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http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends July 1996 Best available copy The Economy in Perspective Good tze~usbears . . . Financial markets were rockecl on July 5 when the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) releasecl its report on labor nlarlcet conclitions for June! along with revisecl data for April ancl May The Bureau reported a 239,000 net increase in June enlployrnent as measured by the survey of employers' payrolls, plus a combinecl upward revision of 45,000 for April ancl May. Average earnings expancted by 9 cents per hour in June, the largest monthly gain ever reported. Moreover, the BLS householcl survey registered a decline in the national unemployment rate to 5.3%. Despite weak trading over the holiday period, the stock n~arltettook a sharp hit that Friday (11 5 points on the Dow Jones Industrial Average), and U.S. Treasury bond prices plunxneted. The yield on a 10-year Treasu~ybond jurnpecl fron16.77% to 7.06% during the day. Long-term bond yields have been on a rollercoaster ricle for the past few years. The pace of econo~nic activity quickened during 1994, putting pressure on capital market interest rates. At the same time, concerns about accelerating inflation prompted the Federal Reserve to slow the rate at which it was supplying reserves to the banking system. The fecleral funds rate rose from 3.0% to 5.5% during the year. Capital market rates declined during 1995, as ~narketparticipants expected growth to gear down a bit to keep pace with additions to productive capacity. By year's end, in fact! capital nlarket rates had fallen ahout 200 basis points fro111 the beginning of the year, and some analysts spoke of a recession in the latter half of 1996. Last January, the Federal Reserve recluced the fecleral funds ancl cliscount rates to keep them in line with open n~arlcetrates, and in anticipation of a decline in inflationary pressures. However, the BLS reported a strong employment gain for February, and subsequent economic data have convinced most economists to expect rnoclerate econornic gro\.?th to continue for the next year or so. I3efore BLS's July report, capital nlarkets had retraced about 100 basis points fi-om their 1995 low point, ancl the July 5 news accounted for another 25 to 30 points. Interest rates have been volatile b e ~ t u s emarliet participants are responding to underlying forces which themselves are volatile. I'eople revise their plans for saving, investment, ancl consumption as they acljust their views of future econonlic activity. These revisions, in turn, affect the real interest rate prevailing in capital rnarkets. People also rnay change their view of the inflation rate they expect to prevail over the next several years. Although the inflation rate as ~neasureclby the Consurner Price Inclex has been following a 3% trencl cluring the past several years, many observers believe the trend will be strongly influenced by the pace of econonlic activity. Since by most accounts the economy has been operating at very high rates of capacity utilization for the past year or two, financial market participants are especially leery of an acceleration in the price level. The association of economic growth with inflation, sometimes referred to as the Phillips curve, stems from positive correlations between changes in the unemployment rate and unanticipated inflation observed during business cycles-particularly before 1981. This has encouraged some analysts to thinlt that policymakers can alter inflation's trend by affecting the unemployment rate, that is, by designing policy so as to speed up or slow clown the pace of economic activity. The non-accelerating inflation rate of unernployment (NAIRU) is thought to keep the prevailing inflation rate steady. If NAIRU is 6%, for example, unernployment rates below 6% will likely generate accelerating inflation. Econo~netricestinlates of Phillips curves and NAIRU reveal that the relationships between inflation and economic growth are not very stable. Moreover, since the early 1980s, inflation has declined during a prolonged period of economic expansion, at apparent odds with predictions from standard Phillips curve models. At the outset of this decade, mainstrean1 estimates of NAIRU centerect on 6%, but this figure is now wiclely regarcled as 5.75%, or even 5.5% If the inflation trend continues to holcl this year, we may see esti~natedNAIIiU fall to 5.25%. Those who forecast inflation fro111a Phillips c u ~ v eview have occupied the high ground in the media during the last few years, even though this approach has been overpreclicting the amount of econornic slack recluired to reduce inflation. The Phillips culve/NAIRU framework puts policy~naltersin the position of being responsible for fluctuations in econo~nic growth on a year-to-year basis, when their Inore liltely objective is to nlaxi~nizeemploynlent ancl promote price stability over business cycles. Excessive t7zo1zeygrowth, not economic growth, creates inflation. Though rapid economic growth may sornetirnes accompany excessive Inoney growth, the goocl news need not bear bad tidings. http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends July 1996 Best available copy Monetary Policy Billions of dollars 420 CURRENCY OUTSIDE BANKS Billions of dollars 480 1 M O N E T A R Y B A S E B ~ l l ~ o nofsdollars 72 T O T A L RESERVES Billions of dollars 1,300 1.250 1,200 56 - 52 - 1,150 1,100 -10%' 48 ' l l l ' ~ l ' ' l ' ' ' ' l ' l ' ' " ' ' ' ' r ~ ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '1,050 ' 1994 1995 1996 a. Growth rates are calculated on a fourth-quarter over fourth-quarter basis. Annualized growth rate for 1996 is calculated on an estimated June over 1995:IVQ basis. b. Adjusted for sweep accounts. NOTE: All data are seasonally adjusted. Last plot IS estimated for June 1996. Dotted lines represent growth ranges and are for reference only. SOURCE: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. So far this year, the narron. monetaly aggregates continue to l ~ rather e weak. Currency, \\-liich 