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The Economy in Perspective

FRB Cleveland • April 1998

Hear ye, hear ye, hear ye … Ladies and gentlemen
of the jury, the question before us is a simple
one: Do overabundant money and credit creation
threaten the U.S. economy with accelerating inflation and below-par performance? You have heard
me present the prosecution’s argument, and you
have heard the case of Ms. Rose Glass, counsel
for the defense. You have also weighed a great
quantity of evidence and listened to expert witnesses for both sides. Just a few minutes ago,
Ms. Glass summarized the defense position. Now,
before you withdraw for final deliberations, I
would like to review the prosecution’s case.
Certain facts are not in dispute. The U.S. economy has been expanding continuously since
1991, and, far from slowing, its growth rate has
accelerated in each of the last two years. Capacity
utilization rates seem high throughout the economy. The nation’s unemployment rate, which
stood at nearly 8 percent early in this business
cycle, has fallen steadily and has registered less
than 5 percent for the last nine months. Add to
these excellent conditions the facts that the producer price level held steady last year and consumer prices increased less than 2 percent.
Now, ladies and gentlemen, Ms. Rose Glass
would have you believe that the U.S. economy
has achieved price stability and that resisting an
upsurge of inflation is inadvisable today because
inflation is already so low. This is where she and I
part company. Many people think that inflation is
whatever the Consumer Price Index records as the
rate of price change from one year to the next.
But, as I have shown you, inflation is a decline in
the purchasing power of money that results from
a persistent increase in the general level of prices.
Last year’s 1¾ percent CPI increase and the even
better performance so far this year are lower than
the rates that prevailed during most of this economic expansion, and, I maintain, lower than
those we will see going forward.
I have laid out our evidence that inflation’s underlying rate easily surpasses 2 percent. For example, last year’s CPI excluding food and energy expanded 2¼ percent, and the median CPI — an
even better measure of core inflation—grew 2¾
percent. These core measures averaged between
2¾ percent and 3 percent over the last five years,

suggesting that the economy’s recent inflation
performance has not moved off this trend. Energy
prices on average have barely risen for six years.
We know that inflation is a monetary phenomenon which escalates when the amount of
money supplied exceeds the demand. Ms. Glass’
experts have told you that there is no positive
way to determine when too much money has
been created, but that is irrelevant. You are not
required to know beyond any doubt, but only to
judge whether there is a preponderance of evidence. On this score, I have presented some
compelling facts. Since 1959, the U.S. economy
has had four distinct periods of persistently accelerating inflation. Before each of these episodes, it
enjoyed two years of strong output and employment growth. In addition, the growth rate of the
monetary base rose steadily over the four years
prior to each inflationary run-up, especially during the six to 12 months just before inflation
began to accelerate.
And what do we see today? Most money measures have been accelerating during the past few
years, with annualized growth rates early this
year reaching 8 percent for the monetary base
and M2 — and hitting 12 percent for M3. Even
3 percent inflation is unlikely to be sustainable
unless these money growth rates slow down.
Financial markets are providing lavish credit to
private borrowers. Mortgage debt outstanding has
increased nearly 25 percent in just four years.
Short-term bank financing, combined with nonfinancial issuance of commercial paper, soared last
year and is still accelerating. Corporations are also
raising large sums through bond issuance and
equity sales.
Make no mistake, ladies and gentlemen of the
jury; excess money and credit creation are serious
threats to our economy and must not go
unchecked. In the last four episodes, painful economic adjustments had to be made when inflation
and inflation expectations accelerated rapidly. Inflation distorts economic decisions, and the
greater the distortions, the more costly the correction. I therefore ask you to make the only responsible decision and return a guilty verdict—before
the Rose Glasses of our society color our economic judgment.

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Monetary Policy

FRB Cleveland • April 1998

SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and the Chicago Board of Trade.

The past two years have been characterized by relatively stable interest rates. At its March 31 meeting,
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) left the federal funds
rate target unchanged, a decision
that was widely anticipated in financial markets. That meeting
marked the one-year anniversary of
the latest rate change, a 25-basispoint increase to 5.5% on March 25,
1997. The discount rate has stayed
the same over an even longer period, its last move being a decrease
of 25 basis points to 5% in February
1996. The FOMC will reconvene on
May 19.

