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FRB Cleveland • August 2002

The Economy in Perspective
Stormy weather…Recent developments, along with
fresh data for 2001, are prompting forecasters to
revise their expectations of economic activity downward for the rest of this year. Increasingly, analysts
who had expected sunshine are calling for partly
cloudy skies, and some are even predicting another
thunderstorm. Economic meteorologists are paying
particularly close attention to consumers, whose
attitudes and spending are thought to signal
upcoming weather patterns. Those who fear that a
second economic thundershower will follow close
behind the one that struck in March 2001, conjecture that consumer spending simply cannot hold up
under the atmospheric low-pressure front brought
on by sinking stock portfolios.
The newest data show that the U.S. economy was
weaker in 2001 than originally reported, and total
spending actually contracted in three of the four
quarters. Sunshine for the year was virtually nonexistent. The decline in activity after the September
terrorist attacks, as it turns out, occurred in the path
of an already menacing hurricane. The data revisions
show that although total personal income expanded
more rapidly than previously estimated for 1999 and
2000, it fell more precipitously in 2001, largely
because of weakening labor market conditions.
Consumers are caught up in several financial
currents that are likely to affect their spending
during the next few years. Households have been
gradually building up wealth for the past two
decades. Along the way, they have devoted an everincreasing share of their assets to equities, while
shrinking the portions claimed by other financial
assets and real estate. Just a few years ago, equity
holdings even surged past real estate in importance, inducing analysts to ponder the effects
of stock market wealth on consumer spending
decisions. Now that the equity-holding waters have
receded because of the bear market, households
hold roughly equal shares of their wealth in equities
and real estate. Consumer sensitivity to the valuation of equity wealth is being tested again, this time
in a downdraft.
Households have been overwhelmed by a twopronged lightning attack. The first bolt came from
the recession itself, which weakened employment
and income growth. The second bolt was hurled
from the stock market accounting cloud. Unlike the
decline of the dot-com companies—which may go
down in history as the most anticipated stock market
collapse ever—recent accounting scandals electrified
nearly everyone and burned many people who could

not carry the voltage. Caught in the storm, households lost billions of dollars in (illusory) wealth and
confidence in the equity markets. It remains to
be seen how much the stock market tempest will
damage household spending during the next year or
so, but it can only add to the strain.
Fortunately, there is a countervailing wind. Sales
of new and existing homes were brisk during the
last few years of the expansion, and the housing
sector continues to be buoyed by interest rates’
low-pressure front. In fact, sales have been so
strong in some markets that talk of price bubbles is
floating in the breeze. Ordinarily, one might wonder
how much longer the lift could be sustained with
interest rates now at 40-year lows. But if consumers
reduce their exposure to stocks, we could see the
climate change in favor of housing wealth again.
Consumers have learned how to cash out the accumulating equity values in their homes through
mortgage refinancing and home equity lines of
credit, using the proceeds to supplement their
incomes. So even if mortgage rates do not decline
from current levels, appreciating house prices
could still add gusts to consumer spending in the
next several years.
Curiously, then, consumers have been pulled in
opposite directions: Vilified for splurging during the
go-go 90s, they are now being urged to hang on just
a bit longer to prevent the recovery from petering
out. Put another way, much was made of the fact
that people’s saving out of personal income had
fallen so low in the latter period of the expansion.
The weather report for June was unusual, showing
both that the personal saving rate rose to 4 percent
and that consumer spending expanded rapidly
because of blistering automobile sales. But this
pattern can continue only if there are sustained
gains in personal income, which in turn require a
better investment climate and a firming of labor
market conditions.
With business fixed investment nearly stagnant,
state and local governments awash in tidal waves of
red ink, and export sales still falling short of
imports, the outlook remains hazy. This uncertainty,
however, is a familiar one. When the seasons
change, weather patterns become uncertain for a
time, until more stable conditions emerge. The U.S.
economy is in the midst of shifting from a disruptive El Niño to a more temperate, traditional expansion. Instead of lamenting the stormy weather, let’s
weather the storm and look forward to a break in
the clouds.

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Inflation and Prices
12-month percent change
4.00 CPI AND CPI EXCLUDING FOOD AND ENERGY

June Price Statistics

3.75

Percent change, last:
2001
a
a
a
1 mo. 3 mo. 12 mo. 5 yr. avg.

3.50
CPI
3.25

Consumer prices

3.00

All items

1.3

2.5

1.1

2.3

1.5

Less food
and energy

0.6

1.9

2.3

2.3

2.7

2.50

Medianb

3.1

2.9

3.5

3.1

3.9

2.25

Finished goods

1.7 –2.0

–2.0

1.1 –1.7

Less food
and energy

2.4

0.3

1.1

2.75

Producer prices

2.00

1.1

0.9

1.75
1.50
CPI excluding food and energy
1.25
1.00
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2000

2001

2002

12-month percent change
5 CORE CPI GOODS AND SERVICES

12-month percent change
4.25 CPI AND CPI-BASED MEASURES
4.00

4

3.75

Core CPI services

3.50
3

3.25
Median CPI b

3.00

2
2.75

Core CPI goods

2.50

1

2.25
2.00

0

1.75
CPI
1.50

CPI, 16% trimmed mean b

–1

1.25
–2

1.00
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

FRB Cleveland • August 2002

a. Annualized.
b. Calculated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; and Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.

The consumer price index (CPI)
rose 0.1% in June (1.3% annualized
rate) after remaining unchanged in
May. According to the Labor Department, a sharp increase in the prices
of tobacco and smoking products
was offset by declining recreation
and communications products prices
and disinflation in the indexes for
shelter and medical care. The CPI’s
food and energy indexes registered
no change in June; excluding these
items, the CPI increased 0.1% (0.6%
annualized rate) for the month
and 2.3% over the past 12 months.

