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FRB Cleveland • July 2000

The Economy in Perspective
Strictly for the birds…Chicken Little was walking
in the woods, worrying about the state of the
economy, when an acorn fell on his head.
“The economy is collapsing,” he cried, “I must
run and tell the press.” He ran along the path
until he encountered Henny Penny, who asked
why he was running so fast.
“The economy is collapsing,” said Chicken Little. “I saw it with my own eyes. I heard it with my
own ears. Some of it fell on my head. I’m going
to tell the New York Times.”
“I’ll go with you,” said Henny Penny. “I’ve
been expecting this to happen, what with the unemployment rate so low. Not that I’m against
birds working, mind you, but there comes a point
when enough is too much. When the grist mill
hired Ducky Lucky, I knew we’d exceeded full
employment around here.”
The two ran on until they came upon Turkey
Lurkey, who asked why they were in such a
hurry.
“The economy is collapsing,” said Chicken Little. “I saw it with my own eyes. I heard it with my
own ears. Some of it fell on my head. I’m going
to tell the New York Times.”
“And I’m going with him,” said Henny Penny.
“Anyone with half a brain knows the unemployment rate is too low. We’d better tell the Wall
Street Journal too.”
“I’ll come along,” said Turkey Lurkey. “It’s a
grave situation, what with the trade deficit as
large as it is. Now, I know that birds around here
have become prosperous and we haven’t been
able to keep our production in line with overall
demand, but I’ve told anyone who will listen that
letting critters from Global Village sell us so much
merchandise would lead to big trouble. There
comes a point when enough is too much. We
either should have stopped importing so much
feed corn, or hired more of our own birds to
grow and process the stuff!”
The three ran on until they met Goosey Loosey,
who asked them why they were rushing so fast.
“The economy is collapsing,” said Chicken Little. “I saw it with my own eyes. I heard it with my
own ears. Some of it fell on my head.”
“We’re going with him,” said Henny Penny and
Turkey Lurkey in unison. “Anyone with half a
brain knows the unemployment rate is too low
and we are not hiring enough of our own birds to
make what we need. We’re going to tell the New
York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and the
Today Show.”
“I’ll go too,” said Goosey Loosey. “Of course,

I’m not surprised. What with the stock market
acting so crazy the past few years, there’s no
question that we’re headed for economic collapse. Not that I don’t believe in efficient markets,
mind you, or that there haven’t been great opportunities to expand business and become more
profitable. But there comes a point when enough
is too much! We shouldn’t let birds invest so
much in new technology and productive capacity. Let the critters over in Global Village make all
the extra bird seed with their own plants and
equipment, and we’ll just buy it from them. Let
their stock market blow up! I’ve been speaking
and writing about this for years, but no one’s
paid any attention.”
“We’re going with you,” Henny Penny and
Turkey Lurkey cried in unison. “Anyone with half
a brain knows the unemployment rate is too low,
we aren’t hiring enough of our own birds to
make what we need, and we should encourage
the critters in Global Village to invest and produce more goods. We’re going to tell the New
York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Today
Show, and CNN.”
The four companions pressed on until they encountered Foxy Loxy, who asked where they
were going in such a hurry.
“The economy is collapsing,” said Chicken Little, Henny Penny, Turkey Lurkey, and Goosey
Loosey in unison. “Too many birds are working,
we aren’t producing enough, and we are investing too much and not buying enough from
Global Village. We must tell the media.”
“I hate to spoil your expedition,” grinned Foxy
Loxy, “but the press has been repeating those stories for ages. There’s no one left to tell.”
“Well, that’s a relief,” said Chicken Little. “As
long as everyone knows the truth.”
Foxy Loxy’s grin vanished. “The truth!” he said
scornfully. “The talking heads have been peddling the same tales so long that you’d think
they’d have lost credibility, but along comes
some new ‘expert’ who claims the sky is falling
and stirs the pot again.”
“Why Foxy Loxy,” said Chicken Little, “I didn’t
think you were so cynical. The experts just want
to warn people about the danger they’re in, and
so do we.”
Foxy Loxy’s face brightened. “Of course,
Chicken Little,” he smiled, “you’ve made me see
how gullible I’ve been. Why don’t you and your
charming friends come along to my den, and I’ll
show you my most recent estimates on the vanishing federal debt.”

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Monetary Policy
Percent
7.25 IMPLIED YIELDS ON FEDERAL FUNDS FUTURES

Percent, weekly average
6.75 RESERVE MARKET RATES
Intended federal funds rate

June 1, 2000
7.00

6.25

June 26, 2000
Effective federal funds rate
5.75

6.75
May 1, 2000
June 29, 2000

5.25

6.50

Discount rate
4.75

6.25
April 3, 2000

4.25
1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

June

August

October

December

Percent, weekly average
9 LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES

Percent, weekly average
6.5 SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES

6.0

6.00
April

1-year T-bill a

8

Conventional mortgage

5.5
7
5.0

3-month T-bill a

30-year Treasury a
6

4.5
10-year Treasury a
5
4.0

3.5
1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

4
1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

FRB Cleveland • July 2000

a. Constant maturity.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and Chicago Board of Trade.

The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) left the intended federal
funds rate unchanged at 6.5% at its
June 27–28 meeting, the first this
year at which the target rate was not
increased. The FOMC cited “signs
that growth in demand is moving toward a sustainable pace” as the basis
for maintaining the current stance of
monetary policy. However, the
Committee also cautioned that such
signs “are still tentative and preliminary,” noting that “the risks continue
to be weighted mainly toward conditions that may generate height-

ened inflation pressures.”
Implied yields on federal funds
futures are often used as a proxy for
the expected future path of policy.
The implied yields of slightly above
6.5% on June and July federal funds
futures contracts prior to the meeting indicate that market participants
were not surprised by the FOMC’s
decision—they had assigned a low
probability to a rate increase. Furthermore, there was little change in
the implied yields following the
meeting. Although traders have lowered their estimates for the year-end

federal funds rates since early June,
the June 29 contract for December is
still trading nearly 40 basis points
(bp) above the current target rate.
Both long- and short-term interest
rates have decreased notably since
mid-May. This is particularly noteworthy, given the 50 bp increase in
the intended federal funds rate on
May 16. It is commonly reported
that increases in the federal funds
rate lead to increases in all other
market interest rates. Clearly, such
reporting is not always accurate.
(continued on next page)