1x1s expandecl at an :tver.age : ~ n n ~ rate ~ a l of nearly SMO/i,over the past 22 years, is growing only asouncl 3(%.'The slo~vclown is believecl to 11e ca~lsedby a clrop in foreign clemancl. Vi~ith :IS much as 70(!4~ of' all U.S. currency held abroacl. any change in foreign clernancl will have a proi~ouncecleffect 01-1 t l i ~aggregate's gro\vth. T h e slower gro\vth o f currency is p:irtly responsil,le for the sluggish perforin:ince of the ruonetary base, .r\;hich has exparldecl at an annual sate of only 1.8% since January. The 1mse comprises currency held outsicle banks, surplus vault cash, ancl total reserves, Ixit is clomin:itecl 11y its currency component. Base gro\vth is also being affected by the clecliile in total reserves clue to \viciespre:tcl implementation of s\veep :~cco~lnts. These accounts ell:tl~leclepository itlstitutio~lsto shift funcis froin other checkable deposits, ~ i h i c h are reservitl>le. to Illoney market deposit accounts, ~vliichare not. Without this reserve avoichnce technicj~ie.it is estilnatecl that total reserves \ V O L I ~have ~ beeil increasing since January. The implementation of sweep accounts and the slowclo\vn in currency growth have rilso influencecl k1l. \\~hichfell at rl 1.5% annual late through June. I-towever. adjusting for the impact of sweep accounts, it have esis estimatecl that M I \\~o~lld pa~lcledat ;i ~lioderaterate. (co~tirrr led 017 17e.vtpagirc) I http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends July 1996 Best available copy Monetary Policy (cont.) Inflationrate, percent Percent I 20 UNEMPLOYMENT AND INFLATION, 1960-1996 CHANGE IN UNEMPLOYMENT AND INFLATION GROWTH, 1960-1 9 9 6 16 - 12 - &I " 8 ta - !a cam fa I a 4 " & I Era@! Hm m B m""m 4 +"" a 0 B3 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 -4 -1 .O 1995 -0.5 0.0 1.O 0.5 1.5 2.0 Change in unemployment rate, percentage points Inflation rate percent Actual minus expected inriation percentage po~nts 8 CHANGE IN UNEMPLOYMENT AND UNANTICIPATED INFLATION, 1 9 6 0 - 1 9 9 6 ~ 3 " - 6 Bs 21 fa fa - 4 I Idf 0 - -1 - " ' l S 2 ' 0 -2 - -3 - @a m f a E ~ i ~ -2 La IBi PI -4 " -1 0 ' ~ -05 ~ 00 ~ ~ 05 ~ l l ' ~ 10 Change in unemployment rate percentage points " 15 " ~ " 20 " ~ " -4 " 0 5 10 15 20 25 Unemployment rate percent a. Unanticipated inflation is the difference between actual inflation and its expected value, where expected inflation is based on past inflation rates. SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; and the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. anel unemployment rates in opposite T h e relationship bet\\-een infl;lreadily reveal the negative correlaclirections, others are not. In fact, the tion anrl unemployment is often tion hetween price changes and ungeneral p:lttern of inflation ancl Llntalien (if only implicitly) to be one of employ~nentthat so Illally cornmen~OIIIchanges appears to tators take for granted. the most relial~lein [ I ~ ~ ~ C S O ~ C O ~e~nployment ics. Evel7.;one Iino\vs that rising Llntrace out a positive relationship. Still, the connection hetween tlie employment means Ion-er inflation. t ~ v o\.asiables shoultl be vie\vecl with Analysts generally resolve this :tncl falling unenlployriicr7t means co~itraclictionof tlie "l'hillips curve" some sitepticism: A negative correlahigher inflation. relationship by focusing not on tlie tion is one thing, but a stable relaTo he sure, such a negatii-e relalevel of inflation ancl u n e ~ ~ ~ p l o y r ~ i e ntionship t is quite another. Eviclence changes. but rather on unemploytionship-referred to xs the '.Phillips shows th:lt silnple estimates of the c~irve"-is not :ll~v:lyseasy to see in ment changes ancl the deviation of I'hillips c u n e based on available the cl:~ta.r\ltliougl~specific episocles inflation from the level that ~liarltet data 1113)- shift over time. over the p : 35 ~ ).c.:lrs are chalacterparticipants expect. Viewed with Nonetheless, the ['hillips curve (contiii[red on ne.xtpug<~) this modification, the data Inore izecl hy movenients of tlie inflation http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends July 1996 Best available copy Moneta~yPolicy (cont.) Real GDP, percent charige Percent 1 5.0 l 8 UNEMPLOYMENT AND OUTPUT G R O W H : 1960-1 996 ALTERNATIVE INFLATION PATHSa Poient~alGDP growth=2 1% Potent~al GDP growth=2 5% I -1 0 -0 5 0.0 05 1.O 15 Change in unemployment rate, percentage points Percent I 1 2.0 Percent ''I 45 ALTERNATIVE UNEMPLOYMENT PATHS 40 35 30 25 20 110 lllQ 1996 IVQ IQ IlQ IIIQ IVQ 1997 a. Model assumes that NAIRU = 5.8%. b. Model assumes that potential real GDP growth = 2.1%. c. Adaptive expectations are based on past inflation rates. NOTE: NAIRU is defined as the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment. SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; and the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. remains a focal p ~ i l i tfils policy discussions. I-'ar-t of the reason is that n ~ o r esophisticatecl slatistical treatments appear to pro\-icie a reasonably stable unempIoyn1enr/i11fliitiol7 connection. The virt~leo f lulnting for sucll stability is in turn rcinforcecl I>y thc ease with n.hich inflation c:un bc connectecl to o~ltputgrowth thro~igh the fairly striking negati\.cx relationship bet\veen ilncrnployment ant1 output gro\vth, a corrcl:ltion genesally linown as "Ok~ln'sla\\.." The Phillips curve, together with Okun's law, essentially coclib milch of the conventional ~viscloruabout monetary policy in a formal statistical way. Intirnately lillkecl to this fr-amework are the concepts of NAIIilr (the ~lnemployrnentrate below \vhich inflationaly pressures build), potential GDI' growth (the long-run sustainable rate of output expansion), and inflationary expectations. Unfort~lnately,the measure of our igrlorance about these important v;iriahles is large incleecl, ;~ncl tile magnitudes really matter. Si~uple back-of-the-envelope calculations illustrate that the filt~~re p:iths of irlflation i~nciercurrent policy, or :I p:ir-ticular rnonetary policy's effect o n ~inemploymerlt,or myriacl other irnportant