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December 2011 (November 11, 2011-December 6, 2011)

In This Issue:
Banking and Financial Institutions
 Mortgage Market Struggles to Gain Footing

Inflation and Price Statistics
 Inflation Takes a Breather…

Growth and Production
 Why Some European Countries and Not the
U.S.?

Monetary Policy
 Policy Innovations at the Zero Lower Bound

Households and Consumers
 Recent Trends in Neighborhood Poverty

Regional Economics
 Pittsburgh’s Labor Market in the Recession and
Recovery

Banking and Financial Markets

Mortgage Market Struggles to Gain Footing
11.29.11
by Yuliya Demyanyk and Matthew Koepke
After a difficult first and second quarter, the U.S.
mortgage market is projected to improve in the
third quarter of 2011. According to the Mortgage
Bankers Association’s October forecast, home mortgage production is projected to improve 6.6 percent
in the third quarter. According to the forecast,
refinance originations are expected to increase 13.3
percent to $204 billion, while purchase originations
are projected to fall 4.5 percent to $105 billion.
The two-to-one ratio of refinance originations to
new purchase originations suggests that mortgage
demand continues to be driven by the favorable interest rate environment and not consumers seeking
to purchase a new home.
While the improvement in the third quarter’s
projected performance is welcomed, it suggests that
there is considerable weakness in the U.S. mortgage
market. According to the Mortgage Bankers Association, the quarterly average for total mortgage
production in 2011 is $300 billion per quarter, well
below the quarterly averages of 2009 and 2010,
where total mortgage production stood at $499 billion and $393 billion, respectively.

1-4 Unit Residential Mortgage Originations
Dollars in billions
1000
Purchase originations
800
600
Refinance originations
400
200
0
3/2000

2/2002

3/2004

3/2006

3/2008

3/2010

The dramatic reduction in total mortgage originations suggests that low interest rates are having a
diminished impact on driving refinance originations and increased demand for mortgages will
have to come from increased demand for housing.
However, significant headwinds exist that may
prevent the demand for housing to improve in the
immediate future.
One significant headwind facing the housing
market recovery is the persistently high levels of
seriously delinquent mortgages. While nonseriously
delinquent mortgages (30-89 days) have shown
signs of improvement recently, falling 34 basis
points over the last quarter to 4.49 percent of all
mortgages, seriously delinquent mortgages remain
stubbornly high. Even though seriously delinquent
mortgages—defined as mortgages that are 90 days

Source: Mortgage Bankers Association.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | December 2011

2

1-4 Unit Residential Mortgage Delinquency
Rates
Rate
12.0
10.0
8.0
6.0

Not seriously delinquent, SAa

or more past due plus mortgages in foreclosure—
have come down from their 2009 peak, recent
data suggest that the decline has halted. In fact,
in the third quarter of 2011, seriously delinquent
mortgages rose 4 basis points to 7.89 percent of
all mortgages. The level of seriously delinquent
mortgages is primarily driven by the inventory
foreclosures; consequently, the level of seriously
delinquent loans will remain high until foreclosures
begin to fall.

4.0
2.0
Seriously delinquent, NSAb
0.0
a. Includes mortgage 30–89 days delinquent.
b. Includes mortgage 90 or more days delinquent or in foreclosure.
Sources: Mortgage Bankers Association, Haver Analytics.

Number of HAMP Trial Modifications
Started per Month
Percent

Due to the number of risky mortgages made from
2004 to 2008 and the reduced support for at-risk
consumers, it may not be realistic to expect the
level of foreclosures to decline in the immediate
future. A recent study from the Center for Responsible Lending suggests that we may be only halfway
through the foreclosure crisis. According to the
study, 8.3 percent mortgages (3.6 million loans)
made between 2004 and 2008 are at an immediate
risk of foreclosure. Consequently, the number of seriously delinquent mortgages may actually increase
in the near future.

100
80
60
40
20
0
1/2010

7/2010

1/2011

7/2011

Source: Department of Treasury.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | December 2011

Additionally, the potential increase in foreclosures
comes at a time when some supports put in place
during the financial crisis may be phasing out.
According to data released by the Department of
Treasury, the number of trial modifications started
under the government’s HAMP program fell to
15,000. Moreover, on a quarterly basis, the number
of trial modifications started in the third quarter
of 2011 was significantly lower than in the second
quarter of 2011. According to the Department of
Treasury, the number of new trial modifications
under the HAMP program in the third quarter
stood at 52,000—the lowest level since the start of
the program. The persistent decline in the number
of new trial modifications suggests that there is a
larger effort to sustain current permanent modifications instead of starting new ones.

