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The Economy in Perspective

FRB Cleveland • May 2003

Too much of a little thing…Federal Reserve Board
Chairman Alan Greenspan concluded his prepared
testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives’
Committee on Financial Services on April 30 with a
comment about inflation. He noted that “…core
prices by many measures have increased very slowly
over the last six months. With price inflation already
at a low level, substantial further disinflation would
be an unwelcome development, especially to the
extent it put pressure on profit margins and impeded
the revival of business spending.” Does this mean we
have closed the door on an era in which accelerating
inflation was the villainous foe of virtuous central
banks? Have central banks become victims of their
own success in the war against inflation?
From one perspective, concern about substantial
further disinflation could be welcome. For decades,
the Federal Reserve and many other central banks
have reduced both the inflation rate and inflation
expectations. U.S. inflation, for example, spiked at
more than 14 percent in 1980; by 2002, the Consumer Price Index had fallen to 2.3 percent. The
International Monetary Fund’s consumer price
index for industrialized countries peaked at more
than 13 percent in 1980, but inflation in those countries registered 1.7 percent in 2002, an order of
magnitude lower than the pace set two decades earlier. Equally important, inflation expectations now
indicate that people believe inflation will remain
close to these low rates.
In macroeconomic parlance, “price stability” is stability in money’s purchasing power over time, the
notion that a dollar tomorrow will buy the same
amount of consumer satisfaction as it will today (in
an economy with positive per capita productivity
growth, consumers would have more dollars, hence
more total satisfaction, in the future.) If an economy
characterized by price stability did experience a small
inflation or deflation from time to time, few problems would be likely to arise as long as people did
not expect the deviations to persist long.
But it is hard to know for sure. Very low inflation
and deflation have been rare events in industrialized
economies, so it has not been possible to draw statistical inferences based on their recurring features.
Nevertheless, we do know from research on very
large economic contractions that deflation has often
been present. In their monumental work, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960,

Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz
observed that every significant real output decline in
the United States has been associated with deflation.
The most notorious episode, of course, was the
Great Depression: Between 1929 and 1933, the price
level fell 24 percent, while real GDP fell nearly 40 percent. Furthermore, both output and prices remained
below their 1929 levels until the end of the Thirties.
During the same period, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France also experienced significant output
declines and deflation.
But there are counterexamples in which the
United States and other countries have experienced
growth during periods of mild deflation. For example, from 1880 to 1896, the wholesale price level in
the United States fell 30 percent. Far from being a
time of gloom and doom, this deflationary episode
was a period of relative prosperity: Real income
increased 85 percent, an average of nearly 5 percent
each year.
Many analysts use the recent experience of
Japan—which is continuing its decade-long period
of economic stagnation accompanied by a small
deflation—as a cautionary example of deflation’s
dangers. From 1992 through 2001, Japan’s real GDP
growth averaged a mere 1 percent annually. The
price level fell at an average rate of about 0.5 percent
a year during that period; by the beginning of 2003,
the country’s economy had experienced deflation in
four of the previous five years. But the very visible
example of Japan may have overshadowed the
counterexample of a neighbor: If deflation causes
recession, how do we account for the situation in
the People’s Republic of China, where real GDP has
been growing at the rate of between 6 percent and
8 percent for several years, despite deflation?
The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland’s 2002
Annual Report contains an essay on deflation, which
conjectures that deflation in itself is not the culprit it is
often made out to be. Rather, monetary economies
seem capable of breaking down when interest rates
approach zero, rendering money almost indistinguishable from interest-bearing assets. Although such
an outcome seems remote, operating in very low
inflation environments might present new challenges
for central banks. But we should recognize that
we have created these possibilities by vanquishing an
old foe.

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Inflation and Prices
12-month percent change
4.25 CPI AND CORE CPI

March Price Statistics

4.00

Percent change, last:
2002
a
a
a
1 mo. 3 mo. 12 mo. 5 yr. avg.

3.75
CPI

3.50

Consumer prices

3.25

All items

4.0

5.2

3.0

2.6

2.4

Less food
and energy

0.0

0.8

1.7

2.3

2.0

Medianb

1.1

2.0

2.6

3.0

3.0

3.00
2.75
2.50
2.25

Producer prices

2.00

Finished goods

19.1 17.4

4.2

2.1

1.2
1.75

Less food
and energy

9.1

4.6

0.9

1.1 –0.5

1.50
CPI excluding food and energy

1.25
1.00
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Annualized quarterly percent change
5 ACTUAL CPI AND BLUE CHIP FORECAST c

12-month percent change
4.25 CPI AND TRIMMED-MEAN CPI MEASURES
4.00
3.75

4

CPI
3.50

Highest 10%

CPI

3.25

Median CPI b

3

3.00

Consensus

2.75
2
2.50
2.25
1

2.00

Lowest 10%

1.75
0

1.50
CPI, 16% trimmed mean b

1.25
1.00
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

–1
1995 1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

FRB Cleveland • May 2003

a. Annualized.
b. Calculated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
c. Blue Chip panel of economists.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland; and Blue Chip Economic Indicators, April 10, 2003.

The Consumer Price Index (CPI)
jumped an annualized 4% in March
and has risen 5.2% over the first three
months of 2003. Outsized increases in
energy costs were again responsible
for its rapid rise; the energy sector has
been an aggravating influence on the
accelerating increase (on a year-overyear basis) in the cost of the representative consumer’s market basket. After
excluding food and energy, however,
the market basket’s cost increases
have been mostly flat this year and
have shown only a modest 1.7%
increase from last year, a sign that

there has been little underlying inflationary pressure outside the energy
sector. Indeed, the median CPI, an
alternative measure of the general rise
in consumer prices, has been moderating over the past 18 months, and its
current 12-month reading of 2.6% is
the lowest since mid-2000.
Whether the inflation trend will
continue its downward course is unclear, of course, but even the most
pessimistic economists do not expect
the CPI’s behavior to worsen. In fact,
the highest 10% of inflation forecasts
from the Blue Chip panel of econo-

mists predict a CPI growth trend of
around 3%, the current 12-month
rate. The panel’s consensus forecast
puts the inflation trend down around
21/2% over the next 18 months, while
the optimists see inflation moving
down to 11/2% over the same horizon.
From an arithmetic perspective,
the moderation in the underlying
inflation trend has resulted from a
downward tilt in the rate of service
price increases. Excluding energyrelated services, the growth trend in
services prices, which seem to have
peaked around 4% early last year, has
(continued on next page)

