View original document

The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.

May 2009: Supplemental (Covering May 5, 2009, to May 12, 2009)

In This Issue:
Economic Activity

ƒ Involunatry Part-Time Workers and the Deficiencies of
the Unemployment Rate
ƒ The Employment Situation, April 2009
ƒ Is the Housing Bust Over?
Banking and Financial Institutions

ƒ How Realistic Were the Economic Forecasts Used in
the Stress Tests?

Economic Activity

Involuntary Part-Time Workers and the Deficiencies of
the Unemployment Rate
05.07.09
by Yoonsoo Lee and Beth Mowry
The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ March employment report had very few positive things to say
about the labor market. Employers slashed an
additional 663,000 jobs, and the unemployment
rate climbed 0.4 percentage point, from 8.1 percent
to 8.5 percent, the highest rate since late 1983. As
dismal as 8.5 percent sounds, the unemployment
rate actually gives a rosier take on the labor market
than alternative measures do. Now appears to be a
time when this rate, the government’s most publicized statistic on employment conditions, offers an
incomplete view of the state of the labor market.
The unemployment rate is often criticized for
leaving some people out of the count. The rate is
defined as the percentage of those in the labor force
who are unemployed, and to be in the labor force,
one needs to be employed or actively seeking work.
Not included are people who are willing and able
to work but who have stopped searching.
There are a variety of reasons these so-called marginally attached workers may have stopped looking for work. Discouraged workers are considered
part of the marginally attached group, for instance,
because they believe searching for a job would not
be worthwhile. As gloomy economic conditions
discourage workers from hunting for new jobs, the
official unemployment rate may understate slack in
the labor market during recessions.
Involuntary part-time workers are another group
whose status is not captured entirely in the official
unemployment rate. These underemployed workers would like to have full-time jobs but instead are
working fewer than 35 hours a week, either because
their hours have been reduced or because part-time
work was all they could find.
The employment report showed that the number
of people employed part-time for economic reasons (rather than by choice) increased by 423,000
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | May 2009: Supplemental

2

last month. This increase followed on the heels of
a 787,000 increase in February, the second-largest
monthly jump since records began in the 1950s
(the largest was September 2001). The total number of involuntary part-timers is now the highest it
has ever been, standing at 9 million—nearly double
what it was just a year ago (4.9 million).

Involuntary Part-Time Employment
Thousands of workers
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000

Slack work or business conditions

3,000

The BLS’s Current Population Survey categorizes
involuntary part-timers into those working parttime due to “slack work or business conditions”
and those who “could only find a part-time job.” In
other words, some workers had full-time jobs but
went to part-time when their employers cut hours
because business was falling off, while other workers had to start out in part-time jobs even though
they were looking for full-time work, because that’s
all that was available.

2,000
1,000

Could only find part-time work
0
1994
1997
2000
2003

2006

2009

Notes: Shaded bars represent recessions. Seasonally adjusted data.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Average Job Openings and Labor Turnover by
Industry
April 2006

March 2009

Change

Total
(thousands)

Percent

Total
(thousands)

Percent

Total
(thousands)

Percent

Total part-time for
economic reasons

3908

100.0

9049

100.0

5141

100.0

Slack work or
business conditions

2440

62.4

6857

75.8

4417

85.9

Could only work
part-time

115

132

370

385

388

383

Manufacturing

232

282

340

352

457

367

Note: Data are seasonally-adjusted.
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey.

The 5.1 million rise in involuntary part-time employment from its recent low in April 2006 to the
present was mainly due to an increase in workers
whose hours were cut back because of slack work
conditions. In fact, the number of those working
part-time for this reason more than doubled since
the beginning of the recession. They accounted for
62 percent of all economic part-timers in 2006, and
now they constitute 76 percent of the group.
This large uptick is important to note because it
fills in some of the gaps of the labor market story
that the official unemployment rate leaves open.
When marginally attached workers and involuntary part-time workers are added to the official
unemployment rate, the unemployment rate nearly
doubles, from 8.5 percent to 15.6 percent.
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | May 2009: Supplemental

3

More and more people appear to be working parttime jobs for economic reasons, rather than by
choice. The unemployment measure that accounts
for these people and other marginally attached
workers has increased even more than the official
unemployment rate over the past year.