policy questions, are quite sensitive to ass~imptions a b o ~ ~ t NAIRU. potential GDP gro~vth,ancl the form:ition of irlflation expect;itions. To consLimers of policy anal>.sis, the best aclvice is always "let the buyer hexvase." http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends July 1996 Best available copy An Alternative Measure ofMonq B~llionsoi dollars seasonally adjusted 3 300 THE MZM AGGREGATE^ Measures of Money MZM growth, 1991-96b 10% .' M1 = + + + M2 = + + + MZM = + - Currency Demand deposits Other checkable deposits Traveler's checks :.5% M1 Savings deposits Small time deposits Retail MMMFs M2 Institutional MMMFs Small time deposits 2,800 Ratio Percent 1994 1995 1996 Ratio Percent a. Last plot is estimated for June 1996. Dotted lines represent growth ranges and are for reference only. b. Growth rates are percentage rates calculated on a fourih-quarter over fourth-quarter basis. Annualized growth rate for 1996 is calculated on an estimated June over 1995:IVQ basis. SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; and Board of Governors of the Federal R e s e ~ e System. In recent years, cleregi~lationancl financial itlnovation I1:iI.e \vreaked havoc on relationships 17etlveen ttxclitionally clefinecl rneasilres of money-M1 ancl hl2-ancl economic :ictivity and interest rates. W h e n these relationships 1,re:ik clown, :lnalysrs often propose 11exv monetary aggreg:ltes. One such measure. MZM, comprises all rnonet:irp instruments th:it !la\-e zero maturity ancl hence we recleemablc at cl. are M1, par 011 d e ~ ~ ~ a nIncludeti savings cleposits, ancl all lnoney m:irket n~utualfilncls (MMMFs). hfZM's i~lln~lilnity to recent deregillation anci financial innovation is evident in the relationship between I\lZhI velocity (the ratio of nominal GDP to MZM) and its opportunity cost (clefined here as the clifference I2etxijeen the 3-month Treasury yielcl anel the share-weighteel average of yielcls paicl on MZM components). Virl~ileessentially tse~lclless since 1974. MZM velocity varies systematically with its opporiunity cost. It is estimated that a onepercentage-point increase in its opporti~nitycost eventually loxvers the level of MZM der~la~lclecl by more than four percentage points. In contrast, the relationship hetween M2 velocity and its opportunity cost broke clown in the 1990s, when &/I2velocity persistently rose i11 the face of killing opportunity cost. This distortion is believed to be a consequence of the pro1ifer:ltion of bond anel equity mutual funcls, xvhicl~grew largely at the expense of small time cleposits. Because MZhI cloes not inclucle s~llallt i ~ n e cleposits, it was not afl'ectecl by the wiclespreacl substitution of I,oncl ancl equity funcls for hank cleposits. e e o e 8~ http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends July 1996 Best available copy o 8~ Interest Rates Percent, weekly averages Percent weekly averages YIELD CURVES~ I 9.5 CAPITAL MARKET RATES Percent Percent INTEREST RATES IN MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE EUROPE^ 4 - 2 - f I n 12111 I 13th I 14th I I 15th 16th 17th 1700 1710 1720 1730 1740 1750 1760 1770 1780 1790 1800 Century a. Three-month and six-month instruments are quoted from the secondary market on a yield basis: all other instruments are constant-maturity series. b. Estimate of the yield on a recently offered, A-rated utility bond with a maturity of 30 years and call protection of five years. c. Bond Buyer Index, general obligation. 20 years to maturity, mixed quality. d. Rates are the lowest reported during each half century for each type of credit, regardless of location. SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and Sidney Homer and Richard Sylla, A History of Interest Rates, 3d ed. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. 1991. The yielcl curve has changecl little since last rnonth. Daily :mcl n.eelcly shifts ha\-e occurrecl :tt hot11 the long ancl short encls, clepencling on the market's assessment of the economy's strength and the chances of t h e Federal Iieserve mising or lo\vering rates. The closely watchecl 3-year, 3-month spre:tcl ancl 10-year. 3-rnonth spreacl staricl at 122 ancl 164 basis points, respectivel\-. Long rates h:lve genesally contin~~ccl [he ~ ~ p \ v a rp:tth d t1ie~-began early in the year, :lltlioclgh they remain a point k~elowthe levels of late 109.4 ~uncl early 1992. Interest sates can provicle a fascinating historical perspecti\,e, as recorcls for A4eclieval anel Renaissance Europe exist as far hacli as the t\velfth century. They can also provicle some important lessons h r toclay. Even on a long time scale, invariaterest rates show trenlendo~~s tion: One century's average interest rate is easily double that of :tnother. Great Britain cle~nonstratesthat 60 years of sates near 3% can I)e folloxvecl l>y 20 years of r;ttes near Soh. 'I'liese figures should malie :in:ilysts tllinli twice Ixfore calling a 7(!4/i, long I)oncl Kite "unsustainal~le." Still. the clo\vn\varcl trend as Europe eleveloped ancl industrializecl may presage a pattern for countries no\\; going through the same process. It is significant that the lowest interest rates appear in seventeenth century I-Iollancl, a country with :I financial system aclvancecl enough that government I~oncls (anel tulip lutures) tlxclecl o n :tn eschange. The data even hold a warning 11bout the clangcrs of inflation: The high rates in the sixteenth :tncl seventeenth centuries arose from the oversilpply of golcl ancl silvcr l ) r ~ ~ ~l>;lclc g h t fro111 the Ne\\ \Kic)rld. http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends July 1996 Best available copy Inflation and Prices Percent change annual rate 9 [MEDIAN CPI BREAKPOINTS~ May Price Statistics Annualized percent change, last: I mo. 5 mo. 12 mo. 5 yr. 1995 avg. Consumer Prices All items 3.9 4.1 2.9 2.9 2.6 Less food and energy 3.0 3.0 2.7 3.2 3.0 Mediana 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.2 Finished goods -0.6 2.6 2.3 1.5 2.1 Less food and energy 0.3 1.5 1.7 2.6 0.0 13.8 10.5 3.6 5.4 Producer Prices -0.4 Commodity futures pricesb Difiusion index, net perceni r~sing PPI manuiacturing, annual growth rate, percent 1 3 4 5 CPI, annual growth rate, percent 2 6 7 a. Calculated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. b. As measured by the KR-CRB composite futures index, all commodities. Data reprinted with permission of the Commodity Research Bureau, a KnightRidder Business Information Service. c. Horizontal lines represent trends. SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland; National Association of Purchasing Management; and the Commodity Research Bureau. 