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Inflation and Prices (cont.)
12-month percent change
10 IMPORT PRICE INDEX

12-month percent change
5 CORE CPI COMMODITIES AND SERVICES

8
4
6

Core CPI services

All items
3

4
2

2
Core CPI commodities

0

1

–2
Non-petroleum imports
–4

0

–6
–1
–8
–10

–2
1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

Percent
100 INSTITUTE FOR SUPPLY MANAGEMENT,
MANUFACTURING PRICES DIFFUSION INDEX a

Producer Price Index, Major Industriesa
Annualized percent change
3 mos. 12 mos. 5 yrs. 10 yrs.
Total manufacturing industries 15.1
Food and kindred products
5.8
Apparel and other finished
products made from
fabrics
0.6
Lumber and wood products
except furniture
2.9
Furniture and fixtures
2.2
Chemicals and allied
products
10.7
Petroleum refining and
related products
313.2
Rubber and miscellaneous
plastic products
8.9
Primary metal industries
–0.3
Fabricated metal products
except machinery and
transportation equipment 1.2
Machinery except electrical –1.4
Transportation equipment
9.1
Electrical and machinery
equipment and supplies –1.5

1992

4.6
2.0

2.0
1.4

1.5
1.3

0.2

0.2

0.5

–0.9
1.1

–0.4
1.1

0.3
1.7

5.5

1.9

2.6

63.7

17.4

6.2

3.0
3.0

0.9
–0.8

1.1
0.6

1.1
–1.3
1.4

0.6
–0.3
0.9

1.2
–0.1
1.1

–2.3

–1.2

–0.7

90

80

70

60

50

40

30
20
1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

FRB Cleveland • May 2003

a. Not seasonally adjusted.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; and Institute for Supply Management.

fallen steadily to about 3% since then.
Because such costs account for more
than half of the consumer’s market
basket, this downward trend has
eased inflation in non-energy household expenses. Meanwhile, the cost
of consumer goods (less food and
energy) continues to show outright
1
declines—down about 1 /2% over the
past 12 months.
The persistent decline in goods
prices has doubtless helped raise the
specter of deflation seen by some
business analysts. Certainly, outright
declines in prices have been occur-

ring for certain goods, like communications equipment, for some time
now. But deflation of the sort that
usually troubles economists involves
more than price declines in a subset
of goods. Rather, deflation is a condition in which price declines are seen
across a broad range of goods and
services. Economists seem somewhat divided as to whether such a
deflationary episode is likely in the
U.S. Some of them observe that
the Federal Reserve has the tools
to prevent such an occurrence, but
others are less confident.

Still, there may be reason to believe,
albeit tentatively, that the downward
slide in consumer goods prices is
coming to an end. Import prices,
which contributed to the drop in consumer goods prices in recent years,
are now showing their largest
increases in about seven years. In addition, price increases posted by U.S.
manufacturers have been increasing
strongly this year across a range of
industries, a development that is consistent with the price hikes reported
by an increasing share of the nation’s
purchasing managers.

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Monetary Policy
Percent
2.00 IMPLIED YIELDS ON FEDERAL FUNDS FUTURES

Percent
8 RESERVE MARKET RATES
7

Effective federal funds rate a
1.75

6

August 14, 2002

5
Intended federal funds rate b

September 25, 2002
1.50

4

December 11, 2002

3
Primary credit rate b
1.25

2
Discount rate b

January 30, 2003
April 22, 2003

November 7, 2002

1
March 19, 2003
1.00

0
2000

2001

2002

2003

Percent
9 FEDERAL FUNDS RATE AND INFLATION TARGETS

Nov.
Sept.
2002

Jan.

Mar.

May

July

Sept.

Nov.

2003

Balance of Risksd

8
Effective federal funds rate

Change in federal funds target rate

7
6

Statement
prior to change –0.5 –0.25

0

Inflationary

0

0

5

3

1

Balanced

0

0

7

2

0

Weakness

6

3

3

0

0

No statement

3

0

0

0

0

0.25 0.50

5
4
3
2

Inflation targets: 0% 1% 2% 3% 4%
(federal funds rates implied by Taylor rule) c

1
0
1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

FRB Cleveland • May 2003

a. Weekly average of daily figures.
b. Daily observations.
c. The formula for the implied funds rate is taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Monetary Trends, January 2002, which is adapted from John B.
Taylor, “Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, vol. 39 (1993), pp. 195–214.
d. Data taken from immediate press releases beginning in May 1999.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; Congressional Budget Office; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System;
and Bloomberg Financial Information Services.

While the Federal Reserve has not
changed the target federal funds rate
this year (the May 6 meeting has not
taken place as of this writing), the fed
funds futures market sees at least a
possibility that rates will be lowered
from their current level of 1.25%.
Futures prices are consistent with
market participants’ belief in a 50-50
chance of a 25 basis point cut by
September.
One perhaps surprising aspect of
monetary policy is the extent to which
the target funds rate has diverged

from the Taylor rule, which posits that
the FOMC chooses the target rate as a
balanced response to weakness and
inflation. The Taylor rule’s form depends on the weights given to inflation and output and to the assumed
inflation target. While the rule has
generally predicted the direction of
the fed funds rate’s move accurately, it
has predicted increasing rates since
the second quarter of 2002, at odds
with actual rates’ downward trend.
Many people look for guidance to
the balance-of-risk statement that the
FOMC has issued after each meeting

since May 1999. Do such statements
contain information about future
FOMC actions? It’s hard to say
whether using the statements would
improve on a shrewd guess based on
the state of the economy, but some
patterns emerge. A statement that
there is a risk of weakness has most
often been followed by a cut in rates,
although the most common response
after an inflationary risk statement
has been no move. And a downward
move has never followed a statement
of balanced risks.

