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The Economy in Perspective

FRB Cleveland • December 2002

Collateral damage… At its early-November meeting, the Federal Open Market Committee reduced
its federal funds rate target by 50 basis points, to
1.25%. Although it was the FOMC’s first action since
December 2001, the November decision was the
twelfth consecutive rate reduction, cumulating to
525 basis points, since May 2000. Many observers
interpret the November decision as the FOMC’s
acknowledgment that the economic expansion
does not seem to be gaining momentum and that
another monetary policy action would provide
additional support. As recently as April, most analysts expected that the 2001 recession would have
ended officially by now, but its presence—or aftermath—remains at the forefront this holiday season.
Consumer sentiment about economic conditions
has been wobbly, and business executives continue
to complain about corporate profits and the poor
environment for capital spending. For some of our
important trading partners, economic conditions
have been worse than our own; this means weak
demand from abroad and downward price pressure. Firms are reluctant to hire new employees,
and although overall employment levels have been
holding fairly steady, the labor force continues to
expand. Consequently, the unemployment rate has
yet to show signs of cresting—the recent report
that the national unemployment rate rose to 6.0%
in November was a sharp disappointment. Disappointment seems to lurk at every turn, and patience
is wearing thin.
On December 6, the White House announced the
resignations of Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill and
National Economic Council head Lawrence Lindsey.
A new team of economic policy leaders is expected
to be named shortly as the Bush administration
places renewed emphasis on communicating its programs and pushing for their enactment. The charged
atmosphere makes it likely that economic stimulus
will figure prominently in the administration’s initiatives, although it has not officially announced the
details of its plans.
Last year, Congress enacted legislation that
created a wide range of tax reductions for individuals and corporations, some effective immediately
and others to be phased in over a 10-year span. One
might reasonably expect the administration to
phase in some of the already agreed-upon tax
measures more rapidly than last year’s legislation
specified. One might also expect the administration

and Congress to pay additional attention to incentives for bolstering capital spending, which has
been so much weaker than household spending on
housing and durable goods.
It is necessary to consider how tax policy might
be adjusted to stimulate economic growth quickly,
but there are risks worth considering as well. The
first concerns the need for stimulus. During recessions and expansions alike, economic activity is
volatile on a monthly and quarterly frequency, limiting the value of forecasts. If the U.S. economy is
currently in a recession, it is a strange recession
indeed, for real growth has been in the range of 3%
all year. Orders for capital goods may strengthen
gradually in the natural course of events next year
as excess industrial capacity dissipates.
A second risk concerns the effectiveness of tax
policy. To take the most obvious example, if capital
goods orders are weak because so much current
industrial productive capacity remains unused,
would investment tax credits spur much demand?
A third risk concerns the interaction between
short-term fiscal policy and the U.S. government’s
long-term fiscal position. In the fiscal year that just
ended, the federal government’s budget deficit
amounted to $159 billion, and total debt outstanding held by the public rose to roughly $3 trillion.
Yet the net present value of the government’s
commitments for the next 75 years to pay Social
Security, Medicare, and federal retirement benefits
is in the range of $18 trillion to $26 trillion, double
the size of our current $11 trillion GDP. As Undersecretary of the Treasury Peter Fisher concluded in
a recent speech, the federal government needs to
encourage more investment and saving to support
faster economic growth, to control the health care
costs affecting the budget, and to become more
disciplined about the cost of its promised future
benefits. Fitting short-term stimulus measures into
this longer-term framework presents its own set
of challenges.
Recessions do not merely inflict damage at their
epicenter; they are also capable of casting long and
unpredictable shadows. Fortunately, recessions in
the United States have been infrequent during the
last 20 years, and economic policymakers have
become more adept in responding to them.
Policymakers’ recent actions show that they are
paying close attention to this one.

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Inflation and Prices
12-month percent change
4.00 CPI AND CPI EXCLUDING FOOD AND ENERGY

October Price Statistics

3.75

Percent change, last:
2001
a
a
a
1 mo. 3 mo. 12 mo. 5 yr. avg.

3.50
CPI

3.25

Consumer prices

3.00

All items

3.4

3.1

2.1

2.3

1.5

Less food
and energy

1.9

2.3

2.2

2.3

2.7

2.50

Medianb

3.4

3.2

3.2

3.1

3.9

2.25

2.75

Producer prices

2.00

Finished goods

13.8

4.7

0.6

1.2 –1.7

5.7

1.6

0.5

1.1

Less food
and energy

0.9

CPI excluding
food and energy

1.75
1.50
1.25
1.00
1995

12-month percent change
4.25 CPI AND MEDIAN CPI

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

12-month percent change
5.5
HOUSEHOLD INFLATION EXPECTATIONS c

4.00

Median CPI b

5.0

3.75
4.5

3.50
CPI

3.25

Five to 10 years ahead

4.0

3.00
2.75

3.5

2.50

3.0

2.25
2.5

2.00

One year ahead

1.75

2.0

1.50

CPI, 16% trimmed mean b

1.5

1.25
1.00
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001b

2002

1.0
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

FRB Cleveland • December 2002

a. Annualized.
b. Calculated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
c. Mean expected change in consumer prices as measured by the University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumers.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland; and University of Michigan.

The consumer price index (CPI) rose
0.3% (3.4% annual rate) in October;
according to the Labor Department,
rising energy prices accounted for
about half of this increase. Energy
prices have been going up at an
accelerating rate, advancing at a
monthly rate of 0.4% in July, 0.6% in
August, and 0.7% in September, then
jumping at a rate of nearly 2.0% in
October. By contrast, inflation in
food prices over the last six months
has been almost nil.
Excluding food and energy prices,
the CPI rose 0.2% (1.9% annual rate).
Among the major CPI categories that

showed accelerating inflation in the
October report were shelter, transportation, medical care, and recreation. Prices for tobacco and smoking
products, though, fell sharply during
the month.
On a year-over-year basis, the CPI
had advanced 2.1% as of October, the
first time in a year that this figure
climbed above 2%. The CPI’s 16%
trimmed mean has also been trending upward, albeit more modestly; in
the past four months, it has risen
from 2.0% to 2.2%. By contrast, the
median CPI continues the downward
trend it began at the end of last year.