'The Consiinwr ['rice Incles ( CI-'I) continueel to accele~ltein May. rising at :ln annual rate o f 3.9% ancl contributing to ;I year-to-date increase of 4.1%. l'his represents a substa~lti:ll d e t e r i o ~ ~ t i otl.0112 n the 2.6% rate ol>ser\.ecl in 1995. I-Io~vever, ~niichof the ~ ~ p t i chas l i been attributecl not to actu:~l ~~nderl\.ing inf'kltion. I>ut to tmnsitor). shocks in the typicall\. \.olarile energy ancl . these food c o t ~ ~ p o n e n t sWllcri itenis are excludeel from the incles, its annc~alizecl,year-to-ci:ltc. growll~ is iclentical to 1995's rate. The meclian CPI through May is actually l>clow last year's posting, but shows n o clear signs of straying from the 3.1% path it has followed for the last five years. I-'roclucer-level prices provide a more optimistic picture of current inflation. The Producer Price Incles (1'1'1) and the purchasing man:lgers' price incles both suggest only moclerate ~ ~ p \ ~ ipressure. rcl The PI'I :inel the PI'I less foocl ancl energy each receclecl slightly in May, ancl \vtlen . footl ancl energy items are excluclecl. the inclex has remained essentially i~nchangeclthis year. In addition, the I'PI grobvth rate is more than t\vo percentage points below last year's r-ate. Similarly, purchasing managers have generally reportecl prices to I,e Ellling or holding steacly since late last ye:m Recent ~ n o d e m t eprice behavior at the inclustrial level prol,al>ly reveals more ahout conclitions specific (coi~titztrcdot? t7(',~.tp~zge) http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends July 1996 Best available copy Inflation and Prices (cont.) Index. 1982-84 = 1 1.59 FOMC'S IMPLIED CPI PATH 12-month percent cliange 36 FOMC'S CPI GROWTH PROJECTIONS - - - 1.50 Percent oi lorecasls 70 15-1 9 J M M J S N J M M J S N Percent of iorecasts -- I DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMISTS' 1997 CPI FORECASTSC 2.0-2 4 2 5-2 9 3 0-3 4 Annuallzed percent change 3.5-3.9 1.8-2.2 2 3-2 7 2.8-3.2 3.3-3 7 Annualized percent change I 3 8-4 2 a. Upper and lower bounds for CPI inflation path as implied by the central tendency growth ranges issued by the FOMC and nonvoting Reserve Bank presidents. b. 2.2% annualized growth represents a reference point between current CPI growth and the upper bound of the FOMC central tendency. c. Consensus forecast of the Blue Chip panel of economists. SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and Blue Chip Economic Indicators, January 16 and June 10,1996. to manufrict~~rers than aI>outgener;il inflationary trencls. Incleed. since 1990, the correlation I,et\veen m;lnLIf,ict~lring :. pricesand retail prices has much less optimistic than it ciocs toclay. An annualizecl gro\vth Itlte of n o more than 2.2% for the remainclcr o f 1996 would b e recluirecl for l>cen \veal<. LVhile CI'I gro\\.th has the CPI to end the year within the Feel's projected range. hovered :iro~lncl2 %Yo to 3%).rnanLlfactusing prices have fluctc~atecl It appe:arstthat many econo~nists .cviclely, fro111 a lo\v of about - I '/L% have 1,ecome more pessimistic in 1991 to nearly 3?0 last year. :il)out price trends for 1996. In JanuT h e CI'I continues to cli~nl,t o ary. approximately 65% of the H I L I ~ w r d the upper bouncl of the centlxl (:hip panel expected the sate of retenclency r.;unge projectecl I)y Fecleml t;iil price i~lcreasesto remain I>elo\v Reserve officials for 1996. When the 3% this pear. By June, only 59% lleltl rangc x a s announcecl in Pet7r~1al-y. 1l1at view. The percentage anticipaiing that the inflation rate wo~lldstay :in iipper limit of 3.0'Xr appe:irecl l~elo\v2.5Vi1clropped from H.i(?41to less th:an 2%)01-er the sariie period. .rhis , increased pessimism has not, ho\ve\.er, been as clearly reflectecl in the forecasts for 1997. In June. more than half o f the 1 3 1 ~ 1 ~ Chip economists predicted that the CI'I \v\iould kill into the 2.8% to 3.2% range nest year. co~nparecl \vith onl). 36% in J;inuary. The 1-a11l<sof those e s ~ c c t i n ggro~vthabove 3\',?4> ant1 those w f ~ oanticipate Iess thzun :i 2'/,%1rise ha\re I~othcl\\~indleclsince January. e e e a e e http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends July 1996 Best available copy e Economic Activity Real GDP and Components, 1996:lQa Revisionto Real GDP and Components, 1996:lCJa (Final estimate, ~.a.a.r.~) (Billions of 1992 dollars, ~ . a . ~ ) change, b~llions of 1992 $ Percent change, last: Four Quarter quarters 36.2 Real GDP Consumer spending 40.9 12.1 Durables 12.7 Nondurables 16.4 Services Business fixed 21.5 investment Equipment 18.2 3.5 Structures Res~dentialinvestment 4.8 Government spending 4.9 National defense 2.9 Net exports -1 8.0 Exports 4.0 Imports 22.0 Change in business -1 8.6 inventories Index 1987 = 1 00 1 20 AUTO PRODUCTION AND INVENTORIES I 2.2 3.6 8.5 3.6 2.5 1.7 2.7 6.2 1.4 2.7 12.4 14.1 7.9 7.4 1.6 3.8 6.0 6.6 4.5 2.0 -0.6 -4.0 - I Real GDP Consumer spending Durables Nondurables Services Business fixed investment Equipment Structures Residential investment Government spending National defense Net ex~orts ~xpohs Imports Change in business ~nventories - 2.0 10.2 6.4 5.0 - - Days' supplyd 95 Revisions Final level Second First 6.812.7 4,655.0 602.2 1,436.9 2,616.8 -2.8 -0.1 0.6 -0.4 -0.2 -8.1 1.6 1.4 2.1 -1.9 746.8 561.7 186.6 271.2 1,255.3 312.2 -114.6 803.8 918.4 0.2 1.1 -0.7 0.5 -3.3 -2.7 -4.0 -5.5 -1.5 0.3 -1.6 1.6 1.4 2.5 0.0 0.4 4.1 3.7 -2.1 3.6 -13.6 Percent change irom preceding quarter,s a a r 4.0 a. Chain-weighted data in 1992 dollars. b. Seasonally adjusted annual rate. c. Seasonally