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Money and Financial Markets
Percent
4.0 PENNACCHI MODEL a

Percent, weekly
5.0 TREASURY INFLATION-INDEXED SECURITIES

3.5
4.5

3.0
10-year TIIS yield

2.5

4.0
2.0
1.5

3.5

1.0
Estimated real interest rate

3.0

0.5
0

2.5
–0.5
–1.0

2.0

–1.5
–2.0

1.5
1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

1998

2003

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Percent, weekly
7 OPTION-ADJUSTED REAL INTEREST RATE

Percent, weekly
9 LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES
8
30-year Government National
Mortgage Administration

6

7
5

6

5

4
30-year Government National Mortgage Administration

10-year Treasury
4
3
3

2

2
1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

FRB Cleveland • May 2003

a. The estimated real interest rate is calculated using the Pennacchi model of inflation estimation and the median forecast for the GDP implicit price deflator
from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Monthly data.
SOURCES: Bloomberg Financial Information Services; Jonathan B. Berk, “A Simple Approach for Deciding When to Invest,” American Economic Review,
vol. 89 (1999), pp. 1319–26; and Wall Street Journal.

While the Federal Reserve controls
several nominal interest rates, the real
economy is affected by real rates, that
is, rates adjusted for inflation. Treasury
inflation-indexed securities (TIIS)
adjust their principal and interest for
inflation, giving a direct measure of
real rates. It is also possible to estimate
real rates using inflation expectations;
for example, the Pennacchi approach
estimates 30-day real interest rates to
have been negative since late 2001.
Both short and long rates have fallen
substantially since early 2002, although they remain at or near their
levels at the beginning of 2003.

Real rates matter because they influence investment. Businesses must
decide which gives them the better
return, buying a bond or buying new
equipment. A high real rate makes
investment projects less profitable.
One must be careful to consider the
appropriate real rate, however, since
most projects implicitly embed a subtle option—the option to wait. That is,
if you don’t buy that new stamping
machine today, you can buy it next
month. If real interest rates rise, this
has two contrary effects: The future
profits from the machine look worse
than the high interest rate of the

bond, but delaying those profits for
another month also looks worse. The
increase in real rates has an ambiguous effect on investment.
One way to adjust for this problem
is to use bonds that themselves embed
an option. Fortunately, rates on these
“callable” bonds are readily available.
“Callable” means that the issuer can
buy them back at a previously specified price. Such bonds generally aren’t
protected against inflation, however,
so finding their real rate requires
an inflation adjustment. The bottom
right chart takes a common callable
(continued on next page)

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Money and Financial Markets (cont.)
Percent, weekly
10 CAPITAL MARKET RATES

Percent, weekly
6
YIELD CURVE a,b
January 4, 2002

9
5
July 26, 2002

Conventional mortgage

8
April 18, 2003

4

7
March 14, 2003

10-year Treasury a
6

3

Municipal bond

5

February 28, 2003
2

4

3

1
0

5

10

15

20

1998

25

Percent, weekly average
3.5 INFLATION

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Dollars per ounce
375 GOLD PRICES AND GOLD/SILVER RATIO

3.0
Estimated expected inflation rate c

Ratio
90

350

80

325

70

2.5

Gold/silver

2.0
300

60

275

50

1.5
10-year Treasury minus 10-year TIIS
1.0
Gold
250

0.5

0
1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

225
1998

40

30
1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

FRB Cleveland • May 2003

a. All yields are from constant-maturity series.
b. Average for the week ending on the date shown.
c. The estimated expected inflation rate is calculated using the Pennacchi model of inflation estimation and the median forecast for the GDP implicit price
deflator from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Monthly data.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Selected Interest Rates,” Federal Reserve Statistical Releases, H.15; Bloomberg Financial
Information Services; and Wall Street Journal.

instrument, the 30-year Government
National Mortgage Administration
bond, and subtracts, as an inflation
estimate, the yield difference between a 10-year Treasury bond and
10-year TIIS. Although its pattern
resembles that of the 10-year TIIS
rate, the option-adjusted rate is
higher and, in addition, has fallen
more since the end of 2001: 182 basis
points (bp) versus 147 bp.
Since last month, the yield curve
has moved up and gotten steeper. The
10-year, three-month spread has risen

from 254 bp to 281 bp, remaining well
above its historical average of 120 bp.
If past performance is any indication,
this predicts strong economic growth
in the year ahead. The two-year, threemonth spread is watched because inversions are thought to indicate that
monetary policy rates are out of line
with the market; however, the spread
has increased from 36 bp to a robust
62 bp. Other long-term rates have followed the general pattern of longterm Treasuries, although so far this
year, municipal bond rates have not
recovered from their precipitous fall.

Central banks may operate by
affecting interest rates, but keeping
inflation within appropriate bounds
remains a major goal. The difference
between nominal yields (Treasury
bonds) and real yields (TIIS) gives a
market-based measure of inflationary
expectations. Although these longrun expectations have notched downward recently, they are still close to
1/
2 percentage point higher than in
mid-2002. Shorter-term expectations
produced by the Pennacchi approach
have been somewhat steadier.
(continued on next page)

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Money and Financial Markets (cont.)
Percent, weekly
1.8 YIELD SPREADS

Percent, weekly
12 SPREADS OF CORPORATE BOND YIELDS
MINUS THE 10-YEAR TREASURY YIELD
10

1.4
10-year interest-rate swap
minus 10-year Treasury bond

8
High yield a

1.0

6

4

0.6

BBB a
2
AA a

0.2
0

90-day commercial paper
minus three-month Treasury bill
–0.2

–2
1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2000

2001

2002

2003

Percent, weekly average
1.5 TED SPREAD b

Index
55 CHICAGO BOARD OF OPTIONS EXCHANGE
VOLATILITY INDEX
50

1.2
45

40

0.9

35
0.6

30

25
0.3
20
15
1998

1999

2000

2000

2002

2003

0
1998

1999

FRB Cleveland • May 2003

a. Merrill Lynch AA, BBB, and High Yield Master II indexes, each minus the yield on the 10-year Treasury note.
b. Yield spread: three-month euro minus three-month constant-maturity Treasury bill.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Selected Interest Rates,” Federal Reserve Statistical Releases, H.15; Chicago Board of
Options Exchange; and Bloomberg Financial Information Services.