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Monetary Policy (cont.)
Trillions of dollars
1.7 THE M1 AGGREGATE

Billions of dollars
640 THE MONETARY BASE

600

Sweep-adjusted base growth, 1995–2000 a
15
12

1.6
5%

9

6
1.5

6
560

Sweep-adjusted M1 growth, 1995–2000 a
8
Sweep-adjusted M1b

4
2

3
0

1.4

5%
Sweep-adjusted base b

0

1.3

520
1.2

5%
480

2%
1.1

440
1998

1997

1999

1999

2000

Trillions of dollars
6.8
THE M3 AGGREGATE

5%

5%

M3 growth, 1995–2000 a

M2 growth, 1995–2000 a
12

9
6.4

6

1%

5%
4.5

1998

1997

2000

Trillions of dollars
4.9 THE M2 AGGREGATE

4.7

–3%

1%

–2%
1.0

3
6.0

1%

0

1%
9
6

5%

3

1%

0

4.3
5%

5%

5.6

4.1

1%

1%
5%

5%

5.2

3.9
1%

1%
4.8

3.7
1997

1998

1999

2000

1997

1998

1999

2000

FRB Cleveland • July 2000

a. Growth rates are percentage rates calculated on a fourth-quarter over fourth-quarter basis. The 2000 growth rates for M2 and M3 are calculated on an estimated June over 1999:IVQ basis. The 2000 growth rates for the sweep-adjusted monetary base and sweep-adjusted M1 are calculated on a May over
1999:IVQ basis.
b. Sweep-adjusted M1 contains an estimate of balances temporarily moved from M1 to non-M1 accounts. The sweep-adjusted base contains an estimate of
required reserves saved when balances are shifted from reservable to nonreservable accounts.
NOTE: Data are seasonally adjusted. Last plots for base, M1, M2, and M3 are estimated for June 2000. Last plots for the sweep-adjusted monetary base and
sweep-adjusted M1 are May 2000. Dotted lines for M2 and M3 are FOMC-determined provisional ranges. All other dotted lines are for reference only.
SOURCE: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

One explanation for the decline
in interest rates is that by acting aggressively, the FOMC credibly signaled to these markets that it will
not tolerate rising inflation. This
would induce a decline in nominal
interest rates by lowering the inflationary expectations that are built
into nominal rates. Data that suggest
a slowing economy may also have
contributed to the rate decline.
Growth rates of the narrow monetary aggregates have fallen off

sharply from last year. Annualized
year-to-date rates for the sweepadjusted base and sweep-adjusted
M1 were 1.9% and 1.0% through
May, compared to 12.7% and 6.5%
(fourth-quarter over fourth-quarter
basis) in 1999, respectively. In contrast, the broad monetary aggregates
are growing at a pace near or above
their 1999 rates.
Regular readers of these pages will
surely notice the growth rates of various monetary aggregates are always

reported. At the same time, it is often
reported that the relationship between money growth and inflation
has become substantially less reliable
in recent years; the shift in M2 velocity is a frequently cited example. Furthermore (and somewhat ironically),
the FOMC appears to place relatively
little emphasis on money in conducting monetary policy.
So why are money growth rates
continually presented here? In large
(continued on next page)

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Monetary Policy (cont.)
Percent
14.5
M2 VELOCITY AND OPPORTUNITY COST

Ratio
2.18

Percent inflation
70 INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATIONS, 40-YEAR AVERAGES a

Velocity
60

■

2.06

11.5

■

50
■
1.94

8.5

40
Opportunity cost
1.82

5.5

■■

30

■

20
■
■■
■■
■■
■
■
■■
■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■
■
■■
■■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■ ■■
■

1.70

2.5

10
–0.5
1959

1965

1971

1977

1983

1989

1995

1.58
2001

0
0

10

■
■
■

30
40
Percent M2 growth

20

50

60

1989

1995

70

Percent
12 TRENDS IN M2 GROWTH AND INFLATION

Annualized quarterly percent change
25 M2 GROWTH AND INFLATION (CORRELATION: 0.05)

(CORRELATION: 0.81) b

M2 growth
20

10

15

8

10

6

5

4

M2 growth

Inflation

2

0
Inflation
–5
1959

1965

1971

1977

1983

1989

1995

2001

0
1959

1965

1971

1977

1983

2001

FRB Cleveland • July 2000

a. Includes 49 nations. Each point shows 40-year averages of M2 growth and inflation for one country.
b. M2 growth and inflation are annualized quarterly percent changes in M2 and CPI (all items). Data are filtered using a band-pass filter to remove frequencies
higher than 20 years.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; International Monetary Fund,
International Financial Statistics; and Lawrence J. Christiano and Terry J. Fitzgerald, “The Band-Pass Filter,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working
Paper no. 7257, July 1999.

part, it is because the preponderance of evidence suggests that eventually money growth and inflation
are very closely associated. Over relatively short time periods, such as a
few months or even a year, however, the association between
money growth and inflation is quite
uncertain.
The lack of a clear short-term relationship to inflation is not unique
to money growth. Other statistics
that are sometimes used to gauge

inflationary pressures, such as unemployment or real output growth,
have the same shortcoming. That is
why Fed policymakers must examine a broad range of indicators in
formulating policy.
A striking characteristic of money
growth as an indicator of inflationary pressures is its close association with inflation over long-enough
time horizons. For example, 40-year
averages of money growth and inflation rates in many different countries

exhibit a clear pattern. Countries
with high money-growth rates have
high inflation rates, and vice versa.
However, the relationship becomes
much less clear when several highmoney-growth, high-inflation countries are excluded.
We gain further evidence on the
relationship between money growth
and inflation by examining their association within each of many countries. For example, trends in
(continued on next page)

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Monetary Policy (cont.)
Number of countries
60 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN M2 GROWTH AND INFLATION OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE a

50

40

30

20

10

0
–0.9

–0.7

–0.5

–0.3

–0.1

0.1

0.3

0.5

0.7

0.9

0.1

0.3

0.5

0.7

0.9

Correlation
Number of countries
60 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN TRENDS IN M2 GROWTH AND INFLATION b

50

40

30

20

10

0
–0.9

–0.7

–0.5

–0.3

–0.1
Correlation

FRB Cleveland • July 2000

a. Distribution of correlations between M2 growth and inflation over the business cycle in 84 countries.
b. Distribution of correlations between trend M2 growth and trend inflation in 84 countries.
NOTE: Data are filtered using a band-pass filter. The business cycle contains frequencies between two and eight years; trends contain frequencies of 24 years
and longer. The correlations are grouped into 10 equally spaced bins of width 0.20, centered on –0.9, –0.7, ..., 0.7, 0.9.
SOURCES: Lawrence J. Christiano and Terry J. Fitzgerald, “The Band-Pass Filter,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper no. 7257, July 1999;
and Terry J. Fitzgerald, “International Facts on Money Prices and Output,” March 2000, unpublished.

