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January 2012 (December 9, 2011-January 3, 2012)

In This Issue:
Inflation and Price Statistics

Banking and Financial Institutions

 Short- and Long-term Inflation Expectations

 The Health of Federally-Insured Credit Unions

Monetary Policy

Regional Economics

 Central Bank Liquidity Swaps

 Domestic Migration and Its Impact on Ohio

Households and Consumers

 Household Financial Position

Inflation and Price Statistics

Short- and Long-term Inflation Expectations
01.03.2012
by Mehmet Pasaogullari and Patricia Waiwood

Annual Inflation
Percent

Dollars per gallon
$4.25

6.0
CPI

5.0

Gas prices

4.0

$3.50

Median CPI

3.0
2.0
Core CPI

$2.75

1.0
0.0

Trimmed-mean CPI

-1.0

$2.00

-2.0
-3.0
3/07

$1.25
12/07

9/08

6/09

3/10

12/10

9/11

Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Energy
Information Administration.

Survey One-Year Inflation Expectations
Percent
6.0
5.0
UM
4.0
3.0
2.0
SPF Core CPI
1.0
0.0
1/07

SPF CPI
10/07

7/08

4/09

1/10

10/10

7/11

Sources: Survey of Professional Forecasters; University of Michigan.

Annual inflation as measured by the Consumer
price index (CPI) has declined in each month since
September, following decreases in food and energy
prices. As of November, the annual inflation rate
is 3.4 percent. Despite this reassuring signal in the
wake of the first half of the year, when the CPI was
increasing, some households and market participants are still worried about an impending inflationary period. Those who are concerned point to
the upward trend in underlying inflation measures,
such as the core CPI (CPI excluding food and
energy prices). For example, the annual core CPI
inflation rate increased from 1.0 percent to 2.0 percent from January to August and then continued to
climb, reaching 2.2 percent in December.
Here we review various measures of inflation expectations, because expectations about future inflation
are both an important predictor and a factor in future inflation. We look at results from two surveys:
the University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumer
Attitudes and Behavior (UM) and the Philadelphia Fed’s Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF).
First, we look at near- and longer-term measures
of inflation expectations from both surveys, focusing on the median responses. Then, we turn again
to the SPF, looking this time at the likelihood that
participants assign (on average) to various ranges of
inflation rates for this year and 2012.
In general, near- and long-term inflation expectations appear contained. Both UM and SPF nearterm headline CPI expectations started to decline
in the second quarter of 2011 and continued to
decline through the end of this year. During the
second half of 2011, SPF long-term expectations
have increased slightly and are now more in line
with their historical levels. SPF respondents expect
to see core CPI inflation between 1.5 percent and
2.0 percent in 2012.
Inflation expectations from consumer surveys, like
the UM 1-year expectations series, are sensitive

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | January 2012

2

to energy prices. Starting in April of 2011, both
gas prices and the UM 1-year measure of inflation
expectations started to decline. They continued to
decline through December, when the expectations
measure bottomed out at 3.1 percent. While still
slightly higher than its average since 2000 (3.0 percent), the UM 1-year expectation currently sits 0.3
percentage points lower than it did at the beginning
of this year and 1.5 percentage points lower than its
peak in April.

2011:Q4 Core CPI Probabilities
Percent
60
2011:Q1
2011:Q2
2011:Q3
2011:Q4

50
40
30
20
10
0

Lower
than 1.0

1.0–1.4

1.5–1.9

2.0–2.4

2.5–2.9

Higher
than 3.0

Ranges for core CPI (percentage point)
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.

2012:Q4 Core CPI Probabilities
Percent
35
30

2011:Q1
2011:Q2
2011:Q3
2011:Q4

25
20

According to the SPF measures, short-term inflation expectations decreased from the third to the
fourth quarters of 2011. Over this period, expectations for 1-year CPI inflation ticked down just
slightly to 1.97 percent from 2.0 percent, while
expectations for 1-year core CPI inflation stayed
at 1.8 percent. Currently, these two measures of
expected short-term inflation are more in line with
each other than they were during previous quarters,
when they followed roughly the same path but
did so at different levels (the CPI stood about 0.3
percentage points above core CPI from 2011:Q12011:Q3).
The reason for this dispersion between SPF expectations for the CPI and the core CPI—and also for
the second-quarter peak of the UM measure—was
some forecasters’ reaction to rising energy prices
during the spring. As energy prices rose, short-term
expectations for the CPI adjusted to a higher level.
Expectations for the core CPI did not adjust in a
like manner because the core CPI excludes energy
prices. This also explains why expectations for the
core CPI did not fall with energy prices through the
second half of the year, like those for the CPI did.
In 2007, the SPF began to ask respondents to assign probabilities to the ranges of annual core CPI
inflation rates they predict for the current and the
following year. These probabilities are assigned
anew each quarter.