Gold, often considered an inflation
hedge, rose from less than $260 per
ounce in early 2001 to nearly $370 in
early 2003 but has since retreated to
around $325 per ounce. Because
gold’s price relative to silver followed
a similar pattern, the rise can probably
be attributed more to specific market
factors than to fears of inflation.
Financial markets, being forwardlooking, can be sensitive to risk. One
measure of risk is the yield spread
between risky and safe instruments.
It may be surprising that in recent
months, risk spreads have moved
lower across a broad class of bonds

despite worries about war and peace
in the Middle East, fears of a doubledip recession, and uncertainty over
fiscal policy. Higher-grade spreads,
such as those between interest rate
swaps or commercial paper and Treasuries, remain at historically low levels.
Spreads of corporate bonds, although
they may not be at historical lows,
have declined appreciably since 2002.
A different measure, considering
risk as volatility in prices, is based not
on bonds but on option prices,
which are particularly sensitive to
such volatility. The Volatility Index,
which measures the implied volatility

of the Chicago Board of Options
Exchanges’ option contract on the
S&P 100, has fallen substantially in
recent months.
The Treasury-to-eurodollar (TED)
spread looks at the difference between the rates on eurodollar deposits and Treasury notes. It is
thought to pick up traders’ worries
about international problems because it is a way to arbitrage rates between the U.S. and the rest of the
world without bearing any currency
risk. By historical standards, the TED
spread remains quite low.

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International Markets
Index, January 2003 = 100
126.0 DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATES, BROAD DOLLAR INDEX
(FOREIGN CURRENCY PER U.S. DOLLAR)
125.5

Index, January 2003 = 100
99 DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATES, MAJOR CURRENCY INDEX
(FOREIGN CURRENCY PER U.S. DOLLAR)
98

125.0
97
124.5
96

124.0
123.5

95

Broad Dollar Index
123.0

Major Currency Index

94
122.5
93

122.0
121.5

92
January

February

March
2003

April

January

February

March
2003

April

Index, January 2003 = 100
104 DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATES
(FOREIGN CURRENCY PER U.S. DOLLAR)
103

Index, January 2003 = 100
104 DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATES
(FOREIGN CURRENCY PER U.S. DOLLAR)
102

British pound

102
100

101
Swedish krona

Japanese yen

100

98

99
96

98
Euro
97

94
Australian dollar

96

92

Canadian dollar

90
January

February

March
2003

April

Swiss franc
95
94
January

February

March
2003

April

FRB Cleveland • May 2003

NOTE: Vertical line marks start of war in Iraq.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and Bloomberg Financial Information Services.

The Broad Dollar Index includes the
currencies of 26 countries or regions
that had a share of at least 0.5% in U.S.
non-oil imports or nonagricultural exports in 1997. The Major Currency
Index includes the currencies of countries or regions that are traded in liquid financial markets and for which
there are both short- and long-term
interest rates. Since the beginning of
the year, these indexes have behaved
alike. After depreciating since the year
began, both of them appreciated

significantly during a short period that
included the starting date of the war
in Iraq. From soon after the war’s start
until now, both have depreciated after
experiencing a run-up around the beginning of April.
The countries or regions included
in the Major Currency Index are
Australia, Canada, the euro region,
Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
U.K. With the exception of the British
pound and the Japanese yen, the
currencies in this index all have
appreciated against the U.S. dollar

since the beginning of the year. Since
the Iraqi war started, the Australian
dollar, the Canadian dollar, the
Swedish krona, and the Swiss franc
have appreciated against the U.S. dollar. Although the British and Swiss
exchange rates have shown considerable movement, the U.S. dollar’s
value against these currencies is
about the same as it was at the start
of hostilities. Since then, the U.S.
dollar has strengthened against the
Japanese yen.

(continued on next page)

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International Markets (cont.)
Percent
–0.5 THREE-MONTH TREASURY BILL RATES
(U.S.–FOREIGN SPREAD)

Percent
0.5 10-YEAR GOVERNMENT BOND RATES
(U.S.–FOREIGN SPREAD)
0.3

–1.0

0.1
Germany

France
–0.1
–1.5

–0.3
U.K.

France

–0.5

Canada

Germany
–2.0

–0.7
–0.9

–2.5

–1.1
U.K.

Canada
–1.3

–3.0

–1.5
January

February

March

April

January

February

2003
Percent
5 CORPORATE YIELDS (U.S.–FOREIGN SPREAD)

4

March
2003

April

Basis points
15 TREASURY-TO-EURO DOLLAR (TED) SPREAD a

Germany

12

3
9
2
6

U.K.
1
France

3

0
Canada
–1

0
January

February

March
2003

April

January

February

March

April

2003

FRB Cleveland • May 2003

NOTE: Vertical line marks start of war in Iraq.
a. Yield spread: three-month euro minus three-month constant maturity Treasury bill.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and Bloomberg Financial Information Services.

Both the short- and long-term
U.S.–foreign interest rate spreads for
France, Germany, and the U.K. have
increased since the beginning of the
year, but the short and long U.S.–
Canada interest rate spreads have
decreased. For all of these spreads,
the movements were more pronounced at the short end than the
long end. For example, the U.S.–
Canada three-month Treasury bill rate
spread decreased more than 50 basis
points (bp), whereas the 10-year government bond rate spread decreased

less than 20 bp. Short-term spreads
did not appear to react to the start of
war in Iraq, but long-term spreads for
France, Germany, and the U.K. spiked
down just before the start of the war
and then back up when war broke out.
Corporate spreads for France, Germany, and the U.K. have remained
comparatively stable since the beginning of the year, while the U.S.–
Canada corporate spread decreased
around 50 bp. None of these spreads
appeared to react to the start of
the war.

The Treasury-to-eurodollar (TED)
spread compares the yield on
three-month T-bills with three-month
eurodollar deposit rates. Both assets
pay off in U.S. dollars, so any difference in the rates reflects risk: A higher
TED spread reflects a higher level of
risk associated with eurodollar deposits. At the outbreak of the Iraqi
war, the TED spread dropped to only
1.5 bp. By the end of March, however,
the spread had reached levels like
those seen earlier this year.