M2 growth and inflation over the
past 40 years display a strong positive association in the U.S. — even
though the raw quarterly growth
rates display none. In fact, trends in
money growth are highly correlated
with trends in inflation in almost all
countries, regardless of the specific
policies. Furthermore, the close relationship holds even in countries
with moderate rates of inflation.
Do short-term fluctuations in
money growth and inflation — over

the business cycle, for instance—
display a consistent positive relationship in different countries? No.
The correlation is not consistently
positive or negative. This result suggests that the lack of a clear shortterm relationship is not unique to
the U.S., but a property shared
among many countries.
The combined weight of this evidence strongly suggests that over
the long term, money growth is the
key factor determining inflation.
Over the short term, however, the

relationship is murky. One can debate the precise time horizon over
which a clear association appears,
but there is some evidence of a notable relationship for periods as
short as two years. Reporting on the
behavior of annual and year-to-date
money growth rates is helpful in
identifying changes in underlying
trend growth rates. If such changes
persist, the evidence suggests that
changes in the underlying trend rate
of inflation will follow.

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Interest Rates
Percent
7.00 YIELD CURVES a

Percent, end-of-day
4.5 TIIS SPREAD

6.75

4.0

10-year TIIS yield

January 2000 b
6.50

3.5

6.25

3.0
May 26, 2000 c

6.00

2.5
Yield spread: 10-year Treasury bond minus 10-year TIIS d

June 30, 2000 c
5.75

2.0

5.50

1.5

5.25

1.0

5.00
0

5

10

15
20
Years to maturity

30

25

35

0.5
1/98

5/98

9/98

1/99

5/99

9/99

1/00

5/00

Percent
10 INTEREST RATES AND EXPECTED INFLATION f

Nominal rate, percent
7.0 REAL VS. NOMINAL RATE (10-YEAR TREASURY),
JANUARY 1998–JUNE 2000 e

9

6.5
8
7

6.0

30-day T-bill rate

6
5.5
5
4

5.0

Estimated expected inflation

3
4.5
2
1

4.0

Estimated real inflation

0
3.5
–1
3.0
3.0

3.2

3.4

3.8
3.6
Real rate, percent

4.0

4.2

4.4

–2
1/88

7/89

1/91

7/92

1/94

7/95

1/97

7/98

1/00

FRB Cleveland • July 2000

a. All yields are from constant-maturity series.
b. Monthly average.
c. Average for the week ending on this date.
d. Line breaks show dates when 10-year Treasury bonds were not traded.
e. Daily data.
f. The estimated expected inflation rate and the estimated real rate are calculated using the Pennacchi model of inflation estimation and the median forecast for
the GDP implicit price deflator from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Monthly data.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Selected Interest Rates,” Federal Reserve Statistical Releases, H.15; Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia, Survey of Professional Forecasters; and Bloomberg Financial Information Services.

The yield curve has shifted downward at all maturities since last
month. It retains its humped shape,
with 2-year yields remaining highest. Two often-watched spreads, the
3-year, 3-month and the 10-year,
3-month, stand at 43 and 15 basis
points, respectively. The supply of
Treasury securities continues to be a
concern, particularly at longer maturities, keeping those rates low.
Yield curves often provide a “market estimate” of expected inflation,
because inflation expectations in-

crease interest rates. Interest rates
may also rise because real rates
change. One may account for this by
looking at the yields on Treasury
inflation-indexed securities (TIIS).
The spread between a nominal 10year Treasury security and a 10-year
TIIS provides an estimate of inflationary expectations (since the bonds differ in liquidity and some tax consequences, it is not an entirely pure
measure). Since May this estimate has
trended downward, with a small recent uptick.
Plotting nominal against real rates

shows that both inflationary expectations and movements in real rates
do matter: While high real rates generally mean high nominal rates, the
relationship is not precise.
Another approach is to combine
survey measures of expected inflation with interest rates to estimate
expected inflation (and the real
rate). The chart above shows one
such approach, concentrating on
short-term inflation expectations
(over the next 30 days), which have
been increasing since early 1999.

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Inflation and Prices
12-month percent change
3.75 MEDIAN CPI

May Price Statistics
Percent change, last:
1 mo.a

3 mo.a 12 mo.

3.50
1999
5 yr.a avg.

Consumer prices
All items

Median CPIb

3.25
3.00

0.7

3.1

3.1

2.4

FOMC
central
tendency
projections
as of July
1999 c

2.7
2.75

Less food
and energy
Median b

2.0

3.2

2.3

2.4

1.9

2.50

2.5

2.6

2.5

2.8

2.3

2.25

0.0

2.7

3.8

1.4

2.9

2.5

1.9

1.4

1.1

0.8

Producer prices
Finished goods

2.00
CPI, all items
1.75

Less food
and energy

1.50
1.25
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

12-month percent change
3.75 CPI EXCLUDING FOOD AND ENERGY

12-month percent change
5.5 HOUSEHOLD INFLATION EXPECTATIONS

3.50

5.0

2001

Year-ahead household inflation expectations d

CPI excluding
food and energy

3.25

2000

4.5

3.00
FOMC central
tendency
projections
as of July
1999 c

2.75
2.50

4.0
3.5
3.0

2.25

2.5

2.00
CPI, all items

2.0

1.75

CPI, all items
1.5

1.50
1.25
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

1.0
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

FRB Cleveland • July 2000

a. Annualized.
b. Calculated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
c. Upper and lower bounds for inflation path as implied by the central tendency growth ranges issued by the FOMC and nonvoting Reserve Bank presidents.
d. Mean expected change in consumer prices as measured by the University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumers.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland; and University of Michigan.