The all-items CPI rose only 1.1%
over the same period, its smallest
year-over-year percent change since
October 1964.
Trimmed-mean measures of the
CPI—which eliminate the smallest
and largest price changes—also are
showing smaller year-over-year rates
of change. During 2002, for instance,
the median CPI’s 12-month rate of
increase has slowed nearly half
a percentage point, from 3.9% in
December 2001 to 3.5% in June
2002. Likewise, the 12-month rate of
increase in the 16% trimmed-mean

CPI has slowed just over half a percentage point, from 2.6% in December 2001 to 2.0% in June 2002.
The downward pressure on these
measures is clearly coming from
goods prices. However, the rate of
increase in core CPI services prices
has begun to trend downward,
reversing its course of the past
several years. Professional medical
care services and rent of primary residence are two of the components
responsible for the recent declines.
Despite the recent reversal in core
CPI services prices, the gap between
(continued on next page)

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Inflation and Prices (cont.)
12-month percent change
6 IMPORT PRICE INDEX EXCLUDING PETROLEUM PRODUCTS

Annualized quarterly percent change
5 ACTUAL CPI AND BLUE CHIP FORECAST a

4

4
Highest 10%
CPI
3

2

Consensus
0

2

–2

1

–4

0

Lowest 10%

–6
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

12-month percent change
5.5
HOUSEHOLD INFLATION EXPECTATIONS b

–1
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

4-quarter percent change
6 EMPLOYMENT COST INDEX
Benefits

5.0
5

4.5
4.0

Wages

Five years ahead

4

3.5
3.0
3

One year ahead
2.5

Total compensation

2.0

2

1.5
1.0

1
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

FRB Cleveland • August 2002

a. Blue Chip panel of economists.
b. Mean expected change in consumer prices as measured by the University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumers.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; University of Michigan; and Blue Chip Economic Indicators, July 10, 2002.

the CPI’s goods and services prices
has widened since 2000. The reason
for this divergence may be that, in
general, goods are tradable and
services are not. Over the last several
years, prices for nonpetroleum products from foreign producers have, on
average, been falling, and this is likely
reflected in downward pressure on
goods prices in the CPI.
The inflation outlook appears
hopeful at present. The consensus
inflation expectation among economists for the next year and a half

is around 21/2%. Even the most
pessimistic economists surveyed
expect inflation to be only slightly
above 3% during this period. Households are similarly sanguine about
the inflation outlook: Both long- and
short-term inflation expectations
have fallen in recent months, and
they continue to be historically low.
Economists believe there is a link
between inflation expectations and
wages—namely, that if workers
believe inflation is about to increase,
they will demand higher wages to
preserve their present buying power.

The fact that wage rates (as well as
total compensation), as measured by
the Employment Cost Index (ECI),
have moderated may be another
indication of households’ improving
inflation outlook. Many economists
also believe that because employment costs represent a significant
share of firms’ total costs, declining
wage growth puts less pressure on
output prices, and hence future inflation. In either case, the ECI’s decline
since the spring of 2000 may bode
well for future inflation.

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Monetary Policy
Percent
8 RESERVE MARKET RATES

Percent
5 REAL FEDERAL FUNDS RATES, 1997–2002

7

4

Intended federal funds rate minus all-items CPI inflation
Effective federal funds a

Intended federal funds b

6

3

5

2

4

1
Discount rate b

0

3

Intended federal funds rate minus
University of Michigan inflation expectations
–1

2

1
1998

–2
1999

2000

2001

1997

2002

1998

1999

2000

2001

Percent
3.75 IMPLIED YIELDS ON FEDERAL FUNDS FUTURES, 2002

Percent
7 REAL FEDERAL FUNDS RATES, 1985–2001

3.50

6

3.25

5

3.00

4

2.75

April 18, 2002

March 28, 2002
2.50

2002

Intended federal funds rate minus
University of Michigan inflation expectations

3
2

May 8, 2002
2.25

1
June 27, 2002

2.00

0

1.75

July 31, 2002

1.50
February

University of Michigan inflation expectations

–1
–2

April

June

August

October

December

1/85

1/87

1/89

1/91

1/93

1/95

1/97

1/99

1/01

FRB Cleveland • August 2002

a. Weekly average of daily figures.
b. Daily.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Selected Interest Rates,” H.15; University of Michigan, Survey of Consumers; and Bloomberg
Financial Information Services.

At its June 26 meeting, the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC)
decided to leave the federal funds
rate unchanged at 13/4%, its intended
level since December 2001. Noting
that incoming information confirmed
a continuing increase in economic
activity, the Committee deemed the
current policy stance accommodative. In light of current information,
the Committee perceives that the
risks are balanced with respect to the
prospects for its two goals—price
stability and sustainable growth.
The inflation-adjusted fed funds
rate has been near zero in backward-

looking terms and negative in forwardlooking terms, an unsustainably low
rate in either case. Although the
unchanged funds rate objective came
as no surprise to financial markets,
earlier this year the fed funds futures
market showed that market participants were expecting rate increases
to begin in the spring.
As information confirmed strongerthan-expected economic activity
in the first quarter, fed funds futures
were priced in anticipation of rates’
imminent upward trajectory. Subsequent revelations, however, which
raised concerns about the quality
of corporate earnings, caused a sharp

decline in equity prices and put the
sustainability of the economic expansion in doubt. Consequently, the
expected arrival of rate increases has
been pushed out for several months.
In fact, by the end of July, the market
had priced in the possibility of
another rate cut.
But how long can a funds rate be
maintained near zero before inflation
accelerates? Experience during the
early 1990s suggests that such a state
can be sustained for an extended
period, provided rates are raised
rapidly enough when inflationary
pressures emerge.