adjusted. d. U.S. dealers' current stock as a share of daily average sales (includes domestic and imported vehicles). SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Blue Chip Economic Indicators, June 19,1996; and Ward's Automotive Reports. Accorclirlg to the Commerce 11ep;~rtrnent's final figures, the econom). exp:inclecl at ;I 2.2% annuzll late in 1996:IQ. The initial estimxte of 2.8% was scvisecl clo-\vn\varcl primarily I>ecause of a massil-e clr.:l\vclo\vn of inventories. In the first clu:lrtcr, nearl). all i~ro:~cl sectors of tlie economy registerecl faster growth than they clicl ewer the past yexr. The most rlotal,le exception lvas in\-entories. After L: $10.5 \,illion increzlse in 1995:I\'Q. l,usinesses clrew clown their stocltpiles at a $2.1 billion annual sate in the first cluarter. Much of this reflected a strike-inclucecl reduction in automobile stoclts. Althougl~the drop in inventories was a cll-ag on first-quarter GDI? it also represents brighteneel prosjxctsfor near-term growth. IvI~ichof the atlticipatecl acceleration in scconcl-cluarter output reflects a n espcctecl rel>ouncl in motor vehicle procluction as ~nanufacturers at- tempt to rehc~ilclstoclts and 11leet strong sales clemand. >/lost economists par'ticipating in the J u n e Blue Cllip su~veylook for :I temporary surge in second-quarter activity, largely hasecl o n the rebuilcling of inventories. Through the remaincler of 1996 ancl in 1997, they foresee the economy expanding a~ :~l,oc~t a 2% clip. 'I'his ~lloclerationis consistent lvith recent estimates of the nation's potential gro~vth-;L (cotrtitrr red 017 ncxtp~lge) http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends July 1996 Best available copy Economic Activig (cont.) Index. 1987=1.OO Ratio 18 Percent change irom corresponding month of previous year l 2 [RETAIL SALES AND CONSUMER CONFIDENCE Index 1985=100 130 Percent change from corresponding month of previous year 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 J M M J S 1994 N J M M J S 1995 N J M M 1996 NOTE: All data are seasonally adjusted. SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and The Conference Board rate that is sustainable at high levels of resource uti1iz:ition. B ~ ~ s i ~ i e sat s e:ill s stages of procluction ancl tratle have managed to lower their inventory-to-sales mtios, even e s c l ~ ~ s i vofe a ~ ~ t o m o l ~ i lFures. ther trimming of stocks seekus unlikely, and in some sectors, inventories appear lean. Inclustrial procluction increasecl 0.7%)in Map for. the second consecutive month, but whereas April's gains cvere largely concent~kteclin autos, May's were ~ i l o r chroaclly 1,asecl. The nzltion's ~nan~~f>icturers, ~ltilities.:inti ~liines ol7er;~ted ;it 83.2% of capacit), in May, somewhat higher than in 1995:I\'Q. On a year-over-year basis, retail sales (acljusted for inflation) have I ~ e e nincreasing at a healthy 4% sate. Reviseel figures for personal consumption expenditures, a I>roacler nieasure of consunler outlays, have also shocvn moderately strong growth since February, often esceecling aclvances in real clisposal>le income. Hocvever, while consumption rose ;tbout 3% in may, real clispc)sal~leincome itlcreasecl slightly fnster. at ahout 3.1%.Although consunies attitc~clesappear fairly erratic on a month-to-mont Imsis, they remain at a tavorable level. While clel~t-servicingI>urdens and delinq~lencysates have piclced LIP,gains in stock ancl housing prices have 1,olsterecl householcl wealth. thsiness fisecl investment spending, tliough still strong, may soon I~eginto rnoclerate. New orders for nondefense capital goods jc~nlped 9.6?6 i i ~May. clue mainly to a n increase in expenclitures for commercial aircraft. I-Iowever, even excluding this \.olatile sector, orders have recently Ixen declining on a yearover-yeas l>asis. http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends July 1996 Best available copy Labor Markefs Change, thousands oi workers" 600 [AVERAGE MONTHLY NONFARM EMPLOYMENT GROWTH 1 Labor Market Conditionsa Average monthly change (thousands of employees) 1995 Year Payroll employment Goods-producing Manufacturing Construction Service-producing Services Computer Retail trade Federal govt. IIQ 1996 April May June 185 265 -5 26 -12 3 9 22 190 239 110 111 11 13 36 68 -5 -6 191 365 13 49 1 16 13 30 178 316 79 156 14 15 79 51 -3 -2 239 16 -7 23 223 99 9 75 -13 Average for period Civilian unemployment 5.6 5.4 5.4 5.6 5.3 rate (%) Average hourly earnings (dollars)b 11.5 11.8 11.7 11.7 11.8 Mfg. workweek (hours)b 34.5 34.4 34.3 34.2 34.7 to date 1996 Percent Percent Percent rising, one-month span a. Seasonally adjusted. b. Production and nonsupervisory workers. c. Vertical line indicates break in data series due to survey redesign. SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. June was cl~arz~cterized 12); wickspreacl strength in the nation's labor markets, as nonfarm payrolls aclcleci 239,000 workers. That expansion pushecl jobs growth for the first six months of the year above the 1.3 nill lion m:lrk, slightly better than 1995's first-half posting of 1.2 mil's inclcx of emlion. J ~ ~ n ecliffusion ployment (61.7%) reveals that the increase was clistri1)utecl among a wick v:u.iety o f inciustrics. Like~vise. the Bure:lu o f Lal~orStz~tisticsre- portccl that both the rise in the nonklrm ~vorkweekand the recorcl increase in average hourly earnings reflecteel broaci-based gains. .I he setvice-producing sector led the June advance, creating 223.000 new jobs on net. Growth in the narrow services industries was slightly I~clowaverage, while retail tracle establishtnents acldecl 75,000 ~ ~ o r l t e. r s nearly half of whom were hirecl 12). rcst:~~~rants and bars. The gooclsproclucing sector posted a small net increase of 16.000, although m a n w facturing employment was negative. The fecleral governnlent continued to trim payrolls, cutting 13,000 ~vorliers cluring the nionth. Ilouseholcl suxvey data also pointecl to strength in the nation's 1:ibor marliets. The unen~ployrnent Kite droppeel to 5.3% in June-its lo\\rest level in SLY years. In :~dclition, the employment-to-pop~~l;~tio~~ ratio mse once again, cclging up to 63.20/1. e e e e http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends July 1996 Best available copy e Education and Earnings 1993 dollars Percent FULL-TIME WORKFORCE BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL Percent Percent 240 REAL MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL AS A SHARE OF HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES' EARNINGSa 220 , - 180 More lhan 4 years of college - +- , 1 6 0 ' b ' - ' * , ' . - - . ... ', -. I . -. ,"., I 1 UNEMPLOYMENT RATE BY EDUCATlONAL LEVEL ' .I I .PJJ 4 years of college ,=-=, 140 &-" 5V/--" -"%"d%ez /w#-J <Pa 1-3 years of college 100 - Less than 4 years or h ~ g hschool a. Refers to full-time workforce. SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statist~cs;and U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census Arnerici~n t\.orliers are 1,ecoming more ec1uc:itccl. 13et1veen 1963 :inel 1993. the fr-:iction of the full-ti~ne workforce ~ v i t h o ~ ai t l ~ i g hschool cliplonla fcll from :il>ocit .iOO.;, to arouncl LO'%). \t,hile tile sh:~reof college gracluates rose from approximately 10'%1t o :ii,o~lt2%~. Weelil!. meclian earnings vary widely 1)). eclucational group, reinforcing the common Ixlief t i n t morc schooling means larger p:~yc h e c l i ~ .\Yliile t l ~ ' real (inflation:idjusteel) nleclian \\.e~lilyearnings of tliose \\.it11 less illan a college cle- gree have been falling since the early 19705, the opposite is true for those \vho have earned at least a I>achelor's cl~, -0ree. kIoreo\.er. the earnings clisparity hetween college graduates (inclucling those with advanced degrees) ancl other worliers has ~viclenecl.In the early 1960s, the median earnings ol' :Lperson who continuecl past college 1vcr.ea1,out 1.6 times more than those of an indiviclual with less than foils years of high school. I3y 1993, that gitp 1i:~Imore than doubleci. EXI-ningsclifferences across eclu- cation:ll groups. however. reveal only p x t of the variation in gross returns from education. Substantial clifferences also exist in unemployment sates. Worliers tvho failed to finish high school w e roughly five tinies Illore liliely to be jobless than those who continuecl their education past college. 111 other ~vorcls, higher eclucation leads to both Iligher wages :~nda better prol>ability of being ernployeel. The trends in educational attainnient I,y various r:ice ancl sex ( ~ 0 1 / t i i / ~ ( ~ ~I~Il o ~ 1. 7Y I ~ G ~ ~ ) Education and Earnings (cont.) 1993 dollars http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends July 1996 Best available copy 1993 dollars 1 REAL MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS Percenl 22 [ UNEMPLOYMENT RATE BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL: BLACKS [ Percent 18 UNEMPLOYMENT RATE BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL: WOMEN I a. Refers to full-time workforce. SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; and U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. g r o ~ i p sSolloxv milch the same pattern. Over the past three decacles, more full-time \v-orkers have c o n plctecl high school, ancl more have at least some college credits. T - I ~ I ~ ever: there are notal>le clifferences in the effect of eclucation on both the earnings ancl unemployment level of I>lacks ancl females. For the entire full-time worliforce, the earnings gap Ixtxi~een "more than college" anel '.less than high school" was zibout cloul,le in 1993. For blacks. however, the clifference was ;llready nearly double in 1963 anci was even higher in 1993 (about 2.6 times). As the median weekly earnings of those with advanced degrees approached $800 (in 1993 clollars): worlcers lacking a high school ctiploma were taking home about $300. For females, the difference is larger yet. Note also that the clisparity is still incre:lsing for both of these groi~ps.For blacks and women, the xv\iage premiurn due to education is greater- than it is for white males. This eclucation premium for l~laclcsancl females does not sho\v LIP as strongly in unemployment rates. Here again, persons who never gracluated from high school are a h o i ~ tfour ti~nesIllore lilcely to find themselves xvithout a job than those who hold at least a bachelor's clegree. Furthermore, since the micl1980s, ilnenlployrnent rates for women ancl l~lackswith a college clegree or postgr:lcluate work have been much less volatile than fix those \vho never finished high school. I 1 http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends July 1996 Best available copy Federal Budget Pyojections Percent of GDP 15 FEDERAL SPENDING PROJECTIONS BY CATEGORY Perceni oi GDP I 1 l o FEDERAL REVENUE PROJECTIONS BY CATEGORY lnd~v~dual Income tax *=-* ?-a=* 6 - 4 Payroll tax -- 7 -4--""- --au wT--enawa-#-- -erz -" x*-rA Corporate income tax 2 - -Z~ --=*---- a - =-m&-"mp--- -~-----s-~-.d~ Exc~seand other taxes 0 1995 l l l 1997 l l 1999 l 1 2001 1 2003 1 l 2005 I 2007 Percent 01 GDP 34 Perceni oi GDP 50 MANDATORY SPENDING PROJECTIONS BY CATEGORY / 40 35 32 Soclai Security 30 - 28 26 24 Medlca~d 15 - *../@ 20 * 1 0 1995 - / & 9 4 e A *@/vz&* 9 . I 1997 d I -- - / H I I 1999 C ~ 22 -d- 20 " I I 2001 l i 2003 l f 2005 i 2007 18 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 NOTE: Dates are CBO fiscal years. 1995 data are actual SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office. Congression;ll Buclget Office (CI30) projections show that. ~unclercurrent fiscal policies, total fecleral revenue as a shue o f GD1' \\rill clecline fronl 18.9% in 1995 to about 18.5% in 2001, ancl \\rill rem:tin at that level through 2006. Over this periocl, the only r e v e l i ~ ~category e expected to pick u p as a share of n:ttional output is the incliviclual income tas (8.2% to 8.79'0). 