Since then, its year-over-year rate of
change has dropped more than 3/4 of
a percentage point. However, the
median remains nearly a percentage
point higher than the trimmed mean.
Households’ short- and long-run
expectations of inflation have been
drifting apart since converging at
about 3% in September; the reason
was a drop in short-run expectations.
Households now expect slightly less
inflation in the next year (2.5%) than
in the next five to ten years (3.3%).
Both long- and short-run inflation
expectations by households remain
(continued on next page)

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Inflation and Prices (cont.)
Four-quarter percent change
12 UNIT LABOR COSTS

12-month percent change
5 CORE CPI GOODS AND SERVICES

10

4
Core CPI services

8
3
6
2

Core CPI goods

4
1
2
0
0
–1

–2
–4
1981

–2
1984

1987

1990

1993

1996

1999

2002

1995

12-month percent change
12-month percent change
40
25 PRODUCER PRICE INDEX AND INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION

1996

1997

1998

1999

PPI, finished goods

15

24

10

16

5

8

0

0

–5

–8
Industrial production, manufacturing

2001

2002

Changes in PPI and IP, by Industry
24-month percent change
Producer
Industrial
Price Index
production

32

20

2000

Printing and publishing
Foods
Stone, clay and glass products
Furniture and fixtures
Fabricated metal products
Rubber and plastics products
Transportation equipment
Chemicals and products
Apparel products
Lumber and products
Industrial machinery and
equipment
Textile mill products
Primary metals
Electrical machinery
Petroleum products

4.81
2.25
2.23
2.09
1.15
0.80
0.58
0.57
0.0
–0.13

–10.86
–0.53
–1.85
–10.36
–5.33
–3.0
–5.47
0.0
–12.88
–3.02

–0.77
–1.03
–2.16
–2.69
–3.45

–10.82
–9.97
–8.44
–7.49
–2.68

–16

–10
1970

1974

1978

1982

1986

1990

1994

1998

2002

FRB Cleveland • December 2002

SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

near historically low levels. A look at
the labor market seems to support
households’ optimism about the
near-term inflation outlook. On a
year-over-year basis, unit labor costs
have fallen in four consecutive quarters, reflecting increases in workers’ productivity amid decreases in
workers’ compensation
One reason for the sanguine nearterm inflation expectations may be
declining goods prices. On average,
prices of core CPI goods, that is,
goods in the CPI market basket
excluding energy, have been falling
for an unprecedented 11 consecutive

months. Core CPI goods prices have
not fallen for any prolonged period
in more than 40 years and then for
only seven straight months.
To understand what might be driving down goods prices, it might be
instructive to look at producer
prices. Consider that in the past,
changes in the Producer Price Index
(PPI) and industrial production in the
manufacturing sector (IP) have
tended to move in opposite directions. This suggests that historically,
the prices of industrial products have
been most affected by supply factors;
temporary declines in output have

been associated with upward pressure on prices.
Recently, however, these economic
time series have begun to move in the
same direction, suggesting that in the
aggregate, these changes may be driven by waning demand. However, the
industry-level data present a murkier
picture. Certainly, some industries
have seen significant declines in production, coupled with falling prices.
But in other industries, particularly
those tied to the automotive sector,
prices have continued to rise even as
production has declined.

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Monetary Policy
Percent
8 RESERVE MARKET RATES
7

Percent
2.75 IMPLIED YIELDS ON FEDERAL FUNDS FUTURES
2.50

Effective federal funds rate a

May 8, 2002

6
2.25
5
2.00

Intended federal funds rate b

June 27, 2002

4
1.75
3

August 14, 2002
1.50

2

November 5, 2002
Discount rate b

1

1.25
November 22, 2002

0

November 7, 2002

1.00
2000

2001

2002

Mar.

2003

Percent
7.75 IMPLIED YIELDS ON EURODOLLAR FUTURES

May

July

Sept.
2002

Nov.

Jan.

Mar.

May

July

2003

Percent, weekly average
6
YIELD CURVE c,d

June 27, 2002

7.25

January 4, 2002

6.75

August 14, 2002

5

6.25

July 26, 2002

5.75

May 8, 2002

November 7, 2002

5.25

October 11, 2002
4

4.75
November 1, 2002

4.25
3

November 22, 2002

3.75

November 22, 2002

3.25
2.75

2

2.25
1.75
1.25

1
2002

2005

2008

2011

0

5

10
15
Years to maturity

20

25

FRB Cleveland • December 2002

a. Weekly average of daily figures.
b. Daily observations.
c. Average for the week ending on the date shown.
d. All yields are from constant-maturity series.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Selected Interest Rates,” H.15; and Bloomberg Financial Information Services.

On November 6, the Federal Open
Market Committee lowered its target
for the federal funds rate by 50 basis
points (bp) to 1.25%. In a related
action, the Board of Governors lowered the discount rate 50 bp to
0.75%. The magnitudes of the moves
surprised markets. Although the fed
funds futures market had priced in a
rate cut, the implied yield indicated
an expectation of a 25 bp change in
November, with a possible further
cut sometime later.
The implied yields on eurodollars—
a measure of the expected fed funds
rate over long horizons—has shifted

up in future years, suggesting that
participants in this market expect the
current rate reduction to be reversed
within a year. Interestingly, expected
rate increases will arrive sooner than
they would have in the absence of
the recent change. Moreover, the
yield curve became more steeply
sloped after the policy announcement, a reaction consistent with the
belief that policy had become more
accommodative.
The FOMC’s announcement recognized the deterioration in the economic outlook but characterized it
as a “soft spot,” that is, a transitory

weakness. The Committee emphasized its belief that the action taken
should prove helpful as the economy
works its way through the period of
weakness. The FOMC also indicated
its belief that with this action, the
risks are balanced with regard to the
prospects for price stability and
sustainable growth in the foreseeable
future. On the other hand, it noted
that incoming economic data have
tended to confirm that greater
uncertainty, resulting partly from
heightened geopolitical risks, is
inhibiting spending, production,
and employment.

