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August 2013 (July 12, 2013-August 15, 2013)

In This Issue:
Banking and Financial Markets
 Tracking Recent Levels of Financial Stress

Inflation and Prices
 What’s Weighing on Inflation?

Labor Markets, Unemployment, and Wages
 Differences in Employment Growth across
Metropolitan Areas

Monetary Policy
 The Effect of Shifting Expectations for Future
Monetary Policy on Current Interest Rates
 Yield Curve and Predicted GDP Growth,
July 2013

Regional Economics
 The Columbus Metropolitan Statistical Area
 Brain Hubs and Manufacturing Centers in the
Fourth District

Banking and Financial Markets

Tracking Recent Levels of Financial Stress
07.11.13
by Timothy Bianco and Amanda Janosko

Cleveland Financial Stress Index
Points
4
3
Grade 4
2
1

Grade 3

0

Grade 2

-1
Grade 1

-2
-3
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Source: Oet, Bianco, Gramlich, and Ong (2012).

Relative Stress-Level Contributions
of Component Markets to CFSI
More
stress

The Cleveland Financial Stress Index (CFSI) has
remained in Grade 2, or within a “normal stress”
level, since the index was revised in April 2013,
when new submarkets were added and updates
began to be posted on a daily basis. The trend in
financial stress over the previous three months is
most likely due to continuing improvements in
financial markets.

100
25

5/1/2013
6/3/2013
7/1/2013

As of July 9, the index stands at −0.39, which is up
0.09 points from a recent low on May 20, 2013.
The index is down 1.47 points over the past year
and is 3.35 points lower than its historical peak in
December 2008.
The CFSI incorporates measures of stress for each
of the major financial submarkets: credit, funding,
equity, foreign exchange, real estate, and securitization. As a result, the total level of system stress can
be decomposed to gauge the level of stress in each
of these submarkets and the contribution each
makes to system stress (see the working paper). Although the overall CFSI has remained low, recently
there have been increases to the amount of financial
stress generated by the equity market. Conversely,
the contribution from the securitization market has
trended downward.

20
15
10
5
No
stress

0
Credit

Funding

Equity

Foreign
exchange

Real Securitization
estate

Note: These contributions refer to levels of stress, where a value of 0 indicates the least
possible stress and a value of 1.00 indicates the most possible stress. The sum of these
contributions is the level of the CFSI, but this differs from the actual CFSI, which is computed
as the standardized distance from the mean, or the z-score.
Source: Oet, Bianco, Gramlich, and Ong (2012).

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | August 2013

2

Inflation and Prices

What’s Weighing on Inflation?
07.22.13
by Todd Clark and Margaret Jacobson

CPI Inflation
12-month percent change
4.0
3.5
CPI
3.0
2.5

Core CPI

2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
1/2011 5/2011

9/2011 1/2012 5/2012

9/2012 1/2013 5/2013

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Prices of Consumer Goods
12-month percent change
10.0
8.0
Nondurables, CPI
6.0
Nondurables, imported
4.0

Various indicators show that CPI inflation has declined over the past year or so. Although the Bureau
of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) most recent release of the
Consumer Price Index (CPI) shows an annualized
increase of 5.9 percent for the month of June, CPI
inflation has been very low for many months of the
year. As a result, measured on a 12-month basis,
CPI inflation continued to remain below 2 percent, at 1.8 percent. The “core” CPI, which covers
goods and services excluding food and energy, rose
at an annual rate of 2.0 percent in June, putting
the 12-month rate at 1.6 percent. Measured on a
12-month basis, core CPI inflation has slowed from
2.2 percent in June 2012 to 1.9 percent in December 2012 to its current rate of 1.6 percent.
The current low rates of inflation in the CPI and
core CPI are partly due to low rates of inflation in
the prices of goods (see “Recent Trends in Various CPI-Based Inflation Measures” and “Behind
Recent Disinflation: 2010 Redux?”). Over the past
year or so, inflation rates for both nondurable and
durable goods captured in the CPI have slowed,
reaching levels that, today, are very low. In June, the
12-month CPI inflation rate for durable goods was
−0.6 percent (meaning that the level of durables
prices fell 0.6 percent), and the CPI inflation rate
for nondurable goods was 1.3 percent.

