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The Economy in Perspective
by Mark Sniderman

A journey of a thousand miles begins with a
single step.
—Chinese proverb
On a journey of a hundred miles, ninety is but
halfway.
—Chinese proverb

FRB Cleveland • March 2006

Participants in the federal funds futures market
expect the Federal Open Market Committee to raise
the funds rate target by 25 basis points at each of
the next two policy meetings. If this does happen,
the funds rate will have steadfastly traversed a territory of 400 basis points in 16 equal steps over a
two-year span. As of today, few believe that the
FOMC will implement another rate increase at its
June meeting—in fact, the futures market actually
expects the funds rate to decline slightly next year
from its anticipated June peak of 5 percent.
What is the logic behind this expected funds rate
path? What does it imply about the market’s view
of the real economy, inflation, and the FOMC? First
of all, the path’s relative stability shows that financial market participants expect the FOMC will have
to take very few actions to achieve its policy objectives. Most forecasters call for the economy to
continue expanding for the next several years at a
pace close to its potential growth rate, and for any
existing inflationary pressures to gradually diminish
as the expansion lengthens. Second, the level of
rates along the path indicates market participants’
belief that for the next few years, the FOMC will
accept the market-expected inflation rate, that is,
just a touch above 2 percent annually on a CPI basis.
A federal funds rate of 5 percent has a certain aesthetic appeal. Many forecasters follow the rule of
thumb that potential GDP will grow at a rate near
3 percent, and that 2 percent inflation lies in the
middle of the FOMC’s comfort zone. With the
1
unemployment rate between 4 /2 and 5 percent,
and the manufacturing capacity utilization rate near
its long-term average, there is ample reason for analysts to suspect that the economy—and monetary
policy—are tantalizingly close to equilibrium.
Arbitrage conditions across financial markets
should guarantee that signals consistent with this
vision will appear in a variety of other places, as they
do. The Treasury yield curve has become nearly flat

from the three-month bill to the 10-year note, but
exhibits a small hump (10 to 15 basis points) that
peaks at the six-month maturity. Quality spreads in
the corporate bond market have remained low and
stable for several years, stock market volatility has
all but disappeared, and inflation expectations
derived from the market for Treasury inflationprotected securities seem well contained.
To dwell forever in policy nirvana requires fulfillment of the expectations that underpin these and
many other financial markets. Though this is not
impossible, the odds are slim. History is full of
unforeseen events. In the economic context, when
shocks happen, prices, interest rates, exchange rates,
and expectations adjust, sometimes very quickly.
Real and financial resources—people, commodities,
equipment, and financial capital—are diverted from
their original destinations toward places where they
command greater economic value.
The FOMC cannot predict these unexpected
events; even if it could anticipate some of them,
it lacks the power to offset their full impact on the
U.S. economy. But it is far from helpless: It has
the ability to accomplish two very important
things. First, it can return the U.S. inflation rate to
the long-term path that represents price stability,
even if shocks initially turn it from that path. For
example, during the 1990s, we saw the FOMC push
the inflation rate down until it reached a price
stability path; we saw it act again in 2003 to raise an
inflation rate that had gotten low enough to be
potentially problematic.
Second, the FOMC can be clear about its objectives and its methods for achieving them. It can
establish ongoing communications with the public
about its own intentions and expectations, and it
can endeavor to be as consistent as is practicable
in its analytical framework, data assessment, and
policy responses to incoming information. Assuming that it does what it says it will do, a central bank
that abides by these principles can create an environment in which the informed decisions of others
will reinforce the outcomes that policymakers seek
to achieve. Well-informed financial markets will
smooth the economy’s journey along the best path,
one step at a time.

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Inflation and Prices
12-month percent change
4.75 CPI AND CPI EXCLUDING FOOD AND ENERGY
4.50

January Price Statistics
Percent change, last:
a
a
a
1 mo. 3 mo. 12 mo. 5 yr.

2005
avg.

4.25
4.00
CPI excluding food and energy

3.75

Consumer prices
All items

8.2 –0.2

4.0

2.5

3.6

3.50
CPI

3.25

Less food
and energy

2.4

2.4

2.1

2.0

2.2

Medianb

2.6

2.7

2.5

2.7

2.5

3.00
2.75
2.50
2.25

Producer prices
Finished goods

3.0

2.0

5.7

2.5

5.8

2.00
1.75

Less food and
energy

4.7

2.6

1.5

1.1

1.7

1.50
1.25
1.00
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

12-month percent change
4.25 CORE CPI AND TRIMMED-MEAN MEASURES

Percent of forecasters
22 DISTRIBUTION OF 2006 CPI FORECASTS c

4.00

20

3.75
3.50

18

Median CPI b

Average forecast: 2.9%
Median forecast: 2.9%

16
3.25
14

3.00
2.75

12

2.50

10

2.25

8

2.00

6

1.75
16% trimmed mean b
1.50

4

CPI excluding food and energy

1.25

2
0

1.00
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Less than 2.5
2.5

2.6

2.7

2.8
2.9
3.0
3.1
Annual percent change

3.2

3.3 Greater than
3.3

FRB Cleveland • March 2006

a. Annualized.
b. Calculated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
c. Blue Chip panel of economists.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Blue Chip Economic Indicators, February 10, 2006; and Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.