Retail prices remained subdued in
May, up a modest 0.1%, as energy
prices fell again (down 1.9% in the
month). Pulling in the opposite direction, food prices rose — rather
sharply — 0.5% (5.9% annualized).
Removing these two volatile sectors
yields the so-called core rate of inflation, which rose 0.2% (2.0% annualized), equaling its April rate of
increase. The median CPI, an alternative measure of underlying inflation, also rose 0.2% in May (2.5%
annualized).
The 12-month percent changes of

these three inflation measures over
the past 18 months also reveal
widely divergent patterns. While the
CPI has accelerated from a 1.5%
growth rate to just over 3.0%, the
core measures have remained steady
(about 2.0% for the CPI excluding
food and energy and 2.5% for the
median CPI). Core measures of inflation are valuable to policymakers
precisely because they screen out
transitory factors — such as recent
energy price increases —leaving a
clearer view of the part of inflation
that may result from the central

bank’s actions. It is interesting, therefore, that the public’s expectations of
future inflation have so closely followed the upward move in the allitems series rather than the core
measures. In other words, the public
seems to ascribe some persistence to
factors that the core measures imply
are merely transitory.
One change that is not reflected
in the May report on consumer
prices is the recent swift re-ascent of
gasoline prices. Having risen more
or less steadily since the beginning
(continued on next page)

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Inflation and Prices (cont.)
Millions of barrels
260 U.S. GASOLINE SUPPLIES

Index, 1982–84=100
140
CPI GASOLINE INDEX

130

240
Average range a
Actual

120
220

110
200

100

180

90

Forecast

80
1998

Cents
200

1999

160
1998

2000

1999

2000

2001

Dollars per barrel
35 CRUDE OIL SPOT AND FUTURES PRICES b

RETAIL GASOLINE PRICES BY REGION

Midwest
Futures prices c

180

West Coast

30

160
25

140

Spot price

Rocky Mountain
East Coast

20

120
U.S. average
15

100
Gulf Coast
80
1998

1999

2000

10
1998

1999

2000

2001

FRB Cleveland • July 2000

a. Average ranges are constructed by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration from data for the most recent three-year period. The
ranges also reflect seasonal variation for the past seven years.
b. West Texas Intermediate crude oil.
c. As of June 30, 2000.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration; Bloomberg Financial
Information Services; and Dow Jones Energy Service.

of 1999, gasoline prices began dropping in mid-March. This reversal
was brief, however, and crude oil
prices began climbing again in early
May, against a background of low
U.S. gasoline supplies (which had
been below the Energy Department’s “normal ranges” since late
last year). Indeed, according to Energy Department sources, gasoline
supplies dropped partly because
producers, hopeful that crude oil
prices would soon retreat, were reluctant to build up their gasoline
stocks in 1999. As demand surged

with the approach of the summer
driving season, suppliers were unable to provide sufficient product,
pushing gasoline prices still higher.
Skyrocketing gasoline prices have
been most dramatic in the Midwest,
where prices in some cities exceeded $2 a gallon. These prices result partly from the supply disruption caused by a leak in the Explorer
Pipeline, which provides about 20%
of the region’s gasoline. (The
pipeline is now operating again, but
at reduced capacity.) In addition, refineries reportedly had difficulty
producing sufficient quantities of a

new type of reformulated gasoline
(RFG), required by the Environmental Protection Agency in some areas.
This explains some of the more extreme price increases in the Chicago
and Milwaukee areas, which together consume about two-thirds of
the Midwest’s RFG.
The outlook for gas prices is improving. Supply disruptions are likely
to abate in the near term, and Saudi
Arabia’s recent announcement that it
will increase production has pushed
prices of crude oil for December delivery down to about $27 a barrel
from June’s average of about $32.

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Economic Activity
GDP AND BLUE CHIP FORECAST a

a,b

Real GDP and Its Components, 2000:IQ
(Final estimate)
Change,
billions
of 1996 $

Real GDP
121.0
Consumer spending 114.9
Durables
47.4
Nondurables
25.9
Services
46.5
Business fixed
investment
70.9
Equipment
57.2
Structures
11.7
Residential investment 4.8
Government spending –5.8
National defense
–22.2
Net exports
–23.4
Exports
– 16.4
Imports
39.8
Change in
private inventories
–38.7

Percent change, last:
Four
Quarter
quarters

5.5
7.7
24.3
5.8
5.5

5.1
5.9
13.3
5.1
4.8

18.7
24.7
20.6
5.2
–1.5
–15.2
—
5.2
11.7

8.5
13.7
2.2
2.1
3.3
–0.4
—
7.9
12.4

—

—

FEDERAL FUNDS RATE AND GDP GROWTH

Blue Chip forecast,
June 10, 2000

Percent
10 EXPENDITURE COMPONENT OF GDP GROWTH
8

Consumer spending
Net exports
Investment

6

Government spending
GDP growth rate d

4

2

0

–2

–4
1992

1994

1996

1998

2000 e

FRB Cleveland • July 2000

a. Chain-weighted data in billions of 1996 dollars.
b. Components of real GDP need not add to totals because current dollar values are deflated at the most detailed level for which all required data are available.
c. Quarterly growth rates.
d. Year-over-year percent change
e. Annualized percent change for 2000:IQ.
NOTE: All data are seasonally adjusted.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and Blue Chip Economic
Indicators, June 10, 2000

The final release of statistics on firstquarter real GDP growth confirmed
that 2000 started with a bang. The
revised figure came in 0.1 percentage point higher than the May estimate, indicating that U.S. output expanded at a healthy annualized rate
of 5.5%.
All consumer spending categories
grew briskly over the first three
months of the year. Consumer
durable spending was particularly
strong, with the June revision show-

ing that expenditures in this category expanded at a 24.3% clip. Business fixed investment also posted
large gains, increasing at an annual
rate of 18.7% in the quarter.
June’s revisions revealed a
narrower U.S. trade gap over the
January– March period than had
been thought. The change reflected
both higher-than-estimated exports
and lower-than-estimated imports.
Blue Chip forecasts continue to
predict GDP growth rates above the