15
10
5
0
Lower
1.0–1.4
than 1.0

1.5–1.9

2.0–2.4

2.5–2.9

Higher
than 3.0

Ranges for core CPI; percentage point
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | January 2012

We turn first to these predictions for 2011. As
of November 2011, survey respondents thought
strongly that core CPI inflation would most likely
be in the 2.0-2.4 percent range at the end of this
year, as they assigned a 52.3 percent probability to
this outcome. This is the highest probability as3

Survey Long-Term Inflation Expectations
Percent
4.0
3.5

UM, 5- to 10-Year

3.0
2.5
2.0

SPF, CPI 10-year

As for current expectations of inflation for 2012,
inflation between 1.5 percent and 1.9 percent is
seen as the most likely outcome for core CPI inflation, with a probability of 31 percent.

SPF, CPI 5-year

1.5

signed to this range over the past four quarters. In
the second and third quarters of 2011, the average
survey response expected lower inflation—between 1.5 and 1.9 percent—assigning to this range
probabilities of 34.2 percent and 38.2 percent,
respectively. In the first quarter, the average survey
response expected the lowest range of core CPI
inflation rates, with a probability of 18.5 percent.

1.0
0.5
0.0
1/07

9/07

5/08

1/09

9/09

5/10

1/11

9/11

Sources: Survey of Professional Forecasters; University of Michigan.

The UM expectation for long-term (5- to 10-year)
inflation declined to 2.7 percent in October and
held that level through December. The drop to 2.7
percent was a slight one from 2.9 percent, which
was the level the measure had held firmly since
July. In June, the UM expectation rose slightly to 3
percent from 2.9 percent in April. The UM expectation hit its 2011 peak, 3.2 percent, in March.
Meanwhile, SPF expectations for longer-term inflation have risen slightly. Since the August survey,
the 5-year measure has risen to 2.4 percent from
2.3 percent. During the same period, the 10-year
inflation expectation also increased—again, by 0.1
percentage points—to 2.5 percent. These increases
since the August survey are bringing these two measures closer to their historical levels.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | January 2012

4

Monetary Policy

Central Bank Liquidity Swaps
12.19.2012
by Todd Clark and John Lindner

Dollar Liquidity Swaps, by Counterparty
Billions of dollars
600
550
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
12/2007

Bank of Japan
European Central Bank
Bank of England
Other banks

9/2008

6/2009

3/2010

12/2010

11/2011

Note: Other banks include Bancode Mexico, Bank of Korea, Danmarks
Nationalbank, Norges Bank, Reserve Bank of Australia, SverigesRiksbank, and
Swiss National Bank.
Source: Federal Reserve Board.

Dollar Liquidity Swaps, by Tenor
Billions of dollars
600
550
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
12/2007

1 day
2-7 days
8-30 days
31-60 days
60 or more days

9/2008

6/2009

3/2010

12/2010

11/2011

Source: Federal Reserve Board.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | January 2012