2.0
0.0
Durables, imported
-2.0
1/2011

Durables, CPI

5/2011 9/2011 1/2012 5/2012 9/2012 1/2013 5/2013

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | August 2013

Goods represent about 40 percent of the total CPI
consumer basket, with food and beverages comprising 15 percent of the entire basket and nondurables
and durables making up the other 25 percent (as
measured by relative importances in December
2012). For the 27 goods components of the CPI,
inflation rates over the past 12 months vary quite
a bit across components, as is normally the case.
However, inflation rates are moderate or low for
most categories and negative (indicating declining
prices) for a number of categories.

3

CPI Goods Prices
Miscellaneous personal goods
Personal care products
Tobacco and smoking products
Communication
Education
Recreation
Medical care commodities
Motor vehicle parts and equipment
Motor fuel
Used cars and trucks
New vehicles
Jewelry and watches
Infants' and toddlers' apparel
Footwear
Women's and girls' apparel
Men's and boys' apparel
Household furnishings and operations
Fuel oil and other fuels
Alcoholic beverages
Food away from home
Other food at home
Nonalcoholic beverages and beverage materials
Processed fruits and vegetables
Fresh fruits and vegetables
Dairy and related products
Meats, poultry, fish, and eggs
Cereals and bakery products

Past 12 months
Past 3 months

-25

-15

-5

5

15

Annualized percent change
Note: The communication, education, and household furnishings and operations components contain both goods and
services.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Prices of Imported Consumer Goods
Nonmanufactured
consumer goods
Coins, gems, jewelry
and collectibles
Home entertainment
equipment
Recreational equipement
and materials
Household durables
Other consumer
nondurables
Apparel, footwear, and
household nondurables
-20

Past 12 months
Past 3 months

-15

-10

-5

0

Annualized percentage change
Source: Bureau of Labor Statics, Import Prices Table 1

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | August 2013

5

While the CPI doesn’t distinguish goods produced
in the U.S. from those produced abroad, the low
inflation rate of CPI goods prices seems to be partly
due to low inflation rates for the prices of imported
goods: the inflation rates of separate BLS indexes
of import prices are very low. The prices of imported durable goods prices fell 0.5 percent on average
over the same period. Inflation in imported nondurable goods was 1.1 percent on a year-over-year
basis in June. Taking a more disaggregated look at
inflation in imported good yields a picture similar
to that for the components of CPI goods. While
inflation rates measured over the past 12 months
differ quite a bit across categories of imported consumer goods, rates are low for most and negative
for a fair number.
So, to briefly answer the question posed in the title,
continued low rates of inflation in goods prices—as
measured in import prices and CPI goods prices—
appear to be an important factor behind overall and
core CPI inflation rates that, on a 12-month basis,
remained below 2 percent in June.

4

Labor Markets, Unemployment, and Wages

Differences in Employment Growth across Metropolitan Areas
08.14.13
by Dionissi Aliprantis and Nelson Oliver
In the last decade, different metropolitan areas of
the United States have experienced dramatically different levels of employment growth. Stark contrasts
can be seen, for example, when we compare the 50
metro areas with the highest employment growth
between 2001 and 2011 to the 50 with the lowest
(using the 100 largest metro areas in the U.S. based
on their 2001 populations).
Employment expanded by 13 percent in the
high-growth metros but only 1 percent in the lowgrowth group. Though both groups lost significant
employment during the Great Recession, the lowgrowth group lost almost 5 percentage points while
the high-growth group lost roughly 3 percentage
points. Even if we focused on employment growth
only up to 2007, the same patterns would hold and
the specific metropolitan areas within each group
would change little (12 metro areas would switch
categories).

Employment Growth in the 100 Largest
US MSAs, 2001−2011
Employment growth (percentage)
15
50 MSAs with highest
employment growth
10
50 MSAs with lowest
employment growth

5

0
2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

Source: Authors’ calculations based on Bureau Economic Analysis data.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | August 2013

2011

Given these substantial differences between highgrowth and low-growth metro areas, it might be
surprising that unemployment rates do not diverge
across metro areas more than they do. In January
2013, for example, average unemployment rates
were 7.7 percent in the high-growth group and 7.8
percent in the low-growth group.
The long-term patterns of employment reflect, to
a greater extent, changes in the size of the local
economy—not utilization rates of labor. One can
see this by looking at the relationship between
population and employment. Employment growth
and population growth are highly correlated (correlation coefficient=0.72). Metro areas that experience high employment growth also experience
high population growth, and vice versa, during the
period in question. This does not necessarily mean
that population growth causes employment growth.
Rather, employment and population growth are
jointly determined. Better job prospects in a region
will attract people to the area, and higher popula5

tion growth in an area will cause economic activity
to rise and increase the demand for labor.