3

Growth and Production

Why Some European Countries and Not the U.S.?
12.02.2011
by Pedro Amaral and Margaret Jacobson
These days it seems it is just a matter of time until
we hear about the next euro zone country whose
interest rates on sovereign debt will start soaring.
What started with Greece, Portugal, and Ireland
Real GDP and Private Domestic Expenditures has since spread to countries of greater economic
importance such as Spain and Italy. The United
Annualized percent change
States is dealing with serious debt issues, too, but
12
while Spain and Italy face increased borrowing
Real private domestic
9
costs, interest rates on U.S. government debt are at
expenditures
6
all-time lows.
3
Real GDP

0
-3
-6
-9
-12
2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Notes: Private domestic expenditures is the sum of private consumption and private
investment. Shaded bar indicates recession.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Why are interest rates on U.S. sovereign debt so
much lower than those of Greece, Italy, Portugal,
Ireland, and Spain? (For simplicity we will call these
countries the euro zone periphery or EZP.) The two
most frequently cited possibilities are substantial
differences across countries in either the ratio of
sovereign debt to GDP or in the countries’ growth
prospects. Neither possibility seems to explain the
sovereign debt spreads between the EZP and the
U.S.
The sovereign-debt-to-GDP ratio could cause the
interest rate spread if it were much smaller in the
U.S. than in the EZP countries. While that is true
for most of the EZP countries, Spain has a smaller
debt-to-GDP ratio than the U.S. and Ireland has
one similar to the U.S. The amount of debt outstanding, however, may not tell the whole story behind the interest rates. In particular, two countries
may have the same debt-to-GDP ratio and have
very different immediate financing needs. When we
look at financial obligations over the next few years,
or at the average debt maturities, we see very little
difference between the U.S. and the group of EZP
economies experiencing large increases in interest
rates.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | December 2011

4

Gross Financing Needs (Percent of GDP)
2011

2012

Maturing
Debt

Budget
Deficit

Total
financing
need

Maturing
Debt

Budget
Deficit

Total
financing
need

Average years to maturity
(as of September 2011)

Debt to GDP ration
(2010)

U.S.

17.6

9.6

27.3

22.4

7.9

30.4

5.1

72.6

Greece

15.71

8.0

23.7

9.6

6.9

16.5

6.9

144.72

Italy

18.5

4.0

22.6

21.1

2.4

23.5

7.2

117.2

Portugal

16.1

5.9

22.0

17.9

4.5

22.3

6.0

88.7

Spain

13.4

6.1

19.6

15.4

5.2

20.6

6.2

48.7

Ireland

8.7

10.3

19.0

5.3

8.6

13.9

6.2

78.0

1. Greece’s maturing debt assumes 90 percent participation in the debt exchange.
2. Eurostat calculation.
Source: International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Monitor, September 2011.

The spread might also arise if the growth outlook is
better for the U.S. That is true, for the most part,
but in order for future growth to help the fiscal
situation, it needs to lift future revenues and reduce
future deficits. Looking at deficit projections,
anticipated U.S. growth does not seem sufficient to
bring down the U.S. deficit in comparison to the
deficits of the EZP.

Gross Financing Needs (Percent of GDP)
2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

United States

–9.6

–7.9

–6.2

–5.5

–5.6

–6.0

Greece

–8.0

–6.9

–5.2

–2.8

–2.8

–2.8

Italy

–4.0

–2.4

–1.1

–1.1

–1.1

–1.0

Portugal

–5.9

–4.5

–3.0

–2.3

–1.9

–1.7

Spain

–6.1

–5.2

–4.4

–4.1

–4.1

–4.1

Ireland

–10.3

–8.6

–6.8

–4.4

–4.1

–3.7

Source: International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Monitor, September 2011.