30-year average through the next
two quarters. The consensus among
professional prognosticators, however, has the pace of economic expansion returning to normal longrun levels by year’s end.
In fact, the slight upward revision
from May’s estimate does not alter
the assessment that economic
growth, though still hot, has cooled
substantially from its torrid pace in
late 1999. Accumulated evidence
(continued on next page)

10
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•

•

Economic Activity (cont.)
OIL PRICE GROWTH AND GDP GROWTH

OIL PRICES AND GDP GROWTH

Percent of total profits

Percent of total income
100 NATIONAL INCOME

CORPORATE PROFITS BY INDUSTRY c
95

95

Other

85

Wholesale
Retail

75

90

Transportation
65

85

55

Manufacturing

80
45
75

35

70
1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

25
1990

Financial

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

FRB Cleveland • July 2000

a. Last observation based on annualized percent change for 2000:IQ.
b. U.S. refiners’ acquisition cost of crude oil, deflated by the CPI.
c. Before-tax profits of domestic industries, with inventory valuation and capital-consumption adjustments.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; and U.S. Department
of Energy.

that the fall-off toward more normal
growth rates continued into the second quarter has led some observers
to surmise that the succession of recent federal funds rate increases are
beginning to bite. Although it is far
too early for any firm conclusion
about this conjecture, there is scant
evidence thus far that the setting of
the funds rate has been very helpful
in projecting GDP growth over the
course of this expansion.
Others have focused on the mod-

erating — if not restrictive — influence of the recent rise in crude oil
and gasoline prices. The current real
price of oil is far below its historical
1981 peak, but some have argued
the economy is more sensitive to
large, sudden spikes in real oil
prices than to the level of those
prices per se. Here the case is
stronger, as the recent run-up in
prices has been large by historical
standards.
One notable characteristic of this
expansion has been the increasing

share of corporate profits in national
income. This development corresponds to a shift in the share of
profits accounted for by industries
classified as “other” in the national
income accounts. This category includes general services, which contains many “new economy” enterprises related to information
technology. It will be interesting to
see whether these trends reverse, if
the economy does in fact revert to a
historically typical growth trajectory.

11
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•

Labor Markets
Change, thousands of workers
450 AVERAGE MONTHLY NONFARM EMPLOYMENT GROWTH

Labor Market Conditions
Average monthly change
(thousands of employees)

400
1997

1998

1999

YTDa

June
2000

Payroll employment
280
Goods-producing
48
Mining
1
Construction
21
Manufacturing
25
Durable goods
27
Nondurable goods –2

251
22
–3
37
–12
–2
–11

229
4
–3
25
–18
–6
–12

261
23
2
20
2
6
–4

11
13
2
3
8
14
–6

229
20
30
22
120
28

225
16
36
10
124
28

237
11
32
–3
109
83

–2
18
49
–6
148
–195

350
300
250
200

Service-producing
b
TPU
Retail trade
FIREc
Services
Government

150
100

232
16
24
21
141
17

50

Average for period (percent)

Civilian unemployment

4.9

4.5

4.2

4.0

4.0

0
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

IIQ

Apr. May June
2000

Percent
8.0

Percent
65.0 LABOR MARKET INDICATORS d

Index: 0 = perfect equality; 1 = perfect inequality
0.46 GINI COEFFICIENT FOR FAMILIES

7.5
64.5
Employment-to-population ratio

7.0

0.44

64.0
6.5
0.42

63.5

6.0

63.0

5.5

0.40

Civilian unemployment rate
5.0

62.5

4.5

0.38

62.0
4.0
0.36

61.5
3.5
61.0
1992

3.0
1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000 2001

0.34
1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

FRB Cleveland • July 2000

a. Year to date.
b. Transportation and public utilities.
c. Finance, insurance, and real estate.
d. Vertical line indicates break in data series due to survey redesign.
NOTE: All data are seasonally adjusted.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; and U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

The 190,000 temporary census
workers who were dropped from
government payrolls contributed
heavily to June’s lower-thanexpected total nonfarm employment
growth (only 11,000, the smallest increase since January 1996). On the
other hand, private-sector employers added 206,000 workers, slightly
higher than 2000’s year-to-date average monthly increase (177,000) and
roughly equal to 1999’s average
(202,000). Another measure, the
employment-to-population ratio,
rose 0.2% to 64.5%, though this is

still lower than April’s record high of
64.9%. In addition, the unemployment rate fell slightly in June to
4.0%; it has fluctuated between 3.9%
and 4.1% since October of last year.
Breaking down payroll growth
by industry shows strong employment gains in retail trade and the
services industry, including business services. After a weak May in
which net employment growth was
only 17,000 workers, the services
industry added 148,000 jobs last
month. In the goods-producing sector, most of the employment gains
occurred in durable goods manu-

facturing (14,000), which has made
a steady net gain of 38,000 jobs
since last October.
Are gains from the current expansion being evenly distributed among
America’s families? An often-cited
measure of inequality in income distribution is the Gini coefficient. The
larger the Gini, the more unequal
the highest and lowest incomes. The
U.S. Gini coefficient rose steadily between 1960 and 1994, an indication
of greater income inequality. But the
coefficient has flattened during the
most recent five-year period.

12
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•

•

Poverty Rates
Percent
45 POPULATION AT OR BELOW THE POVERTY LEVEL

Percent
7.0 POPULATION BELOW 50 PERCENT OF THE POVERTY LEVEL

40

6.5

African American

35

6.0

30

5.5

25

5.0

20

4.5
Total

15

4.0

10

3.5

White

5
1959

1963

1967

1971

1975

1979

1983

1987

1991

1995

Percent
50 POPULATION 18 AND YOUNGER AT OR BELOW
THE POVERTY LEVEL
45
African American

3.0
1975

1978

1981

1984

1987

1990

1993

1996

Percent
26 FOURTH DISTRICT POVERTY RATES
24
West Virginia

40

22

35

20
30

Kentucky
18

25

16

Total

Pennsylvania

20

14
15

Ohio
12

White

10
5
1959

1963

1967

1971

1975

1979

1983

1987

1991

1995

10
1980

1984

1988

1992

1996

FRB Cleveland • July 2000

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, March Current Population Survey.