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Money and Financial Markets
Percent, weekly average
Percent, quarterly average
7 SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES AND M2 OPPORTUNITY COST 6
1-year T-bill a

6

Trillions of dollars
5.9 THE M2 AGGREGATE
5%

M2 growth, 1997–2002 b
12

5

9

1%

10%

6
5

4

5.2

5%

3
0

3-month T-bill a
3

4

5%
1%

3

2

5%

4.5

1%
M2 opportunity cost
2

5%

1

1%
1
1997

0
1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

3.8

2003

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Ratio
50 S&P 500 PRICE/EARNINGS RATIO

Index, 1941–43 = 100
1,600 THE S&P 500 INDEX

45
40
1,200

35
30
24.9

25
20

800

15
13.3
10
5

400
1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

1946

1956

1966

1976

1986

1996

FRB Cleveland • August 2002

a. Constant maturity.
b. Growth rates are calculated on a fourth-quarter over fourth-quarter basis.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Standard and Poors Corporation; and Wall Street Journal.

The drop in short-term interest
rates over the past 18 months
sharply reduced the opportunity
cost of holding monetary assets.
Consequently, the demand for money,
as measured by M2, rose sharply
in 2001. As short-term rates have
stabilized at lower levels, M2 growth
has slowed considerably.
In the financial sector, the stock
market remains the big story. Despite
reasonably strong economic fundamentals and quickly rising secondquarter earnings, stock prices plunged
to five-year lows in July. Although

price-to-earnings (P/E) ratios receded,
they still exceed recent historical averages. If earnings projections for 2002
and 2003 come to pass, P/E ratios will
continue to fall.
A series of revelations about corporate violations of accepted accounting standards has damaged investor
confidence. With no way to assess
how widespread such accounting
abuses are, investors have become
skittish, questioning the accuracy
of all earnings reports and, more
importantly, analysts’ projections of
future earnings.

By August 14, markets will have
some benchmark for assessing the
magnitude of the accounting problem. On that date, the largest corporations’ chief executive officers and
chief financial officers will be
required to personally attest to the
accuracy of their financial reports.
Moreover, Congress has acted
swiftly to provide clear guidelines
for reducing the conflicts of interest
that permitted the kinds of accounting shenanigans that have become
visible in recent months.
(continued on next page)

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Money and Financial Markets (cont.)
Dollars per share
60 S&P 500 REPORTED EARNINGS a

Annualized percent change
9
OUTPUT PER WORKER b
8
7

50

6
5
4

40
3
2
1

30

0
–1
20
1994 1995

1996

1997

1998 1999

2000

2001 2002

2003

–2
1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

Ratio
7 WEALTH/INCOME c

Index, 1996:IQ = 100
120 CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS

6

100

5

80

4

60

3
1980

1984

1988

1992

1996

2000

40
1980

1985

1990

1999

2000

1995

2001

2002

2000

FRB Cleveland • August 2002

a. Dashed line shows earnings estimates provided by Standard and Poors.
b. Nonfarm business sector.
c. Wealth equals assets minus liabilities.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Standard and Poors Corporation;
and University of Michigan, Survey of Consumers.

One key fundamental for earnings
is productivity’s pronounced acceleration in recent quarters. Productivity
jumped 5.5% in 2001:IVQ and 8.5%
in 2002:IQ, reaching a level more
than 4% higher than in 2001:IQ. The
late 1990s’ increase in trend productivity shows no sign of slackening.
With higher trend productivity and
relatively stable employment costs,
profit margins are expected to keep
increasing.
The unrelenting bear market of
early summer aroused concerns that

falling stock market wealth would be
associated with another dip in economic activity. It is unusual for equity
prices to drop in the six months after
a cyclical trough. The question is
whether the price plunge reflects an
underlying deterioration in economic fundamentals or simply a transitory crisis of confidence. Although
the wealth-to-income ratio has fallen,
it still exceeds its average for the
1980s and early 1990s.
Investment has been slow to turn
around in the face of excess capacity,

but consumers have not been shaken
by stock market volatility. Consumer
expectations have held up well, slipping only modestly from recent
levels. One important element in
consumer resilience appears to be
the continued, albeit slower, appreciation in housing prices.
A substantial share of household
spending in the past 20 years was
made possible by falling interest
rates. Lower rates allowed consumers
to assume a higher level of debt
for a given level of debt burden
(continued on next page)

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Money and Financial Markets (cont.)
Percent, weekly average
10 LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES

Annual percent change
20 HOME PRICES

9
15
Conventional mortgage
New home prices

8

10
7
5

20-year Treasury b
6
House Price Index a

0

5
10-year Treasury b
4

–5
1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Percent
50 HOUSEHOLD ASSETS AS A SHARE OF TOTAL ASSETS

Percent of disposable personal income
10 HOUSEHOLD DEBT-SERVICE BURDENS

Financial non-equity related

9

40
Consumer debt
Real estate

8
30
7
20

Financial equity related c

6
Mortgage
10
5

Tangible non-real estate
0

4
1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

FRB Cleveland • August 2002

a. Includes new and existing homes.
b. Constant maturity.
c. Equity-related assets are defined as corporate equities, mutual fund shares, and pension fund reserves.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight; and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

(as measured by their monthly
payments). So lower interest rates not
only made home ownership accessible to greater numbers of households,
but also allowed those who already
owned homes to tap equity values
through mortgage refinancing. It is
important to remember that falling
interest rates were largely the result
of lower inflation expectations, the
ultimate product of disinflation. With
inflation currently near historical lows,
it is doubtful that interest rates will
continue to trend downward, which

suggests that this source of consumer finance will diminish in the
years ahead.
Some market analysts fear a housing price bubble. To a large extent,
the rise in housing prices has encouraged greater consumer spending
because liquidity-constrained households have been able to use increased
housing values as a source of finance.
If higher housing prices were not
based on fundamentals, a persistent
adjustment in consumer spending
could result, precipitating another
dip in aggregate economic activity. But

the fundamentals for continued strong
housing demand in the years ahead
appear to be sound. Demographics
reveal that “echo boomers”—the
children of baby boomers—are just
beginning to reach home-buying age.
Moreover, a greater number of households are buying second homes.
Although real estate as a share of
wealth has risen sharply in recent
years, this is largely a reflection of
the sharp decline in stock prices.
Real estate is still below its share in
the 1980s.