Two weeks ago, the Federal Reserve took action to
expand the capabilities of its liquidity swap lines
with other central banks. The Fed lowered the
rate that it charges central banks on existing dollar
liquidity swap lines, and it extended the authorization of those lines to February 1, 2013. In addition,
the Fed reinstated reciprocal swap lines with other
central banks, so that operations can be conducted
using foreign currencies.
These central bank swap lines were originally put
in place at the beginning of the financial crisis in
2007, and since then they have been used periodically. A look back at how they were used during the
crisis can help to explain why these recent actions
were taken.
For foreign banks, liquidity problems started in
2007 because of the proliferation of dollar-denominated assets in the global banking system. A large
chunk of securities, such as the now-infamous
mortgage-backed securities (MBS), ended up in the
hands of foreign banks, and those banks had funded those assets in short-term, wholesale markets.
More simply, the banks were borrowing dollars for
periods of less than 3 months to buy these longterm securities. That strategy works when markets
are liquid, but by the middle of 2007, that was no
longer the case.
With the financial crisis sharply reducing liquidity in financial markets, foreign central banks used
the swap lines to borrow large amounts of dollar
liquidity in 2008 and 2009. By far, the biggest user
was the European Central Bank, whose outstanding
amounts peaked in late 2008 at over $300 billion.
The Bank of England and the Bank of Japan also
were heavy users, topping out at $95 billion and
$125 billion, respectively. There were seven other
central banks that all conducted operations as well,
but they made up a minority of the outstanding
balances at any one point in time.

5

Dollar Liquidity Swaps, 30 Days or Less
Percent

Billions of dollars

3.5

450
400

3.0

350
2.5

300
250

2.0

200

1.5

150

1.0

100

1-month LIBOR-OIS

0.5

50
0
1/2007

0.0
10/2007 7/2008

4/2009

1/2010 10/2010

7/2011

Sources: Federal Reserve Board; Bloomberg.

Dollar Liquidity Swaps, More Than 30 Days
Percent

Billions of dollars
400

4.0

350

3.5

300

3.0

250

2.5

200

2.0

150

1.5
1.0

100
3-month LIBOR-OIS

0.5

50
0
1/2007

0.0
10/2007 7/2008

4/2009

1/2010 10/2010

7/2011

Sources: Federal Reserve Board; Bloomberg.

At the very height of the crisis, the swaps were
being drawn at shorter tenors. One-day draws
peaked in October 2008, spiking up to over $150
billion, and tenors within one week topped $150
billion in early November 2008. The same was true
with swap operations that lasted for one month,
as they quickly hit their highest point in the last
three months of 2008. However, by the first part of
2009, swaps of longer tenors easily started dominating the composition of the outstanding operations. Swaps with tenors of 60 or more days grew to
over $360 billion.
Collectively, these programs helped to improve
liquidity in the interbank lending market. One way
to measure how effective the dollar lending was at
easing conditions is to look at the 1-month and
3-month Libor-OIS spreads. The Libor is the London interbank offer rate, a floating rate that fluctuates depending on how risky the borrowers appear
to the lenders. The overnight indexed swap (OIS)
rate is a more stable rate, and it simply measures
the cost of swapping a fixed interest rate for a floating interest rate.
Noticeably, the spreads on the 1-month and
3-month measures widened substantially during the
fall of 2007, meaning lenders saw foreign banks as
more risky than they had in the past. The spreads
spiked from 10 basis points (bp) to 50 bp in a matter of days, putting strains on the balance sheets of
foreign banks. Following the collapse of Lehman
Brothers in September 2008, both 1-month and
3-month spreads increased from their already elevated levels to crisis peaks.
The interesting observation is that when swap
operations began to be used heavily, the spreads
fell below their previously elevated levels. Just two
months after the surge in shorter-term swaps, the
Libor-OIS spreads fell from their peaks to levels
much closer to normal. For example, instead of falling to the elevated 50 bp threshold, the 1-month
spread tumbled all the way to 30 bp and continued
to soften in early 2009. Similarly, the longer-term
Libor-OIS spread receded to more normal levels as
large amounts of long-term swaps were drawn.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | January 2012