The size of the 10-year government bond spread
between the U.S. and the EZP is pretty significant.
There are several other reasons that might explain
why rates are still so low in the U.S.
First, as the Irish know all too well, banking balance sheet problems can quickly turn into sovereign
problems. In the fall of 2010, the Irish government
had to intervene to recapitalize the banks, which increased the country’s sovereign debt. In the United
States, links between the banking sector and government debt seem to be weaker than in Europe.
For example, the claims of domestic banks on their
respective governments exceed 20 percent of GDP
for all the countries in the EZP, while such claims
amount to only 8 percent in the United States. The
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | December 2011

5

same pattern is true if one looks at overall sovereign
debt exposure; less foreign debt is held by U.S.
banks compared to their European counterparts.
Should the government need to step in and recapitalize banks, as in the case of Ireland, less exposure
to banks means that the government’s liabilities are
likely to be smaller in the U.S. than in the EZP.
A second factor explaining the difference in interest
rates has to do with the demographics of sovereign
debt holders. Compared to the EZP, the U.S. has a
larger share of domestic holders and foreign official holders such as other central banks. This gives
the U.S. the advantage of a very stable investment
base. Private domestic holders tend to exhibit some
home bias. If they want to hold an asset with the
risk-return characteristics of a government bond,
they are, everything else being the same, much
more likely to hold a government bond of their
home country. In turn, these investors are also
less likely to shift away from these bonds as prices
fluctuate. Furthermore, given the importance of the
U.S. economy, foreign central banks may want to
hold U.S. treasuries for strategic reasons that do not
necessarily reflect market concerns.
Another reason for the interest rate spread is the
safe haven factor. Money managers need to park
their funds somewhere, and with a large fraction of
European sovereign bonds in trouble, U.S. debt has
benefited from an increase in demand. This mechanism has been exacerbated by the recent increase in
volatility in capital markets.
Finally, we will finish with a word on credibility. A
security does not bear the “safe haven” moniker by
chance. The reason U.S. Treasury securities command lower interest rates than say Zimbabwean
government securities is partly because both the
U.S. government and the Federal Reserve have
each made credible commitments; the government
pledges to keep the debt at a sustainable level and
the Federal Reserve assures that it will not monetize
away the debt. These commitments are more credible in the eyes of the public than those made by
the Zimbabwean government and central bank.
In the euro zone it seems the commitment devices
set forth by the Maastricht Treaty limiting the
national governments’ debts and deficits lacked
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | December 2011

6

bite and ultimately failed, shattering the credibility
of some of the member countries’ governments.
In contrast, the market seems to think the U.S.
government can solve its debt problems, which are
mostly tied to entitlements (see this Commentary).
This vote of confidence should not be squandered.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | December 2011

7

Households and Consumers

Recent Trends in Neighborhood Poverty
11.29.11
by Dionissi Aliprantis and Nelson Oliver
Recent data releases have focused attention on the
increase in the share of individuals living in poverty
since 2006. Since this increase in poverty has not
only changed individuals’ economic circumstances,
but also those of entire communities, researchers
have been interested in understanding how those
circumstances have varied across communities. One
way to summarize the impact of the recent recession on communities is to examine neighborhood
poverty rates.

The U.S. Population in 2000 and 2005-2009
Fraction
.6
2000
2005−2009
.4

.2

0
10

20

30

40

50

60

Poverty rate (percent)
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau; NHGIS; ACS.

U.S. Population by Neighborhood
Poverty Rate
Neighborhood poverty
rate (percent)

Share of population (percent)
2000

2005-2009

2.5 or less

8.3

7.5

10 or greater

47.0

52.2

20 or greater

18.4

21.8

40 or greater

2.8

3.5

We use data from the 2000 Census and from the
2005-2009 American Community Surveys (ACS)
to examine recent trends in neighborhood poverty
rates. The fraction of Americans living in more affluent neighborhoods (poverty rates of 10 percent
or less) declined between 2000 and 2005-2009.
Meanwhile, the share of Americans in neighborhoods with higher poverty rates (greater than 10
percent) grew during these years.
In terms of the magnitude of the changes during this period, the share of Americans living in
the most well-to-do neighborhoods (less than 2.5
percent poverty rates) fell from 8.3 percent to 7.5
percent during this period. The share of Americans
living in neighborhoods with poverty rates of 10
percent or higher grew by over 5 percent, and the
share in high poverty neighborhoods (greater than
20 percent or greater than 40 percent) increased as
well.
During this period, poverty patterns also shifted
across the Fourth District of the Federal Reserve
System, which includes Ohio, western Pennsylvania, eastern Kentucky, and the northern panhandle
of West Virginia. The overall poverty rate in the
Fourth District in 2000, 11.6 percent, was lower
than the nation as a whole. But by 2005-2009, the
Fourth District’s rate had surpassed the national
rate, growing to 14.1 percent.