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Is the Dollar Sustainable?
Major Currencies Index, March 1973 = 100 a
111 FOREIGN EXCHANGE

Percent of GDP
2 CURRENT ACCOUNT

109

1

107

0

105

–1

103

–2

101

–3

99

–4

97
January

March

May

–5
1960

July

1967

1974

1981

1988

1995

2002

2002
Index, monthly average, January 1990 = 100
1,200 STOCK MARKET INDEXES

Percent of GDP
20 NET INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION
15

1,000
NASDAQ

10
800
5

0

600

–5
400
–10
200
–15

S&P 500

–20

0
1976

1981

1986

1991

1996

2001

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002 b

FRB Cleveland • August 2002

a. Includes the currencies of Canada, the euro area, Japan, U.K., Switzerland, Australia, and Sweden.
b. Data through July 23.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census and Bureau of Economic Analysis;
and Wall Street Journal.

Shaken by disclosures in U.S. equity
markets, the dollar has slid about
7% against the currencies of our
major trading partners since April.
Some economists worry that a more
fundamental adjustment may be in
the offing.
The U.S. has run a current account
deficit almost continuously since
1982, primarily because we import
more than we export. This year, the
current account deficit will approach
$500 billion, or 5% of GDP, and most
analysts expect that it will continue to
expand over the next year.

We finance this deficit by issuing
financial instruments—stocks, bonds,
bank accounts—to foreigners, giving
them a claim to our future output.
Currently, international investors’ net
financial claims against the U.S. are
equal to approximately 19% of our
GDP. (The Commerce Department
records this as a negative net international investment position.) Although
19% is high, it is not unprecedented,
and we have no metric by which to
judge it excessive or unsustainable.
Nevertheless, some analysts fear
that international investors will

become increasingly reluctant to
hold additional dollar-denominated
assets in their portfolios. In that case,
U.S. interest rates would rise, and
the dollar would depreciate in foreign exchange markets to trim the
trade deficit and to coax additional
financial inflows.
Whether the U.S. is on the cusp
of such a development is anyone’s
guess, but the accounting scandals
rocking U.S. equity markets cannot
but make international investors more
skittish about holding U.S. securities.

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Energy, Monetary Policy, and the Business Cycle
Percent
12 ENERGY, MONETARY POLICY, AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE a

Dollars per barrel
45

10

40

8

35
Real federal funds rate (federal funds rate minus median CPI)

West Texas intermediate crude oil price

6

30

4

25

2

20

0

15

–2

10

–4

5
0

–6
1968

1973

1978

1988

1983

1993

1998

Thousands of Btu / real GDP in 1996 dollars
25 ENERGY PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION
PER DOLLAR OF REAL GDP

Change in West Texas intermediate price, dollars per barrel
10 OIL PRICE VOLATILITY
8

20

6

Consumption
4
Production

15

2
0

10

–2
–4

5

–6
–8

0

–10
1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

1950 1955

1960 1965

1970

1975

1980

1985 1990

1995

2000

FRB Cleveland • August 2002

a. Shaded areas indicate recessions.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Energy; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland; and Wall Street Journal.

With the economy moving toward recovery, price pressures will eventually
build, and the Federal Open Market
Committee will need to focus more
keenly on price stability. Threading
policy between recovery and price
stability will be especially difficult if
oil prices remain high and volatile.
Oil prices have spiked before nearly
every U.S. recession since World War
II, including the recent slowdown.
Many economists have suggested,
however, that oil costs alone are too
small relative to output to explain
such severe business-cycle responses.

They contend that imperfections in
the adjustment process or some other
mechanisms—primarily monetary
policy—leverage oil price shocks into
economic downturns. Indeed, an
increase in the real federal funds
rate—the observed funds rate minus
the median CPI inflation rate—also
has preceded nearly every recession.
Economic studies, however, indicate that the economic impact of oil
price shocks has waned since the early
1980s. Although oil price increases
preceded the downturns of 1990–91
and 2001–02, these recessions were

especially mild. Many economists
point out that the U.S. economy has
become much less dependent on oil.
We now use about half as much
energy to produce a unit of GDP as
we did in 1970. Many others, however, attribute the post-1980 break
between oil prices and economic
activity to a change in the nature of
monetary policy. The Federal Reserve
has rebuilt its reputation for price
stability, with the result that inflation
expectations no longer parallel
energy price patterns closely. Price
credibility has real value.

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Economic Activity
Percentage points
3.0 CONTRIBUTION TO PERCENT CHANGE IN REAL GDP

a

Real GDP and Components, 2002:IIQ
(Advance estimate)
Change,
billions
of 1996 $

Percent change, last:
Four
Quarter
quarters

Real GDP
24.7
Personal consumption 30.4
Durables
5.8
Nondurables
–2.8
Services
27.0
Business fixed
investment
–4.8
Equipment
6.9
Structures
–9.0
Residential investment
4.6
Government spending
7.5
National defense
7.5
Net exports
–50.9
Exports
28.9
Imports
80.0
Change in business
inventories
29.9

1.1
1.9
2.4
–0.6
3.0

2.1
3.1
7.6
3.0
2.2

–1.6
2.9
–14.0
5.0
1.8
8.0
__
11.7
23.5
__

–6.1
–3.0
–14.6
3.8
4.1
9.6
__
–3.6
2.9
__

Annualized percent change from previous quarter
6.0 REAL GDP AND BLUE CHIP FORECAST

4.0

Exports
1.0

2002:IIQ
Government
spending

Residential
investment
0

Change in
inventories
Business fixed
investment

–1.0

–2.0

–3.0

Imports

–4.0

Annualized percent change from previous quarter
REAL GDP
Final percent change
Advance estimate
Blue Chip forecast b

5.0

Last four quarters

Personal
consumption

2.0

8.0
Pre-revision
Post-revision
6.0

30-year average

3.0
4.0
2.0

1.0

2.0

0
0
–1.0
–2.0

–2.0
IIQ

IIIQ
2001

IVQ

IQ

IIQ

IIIQ
2002

IVQ

IQ
2003

IQ

IIQ IIIQ IVQ
1999

IQ

IIQ IIIQ IVQ
2000

IQ

IIQ IIIQ IVQ IQ
2001
2002

FRB Cleveland • August 2002

NOTE: All data are seasonally adjusted and annualized.
a. Chain-weighted data in billions of 1996 dollars. Components of real GDP need not add to the total because the total and all components are deflated using
independent chain-weighted price indexes.
b. Blue Chip panel of economists.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; and Blue Chip Economic Indicators, July 10, 2002.