The current economic expansion,
the longest on record, has had only
a slight impact on the share of the
population living above the poverty
line (the line was set at $16,660 for a
family of four in 1998). Forty years
ago, 22% of the population was living in poverty, but that figure
dropped to roughly 12% over a 10year period. Since then, the poverty
rate, while fluctuating somewhat,
has remained around 12%. The current expansion reduced the share of
those living in poverty from 15% to
12% overall.
For African Americans, however,

the reduction has been more substantial. After hovering above 30%
for 30 years, the poverty rate for
African Americans has fallen closer
to 25% since 1993, while that for
whites has declined only slightly.
The fraction living in extreme
poverty (that is, those with incomes
below $8,300, half of the poverty
level) also increased from the mid1970s to the early 1980s. From 1976
to 1992, however, the fraction
roughly doubled, from just above 3%
to more than 6%. It has recently declined again and is now closer to 5%.
Among young people (those aged

18 or less), the poverty rate has also
increased slightly over the past 30
years, rising from 15% to more than
20% in the early 1990s but dropping
below 20% by the end of 1999. However, the share of young African
Americans has shown a marked decline of 10 percentage points, from
more than 45% to just over 35% over
the decade.
Within the Fourth District, Kentucky and West Virginia continue to
have higher poverty rates than Pennsylvania, Ohio, and the nation as a
whole, although the differences narrowed in the 1990s.

13
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•

Regional Conditions
Dollars per square foot
26 REAL RENT OF CBD OFFICE SPACE

Dollars per square foot
200 REAL PRICE OF CBD OFFICE SPACE

24

180
U.S. average
160

22
U.S. average
20

140

18

120

Columbus
Cleveland
Columbus

Cleveland
100

16
Cincinnati
14
1989

Cincinnati

80
1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

Dollars per square foot
26 REAL RENT OF OFFICE SPACE IN CLEVELAND AND THE U.S.

1989

1993

1991

1995

1997

1999

Office Space in Cleveland
Inventory
(millions
of sq. ft.)

24
CBD, U.S. average

Vacancy Absorption Construction
rate
(thousands (thousands
(percent) of sq. ft.)
of sq. ft.)

22

20

1988:IQ
Total
CBD

33.8
19.3

12.2
15.2

—
45.0

—
—

1999:IQ
Total
CBD

33.9
18.5

10.7
11.4

255.8
–56.8

903.8
36.0

1999:IIIQ
Total
CBD

34.4
18.3

10.6
10.4

—
45.1

892.7
0

Suburbs, U.S. average
18

Cleveland CBD

16
Cleveland suburbs
14

12
1996

1997

1998

1999

FRB Cleveland • July 2000

SOURCES: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development; and National Real Estate Index (NREI), Market History Reports and Market Monitor.

Advances in communications and
information technology are changing not only how we do business,
but also where we do business. Instead of rehabbing older downtown
skyscrapers, many firms are building shorter, multi-unit offices with
state-of-the-art technologies, located outside the central business
district (CBD).
Average real rent for CBD office
space in the U.S. has been climbing
steadily since 1993, the low point of
the past decade. In fact, rents fell

more than 25% between 1989 and
1993. By 1999, rents had reverted to
their 1989 level.
Although rents in Cincinnati,
Cleveland, and Columbus mimicked
the substantial national decline between 1989 and 1993, they show no
sign of returning to their previous
levels. Rent for office space in Cleveland’s CBD was almost identical to
the national average in 1989. By
1999, however, rent in Cleveland
was only about 75% of the U.S. average. In Cincinnati, rent declined until

1995, but now has climbed to levels
similar to Cleveland and Columbus.
The pattern of real rent for suburban areas is similar to that of the
CBD, but several points are worth
noting. First, rent is lower in the suburbs, consistent with the fact that rent
declines with distance from the CBD.
Second, although rental rates in
Fourth District cities’ CBDs have diverged from the national average,
this is not the case for suburban
property in Cleveland or Cincinnati.
(continued on next page)

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Regional Conditions (cont.)
Dollars per square foot
26 REAL RENT OF OFFICE SPACE IN COLUMBUS AND THE U.S.

Office Space in Columbus

24

Inventory
(millions
of sq. ft.)

Vacancy Absorption Construction
rate
(thousands (thousands
(percent) of sq. ft.)
of sq. ft.)

22
CBD, U.S. average
20

1988:IQ
Total
CBD

30.2
11.2

7.2
7.0

—
—

—
—

1999:IQ
Total
CBD

21.3
8.6

9.2
10.5

–73.5
–0.1

1,640.1
395.1

1999:IIIQ
Total
CBD

22.6
8.9

10.6
12.4

—
25.1

1,182.8
184.5

Suburbs, U.S. average
18
Columbus CBD

16
Columbus suburbs
14

12
1996

1997

1998

1999

Dollars per square foot
26 REAL RENT OF OFFICE SPACE IN CINCINNATI AND THE U.S.

Office Space in Cincinnati
Inventory
(millions
of sq. ft.)

24

Vacancy Absorption Construction
rate
(thousands (thousands
(percent) of sq. ft.)
of sq. ft.)

22
CBD, U.S. average
20

1988:IQ
Total
CBD

27.0
13.4

9.2
8.7

—
570.0

—
—

1999:IQ
Total
CBD

28.0
13.6

9.0
7.1

772.7
266.7

890.1
180.0

1999:IIIQ
Total
CBD

28.2
13.6

9.5
8.6

—
–19.0

582.4
0

Suburbs, U.S. average
18
Cincinnati CBD
16

14

Cincinnati suburbs

12
1996

1997

1998

1999

FRB Cleveland • July 2000

SOURCES: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development; and National Real Estate Index (NREI), Market History Reports and Market Monitor.

Office rents in Cleveland’s suburbs have fared better than those in
the CBD, trending upward over the
past five years, while those in the
CBD have remained flat. Much of
this has to do with new construction, most of which is occurring in
outlying areas. In the Cleveland
area, only 36,000 of 1.8 million
square feet constructed over the past
year was in the CBD. In Cincinnati,
out of approximately 1.5 million

square feet, only 180,000 was built
in the CBD. And in Columbus, about
2.8 million square feet was constructed, just under 600,000 of it in
the CBD.
Vacancy rates in the CBD show
quite different patterns across
the three cities. Vacancy rates
continue to fall in downtown
Cleveland, but have risen markedly
over the past half-year in Cincinnati
and Columbus.