Alternative Measures of
Unemployment Rate
Percent
18

14

Official rate with marginally attached
and involuntary part-timers
Official rate with all marginally attached
workers
Official rate with discouraged workers
Official unemployment rate

The official unemployment rate rose from 4.9
percent at the start of the recession in December
2007 to its present 8.5 percent, an increase of 3.6
percentage points. The unemployment rate including marginally attached workers and the underemployed increased 6.9 percentage points in the

10

6

2
1994

1997

2000

2003

2006

2009

Notes: Shaded bars indicate recessions. The official unemployment rate is the
ratio of unemployed persons to the labor force. The other rates include the
additional worker classifications in the numerator and denominator.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | May 2009: Supplemental

To read more on the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ March employment
report:
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm

4

Economic Activity

The Employment Situation, April 2009
05.12.09
by Yoonsoo Lee and Beth Mowry
Nonfarm payroll employment declined by a lessthan-expected 539,000 in April, boosted by federal
government hiring and smaller-than-expected losses
across many private industries. While still very
large, the loss was the smallest since last October.
Revisions to the data for the previous two months,
however, continued to be on the downside, adding
66,000 additional losses to the earlier figures for
February and March. Those months have now seen
respective losses of 681,000 and 699,000, bringing
total payroll losses since the start of the recession to
5.7 million.
The unemployment rate jumped from 8.5 percent
to 8.9 percent in April, largely due to a labor force
increase of 683,000 people, which pushed up the
participation rate 0.3 percentage point to 65.8 percent. The employment-to-population ratio, often
considered a more stable measure of labor market
dynamics, remained at 59.9 percent.

Average Nonfarm Employment Change
Change, thousands of jobs
300
200
100
0
-100
-200
-300
-400
-500
-600
-700
-800

Revised
Previous estimate

2006 2007 2008
IV
III
YTD 2009 2008

I February
April
2009
March

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

The diffusion index of employment change, which
tracks the percentage of industries that are increasing their employment, saw its largest monthly
increase since September 2007, jumping from
20.3 to 28.2. This reading is still well below the 50
threshold, which would indicate an equal balance
between industries with increasing and decreasing
employment.
Goods-producing payrolls decreased by 270,000
in April, compared to average monthly losses of
322,000 for year-to-date 2009. Manufacturing and
construction losses (−149,000, −110,000) were
both the smallest seen for any month this year. Durable goods (−127,000) continued to be a heavier
drag on the manufacturing figure than nondurable
goods (−22,000). Within durable goods, motor
vehicles and parts manufacturers alone were responsible for 29,000 of the payroll losses.
The private service-providing sector shed 341,000
jobs in April, after larger drops in February
(−393,000) and March (−375,000). Of all the ma-

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | May 2009: Supplemental

5

jor service industries, only information (−17,000)
and leisure and hospitality (−44,000) fared slightly
worse than they had in March. Other service industries shed fewer jobs last month: Trade, transportation, and utilities lost 126,000, financial activities
lost 40,000, and professional and business services
dropped 122,000. Payroll losses in temporary
help services lessened slightly but are still elevated
compared to most months over the course of the
recession. As has been the case over the past year,
education and healthcare is the only service industry to add to payrolls, with a net gain of 15,000.
The government sector experienced its largest
monthly gain since June 2001, due to the hiring of
140,000 federal employees in preparation for the
2010 Census.

Labor Market Conditions and Revisions
Average monthly change (thousands of employees, NAICS)
February
current