The advance estimate from the
national income and product accounts
shows that real gross domestic product (GDP) grew at a 1.1% annualized
rate during 2002:IIQ. Consumer
spending for the quarter rose 1.9%,
which was considerably less than
the 3.1% growth rate of the last four
quarters. Even so, it remained the
strongest contributor to real GDP
growth. On a somewhat more positive
note, business fixed investment fell
only 1.6%, a marked improvement on
the 6.1% decline of the last year. The

change in inventories contributed
1.2 percentage points of real GDP
growth as the economy began to
accumulate inventory for the first
time since 2000:IVQ. Exports’
increase of nearly 12% was dwarfed
by a 23.5% surge in imports, which
created the greatest economic drag
by lowering real output growth
2.8 percentage points.
Blue Chip forecasters had predicted that real GDP would grow
2.6% in 2002:IIQ—more than double
the advance estimate of 1.1%. As
of July 10, they also expected real

GDP growth to surpass its long-term
average by 2002:IIIQ; however, the
discrepancy between the 2002:IIQ
forecast and the advance estimate
may modify their expectations.
Every July, national income and
product account estimates are
revised, beginning with data three
years prior (the most recent revision,
reported July 31, covers 1999:IQ
onward). One of the most significant
findings of July’s revision was that
real GDP growth seems to have
declined during the first three quarters of 2001, not 2001:IIIQ alone.
(continued on next page)

11
•

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•

•

•

•

•

Economic Activity (cont.)
Index, 50+ = expansion
90 ISM MANUFACTURING INDEXES a

Percent change from previous month
20 MANUFACTURERS' NEW ORDERS
15

80

Durable goods
10

Prices

All industries

70
Production

5

New orders

60

0

–5
50
–10

Purchasing managers’
(composite)

40

–15
30

–20
January
2000

July

January

July

January

2001

July

January

2002

Index, 1992 = 100
156 PRODUCTION AND CAPACITY

July

January

2000

Percent of capacity
86

154

January
2002

July
2001

June

Percent change from previous quarter
3.0 MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY

84
Industrial production, manufacturing

152

82

150

80

148

78

146

74

142

72

140

70

138

68

136

66

134

64
2000

January

1.0

0

144

July

Productivity

76

Capacity utilization, manufacturing

January

2.0

July
2001

January
2002

June

–1.0
Employment
–2.0

–3.0
IQ

IIQ

IIIQ
2000

IVQ

IQ

IIQ

IIIQ
2001

IVQ

IQ

IIQ
2002

FRB Cleveland • August 2002

a. Refers to the Institute for Supply Management (formerly the National Association of Purchasing Management).
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census and Bureau of Economic Analysis; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics;
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and Institute for Supply Management.

Manufacturing’s road to recovery
has been far from smooth. The Institute for Supply Management’s composite index fell to 50.5 in July from
June’s 56.2. Although technically indicating an expansion, the figure was
weaker than expected. New orders
led the decline, falling to 50.4 in July
from 60.8 in June. The production
component also fell, but was still a
relatively high 55.7. The price component rose sharply to 68.3, partly
because the dollar weakened.
Further evidence of turbulence is
the disappointing 4.1% fall in June

orders for durable goods. Even without transportation, including the
extremely volatile aircraft component,
orders were still down more than 3%.
Of course, considering the large
fluctuations this series is subject to,
one should not overemphasize one
month’s figure.
Manufacturing has some bright
spots. Capacity utilization and industrial production have been rising
steadily since December 2001. Both
of these series show far less monthto-month fluctuation than durable
goods orders, and so may be more
reliable indicators of manufacturing’s

health. Manufacturing output has now
recovered more than a third of the
decline experienced since July 2000.
Another positive indicator is that
manufacturing employment declines
have been slowing since 2001:IVQ.
Even in the best of times, manufacturing employment has grown slowly
because productivity has increased so
fast that employers have not needed
to hire many new workers to meet
demand. This state of affairs is likely
to continue because annual productivity growth averaged about 4% for
the four quarters ending 2002:IQ.

12
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Labor Markets
Change, thousands of workers
350 AVERAGE MONTHLY NONFARM EMPLOYMENT

Labor Market Conditionsa

300

Average monthly change
(thousands of employees)

250
Revised
Preliminary

200

Payroll employment
Goods-producing
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Durable goods
Nondurable goods
Service-producing
TPUb
Wholesale and
retail trade
FIREc
Servicesd
Health services
Help supply
Government