The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose
at the brisk annualized rate of 8.2% in
January, nearly reversing the declines
of the preceding two months. About
70% of the January advance was
attributed to a 79.4% (annualized
rate) gain in energy costs, which had
remained stable or declined since
September 2005. Growth in the core
retail price measures was more
moderate, but slightly above the 12month trends, with the CPI excluding
food and energy up 2.4% (annualized

rate) and the median CPI up 2.6%
(annualized rate) during the month.
The longer-term trends of underlying inflation are just a bit north of 2%,
a level that some might argue is near
the upper limit of a range consistent
with price stability. Specifically, the 12month growth rates were 2.1% for the
core CPI, 2.5% for the median CPI, and
2.6% for the 16% trimmed-mean CPI.
And the consensus and median estimates from the Blue Chip panel of
economists predict that the CPI
will rise 2.9% in 2006. However, the

proportion of them (about 23%) who
think the CPI could top 3% this year
slightly exceeds the proportion predicting the CPI will fall back to less
than a 2.7% rise.
Housing is the largest component
of CPI, accounting for more than 40%
of its basket of goods. The owners’
equivalent rent (OER) of primary
residence—the cost homeowners
would assume if they rented their
houses instead of owning them—is
responsible for 23.4% of the overall
CPI. The OER is computed using
(continued on next page)

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Inflation and Prices (cont.)
Four-quarter percent change
16 HOUSING PRICES

RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF CPI COMPONENTS,
DECEMBER 2005
All other
3.5%
Education and
communication
6.0%
Recreation
5.6%
Owners’ equivalent
rent of primary
residence
Medical care
23.4%
6.2%

14

12

8

Rent
5.8%

Transportation
17.4%

House Price Index

10

6
CPI, rent a

Shelter
(other expenses)
13.1%

4

Food and apparel
18.8%

2
CPI , owners’ equivalent rent of primary residence a
0
1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

Four-quarter percent change
3.00 CORE PCE PRICE INDEX AND FOMC MEMBERS’ CORE
PCE PRICE INDEX PROJECTIONS c

Percent
11 RENTAL HOME VACANCY RATE b

2.75
Upper
range

10
2.50
Core PCE

Central tendency

2.25

9

2.00
8

1.75
Lower
range
1.50

7
1.25
1.00

6
1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

FRB Cleveland • March 2006

a. Twelve-month percent change.
b. Vacant housing units available for rent year-round divided by the sum of renter-occupied housing units, vacant units rented year-round but awaiting
occupancy, and vacant units available for year-round rent.
c. Projections by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Reserve Bank presidents.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census; Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight; and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Monetary Policy Report to the Congress, February 15, 2006.

rental prices, which have probably
been lowered by the greater attractiveness of owning a home instead of
renting. Indeed, as home prices have
risen at a double-digit pace in the past
couple of years, the OER has moder1
ated to an annual rate of about 2 /4%—
down from rates near 3% for most of
the 1990s.
Given the large weight of the implied rental cost of homeownership
in the CPI, a firming in the home
rental market could have a meaningful

impact on the inflation statistic. It
might be true that rents are underpriced, partly because of the housing
market’s strength in the past couple
of years, but the potential for a significant rise in rents should be balanced
against what continues to be a relatively large stock of vacant rental properties. And although the vacancy rate
on rental homes has come down
some since peaking in 2004, vacancies
are still well above the levels seen
throughout the 1990s.

No sustained rise in retail price
inflation is currently being predicted
inside the Federal Reserve, according
to recent projections by voting and
nonvoting members of the Federal
Open Market Committee, which were
reported in the Federal Reserve’s
semiannual Monetary Policy Report to
the Congress. The central tendency of
the group’s projection for the core
PCE Price Index is 2% in 2006 and
3
1 /4%–2% in 2007, on a fourth-quarter
to fourth-quarter basis.

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Monetary Policy
Percent
8 RESERVE MARKET RATES

Percent
6 REAL FEDERAL FUNDS RATE c,d

7

5

Effective federal funds rate a

4

6
Intended federal funds rate b

3

5

2

4
Primary credit rate b

1

3

0

2
Discount rate b

–1

1

–2

0
2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

1988

2006

Percent
5.1 IMPLIED YIELDS ON FEDERAL FUNDS FUTURES

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

Percent, daily
100 IMPLIED PROBABILITIES OF ALTERNATIVE TARGET
FEDERAL FUNDS RATES, MAY MEETING OUTCOME f
90

4.9
80

February 24, 2006

5.00%

February 1, 2006 e
70

4.7
December 14, 2005 e

60

4.5

50
40
4.75%

4.3
30

4.1

20
4.50%

November 2, 2005 e

10

3.9
Nov. Dec.
2005

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May
2006

June

July

Aug. Sept.

0
1/31

2/07

2/14

2/21

2006

FRB Cleveland • March 2006

a. Weekly average of daily figures.
b. Daily observations.
c. Defined as the effective federal funds rate deflated by the core PCE Chain Price Index.
d. Shaded bars indicate periods of recession.
e. One day after the FOMC meeting.
f. Probabilities are calculated using trading-day closing prices from options on May 2006 federal funds futures that trade on the Chicago Board of Trade.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Selected Interest Rates,”
Federal Reserve Statistical Releases, H.15; Chicago Board of Trade; and Bloomberg Financial Information Services.

On January 31, the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) voted to
raise the target level of the federal
funds rate 25 basis points (bp) to
4.50%. Since the FOMC initiated its
tightening cycle in June 2004, the
target level has increased 3.5 percentage points. The inflation-adjusted fed
funds rate now stands more than
300 bp above its low in June 2004.
The measured upward pattern of rate
hikes is consistent with the FOMC’s
stated intention of gradually removing monetary accommodation in
order to avoid inflationary pressures.

In recent months, however, FOMC
meeting minutes reveal that many
members believe that the target is at
or approaching its neutral level, which
suggests that the pattern of rate hikes
may be nearing an end. Nevertheless,
the FOMC’s January 31 policy statement release said that “some further
policy firming may be needed.” Market participants have heard the message clearly. Federal funds futures indicate that by August the fed funds rate
will plateau near 5%.
Options on fed funds futures indicate that the FOMC will almost

certainly raise the rate another 25 bp
at its next meeting in late March.
Moreover, since the January meeting,
implied probabilities based on options prices have indicated a betterthan-even chance that the fed funds
rate will reach 5% by May.
Relatively stable prices in futures and
options markets signal that the market
expects policy continuity from the
FOMC as Chairman Bernanke takes
over. His testimony on February 15
and 16, including his remark that “the
inverted yield curve is not signaling a
(continued on next page)

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Monetary Policy (cont.)
Percent
5.8 IMPLIED YIELDS ON EURODOLLAR FUTURES