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Money and Financial Markets
Percent, weekly average
Percent, monthly average
7 SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES AND M2 OPPORTUNITY COST 6

Trillions of dollars
6.2 THE M2 AGGREGATE
10%

1-year T-bill a

6

M2 growth, 1997–2002 b
12

5
5.6

5

9

4

6

3

0

5%
10%

3

3-month T-bill a
4

5.0

5%

5%
3

1%

2

5%
4.4

M2 opportunity cost
2

1%

1

0

1
1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

10/99

10/00

10/01

10/02

45

Daily
1,100

S&P 500

900
1,100

10/98

Ratio
50 S&P 500 PRICE/EARNINGS RATIO

Index, monthly average
1,500 STOCK MARKET INDEXES
1,300

3.8

2003

S&P 500

40

700
35

S&P 100

500
300

900

30

Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.
2002

24.9

25

700

20
500
15

S&P 100

13.3

300

10

100
1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

5
1946

1956

1966

1976

1986

1996

FRB Cleveland • December 2002

a. Constant maturity.
b. Growth rates are calculated on a fourth-quarter over fourth-quarter basis. The 2002 growth rate for M2 is calculated on an October over 2001:IVQ basis.
Data are seasonally adjusted.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Selected Interest Rates,” H.15. and “Money Stock Measures,” H.6, Federal Reserve
Statistical Releases; Standard and Poor’s Corporation; and Bloomberg Financial Information Services.

The sharp decline in interest rates
over the past two years reduced the
opportunity cost of holding monetary instruments nearly to zero. Consequently, the demand for money, as
measured by M2, rose sharply in
2001. As short-term interest rates and
opportunity cost stabilized in 2002,
M2 growth slowed considerably but
accelerated in the spring.
In the financial sector, stock market
volatility remains a big story. Although
economic fundamentals softened
somewhat in the fall, earnings reports

surprised investors, coming in slightly
better than forecast for the third
quarter. After hitting bottom in October, the S&P 500 turned around but
remains well below its level at the
beginning of the year. Earlier
declines were consistent with the
realization that the recovery was
much weaker than had been
expected when 2002 began, particularly for investment. Falling stock
prices, combined with rising earnings, resulted in a precipitous decline
in the price-to-earnings ratio.

Another factor contributing to the
stock market decline is concern over
the quality of financial reports. The
issue has shifted from worry about potential corporate fraud to questions
about legal but improper accounting
practices. One practice now receiving
closer scrutiny is public companies’
developing their own measures of
earnings and reporting them in press
releases. Such measures—called pro
forma, street, or operating earnings—
differ from the measures defined
by generally accepted accounting
(continued on next page)

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Money and Financial Markets (cont.)
Dollars per share, four-quarter moving average
15 S&P 500, EARNINGS PER SHARE, 1990–2006 a

Dollars per share
14 S&P 500, EARNINGS PER SHARE, 2001–02

Operating

12

13

Operating
As reported
Core

10
11
8
9
6
7
4
As reported
5

2

3

0
1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

IQ

IIQ

IIIQ

IVQ

IQ

IIQ
2002

2001

IIIQ b

Index, 1985 = 100
200
CONSUMER ATTITUDES d

Annualized percent change
9 OUTPUT PER WORKER c
8

180
7

Present situation

6

160
Consumer confidence

5
140

4
3

120

2
100

1
0

Consumer expectations
80

–1
60

–2
1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

FRB Cleveland • December 2002

a. Dashed line shows earnings estimates provided by Standard and Poor’s.
b. Preliminary.
c. Nonfarm business sector.
d. Data are seasonally adjusted.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Standard and Poor’s Corporation; and Conference Board.

principles—GAAP—earnings in that
they omit various nonrecurring, noncash, and miscellaneous items. Full
reports typically provide GAAP earnings somewhere but they feature
company-defined measures far more
prominently.
The discrepancy between companydefined (“operating”) earnings and
GAAP (“as reported”) earnings has
been increasing over time. Does the
operating earnings measure exaggerate a firm’s performance? Excluding
items such as nonrecurring costs
may be appropriate if such charges

are truly unrelated to a firm’s future
earning power. The great question is
whether the items excluded from
alternative measures are truly nonrecurring. If they are, one would expect
the discrepancy to diminish, with
GAAP earnings growing faster than
the alternatives. Only time can
resolve this question.
Two other issues are the treatment
of employee stock options (ESOs)
and pension fund gains and expenses. Under current GAAP rules,
firms are not required to expense the
value of the stock options they grant.

Because ESOs are a form of compensation, critics argue that omitting
them from expenses exaggerates
earnings. During the past year, more
than 100 firms in the S&P 500
announced their intention to expense
earnings voluntarily.
Weakness in the stock market has
reduced the value of pension fund
portfolios, increasing the need for
cash contributions. Critics note that
current GAAP rules do not fully
reflect increased pension expenses.
Standard and Poor’s calculates a core
(continued on next page)

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Money and Financial Markets (cont.)
Percent, weekly average
9 LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES

Annual percent change
20 HOME PRICES

Conventional mortgage
8
15
New home prices
7
10
20-year Treasury b
6
5
House Price Index a

5
10-year Treasury b

0

4

3

–5
1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

1997

2000

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Percent
50 HOUSEHOLD ASSETS AS A SHARE OF TOTAL ASSETS

Percent of disposable personal income
10 HOUSEHOLD DEBT-SERVICE BURDENS

Financial non-equity related
9

40
Consumer debt
Real estate

8
30
7
20
6

Financial equity related c
Mortgage

10

5

Tangible non-real estate
0

4
1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

FRB Cleveland • December 2002

a. Includes new and existing homes.
b. Constant maturity.
c. Equity-related assets are defined as corporate equities, mutual fund shares, and pension fund reserves.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight; and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Selected Interest Rates,” Federal Reserve Statistical Releases, H.15.

earnings measure for the S&P 500
that adjusts GAAP earnings for the
value of ESOs and pension funds.
Despite the earnings quality issue,
the stock market has firmed since its
October low. The underlying fundamentals of continued strong productivity growth and steady consumer
spending provide some support for
optimism. Nevertheless, measures of
consumer confidence remain tempered, even with the most recent
increase in consumer expectations.