1':tyroll taxes s h o ~ ~ lholcl d steacly at arouncl 6.6%). while corporate t:ises ancl excise and other taxes arc seen as edging clown. These trencls reflect :t continuation of those ol,se~veclin the past. except for pay- roll tax revenues, whose share of GDP has increased consistently over tlie last foiu decacles. The iup~vardtrend in projected fetleral spencling continues to be clonlinated hy increased m:lndato~-j~ outlays. Escl~~clingoffsetting receipts, mandatory spending is espectecl to grow froril 10.3% of GDP in 1995 t o 12.9%)in 2006, mainly as a result of increased health care costs. Medicare's share of national output is seen as rising 1.3 percentage points over the next clecacle. while Medicaicl is projectecl to expa~lcl0.8 percentage point. In contrast, the CHO z~nticipatesnet interest outlays will reniain unchangecl, while clefense ancl no~ldefensecliscretionary spellcling are each espectecl to fall about 1.0 percentage point relative to output. As a result, the I~aselinefecler~l cleficit is on course to jump fro111 2.3% of GDP in 1995 to 3.3% in 2006. Ilowever, clespite the attention the deficit receives in the ~necliaand o n the campaign trail, what the govemment spencls our Ilioney on ancl how it taxes us to pay for that spencling are more important than the size of the overall cleficit. (corzti~ ~1c.don n~rtpcige) http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends July 1996 Best available copy Federal Budget P~ojections(cont.) Percent of GDP Percent of GDP IFEDERAL DEFICIT PROJECTIONS Percenl oi GDP 1 Perceni oi GDP NOTE: Dates are calendar years. 1995 data are actual. SOURCES: Congressional Budget Office; and U.S. Depaliment of Commerce. Bureau of Economic Analysis I-Zaseline deficit ancl clebt IILIIIIhers are witlely ~lseclto measure the hi~dget'simpact o n national saving a n d 011 the extent to which current will have to government pi~rchz~ses b e paicl for I>>, future generations. Analysts use several measures to address these concel-11s.For ex:lmple. the ~'stanclarclizecl employment deficit" refers to the amount of publ if lic borrowing that w o ~ ~ l coccur the econolny n-ere operating at fill1 potential. ?'he "on-l~i~clget" deficit refers to gener:ll government operations. >u.l)itrarilyexclucling Social Se- c~lrity2nd Postal Service accounts. In general, holvever, deficits are inaclequ:ite measures of how fiscal policies shift the burden of taxes and espenciitures fro111 older to younger generations, ancl of how that shift affects interest sates and national saving For example, stn~cturalchanges in taxes and trztnsfers may leave clebt ancl deficit levels untouchecl, yet tmnsfer hurtlens fro111 older Americans to younger a11cl fi~turegenerations, thel-eby affecting U.S. saving. Some clra~llaticstn~cturalchanges in taxes and transfers have taken place during the postwar periocl: L:il>or income a11d payroll taxespaid by younger. worliing generations-have i~lcreaseclas a share of GDP, whereas taxes on capital income-paicl ~rlostlyby olcler inclivicl~~als-have dropped su1,stantially. Moreover. Social Security. Medicare, and Meclicaicl transfers, n.11ich go mainly to olcler Americans, have sliyroclieted relative to nation;~l outpilt, nhile welfare tra~~sfers, which rnairlly benefit younger indi\ricluals (especially single mothers), have remained nearly constant. http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends July 1996 Best available copy Bank Lending Standards Percent oi respondents Percent of respondents loo I FDIC SURVEY OF LOAN UNDERWRITING PRACTICES 60 I RISK LEVEL FOR ENTIRE LOAN PORTFOLIO^ Change in standards Risk level for new loans Below average Average 1 Above average Percent of respondents 100 80 60 40 20 0 Eased somewhat a. Includes old loans. b. Survey was conducted in May 1996 for the previous three-month period. Includes commercial and industrial loans and credit lines. SOURCES: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Report on Underwriting Practices; and Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer Survey, May 1996. 13:lnlis face clelicate tmcle-off in rnzlliing loans. O n the one hand. if they lencl only l o uncleni:ll,ly safe ancl secure creclitors, then lentling. profits, anti perhaps economic growth n.ill s u f i r . If they relas their stanclarcls :lncl lencl to a hrozicler spectr-urn of crcclitors, then defaults may increase, threatening profits froln the other sicle. Furthermore, what is :~pprolxi:ite :it the clepths of :I recession may cliffcr from \\:hat's bc.st dnring ;l strong recover-!.. One measure of how banlis are responding to the challenge cornes from a recently released report on hank lencling stand;lrcls. The Federal Ileposit Insurance Corporation surveyecl examiners of 2,000 b:~nlison loan untlerwriting practices. Most I2anlts reported no change in lencling st:mtiarcls; of those that clicl note ch:ul~ges,nearly twice as many tightenecl as eased. The numl>er of hanlis that saisecl their standards ro~ighlycorresponcls to the numher reporting ahove-averxge risk o n new loans. When characterizing the risk of their entire portfolio (including olcl loans), most batllts again noted aver-ape or belo~v-average risk. Some states h;ld more than the usual numl~erof banlts reporting above-average sisli. notably California (jS"/o), Louisizwa (25%), and New York (24%). Another measure of bank lo:ln standards comes from the Federal fco?ztinue~l 071 izextpqqe) http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends July 1996 Best available copy Bank Lending Standards (cont.) Percent of respondents 60 1 KEY SOURCES OF CONSTRUCTION LOAN RISK i Percent of respondents 100 0 Failure lo consider alternative repaymenl sources Failure to verify alternative repayment sources Speculative projecls lnlerest paid by lender or deferred during loan term Percent of respondenls Tightened considerably Tightened considerably Tightened somewhat Basically unchanged Eased somewhat Eased considerably Tightened somewhat Basically unchanged Eased somewhat Eased considerably Percent of resoondents Tightened somewhat Basically unchanged Eased somewhat Eased considerabiy Tightened considerably SOURCES: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Report on Underwriting Practices; and Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer Survey, May 1996. Reserve's Senior Loan Officer Survey. For the I,road category of busi~less loans, banks