Sources: U.S. Census Bureau; NHGIS; ACS.

Comparing neighborhood poverty rates over this
period, we see that the share of people living in
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | December 2011

8

neighborhoods with poverty rates of 10 percent
or more increased 5.2 percentage points in the
nation as a whole, and 10.8 percentage points in
the Fourth District. This trend was also true for
extreme-poverty neighborhoods; for example, the
share of residents in neighborhoods with poverty
rates of 40 percent or higher grew by 2.1 percentage points in the Fourth District, almost doubling.

The Fourth District Population in 2000
and 2005-2009
Fraction
.6
2000
2005−2009
.4

.2

0
10

20

30

40

50

60

Poverty rate (percent)
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau; NHGIS; ACS.

Fourth District Population by
Neighborhood Poverty Rate
Neighborhood poverty
rate (percent)

Share of population (percent)
2000

2005-2009

2.5 or less

8.7

6.5

10 or greater

42.2

53.0

20 or greater

16.6

23.5

40 or greater

2.4

4.5

Sources: U.S. Census Bureau; NHGIS; ACS.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | December 2011

One possible explanation for the increase in the
population in high-poverty neighborhoods would
be a uniform increase in the poverty rate across all
neighborhoods. In this case, geographic considerations would play little role in any policies aimed at
decreasing the poverty rate.
However, the data show that the increase in overall
poverty was not felt equally in all neighborhoods.
We do not present details here, but the data indicate that the change in the poverty rates of the
poorest neighborhoods was larger than the change
for more affluent neighborhoods, both nationally
and in the Fourth District. This pattern indicates
that the process leading to individual-level poverty
is connected to the process leading to neighborhood-level poverty. One implication is that an
improved understanding of neighborhood poverty
can help to improve poverty-related policies. Such a
motivation will keep researchers and policymakers
focused on neighborhood poverty as they seek to
understand and respond to the recent recession.

9

Inflation and Price Statistics

Inflation Takes a Breather…
11.22.11
by Brent Meyer
Upward pressure on the Consumer Price Index
(CPI) from a few component prices reversed in
October, and the 12-month growth rate in the
index slowed from 3.9 percent to 3.5 percent, edging down for the first time since last November.
This reversal came as a dip in energy prices (led by
a 31.6 percent decrease in motor fuel) more than
offset a modest 1.4 percent increase in food prices.
However, October’s increase in food prices—which
was the smallest of the year—was due in large part
to a fairly sizeable 28 percent decrease in fresh fruit
and vegetable prices. Most of the other food categories were in the upper tail of the price-change
distribution (posting increases above 5 percent).

October Price Statistics
Percent change, last
1mo.a

3mo.a

6mo.a

12mo.

5yr.a

2010
average

All items

–1.0

2.4

2.1

3.5

2.3

1.4

Excluding food and
energy (core CPI)

1.6

1.8

2.4

2.1

1.8

0.6

Medianb

2.3

2.8

2.5

2.2

2.0

0.7

16% trimmed meanb

1.4

2.6

2.5

2.5

2.1

0.8

Sticky pricec

2.5

2.5

2.0

1.9

2.0

0.9

–8.8

2.4

2.1

7.8

3.3

3.5

Consumer Price Index

Flexible

pricec

a. Annualized.
b. Calculated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
c. Author’s calculations.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Measures of underlying inflation, on the other
hand, rose slightly. One popular measure of underlying inflation, the “core” CPI (which is the CPI
excluding food and energy prices) rose 1.6 percent
in October. The core CPI is up 1.8 percent over
the past three months, slightly below its 6-month
growth rate of 2.4 percent and its 12-month
growth rate of 2.1 percent. Measures of underlying
inflation produced by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland—the median CPI and the 16 percent
trimmed-mean CPI—rose 2.3 percent and 1.4
percent, respectively, in October. As was the case
last month, both measures slowed relative to their
respective 3- and 6-month growth rates.