The implied yields on federal
funds futures are fairly constant over
the next several months, increasing
only slightly. Fed funds futures
allow market participants to hedge
against or speculate on future
changes in the federal funds rate.
Implied yields show where market
participants expect the federal funds
rate to be in the coming months.
The yields’ downward slope in January and February signaled participants’ belief that the rate was more
likely to decrease than to increase.
As of March 30, this expectation was
replaced by a more symmetric belief
that rates are about equally likely to

increase or decrease, with an increase slightly more probable.
Short-term interest rates have fluctuated within a fairly narrow range
since the beginning of 1996. The
weekly average yield on 3-month
Treasury bills traded in the secondary market has fluctuated by
only 50 basis points (between 4.93%
and 5.42%) over this period, and
stood at 5.19% for the week ended
March 27. This differs starkly from
the experience of 1994, when 3month Treasury bill yields increased
from 2.99% to 5.86% in just a year.
(continued on next page)

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Monetary Policy (cont.)

FRB Cleveland • April 1998

a. Growth rates are percentage rates calculated on a fourth-quarter over fourth-quarter basis. Annualized growth rate for 1998 is calculated on an estimated
March over 1997:IVQ basis.
b. Adjusted for sweep accounts.
NOTE: All data are seasonally adjusted. Last plot is estimated for March 1998. For M2 and M3, dotted lines are FOMC-determined provisional ranges. For
M1 and the monetary base, dotted lines represent growth rates and are for reference only.
SOURCE: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

Long-term interest rates have
likewise varied over a relatively
limited range. The weekly average
yield on the 30-year Treasury
constant-maturity rose from 6.00% at
the beginning of 1996 to 7.13% in
the middle of that year, but has since
sunk back below 6.00%. As of the
week ended March 27, the 30-year
yield stood at 5.92%. In contrast, the
30-year yield increased from 6.24%
to 8.13% in 1994, and fell again to
6.00% by the end of 1995.
The growth rates of the monetary
aggregates accelerated in 1998:IQ,

leaving M2 and M3 substantially
above the provisional ranges set by
the FOMC. These aggregates’ relatively rapid growth has caught the
attention of some policymakers, because sustained money growth may
herald an inflation rate increase.
The monetary base rose an estimated 11.5% in March, and has expanded 7.8% since 1997:IVQ. Adjusted for sweep accounts, which
banks use to “sweep” money from
reservable to nonreservable accounts, the base increased 8.7%
from 1997:IVQ through January

(estimates of sweep activity are
lagged one to two months). Growth
through March in the adjusted base
will be at least as large as in the nonadjusted base.
The M2 and M3 aggregates,
which are unaffected by sweep activity, increased substantially in early
1998. M2 rose an estimated 9.8% in
March, and about 8.4% from its
1997:IVQ level, while M3 increased
roughly 16.0% in March and about
11.8% since 1997:IVQ. These growth
rates are well above the ranges set
by the FOMC.

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Rising Inflation

FRB Cleveland • April 1998

SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; and Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System.

Since 1959, there have been four
distinct periods of persistently accelerating inflation. Although it is difficult to date their beginnings and
ends, they correspond roughly to the
years 1966 – 70, 1973 – 75, 1978 – 81,
and 1987– 91. In each of these
periods, the inflation rate was substantially higher at the end than at
the beginning.
The dominant issue facing monetary policymakers today is whether
action is necessary to prevent yet
another period of accelerating infla-

tion. In the light of past episodes,
two natural questions arise: Have
the years preceding each earlier period of accelerating inflation shown
a characteristic pattern? And if so,
does the recent performance of the
economy fit that pattern?
The answer to the first question is
yes, there have been broad similarities among the economy’s performances before periods of accelerating
inflation. The two years preceding
each of the four earlier run-ups were
characterized by strong output and

employment growth. In addition, the
growth rate of the monetary base
had been rising steadily over the
four years prior to each period, most
notably in the six to 12 months just
before inflation began to accelerate.
These similarities do not imply
that strong economic growth causes
rising inflation, or that accelerating
money growth necessarily results
in spiraling prices. The crucial point
is whether money supply growth
exceeds the increase in a strong
(continued on next page)

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Rising Inflation (cont.)