Employment and Population Growth
in the 100 Largest MSAs, 2001−2011

Employment-to-population ratios diverge much
less across the two groups of metropolitan areas
than employment-growth rates. Still, low-growth
metro areas have underperformed and their employment-to-population ratios have declined by
about 1 percentage point more than those of highgrowth metros.

Employment growth (percentage)
MSAs

Fourth District MSAs

Fitted values

40

20

0

−20
−10

0

10

20

30

40

Population growth

Source: Authors’ calculations based on Bureau Economic Analysis data.

Change in Employment-to-Population Ratio
in the 100 Largest US MSAs, 2001−2011
Change in EPR (as a percentage of 2001 EPR)
4
2

50 MSAs with highest
employment growth

0
−2

50 MSAs with lowest
employment growth

−4
2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

Source: Authors’ calculations based on Bureau Economic Analysis data.

2011

One factor behind the trend in the employment-topopulation ratio is that population share is moving
from low-growth metros to high-growth metros,
and this is reflected in employment. However,
simple differences in population growth are not the
entire story. Industrial structure has worked against
the low-growth metros: They are much more
focused on manufacturing than the high-growth
metros. In 2011, for example, low-growth metros
had 40 percent more manufacturing workers than
the high-growth metros, and manufacturing represented a greater share of their overall employment
(7.4 percent versus 4.9 percent)—although this gap
had narrowed since 2001 (when it was 10.8 percent versus 7.2 percent). Even though the negative
shocks to manufacturing during the decade were
widespread, low-growth metros also lost a greater
proportion of their manufacturing workers than
higher-growth metropolitan areas.
Between 2001 and 2003, manufacturing employment in low-growth metro areas declined by
790,000, whereas high-growth metro areas experienced a more moderate decline of 457,000. A large
gap was apparent between 2003 and 2008, when
low-growth metro areas lost 432,000 manufacturing jobs and high-growth metros lost only 66,000.
And the contrast in manufacturing employment
trends was again apparent between 2008 and 2011,
when low-growth metros lost 609,000 manufacturing jobs and high-growth metros lost 377,000.
That said, industrial structure explains only a
small fraction of the difference in employment
growth between high- and low-growth metros. If
one replaced the industrial structure of the lowgrowth regions with the industrial structure of the
high-growth regions, but kept each group’s origi-

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | August 2013

6

nal sectoral employment growth rates, the overall
difference in employment growth between the two
groups of metros would shrink by only 18 percent.
So even if the metro groups had similar industry
structure in 2001, it is likely there would still be
a large gap in growth rates between our high- and
low-employment growth rate metros.

Manufacturing Employment in the 100
Largest US MSAs
Millions employed in manufacturing
6.0
5.5

Low-growth MSAs

5.0
4.5
4.0
High-growth MSAs
3.5
3.0
2.5
2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

2011

Source: Authors’ calculations based on Bureau Economic Analysis data.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | August 2013

7

Monetary Policy

Shifting Expectations and Interest Rates
08.15.13
By John Carlson, Sara Millington, and Bill Bednar
By simply changing their views about future economic conditions and the likely policy response,
monetary policymakers can alter financial conditions in the present. As a result, how policymakers
choose to communicate their expectations influences the effectiveness of their policies. The recent
rise of interest rates is a case in point.
Since the beginning of the year, there have been
no explicit changes to monetary policy actions.
The Federal Reserve has been purchasing the same
amount of federal-agency mortgage-backed securities and Treasury securities since January, and the
target for the federal funds rate has not changed.
Still, interest rates have steadily risen over the past
few months (although they have moderated somewhat recently). Rising rates effectively translate into
tightening financial conditions, which could feed
into broader economic conditions as well. A key
factor influencing these rates is market participants’
evolving expectations about the timing of future
changes in monetary policy, especially in the context of the Committee’s economic projections.

Daily Treasury Yields
Percent

Percent
3.0

0.6
June FOMC meeting

2.8
2.6

0.5
10-year treasury yield
(left axis)

2.4
2.2

0.4

2.0
1.8

0.3
2-year treasury yield
(right axis)

1.6
1.4

0.2

1.2
1.0

0.1
5/1

5/15

5/29

6/12

6/26

7/10

7/24

The yield on a 10-year treasury bond, which is
highly correlated with many other longer-term
interest rates, including rates on mortgages and
corporate bond yields, has increased from around
1.7 percent to nearly 2.6 percent since May 1.
Similarly, on the shorter end of the maturity distribution, interest rates on 2-year treasury bonds have
increased from around 0.2 percent to over 0.3 percent. The largest movements in these rates came in
the days following the June Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) meeting, when the Committee released its updated economic projections and
Chairman Bernanke gave additional details on the
predicted future of asset purchases. In contrast, the
reaction after the July FOMC meeting, when less
new information about the Committee’s outlook
was provided, was rather muted. This suggests that,

Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Haver Analytics.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | August 2013

8

while there are many influences on interest rates,
the outlook and expectations of FOMC participants are playing some role in driving these tighter
financial conditions.