150
100
50
0
–50
–100
–150
–200

1999
259
8
–3
26
–16
–5
–11
252
19

2000
159
–1
1
8
–11
1
–12
161
17

60
7
132
9
32
35

25
5
92
15
0
22

–250

2001
–119
–111
1
–3
–109
–79
–30
–8
–23

Jan.–
June
2002
–20
–66
–2
–13
–51
–37
–13
45
–11

July
2002
6
–40
–3
–30
–7
–18
11
46
–3

–31
10
–2
27
–54
39

–2
–2
45
22
20
18

–13
2
50
29
–35
–16

Average for period (percent)
Civilian unemployment
rate

–300
–350
1998 1999 2000 2001 IIIQ IVQ
2001

IQ

May

IIQ
2002

June
2002

Millions of workers
4
LABOR MARKET INDICATORS a

4.2

4.0

4.8

5.8

5.9

July

Percent
10.0

Percent
12.0 MEASURES OF LABOR RESOURCE UNDERUTILIZATION e

Ratio
1.9

U-6/U-3
Unemployed 15 weeks or longer

10.5

1.8

9.0

1.7

7.5

3

U-6 f
5.0

2

7.5

1.6

6.0

1.5

4.5

1.4

Civilian unemployment rate

2.5

1
Job losers on layoff

U-3: Official civilian unemployment rate
0

0
1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

3.0

1.3
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

FRB Cleveland • August 2002

a. All data are seasonally adjusted.
b. Transportation and public utilities.
c. Finance, insurance, and real estate.
d. The services industry includes travel; business support; recreation and entertainment; private and/or parochial education; personal services; and health services.
e. Data are not seasonally adjusted.
f. Unemployed persons plus marginally attached workers plus persons employed part time for economic reasons divided by the labor force plus marginally attached workers. (Marginally attached workers are those not in the labor force who want to work and have actively searched for a job within the last 12 months,
but not within the last four weeks.)
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Nonfarm payroll employment was
virtually unchanged in July (up 6,000)
after a revised increase of 66,000 jobs
in June. The second-quarter net
employment increase (67,000) seems
to compare favorably with the firstquarter job loss (189,000), but most of
that loss (165,000) came in February.
Services employment increased
50,000 jobs in July, 29,000 of them
coming from health services. However, help supply services declined
35,000 jobs. Goods-producing industries showed a net loss of 40,000 jobs,
with much of the loss in construction

(30,000). This decline offset much of
the job gain in services.
Although the unemployment rate
was unchanged at 5.9%, the number
of unemployed on temporary layoff
rose 162,000, while the number of job
losers not on layoff fell by about the
same amount (163,000). Consistent
with this, the number unemployed for
15 weeks or longer fell 220,000 to
2.9 million. That number had been
increasing every month since May
2001, when it was at 1.5 million.
The number of persons working
part time for economic reasons rose
from 3.9 million in June to 4.2 million

in July. These workers are not counted
as unemployed by the official unemployment rate. The Bureau of Labor
Statistics releases a range of unemployment indicators (U-1 to U-6)
to measure this and other types of
underemployment. Alternative measures usually—but not always—mirror
trends in the official unemployment
rate (U-3). The broadest, most popular
alternative measure, U-6, includes
those who work part time for economic reasons. From July 2001 to July
2002, U-6 grew 22%, (from 8.1% to
9.9%) while U-3 grew 28% (from 4.7%
to 6.0%), lowering the U-6/U-3 ratio.

13
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•

•

•

•

Labor Earnings Growth
Percent change, year over year
6 REAL COMPENSATION GROWTH a

Percent changes, year over year
6 REAL COMPENSATION AND EARNINGS GROWTH
FROM CURRENT EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS a
Real hourly compensation, nonfarm business sector b

Current Employment Statistics

4

4

2

2

0

0

–2

–2

Employment Cost Index d
Average real hourly earnings c

Average hourly earnings, deflated by CPI-U

–4
1983 1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001 2003

Index, 1992 = 100
110 EMPLOYMENT COST INDEX AND EMPLOYER COSTS
FOR EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION

–4
1983 1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001 2003

Percent change, year over year
8 NONFARM BUSINESS SECTOR PRODUCTIVITY

AND INFLATION-ADJUSTED UNIT LABOR COSTS a

6
ECI, wage and salary
Productivity

105
4

ECI, total compensation

2

100
0
ECEC, total compensation
ECEC, wage and salary

–2

95
Unit labor costs d
–4

90
1992 1993

–6
1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001 2002 e

1983 1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001 2003

FRB Cleveland • August 2002

a. Seasonally adjusted.
b. Uses CPI for all urban consumers (CPI-U) as a deflator.
c. Uses CPI for urban wage earners and clerical workers (CPI-W) as a deflator.
d. Inflation adjustment is made by dividing the series by the CPI-U.
e. First quarter.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Measures of labor earnings growth are
quite sensitive to differences in definition and method. In the past several
years, average real hourly earnings
growth from the Labor Department’s
Current Employment Statistics (CES)
data series has increased, while real
hourly compensation growth, which
includes benefits, has decreased. Even
when both series are deflated by the
CPI-U, trend differences remain.
Both real compensation and real
earnings are affected by employment
shifts. The Employment Cost Index
(ECI), which uses fixed weights
across industries and occupations,

measures compensation growth without the influence of employment
changes. Real total compensation
from the ECI is generally more volatile
than the CES measure, and the two
series have behaved quite differently
in the past several years.
Employer Costs for Employee
Compensation (ECEC), a series calculated with data from the ECI survey,
uses current rather than fixed employment weights. From 2001 to
2002, ECEC measures of real compensation and of wages and salaries
grew more than the ECI. Some of the
recent ECEC increase came from a

reduction in hours for lower-wage
and salary workers during the most
recent recession. Conversely, the
ECI’s growth exceeded the ECEC’s in
the 1990s because of the shift toward
lower-paying jobs during that decade.
ECEC data are used to assess employers’ labor costs, but they do not
measure labor costs relative to production. These are measured by unit
labor costs (compensation per unit of
real output). Unit labor costs, which
are negatively related to productivity,
have fallen dramatically in recent
quarters, as often happens near the
end of a recession.

14
•

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•

•

•

•

Health Insurance
Percent
30 INDIVIDUALS AND CHILDREN WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE
AND THOSE INSURED THROUGH MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
28
26

PERCENT OF INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT
HEALTH INSURANCE, 2000 a

Individuals with Medicare or Medicaid

24
22
20
Children with Medicare or Medicaid
18
Uninsured individuals
16
14
Below U.S. average

Uninsured children

12

About equal to U.S. average ( + 2 percentage points)
Above U.S. average, 1987–2000

10
1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

PERCENT OF CHILDREN WITHOUT
HEALTH INSURANCE, 2000

CHANGE IN PERCENT OF INDIVIDUALS
WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE, 1987–2000

Decrease

Below U.S. average

Slight increase

About equal to U.S. average ( + 2 percentage points)

Increase

Above U.S. average, 1987–2000

FRB Cleveland • August 2002

a. Includes only those who were uninsured at all times during the year.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey.

