
15

7.75
10
U.S. CPI
7.50
5

7.25

0

7.00
Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June
2003

July

Aug.

Sept.

Oct.

Nov.

Billions of dollars
150 U.S. TRADE WITH CHINA

–5
1987

1990

1993

1996

1999

2002

Percent of GDP
60 TOTAL TRADE

Nonmanufacturing imports
50

Manufactured materials imports
Other manufacturing imports

120

China

Machinery and transport equipment imports
40
90
Total exports

30
U.S.

60
20

Japan
30
10

0

0
1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003 b

1980

1983

1986

1989

1992

1995

1998

2001

2004

FRB Cleveland • November 2003

a. A rise indicates a depreciation of the renminbi. (China’s currency is the renminbi and its currency unit is the yuan. A renminbi consists of one yuan).
b. Annualized by multiplying the total for the first eight months of the year by 1.5.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics; World Bank Group, World
Development Indicators Online; and William Testa, “Midwest Manufacturing and Trade with China,” Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago Fed Letter,
no. 196, November 2003.

There have been many calls for China
to stop pegging the yuan–dollar exchange rate in a narrow range around
8.28. Chinese officials have indicated
that they will continue to maintain the
exchange-rate peg, but will loosen it
sometime in the future. Forward
yuan–dollar exchange rates are consistent with this: The three-month forward rate recently climbed back close
to the pegged rate, and the two-year
forward rate is now pricing in a 6.5%
decline in the renminbi relative to
the dollar.
Why is China being urged to let its
currency float? The renminbi is widely
considered to be undervalued against

the dollar, so that low-priced Chinese
exports are hurting domestic manufacturers. Economists typically look at
real exchange rates to assess trading
advantages. Since the yuan–dollar exchange rate is pegged, real exchange
rate changes between the U.S. and
China are determined entirely by their
differences in inflation. Since U.S. inflation has exceeded Chinese inflation
by 2.7% on average since 1998. U.S.
imports from China should be getting slightly less expensive relative to
domestically produced goods.
Despite these minor changes in
recent years, the value of this year’s
Chinese imports to the U.S. will be

nearly twice as big as in 1998, with
most of the increase coming from
manufacturing. A recent study showed
that China’s manufacturing import
penetration in the U.S.—the ratio of
Chinese imports to the domestic manufacturing market—rose from 1.7% in
1997 to 2.7% in 2001. This import
surge, apparently without any large
change in the terms of trade between
China and the U.S., is not surprising
in view of some fundamental changes
in the Chinese economy. Export-led
industrialization, starting roughly
with the rise of Deng Xiaoping in
December 1978, has helped turn
(continued on next page)

9
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

China’s Trade (cont.)
Year-over-year percent change, four-quarter trailing average
15
FOREIGN GDP GROWTH

Percent of world total
15 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS

12

U.S.
12

China

9

Germany
6

U.K.

9
Japan

3
6

0

U.K.
Japan

Germany

Canada

–3
3

Mexico
–6

China

–9
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

0
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

Import price index, 2000 = 100
U.S./foreign currency, January 1997 = 100
150 U.S. IMPORT PRICES AND EXCHANGE RATES
150

Percent of total imports, 12-month trailing average
25 U.S. GOODS IMPORTS
Europe/former Soviet Republic

140

140

20

120

120

110

110
Japan

Newly industrialized
Asian countries a

10

130
Major currency index

Japan

Rest of world

15

Japan

130

Canada

100
Mexico

China

100

90

90
All industrialized countries

5
Other Pacific Rim countries

80

80

70

0
1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

70
1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

FRB Cleveland • November 2003

a. Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Foreign Exchange Rates,” Federal
Reserve Statistical Releases, G.5; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics; and World Trade Organization.