Intra-day Treasury Yields for June Meeting
Percent

Percent
0.40

2.4

2.3
0.35
10-year
2.2
0.30
2.1
2-year

2.0
9:00 AM

0.25
10:30 AM

12:00 PM

1:30 PM

3:00 PM

4:30 PM

Source: Bloomberg.

Looking at these yields on the date of the June
meeting provides further evidence of the impact
that the FOMC’s outlook is having on financial
conditions. Sharp increases are observed in the
intraday yields for the 2-year treasury rate, which
coincide with the release of new economic projections and the Chairman’s press conference on
future plans for monetary policy. Additionally,
the 10-year Treasury rate experiences a significant
jump following the press conference and finishes
on June 19 nearly 20 basis points higher than the
level at which it started the day. Therefore, while
no explicit changes to policy actions were made at
the June meeting, the yields on both the short- and
longer-term Treasury bonds increased considerably
throughout the day, and the new rates reached on
these bonds after this meeting persisted through
July.
One of the likely causes of the strong reaction
of financial markets to the June meeting was the
release of the Committee’s economic projections.
Those projections reflected some improvement in
the FOMC’s forecast, notably for the unemployment rate, over the Committee’s previously released
projections in March. Specifically, the central tendency of the unemployment rate forecasts for 2014
encompassed 6½ percent, the Committee’s threshold for raising the federal funds rate target; while
in the March projections, a majority of FOMC participants saw the unemployment rate reaching this
threshold some time in 2015. Given this shift in
the unemployment rate forecast and the FOMC’s
threshold, the improved outlook is expected to
impact the projected path of the federal funds rate,
which will additionally feed into other longer-term
rates in the present.
In order to gauge market expectations for the path
of the federal funds rate, we can look at data from
federal funds futures contracts. The expected path
of the federal funds rate shifted higher following
the June meeting and has remained at this level for
most of June and July. The upper bound on the

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | August 2013

9

Unemployment Rate SEP Projections
Percent, fourth quarter average
8.0
7.5
7.0
Central tendency
6.5
6.0

Range

current target range for the federal funds rate set
by the FOMC is currently 0.25 percent. Since this
expected path has steepened since May 1 and has
continued to follow the higher path first seen on
June 19, the expectation about when the federal
funds rate will exceed the current target range and
come off of the “lower bound” is now not as far
away as previously thought, and it is no coincidence that this shift corresponds with the improvement in the outlook for the unemployment rate.

5.5
5.0

March
June

4.5
4.0
2013

2014

Longer-run

2015

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

Implied Federal Funds Rate Path
Percent
1.6
1.4

July 31

1.2
1
0.8

June 19
June 18

0.6
May 1
0.4
0.2
0
5/2013 9/2013 1/2014 5/2014 9/2014 1/2015 5/2015 9/2015 1/2016 5/2016

Source: Bloomberg.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | August 2013

Additionally, expectations about the projected path
of short-term interest rates play a major role in
determining the current level of long-term interest rates, so this shift in expectations is likely to
feed through to current interest rates on securities
with longer maturities, like 2- or 10-year Treasury
bonds, as well as mortgages or auto loans.
Another potential cause of the recent shift in interest rates, especially on longer-term securities, is
changes to expectations about the Federal Reserve’s
asset purchase program. The Federal Reserve started
purchasing long-term securities when the primary
monetary policy tool, the target federal funds rate,
reached its zero lower bound following the financial
crisis, and further easing in financial conditions was
needed. Since this program is a tool meant to influence interest rates, changes in how these purchases
are expected to evolve are likely to impact the
behavior of interest rates as well. At the June meeting, Chairman Bernanke laid out a potential path
of asset purchases if the economic recovery were to
proceed as forecasted. The Chairman’s statement
may have caused the market’s expectations about
the path of asset purchases to shift from previous
projections closer to the path he presented, which
would impact the current level of interest rates.
One view of potential shifts in expectations for asset purchases is drawn from the Survey of Primary
Dealers. Primary dealers—financial institutions that
trade securities directly with the Federal Reserve—
are regularly surveyed on their expectations for the
economy, monetary policy, and financial market
developments prior to FOMC meetings. Data from
this survey show that there was a downward shift to
the expected pace of asset purchases following the
June meeting. This shift is likely playing some role
10

in the recent increases in interest rates, although it
is tough to determine what the impact is or to differentiate it from the impact of shifts in the expectations of other policy tools.