reported almost 110 change in lencling standarcls over the 1:lst three months, with a slight bias towarcl tightening. Conlmercial real estate loans, which include construction ancl la11d clevelopment loans ancl loans secured by nonfarm, nonresidential land, can be risky I~ecausesuch projects typic;illy clo not produce an immecliate return for the horrower. Banlcs mitigate this risk by modifying the terms of the loan contmct, but some practices that have led to proble~nsin the past remain common. Of these, the most prevalent is banks' failure to check the quality of alternative repayment sources. This h i ~ p111ost concern, ~ v l ~ i cshowed often in New England, may be the source of the slight tightening in sta~lclarclsfor a nlinority of commercial real estate loans. The consumer lending side fol- lows a broaclly si~nilarpattern, nit11 most banlis reporting little or n o change in standards. About 10% of the responclent banks expressecl concern over collateml quality ancl repayment ability, but this seems not to have filtered down into major changes in behavior. Stantlartls for credit carcl loans are tightening, however. with rnore than a quarter of reporting hanks raising standards, some co~lsiclerably. http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends July 1996 Best available copy International Developments 1 Percentage po~nts INTEREST-RATE DIFFERENTIALS~ Billions of U.S dollars Percent change lrom corresponding month of prevlous year 45 CONSUMER PRICES 40 - 35 9 -*/flB - 25 - Uyi US 151005 -05 -10 , 4 . . , '/Y' Japan - %%-8 l J l F M t " ' A M J I J t A l l t S O N l I D J 1995 ' t F M t l A M J J 1996 a. 10-year minus 3-month interest rate. SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and DRIIMcGraw-Hill. The sl>re;~dIxtlveen long-term :lncl short-term interest rates has expanclecl cl~lringn ~ o s tof 1996 in the U.S., Germany. ancl the LJ.Iil. Over the I:~stmonth, this \viclening has stemmed from higher long rates, reflecting signs of economic strength and perh;~pshigI~er expecteel short rates. Despite some e\.iclcnce of renewed vigor in Japan, interest rates have not increased cl~lringthis same periocl. The dollar h;~s gainecl groclncl ;lg:iinst the yen in spite of periodic expectations of Jap:lnese morletary tightening. Recent statements suggest t1i;~tJapan's central k~anliis still ;~ttemptingto sustain the nation's recovery with low rates. The clollar has generally risen ag:iinst the German mark this year on signs of a strengthening U.S. economy. hut recently droppecl in the wake of reports showing renewecl Germ~ungrowth. The recent appreciation of the British pouncl can be p:trtially explained by the nation's continueel moderate expansion. Short-term interest rates have fallen over the past month, and the inflation r:lte contin~lesto clecline. Inflation pressures generally reConsumer prices in main s~~bcluecl. Japzln fell over in~lchof the last year, 1,ut llave been rising since Januai-y. Inklatioil in Germany remains stahle, and the U.S. llas seen only a slight uptick. Foreign exchange rates react to ~ t tracle balances ancl news a b o ~ 130th economic strength or weakness, ~vhiletlxcle 1,al;lnces are in turn infl~le~lcecl by excl1:lnge rates. However. these reactions often take time ancl are cornplic:ltecl by the uncertainty surrouncling futnre econorliic policies. Thus, it is not surprising that the Japanese trade surplus has declined clespite \\?e;lltness in the yen, while a first-quarter cteterio~ition in the U.S. balance has accompaniecl strength in the clollar. http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends July 1996 Best available copy Balance-ofpayments Trends Billions of U S dollars 250 Billions 01 U S dollars loo IU.S I BAWNCE OF PAYMENTS OFFICIAL CAPITAL F L O W S ~ Current account Billions of U.S. dollars U.S. Current Account: Savings and Investment [ NET INVESTMENT INCOME I (Percent of GDP) 1993 1994 1995 1996 14.3 15.2 15.8 16.2 Private 14.7 14.5 14.7 15.1 Government -0.4 0.7 1.1 1.1 Gross saving Foreign capital inflowC 1.5 2.2 2.1 1.9 Gross domestic investment 16.5 17.7 17.8 17.4 Statistical discrepancy -0.7 -0.3 0.1 0.7 a. Private capital flows have signs reversed and include the statistical discrepancy as unrecorded capital flows. Positive values represent a capital oufflow. b. Positive values represent a capital inflow. c. Foreign capital ~nflowsare the current account deficit with the sign reversed. NOTE: All 1996 data are annualized f~rst-quarterfigures. SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of Econom~cAnalysis; and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. l)relimin:iiy clata sllon. the U.S. c~irrent account cleficit r~lnningat a S 142 billion arinu:11 rate in 1906:IQ. *The current account inclucles tmcle in goocls ancl sei-\,ices, net investment inconlie, xncl i~llilateraltransf CIS. - - . h[ost eco110111istse s j x c t this year's current account cleficit to exceed last year's $1-tH 1,illion posting some~vlia t. A coilntry running a current :kccount cleficit is applying ~iioreof the world's oiitpiit to its oxvn consumption 311~1in\'estments th:~nit is pro- ducing. To finance its imports, tile l1.S. must export financi,<I1 i1ssetsclai~nso n o ~ nation's ~ r fxiture procluction-~ul~cl a net inflow of foreign capit'il milst occur. Any te~lclencyfor the foreign capital inflow not to match the ciirrent account deficit \\;ill initiate changes in interest rates, exchange Kites, and other economic variables to restore balance. Interestingly, a net private capital outflo~v accompaniecl the 1996:IQ current account cleficit. 'The recluisite net capital inflow canie when foreign gov- ernments aclclecl $206.5billion (annual rate) to their official holclings. Often, foreign governments \\rill mal<e such :I move to :lvoicl acljustments in the exchange rate. A country's al~ilityto service future foreign claims on its o ~ l t p u t without a decline in its standarcl o f living clepends on \vhetIier it uses foreign c:ipiral to finance consLlrlil,tion or investment. Apparently, recent net foreign-capital inflolvs ha1.e supported U.S. in\-,cstment. '