China into a major economic power.
Since 1980, its total trade as a share of
its GDP has more than tripled—to
slightly over 50%. Since 1991, its real
GDP growth has exceeded 6% annually. With the combined effects of
robust economic growth and a transition toward more foreign trade,
China’s exports to the rest of the
world have boomed. In fact, from
1996 to 2002, China’s share of world
merchandise exports increased 81%,
which is more than the 60% increase
in its share of U.S. goods imports. It is
uncertain how much this surge in U.S.
imports from China has displaced
domestic manufacturing. To a large

extent, Chinese imports to the U.S.
have probably displaced imports from
other countries. For example, the
import shares of Japan and the newly
industrialized Asian countries have
been falling since the 1990s; Mexico’s
share of imports to the U.S. has been
falling since about 2002.
China probably has displaced some
domestic manufacturing, but the role
of import prices and exchange rates in
this displacement is not entirely clear.
For example, from 1995 to 1999, prices
for Japan’s imports to the U.S. fell more
dramatically than prices from other
industrialized countries, but the U.S.
share of Japanese imports continued

to drop. Furthermore, even if the renminbi appreciated against the dollar, it
is unclear how much it would affect
Chinese import prices. Exchange
rate changes are not always passed
through to changes in import prices,
as the case of Japan illustrates. Research has shown that roughly 50% of
exchange rate changes were passed
through to import price changes in the
1980s but only 25% were passed
through in the 1990s. One reason
import prices do not respond to
exchange rate changes is that some
exporters try to maintain volume by
accepting lower profits when their currency appreciates relative to the dollar.

10
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Economic Activity
Percentage points b
5.0 CONTRIBUTION TO PERCENT CHANGE IN REAL GDP

a

Real GDP and Components, 2003:IIIQ
(Advance estimate)

Annualized
Change, percent change, last:
billions
Four
of 1996 $
Quarter
quarters

Real GDP
167.8
Personal consumption 108.2
Durables
65.1
Nondurables
38.1
Services
20.5
Business fixed
investment
53.8
Equipment
36.5
Structures
–1.3
Residential investment 19.6
Government spending
5.7
National defense
0.0
Net exports
23.5
Exports
23.8
Imports
0.3
Change in business
inventories
–18.2

7.2
6.6
26.9
7.9
2.2

3.3
3.5
9.1
5.1
1.7

14.0
15.4
–2.4
20.4
1.3
0.0
__
9.3
0.1

6.2
6.0
–2.9
11.5
3.7
11.9
__
0.1
2.3

__

__

Personal
consumption

Last four quarters
2003:IIIQ

3.0

2.0
Residential
investment

1.0

Exports

Government
spending

0
Business fixed
investment

Imports
Change in inventories

–1.0

Percent change from previous year b
7 REAL PERSONAL INCOME AND SPENDING TRENDS

Percent change from previous quarter b
8.0 REAL GDP AND BLUE CHIP FORECAST
7.0

6

Final percent change
Advance estimate
Blue Chip forecast

6.0

4.0

Real disposable personal income
5

5.0

4

30-year average
4.0

3
3.0

2

2.0

Real personal
consumption expenditures

1

1.0
0

0
IVQ
2002

IQ

IIQ

IIIQ

IVQ

2003

IQ

IIQ
2004

IIIQ

2000

2001

2002

2003

FRB Cleveland • November 2003

a. Chain-weighted data in billions of 1996 dollars. Components of real GDP need not add to the total because the total and all components are deflated using
independent chain-weighted price indices.
b. Data are seasonally adjusted and annualized.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; and Blue Chip Economic Indicators, October 10, 2003.

Real gross domestic product (GDP)
skyrocketed to an advance estimate of
7.2%, the highest growth rate since
1984:IQ and a full percentage point
higher than most forecasters had
expected. (One caution: This number
will be subject to more than the usual
amount of revision because the series
will be re-benchmarked in December.)
Consumer spending (6.6%), business
fixed investment (14.0%), and residential investment (20.4%) led the
way. Foreign trade statistics were also
encouraging: Exports surged 9.3%,
whereas imports grew a scanty 0.1%.

Government spending was up only
1.3%, partly because defense spending was flat. Inventories (down $18.2
billion, the largest decline since
2001:IVQ) and investment in structures (down 2.4%) were the only
negative components.
Personal consumption expenditures
alone contributed 4.7 percentage
points to real GDP growth. Business
fixed investment, residential investment, and exports each added about
one percentage point. Inventories
were the most significant drag, reducing real GDP growth by almost
0.7 percentage points.