There was a slight increase in
total square footage rented (known
as absorption) in Cleveland’s CBD
over the first half of 1999, for a net
gain of 45,000 square feet. From
mid-1998 to mid-1999, however,
there was a slight decline. The first
half of 1999 shows substantial positive absorption in the suburbs of
Cleveland and Cincinnati, but a
small decline in total square footage
rented in the Columbus area.

15
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•

U.S.Payments Overview
Billions of dollars
600
VALUE OF BANK NOTES AND COIN ISSUED

CONSUMER PAYMENTS, SHARE OF ALL TRANSACTIONS,
1998
Electronic transfers
Debit and other cards
1.3%
5.9%

500
Total bank notes and coin
400

Credit cards
17.4%

300

Cash
43.5%

Other
paper
2.0%

$100 bank notes
200

Personal checks
29.9%
100
Coin
0
1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

Currency Outstanding
Denomination
$1

$2

$5

$10

$20

$50

$100

Value (millions of U.S. dollars)

7,000

1,100

8,000

14,300

90,900

50,500

320,100

Number of notes (millions)

7,000

550

1,600

1,430

4,545

1,010

3,201

Notes processed, 1998 (millions)

9,199

13

2,075

2,389

10,740

875

1,071

Percent of total

Share of value

1.4

0.2

1.6

2.9

18.5

10.3

65.1

Share of notes

35.5

2.8

8.3

7.2

23.0

5.1

16.2

Share of notes processed

34.9

0.1

7.9

9.1

40.7

3.3

4.1

FRB Cleveland • July 2000

SOURCES: Bank for International Settlements; and The Economist, May 20, 2000.

The payment system, made up of
the various methods available to settle debts and obligations, performs
an important role in facilitating economic activity. Although the cost of
operating the U.S. payment system
is estimated at 3% of GDP, it generally receives little attention.
Jointly, paper-based payment instruments, including checks, cash,
and other paper, accounted for
about three-fourths of U.S. consumer payments in 1998. The
demise of paper-based instruments
has been predicted ever since the
1950s. However, for various reasons
centering on cost and ease of use,

no alternative instrument has seriously threatened the existence of the
traditional paper ones. While paper’s
share has declined as new payment
instruments have been introduced, it
is difficult to know how much because no method-consistent estimates are available over time.
Cash alone accounts for more than
40% of consumer transactions and
remains a very convenient method
for consumers to transfer value. Cash
outstanding increased at a 6.7% rate
from 1994 to 1998. Almost all of this
growth came from an increase in the
number of $100 notes, which are in
great demand overseas.

Although $100 bills comprise almost two-thirds of the value of notes
outstanding, they account for only
about 4% of the value of notes
processed by Reserve Banks. This
suggests that $100s are used more as
a store of value than as a medium of
exchange. In contrast, $1 bills account for over one-third of notes
outstanding and notes processed—
far higher than their meager 1.4%
value share. The $20 bill also appears to be heavily employed for
making payments. Although $20s
comprise only one-fourth of the
(continued on next page)

16
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•

U.S.Payments Overview (cont.)

1998

Number of Transctions Using Cashless Payment Instruments (millions)
Checks
Payments by card
Debit
Credit
Paperless credit transfers
CHIPS
Fedwire
Federal Reserve ACH
Private ACH
Direct debits
Federal Reserve ACH
Private ACH
Total
Memorandum item:
Commercial “on-us” ACHa

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

61,670
14,777
1,096
13,681
1,677
46
72
1,526
34
886
847
39
79,010

62,963
16,513
1,599
14,914
1,899
51
76
1,739
34
1,024
978
46
82,399

64,684
18,599
2,469
16,130
2,139
54
83
1,945
58
1,176
1,101
76
86,599

66,093
20,791
3,913
16,879
2,489
59
90
2,110
230
1,347
1,170
177
90,720

67,000
23,255
5,731
17,525
2,889
59
98
2,406
325
1,545
1,313
232
94,689

480

595

738

861

1,057

FRB Cleveland • July 2000

a. ACH transactions originated and received by the same bank.
SOURCE: Bank for International Settlements.

notes outstanding, they account for
40% of those processed.
Of course, newer payment instruments are making inroads. The number and value of checks grew at a
rate of only about 2.5% from 1994 to
1998. Meanwhile, the number of paperless credit and debit transfers almost doubled, and (unlike checks)
their value increased by about onethird, well ahead of inflation. Also,
the number of point-of-sale (POS)
machines is growing rapidly. These
machines for reading debit and
credit cards are finding their way
into more and more grocery stores,
gas stations, and other retail estab-

lishments and now outnumber ATMs
more than seven to one. Despite this
disadvantage, ATMs handle more
transactions, in terms of both volume
and value, than do POS machines.
Since 1996, when ATM surcharging
became widespread, ATM volumes
have slowed dramatically, whereas
POS volumes have continued to accelerate strongly. Some modest consolidation in the number of ATM and
POS networks has already occurred;
more may follow as regional networks compete to offer nationwide
coverage.
Two important market shifts are
occurring in cashless payment instru-

ments. First, although the volume
and value of credit cards continue to
exceed those of debit cards, the latter
are quickly closing the gap. Second,
despite strong growth in both volume and value, the Federal Reserve’s
market share of ACH transfers, the
electronic analogue of paper checks,
fell during the 1994–98 period as private ACH experienced even more
explosive growth.
A significant but little-appreciated
fact is that although a large number
of transactions are still made with
paper-based payment instruments,
most of the value exchanged in trade
(continued on next page)

17
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•

U.S.Payments Overview (cont.)
Trillions of dollars
250 SECURITIES SETTLEMENT VALUE

Millions of transactions
180 SECURITIES SETTLEMENT VOLUME
160

200

140
Corporate and municipal
120

Government
150

100
80
100
60
Corporate and municipal
40

50
Government

20
0
1994

1995

1996

1997

0
1994

1998

1995

1996

1997

1998

Value of Transctions Using Cashless Payment Instruments (billions of dollars)
Checks issued
Payments by card
Debit
Credit
Paperless credit transfers
CHIPS
Fedwire
Federal Reserve ACH
Private ACH
Direct debits
Federal Reserve ACH
Private ACH
Total