LSAP Projections
Billions of dollars
90
80
Pre-June FOMC
SPD pace

70
60
Actual pace
50

Post-June FOMC
SPD pace

40

Even as monetary policy actions remain consistent,
expectations about future monetary policy actions
are likely to change as the economy evolves. As
these expectations change, they are likely to have
a fresh impact on current financial and economic
conditions.

30
20

Projections

10
0
9/2012

12/2012 5/2013

6/2013

9/2013

12/2013 3/2014

Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Survey of Primary
Dealers.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | August 2013

11

Monetary Policy

Yield Curve and Predicted GDP Growth, July 2013
Covering June 15, 2013–July 19, 2013
by Joseph G. Haubrich and Margaret Jacobson
Overview of the Latest Yield Curve Figures

Highlights
July

June

May

Three-month Treasury bill rate (percent)

0.03

0.05

0.04

Ten-year Treasury bond rate (percent)

2.54

2.20

1,93

Yield curve slope (basis points)

251

215

189

Prediction for GDP growth (percent)

0.9

0.4

0.3

Probability of recession in one year (percent)

2.6

4.4

6.1

Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; authors’ calculations.

Yield Curve Predicted GDP Growth
Percent
Predicted
GDP growth

4
2
0
-2

Ten-year minus three-month
yield spread

GDP growth
(year-over-year
change)

-4
-6
2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

The steeper slope had a small but noticeable impact
on projected future growth. Projecting forward
using past values of the spread and GDP growth
suggests that real GDP will grow at about a 0.9
percent rate over the next year, up a bit from June’s
0.4 percent and triple May’s 0.3 percent. The strong
influence of the recent recession is still leading
towards relatively low growth rates. Although the
time horizons do not match exactly, the forecast
comes in on the more pessimistic side of other
predictions but like them, it does show moderate
growth for the year.

2014

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, authors’ calculations.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | August 2013

Over the past month, the yield curve steepened
sharply as long rates surged and short rates ticked
down, increasing the slope even more than last
month. The three-month Treasury bill dropped to
0.03 percent (for the week ending July 19), down
from June’s 0.05 percent and from May’s 0.04
percent. The ten-year rate moved to 2.54 percent,
a third of a percent above June’s 2.20 percent, and
more than half a percent above May’s 1.93 percent.
The slope increased to 251 basis point, up from
June’s 215 basis points, and well above the May
level of 189 basis points.

The slope change had a bit more impact on the
probability of a recession. Using the yield curve to
predict whether or not the economy will be in recession in the future, we estimate that the expected
chance of the economy being in a recession next
July is 2.58 percent, down from June’s already low
4.35 percent and May’s 6.1 percent. So although
our approach is somewhat pessimistic regarding the
level of growth over the next year, it is quite optimistic about the recovery continuing.

12

The Yield Curve as a Predictor of Economic
Growth

Recession Probability from Yield Curve
Percent probability, as predicted by a probit model
100
90
Probability of recession

80
70
60

Forecast

50
40
30
20
10
0
1960 1966

1972 1978 1984

1990

1996

2002 2008

2014

Note: Shaded bars indicate recessions.
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, authors’ calculations.

Yield Curve Spread and Real GDP Growth
Percent
10
GDP growth
(year-over-year change)

8

The slope of the yield curve—the difference between the yields on short- and long-term maturity
bonds—has achieved some notoriety as a simple
forecaster of economic growth. The rule of thumb
is that an inverted yield curve (short rates above
long rates) indicates a recession in about a year, and
yield curve inversions have preceded each of the last
seven recessions (as defined by the NBER). One of
the recessions predicted by the yield curve was the
most recent one. The yield curve inverted in August
2006, a bit more than a year before the current
recession started in December 2007. There have
been two notable false positives: an inversion in late
1966 and a very flat curve in late 1998.
More generally, a flat curve indicates weak growth,
and conversely, a steep curve indicates strong
growth. One measure of slope, the spread between
ten-year Treasury bonds and three-month Treasury
bills, bears out this relation, particularly when real
GDP growth is lagged a year to line up growth with
the spread that predicts it.
Predicting GDP Growth
We use past values of the yield spread and GDP
growth to project what real GDP will be in the future. We typically calculate and post the prediction
for real GDP growth one year forward.