Household spending during 2002
was supported by funds made available from mortgage refinancing.
Because the holiday season is so critical, markets are likely to be sensitive
to the strength of retail spending
in December.
Housing prices have held up
reasonably well despite limited
employment growth. The housing
price index, though decelerating,
has continued to increase. A key
factor in housing strength is that
falling mortgage rates have made

home ownership more affordable.
Debt service burdens for mortgages
are essentially unchanged from 1990.
Worries about a housing price bubble
do not seem justified by these facts.
The decline in mortgage rates is
ultimately bounded. Thus, to the
extent that consumer spending has
been fueled by mortgage refinancing
and housing by affordability, private
spending by households could slow.
Hopefully, investment spending by
firms will continue to accelerate and
pick up the slack.

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The Current Account Deficit
Billions of dollars, annual rate
1,600 GOODS AND SERVICES TRADE

Billions of dollars, annual rate
200 THE CURRENT ACCOUNT AND ITS COMPONENTS

1,400

100
Net investment income

1,200
0

Imports
1,000

Unilateral transfers
–100

800
–200

Goods and services balance

600
Exports

–300
400
–400

200

Current account

0
1982

–500
1982

1986

1990

1994

1998

2002

Percent
Billions of dollars, annual rate
7 REAL GROWTH AND THE CURRENT ACCOUNT a
200
6

100

Foreign growth b
U.S. growth

Current account
5

0

4

–100

3

–200

1986

1990

1994

1998

2002

Billions of dollars, annual rate
1,000 NET INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION
500
0
–500
–1,000
–1,500

2

–300
–2,000

1

–400

0

–500 –3,000

–1
1988

–2,500

–600 –3,500
1991

1994

1997

2000

2003

1982

1986

1990

1994

1998

2002 c

FRB Cleveland • December 2002

a. Data for 2002 and 2003 are averages of data from several sources.
b. Foreign GDP growth is the trade-weighted average growth rate for the top 15 U.S. trading partners in 1992–97: Canada, Japan, Mexico, Germany, U.K.,
China, Taiwan, Korea, France, Singapore, Italy, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Netherlands, and Brazil.
c. Author’s estimate.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census and Bureau of Economic Analysis; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Economic Outlook; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics; DRI/McGraw-Hill; Blue Chip Economic Indicators, November 10, 2002; and
The Economist.

The U.S. seems to be emerging from
the most recent economic frost a little faster than the rest of the world.
As a consequence, our perennial current account deficit, which seemed
dormant in 2001, is blooming again.
The nation’s current account deficit
in the first half of 2002 equaled $485
billion (annual rate), approximately
4.7% of GDP. Most observers recently
trimmed their foreign growth estimates and expect the U.S. current
account deficit will easily exceed 5% of
GDP by year’s end. Typically, foreign
economic growth must exceed U.S.

economic growth by approximately
1% before our trade pattern improves.
Although trade shortfalls account for
nearly all of our current account
deficits, net income receipts, traditionally a surplus item for the U.S.,
became a deficit entry this year.
Our persistent current account
deficit indicates that the U.S. has not
exported enough goods and services
to pay for its imports, unilateral transfers, and net income payments to foreigners. To settle the balance, the U.S.
either must give foreigners financial
claims against its future output or

reduce its existing claims to their
future output. This process creates
financial inflows that, abstracting from
measurement error, exactly equal the
current account deficit.
These inflows consist of various
financial instruments that give foreigners claims on our future output. Since
the late 1980s, the resulting stock of
foreign claims against this nation has
exceeded the stock of U.S. claims on
other countries. This year, the market
value of our negative net international
investment position will approach
$3 trillion or 29% of GDP.

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Japanese Interventions
Yen per dollar
160

Trillions of yen
2,000 INTERVENTION AND THE YEN
1,500

152

1,000

144
Japanese interventions a

500

136

0

128

–500

120

–1,000

112

–1,500

104
Yen exchange rate

–2,000

96

–2,500

88

–3,000

80
1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Year-over-year percent change
10
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT b

12-month percent change
5 CONSUMER PRICES
4

8

3
6
2
4
1
2
0
0

–1

–2
1986

–2
1991

1996

2001

1971

1976

1981

1986

1991

1996

2001

FRB Cleveland • December 2002

a. Positive values are official purchases of dollars; negative values are official sales of dollars.
b. Data for 2002 and 2003 are from the Blue Chip forecast.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Japanese Ministry of Finance; and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

On November 19, Japanese Finance
Minister Masajuro Shiokawa formally
asked the Bank of Japan not to neutralize the monetary effects of any
foreign exchange interventions that
the Ministry of Finance (MF) might
undertake. The move surprised many
analysts because it potentially gives
the MF leverage over Japanese monetary policy and could compromise the
Bank of Japan’s independence.
The Bank of Japan executes all official Japanese foreign exchange transactions at the direction of the MF.
Since 1993, MF interventions have

been fairly frequent and large. These
operations can alter the amount of
yen reserves in the Japanese banking
system. An intervention purchase
of dollars, for example, adds to yen
reserves. The Bank of Japan, however, undertakes traditional openmarket operations to offset any such
reserve changes that conflict with its
independently determined monetary objectives.
The MF may feel that undertaking a
monetary operation in exchange markets could have a bigger economic
kick than standard open-market

procedures, or it may just want to
increase the overall size of monetary
operations. Japan’s economic malaise
has persisted with little respite for
more than a decade. The Bank of
Japan eased monetary policy to halt
the decline in both output and
prices; but with short-term interest
rates near zero, the traditional channels of monetary influence seem
ineffective. Recently, the Bank lowered its economic growth outlook,
largely because of deteriorating
prospects for Japan’s critically important export sector.