Percent, weekly average
5.0 YIELD CURVE b,c
November 4, 2005 d

5.6

4.8
November 2, 2005 a

February 3, 2006 d

5.4

February 24, 2006

4.6
5.2
February 24, 2006

December 16, 2005 d
4.4

5.0
December 14, 2005 a

4.2

4.8
February 1, 2006 a
4.0

4.6

4.4

3.8
2008

2005

2011

2014

Percent, weekly average
8 SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES b

0

5

10
15
Years to maturity

20

25

Percent, weekly average
9 LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES

7
8
Conventional mortgage
6
7
5

4

6
Three-month Treasury bill
Two-year Treasury note

3
5

One-year Treasury bill
2

20-year Treasury bond b
4

1
10-year Treasury note b
0

3
1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

FRB Cleveland • March 2006

a. One day after the FOMC meeting.
b. All yields are from constant-maturity series.
c. Average for the week ending on the date shown.
d. First weekly average available after the FOMC meeting.
SOURCE: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Selected Interest Rates,” Federal Reserve Statistical Releases, H.15.

slowdown,” had no perceptible effect
on market expectations; neither did
the minutes released on February 21.
Implied yields derived from Eurodollar futures provide a measure of
expected policy actions over a longer
period. These yields often overpredict the federal funds rate and, like
most forecasts, become less accurate
as they predict farther into the future. Near-term Eurodollar futures
also suggest that the current round
of tightening is not over yet.
The U.S. Treasury yield curve flattened further in February and is even

inverted in some ranges. For example,
on the day after the January 31 FOMC
meeting, the 10-year Treasury bond
was 5 bp lower than the one-year Treasury note. By the end of February, the
inversion had increased to 13 bp.
In the past, yield curve inversions
often foreshadowed recessions, but
this is not necessarily the case today.
In recent years, the FOMC has enjoyed enhanced credibility for maintaining price stability. As a consequence, transitory inflation pressures
—such as those associated with the
recent surge in energy prices—no

longer affect long-term inflation
expectations as they did in the 1970s
and 1980s. During economic expansions, on the other hand, inflationary
pressures still tend to boost shortterm inflation expectations. Because
interest rates reflect inflation expectations over their corresponding
terms, inflation shocks temporarily
boost short-term rates relative to
long-term rates, while the economy
continues to grow. Hence, yield
curves may be less informative now
than they were in recent history.

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Money and Financial Markets
Percent, daily
12 YIELD SPREADS: CORPORATE BONDS
MINUS THE 10-YEAR TREASURY NOTE c

Percent of total refinancing
100 CASH-OUT REFINANCING OF RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY a

10
80
At least 5% higher loan amount b

8
High yield

60

6

4

40

BBB
2
Lower loan amount b

20

AA

0

0

–2
1987 1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Index, 1985 = 100
155 CONSUMER ATTITUDES

Percent, daily
5 10-YEAR REAL INTEREST RATE AND
TIPS-BASED INFLATION EXPECTATIONS
10-year TIPS d

4

1998

2005

2004

2005

2006

Index, 1966:IQ = 100
115

Consumer sentiment, University of Michigan f

135

105

Corrected 10-year,
TIPS-derived expected inflation e
3

115

95

2

95

85

10-year, TIPS-derived expected inflation d
75

1

75
Consumer confidence,
Conference Board

55

0
1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

65
2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

FRB Cleveland • March 2006

a. Annual data until 1997; quarterly data thereafter.
b Compared with previous financing.
c. Merrill Lynch AA, BBB, and High Yield Master II indexes, each minus the yield on the 10-year Treasury note.
d. Treasury inflation-protected securities.
e. Ten-year, TIPS-derived expected inflation adjusted for the liquidity premium on the market for the 10-year Treasury note.
f. Data are not seasonally adjusted.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Selected Interest Rates,” Federal Reserve Statistical Releases, H.15; Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation; University of Michigan; the Conference Board; and Bloomberg Financial Information Services.

Long-term interest rates remain low
by historical standards, posing something of a conundrum. For more than
three years, the economy has been
expanding at an average annual rate
of 3.5%. Normally, when economies
expand at such a healthy pace, investment opportunities abound, raising
the real rate of return on new business investment. In turn, the high
returns on new capital tend to pull
up the entire yield structure, including long-term real interest rates.

The impact on the economy of low
long-term rates is nowhere more
evident than in the housing sector.
Persistently low mortgage interest
rates have contributed to a housing
boom—a situation characterized by a
sharp increase in housing prices relative to household income levels.
The housing market is expected to
cool considerably this year. A chief
concern of many forecasters is that if
mortgage rates rise sharply, housing
values could plummet. High housing

values and low mortgage rates have
combined to give households a substantial source of financing. More
specifically, households have been able
to tap increased housing equity by refinancing at higher loan amounts. This
“cash-out refinancing” has provided
funds that have allowed households
to spend at a pace that has exceeded
that of personal income growth in
recent months. A sharp uptick in
interest rates could halt cash-out
(continued on next page)

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Money and Financial Markets (cont.)
Index, monthly average
2,200 STOCK MARKET INDEXES

Index, monthly average
5,500

Dollars per share, four-quarter moving average
24 S&P 500, EARNINGS PER SHARE a

5,000

22

1,800

1,400
1,300

2,400
2,200

4,500

20

1,600

1,200
1,100

2,000
1,800

4,000

18

3,500

16

3,000

14

2,500

12

2,000

10

1,500

8

400

1,000

6

200

500

4

0

2

2,000

1,400

July Sept. Nov.
2005

Jan. Mar.
2006

Operating

1,200
1,000
S&P 500
800
600

As reported

NASDAQ

0
1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

18
16
14
12
10

40

1996

1999

2002

2005

45
40
July Sept. Nov. Jan. Mar.
2005
2006

35

1993

Ratio
50 S&P 500 PRICE/EARNINGS RATIO

Index
50 S&P 500 OPTIONS VOLATILITY b
45

1990

2006

35
Average
30

30

23.8
25

25
20
20

15

15

13.3

10
5

10
1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

1946 1952

1958

1964

1970

1976

1982

1988

1994

2000 2006

FRB Cleveland • March 2006

a. Dashed lines represent the forecast as of February 16, 2006.
b. CBOE volatility Index (VIX). Monthly data.
SOURCES: Standard and Poor’s Corporation; Chicago Board Options Exchange; and Bloomberg Financial Information Services.