6
4
2
0
10-year minus three-month
yield spread

-2
-4
-6
1953

1960

1967

1974

1981

1988

1995

2002

2009

Note: Shaded bars indicate recessions.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.

Predicting the Probability of Recession
While we can use the yield curve to predict whether
future GDP growth will be above or below average, it does not do so well in predicting an actual
number, especially in the case of recessions. Alternatively, we can employ features of the yield curve
to predict whether or not the economy will be in a
recession at a given point in the future. Typically,
we calculate and post the probability of recession
one year forward.
Of course, it might not be advisable to take these
numbers quite so literally, for two reasons. First,
this probability is itself subject to error, as is the
case with all statistical estimates. Second, other
researchers have postulated that the underlying
determinants of the yield spread today are materi-

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | August 2013

13

Yield Spread and Lagged Real GDP Growth
Percent
10
One-year lag of GDP growth
(year-over-year change)

8
6
4
2
0

Ten-year minus three-month
yield spread

-2
-4
-6
1953

1960

1967

1974

1981

1988

1995

2002

ally different from the determinants that generated
yield spreads during prior decades. Differences
could arise from changes in international capital
flows and inflation expectations, for example. The
bottom line is that yield curves contain important
information for business cycle analysis, but, like
other indicators, should be interpreted with caution. For more detail on these and other issues related to using the yield curve to predict recessions,
see the Commentary “Does the Yield Curve Signal
Recession?” Our friends at the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York also maintain a website with
much useful information on the topic, including
their own estimate of recession probabilities.

2009

Note: Shaded bars indicate recessions.
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.

For more on the yield curve, read the Economic Commentary “Does
the Yield Curve Signal Recession?” at http://www.clevelandfed.org/
Research/Commentary/2006/0415.pdf.
For more on the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s estimate fo
recession, visit http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/capital_markets/ycfaq.html.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | August 2013

14

Regional Economics

The Columbus Metropolitan Statistical Area
08.02.13
by Kathryn Holston and Kyle Fee
2012 Location Quotients
Education and health services
Financial activities
Government
Information
Leisure and hospitality
Manufacturing
Mining, logging, and construction
Professional and business services
Other services

Ohio
Columbus MSA

Trade, transportation, and utilities

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

Note: The location quotient is the ratio between a given industry’s employment share in two locations. For
both Ohio and the Columbus MSA, the base area is the United States.
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Haver Analytics.

Payroll Employment since December 2007
Index: December 2007=100
102

100
Columbus MSA
98
US

96

Ohio

94

92
2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Haver Analytics.

Located in the geographic center of Ohio, the
Columbus Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) is
home to nearly 2 million people, dispersed across
ten counties (Delaware, Fairfield, Franklin, Hocking, Licking, Madison, Morrow, Perry, Pickaway,
and Union). The MSA has a significantly higher
concentration of employment than the nation in
two high-skilled, high-wage service industries:
financial activities and professional and business
services. This was true in 2007 and remained the
case throughout the recession. In 2012, the share
of workers in each of these industries surpassed the
nation’s share by 25 to 30 percent.
Columbus’s employment is largely concentrated in
different industries than the state as a whole. Looking at location quotients for Ohio and Columbus
(which show how employment is concentrated in
various industries relative to the nation), we can see
that the proportion of the state’s workforce that is
employed in manufacturing is higher than the national average, unlike the Columbus MSA. In contrast, the state has a smaller share of workers than
the nation in financial activities and professional
and business services, the two sectors in which Columbus’s employment is particularly concentrated.
Perhaps this difference in labor allocation accounts
for the dissimilarity between the MSA’s and the
state’s employment levels throughout the recession:
Columbus suffered less job loss than the nation and
significantly less than the state. Since the last business cycle peak in December 2007, employment
within the MSA has grown by almost 1 percent. In
comparison, Ohio’s employment fell by 3.8 percent
and the nation’s declined by 1.7 percent over the
same period.
Since the last business cycle peak, nonmanufacturing employment within the MSA has increased by
roughly 3 percent, compared to the nation’s decline
of 0.4 percent. In contrast, manufacturing job
losses have been almost equivalent in Columbus
and the nation.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | August 2013

15

Recent job growth within the MSA has been largely
driven by service industries. The leisure, hospitality, education, and health services sectors have
consistently contributed to positive employment
gains throughout the past six years. Although the
professional and business services sector suffered a
significant decline in employment in 2009, it has
resurfaced as one of Columbus’s leading sectors in
terms of job growth in both 2011 and 2012.