Revision to
February

March current

Revision to
March

April 2009

Payroll employment

−681

−30

−699

−36

−539

Goods-producing

−295

−10

−318

−13

−271

Construction

−113

−6

−135

−9

−110

−7.6

−2

−12

−2

−17

Heavy and civil engineering
Residentiala

−51.1

2

−62

−3

−52

Nonresidentialb

−54.1

−6

−61

−4

−41

−172

−3

−167

−6

−149

−128

0

−127

−2

−127

Manufacturing
Durable goods

−44

−3

−40

−4

−22

Service-providing

Nondurable goods

−386

−20

−381

−23

−269

Retail trade

−57

−6

−64

−16

−47

−56

−12

−43

0

−40

−176

2

−130

3

−122

Financial

activitiesc

PBSd
Temporary help services

−73

4

−72

0

−63

Education and health services

19

−3

10

2

15

−32

−4

−42

−2

−44

Government

7

4

−6

−1

72

Local educational services

6

−4

−4

−4

4

Leisure and hospitality

a. Includes construction of residential buildings and residential specialty trade contractors.
b. Includes construction of nonresidential buildings and nonresidential specialty trade contractors.
c. Includes the finance, insurance, and real estate sector and the rental and leasing sector.
d. PBS is professional business services (professional, scientific, and technical services, management of companies and enterprises, administrative and support, and waste management and remediation services.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | May 2009: Supplemental

6

Private Sector Employment Growth
Thousands of jobs
400
200
0
-200

Total private sector employment dropped by a
milder 611,000 jobs last month, compared to
March’s loss of 693,000. Still, monthly privatesector losses this year have been considerably worse
for several months running compared to past recessions. The only months in the series with comparable losses were December 1974 and October
1949, which saw respective private sector losses of
629,000 and 814,000.

-400
-600

Monthly change
Three-month moving average

-800
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | May 2009: Supplemental

7

Economic Activity

Is the Housing Bust Over?
Existing Single-Family Homes for Sale
Months of supply
13

Millions of units
4.0
3.7

12

3.4

11

3.1

10

2.8

9

2.5

8

2.2

7

1.9

6

1.6

5

1.3

4

1.0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

3

Source: National Association of Realtors.

Existing Single-Family Home Sales
Thousands of dollars, NSA

Millions of units, SAAR
6.5

240

6.0

220

Sales

5.5

200

5.0

180

4.5

160

Median sales price

4.0

140

3.5

120

3.0
1995

100
1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

Source: National Association of Realtors.

Foreclosure Starts
Percent of loans entering foreclosure
1.4
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
1980

1984

1988

1992

1996

2000

2004

2008

Source: Mortgage Bankers Association.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | May 2009: Supplemental

05.12.09
by Michael Shenk
It was early 2006 that housing markets did their
abrupt turnaround, transitioning from a period of
increasing prices and sales to one where both prices
and sales were in a near freefall. The fallout of the
housing market bust has been well documented,
and the boom-bust cycle is often cited as a leading
cause of the current recession.
It’s been three years—is the housing market correction finally over? The short answer is probably no,
but there are some encouraging signs of improvement.
Existing single-family home sales, by far the largest segment of the housing market, have been
relatively stable for the past five months. Prior to a
steep drop off in November, sales had held steady
for roughly 14 months. This stability has come at a
cost though, as the median price of homes sold has
fallen drastically over the past year and a half.
Part of the reason that existing home prices seem to
be falling so rapidly is that an increasing percentage of homes being sold are distressed. In April,
the National Association of Realtors reported that
just over half of March’s home sales were in this
category. While this may not seem encouraging
for homeowners, working off the bloated supply
of foreclosures is an important step in the return
to normalcy. So far, inventories of existing homes
have yet to come down significantly, but with sales
showing signs of stability, it appears that inventories
may have turned a corner. In addition, the Mortgage Bankers Association reported that the percent
of loans entering foreclosure fell in the second half
of 2008.
New single-family home sales have also shown
tentative signs of stabilizing over the past few
months. However, since they began their decline
in late 2005, new home sales have shown quite a
few signs of stability over short periods, only to be
followed by more declines. Of course, one might
not expect new home sales to stabilize as rapidly
8

as existing home sales, since an excess supply of
homes usually means homebuilders will be adding
fewer homes to the market. With fewer new homes
on the market, there should be fewer sales as well.
Looking at housing starts and the level of inventory
for new homes, it is pretty clear that builders are
scaling back. In fact, the current level of inventory
is roughly in line with the average seen from 1980
to 2000.

Housing Starts and Permits
Millions of units
1.9
1.7
Starts
1.5
1.3
1.1
Permits

0.9
0.7
0.5
0.3
1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

Source: Census Bureau.