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Economic Activity
Percentage points
2.0 CONTRIBUTION TO PERCENT CHANGE IN REAL GDP

a

Real GDP and Components, 2003:IQ
(Advance estimate)

Last four quarters
Annualized
Change, percent change, last:
billions
Four
of 1996 $
Quarter
quarters

Real GDP
Personal consumption
Durables
Nondurables
Services
Business fixed
investment
Equipment
Structures
Residential investment
Government spending
National defense
Net exports
Exports
Imports
Change in business
inventories

37.8
22.6
–2.9
19.9
4.8

1.6
1.4
–1.1
4.1
0.5

2.1
2.3
3.3
2.5
1.9

–12.6
–11.2
–1.9
11.4
3.8
–1.6
24.0
–8.6
–32.5

–4.2
–4.4
–3.4
12.0
0.9
–1.5
__
–3.2
–7.9

–1.3
2.8
–13.4
6.2
2.4
5.9
__
2.2
5.7

–13.0

__

__

2003:IQ

1.5

Personal
consumption

Imports

1.0
Residential
investment
0.5
Exports
0
Government
spending
–0.5

Business fixed
investment

Change in
inventories

–1.0

Percent change from previous year, monthly data
7 REAL PERSONAL INCOME AND SPENDING TRENDS

Percent change from previous quarter
4.5 REAL GDP AND BLUE CHIP FORECAST
4.0

Real personal consumption expenditures

Final percent change

6

Advance estimate
3.5

Blue Chip forecast b
5

3.0

Real disposable personal income
4

2.5
30-year average
2.0

3

1.5
2
1.0
1

0.5

0

0
IIQ

IIIQ
2002

IVQ

IQ

IIQ

IIIQ
2003

IVQ

IQ
2004

2000

2001

2002

2003

FRB Cleveland • May 2003

NOTE: All data are seasonally adjusted and annualized.
a. Chain-weighted data in billions of 1996 dollars. Components of real GDP need not add to the total because the total and all components are deflated using
independent chain-weighted price indexes.
b. Blue Chip panel of economists.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; and Blue Chip Economic Indicators, April 10, 2003.

The advance estimate of the national
income and product accounts puts
real GDP growth at a sluggish 1.6%
(annual rate) in 2003:IQ, less than
many forecasters had hoped. Consumer spending, which increased
2.3% over the past year, rose only
1.4% for the quarter (annual rate).
Expenditures on motor vehicles and
parts decreased for the second
straight quarter, hampering durable
goods spending, and the growth of
services spending slowed considerably. In a discouraging development
for capital spending, business fixed

investment fell 4.2% (annual rate), its
ninth decrease in the past 10 quarters.
Although the uptick in this category in
2002:IVQ inspired hope that recovery
was on the horizon, the most recent
decline could foretell another delay.
Businesses also cut back on their
inventories. Inventory changes and
business fixed investment combined
subtracted 0.9 percentage point from
real GDP growth in 2003:IQ. Exports
also made a negative contribution to
output growth, but this was overbalanced by the positive contribution of
decreased import spending.

Real GDP growth in 2003:IQ barely
exceeded last quarter’s 1.4% growth
(annual rate) and fell far short of the
long-term average. Nonetheless,
Blue Chip forecasters predict robust
increases by the latter half of the year
and into 2004.
Growth in real personal disposable
income has been decelerating since
last November. Although real income
growth was substantially larger than
real consumer spending during
2002:IVQ, the increase in personal
consumption expenditures outpaced
(continued on next page)

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Economic Activity (cont.)
Thousands of dollars
225 MEDIAN HOME PRICES

Thousands of units
2,800
EXISTING HOME SALES BY REGION a,b

2,400
200
New homes

South
2,000

175
1,600
West
150
1,200

Existing homes

Midwest
125
800
Northeast
100
1999

400
2000

2001

2002

2003

Percent
8.8 MORTGAGE RATES c

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Index: March 16, 1990 = 100
1,600 TOTAL MORTGAGE LOAN APPLICATIONS a

8.4

1,400
Existing single-family homes

8.0

1,200

7.6

1,000

7.2

800

6.8

600
All mortgage loans closed

6.4

400
New single-family homes

6.0

200

5.6
1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

0
1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

FRB Cleveland • May 2003

a. Seasonally adjusted.
b. Annual rates.
c. Contract interest rate.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census; Federal Housing Finance Board; Mortgage Bankers Association of America; and National
Association of Realtors.

the increase in income by January
2003 and again in March.
Although some economic observers
have expressed concern that the
housing market is softening, the
latest data releases provide little evidence for this view. Median prices for
both new and existing homes were
up last month; more important, their
underlying trend remains unchanged.
Because short-term changes in the
physical characteristics and location of
homes sold introduce a fair amount of
noise, these series must be looked at
over a period of time.

Existing home sales did drop in
each of the four regions last month—
and by 5.6% overall—but remained at
a historically high level. In addition,
these data are based on closings, and
so may have been affected by wintry
weather earlier in the year. More
forward-looking data suggest that the
housing sector continued strong.
Sales of new single-family homes,
defined as signed contracts for sale,
rose 7.3%. Building permits were off
their January peak, but remained at a
high level of about 1.8 million units.

Housing starts, a very volatile indicator, fell sharply in March, but they,
too, stayed at a high level.
Rates for all mortgage loans closed
reached their lowest level (5.75%)
since the Federal Housing Finance
Board started tracking interest rates
in 1963. Low rates not only fueled
sales of new and existing homes, but
also induced many homeowners to
refinance their existing mortgages—
some for the second or third time in
the last three years.