refinancing, causing a sharper-thanexpected drop in consumer spending.
Stable spreads of corporate bond
rates over Treasury note rates with
comparable terms indicate that corporate balance sheets are quite
healthy. Businesses have ample cash
to invest if they choose to spend it.
With inflation expectations remaining well contained and consumer confidence on the rebound, business
investment is expected to supplant
consumer spending as the chief driver

of the expansion, especially in employment growth. Moreover, although
consumer spending might slow, it
could continue to be supported by
employment gains.
The positive outlook for investment seems to be supported by a
surge in broad equity indexes early
this year. Stock market fundamentals
remain quite favorable, chiefly earnings at S&P 500 companies, which increased at double-digit rates during
2005. Although they are expected
to decelerate, their earnings are

projected to grow just under 10%
during 2006.
Equities’ strength since October
was coupled with diminished volatility in equity options. The decline in
volatility since October may reflect
some soothing of inflation fears. Continued progress in reducing inflation
over the short term is important to
maintaining healthy financial conditions. Despite the recent run-up in
stock prices, the price–earnings ratio
remains well below its average of
recent years.

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Oil Prices

•

SOURCES OF U.S. PETROLEUM IMPORTS, NOVEMBER 2005

SOURCES OF U.S. PETROLEUM IMPORTS, NOVEMBER 2000

U.S. Virgin
Islands 3%

Canada
15%

Other
20%

Columbia
3%
U.K.
3%
Angola
3%

U.K.
3%

Saudi Arabia
14%
Nigeria
8%

Mexico
13%

Columbia
2%

Venezuela
14%

Iraq
5%

Canada
17%

Other
24%

Saudi Arabia
10%

Algeria
4%

Mexico
12%

Iraq
4%

Venezuela
9%

Nigeria
9%

Angola
5%

Index: Year 2000 = 100
250 IMPORT PRICE INDEX, PETROLEUM IMPORTS

Dollars per barrel
70 SPOT PRICE AND TWELVE-MONTH FUTURES,
WEST TEXAS INTERMEDIATE CRUDE OIL
60

200
50
150

40
Spot price with 11-month lead
30

100

20
12-month futures

50
10

0

0
1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

FRB Cleveland • March 2006

SOURCES: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration; and Bloomberg Financial Information Services.

In November 2005, the two largest
exporters of oil to the U.S. were its
neighbors. Canada and Mexico combined accounted for about 30% of
total U.S. oil imports, up from about
27% five years earlier. During the
same period, oil imports from Saudi
Arabia and Venezuela decreased from
14% to 10% and from 14% to 9%,
respectively. The share of U.S. oil imports from the other top 10 countries
has remained relatively constant.

Import prices for petroleum products have more than doubled in the
last two years. In September 2005,
the Petroleum Import Price Index
reached its highest point, nearly 225,
before settling down to 209 in January 2006. During this time, the spot
price of a barrel of oil soared from
just under $29 to slightly over $62.
In the mid-1990s, the 12-month oil
futures contract seemed a fairly good
indicator of future oil prices. More
recently, however, oil futures contracts

have been poor predictors of oil
prices one year out, substantially
underpredicting the spot price of oil.
This probably results from the
increased volatility in spot oil prices
over the last five years. In more
volatile circumstances, like the current oil market, the value associated
with futures markets comes from the
hedging opportunities that futures
contracts provide rather than their
ability to predict spot prices.

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The Current Account and Dollar Depreciation
Billions of dollars
100 CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE a

Percent of GDP
1

0

0

–100

–1

–200

–2

–300

–3

–400

–4

–500

–5

–600

–6

–700

–7
–8

–800
1980

1984

1988

1992

Daily index, February 27, 2002 = 100
110 NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE CHANGES b

1996

2000

2004

Selected Global Current Account Balances

105

Billions of dollars
1996
2004
Change

100
Other Important Trading Partner Index
95

U.S.
Other advanced
economies
Developing countries
Asia
Africa
Central and Eastern
Europe
Middle East
Commonwealth of
Independent States
Western Hemisphere

Broad Dollar Index
90
85
80
75
Major Currency Index
70

–124.9

–668.1

–543.2

150.9
–84.9
–37.8
–5.0

354.1
227.7
93.0
0.6

203.2
312.6
130.8
5.6

–17.8
12.7

–50.1
102.8

–32.3
90.1

2.5
–39.6

63.1
18.3

60.6
57.9

65
02/02 08/02

02/03

08/03

02/04

08/04

02/05

08/05

FRB Cleveland • March 2006

a. The 2005 observation is estimated using data from the first three quarters.
b. The Broad Dollar Index measures dollar movements against the currencies of our 26 most important trading partners. The Other Important Trading Partner
Index measures dollar movements against 19 emerging-market currencies. The Major Currency Index measures dollar movements against developed countries’ currencies. All indexes are constructed on a trade-weighted basis.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; and International Monetary
Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2005.

In 2005, the U.S. current account
deficit will reach an estimated $783
billion or about 6.3% of GDP. Globally,
current account balances must sum to
zero. Less obviously, at the national
level, the current account must equal
the financial flows account because a
country that runs a current account
deficit must finance it by a financial inflow. There are two possible causes for
the large U.S. deficit: Either the U.S.
has a high demand for current consumption, which it must finance
by borrowing from the rest of the

world, or the rest of the world desires to invest in U.S. assets, which
implies that we must run a current
account deficit.
Which scenario is more likely? If
the U.S. is demanding higher levels of
consumption, then the dollar’s value
might decrease when our residents
must purchase foreign currency with
dollars in order to buy foreign goods.
On the other hand, foreigners’ desire
to invest in U.S. assets could have the
contrary effect—causing the dollar to
appreciate—because the demand for
dollars would be stronger. A quick

look at the data cannot distinguish
one story from the other. During the
three-year period beginning in February 2002, the dollar depreciated
substantially, which suggests that the
dominant force behind the growing
current account deficit was high U.S.
consumption. Since February 2005,
however, the dollar has stabilized and
appreciated somewhat, which implies that strong foreign demand for
U.S. investments is the dominant
force behind the increase in the U.S.
current account.