10
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•

•

•

•

Economic Activity
Real GDP and Components, 2002:IIIQ

Percentage points
3.5 CONTRIBUTION TO PERCENT CHANGE IN REAL GDP

(Preliminary estimate)

3.0

a

Change,
billions
of 1996 $

Annualized
percent change, last:
Four
Quarter
quarters

Real GDP
91.6
Personal consumption 66.8
Durables
52.3
Nondurables
4.4
Services
20.2
Business fixed
investment
–2.1
Equipment
15.4
Structures
–13.0
Residential investment
2.0
Government spending 12.9
National defense
6.9
Net exports
–0.1
Exports
8.8
Imports
8.9
Change in business
inventories
10.6

4.0
4.1
23.1
0.9
2.2

3.2
3.7
12.0
3.1
2.5

–0.7
6.6
–20.6
2.1
3.1
7.1
__
3.3
2.3

–5.1
1.1
–20.9
3.7
5.1
10.2
__
2.5
6.5

__

__

2.5

2002:IIIQ

2.0
1.5
Government
spending

1.0
Exports

Residential
investment

0.5
0

Change in
inventories

–0.5
Business fixed
investment

–1.0

Imports

–1.5

Percentage points
4.5 REAL GDP AND COMPONENT CONTRIBUTIONS, 2002:IIIQ

Percent change from previous quarter
6 REAL GDP AND BLUE CHIP FORECAST
Final
Advance estimate
Preliminary estimate
Blue Chip forecast b

5
30-year average

4

Last four quarters

Personal
consumption

4.0
Advance estimate, October 31

3.5

Preliminary estimate, November 26

Personal
consumption

3.0
2.5

3

2.0
2

1.5
1.0

1

Change in
inventories

0.5

Government
spending

Business fixed
investment

0

0
GDP
–1

–0.5
IIIQ

IVQ
2001

IQ

IIQ

IIIQ
2002

IVQ

IQ

Residential
investment

Net exports

IIQ
2003

FRB Cleveland • December 2002

NOTE: All data are seasonally adjusted and annualized.
a. Chain-weighted data in billions of 1996 dollars. Components of real GDP need not add to the total because the total and all components are deflated using
independent chain-weighted price indexes.
b. Blue Chip panel of economists.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; and Blue Chip Economic Indicators, November 10, 2002.

The preliminary estimate showed
that real gross domestic product
(GDP) advanced at an annual rate of
4.0% during 2002:IIIQ. Personal consumption expenditures rose 4.1%
(annual rate) and made the largest
contribution to real GDP growth.
Consumer spending was boosted by
a rise of 23.1% (annual rate) in durable
goods expenditures. Business spending fell slightly, with expenditures
on structures falling $13.0 billion
(chained 1996 dollars). Residential
investment and government spending

both added to real GDP growth, but at
a slower rate than in the last four quarters. In international trade, exports
increased 3.3% and imports rose only
2.3% (annual rates).
The preliminary estimate put real
GDP growth nearly 1% above its longterm average. Blue Chip forecasters,
however, predict that real GDP
growth will not surpass this average
again until 2003:IIQ. The preliminary
figure of 4.0% real GDP growth issued
in November represented a substantial upward revision from the advance

estimate of 3.1% (annual rates).
Inventories were among the most
important factors in the revision:
Whereas the advance release had
estimated that inventories reduced
real GDP growth by 0.1%, the
preliminary figure showed them
adding nearly 0.5%. Last month,
business spending was expected to
increase real GDP growth slightly.
But instead of making its first positive contribution since 2000:IIIQ,
business spending declined for the
eighth consecutive quarter.
(continued on next page)

11
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•

•

Economic Activity (cont.)
Percent
36 NOVEMBER’S SHARE OF FOURTH-QUARTER SALES a

Percent
65 DECEMBER’S SHARE OF FOURTH-QUARTER SALES a

34

Jewelry
60
Total retail

32

Electronics and appliances

55

30
Clothing
28

50

26

Clothing

45

Jewelry
24

Electronics and appliances
40
22

Total retail

20

35
1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

Percent
35 JANUARY’S SHARE OF FIRST-QUARTER SALES a

Percent
46 FOURTH-QUARTER’S SHARE OF ANNUAL SALES a
43

Electronics and appliances

33
Jewelry

40

Total retail
31

37

Clothing
34

29

Clothing
31

Jewelry
27

Electronics and appliances
28
Total retail
25
1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

25
1992 1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001 2002

FRB Cleveland • December 2002

a. Current dollars, not seasonally adjusted.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

The holiday season is in full swing,
and December is the biggest month
for shopping. For example, both
clothing and electronics and appliances typically post about 30% of
their fourth-quarter sales in November but nearly 45% in December.
This pattern is especially dramatic for
jewelry, where roughly 24% of fourthquarter sales occur in November
compared to 60% in December.
The importance of the holiday
season—and thus the fourth
quarter—is evident for many items.
Without the seasonal component,

roughly 25% of a given item’s purchases would occur in the fourth
quarter. Jewelry sales have the largest
seasonal component by far, with
nearly 38% of 2001 sales made in the
fourth quarter. Clothing and electronics and appliances follow, with about
31% of annual sales in the fourth
quarter. The season is becoming
somewhat less important, however,
for jewelry and clothing. Its impact
on total retail sales is also lessening
slightly, perhaps because other outlets, such as the Internet, account for
a greater share of holiday purchases.

It is also notable that although the
holiday season is certainly important
for retailers’ yearly success, its importance is probably less than the
rhetoric suggests. Retailers make
about 27% of their annual sales in the
fourth quarter.
There is no evidence for the many
reports that people are delaying some
of their holiday shopping until January to take advantage of post-holiday
sales. January’s importance in firstquarter sales for all the usual holiday
items is either stable or decreasing.

12
•

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•

•

Labor Markets
Change, thousands of workers
300 AVERAGE MONTHLY NONFARM EMPLOYMENT CHANGE

Labor Market Conditions
Average monthly change
(thousands of employees)

250

Preliminary
2001
–119
–111
1
–3
–109
–79
–30
–8
–23

Jan.–
Oct.
2002
3
–57
–1
–9
–47
–37
–10
59
–13

Nov.
2002
–40
–51
–2
–4
–45
–36
–9
11
–10

–31
10
–2
27
–54
39

–7
7
50
22
8
22

–44
7
50
27
–23
8

Revised

200

Payroll employment
Goods-producing
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Durable goods
Nondurable goods
Service-producing
TPUa
Wholesale and
retail trade
FIREb
Servicesc
Health services
Help supply
Government

150
100
50
0
–50

1999
259
8
–3
26
–16
–5
–11
252
19

2000
159
–1
1
8
–11
1
–12
161
17

60
7
132
9
32
35

25
5
92
15
0
22

Average for period (percent)

–100

Civilian unemployment
rate

–150
1998

1999

2000

2001

IQ

IIQ
2002

IIIQ

Sept.