While Blue Chip forecasters are
optimistic about the outlook for GDP
growth in the next few quarters, most
expect the rate to fall back toward
earth. On average, they anticipate that
real GDP growth will be in the range of
3.7%–3.8% over the next four quarters,
still well above the 3.1% average observed over the last 30 years. Income
and spending numbers appear to
support this strong outlook. Over the
last year, real disposable personal
income rose 3.7%, outpacing real
personal consumption expenditures’
3.4% growth rate.
(continued on next page)

11
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Economic Activity (cont.)
Annualized monthly percent change
80 DURABLE GOODS ORDERS

Percent of capacity
86 CAPACITY UTILIZATION

Year-over-year percent change
25
20

60

84

15
40
82

10
20

5

80

0

0
78

–5

–20

–10

76

–40
–15

74

–60

–20

–80

72
1995

1997

1999

2001

Percent change
25 BUSINESS FIXED INVESTMENT

–25
1995

2003

1997

1999

2001

2003

Diffusion index
70 INSTITUTE FOR SUPPLY MANAGEMENT,
NEW ORDERS INDEX

20

65

Year-over-year percent change
15

60
10
55

5
0

50
Annualized quarterly percent change

–5
45
–10
40

–15
–20
1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

35
1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

FRB Cleveland • November 2003

SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; and Institute for
Supply Management.

Now that the blockbuster GDP
growth of 2003:IIIQ is history, the
question is how much of it can be sustained. Many economists believe that
the key is whether businesses finally
gain enough confidence in the recovery to boost capital spending and
hiring. Capacity utilization crawled up
to 74.7% after bottoming out at 74.1%
last June, but still remains very low.
Durable goods orders yield more
promising numbers. This is a very
volatile series, but an upward trend is
apparent in the year-over-year growth
rates. This series has rebounded fairly

steadily and now stands at 6.2% after
bottoming out at –20.6% in June 2001.
Further positive news can be found
in business fixed investment. Fixed
private nonresidential investment was
up 11.1% last quarter, led by spending
on equipment and software. On a
year-over-year basis, this series grew
3.9%, its first positive change since
April 2001.
Moreover, the Institute for Supply
Management’s New Orders Index
soared to 64.3 from an already robust
60.4 and has been above 50 since last
May. By construction, this diffusion

index is bounded by zero and one,
with a number greater than 50 indicating growth. The index is calculated from a monthly survey that asks
purchasing managers about the general direction of orders. The survey
includes roughly 400 manufacturing
firms representing 20 industries and
all 50 states.
Altogether, it seems likely that the
expansion will continue, albeit with
real GDP growth in the next few
quarters closer to 4% than to last
quarter’s 7.2%.

12
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Labor Markets
Change, thousands of workers
300 AVERAGE MONTHLY NONFARM EMPLOYMENT
250

Labor Market Conditions
Average monthly change
(thousands of employees)

Preliminary
Revised

200

2000
161

2001
–149

Jan.–Sept. Oct.
2002 2003
2003
–39
–21
126

–1
7
–9
2
–11

–124
–1
–123
–88
–35

–64
–4
–57
–41
–16

–39
12
–51
–35
–16

–17
6
–24
–10
–14

Service providing
162
Information
15
Financial activitiesa
6
b
PBS
40
Education and health
32
Leisure and hospitalityc
22
Government
22

–25
–15
7
–63
51
–2
46

25
–14
5
–10
37
7
16

18
–10
11
17
22
4
–9

143
–8
–9
43
56
23
10

Payroll employment

150
Goods producing
Construction
Manufacturing
Durable goods
Nondurable goods

100
50
0
–50
–100

Average for period (percent)
Civilian unemployment
rate

–150

4.0

4.8

5.8

6.0

6.0

–200
1999 2000 2001 2002

IVQ IQ
2002

Aug.