6

Even though these swaps had expired in February
2010, they were quickly reauthorized in May 2010
after the beginning of the Greek debt crisis. Evidence of the strains caused by this crisis can be seen
in the Libor-OIS spreads, which rose to 15 bp and
33 bp in the 1- and 3-month periods, respectively.
Helped in part by the swap lines, as liquidity in the
interbank funding market improved, the spreads
calmed during the summer of 2010.
More recently, with other European countries’
finances under pressure, liquidity in the interbank
market has again deteriorated. The 1-month spread
recently hit 19 bp, and the 3-month spread is now
nearing 50 bp. In response to these conditions, the
Fed and other central banks took action to make
more liquidity available.
Specifically, the Fed lowered the cost of dollar
liquidity to the other central banks. Instead of
charging 100 bp over the OIS rate, the Fed is now
requiring a spread of 50 bp over OIS. By lowering
this rate, the Fed has effectively put a ceiling on
the cost of dollar liquidity. Terms for operations
conducted using foreign currencies have not yet
been determined, but those will be decided upon if
U.S. banks start experiencing greater strains in their
foreign currency funding.
Already European banks have taken advantage of
the extension of dollar liquidity. Last week, the European Central Bank reported that over $50 billion
of 84-day swaps were drawn by banks in the euro
zone. Although these quantities are very small compared to crisis-level amounts, the swap line actions
taken by the Fed and other central banks should
help support market liquidity.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | January 2012

7

Households and Consumers

Household Financial Position
12.19.2011
by O. Emre Ergungor and Patricia Waiwood

Household Wealth and Consumption
Billions of dollars
12,000

Ratio
7
6

10,000

5
8,000
4

Wealth-to-income ratio

6,000

3
4,000
Personal consumption expenditures
2,000

2
1

0
1980

0
1983 1987 1990 1994 1998 2001 2005 2008

Notes: Shaded bars indicate recessions. Wealth is defined as household net worth.
Income is defined as personal disposable income.
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.

Personal Savings Rate
Percent of income

12
10
8
6
4
2

1984

1988

While people often associate the word “savings”
with money in the bank, an increase in the savings rate also means that people are paying down
their debts. Before the downturn, in April 2005,
the personal savings rate reached a record low of
just 0.8 percent. Since then, however, the rate has
steadily increased, peaking at 6.2 percent in 2008
and maintaining rates above 4.3 percent. Currently,
the savings rate sits at 3.8 percent, which is roughly
where it was in 2004.
Outstanding home mortgage debt is still contracting, reflecting record write-offs and reduced demand for homeownership. Revolving consumer
credit, which primarily includes credit card balances, plummeted in 2008 and is currently 1.7
percent below year-ago (third-quarter 2010) levels.
Nonrevolving consumer credit, which consists of
the secured and unsecured credit for student loans,
auto financing, durable goods, and other purposes,
is actually 4.4 percent above year-ago levels.

14

0
1980

In the years preceding the stock market and housing bubbles, household wealth grew faster than incomes, leading Americans to believe that they were
getting richer. As the bubbles burst, the wealth-toincome ratio took a dive and returned to its longterm trend. The adjustment took place as households constrained their spending and reduced their
debt. After peaking in 2008, household consumption expenditures dropped slightly (1.69 percent),
hitting a trough in 2009. Yet since then, the wealth
ratio has stabilized, and consumption expenditures
have resumed growth, already climbing 2.2 percent
beyond the pre-recession peak.

1992

1996

2000

2004

2008

Notes: Shaded bars indicate recessions. Quarterly Averages of Monthly Data.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | January 2012

Part of the decline in outstanding debt is attributable to people defaulting on their obligations and
reducing their debt in bankruptcy. Nonbusiness
bankruptcy filings spiked dramatically in October
2005—before the federal government enacted the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, a sweeping reform of the U.S. bank8

ruptcy code designed to make it more difficult for
debtors to file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Following
an initial postreform decline, bankruptcy filings
started to increase, and as of June 2011, the number of bankruptcies had reached 118,000.

Outstanding Debt
Four-quarter percent change
29
24

Revolving consumer credit

19

Home mortgages

Certain delinquency rates are not likely to return to
their pre-crisis levels soon. As of the third quarter
of 2011, delinquency rates for residential real-estate
and commercial real-estate loans remain extremely
elevated (10.2 and 6.7 percent respectively). On the
other hand, credit card and commercial and industrial (C&I) loan delinquencies are at or below their
respective pre-crisis levels. In the third quarter of
2011, these rates sat at 3.5 and 1.8 percent, respectively.

14
9
4
-1

Nonrevolving consumer credit

-6
-11
1991

1995

1999

2003

2007

2011

Notes: Seasonally-adjusted quarterly data. Shaded bars indicate recessions.
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

Indexes of consumer sentiment and confidence
have gained traction since early 2009, likely due
in part to recent small payroll gains, stabilizing
(though still depressed) home sales, and stock market performance this past year. Be that as it may,
the indexes still have a ways to go before returning
to pre-recession levels.

Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Filings
Thousands
250
619,000
200

150

100

50

0
1991

1995

1999

2003

2007

2011

Note: Shaded bars indicate recessions.
Source: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.

Consumer Attitudes

Delinquency Rates
Percent of Average Loan Balances

Index, 1966=100

14

140

12

120

10

Commercial real
estate loans

Residential real
estate loans

Index, 1985=100
180

Consumer Sentiment:
University of Michigan

160
140

100

120
80

8
6

Commercial and
industrial loans

60

Credit cards

4

40

2

20

0
1991

1995

1999

2003

2007

100

2011

Note: Shaded bars indicate recessions.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | January 2012

0
2000

80
60
Consumer Confidence:
Conference Board

40
20
0

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

Note: Shaded bars indicate recessions.
Source: University of Michigan, The Conference Board.

9

Banking and Financial Markets

The Health of Federally-Insured Credit Unions
12.20.2011
by Matthew Koepke and James Thomson

Credit Union Industry Structure
Number in thousands
10.0

Dollars in billions

Total credit union assets

1000

Number of credit
unions

7.5

750

5.0

500

2.5

250

0.0

0
2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Source: National Credit Union Administration.

Credit Union Lending Trends
Dollars in billions

Percent

700

Loan growth

Amount of loans

12.0

600

10.0

500

8.0

400

6.0

300

4.0

200

2.0

100

0.0

0

Credit unions are cooperatively owned depository institutions that provide financial services to
their members. They serve as a viable alternative to
commercial banks and savings associations for basic
depository institution services such as consumer
loans, checking accounts, and savings accounts.
Like banks and savings associations, the credit
union industry has followed a path of consolidation.
From 2004 to June 2011, the number of federallyinsured credit unions has fallen from 9,014 institutions to 7,239 institutions. However, over the same
time period, total credit union assets rose nearly
46 percent from $647.0 billion to $942.5 billion.
Moreover, the number of credit union members has
steadily increased, growing 8.9 percent from 83.6
million members at the end of 2004 to 91.0 million members at the end of June 2011.
Fueled by positive loan growth, credit union assets
grew through the end of 2009, before turning negative in 2010 and 2011. From 2004 to 2009, loans
issued by federally-insured credit unions grew 38.1
percent from $ 414.3 billion to $572.4 billion.
However, like at banks and savings institutions,
from 2010 to midyear 2011, loans at federallyinsured credit unions fell 1.5 percent to $564.0
billion.

-2.0
2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2010

Source: National Credit Union Administration.

It is interesting to note that from 2004 to 2007,
loans as a share of assets grew moderately, increasing from 64.0 percent to 70.0 and started to
decline in 2008, falling 10 percentage points to
59.8 percent of assets by midyear 2011. Based on
the decline in the amount of loans on credit unions’
balance sheets as well as the reduction of the loans’
total share of credit union assets, it appears that,
like commercial banks and savings institutions,
credit unions have not been immune to the ongoing deleveraging by households.
Federally-insured credit union shares have risen
steadily since 2004. Shares, which are the equiva-

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | January 2012

10

Credit Union Shares
Dollars in billions

Percent

900

12.0
Amount of shares

Share growth
750

10.0

600

8.0

450

6.0

300

4.0

150

2.0
0.0

0
2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

lent of deposits in banks and savings associations,
are the primary source of funds for credit unions,
accounting for roughly 85 percent of total sources
of funds. Like the growth in loans, the annual
growth of credit union shares has fluctuated over
the past 7.5 years, varying between 3.9 percent and
10.5 percent. Overall, shares grew at a robust 4.8
percent annual growth rate over this time period.
From 2004 to June 2011, credit unions have continued to accumulate capital, with the exception of
2009 when capital fell 1.2 percent. Overall, credit
union capital has increased from $70.6 billion the
end of 2004 to $95.7 billion at the end of June
2011, an improvement of more than 35 percent.

Source: National Credit Union Administration.

Credit Union Profitability
Percent

Percent

10.0

1.0
Return on assets

Return on equity

8.0

0.8

6.0

0.6

4.0

0.4

2.0

0.2

0.0

0.0
2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Source: National Credit Union Administration.