4.2

4.0

4.8

5.7

6.0

Oct. Nov.
2002

Percent
65.0 LABOR MARKET INDICATORS

Percent
6.5

12-month percent change
6 EMPLOYMENT COST INDEX, CIVILIAN WORKERS

Employment-to-population ratio
64.5

6.0

64.0

5.5

5

Wages

4
63.5

5.0

63.0

4.5

3

Civilian unemployment rate

62.5

62.0
1995

4.0

3.5
1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Compensation

Benefits

2

1
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

FRB Cleveland • December 2002

NOTE: All data are seasonally adjusted, unless otherwise noted.
a. Transportation and public utilities.
b. Finance, insurance, and real estate.
c. The services industry includes travel; business support; recreation and entertainment; private and/or parochial education; personal services; and health services.
SOURCE: U.S Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Nonfarm payroll employment posted
a net loss of 40,000 jobs in November.
Employment numbers for October
and September, however, have been
revised upward by 11,000 and 9,000,
respectively. Instead of a loss, it now
appears that 6,000 jobs were added
in October.
The goods-producing industries
continued their decline with a net loss
of 51,000 jobs in November, while service-producing industries continued
their rise with a net gain of 11,000
jobs. Manufacturing employment fell
45,000, consistent with the industry’s
average monthly decline since the
beginning of 2002. Over the past two

years, manufacturing as a whole has
shown a net loss of 388,000 jobs. Construction declined only slightly in November, in comparison to its net loss
of 22,000 jobs the previous month.
Jobs in help supply services declined
for the second consecutive month,
this time by 23,000. Health services
added 27,000 jobs, accounting for
about half of all services gains.
Employment in wholesale and retail
trade fell sharply for a net loss of
44,000. After posting large gains in
October, government added only
8,000 jobs in November. Finance,
insurance, and real estate continued
to gain jobs, although the gains were
smaller than in recent months.

The unemployment rate rose to
6.0%, 0.3 percentage points higher
than last month. This matches the
level reached in April of this year. The
employment-to-population ratio fell
0.4 percentage points to 62.5, the
lowest so far this year.
Total compensation, as measured
by the Employment Cost Index, rose
at a rate of 3.7% between 2001:IIIQ
and 2002:IIIQ. This was its slowest
rate in three years. The wage component grew at a 3.2% rate, its slowest
since early 1996. Benefits increased
at a 4.9% rate, far outpacing wage
cost growth.

13
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•

•

The Economy’s Health
Index, January 2002 = 1.00
1.04 AGGREGATE WEEKLY HOURS

Index, January 2002 = 1.00
1.04 EMPLOYMENT LEVEL

1.03

1.03

1.02

1.02
Services c

1.01

1.01

Services c

FIRE a
1.00

FIRE a

1.00

TPU b

0.99

0.99

Construction

Manufacturing

TPU b

Manufacturing
0.98

0.98
Construction
0.97

0.97

0.96

0.96
0.95

0.95
Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June
2002

July

Aug.

Sept.

Oct.

Index, January 2002 = 1.00
1.04 AVERAGE WEEKLY HOURS

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June
2002

July

Aug.

Sept.

Oct.

Sept.

Oct.

Thousands
440 INITIAL UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE CLAIMS

1.03
430
1.02
TPU b

Manufacturing
1.01

420

1.00

Services c

FIRE a

410

0.99
0.98

400
Construction

0.97

390
0.96
0.95

380
Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June
2002

July

Aug.

Sept.

Oct.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June
2002

July

Aug.

FRB Cleveland • December 2002

NOTE: All data are seasonally adjusted.
a. Finance, insurance, and real estate.
b. Transportation and public utilities.
c. The services industry includes travel; business support; recreation and entertainment; private and/or parochial education; personal services; and health services.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Some have argued that the economy
entered the recovery or expansion
phase of the business cycle in January
2002; others say it is still too early to
tell. These mixed signals are certainly
evident in the labor market.
The economy’s industries have
behaved in various ways over the first
10 months of the year. To compare
industries more clearly, the charts
show each industry’s employment,
hours, and aggregate hours indexed
to 1.0 for January 2002.
Aggregate weekly hours show
how differently these industries have
performed so far this year. For the

services industry, aggregate weekly
hours have risen approximately 1.5%;
for construction, they have fallen
about 4%; for manufacturing as well
as transportation and public utilities,
they have fallen roughly 1%.
Aggregate hours are the product
of the employment level and average
hours per week. Employment has
fallen in manufacturing; construction; and transportation and public
utilities. In finance, insurance, and
real estate, employment has been
mostly flat but has begun rising in the
past few months. The services industry is the only one to show sustained
employment growth. Some of these

changes may result from longer-run
secular rises or declines, especially in
manufacturing.
In terms of hours per week, the
construction industry has declined
substantially. In manufacturing and in
transportation and public utilities,
hours have risen moderately for
much of the year. In every industry
except construction, however, the
level is about what it was at the beginning of the year.
Unemployment insurance claims,
after bouncing around for the first
10 months of the year, are close to
the level posted when 2002 began.

14
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•

•

Census 2000: Educational Attainment
SHARE OF THOSE WITH
A HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA OR MORE, 2002

National rate: 80.4%

GROWTH RATES FOR THOSE WITH
A HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA OR MORE, 1990–2000

Higher than nation
Within + 2 percentage points of nation
National growth: 5.2%

Lower than nation

Lower than nation

GROWTH RATES FOR THOSE WITH
BACHELOR’S DEGREE OR MORE, 1990–2000

SHARE OF THOSE WITH
A BACHELOR’S DEGREE OR MORE, 2000

National rate: 24.4%

Higher than nation
Within + 1 percentage point of nation

Higher than nation
Within + 2 percentage points of nation

National growth: 4.1%

Lower than nation

Higher than nation
Within + 0.5 percentage point of nation
Lower than nation

FRB Cleveland • December 2002

NOTE: All data refer to persons who are 25 and older.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 2000 Census, Summary File 3.