IIQ IIIQ
2003

Sept. Oct.
2003

Percent
65.0 LABOR MARKET INDICATORS

Percent
6.5

70

Employment-to-population ratio

64.5

Percent
80 DIFFUSION INDEX OF EMPLOYMENT

6.0
60
Total private

5.5

64.0

50

63.5

5.0

63.0

4.5

40

30
Manufacturing
20
62.5

4.0
10

Civilian unemployment rate
62.0
1995

3.5
1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

0
1/00

7/00

1/01

7/01

1/02

7/02

1/03

7/03

FRB Cleveland • November 2003

NOTE: All data are seasonally adjusted.
a. Financial activities include the finance, insurance, and real estate sector and the rental and leasing sector.
b. Professional and business services include professional, scientific, and technical services, management of companies and enterprises, administrative and
support, and waste management and remediation services.
c. Leisure and hospitality includes arts, entertainment, and recreation, as well as accommodation and food service.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Total nonfarm payroll employment
increased by 126,000 jobs in October.
Employment numbers for September
and August have been revised upward
considerably: Instead of a net loss in
August, there was a net gain of 35,000
jobs; for September, the net gain was
revised upward by 68,000, reaching a
total of 125,000 jobs.
Service providers showed a net gain
of 143,000 jobs in October, with 56,000
jobs from education and health services alone. Professional and business
services and leisure and hospitality
services both remained strong,

increasing by 43,000 and 23,000 jobs,
respectively. Government employment increased by 10,000 jobs in
October, and gains for both August
and September were revised upward
substantially. Employment in manufacturing continued its downward
trend but at a much slower pace, losing 24,000 jobs in October, well
below the monthly average net loss
of 53,000 in the previous 12 months.
Information services, another industry that has been weak throughout
2003 so far, continued to shed jobs,
posting a net loss of 8,000 in October.

The unemployment rate in October
fell 0.1 percentage point to 6.0%, and
the employment-to-population ratio
rose 0.2 percentage point to 62.2%.
Another positive feature of this
report is the greater breadth of employment gains. The three-month
diffusion index reports the share of
detailed industries in which employment is increasing. For total private
employment, the index measured
48.2% in October, the highest since
the March 2001 peak. The manufacturing index rose to 26.8%, its strongest
reading since July 2002.

13
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Measuring Employment Changes
Millions of people
14 GROSS JOB GAINS VERSUS GROSS JOB LOSSES

Percent of employment
8 EXPANSIONS VERSUS CONTRACTIONS
AND OPENINGS VERSUS CLOSINGS

12

7
Expansions

10

6
Contractions

Gross job gains
8

5
Gross job losses

6

4

4

3

2

Openings

2
Net employment change

Closings
0

1

–2
1992

0
1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

Millions of establishments
2.00 ESTABLISHMENTS GAINING JOBS VERSUS LOSING JOBS
1.95

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

Percent of establishments
30 ESTABLISHMENTS EXPANDING VERSUS CONTRACTING
AND OPENING VERSUS CLOSING
Expanding establishments
25

1.90
Establishments gaining jobs

Contracting establishments

1.85
20
1.80
1.75

15

1.70
10

1.65
Establishments losing jobs

Opening establishments

1.60
5

Closing establishments

1.55
1.50
1992

0
1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

FRB Cleveland • November 2003

NOTE: All data are seasonally adjusted. Shaded areas mark periods of recession.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ new
data series, Business Employment
Dynamics, measures the gross gains
and losses that underlie net changes
in employment. Employment expansion at existing establishments and
from the opening of new establishments is termed gross job gains. Contraction at existing establishments
and from establishment closings is
termed gross job losses. The difference between gross gains and gross
losses is net employment change.
Throughout the expansion phase of
the 1992:IIIQ–2000:IVQ business cycle,

gross job gains remained slightly
larger than gross losses, consistently
producing net gains. It is clear that
the 1990s trend increase in these
series was simply the result of workforce expansion because gross gains
and losses, expressed in percentage
terms, were strikingly steady. Layoffs
and downsizing are often attributed
to recessions, yet job losses resulting
from contractions and closings were
quite steady throughout the 1990s,
indicating the layoffs and downsizing
occur even when the labor market is
operating smoothly.

The recession phase of the current
business cycle reversed this pattern:
Gross job losses rose rapidly while
gross job gains declined even more
sharply, producing a precipitous
employment drop. Surprisingly, after
the recession phase, gross job losses
declined but gross job gains remained
well below pre-recession levels, showing that reluctance to hire workers,
not continued layoffs, was the real
source of weak employment growth
in 2002.