10
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Economic Activity
Percentage points
4 CONTRIBUTION TO PERCENT CHANGE IN REAL GDP c

a,b

Real GDP and Components, 2005:IVQ
(Preliminary estimate)

Annualized
percent change
Current
Four
quarter
quarters

Change,
billions
of 2000 $

Real GDP
Personal consumption
Durables
Nondurables
Services
Business fixed
investment
Equipment
Structures
Residential investment
Government spending
National defense
Net exports
Exports
Imports
Change in business
inventories

45.3
22.7
–51.9
29.0
33.5

1.6
1.2
–16.6
5.1
3.0

3.2
3.0
0.2
4.4
2.9

17.3
16.0
2.1
3.9
–3.4
–11.8
–38.7
16.7
55.5

5.4
6.1
3.3
2.6
–0.7
–9.0
__
5.7
12.8

7.1
9.0
1.5
7.5
1.6
1.7
__
6.5
5.5

43.7

__

__

3

Last four quarters
2005:IIIQ
2005: IVQ

Personal
consumption
2
Residential
investment

1

Exports

Government
spending

0
Business fixed
investment
Change in
inventories

–1

–2
Imports
–3

Annualized quarterly percent change
5 REAL GDP AND BLUE CHIP FORECAST
30-year average

Final estimate c
Preliminary estimate
Blue Chip forecast d

Year-over-year percent change
7 REAL DISPOSABLE PERSONAL INCOME AND
REAL PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES c
6

4
5

4

3

3
2

2

1
1

Real disposable personal income
0
Real personal consumption expenditures
–1

0
IVQ
2004

IQ

IIQ

IIIQ
2005

IVQ

IQ

IIQ

IIIQ
2006

IVQ

1990

1993

1996

1999

2002

2005

FRB Cleveland • March 2006

a. Chain-weighted data in billions of 2000 dollars.
b. Components of real GDP need not add to the total because the total and all components are deflated using independent chain-weighted price indexes.
c. Data are seasonally adjusted and annualized.
d. Blue Chip panel of economists.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; and Blue Chip Economic Indicators, February 10, 2006.

The Commerce Department’s preliminary reading of real GDP growth for
2005:IVQ was 1.6%, up 0.5 percentage
point (pp) from January’s advance
reading. The final 2005:IIIQ growth
was 4.1%. The preliminary report’s
upward revision resulted primarily
from upward revisions to exports,
government spending, equipment
and software, and change in inventories, partly offset by an upward revision to imports.
Most components’ contributions
to the change in real GDP decreased
in 2005:IVQ. The two exceptions
were change in inventories, which

added 2.1 pp, and exports, which
added 0.3 pp, compared to 2005:IIIQ.
Imports subtracted 2.0 pp after
deducting only 0.4 pp last quarter.
Personal consumption expenditures,
which traditionally makes the largest
positive contribution to GDP, added
only 0.8 pp, versus 2.9 pp the previous quarter.
The GDP growth rate has averaged
3.2% over the past 30 years, twice
as high as the 2005:IVQ preliminary
reading of 1.6%. In fact, the preliminary estimate was the lowest since
2002:IVQ. However, as of February 10,
the Blue Chip panel of economists

predicted that 2006:IQ growth will be
4.1%, up 0.5 pp from their January
estimate. For the rest of 2006, they expect growth between 3.0% and 3.4%.
Since personal consumption is
typically the largest component of
GDP, its trends are important for the
overall economy. Although real personal consumption expenditures are
growing, the year-over-year annual
growth rate has slowed to 3.0%. In
fact, it is a bit surprising that consumers have not reined in spending
more, considering that year-over-year
growth in the more variable real
(continued on next page)

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Economic Activity (cont.)
Billions of dollars
200 FEDERAL SURPLUS OR DEFICIT

Billions of dollars
350 FEDERAL RECEIPTS AND OUTLAYS
Federal receipts

300

150
Federal surplus/deficit
100

250
50
200
0
150
–50
12-month moving average
100

–100

Federal outlays

–150

50
1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

1996

2006

Billions of dollars
600 MAJOR COMPONENTS OF FEDERAL SPENDING

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

Percent of GDP
6 MAJOR COMPONENTS OF FEDERAL SPENDING
AS A SHARE OF GDP a

550
5
500

Social Security
Social Security

450

4

400

National defense
3

350
National defense

Interest

300
2
250

Health

Interest

200

1
Health

150

0

100
1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

FRB Cleveland • March 2006

a. Fiscal year GDP.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; U.S. Department of the Treasury; and Office of Management and Budget.

disposable personal income slowed
from 4.1% in 2004:IVQ to only 0.5%
in 2005:IVQ.
Growth in federal receipts for January 2006 has increased 13.7% on a
year-over-year basis. Outlays over the
same period were only up 7.9%, easing the budget deficit by about 21%.
Nonetheless, the deficit’s 12-month
moving average is still $25.6 billion
per month.
In 2005, all the major spending categories increased faster than GDP’s
3.5%. The fastest-growing category
was federal outlays on interest, up
20.3% from 2004 to 2005, the result of

the one-two punch of rising deficits
and interest rates. National defense, at
8.7%, was the next fastest. Social Security and health grew at slower rates,
5.6% and 4.7%, respectively.
While these growth rates can seem
alarming, as a percent of GDP the
trends look a bit less so. Social Security has been roughly 4.4% of GDP
since 1990. National defense, which
increased to 4.1% in 2005, remains
below its level at the end of the Cold
War. Even the fast-growing interest
outlay category, currently 1.6% of GDP,
is far below the 3.2% it averaged in the
first half of the 1990s. An exception to

this more benign view is outlays on
health, 2.1%, which has nearly doubled since 1990, but the bottom line is
that last year’s deficit declined a full
percentage point, from 3.6% to 2.6%.
Before one becomes too complacent, it is important to note that,
although federal receipts have increased from 16.5% to 17.5% of GDP
over the last year, federal outlays
remain firmly rooted at 20%. In addition, policymakers need to keep a
wary eye on a buildup of budgetary
pressures caused by the aging of the
baby boomers and the continuing
costs of conflicts abroad.