Credit Union Capital
Dollars in billions

Percent
10.0

120
Capital growth

Capital

100

8.0

80

6.0

60

4.0

40

2.0

20

0.0

0

Not surprisingly, since retained earnings are the
only source of capital for credit unions, the pace of
capital accumulation mirrors the general downward
trend in the return on average assets (ROA) and the
return on average equity (ROE) since 2004. The
return on average assets fell from 0.92 percent in
2004 to 0.17 percent in 2009. In 2010, the return
on average assets rebounded to 0.51 percent and
continued to improve to an annualized rate of 0.71
percent for the first half of 2011. Not surprisingly,
over the same time period, the return on equity followed a similar pattern. The decline in profitability
for credit unions during the 2007-2009 recession is
due in part to steadily increasing operating expenses
per dollar of assets and the relatively high costs of
funds.
Overall, the health of the credit union industry
appears to be good. Capital as a percent of assets
stands at 10.1 percent at midyear 2011. On the
other hand, asset quality, while improving, continues to be a concern. Delinquent loans as a share
of total loans has improved, falling from a peak of
1.84 percent in 2009 to 1.58 percent at midyear
2011—well above the pre-financial-crisis loan-delinquency rate of 0.68 percent at the end of 2006.

-2.0
2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Source: National Credit Union Administration.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | January 2012

11

Regional Economics

Domestic Migration and Its Impact on Ohio
12.21.2011
by Guhan Venkatu and Kyle Fee
Americans tend to be more mobile than others
in the industrialized world. According to a recent
study*, the fraction of Americans who moved in
2005—roughly 12 percent—was about twice as
high as the fraction that moved in most European
countries outside of Northern Europe during the
same time. While Americans’ annual mobility rates
remain high by international standards, they appear
to have trended down since at least 1980, though
the reasons for this remain unclear.

U.S. Net Domestic Migration

Less than -100,000
-100,000 – -50,000
-50,000 – 0
1 – 50,000
50,000 – 100,000
Greater than 100,000
Source: American Community Survey, 2005-2009

Net Domestic Migration to/from Ohio

State proportion of Ohio’s net outflow

State proportion of Ohio’s net inflow

Greater than 10%
5.1–10%
0–5%
0–5%
5.1–10%
Greater than 10%

Source: American Community Survey, 2005-2009.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | January 2012

What has changed less over this period is where
Americans are going. About 2.5 percent of Americans move from one state to another in a given year,
and for several decades, these flows have tended to
transfer population from the Midwest and Northeast toward the South and West. More recent data,
from 2005 to 2009, suggest that this general movement of population is continuing to take place.
What accounts for this ongoing trend? Some explanations emphasize economic factors, such as less
onerous land and labor regulations in the South,
likely to be favored by businesses. Other explanations emphasize more desirable weather, as well as
proximity to natural amenities, like mountains or
oceans, likely to be favored by households. Which
of these explanations turns out to be closer to the
truth has important implications for states that
have seen net outmigration on average over the last
few decades. The former explanation suggests that
different policy choices can reverse the observed
trend.
Ohio, like many Midwestern states, saw a net
outmigration over the period from 2005 to 2009,
taking in about 35,000 fewer individuals from
other states than it transferred to them. It received
individuals on net from the District of Columbia
and 16 states which were largely concentrated in
the northeast and upper Midwest, and it made net
transfers to 33 states which were generally in the
South and West.
12

Ohio gained the most net migrants from Michigan (+3,043), New York (+1,821), and Illinois
(+1,797); and lost the most net migrants to Florida
(−7,954), North Carolina (−6,417), and Texas
(−5,635).

Net Domestic Migration to and from
Ohio
Net migrant
5,000

Net migration flows from Ohio to other states
tended to be consistent with broader, national net
migration flows.

0

−5,000

Among these first three states, net inflows from Illinois and Michigan were weighted heavily toward
those under 35. For New York, net inflows for individuals under 35 outpaced those of older individuals by about two-to-one. There were meaningful
net inflows of individuals with advanced degrees,
but these were outpaced by inflows of individuals
without a college degree by at least three-to-one.