New Single-Family Home Sales
Millions of units, SAAR

Thousands of dollars, NSA

1.5

275

1.3

250

Sales

1.1

225

0.9

200

0.7

175

Median sales price

0.5
0.3
1995

150
125
1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

Source: Census Bureau.

Perhaps the most positive sign for housing markets
is that the home-price indexes are beginning to
suggest that price declines may be slowing. Both
the latest S&P/Case-Shiller indexes and the FHFA
index indicate some stability in the 12-month
growth rate of prices as of February. The FHFA
index shows prices actually improving in February, while the Case-Shiller index, which is narrower
than the FHFA index in terms of geographic coverage but also includes nonconforming loans which
the FHFA index leaves out, simply has prices falling
at a slower pace.
While there are some tentative signs that the housing market is stabilizing, it is Important to note
that things are still far from normal. Home prices,
for example, are currently down 30.7 percent and
9.5 percent from their respective peaks in the CaseShiller and FHFA indexes. Also, given the stillbloated inventories of unsold homes, it might be
some time before things return to what we remember as normal. That being said, any positive signs in
the market are certainly welcome after such a long
period of dreary news.

New Single-Family Homes for Sale
Thousands of units
600

Months of supply
15

550

13

500

11

450

9

400

7

350

5

300

3

250
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

1

Source: Census Bureau.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | May 2009: Supplemental

9

Monthly Home Price Indexes

Monthly Home Price Indexes

12-month percent change

Index, January 2000=100

25

250

S&P/Case-Shiller ten-city index

20

225
15
200

10
5

175

FHFA purchase-only index

0

150

S&P/Case-Shiller 20-city index

-5

FHFA purchase-only index

125

-10

100

-15
-20
1995

S&P/Case-Shiller ten-city index

S&P/Case-Shiller 20-city index
1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

Sources: S&P, Fiserv, and MacroMarkets LLC, Federal Housing Finance
Agency.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | May 2009: Supplemental

75
2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

Sources: S&P, Fiserv, and MacroMarkets LLC, Federal Housing Finance
Agency.

10

Banking and Financial Institutions

How Realistic Were the Economic Forecasts Used in the Stress Tests?
05.12.09
by Ken Beauchemin and Brent Meyer
The results of the “stress tests” came out last Thursday, and we can now see what three months of
intense scrutiny of 19 of the countries’ largest bank
holding companies has revealed about the amount
of capital they are likely to need to withstand a
worse-than-expected recession. Since the April 24
release of the Federal Reserve white paper describing the process, a number of observers have suggested that the economic forecasts used in the tests
are not severe enough, and may result in insufficient capital requirements.
Regulators tested the banks against two sets of assumptions for GDP, unemployment, and housing
prices. The “baseline” scenario averaged the February forecasts of real GDP and the unemployment
rate from the Blue Chip Survey, Consensus Forecasts, and the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
The assumptions for house prices followed a path
implied by futures on the Case-Shiller Housing
Price Index. The second, “more adverse” scenario
represented a longer and deeper recession than the
baseline scenario.
In the baseline case, real GDP falls by 2.0 percent in 2009 before rebounding to 2.1 percent in
2010; the unemployment rate averages 8.4 percent
in 2009 and 8.8 percent in 2010. House prices
decline 14.0 percent in 2009 and fall an additional
4.0 percent in 2010.
The more adverse (but not necessarily “worst-case”
scenario) assumes a sharp 3.3 percent real GDP
contraction in 2009 followed by scant 0.5 percent
growth in 2010; the unemployment rate averages
8.9 percent in 2009 and 10.3 percent in 2010.
House prices drop 22.0 percent in 2009 and 7.0
percent in 2010.
At the time the assumptions were determined, the
advance estimate on fourth-quarter 2009 real GDP
growth was −3.8 percent (annualized), and the February employment figures were not known. Subsequently, the Bureau of Economic Analysis slashed
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | May 2009: Supplemental

11

the fourth-quarter growth estimate by a stunning
2.5 percentage points, to −6.3 percent. Given the
large downward GDP revision, an exceptionally
rapid deterioration in the labor market, and yet
another large GDP decline (in the first quarter),
it is, of course, natural to question the validity of
the bank stress tests. It turns out, however, that the
most recent forecasts remain in line with the two
stress-test scenarios.
First, the most recent GDP growth forecasts still lie
within the range covered by the stress-test scenarios.
While both the Blue Chip consensus and Macroeconomic Advisors forecasts dip below the baseline-scenario projection for 2009 growth of −2.0
percent, they are quite close to the 2010 baseline
and remain firmly within the range between the
baseline and more adverse scenarios in both years.
Furthermore, only the Blue Chip pessimists’ forecast hits the lower bound of the stress-test scenarios
in 2009, and it is 0.4 percentage point above the
more adverse scenario for 2010.