Component Price-Change Distribution
Annualized percentage change, October 2011
Jewelry and watches
Processed fruits and vegetables
Women’s and girls’ apparel
Motor vehicle fees
Men’s and boys’ apparel
Medical care services
Nonalcoholic beverages and beverage materials
Meats, poultry, fish, and eggs
Rent of primary residence
Tenants’ and household insurance
Cereals and bakery products
Other food at home
Education
Personal care products
OER, South Urban Region
Medical care commodoties
Motor vehicle insurance
OER, West Urban Region
Miscellaneous personal services
Motor vehicle maintenance and repair
Water, sewer, trash collection services
OER, Midwest Urban Region
Food away from home
OER, Northeast Urban Region
Fuel oil and other fuels
Personal care services
Household furnishings and operations
Dairy and related products
Communication
Public transportation
Alcoholic beverages
Tobacco and smoking products
Recreation
Car and truck rental
Motor vehicle parts and equipment
New vehicles
Gas piped and electricity
Used cars and trucks
Infants’ and toddlers’ apparel
Miscellaneous personal goods
Footwear
Lodging away from home
Fresh fruits and vegetables
Motor fuel

-40

Median price
change = 2.3%

-20

0

20

Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics; author’s calculations.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | December 2011

40

A large contingent of automobile-related prices
(used cars and trucks, new vehicles, car and truck
rentals, and parts and equipment) decreased in
October, which put some downward pressure on
the core CPI. Notably, new car prices, which are
still up 3.4 percent over the past year, followed
up a 2.4 percent decrease in September by falling
5.1 percent in October. On the other hand, prices
for medical care services jumped up 6.6 percent
in October, their largest monthly increase in 13
months. Still, the 12-month percent change in the
price index for medical care services stands at 3.1
percent and has yet to climb back to its longer-run
10

CPI Component Price-Change Distribution

(10-year) growth rate of 4.25 percent.

Weighted frequency

An alternative way to view the price-change distribution takes the focus off of the price changes for
the individual components and draws it to where
the mass of the distribution was centered during
the month. Shifting the focus this way allows us to
see that there was a leftward (downward) shift in
the mass over the past few months. Notably, just
one-third of the prices in the consumer market basket (by expenditure weight) rose at rates in excess of
3 percent in September and October, compared to
an average of 43 percent over the first eight months
of 2011. We can also see that, while it appears that
some of the underlying mass has shifted from the
upper end, the price-change distribution doesn’t
look nearly as disinflationary as it did during 2010
(when the average increase in the median CPI was a
mere 0.7 percent).

40
2010 average
Average, January to August
Average, September and October
30

20

10

0

<0

0 to 1

1 to 2

2 to 3

3 to 4

4 to 5

>5

Annualized percentage change
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics; author’s calculations.

Rents
Annualized percent change
8
Rent of primary residence
Owners’ equivalent rent
6

4

2

0

-2
1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

2011

Source: Federal Reserve Board.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | December 2011

While we’ve seen a slowing in underlying inflation
over the past few months, continued increases in
OER and rent (perhaps as homeownership rates
and rental vacancy rates continue to decline) are
likely to put upward pressure on measured inflation. The indexes for owners’ equivalent rent
of residences (OER) and rent of primary residence—which account for roughly 30 percent of
the overall index—accelerated in October. Rent of
primary residence jumped up 4.8 percent during
the month, pulling its near-term (3-month) growth
rate up to 4.1 percent, well above its longer-term
(10-year) growth rate of 2.8 percent. Following
suit, OER rose 2.5 percent in October and has
posted increases of at least 2.5 percent in three of
the last four months. For comparison, prior to July
2011, the last time OER had a monthly increase
of 2.5 percent or higher was March 2009. On a
year-over-year basis, OER is now up 1.6 percent.
Last October, the 12-month growth rate in OER
was flat.

11

Monetary Policy

Policy Innovations at the Zero Lower Bound
12.01.11
by Todd Clark and John Lindner
The late summer and early fall bore witness to two
new innovations in monetary policy.
The first was at the August Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) meeting, when the Committee introduced a change to the statement released
after meetings, which altered the projected path
of the federal funds rate target. The Committee
announced that it “currently anticipates that economic conditions—including low rates of resource
utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over
the medium run—are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least
through mid-2013.”
The second came in September, when the Committee opted to begin selling shorter-term Treasuries
from the Fed’s portfolio and use the proceeds from
those sales to purchase longer-term Treasury securities. According to the statement, “this should put
downward pressure on longer-term interest rates
and help make broader financial conditions more
accommodative.”