Payroll Employment since December 2007
Index: December 2007=100
105
Nonmanufacturing
100

95
US
90
Columbus MSA

During 2012, jobs in Columbus grew by about
1.5 percent, compared to the nation’s gain of 1.7
percent. Predictably, the MSA performed more
strongly than the nation in a number of higherskilled service industries over this period, including
financial activities, education and health services,
and leisure and hospitality. Columbus experienced
negative employment growth in only one sector
and posted growth of more than 1 percent in many
others.

85
Manufacturing
80
2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Haver Analytics.

Components of Employment Growth,
Columbus MSA
Percent change
3
2

From 2005 to 2009, Columbus’s unemployment
rate remained very close to the nation’s. While
unemployment did increase sharply in the MSA
during the recession, it has consistently been lower
than the nation since early 2009. In December, the
MSA’s seasonally adjusted unemployment rate was
5.7, compared to 7.8 percent in the nation.

Columbus MSA

1
0
-1
-2

Financial services and information
Government and other services
Leisure, hospitality, education, and
health
Manufacturing

US

-3

Mining, logging, and construction

-4

Professional and business services

Columbus is the only large Fourth District MSA
whose population has grown at a faster rate than
the nation’s in the past three decades. Since 1980,
Columbus’s population has increased by 53 percent, compared to the nation’s gain of 39 percent.
In that same period, Cincinnati’s population grew
at slightly more than half of the national rate, while
Cleveland’s declined by 5 percent and Pittsburgh’s
fell by 10 percent.

Trade, transportation, and utilities

-5
2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Note: The US and Columbus MSA lines represent total nonfarm employment growth.
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Haver Analytics.

Payroll Employment Growth December 2012
Total nonfarm
Total goods-producing
Total services-providing
Education and health services
Financial activities
Government
Information
Leisure and hospitality
Logging, mining, and construction
Manufacturing
Other services

US
Columbus MSA

Professional and business services
Trade, transportation, and utilities
-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

Year-over-year percent change

4

Although the Columbus MSA is home to a smaller
percentage of minorities than the US, it has a higher percentage than the state. The MSA’s population
is relatively better educated: Almost a third of Columbus’s residents aged 25 and older have earned a
bachelor’s degree, higher than in either Ohio or the
nation. The MSA’s population is also younger, on
average, than either the state’s or the nation’s, with a
median age of only 35.4.

Note: In the surrounding months, Columbus’ professional and business services sector had year-over-year
growth rates of one to four percent.
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Haver Analytics.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | August 2013

16

In 2011, the MSA’s per capita income was $40,188,
exceeding the state’s ($37,836) but falling below the
nation’s ($41,560). While Columbus’s per capita
income has been below the national level in recent
years, it has historically been higher. It has also
surpassed Ohio’s in every year since 1980.

Unemployment Rate
Percent
10
US
9
8
7
6
Columbus MSA

5
4
3
2
2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

Note: Shaded bars indicate recessions.
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Haver Analytics.

Selected Demographics
Columbus

Ohio

US

1.9

11.5

311.6

White

77.7

82.9

74.1

Black

14.6

12.1

12.6

Other

7.7

5.0

13.3

0-19

27.4

26.2

26.6

20-34

22.2

19.0

20.4

35-64

39.7

40.5

39.6

65 and older

10.8

14.2

13.2

Percent with bachelor’s degree or higher

32.9

24.7

28.5

Median age

35.4

39.1

37.3

Total population (millions)
Percent by race

Percent by age

Source: US Census Bureau, 2011 American Community Survey.

Per Capita Personal Income

Population Growth in the Fourth District

Dollars, thousands

Index: 1980=100

50
150

40

Columbus MSA

140

US

130

Columbus MSA
Ohio

US

Cincinnati MSA

120

30

20

110

Ohio

100

Cleveland MSA

90
Pittsburgh MSA
10
1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Haver Analytics.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | August 2013

80
1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

Sources: Bureau of the Census, Haver Analytics.