12
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•

Labor Markets
Change, thousands of workers
300 AVERAGE MONTHLY NONFARM EMPLOYMENT CHANGE

Labor Market Conditions

250
Average monthly change
(thousands of employees)

200
Revised
Preliminary

150

Payroll employment
Goods-producing
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Durable goods
Nondurable goods
Service producing
TPUa
Wholesale and
retail trade
FIREb
Servicesc
Health services
Help supply
Government

100
50
0
–50
–100
–150
–200
–250

2000
159
–1
1
8
–11
1
–12
161
17

2001
–119
–111
1
–3
–109
–79
–30
–8
–23

2002
–18
–59
–1
–8
–51
–39`
–12
41
–14

Jan.-Mar.
2003
–91
–37
1
–2
–36
–30
–6
–54
–13

Apr.
2003
–48
–73
4
18
–95
–71
–24
25
–19

25
5
92
15
0
22

–31
10
–2
27
–54
39

–19
6
49
21
7
20

–12
7
–32
11
–15
–4

–16
7
21
13
–14
32

–300

Average for period (percent)
Civilian unemployment
rate

–350
–400
1999 2000 2001 2002

IIQ

IIIQ IVQ IQ
2002
2003

4.0

4.8

5.8

5.8

6.0

Feb. Mar. Apr.
2003

Percent
65.0 LABOR MARKET INDICATORS

Percent
6.5

Thousands
500 UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE

Percent
3.5

Employment-to-population ratio
64.5

6.0

64.0

5.5

63.5

5.0

63.0

4.5

62.5

4.0

3.1

450
Initial claims
400

2.7

350

2.3

300

1.9

Civilian unemployment rate

Insured unemployment rate

62.0

3.5
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

250
1995

1.5
1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

FRB Cleveland • May 2003

NOTE: All data are seasonally adjusted.
a. Transportation and public utilities.
b. Finance, insurance, and real estate.
c. The services industry includes travel; business support; recreation and entertainment; private and/or parochial education; personal services; and health services
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Total nonfarm payroll employment
fell by 48,000 jobs in April 2003, after
losing a revised 124,000 jobs in
March. By early April, about 220,000
reservists had been called up because of war, but the Bureau of Labor
Statistics cannot quantify the effect
on its employment figures.
In April, job losses were concentrated in goods-producing industries,
which posted a net loss of 73,000. Manufacturing employment fell by 95,000,
the largest drop in 15 months and
twice the monthly average for the prior
12 months. Manufacturing’s drop was

partly offset by gains in construction
(18,000), and mining (4,000). Serviceproducing industries added 25,000
jobs in April after two months of steep
decline. Help supply (temporary)
employment declined by 14,000, its
second consecutive drop this year.
Government added 32,000 jobs after
declining in February. Services posted
a 21,000-job gain. Wholesale and retail
trade fell by 16,000 jobs. Health services continued adding jobs, 13,000
in April.
The unemployment rate jumped to
6.0%, 0.2 percentage point higher

than in March. The employment-topopulation ratio inched up 0.1 percentage point to 62.4.
The insured unemployment rate
(the share of the labor force that
claims unemployment benefits) rose
to 2.8% in April, this year’s highest
level. It is lower than the total unemployment rate because some unemployed persons do not qualify or do
not choose to receive benefits. Consistent with the declining labor market,
the weekly average of initial claims
rose sharply to 444,000 in April, the
highest level since November 2001.

13
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•

Employment and Earnings
Hourly earnings in 2002 dollars
16.0 REAL AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGS

Annual percent change
8 GROWTH IN REAL EARNINGS AND INFLATION

15.5
6
15.0

Average hourly earnings

Inflation
Manufacturing

4

14.5

14.0

2
Private nonfarm

13.5
0
Private service-producing
13.0

Real average hourly earnings
–2

12.5
12.0
1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

–4
1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

Annual percent change
7 PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH

Annual percent change
8 EMPLOYMENT COSTS

6

7
Benefits

5
Output per hour

6
4
5

3
2

4

1

3

0

Wages and salaries
2

–1

Employment Cost Index

Aggregate hours, private workers

1

–2

0
1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

–3
1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

FRB Cleveland • May 2003

NOTE: All data are seasonally adjusted.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Real average hourly earnings have
shown two distinct patterns since the
beginning of the 1990s. For the first
five or six years of the decade, real
earnings were essentially flat; between
January 1990 and May 1996, earnings
growth fell about 2%. Since then, real
earnings have grown about 10%. Over
the last few months, however, earnings growth has been sluggish. In fact,
the year-over-year percent change for
monthly data shows that real earnings
declined 0.12% in March 2003, the
first drop since July 2000.

The growth rate of real earnings
increased from early 2000 to the beginning of 2002 and has been declining
since then. Although nominal earnings
began to fall in early 2001, declining
inflation caused real earnings to rise.
However, as inflation began to tick up
in early 2002, with nominal earnings
growth continuing to decline, real
earnings growth fell sharply.
Despite lower real earnings, the cost
of employing a worker continues to
rise, with benefits growing faster than
wages and salaries. In the mid-1990s,
the wages and salaries component of

the Employment Cost Index grew
more than the benefits component.
But by the beginning of 2000, benefits
growth once again exceeded growth
in wages and salaries.
Although private workers’ aggregate hours are still low, they have
begun to turn around, reversing the
trend that started in early 2000. On a
positive note, in the last quarter of
2002, growth in private workers’ rate
of output per hour remained historically high at 4%, although it was
down compared to the first three
quarters of that year.

14
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•

Changes in Measuring Employment
North American Industrial Classification
System (NAICS) Code, Major Categories

Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code,
Major Categories
Goods-producing
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing

Goods-producing
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting
Mining
Utilities

Service-producing
Transportation, communications, and public
utilities
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Finance, insurance, and real estate
Services
Government

Construction
Manufacturing
Service-providing
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Transportation and warehousing
Information
Finance and insurance

Index, March 2001 = 100
110 OHIO MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT INDEX

Real estate, rental, and leasing
Professional, scientific, and technical services

105

Administrative, support, waste management,
100

and remediation services
SIC

Educational services

95

Health care and social assistance
Arts, entertainment, and recreation
Accommodation and food services

NAICS
90

85

Other services (except public administration)
80
January
July
2000

Public administration

January
July
2001

January
July
2002

January
2003

FRB Cleveland • May 2003

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics is in
the process of changing its reporting
of employment figures to conform to
the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), which will
replace the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system. This conversion is expected to be complete by
May; the June 6, 2003 employment
release will report all industry data
for the nation and the states under
NAICS codes.
The SIC system was developed in
the 1930s, when manufacturing and
other goods-producing industries
dominated the U.S. economy.