12
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Labor Costs
12-month percent change
7.0 EARNINGS AND INFLATION

Four-quarter percent change
8.0 EMPLOYMENT COST INDEX a
7.5

6.5

7.0

6.0
Consumer Price Index

6.5
Benefits

5.5
6.0
Total compensation

5.0
Average hourly earnings of production workers

4.5

5.5
5.0

4.0

4.5

3.5

4.0

Salary and wages

3.5

3.0

3.0
2.5
2.5
2.0

Consumer Price Index

2.0

1.5

1.5

1.0

1.0
1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL COMPENSATION, 2004

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2002

2004

Four-quarter percent change
6.0 UNIT LABOR COSTS
5.5
5.0

Retirement and
savings benefits
Insurance benefits

1990

4.5
Legally
required
benefits

Nonfarm business sector

4.0
3.5
3.0

Supplemental
pay

2.5
2.0

Paid leave

1.5
Wages and salaries

1.0
0.5
0
–0.5
–1.0

Nonfinancial corporate sector

–1.5
–2.0
1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

FRB Cleveland • March 2006

a. Private industry workers.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Labor costs account for roughly 70% of
firms’ production costs. For this reason, logic suggests that rising labor
costs might signal potential inflation
pressure should firms try to recoup
labor cost increases by raising their
product prices. However, measuring
labor cost inflation is a challenge, and
there are several ways to do it.
Average hourly earnings of production and nonsupervisory workers
provide the timeliest measure. Although inflation growth has generally
exceeded average hourly earnings

growth for about two years, earnings
growth has more than doubled since
2004, rising 3.3% on a year-over-year
basis in January 2006. However, this
measure is limited because it reflects
only changes in hourly wage rates
and pay for overtime. Moreover, it
captures only the wages of production and nonsupervisory workers,
who historically have accounted
for roughly 70% of all private employees. Finally, average hourly earnings
cannot control for movement across
industries and occupations; thus, increased earnings may reflect a shift

toward higher-paying industries rather
than wage inflation.
The Employment Cost Index (ECI)
is a more comprehensive measure. It
comprises many important elements
of labor compensation, including
benefits such as paid leave, bonuses,
insurance, payroll taxes paid by employers, and retirement and savings
benefits: When combined, these benefits account for nearly 30% of total
compensation. Furthermore, the ECI
computes total compensation based
on a fixed mixture of industries and
(continued on next page)

13
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•

Labor Costs (cont.)
Four-quarter percent change
8.5 COMPENSATION
8.0

Four-quarter percent change
6.0 CHANGE IN OUTPUT PER HOUR
5.5

7.5

5.0
4.5

7.0
Nonfarm business sector

6.5

Nonfarm business sector

4.0
3.5

6.0

3.0

5.5

2.5

5.0

2.0

4.5

1.5

4.0

1.0

3.5

0.5

3.0

0

2.5

–0.5

Nonfinancial corporate sector

2.0

–1.0

1.5

–1.5
–2.0

1.0
1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

Nonfinancial corporate sector

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

Index, 1992 = 100
150 OUTPUT PER HOUR

Four-quarter percent change
16 INFLATION AND UNIT LABOR COSTS

145

14

2002

2004

CPI excluding food and energy

140

12

135
10
130
8

125

Unit labor costs,
nonfinancial corporate sector

Nonfinancial corporate sector
6

120
115

4
Nonfarm business sector

110

2

105
0
100
95

–2

90

–4
1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

Unit labor costs, nonfarm business sector
1958 1962

1967

1972

1977

1982

1987

1992

1997

2002

FRB Cleveland • March 2006

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

occupations, in order to distinguish
labor cost growth from growth caused
by shifts in industrial and occupational
structure over time. The ECI suggests
that labor cost growth has decelerated
since 2000, registering 2.8% year-overyear in 2005:IVQ. The ECI is a straightforward measure of labor costs, but it
does not account for productivity.
Finally, unit labor costs for nonfarm
business, a compensation measure
that is adjusted for labor productivity,
is decelerating after a period of unusually elevated growth. From 2004:IVQ

to 2005:IVQ, unit labor costs for nonfarm business rose a mere 1.0%. Inflation in unit labor costs for the nonfinancial corporate sector has been
relatively modest over the past two
years, generally ranging between
–0.5% and 1.0%. Since these sectors
have similar compensation, the difference in their unit labor costs reflects a
relatively higher level and faster
growth in labor productivity in the
nonfinancial corporate business sector. Some contend that this sector
provides a better measure of labor
cost inflation because it excludes

noncorporate entities, whose productivity is difficult to measure.
Although labor costs are an important part of production costs, the historical link between employment
cost pressures—as measured by unit
labor costs—and core inflation,
which was strong during the higherinflation 1970s, has become less reliable. In recent years, unit labor costs
in both nonfarm business and the
nonfinancial corporate sector have
been poor indicators of changing
inflation rates.

14
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•

Fourth District Employment
Percent
8.5 UNEMPLOYMENT RATES a

UNEMPLOYMENT RATES, DECEMBER 2005 b

8.0

U.S. average = 4.9%

7.5
7.0
6.5
6.0
U.S.
5.5
Lower than U.S. average
About the same as U.S. average
(4.8% to 5.0%)
Higher than U.S. average
More than double U.S. average

5.0
4.5
Fourth District b
4.0
3.5
1990

1993

1996

1999

2002

2005

Percentage points
6 COMPONENTS OF EMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN METROPOLITAN AREAS SINCE LAST BUSINESS CYCLE PEAK b,c
1.6

–0.5

–2.0
2

1.4

–0.8

4
–6.2
–5.1

–4.6

0

–2

–4

–6

Natural resources, mining, and construction

Education, health, leisure, government, and other services

Retail and wholesale trade
Manufacturing

Financial, information, and business services
Transportation, warehousing, and utilities

–8
Dayton

Cleveland

Toledo

Pittsburgh

Columbus

Lexington

Cincinnati

U.S.