17

Regional Economics

Brain Hubs and Manufacturing Centers in the Fourth District
08.07.13
by Joel Elvery
Urban economists like to divide a regional economy into two sectors: tradable and nontradable.
The tradable sector produces goods and services
that are sold outside of the region; the nontradable
sector produces goods and services for use in the
region. The long-term growth trends of regions are
closely tied to the fate of their tradable sectors. If
the industries that make up the tradable sector are
growing nationally, then the region will most likely
grow. If the tradable sector is struggling, eventually
the region will also struggle.
In his 2012 book The New Geography of Jobs,
Enrico Moretti uses this framework to study the
growth of metropolitan areas (metros) over the
last 50 years. The key insight is that metros whose
tradable sectors are focused on knowledge work—
which he calls brain hubs—have seen strong growth
in employment, property values, and wages (think
San Francisco, New York, and DC). Those metros with tradable sectors focused on manufacturing—manufacturing centers—have seen weak wage
growth and a loss of employment and population
(think Detroit, Toledo, and Cleveland). Regions
with small tradable sectors—the rest—have either
thrived or declined based on whether they have
been able to attract more population, primarily due
to natural amenities and the cost of new housing.
A few Fourth District metros could be considered
brain hubs. A good measure of a brain hub is the
number of knowledge jobs per manufacturing job
(K/M). The higher K/M is, the more likely that a
metro is a brain hub. The chart below shows K/M
for 11 of the largest metros in the Fourth District and ten other metros, including those where
K/M is the highest (Washington, DC) and lowest
(Elkhart, IN). (Knowledge jobs were defined as jobs
in the following industrial sectors: information;
finance, insurance, and real estate; and professional
and business services.)

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | August 2013

18

Knowledge Jobs per Manufacturing Job in 2012
19.04

Washington, DC
New York, NY
Raleigh, NC
Austin, TX
Columbus, OH

16.16
5.20
3.77
3.73
3.12
2.91
2.67
2.53
2.50
2.28
2.26
1.82
1.80
1.68
1.64
1.16
1.08
0.88
0.77
0.23

San Francisco-San Jose, CA

Pittsburgh, PA
Chicago, IL
Indianapolis, IN
Minneapolis, MN
Seattle, WA
Cincinnati, OH
Dayton, OH
Cleveland, OH
Akron, OH
Lexington, KY
Toledo, OH
Youngstown, PA
Canton, OH
Erie, PA
Elkhart, IN
0

2

4

Nation = 2.38

Fourth District metros
Other metros

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

Source: Author’s calculations from Bureau of Labor Statistics data.

Change from 1992 to 2012 in Knowledge
Jobs per Manufacturing Job
2.00

Columbus

1.50
United States

Pittsburgh

Cincinnati

1.00

0.50

0.00
0.20

Dayton
Akron
Cleveland
Youngstown
Canton
Toledo
Erie

0.40

0.60

0.80

Lexington

1.00

1.20

1.40

1.60

1.80

Knowledge job per manufacturing job in 1992

Source: Author’s calculations from Bureau of Labor Statistics data.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends | August 2013

2.00

While no metros in the district have tradable
sectors as specialized in knowledge work as Washington or New York, Columbus and Pittsburgh
are close to some of the metros Moretti cites as
brain hubs, such as Austin, TX, and San Francisco/
San Jose, CA. Columbus and Pittsburgh also rank
above three Midwestern metros that have fared
well in the last 30 years (Chicago, Indianapolis,
and Minneapolis). However, the remaining metros
in the district fall below the number of knowledge
jobs per manufacturing job found in the nation as
a whole and are better classified as manufacturing
centers. Canton and Erie are unusual because they
have more manufacturing jobs than knowledge
jobs.
Few metros in the Fourth District seem to be
transitioning from manufacturing centers to brain
hubs. The chart below shows the number of knowledge jobs per manufacturing job in 1992 (horizontal axis) and the change in this measure from
1992 to 2012 for Fourth District metros (vertical
axis). K/M increased in all of the metros, with the
increase ranging from one-third of a job in Erie to
almost 2 jobs in Columbus. Columbus and Pittsburgh were more concentrated in knowledge work
than the United States in 1992, and this lead grew
from 1992 to 2012. The other metros in the Fourth
District were behind the United States in 1992,
and the gap grew over the last 20 years. Lexington
and Toledo stand out as regions where growth in
knowledge work has been weaker than would be
expected based on their 1992 K/M levels.
The increased polarization of Fourth District metros is similar to what Moretti found for the nation
as a whole: regions that had more knowledge work
in 1980 had larger increases in knowledge work
over the next 30 years. Based on trends in technology and increased foreign trade, Moretti argues that
the future of metros will look a lot like the recent
past: brain hubs will thrive, manufacturing centers
will struggle, and the rest will be somewhere in
between. Finding ways to draw knowledge work to
manufacturing centers remains critically important
to many Fourth District metros.

19

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