Access to affordable health care is a
significant problem facing the U.S.
With health care costs rising, access
to insurance that defrays the costs to
consumers is now more important
than ever.
In 1987, both children (those 18
and younger) and the total population were uninsured at the same
rate (13%), but they have not
followed the same trend since then.
Remarkably, the share of the total
population that is uninsured dropped
to 14.3% in 1999 from a high of 16.3%
in 1998. The share of children who
are uninsured fell to 11.6% in 2000,

the lowest figure since the Current
Population Survey began tracking the
statistic in 1987. The number of people receiving Medicare or Medicaid
has increased, but the decrease in
the number of uninsured probably
results from more than increased
public insurance coverage.
In 2000, 14% of the total population
lacked health insurance, with lower
rates in the midwestern and northeastern states. The higher rates of
uninsured people were concentrated
in the south-central and southwestern
states plus Florida, Montana, and
Alaska. The southern states’ higher

rate of uninsured people results at
least partly from immigration into
the region and the type of labor
done there.
Over the 13-year period, a slightly
different picture emerges. Whereas
the U.S. average rate of uninsured
individuals increased (which means
that rates would inevitably rise in
some states), the states with significant increases in uninsured rates
were mostly in New England and the
north-central region.
For children, the highest uninsured
rates are mostly in the West; all states
(continued on next page)

15
•

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•

•

•

•

•

Health Insurance (cont.)
Percent
20 INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE

Percent
20 INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE a,b

18
West Virginia

18
1999
16

2000
16

14
Kentucky
12

14

Ohio
10

12

Pennsylvania
8

6

10
Northeast

Midwest

South

1987

West

1989

1991

1993

1995

Percent
36 INDIVIDUALS RECEIVING MEDICARE OR MEDICAID

Percent
20 CHILDREN WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE

34

18

1997

1999

West Virginia

West Virginia
32

16

30

14
Kentucky
Kentucky
12

28

10

26
Pennsylvania

Ohio
8

24
Ohio

Pennsylvania
6

22
20
1987

4
1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

FRB Cleveland • August 2002

a. Standard regions as defined by the Census Bureau.
b. Includes only those who were uninsured at all times during the year.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey.

east of the Mississippi, save two, had
rates below or consistent with the
national rate.
Although the share of uninsured
individuals in the Midwest has risen,
the region’s population is still insured
at much higher rates than in the
South and West. The presence and
strength of labor unions, as well as
the type of employment they represent, probably account for their high
rates of insured people.
Within the Fourth District, the populations of Ohio and Pennsylvania

have historically had lower percentages lacking insurance, although
uninsured rates in both states rose
between 1987 and 2000. In fact,
Pennsylvania has one of the lowest
rates of any state in the nation. Rates
of uninsured in Kentucky and West
Virginia have been volatile over the
years, with West Virginia peaking in
1993, when 18.3% of the state’s population had no health insurance (by
2000 the figure was around 14%).
Ohio has the lowest rate of federal
health care assistance use of any
state in the Fourth District. Unlike

the nation as a whole, Ohio’s rate of
uninsured children has increased
slightly since 1987. West Virginia and
Kentucky, on the other hand, have
mirrored the national trend and
have made substantial progress in
improving children’s uninsured
rates. In 2000, West Virginia had the
same rate as Ohio. Kentucky posted
large declines in the rate of uninsured children since 1996, showing a
drop of almost 10 percentage points
in four years. Pennsylvania still
boasted the lowest rate (5%) in 2000.

16
•

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•

•

•

Savings Associations
Billions of dollars
24 SOURCES OF INCOME

Billions of dollars
4 NET INCOME

Billions of dollars
4.0

23

3.5
Total noninterest income

3

2

1

22

3.0

21

2.5

20

2.0

19

1.5

0

Total interest income

18

Net operating income

1.0

Securities and other gains/losses
–1

0.5

17
3/1/97

3/1/98

3/1/99

3/1/00

3/1/01

3/1/02

Percent
10 NET INTEREST MARGIN AND ASSET GROWTH

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002 a

Percent
1.5 EARNINGS

Percent
15

8

Return on equity

1.3

13

6

4

1.1

11

0.9

9

0.7

7

Net interest margin
2

0
Asset growth rate
–2
Return on assets
0.5

–4
1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002 a

5
1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002 a

FRB Cleveland • August 2002

a. Observation for 2002 represents annualized first-quarter data.
SOURCE: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Quarterly Banking Profile, various issues.

FDIC-insured savings associations reported net income of $3.6 billion for
2002:IQ. This was an increase of $739
million (24.5%) from a year earlier.
Compared to the previous quarter,
however, it amounted to a decrease
of $76 million.
Despite declining interest income,
S&Ls’ noninterest (fee) income remained quite strong, rising slightly
to $3 billion. Total interest income in
2002:IIQ was 13% lower than a year

earlier. But because of lower interest
rates, the cost of borrowing fell
faster than interest income, producing a 22.7% increase in net interest
income.
Savings institutions’ strong earnings performance is once again
apparent in the net interest margin
(the difference between interest and
dividends earned on interest-bearing
assets and interest paid to depositors
and creditors; it is expressed as

a percentage of average earning
assets). During 2002:IQ, S&Ls’ net
interest margin rose to 3.52%. This
factor, coupled with asset growth’s
drop to 5.01%, pushed S&Ls’ return
on assets to 1.11%. First-quarter
return on equity went up to 12.83%.
The 2002:IQ levels for all three of
these indicators were the highest
since 1993.
Net loans and leases as a share
of total assets fell from 66.5% in