FRB Cleveland • April 1998

a. The actual and expected inflation for a given year correspond to the increase and expected increase in the Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers
(CPI–U) from October of the previous year through December of the given year.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia, Livingston Survey.

economy’s demand for money. The
periods discussed do suggest that
robust growth has frequently been
accompanied by overexpansion in
the money supply.
Does the economy’s recent performance fit the pattern of those earlier periods? From a very general
perspective, the answer is yes. Output and employment growth during
the past two years have been strong,
and the growth rate of the sweepadjusted monetary base has increased steadily. Recent years’ similarities to earlier preacceleration

periods indicate that present concerns about inflation are not unfounded. Furthermore, the fact that
inflation is widely expected to remain low cannot comfort those who
observe that a similar expectation
prevailed before previous run-ups.
As mentioned earlier, similarities
between today and earlier preacceleration periods do not guarantee
that rising inflation is at hand. There
have also been instances in which
strong economic growth and rising
monetary base growth were not followed by increasing inflation.

In the most recent example, base
growth accelerated briskly through
1992, a year of fairly strong output
growth, yet inflation did not subsequently increase. This may have
been the result of an effective monetary policy strategy that responded
to current conditions and prevented
base growth from exceeding money
demand. Moreover, some of the increase in the monetary base may
have reflected factors, such as larger
currency holdings abroad, which
have little connection with domestic
economic activity.

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Interest Rates

FRB Cleveland • April 1998

a. All instruments are constant-maturity series.
b. Vertical line marks the change from the TIPS series that is due to mature in 2007 to the series due to mature in 2008.
c. 10-year Treasury bond constant-maturity yield minus the yield quote for the TIPS-adjusted series.
d. The real interest rate and expected inflation rate, from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, are calculated using the 30-day T-bill rate.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Survey of Professional Forecasters; Bloomberg
information services; and The Wall Street Journal, various issues.

The yield curve remains flat relative
to its historical shape, with the
benchmark 3-year, 3-month and 10year, 3-month spreads at 40 and 44
basis points, respectively. The flatness is particularly noticeable at the
long end. Since last month, the
curve has steepened slightly because of lower 3-month rates and
higher rates on maturities of two to
10 years. The yield curve continues
to show a rather bumpy shape over
those years.
The recent introduction of Treasury Inflation-Protection Securities
(TIPS) makes it easier to use the

yield curve to discern future inflation
trends. One simple measure of expected inflation subtracts the interest
rate on TIPS from the standard nominal (not inflation-protected) Treasury. This assumes that the nominal
interest rate is the sum of the real
rate and expected inflation —ignoring risk premiums, liquidity differences, and tax effects—but it probably suffices for a first look. The
resulting measure of expected inflation has fluctuated, but has shown
no discernible trend since January
and now stands at 1.9%. A more sophisticated procedure using shortterm rates and a survey of profes-

sional forecasters yields 2.16% expected inflation for the month of
April, with a 1-month real interest
rate of 2.39%.
The final chart combines the 1month results with TIPS bonds of
five, nine, and 10 years to construct a
yield curve of real interest rates. It
clearly indicates that the slope of the
yield curve depends on more than
inflationary expectations; in fact, at
the short end, the real yield curve is
steeper than the nominal curve, with
a 5-year, 1-month spread of 160 basis
points. This exceeds the nominal
curve’s spread of 62 basis points.

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Equity Prices

FRB Cleveland • April 1998

a. Real earnings growth is the compounded growth rate of four-quarter total real earnings divided by four-quarter total real earnings four years earlier. Real
dividend growth is the compounded growth rate of the current-quarter real dividend divided by the real dividend four years earlier.
SOURCES: Robert J. Shiller, Market Volatility. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989; and Standard & Poor’s Statistical Service, Security Price Index Record,
various issues.

The stock market is again hitting
new highs almost daily. Some analysts think this means a bubble is
about to burst, while others believe
it heralds a “new economy” of
strong growth with low inflation. A
closer look suggests that evidence
can be marshaled on both sides.
Plotting the Standard & Poor’s
(S&P) 500 index on a logarithmic
scale underscores the bias that
high levels can impart to changes:
A 100-point increase means much

less when the index stands at 1,000
than when it stands at 100. Nonetheless, doubling from 500 to 1,000 in
only three years is impressive on
any scale.
Pessimists point to very high
price/earnings (P/E) ratios — which
are approaching post –World War II
records—and predict that prices will
come back into line with earnings.
Optimists believe current P/E ratios
are justified by strong earnings
growth, which they expect to con-

tinue despite some slackening in
recent quarters. More of the earnings do seem to be passed on to
shareholders via dividends, but
share repurchases might have the
same effect. The dividend/price
ratio, often an accurate predictor, is
signaling low expected returns to
equity holdings. Whether this means
a permanently higher plateau for
prices, a bear market, or just a mistake, remains to be seen.