Federal Funds Futures Implied Interest Rates
Percent
1.4
1.2
1.0
0.8
August 8

0.6
0.4

August 9

0.2
0.0
9/2011

2/2012

7/2012 12/2012

5/2013 10/2013

3/2014

Maturity
Source: Bloomberg.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | December 2011

Both of these innovative moves were intended to
adjust interest rates, one through communications
and one through balance sheet manipulations.
Here’s a quick look at how they did and at what
some of the consequences could be.
The new language introduced in August is clearly a
conditional statement. Whether the federal funds
rate stays “exceptionally low” until mid-2013 depends on the economy progressing as the FOMC
thinks it will. The August communication strategy,
as we’ve highlighted before, was extremely effective at lowering expected future interest rates. One
way of seeing how markets interpreted this statement is by looking at a type of derivative called
a federal funds rate future contract. The contract
allows banks to borrow interbank (federal) funds at
a specified rate at some date in the future. Implied
interest rates from these contracts declined dramatically after the August statement, incorporating
12

the expectation that the federal funds rate would
remain low until the middle of 2013.

Federal Funds Futures Implied Interest Rates
Percent
0.8
0.7
0.6
September 20
0.5

The announcement of September’s new policy,
dubbed Operation Twist, was also successful at
lowering long-term interest rates. A simple chart
of some longer-maturity Treasury yields shows that
there were significant declines following the release
of the Committee’s statement. Yields on 30-year
Treasury securities fell 17 basis points to 3.03 percent, and 10-year Treasury yields dropped 23 basis
points in the two days following the meeting.

0.4
0.3
0.2
September 21
0.1
0.0
11/2011

2/2012

7/2012 12/2012

5/2013 10/2013

3/2014

Maturity
Source: Bloomberg.

A rough look at the history of the maturity distribution for the Fed’s Treasury holdings shows that
long-term securities have traditionally comprised
just about 20 percent of the Fed’s Treasury holdings. During and after the financial crisis in 2008,
that percentage grew closer to 50 percent. The proportion, according to back of the envelope calculations, is expected to balloon. (This is an imperfect
measurement, as the availability of detailed data is
limited. We have broadly defined short-term securities as those that mature in less than five years, and
long-term securities as those that mature in more
than five years.)

Long-Term Treasury Interest Rates
Percent
3.5
September 20
3.0

2.5
September 22
2.0
September 21
1.5

1.0
7-year

10-year

20-year

One issue that some economists are concerned
about is Operation Twist’s effect on the Fed’s balance sheet. The policy will likely push the balance
of Treasury holdings to long-term security holdings. Ultimately, $400 billion will be shifted from
short-term Treasury securities to long-term Treasury
securities.

30-year

Maturity
Source: Federal Reserve Board.

Another view of this situation looks at the combined holdings of Treasury securities and the agency
securities that were purchased as part of previous
large-scale accommodative programs. Since the
Fed’s portfolio mostly includes agency securities
with long-term maturities, adding in those types
of securities would show that the asset holdings
on the Fed’s balance sheet will be even more heavily weighted in long-term securities (roughly 78
percent by mid-2012).
What are some of the implications of these changes
in the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet? Most immediately, the Fed’s income from interest payments on
purchased securities has risen, from $40.3 billion

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | December 2011

13

Federal Reserve Long-Term Treasury Holdingsin 2007 to about $76.2 billion in 2010. Interest

income has risen with the share of the balance sheet
devoted to long-term bonds because long-term
bonds pay more interest than short-term bills. The
increase in the Fed’s interest income has allowed the
Fed to turn more money over to the Treasury each
year.

Percent of total Treasury holdings
100

80
Estimated

60

40

20

0
1996

1999

2002

2005

2008

2011

Note: Long-term is defined as a security of maturity more than 5 years.
Source: Federal Reserve Board’s H.4.1 Statistical Release.

However, in future years, as interest rates rise, the
Federal Reserve’s income could fall sharply. Specifically, such losses could arise when the Federal
Reserve eventually follows through on the FOMC’s
stated intention to sell some of the long-term assets,
to gradually shrink its balance sheet to a more normal size. The reason is that the value of long-term
securities falls when interest rates increase, potentially causing the Fed to realize capital losses with
the eventual sales of bonds.