Real GDP Growth Forecasts and
Stress Test Scenarios
Annual average percent change
3

Baseline
scenario

2
1
0
-1
Blue Chip optimists
Blue Chip consensus
Blue Chip pessimists
Macroeconomic Advisers
April forecast

-2
-3

More adverse
scenario

-4
2007

2008

2009

2010

Sources: Blue Chip Newsletter, April 2009; Macroeconomic Advisers, April 2009;
Bureau of Economic Analysis; Federal Reserve Board.

Unemployment Rate Forecasts and
Stress Test Scenarios
Percent, annual average
12

Blue Chip optimists
Blue Chip consensus
Blue Chip pessimists
Macroeconomic Advisers
April forecast

10

Baseline
scenario

8
More adverse
scenario
6

4
2007

2008

2009

2010

Sources: Blue Chip Newsletter, April 2009; Macroeconomic Advisers forecast,
April 2009; Bureau of Labor Statistics; Federal Reserve Board.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | May 2009: Supplemental

Second, while rapid deterioration in the labor
market has led to a near-term path for the unemployment rate that will most likely generate a 2009
average in excess of the 8.4 percent rate assumed
by the baseline scenario, both the most recent
Macroeconomic Advisors and Blue Chip forecasts
predict an unemployment rate slightly lower than
the 8.9 percent rate assumed by the more adverse
scenario. The forecasts for 2010 are also less dire
than assumed by the more adverse scenario. As the
Federal Reserve noted in its April 24 white paper,
“Although the likelihood that unemployment
could average 10.3 percent in 2010 is now higher
than had been anticipated when the scenarios were
specified, that outcome still exceeds a more recent
consensus projection by professional forecasters for
an average unemployment rate of 9.3 percent in
2010.”
Finally, recent forecasts for house prices remain
consistent with those of the stress-test scenarios and
even hold out some hope that house prices may
rise faster than the baseline forecast. This result is
particularly encouraging since further declines in
house prices will be a leading cause of any additional losses. Home prices are an important indicator
12

to consider because the troubled assets that could
potentially threaten the 19 tested financial institutions are largely related to residential real estate.
The ultimate performance of these assets is partly
a function of what happens to home prices in the
future.

House Price Forecasts and
Stress Test Scenarios
Fourth-quarter levels (index, January 2000=100)
250
225

Path implied by Case-Shiller futures (as of 5.4.09)
Macroeconomic Advisers April forecast

200
175
Baseline scenario
150
125
More adverse scenario
100
2007

2008

2009

2010

Sources: Macroeconomic Advisers forecast; Chicago Mercantile Exchange; S&P,
Fiserv, & Macromarkets; Federal Reserve Board.

In summary, notwithstanding further unexpected
and dramatic declines in the economy, recent
projections by professional forecasters indicate that
the stress-test scenarios remain viable and relevant
to the task of assessing the potential losses faced
by nation’s largest bank holding companies. While
the adverse scenario may seem more likely than
when it was first drawn up, it is only the near-term
outlook for unemployment that has significantly
strayed from baseline assumptions. Furthermore,
the alternatively adverse scenario looks to be plenty
adverse, and exposes the wisdom of planning for a
more stressful outcome in the first place.
To read the April 24 release from the Federal Reserve:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20090424a1.pdf

Economic Trends is published by the Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
Views stated in Economic Trends are those of individuals in the Research Department and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Materials may be reprinted
provided that the source is credited.
If you’d like to subscribe to a free e-mail service that tells you when Trends is updated, please send an empty email message to econpubs-on@mail-list.com. No commands in either the subject header or message body are required.
ISSN 0748-2922

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | May 2009: Supplemental

13