14
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Higher Education Enrollment
Millions of students
16 COLLEGE ENROLLMENT

Percent
70 SHARE OF HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
ENROLLING IN COLLEGE

14

65

12

60

10

55

8

50

6

45

4
1965

40
1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

Percent
14 CHANGE IN COLLEGE ENROLLMENT

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

CHANGE IN COLLEGE ENROLLMENT BY STATE, 2000

12

U.S. average: 6.6%

10
8
6
4
2
Decreased or was unchanged

0

Increased less than 5%
Increased at least 5%, less than 15%
Increased 15% or more

–2
–4
1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

FRB Cleveland • November 2003

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics, 2002.

In our increasingly high-tech economy, education is becoming ever
more important. U.S. college enrollment held steady in the mid-1990s
but rose later in the decade, primarily
because the number of women
attending college increased substantially. In 2000 (the latest data available), more than 15 million students
nationwide were enrolled in institutions of higher learning.
Although college enrollment rose
in the late 1990s, the percentage of
high school graduates enrolling in

college declined. After a fairly steady
rise that began in the early 1980s,
67% of high school graduates went
on to college in 1997, the highest
share recorded in the 40 years the
Department of Education has tracked
matriculation rates. By 2000, however, that share had fallen to slightly
more than 63%.
College enrollment growth in
recent years has been meager compared with increases in the 1960s
and early 1970s. During that period,
the nation was shifting away from a
manufacturing-based economy, where

a high school diploma was enough to
land a job that paid well and could last
a person’s entire working life. The
U.S. was developing a service-based
economy, where employers wanted
people with higher degrees. Typically,
in the years following recessions, U.S.
college enrollment has shown very
meager growth (less than 0.5%) or
outright declines. Enrollment was flat
or fell in 1976, after the 1973–75 recession; in 1983 and 1984, after the
1981–82 recession; and in 1993–95,
after the recession of 1990–91.
(continued on next page)

15
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Higher Education Enrollment (cont.)
Thousands of students
700 COLLEGE ENROLLMENT IN FOURTH DISTRICT STATES

Percent
5.0 FOURTH DISTRICT STATES’ SHARE
OF U.S. COLLEGE ENROLLMENT
4.5

600

500

400

4.0

1980
1985
1990
1995
2000

3.5
3.0
2.5

300

1980
1985
1990
1995
2000

2.0
1.5

200

1.0
100
0.5
0

0
Kentucky

Ohio

Pennsylvania

West Virginia

Percent
100 HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES ENTERING COLLEGE
WHO REMAIN IN THE SAME STATE, 2000

Kentucky

Pennsylvania

West Virginia

Percent
100 SHARE OF ALL COLLEGE FRESHMEN IN A STATE WHO
GRADUATED FROM A HIGH SCHOOL IN THAT STATE, 2000

95

95

90

90

85

85

80

80

75

75

70

70

65

65

60

Ohio

60
Kentucky

Ohio

Pennsylvania

West Virginia

Kentucky

Ohio

Pennsylvania

West Virginia

FRB Cleveland • November 2003

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics, 2002.

From 1996 to 2000, college enrollment rose 6.6% nationwide. The
strongest enrollment growth occurred
in California, Nevada, Arizona, and
Georgia, where rates exceeded 15%.
The Fourth District states of Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and West Virginia also
experienced some growth over this
period, but the rates were well below
the national average (1.0%, 3.8%, and
0.9%, respectively). Kentucky fared
slightly better, with enrollment growing 5.3% between 1996 and 2000. In
all four of the Fourth District states,

enrollment has remained relatively
steady over the last 10 years: In 2000,
enrollment in each Fourth District
state was near 1990 levels.
Although enrollment numbers
have held their ground, the share of
the nation’s college students educated in Fourth District states has
fallen. Ohio and Pennsylvania have
seen the largest drops, losing a combined 1% share of national enrollment between 1985 and 2000.
In 2000, more than four out of
every five high school students who

went on to college in Kentucky, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and West Virginia stayed
in their home state (the rates were
87%, 86%, 85%, and 83%). The share
of high school graduates remaining in
their state as a percentage of all college students in the state varied more
widely within the Fourth District: 87%
of Ohio college students were graduates of Ohio high schools, whereas
only 73% of West Virginia college students had graduated from high
schools in West Virginia.