Although the SIC codes were revised
over the intervening decades in an
effort to capture changes in the
economy’s structure, the system has
not been able to reflect rapid-fire
changes in areas such as information
services, health care, and high-tech
manufacturing.
The NAICS system was developed
in cooperation with Canada and Mexico to create a uniform classification
system for North America (a result of
the NAFTA trade agreement). NAICS
consists of a six-digit hierarchical classification system and identifies 1,170
industries, compared to the 1,004

industries recognized in the four-digit
SIC system. NAICS not only recognizes more industries, it also revises
the definition of more than 600 of the
SIC industries to reflect their nature
more accurately. For example, under
the SIC system, computer manufacturing was not an individually recognized
industry at the aggregate level; it was
lumped with other industries in the
industrial machinery and equipment
category (35). Under NAICS, computer manufacturing is its own industry, computer and electronic product
manufacturing (334); combined with
(continued on next page)

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Changes in Measuring Employment (cont.)
Index, March 2001 = 100
104 OHIO SERVICES EMPLOYMENT INDEX

Ohio
Percent change

Jan.—Feb. Feb. 2002—
2003
Feb. 2003
102

Nonfarm employment
Goods-producing
Construction
Manufacturing
Service-providing
Trade, transportation,
and utilities
Information
Financial activities
Professional and
business services
Education and health
services
Leisure and hospitality

NAICS

100

SIC
98

96
January
July
2000

January
July
2001

January
July
2002

–1.2
–3.0
–2.1
–3.2
–0.8

0.3
–0.5
0.1

–0.7
–4.2
–0.6

–0.3

–0.4

–0.2
–0.1

0.6
–2.4

January
2003

Pennsylvania

Nonfarm employment
Goods-producing
Construction
Manufacturing
Service-providing
Trade, transportation,
and utilities
Information
Financial activities
Professional and
business services
Education and health
services
Leisure and hospitality

–0.2
–0.5
–1.9
–0.1
–0.2

Kentucky
Percent change

Percent change

Jan.—Feb. Feb. 2002—
2003
Feb. 2003

Jan.—Feb. Feb. 2002—
2003
Feb. 2003

0.0
–0.1
0.5
–0.3
0.0

–0.4
–3.9
–0.8
–4.8
0.3

–0.6
–0.4
0.0

–1.8
–1.3
0.6

–0.9

–2.1

0.4
0.6

2.6
2.2

Nonfarm employment
Goods-producing
Construction
Manufacturing
Service-providing
Trade, transportation,
and utilities
Information
Financial activities
Professional and
business services
Education and health
services
Leisure and hospitality

–0.3
–0.9
–3.3
–0.2
–0.1

0.1
–2.8
–0.9
–2.8
0.8

0.5
–0.6
–0.3

–1.8
–0.9
2.6

–0.3

1.7

0.8
–0.2

4.3
3.9

FRB Cleveland • May 2003

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

machinery manufacturing (333), it
comprises most of the SIC’s old industrial machinery category. As is clear
from examining the major categories,
the service-producing sector is more
clearly delineated under NAICS than it
was under the SIC system.
The transition from SIC to NAICS
does not change an economy’s aggregate number of jobs in any given
month, but the accounting change
does affect individual industries and
will alter the way we view our economy. A good example of this change
is the manufacturing industry in Ohio.
Under the SIC classification, Ohio’s

manufacturing lost roughly 5% of total
employment between the recession’s
March 2001 onset and December
2002. NAICS data, however, show a
loss of more than 12% of Ohio’s manufacturing jobs over that period. In the
case of the services industry, there are
substantial short-run deviations between the two classification systems.
The change in classification codes
is already complete for three of the
states in the Fourth District: Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and Kentucky (the Bureau of Labor Statistics revised past
data to reflect NAICS classifications in
order to allow historical comparisons

in employment). The data show that
goods-producing sectors in every
Fourth District state continue to
struggle; in all of these states, goods
producers posted much larger yearover-year employment losses in February than did their service-providing
counterparts. Although employment
in Ohio’s service-providing sector
declined slightly, the sector showed
modest gains in Pennsylvania and
Kentucky. Education and health
services, formerly encompassed in
the SIC’s generic “services” category,
enjoyed year-over-year employment
gains in all three states.

16
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•

Savings Institutions
Billions of dollars
5 NET INCOME a

Billions of dollars
24 SOURCES OF INCOME

Billions of dollars
4.0

3.5

23

4

Total non-interest income
Securities and other gains/losses
Net operating income

22

3.0

21

2.5

20

2.0

19

1.5

3

2

1

Total interest income

0

1.0

18

17
1997

–1
3/97

3/98

3/99

3/00

3/01

3/02

Percent
10 NET INTEREST MARGIN AND ASSET GROWTH

Percent
3.4

8

0.5
1998

1999

2000

2001

Percent
1.5 EARNINGS

2002

Percent
15

3.3
1.3

Asset growth

13
Return on equity

6

3.2

4

3.1

1.1

11

Net interest margin
2

3.0

0

2.9

–2

2.8

–4

2.7
1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Return on assets
0.9

9

0.7

7

0.5
1997

5
1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

FRB Cleveland • May 2003

a. Net income equals net operating income plus securities and other gains/losses.
NOTE: Observation for 2002 is fourth-quarter annualized data.
SOURCE: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Quarterly Banking Profile, various issues.

FDIC-insured saving institutions reported net income of $3.99 billion for
2002:IVQ, which was $329 million
(9.0%) higher than a year earlier.
Compared to the previous quarter, it
increased by a modest $15 million. As
in recent quarters, net income was
buttressed by one-time gains in securities sales—to the tune of $1.86 billion.
S&Ls’ noninterest (fee) income of
$2.8 billion was higher than the previous quarter and almost back to its level

a year earlier. Total interest income in
the fourth quarter of 2002 was 10.6%
lower than the same quarter the year
before. The process of re-pricing S&Ls’
loan portfolios seemed to be heading
toward completion in 2002. It brought
their cost of borrowing into line with
lending costs, producing a modest
(0.8%) increase for net interest income
in 2001–02.
Saving institutions’ strong earnings
performance is once again apparent
in the net interest margin (calculated

as interest plus dividends earned on
interest-bearing assets minus interest
paid to depositors and creditors; it is
expressed as a percentage of average
earning assets). S&Ls’ net interest
margin continued to increase from its
low of 2.96% in 2000 and now stands
at 3.35%, its highest level since 1993.
This factor, coupled with asset
growth’s decline to 3.24%, pushed
S&Ls’ return on assets to 1.16% and
their return on equity to 12.36%.