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

71,500

73,515

74,879

77,811

79,000

764
34
731

938
59
879

1,083
100
983

1,234
163
1,071

1,396
239
1,157

510,702
295,444
211,202
3,285
772

537,543
310,021
222,954
3,757
811

586,052
331,541
2,491,400
4,235
1,136

657,044
362,187
288,420
4,844
1,594

686,892
350,372
328,749
5,751
2,020

6,111
5,085
1,026

6,480
5,438
1,042

6,814
5,763
1,051

7,613
5,866
1,747

8,614
6,576
2,038

589,077

618,476

668,828

743,702

775,902

FRB Cleveland • July 2000

SOURCE: Bank for International Settlements.

already flows electronically. Consumers continue to rely heavily on
paper-based payment instruments,
but most economic entities that frequently transfer large sums have
switched to electronic instruments.
Consequently, many of the benefits
of converting to electronic payments
have already been achieved. Although checks comprised 70% of
noncash transactions in 1998, they
accounted for only about 10% of
their value. The two large-dollarvalue electronic payment systems,

the Clearing House Interbank Payment System (CHIPS) and Fedwire,
account for less than 0.2% of the volume of transactions but about 88% of
the value.
Similarly, electronic payments also
dominate the multi-trillion-dollar securities settlement market. Although
the settlement volume of corporate
and municipal securities far exceeds
that of government securities and is
growing much more rapidly, government securities’ settlement value is
about three times larger.

It is clear that future technologies
will permit payments to be made
even more efficiently and conveniently. The challenge for payment
providers is discovering how to deliver these benefits even for relatively small-value transactions. This
is a tricky puzzle because a successful entrant must offer consumers and businesses the ability to
transact more cheaply or conveniently, yet it must also yield a
profit — at least eventually — to its
creators and providers.

18
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•

International Developments
Billions of dollars
300
U.S. AND FOREIGN ASSETS

Billions of dollars
40 THE CURRENT ACCOUNT AND ITS COMPONENTS

250

20

Trade balance on services

200

0

Foreign assets in the U.S.
150

Current account
–20

100

–40

50
Trade balance on goods

0

–60

U.S. assets abroad
–50

–80

–100
–100

–150

–120
1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

–200
1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

Yen per dollar
170 FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES

Billions of dollars
15
U.S. PETROLEUM TRADE

1998

1999 2000

Marks per dollar
2.2
German marks

150

10

2.0

Imports
Japanese yen
5

130

1.8

110

1.6

90

1.4

Exports
0
Trade balance on petroleum
–5

–10
1990

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

2000

70
1992

1.2
1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

FRB Cleveland • July 2000

SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Deutsche Bundesbank; Japan
Securities Dealers Association; and Association of Call and Discount Companies/Nihon Keizai Shinbun (Nikkei).

The U.S. current-account deficit
widened from $96.2 billion
in 1999:IVQ to $102.3 billion in
2000:IQ. This movement reflects a
decrease in the surplus on the services balance combined with an increase in the goods deficit. This
rapidly increasing goods deficit, resulting primarily from imports to the
U.S., almost completely accounts for
the sharp increase in the currentaccount deficit since 1997. Imports
have been boosted by rising in-

comes and by a strong dollar that
makes imports to the U.S. cheaper
and exports more expensive.
The sustainability of the U.S.
current-account deficit concerns
many analysts. The counterpart of
this deficit is a strong capital inflow,
which can be seen as financing consumption of imports in excess of exports. One can also view capital inflows as a vote of confidence in the
U.S. economy that might, in turn,
explain the strength of the dollar.

This latter view implies that the
trade deficit is less worrisome so
long as the dollar remains strong.
The dollar’s international value is
also related to differences in interest
rates between countries. A major
concept in international finance is
uncovered interest rate parity — the
notion that interest rate differentials
must be balanced by expected
changes in currency exchange rates.
This concept implies, for example,
(continued on next page)

19
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

International Developments (cont.)
Percent
8 SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATE DIFFERENTIALS

Percent
6 LONG-TERM INTEREST RATE DIFFERENTIALS

6

5
U.S. minus Japan

U.S. minus Japan

4

4

2

3

0

2
U.S. minus Germany

U.S. minus Germany

–-2

1

–4

0

–6

–1

–8
1990

–2
1990

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Index, 1995 = 100
200 PRICES

Index, 1982–84 =100
7

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Index, 1995 = 100
200 PETROLEUM PRICES AND TREASURY RATES

Percent yield
10

6

170

8

160
10-year Treasury bond
Import price index, petroleum

140

5
120

Import price index, all items
110

4

80

3

6

80

CPI, all items
50

2

20
1990

1
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

4
Import price index, petroleum

40

0
1990

2

0
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

FRB Cleveland • July 2000

SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Deutsche Bundesbank; Japan
Securities Dealers Association; and Association of Call and Discount Companies/Nihon Keizai Shinbun (Nikkei).

that if U.S. interest rates are higher
than Japanese, market participants
must expect the yen/dollar exchange
rate to decline. According to this
view, recent increased differentials
between U.S. interest rates and those
of Germany and Japan suggest that
the dollar is expected to depreciate
more than before.
Researchers have found little evidence of a link between short-term
interest rate differentials and exchange rate movements. However,
there is stronger evidence of a link

between longer-term interest rates
and longer-term movements in currency values. Thus the recent, relatively abrupt increase in the difference between 10-year interest
rates in the U.S. and those in Germany and Japan might indicate expectations of a longer-term decline
in the dollar.
Petroleum products form a major
component of the recent decline in
the U.S. goods balance. The volume
of petroleum imports has risen
sharply since 1999, with prices in-

creasing at a faster rate than other
import prices or even overall consumer prices.
The importance of petroleum
price increases depends largely on
whether they are expected to be
temporary. The positive correlation
between the Import Price Index for
petroleum and the 10-year U.S.
Treasury bond yield is consistent
with an increase in expected inflation imbedded in the bond yield. On
the other hand, interest rates may
have risen partly in anticipation of
increased inflation.