Federal Reserve Security Holdings
Trillions of dollars
3.0

Estimated

2.5
2.0
1.5

Long-term securities

1.0
0.5
Short-term securities
0.0
7/2008 1/2009 7/2009 1/2010 7/2010 1/2011 7/2011 1/2012
Note: Security holdings composed of all Treasury, agency debt, and agency
mortgage-backed securities on the Fed’s balance sheet.Short-term is defined as
a security of maturity less than 5 years. Long-term is defined as a security of
maturity more than 5 years.
Source: Federal Reserve Board’s H.4.1 Statistical Release.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | December 2011

14

Regional Economics

Pittsburgh’s Labor Market in the Recession and Recovery
12.02.11
by Tim Dunne and Kyle Fee
Over the course of the recent business cycle, labor
markets within the Fourth District have experienced distinctly different patterns of contraction
and expansion. In particular, Pittsburgh experienced a milder recession, measured in terms of
job loss or unemployment rates, than the nation
and the three other major metropolitan areas in
the Fourth District—Cincinnati, Cleveland, and
Columbus. Pittsburgh’s recovery has also been more
robust.

Unemployment Rate
Percent
12
10
8
6
Cleveland
Nation
Cincinnati
Columbus
Pittsburgh

4
2
0
2005

2007

2009

2011

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Payroll Employment

This employment recovery reflects, in part, the
muted recession that Pittsburgh experienced. At the
depth of the recession, Pittsburgh lost only 3 percent of its payroll employment, roughly half of the
nation’s loss and well below the employment losses
seen in Cincinnati and Cleveland. Still, Pittsburgh
has also seen a more rapid recovery than the nation
or the other major metropolitan areas in the Fourth
District.

Index, December 2007 = 100
102
100
98
96
94
92
90
88
2007

Cleveland
Nation
Cincinnati
Columbus
Pittsburgh
2008

Pittsburgh’s unemployment rate is currently considerably lower than the nation’s unemployment rate,
(7.5 percent versus 9.0 percent), and it has been
lower throughout the recession and recovery. More
striking, however, is the fact that Pittsburgh has
recovered (on net) the employment it lost since the
start of the last recession. This stands in stark contrast to the nation as a whole, where employment
is almost 5 percent below pre-recession levels, and
to Cleveland, where employment remains 7 percent
below pre-recession levels.

2009

2010

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | December 2011

Looking across the 50 largest metropolitan areas in
the country, Pittsburgh is one of a handful of metro
areas that have shown a net expansion in employment since the start of the last recession, albeit a
very slight one. The other metropolitan areas where
employment rose are all located in the south central
part of the United States. Included are Austin,
Houston, New Orleans, Oklahoma City, and San
Antonio.

15

Payroll Employment Growth,
December 2007–October 2011
Percent
4
Austin

2

Pittsburgh

0
-2
-4
Columbus

-6

Cincinnati

-8

Cleveland

-10
-12
-14

Las Vegas

-16
Top 50 Most Populous MSAs

A natural question is whether the difference in
Pittsburgh’s labor market performance was driven
by its industrial structure. That is, did Pittsburgh
perform better than other parts of the country
because the city specialized in industries that overperformed during the business cycle? To examine
this issue, we decompose the differences in employment growth between Pittsburgh and the nation
into the fraction due to differences in industry
specialization and the fraction due to differences in
industry growth rates. The latter term accounts for
differences in employment growth which are due to
differences in industry-specific growth between the
metro area and the nation.

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Payroll Employment
Index, December 2007 = 100
102
100
98
96
94
92
90
88
2007

Ohio
Nation
Pennsylvania minus Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh
2008

2009

2010

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Payroll Decomposition, December
2007–October 2011
Pittsburgh
City–U.S. Difference
(percentage points)

+4.7

Percent to growth differences

81.5

Percent to share differences

18.5

Pittsburgh’s relatively strong labor market performance may also reflect the strength of the state’s
overall labor market performance, which was better
than the nation’s. Looking at Pennsylvania’s employment with Pittsburgh’s employment subtracted
out, we see that Pennsylvania outside of Pittsburgh
experienced less employment loss than the nation
in the recent business cycle but still performed
somewhat worse than Pittsburgh during the recession. Moreover, Pittsburgh’s recovery has clearly
been more robust than the rest of Pennsylvania. So,
Pittsburgh’s relative performance does not simply
reflect a “state effect.”

The difference in employment growth rates between Pittsburgh and the nation was 4.7 percentage points from December 2007 to October 2011.
About one-fifth of the difference in growth is
accounted for by industry specialization, as Pittsburgh had a higher share of employment in industries that grew faster or shrank less during the recession and recovery. However, industry specialization
plays a secondary role compared to differences in
industry growth, as four-fifths of the growth difference is accounted for by industry-growth differentials. Pittsburgh performed better largely because
specific industries in Pittsburgh grew faster (or
declined less) than those industries in the nation as
a whole.

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | December 2011

16

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