16
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Depository Institutions
Billions of dollars
6 NET INCOME a

Billions of dollars
24 SOURCES OF INCOME

5

Billions of dollars
4.0

3.5

23
Net operating income

Total non-interest income

Securities and other gains/losses
4

22

3.0

3

21

2.5

2

20

2.0

1

19

1.5

0

18

1.0

Total interest income

–1
3/97

3/98

3/99

3/00

3/01

3/02

Percent
14 NET INTEREST MARGIN AND ASSET GROWTH

17
1997

3/03

Percent
3.5

0.5
1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Percent
1.5 EARNINGS

Percent
15

3.4

12

Return on equity

Net interest margin
10

3.3

8

3.2

6

3.1

4

3.0
Asset growth rate

2

2.9

0

2.8

–2

2.7
2.6

–4
1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

1.3

13

1.1

11

Return on assets
0.9

9

0.7

7

0.5

5
1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

FRB Cleveland • November 2003

NOTE: Observations for 2003 are second-quarter annualized data.
a. Net income equals net operating income plus securities and other gains and losses.
SOURCE: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Quarterly Banking Profile, various issues.

FDIC-insured savings institutions reported net income of $4.72 billion for
2003:IIQ, $838 million (21.6%)
higher than the same quarter a year
earlier. Compared to 2003:IQ, this
was an increase of $281 million. As in
previous quarters, net income was
buttressed by one-time gains on the
sale of securities, to the tune of $1.45
billion.
S&Ls’ non-interest (fee) income
stood at $3.64 billion, 28.0% higher

than a year earlier. Total interest
income continued to fall, reaching a
level 6.9% lower than a year earlier.
However, the process of re-pricing
S&Ls’ loan portfolios seems to have
been completed toward the end of
2003:IQ. This adjustment resulted in
a modest (2.3%) increase in net
interest income between 2002:IIQ
and 2003:IIQ because reductions in
interest income from lending were
nearly matched by declines in borrowing costs.

Overall earnings performance continued to be strong despite a small
drop in the net interest margin (calculated as interest and dividends
earned on interest-bearing assets
minus interest paid to depositors and
creditors, expressed as a percentage
of average earning assets). S&Ls’ net
interest margin declined slightly from
3.35% in 2002 to 3.33% in 2003.
Although S&Ls’ assets grew at a rate
of 10.08% on a year-over-year basis,
their net income grew at a 21.6% rate

(continued on next page)

17
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Depository Institutions (cont.)
Percent of total assets
70 NET LOANS AND LEASES

Percent
0.5 ASSET QUALITY

68

0.4

66

0.3

Percent
1.2

1.0

0.8
Net charge-offs

64

0.2

62

0.1

0.6
Problem assets

0.4

0

60
3/97

3/98

3/99

3/00

3/01

3/02

Percent
10 HEALTH

0.2
1997

3/03

Percent
1.4

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Ratio
8.3 CAPITAL

Ratio
1.4

Problem S&Ls
9

1.2

1.3

8.2
Coverage ratio

8

1.0

7

0.8

6

0.6
Unprofitable S&Ls

5

8.1

1.2

8.0

1.1

7.9

1.0

7.8

0.9
Core capital (leverage) ratio

0.4

0.2

4

3

0
1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

7.7

0.8

7.6

0.7
0.6

7.5
1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

FRB Cleveland • November 2003

NOTE: Observations for 2003 are second-quarter annualized data.
SOURCE: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Quarterly Banking Profile, various issues.

over the same period, raising the return on assets to 1.31% and the return on equity to 13.91%.
In 2003:IIQ, net loans and leases
as a share of total assets (65.8%)
were up slightly from the previous
quarter. This is lower than its recent
high of 67.9% in 2000:IIIQ, indicating
a continued decline in S&Ls’ direct
loan holdings.
Asset quality showed mixed signs
in 2003:IIQ. Net charge-offs (gross
charge-offs minus recoveries) rose to