The Census Bureau recently released
information on educational attainment from the 2000 Census (Summary File 3). It provides data on those
25 and older for two attainment levels: a high school diploma or more
and a bachelor’s degree or more.
In 2000, 80.4% of people in the U.S.
had at least a high school diploma or
equivalent. The states with higher
percentages of high school graduates
are in the Northwest, Great Plains,
Upper Midwest, and New England regions; the states with lower percentages are in the South plus California
and Rhode Island.

Between the censuses of 1990 and
2000, the South and parts of the Midwest and Great Plains improved their
educational attainment rates more
quickly than the nation as a whole;
the western states had slower growth
rates than the U.S. For the nation, the
share of people 25 and older with at
least a high school diploma increased
5.2% over the decade. In six states,
the shares of high school grads rose
less than 3%; in California, the increase was less than 1%.
Almost 25% of people in the U.S.
have at least a bachelor’s degree,
with higher rates in Washington,

California, Colorado, and Minnesota
as well as the Washington, D.C., area
and some New England states. In
Connecticut, Maryland, Colorado,
and Massachusetts, more than 30%
of the population has at least a bachelor’s degree.
Between 1990 and 2000, states
that had the highest growth rates for
the share of the population with at
least a bachelor’s degree were scattered all over the nation. Burgeoning
numbers of high-tech jobs in Washington, North Carolina, Virginia, and
Maryland could account for some of
the increase in those states.
(continued on next page)

15
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•

•

•

Census 2000: Educational Attainment (cont.)
Percent
90 SHARE OF THOSE WITH
A HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA OR MORE

Percent
30 SHARE OF THOSE WITH
A BACHELOR’S DEGREE OR MORE
28

85
1990

1990

26

2000

2000
24

80

22
75

20
18

70
16
14

65

12
60

10
U.S.

KY

OH

PA

WV

SHARE OF THOSE WITH
A HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA OR MORE, BY COUNTY, 2000

U.S.

KY

OH

PA

WV

SHARE OF THOSE WITH
A BACHELOR’S DEGREE OR MORE, BY COUNTY, 2000

Below 70%
70–79.9%
80–84.9%
85% and higher

Below 10%
10–14.9%
15–19.9%
20% and higher

FRB Cleveland • December 2002

NOTE: All data refer to persons who are 25 and older.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 2000 Census, Summary File 3.

Every Fourth District state increased the percentage of those at
both attainment levels—high school
and college. In 1990, Ohio was the
only state in the District to exceed the
nationwide percentage of those with
at least a high school diploma (75.7%
versus 75.2%). By 2000, rates in both
Ohio and Pennsylvania were higher
than the nation. Kentucky and West
Virginia were still among the least
educated states in the nation (second
and fourth from the bottom); however, the shares of those with at least
a high school diploma improved considerably. Districtwide, the percent
of those with at least a bachelor’s

degree lagged the nation again in
2000; however, Pennsylvania’s rate of
increase was higher than the nation’s.
Counties near major cities generally
have a higher share of people with at
least a high school diploma; however,
this is not always true of counties in
which those cities are located. The
counties with the lowest percentages
are concentrated in eastern Kentucky,
which relies heavily on agriculture,
and Holmes County, Ohio, which has
a large Amish population.
The counties with the highest
percentages of the population with
a bachelor’s degree or beyond are
focused in and around counties with

major cities. The counties with the
lowest percentages are in Eastern
Kentucky and in pockets of southern,
eastern, and central Ohio. For both
levels of attainment, rural counties
with a college or university often have
higher rates than the surrounding
counties (for example, Rowan County,
Kentucky has Morehead State University, and Athens County, Ohio has
Ohio University). Counties that have
smaller colleges or at least one major
employer (particularly hospitals and
private companies) often surpass
neighboring countries’ shares of people with a bachelor’s degree or more.

16
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•

•

•

Federal Home Loan Banks
Billions of dollars
600 ASSETS

Billions of dollars
800 LIABILITIES
700

500

Deposits and borrowings

Advances
Investments

Consolidated obligations

600

Other liabilities
Capital

Other assets
400
500

300

400

300
200
200
100
100
0

0
1993

1994

1995

1997

1996

1998

1999

COMPOSITION OF OTHER ASSETS a
2%
All other assets

7%
Derivative assets

5%
Interest receivable

2000

2001

2002

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Percent
8 CAPITAL

2001

2002

Billions of dollars
40
35

7
Percent of assets

6

30

5

25

4

20

3

15

2

10

1

5

86%
Net mortgagte loans

0

0
1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

FRB Cleveland • December 2002

a. Data through 2002:IIIQ.
SOURCES: Federal Home Loan Bank System, Quarterly Financial Report, September 30, 2002; and annual reports.

The 12 Federal Home Loan Banks
(FHLBs) are stock-chartered, government-sponsored enterprises whose
mission initially was to provide shortterm advances to member institutions, funded with deposits from
those institutions. Membership was
open to specialized housing-finance
lenders, mostly savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks.
With continued shrinkage of their
traditional clientele and the financial
system’s ongoing consolidation,
FHLBs have been reinventing their
role in financial markets. Advances—
borrowings by FDIC-insured institutions from the FHLB—are an

important source of funding for
member institutions’ mortgage
portfolios. By the end of 2002:IIIQ,
advances had risen to $490.74 billion, far outstripping all other FHLB
investments and assets.
The lion’s share of funding for
FHLB assets came from $667.56 billion of consolidated obligations
of the Federal Home Loan Bank
System—bonds issued on behalf of
the 12 FHLBs collectively. The market sees these bonds as implicitly
backed by the U.S. government;
hence, they allow FHLBs to raise
funds at lower rates of return than
AAA-rated corporations. Member

institutions’ deposits, short-term
borrowings, and other liabilities
provided only a miniscule amount of
funds. FHLBs have added to their
capital as they have grown. Since
1996, however, the pace of asset
growth has outstripped capital
growth; by the end of the 2002:IIIQ,
the capital-to-asset ratio had fallen
to 4.72%.
In 1997, the Federal Home Loan
Bank of Chicago initiated the Mortgage Partnership Finance Program, in
which nine of the 12 FHLBs participate. The 12 FHLBs currently have a
combined $47.07 billion in mortgages,
(continued on next page)

17
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•

•

•

Federal Home Loan Banks (cont.)
Millions of dollars
3,500 COMPOSITION OF INCOME

Millions of dollars
2,500 EARNINGS

3,000
2,000

2,500

Jan.–Dec.
Jan.–Sept.