(continued on next page)

17
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•

•

Savings Institutions (cont.)
Percent of total assets
70 NET LOANS AND LEASES

Percent
1.0 ASSET QUALITY

68

0.8

1.6

66

0.6

1.2

64

0.4

Percent
2.0

0.8
Problem assets

62

0.4

0.2
Net charge-offs

60

0

0
3/97

3/98

3/99

3/00

3/02

3/01

Percent
16 HEALTH

1997

Percent
1.4

14

1.2

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Ratio
8.3 CAPITAL

Ratio
1.4
1.3

8.2
Coverage ratio

Problem S&Ls
12

1.0

10

0.8

8

8.1

1.2

8.0

1.1

7.9

1.0

0.6
7.8

6

0.4
Unprofitable
0.2

4

2
1997

0
1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

0.9

Core capital (leverage) ratio

7.7

0.8

7.6

0.7

7.5
1997

0.6
1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

FRB Cleveland • May 2003

NOTE: Observation for 2002 is fourth-quarter annualized data.
SOURCE: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Quarterly Banking Profile, various issues.

In 2002:IVQ, net loans and leases as
a share of total assets were 65.4%, unchanged since the previous quarter.
This is less than its recent high of
67.9% in 2000:IIIQ and indicates a
continued decline in savings institutions’ direct holdings of loans.
Asset quality declined slightly in
2002. Net charge-offs (gross chargeoffs minus recoveries) of 0.29%
showed almost no change from 0.28%
in 2001. Problem assets (non-current

assets plus other real estate) made up
0.69% of total assets in 2002, only a
slight increase from 0.65% in 2001.
However, asset quality is not a significant problem for FDIC-insured
savings institutions. Problem S&Ls
(those with substandard exam ratings) declined from 1.24% in 2001 to
1.16% in 2002. The percent of unprofitable institutions is falling and
currently stands at 6.68%. The coverage ratio stands at 99 cents in loan

loss reserves for every dollar of noncurrent loans, down from $1.03 at
the end of 2001. The decline in the
coverage ratio was caused primarily
by a larger ($768 million) increase in
noncurrent loans, compared to a
$482 million increase in loan loss
reserves since the end of 2001. For
2002:IIIQ, core capital, which protects saving institutions against unexpected losses, increased to 8.05%
from 7.77% in 2001.

18
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Foreign Central Banks
6

–30

Trillions of yen
36
BANK OF JAPAN b
33

5

–25

30

4

–20

27

3

–15

Percent, daily
7 MONETARY POLICY TARGETS a

Trillions of yen
–35

Current account balances (daily)

Bank of England

European Central Bank

–10

2
Federal Reserve

1

–5

0

0

–1

5

–2

10

24
21
Current account balances

18
15

15

–3
Bank of Japan

12
9
Excess reserve balances
6

–4

20

–5

25

3

30

0

–6
4/1

8/1
2001

12/1

4/1

8/1
2002

12/1

Percent
7 CENTRAL BANK POLICY RATES AND INFLATION

Current account less required reserves

4/1

4/1
2003

4/1

10/1
2001

10/1
2002

4/1
2003

Ratio
0.8 BANK OF MEXICO

New Zealand offical cash rate

0.7

6

0.6

5
Bank of Canada overnight rate

0.5

4
0.4
New Zealand CPI

3

0.3
2
0.2

Canadian core CPI
1

0.1
Ratio of foreign currency assets to total assets

0

0
1/1

6/30
2001

12/27

6/25

12/22

1/86

1/90

1/94

1/98

1/02

2002

FRB Cleveland • May 2003

a. Federal Reserve: overnight interbank rate. Bank of Japan: quantity of current account balances (since December 19, 2001, a range of the quantity of current
account balances). Bank of England and European Central Bank: two-week repo rate.
b. Current account balances at the Bank of Japan are required and excess reserve balances at depository institutions subject to reserve requirements plus the
balances of certain other financial institutions not subject to reserve requirements. Reserve requirements are satisfied on the basis of the average of a bank’s
daily balances at the Bank of Japan starting the sixteenth of one month and ending the fifteenth of the next.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Bank of Japan; European Central Bank; Bank of England; Wholesale Markets Brokers
Association; and Bloomberg Financial Information Services.

The Bank of Japan, alone among the
four major central banks, loosened its
policy setting over the past month by
an additional ¥5 trillion in current
account balances. The Bank also has
proposed to transact open market
operations in asset-backed securities
as a way to stimulate financial intermediation. There has been speculation that the Bank may seek approval
to retain a larger share of its earnings
as reserves, a change that is consistent with the broader range of private
debt and equity securities it has been

adding to its balance sheet. The Bank
appears close to the lower bound of
its own accounting rule, which calls
for a capital adequacy ratio (reserves
plus capital divided by banknotes
outstanding) of 8% to 12%.
Policy settings have changed in
both Canada and New Zealand. The
Bank of Canada raised its target for
the overnight loan rate 25 basis
points (bp) to 3.25%, citing inflation
rates “well above the Bank’s 2 per
cent inflation target” in the context of
strong current domestic demand and

employment. The Reserve Bank of
New Zealand reduced its official cash
rate 25 bp to 5.50%. Over the past
year inflation was 2.5%, within the
target range of 0% to 3%. However,
the Bank stated, “the weaker tradable
sector is expected to feed through
into reduced domestic demand elsewhere in the economy, as exporters’
incomes decline.”
The Bank of Mexico, whose holdings of foreign currency assets have
reached very high levels, announced
a plan for gradual sales of dollars.