−10,000
FL TX AZ WV IN CO VA OK WI WA MT ME CT SD ID UT NH MA MS NE IA DE PA NJ NY
NC KY GA SC NV AL OR LA TN KS MO RI HI DC WY NM AR VT MN ND AK MD CA IL MI

Source: American Community Survey, 2005−2009.

Net Domestic Migration,
United States and Ohio

Among the states to which Ohio lost migrants on
net, there were losses across all age and educational
attainment categories. In North Carolina and
Texas, these losses were weighted toward younger
individuals (those under 34) by at least two-toone. For Florida, this ratio was almost two-to-one
in favor of older individuals. As far as educational
attainment, net outflows to Texas and North
Carolina were weighted toward those with at least
a college degree; however, for Florida, net outflows
were weighted modestly toward those without a
college degree.

Net migration, U.S.
200,000
TX

100,000

NC

GA AZ
SC

0
MI

IL

VA
TN
WA
OR
ALCO
OK
PA AR
NV
UT
IDMO
MT
IA
DE
NM
SD
ND
KS
WI
NE
NH
ME
INWV
VT
WY
HI
RI
MS
CT
DC
MDMN
MA
AK
LA
NJ

FL

KY

−100,000
NY CA

−200,000
−5,000

0

5,000

10,000

*“Internal Migration in the United States,” by Raven Molloy, Christopher L. Smith, and Abigail Wozniak. 2011. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, vol. 25, no. 3.

Net outmigration, Ohio

Migration Flows to and from Ohio by Age for Selected States
2011
Education

In

Out

2011
Net

In

Out

2011
Net

In

Out

2011
Net

In

Out

2013
Net

In

Out

2016
Net

In

Out

Net

<18

3,244

3,017

227

1,252

813

439

1,536

800

736

3,436

4,419

−983

1,462

2,662

−1,200

1,896

2,511

−615

18-24

5,144

4,024

1,120

2,671

2,544

127

3,227

2,755

472

2,173

3,455

−1,282

1,141

3,388

−2,247

1,182

2,987

−1,805

25-34

4,497

2,841

1,656

2,092

1,488

604

2,303

1,829

474

3,747

4,388

−641

1,851

3,118

−1,267

1,658

−1,333

2,991

35-44

1,569

1,753

−184

953

774

179

864

780

84

2,050

3,165

−1,115

918

1,499

−581

1,279

1,497

−218

45-54

1,304

1,047

257

684

472

212

528

552

−24

2,057

2,484

−427

305

718

−413

759

1,553

−794

55-64

812

597

215

431

343

88

328

397

−69

1,001

3,012

−2,011

259

630

−371

436

1,017

−581

>65

450

All 17,020

698

−248

414

242

172

199

75

124

2,140

3,635

−1,495

461

799

−338

273

562

−289

13,977

3,043

8,497

6,676

1,821

8,985

7,188

1,797

16,604

24,558

−7,954

6,397

12,814

−6,417

7,483

13,118

−5,635

Note: Individuals 25 and over only.
Source: American Community Survey, 2005-2009.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | January 2012

13

Migration Flows to and from Ohio by Age for Selected States
2011
Education

In

Out

High school
diploma or less

3,476

2,546

Some college

1,927

1,508

College degree

1,586

More than
college degree

1,643

All

8,632

2011
Net

2011

In

Out

Net

In

Out

930

1,620

1,234

386

1,505

879

419

1,050

509

541

613

1,536

50

1,035

981

54

1,346

297

869

595

274

6,936

1,696

4,574

3,319

1,255

2011
Net

In

Out

626

6,077

472

141

2,311

1,189

1,565

−376

915

717

198

4,222

3,633

589

2013

2016

Net

In

Out

Net

In

Out

Net

8,188

−2,111

1,649

2,046

–397

1,889

2,698

−809

3,332

−1,021

895

1,682

−787

948

1,211

263

1,729

3,197

−1,468

878

1,967

−1,089

793

1,836

−1,043

783

2,204

−1,421

457

1,200

−743

785

1,507

−722

10,995

16,684

−5,689

3,794

6,764

−2,970

4,405

7,620

−3,215

Note: Individuals 25 and over only.
Source: American Community Survey, 2005-2009.

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14