2,000

1,500
1,500
1,000
1,000
500
0

500

–500

Net interest income, Jan.–Dec.
Net interest income, Jan.–Sept.

–1,000

0

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Sept. 2000 Sept. 2001 Sept. a
2000
2001
2002

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Sept. 2000 Sept. 2001 Sept. a
2001
2000
2002
Percent
0.7 PROFITABILITY

Net non-interest income, Jan.–Dec.
Net non-interest income, Jan.–Sept.

Ratio
27 RETURN ON EQUITY

Percent
9
8

24
Equity multiplier c

0.6
21

7

18

6

15

5

12

4

9

3

6

2

3

1

Net interest margin
0.5

Return on assets

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1
1993

0
1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001 2002 b

0
1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002 a

FRB Cleveland • December 2002

a. Data through 2002:IIIQ.
b. Data for 2002:IIIQ are annualized.
c. The equity multiplier is the ratio of total assets to equity.
SOURCES: Federal Home Loan Bank System, Quarterly Financial Report, September 30, 2002 and annual reports.

more than twice their holdings a
year ago. Mortgage portfolios are
expected to be a major source of
future asset growth.
FHLBs’ earnings (income) rose
steadily from 1994 through 2000,
then fell in 2001. Their $1,356 million
in net income in the first nine months
of 2002 was down from $1,515 million
for the same period in 2001.
Breaking down income into interest
and non-interest sources shows that
FHLBs’ primary source of earnings is
net interest income (interest income
less interest expense). Net interest
income grew from $954 million in

1993 to $3,096 million in 2001. The net
interest income of $2,194 million for
the first nine months of 2002 was
down from $2,358 million for the same
period in 2001.
Unfortunately, FHLBs’ improvements in earnings and net interest
income have resulted from strong
asset growth, not improvements in
underlying profitability. Return on
assets declined from 49 basis points
(bp) in 1993 to 31 bp at the end of
2001. The annualized return on
assets through 2002:IIIQ is 24 bp.
Profitability in 2002 has been hurt
by a decline in the net interest margin (net income before loan loss

provisions as a percentage of average earning assets), from 54 bp at
the end of 1993 to an annualized
39 bp at the end of 2002. Moreover,
FHLBs’ net interest margins pale
by comparison to the 300–400 bp
typical of depository institutions.
Finally, although leverage has
increased continually since 1996,
return on equity fell slightly to 5.03%
for the first nine months of 2002 from
6.29% at the end of 2001. These persistently weak returns on assets and
equity put further pressure on FHLBs
to undertake nontraditional lines of
business in search of higher returns.

18
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•

•

Foreign Central Banks
Percent, daily
7 MONETARY POLICY TARGETS a

Trillions of yen
–35

6

–30

5

–25
Bank of England

4

Trillions of yen
30
BANK OF JAPAN b
27
Current account balances (daily)
24

–20
21

3

–15

European Central Bank

–10

2
Federal Reserve

–5

15

0

0

12

–1

5

–2

10

1

Current account less
required reserves

18

Current account
balances

9

–3

15
Bank of Japan

–4
–5
4/1

7/1

10/1

1/1

4/1

2001

7/1

Excess reserve balances
6

20

3

25

0

10/1

4/1

7/1

10/1

2002

1/1

4/1

2001

7/1

Index, January 1, 2002 = 100
450 FOREIGN CURRENCY PER U.S. DOLLAR

Index, January 1, 2002 = 100
450 FOREIGN CURRENCY PER U.S. DOLLAR

400

400

350

350
Argentine peso

Argentine peso
300

300

250

250
Uruguayan peso

200

200

150

Paraguayan guarani

150
Brazilian real

Bolivian boliviano

100

Chilean peso

50

100
50

0
4/1

10/1

2002

Peruvian new sol

0
7/1

10/1

1/1

4/1

2001

7/1
2002

10/1

4/1

7/1

10/1
2001

1/1

4/1

7/1

10/1

2002

FRB Cleveland • December 2002

a. Federal Reserve: overnight interbank rate. Bank of Japan: a quantity of current account balances (since December 19, 2001, the range of a quantity of
current account balances). Bank of England and European Central Bank: two-week repo rate.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Bank of Japan; European Central Bank; Bank of England; Banco Central do Brasil; and
Bloomberg Financial Information Services.

On November 6, the Federal Reserve
reduced its federal funds rate target
50 basis points (bp) to 1.25%. Since
then, the Bank of England’s Monetary
Policy Committee has twice left its
policy rate unchanged. Although the
European Central Bank did not
change its policy rate on November 7,
it did cut the rate 50 bp to 2.75%
on December 6. Also in November,
the Bank of Japan noted reduced
prospects for economic growth
but left its target for the range of
current account balances unchanged.

Nonetheless, the actual supply of
balances, currently more than ¥19
trillion, has been moving steadily
toward ¥20 trillion, the upper end of
the target range.
Banco Central do Brasil raised its
rate target 100 bp in mid-November.
The Brazilian real seems unaffected
by recent election results and by
reports that President-elect Lula will
appoint a new central bank president. Argentina defaulted on more
than 90% of an $805 million payment
to the World Bank in October. In
Argentina, inflation has moderated

somewhat, the exchange rate has
strengthened a bit, and depositors
now have access to previously frozen
accounts (other than CDs).
The effects of the Argentine and
Brazilian situations continue to
plague neighboring economies. The
Paraguayan central bank president
resigned in frustration over congressional resistance to tax reforms
needed to secure emergency aid from
the International Monetary Fund. In
Uruguay, five coalition cabinet ministers threatened to quit over the government’s handling of the economy.