(continued on next page)

17
•

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•

•

•

•

•

Savings Associations (cont.)
Percent of total assets
70 NET LOANS AND LEASES

Percent
1.0 ASSET QUALITY

68

0.8

2.0

66

0.6

1.5

64

0.4

1.0

Percent
2.5

Problem assets

Net charge-offs
0.2

62

0
1993

60
3/1/96

3/1/97

3/1/98

3/1/99

3/1/00

3/1/01

Percent
16 HEALTH

3/1/02

Percent
7

6

14

0.5

0
1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002 a

Ratio
8.1 CAPITAL

Ratio
1.3

8.0

1.2
Core capital (leverage) ratio

Unprofitable S&Ls

Coverage ratio
5

12

10

7.9

1.1

7.8

1.0

7.7

0.9

7.6

0.8

4

8

3

6

2

4

1
Problem S&Ls
0

2
1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002 a

7.5
1995

0.7
1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002 a

FRB Cleveland • August 2002

a. Observation for 2002 represents annualized first-quarter data.
SOURCE: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Quarterly Banking Profile, various issues.

2001:IVQ to 64.7% in 2002:IQ, well
below its recent high of 67.9%
in 2000:IIIQ. This ratio indicates
continued decline in lending-market
activity.
Asset quality showed a slight improvement in 2002:IQ. Net chargeoffs (gross charge-offs minus recoveries) declined slightly from the
previous quarter, reaching $570 million (about 0.26% of S&Ls’ loans and
leases). Net charge-offs rose for

residential mortgages and real estate
construction loans but declined for
loans to individuals. Problem assets
(nonperforming loans and repossessed real estate) were on the rise,
reaching 0.68% of total assets.
Problem S&Ls (those with substandard examination ratings) rose
to 1.45%, the highest level since
1997. However, asset quality is not a
significant problem for FDIC-insured
savings associations, where the percent of unprofitable institutions is

falling. Since the end of 2001, the
coverage ratio has dropped from
$1.02 in loan loss reserves for every
dollar of noncurrent loans to 99 cents
per dollar. The $205 million increase
in loan loss reserves was less than the
$430 million increase in noncurrent
loans; the result was a decline in the
coverage ratio. In 2002:IQ, core capital, which protects savings associations against unexpected losses,
rose to 7.89% from 7.80% in 2001.

18
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•

•

•

•

Foreign Central Banks
Percent, daily
7 MONETARY POLICY TARGETS a

Trillions of yen
–35

6

–30

5

–25

Trillions of yen
30
BANK OF JAPAN b
27
Current account balances (daily)
24

Bank of England
4

–20

3

–15

European Central Bank

Federal Reserve

21
Current account balances
18

2

–10

1

–5

0

0

15
12
Bank of Japan

–1

5

9

–2

10

6

–3

15

3

20

0

–4
4/1

7/1
2001

10/1

1/1

4/1
2002

7/1

4/1

Turkey

Ukraine

1/1

4/1
2002

7/1

Argentine peso

Colombia
Czech Republic

Russia
Sri Lanka

300

Indonesia

Brazil

250

Switzerland

Slovenia
Philippines

Bulgaria

Lithuania
Mexico
Croatia
Malta
Hungary
Thailand
Taiwan
Singapore
Peru
South Korea
Australia
Canada
January–June 2002
Sweden
Norway
July 2002
New Zealand
China
South Africa
Israel
–15

10/1

350

Chile

Poland

–30

7/1
2001

Index, December 1, 2002 = 100
400 FOREIGN CURRENCY PER U.S. DOLLAR

CHANGES IN OFFICIAL RATES
Venezuela

–35

Excess reserve balances

Current account
less required reserves

–10
–5
Percentage points

0

5

200
Uruguayan peso
150
Chilean peso
100
Brazilian real
50
0
10

4/1

7/1
2001

10/1

1/1

4/1
2002

7/1

FRB Cleveland • August 2002

a. Federal Reserve: overnight interbank rate. Bank of England and European Central Bank: two-week repo rate. Bank of Japan: quantity of current account
balances; since December 19, 2001, it has targeted a range for the quantity.
b. Current account balances at the Bank of Japan are required and excess reserve balances at depository institutions subject to reserve requirements plus the
balances of certain other financial institutions not subject to reserve requirements. Reserve requirements are satisfied on the basis of the average of a bank’s
daily balances at the Bank of Japan starting the sixteenth of one month and ending the fifteenth of the next.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Bank of Japan; European Central Bank; Bank of England; Bank of Canada; and Bloomberg
Financial Information Services.

Policy settings at the four major central
banks have remained unchanged
throughout this year. Recently, market
speculation in the U.S. has shifted
somewhat with the emergence of uncertainty as to whether the next policy
move will be an increase or a decrease.
The Bank of Japan has continued
to supply about ¥15 trillion in current
account balances, at the upper end
of its policy target of ¥10 trillion–
¥15 trillion. Likewise, excess reserves’
swollen value continues about unchanged. Banks have retained as
excess reserves almost 90% of the

nearly threefold increase in current
account balances over the past year.
Another 9% has been added to the
balances of financial institutions not
subject to reserve requirements.
Only 2% of the growth in current
account balances has been used to
meet increased need for required
reserves. Although they account for
only this small portion of current
account balances’ massive increase,
required reserves nonetheless grew
4.8% over the past year (June 2001–
June 2002), while nominal GDP probably fell over the same period.

Rate increases have been seen this
year in the “dollar” countries of New
Zealand, Australia, and Canada and in
the non-euro central banks of Sweden
and Norway. Rate cuts have been
prevalent among central banks in
Eastern Europe and Latin America,
with very wide rate swings in some
members of both groups. Rate cuts
are also evident in some far eastern
nations but not in Singapore, South
Korea, or China.
In Argentina, a month’s rapid peso
depreciation was reversed around
the beginning of July, while Uruguay’s
peso came under continued pressure.