FRB Cleveland • March 2006

a. Shaded bars represent recessions.
b. Seasonally adjusted using the Census Bureau’s X-11 procedure.
c. The numbers above the bars represent total employment growth (percent) since March 2001.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

The Fourth District’s unemployment
rate rose 0.1% in December to 5.9%.
In contrast, the U.S. unemployment
rate fell from 5.0% to 4.9%. This trend
continued in January, when the U.S.
unemployment rate fell further, reaching 4.7%. The gap between the District and U.S. unemployment rates has
progressively widened since 2003,
when the rates were roughly equal.
Not surprisingly, the unemployment rate in most District counties
also exceeded the national average in
December. These include Ohio counties with major population centers

such as Cleveland, Cincinnati, and
Columbus, as well as counties with
smaller cities like Akron, Dayton,
Toledo, and Youngstown. Circumstances improved somewhat outside
of Ohio: The unemployment rate in
Fayette County, Kentucky, of which
Lexington is the seat, was roughly
equal to that of the U.S. And rates
in Ohio County, West Virginia, and
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, of
which Wheeling and Pittsburgh, respectively, are the seats, were lower
than the national average.
During the period from the last
business cycle peak in March 2001

through December 2005, few of the
District’s metro areas had higher
employment growth than the nation,
Cincinnati being an exception. Manufacturing contributed negatively to all
metro areas and even the U.S., but
the metro areas where employment
growth was slower tended to have
larger negative contributions from
manufacturing. These areas also
showed declines in financial, information, and business services, and
posted relatively weaker gains in
education, health care, leisure, and
government services.

15
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The Columbus Metropolitan Area
Index, March 2001 = 100
104 PAYROLL EMPLOYMENT SINCE MARCH 2001 b

LOCATION QUOTIENTS, 2005 COLUMBUS MSA/U.S. a
Natural resources
and mining

102

Construction
Manufacturing

U.S.

Trade, transportation,
and utilities
Information
Financial activities

100
Columbus MSA a

Professional and
business services
Education and
health services
Leisure and hospitality

98
Ohio
96

Other services
Government

94
0

0.5

1.0

1.5

U.S.
Columbus MSA a

Goods producing
Manufacturing

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Percentage points
2 COMPONENTS OF EMPLOYMENT GROWTH,
COLUMBUS MSA a,c
U.S.

PAYROLL EMPLOYMENT GROWTH
Total nonfarm

2001

1
Natural resources, mining, and construction
Service providing

0

Wholesale trade
Retail trade

Columbus MSA a

Transportation, warehousing, utilities
–1

Information
Financial activities
Educational and
health services

Transportation, warehousing, and utilities
Financial, information, and business services
Education, health, leisure,
government, and other services
Retail and wholesale trade
Manufacturing
Natural resources, mining, construction

Professional and
business services
–2
Leisure and hospitality

Other services
Government
–3

–3

0
3
12-month percent change, December 2005

6

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

FRB Cleveland • March 2006

a. The Columbus, OH Metropolitan Statistical Area consists of Delaware, Fairfield, Franklin, Licking, Madison, Morrow, Pickaway, and Union counties.
b. Seasonally adjusted.
c. Lines represent total employment growth.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census; and U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Columbus is Ohio’s third-largest metropolitan area, with over 1.5 million
residents. In terms of employment
composition, it resembles the U.S. in
many ways, but there are a few differences. First, Columbus is less focused
on goods production than the nation
as a whole; it also has a higher concentration of white-collar, servicesector jobs. Interestingly, although it
is home to the state government, the
proportion of its workforce in government appears to be about equal
to the nation’s.

How has the metro area’s employment fared in recent years? Throughout the recession and early in the
recovery, its employment performance tracked the nation’s and was
better than the state’s. Columbus’
labor-market performance continues
to be stronger than the state’s, but
since late 2003, it has lagged the nation’s. Consequently, although the
U.S. has surpassed the job total it
began the recession with, Columbus
has yet to do the same.
Over the 12 months ending in December 2005, Columbus performed

somewhat better than the nation in
goods-producing industries, but fared
worse in the much larger serviceproviding category, posting notable
losses in retail and wholesale trade, information, and financial services. The
last of these is significant in view of the
metro area’s above-average concentration of finance jobs. Nevertheless, the
combined employment growth in financial, information, and business services in 2005 contributed positively to
the metro area’s overall employment
growth for the first time in several
years. The sectors that contributed
(continued on next page)

16
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The Columbus Metropolitan Area (cont.)
Percent
30 VACANCY RATES

BLUE CHIP FORECAST 2006, COLUMBUS MSA a

U.S. metropolitan areas
Columbus MSA a

Total nonfarm
25

Manufacturing
Construction

20

Wholesale trade
Retail trade

15

Transportation, utilities, and information
Financial activities

10

Professional and business services
Educational and
health services
Leisure, hospitality,
and other services

5

Government
0
0
2
Year-over-year percent change

–2

4

Rental c

Thousands of dollars
35 PER CAPITA PERSONAL INCOME

Selected Demographics, 2000
Columbus
MSAa

Ohio

U.S.

1.5

11.4

281.4

Percent by race
White
African American
Other

81.3
13.4
5.3

85.0
11.5
3.6

75.1
12.3
12.5

Percent by age
0 to 19
20 to 34
35 to 64
65 or older

28.4
23.7
37.8
10.0

28.2
19.8
38.7
13.3

28.5
20.8
38.3
12.4

Total population (millions)

Office b

Industrial b

Percent with bachelor’s
degree or higher
Total population change
(percent), 1990–2000

29.1

21.1

24.4

19.8

5.0

13.0

Median age

33.6

36.2

35.3

30
Columbus MSA a
Ohio
25
U.S. metropolitan areas

U.S.