0.31%. Problem assets (non-current
assets plus other real estate) made
up 0.64% of total assets, which represented only a slight decrease in the
problem asset ratio from its 2002
level of 0.69%.
However, asset quality is not a significant problem for FDIC-insured
saving institutions. Problem S&Ls
(those with substandard exam ratings) declined significantly to 0.84%
in 2003:IIQ from 1.16% in 2002. The
percent of unprofitable institutions

has been falling and now is 4.95%.
The coverage ratio stands at $1.08 in
loan loss reserves for every dollar of
non-current loans. The increase in
the coverage ratio since the previous
quarter resulted from a $231 million
increase in loan loss reserves, coupled with a $288 million decline in
non-current loans during the same
period. Core capital, which protects
savings institutions against unexpected losses, decreased to 8.03% in
2003:IIQ from 8.06% in 2002.

18
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Foreign Central Banks
Percent, daily
7 MONETARY POLICY TARGETS a

Trillions of yen
–35
–30

6

–25

5
Bank of England

4

European Central Bank

2
Federal Reserve

1

Current account balances (daily)
30

–20
–15

3

Trillions of yen
36
BANK OF JAPAN b
33

–10

24

–5

21

0

0

27

18

5

–1

10

Bank of Japan

–2
–3

15

12

20

9

–4

25

–5

30

–6

35
40

–7
4/1

9/28
2001

3/27

9/23
2002

3/22

Excess reserve balances
3
0
4/1

10/1
2001

2003

SINCE 2001

Current account less
required reserves

6

9/18

Percent
65 ANTICIPATED PORTION OF POLICY RATE CHANGES

Current account balances

15

4/1

10/1
2002

4/1

10/1
2003

Billiions of yuan
1,400 PEOPLE'S BANK OF CHINA: CHANGE IN ASSETS
AND LIABILITIES, DECEMBER 1999–DECEMBER 2002

Percent
70

1,200

60

1,000

50

800

40

600

30

400

20

200

10

60

55

50

45

40

0
European Central Bank

Bank of England

Federal Reserve Bank

0
Foreign assets

Domestic assets

Reserve money (M0)

FRB Cleveland • November 2003

a. Federal Reserve: overnight interbank rate. Bank of Japan: a quantity of current account balances (since December 19, 2001, a range of quantity of current
account balances). Bank of England and European Central Bank: two-week repo rate.
b. Current account balances at the Bank of Japan are required and excess reserve balances at depository institutions subject to reserve requirements plus the
balances of certain other financial institutions not subject to reserve requirements. Reserve requirements are satisfied on the basis of the average of a bank’s
daily balances at the Bank of Japan starting the sixteenth of one month and ending the fifteenth of the next.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Bank of Japan; European Central Bank; Bank of England; People’s Bank of China; Wholesale
Markets Brokers Association; and Bloomberg Financial Information Services.

Major central banks have not moved in
concert lately. The Bank of Japan made
another easing adjustment, raising the
top of its target range for current
account balances. The Federal Reserve
and European Central Bank maintained policy unchanged. The Bank
of England tightened by raising its
repo rate 25 basis points to 3.75%—a
change that was widely expected
after a narrow vote against tightening
in October. Indeed, markets generally anticipate changes in policy. Both
the Federal Reserve and the Bank
of Japan recently have considered

improving transparency in communicating policy intentions. The appointment of a new European Central Bank
president has spurred conjecture
about changes in that bank’s format
for communicating policy decisions.
Transparency implies that actual
changes in a policy setting will be anticipated, with no reaction of market
interest rates. Comparing the average
change in the one-month riskless
rate from the day before a change in
the policy target to the day after suggests that policy actions are largely
anticipated. Over the past two years,
on average, 60% of the amount of

each change in the policy rate was
anticipated in both the U.S. and the
euro area; in the U.K., the average
was about 50%.
The fixed exchange rate of the People’s Bank of China has attracted
much attention. Preventing appreciation has required sizeable purchases
of foreign exchange. Over the three
most recent years for which data are
available, rapid accumulation of foreign exchange by the People’s Bank
was accompanied by rapid growth
of reserve money, with virtually no
purchases of domestic assets.