20

15

10
1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

FRB Cleveland • March 2006

a. The Columbus, OH Metropolitan Statistical Area consists of Delaware, Fairfield, Franklin, Licking, Madison, Morrow, Pickaway, and Union counties.
b. Industrial and office vacancy rates for 2005:IVQ.
c. Rental vacancy rates for 2004.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census and Bureau of Economic Analysis; Columbus Chamber of Commerce; and CB Richard Ellis.

negatively to job growth in 2005 were
manufacturing and retail and wholesale trade, which have been responsible for most of the area’s job losses
since 2001.
According to a group of Columbusarea economists, the metro area can
expect the pace of local job gains to be
lower than the national average again
in 2006, to about the same extent as in
2005. As in recent years, manufacturing and retail and wholesale trade are
expected to have a negative effect
on the area’s overall job growth.
Although the forecast for construction

in the metro area is positive, aboveaverage vacancy rates are likely
to limit job gains in the sector.
Columbus’ vacancy rates are about
1.5 times as high as the national average for office and industrial properties, and nearly twice as high for
residential rental units.
Between 1990 and 2000, the
Columbus metro area enjoyed strong
population gains, which put it among
the fastest-growing cities in the nation. More recent estimates, however, suggest some slowing in its
population growth. Like Ohio,
Columbus has a higher proportion of

white residents than the nation as
a whole, as well as a significantly
smaller share of non–African American minorities. The area’s age profile
tends to skew slightly younger, with a
lower median age than in Ohio or the
U.S. as a whole. Given Columbus’
higher concentration of white-collar,
service-sector jobs, it’s not surprising
that the population tends to be more
highly educated. This translates into
a per capita income that is greater
than the state’s or the nation’s, but
about average compared to other
U.S. population centers.

17
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Credit Unions
Thousands
12

Billions of U.S. dollars
750 STRUCTURE
Number of institutions
650

Millions
90 MEMBERSHIP
85

11
80
Assets

550

10

75
70

450

9

350

8

65
60
55

250

7

50
45

150

6

40

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Percent
12 LOANS

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Billions of U.S. dollars
500

Billions of U.S. dollars
600
Shares

Loans
450

11

Percent
20 SHARES
18

550

16

500

Loan growth a
400

10

Share growth a

14
9

350

8

300

7

250

12

400

10

350

8

300

6

250
200

6

200

5

150

4

100

2

4
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

150
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

FRB Cleveland • March 2006

NOTE: Data are for federally insured credit unions.
a. Twelve-month growth rate.
SOURCE: National Credit Union Administration.

Credit unions are mutually organized
depository institutions that provide
financial services to their members.
Like banks and savings associations,
credit unions appear to be consolidating. Their numbers fell steadily
from 11,687 in 1995 to 8,695 at the
end of 2005. However, their total
assets more than doubled over the
same period from $306.6 billion to
$678.7 billion. The number of credit
union members also increased steadily
from 67.1 million in 1995 to 84.8 million at the end of 2005.

450

Growth in credit unions’ assets has
been fueled by positive loan growth.
From the end of 1995 to the end of
2005, loans increased from $192.1 billion to $458.3 billion; loans as a share
of assets grew modestly over that period, rising from 62.7% to 67.5%.
Year-over-year loan growth has varied
between 5.8% and 11.3% over the
past 10 years, with an average annual
growth rate of 7.9%.
Shares in federally insured credit
unions have also risen steadily since
1995. Shares, which are analogous to

deposits in banks and savings associations, are the primary source of
funds for credit unions, accounting
for roughly 85% of total funds. Like
loan growth, annual share growth
has fluctuated between 3.8% and
15.3% for the past 10 years. Overall,
shares grew at a robust 7.3% annual
rate during this period.
Credit unions continued to accumulate capital, which increased from
$31.6 billion at the end of 1995 to
$75.3 billion at the end of 2005, a gain
of more than 138%.
(continued on next page)

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Credit Unions (cont.)
Percent
16 CAPITAL

Billions of U.S. dollars
80

Percent
12 EARNINGS b

Percent
1.2
Return on assets

75

15

11

Capital
14

70

13

65

1.1
Return on equity

10

1.0

9

0.9

8

0.8

7

0.7

6

0.6

5

0.5

Capital growth a
12

60

11

55

10

50

9

45

8

40

7

35

6

30
25

5

Percent
4.0 EXPENSES c

0.4

4

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Percent
3.50

Percent
0.70 CREDIT UNION HEALTH

Cost of funds/assets

Delinquent loans/assets

Percent
12.0
Capital/assets

3.45

0.65

11.5

3.0

3.40

0.60

11.0

2.5

3.35

0.55

10.5

2.0

3.30

0.50

10.0

1.5

3.25

0.45

9.5

1.0

3.20

0.40

9.0

0.5

3.15

0.35

8.5

3.10

0.30

3.5
Operating expenses/assets

0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

8.0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

FRB Cleveland • March 2006

NOTE: Data are for federally insured credit unions.
a. Twelve-month growth rate.
b. Return on average assets; return on average equity.
c. All ratios are on average total assets.
SOURCE: National Credit Union Administration.

The increase in capital and the declining interest margins are responsible for the general downward trend in
return on assets and return on equity
since 1995. Return on assets fell from
a high of 1.1% in 1995 to 0.9% in 1999,
rebounded to 1.1% in 2002, then, at
the end of 2005, fell back close to its
1999 level. Return on equity followed
a similar pattern during the same
period. Credit unions’ decline in profitability over the second half of the
1990s resulted partly from a steady

increase in operating expenses per
dollar of assets and the relatively high
cost of funds. The improvement in
operating expenses since 2000 points
to credit unions’ increased efficiency,
which is important for the industry’s
future viability. Declines in the cost of
funds over the past five years have
largely resulted from a low-interestrate environment. That trend reversed
in 2005.
Overall, the health of the credit
union industry appears to be sound.

Capital as a share of assets stood at
11.1% at the end of 2005. Delinquent
loans as a share of assets fell from
0.67% in 1997 to 0.49% at the end of
2005. Moreover, at the end of 2005,
credit unions held about $22.5 of
capital for every $1 of delinquent
loans. In short, credit unions remain
a viable alternative to commercial
banks and savings associations for
basic depository institution services
such as checking accounts, consumer loans, and savings accounts.