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Inflation and Prices
February Price Statistics
Annualized percent
change, last:

1997

1 mo.

6 mo.

12 mo.

5 yr.

avg.

All items

0.7

1.4

1.4

2.5

1.7

Less food
and energy

3.6

2.5

2.3

2.7

2.2

Median a,b

3.1

2.7

2.7

2.9

2.8

Finished goods –0.9

–1.4

–1.7

0.9

–1.5

1.7

0.4

0.1

1.0

0.0

Commodity futures
prices c
8.9

–8.4

–3.8

2.7

–3.5

Consumer prices

Producer prices
Less food
and energy

FRB Cleveland • April 1998

a. Calculated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
b. Revised since January 1993 to reflect new Bureau of Labor Statistics seasonal factors.
c. As measured by the KR–CRB composite futures index, all commodities. Data reprinted with permission of the Commodity Research Bureau, a Knight–
Ridder Business Information Service.
d. Upper and lower bounds for CPI inflation path as implied by the central tendency growth ranges issued by the FOMC and nonvoting Reserve Bank presidents.
e. Median expected change in consumer prices as measured by the University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumers.
f. Blue Chip panel of economists.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland; the Commodity Research Bureau; the University of
Michigan; and Blue Chip Economic Indicators, September 10, 1997 and March 10, 1998.

Consumer prices edged up an annualized 0.7% in February, resulting
in a 12-month change of only 1.4%,
down from the 1997 average of
1.7%. Excluding food and energy
components, however, prices rose
at a 3.6% annualized rate, well
above the five-year average of 2.7%.
The median Consumer Price Index
(CPI), an alternative inflation measure, advanced 3.1% in February and

is tracking close to its five-year average. The CPI for all items remains
below the Federal Open Market
Committee’s (FOMC) central tendency projection, partly because of
the continuing slump in energy
prices.
Producer prices declined again in
February, with the Producer Price
Index (PPI) for all items falling at a
0.9% annualized rate. Here, too, a

closer look reveals that declining
energy prices are responsible for
the drop, since the PPI less food
and energy climbed at a 1.7% annualized rate during the same period.
Consumer expectations for inflation one year ahead rose this month
to 2.5%, the second straight increase
in their median response. Over the
longer term, consumers continue to
(continued on next page)

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Inflation and Prices (cont.)

FRB Cleveland • April 1998

a. West Texas Intermediate.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

expect a 2.8% rate of inflation,
which is roughly the same as the
five-year trend in the median CPI.
Economists participating in the latest Blue Chip survey revised their
1998 inflation expectations downward for the fourth straight month,
with 56% now expecting inflation
in the 1.5% to 2.0% range. This represents a drop of more than one full
percentage point since September
1997, when 60% of participating
economists expected inflation of
2.7% to 3.2%.
Energy prices have restrained increases in the overall CPI since their
sharp decline early in 1986. Since

December 1997, energy prices have
been decreasing monthly.
The energy index of the CPI
measures price changes in fuel oil,
household fuel commodities, piped
gas, electricity, and motor fuel, items
that account for 3.3% of the typical
consumer’s budget. The energy
index is heavily influenced by the
price of oil. While both the energy
index as a whole and the spot price
for intermediate crude oil show considerable volatility over time, since
1984 the crude oil spot price has led
movements in the energy index, although it does not dictate the trend
in energy prices.

Gasoline closely follows the price
patterns of intermediate crude oil.
Natural gas follows oil prices rather
loosely, while electricity is influenced only by large oil price swings.
Other consumer areas, such as
transportation services, rely heavily
on energy. Although airfares exhibit
more variability than the energy
index, they often mirror its pattern.
Apart from the cost of flying, intercity transportation is only weakly related to the energy index and tends
to be relatively stable. While swings
in oil prices clearly affect a household’s cost of living, they do so
mostly through direct purchases of
gasoline and other oil products.

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Economic Activity
Real GDP and Components, 1997:IVQ
(Final estimatea, b )

Change,
billions
of 1992 $

Real GDP
66.0
Consumer spending
29.9
Durables
3.2
Nondurables
–4.6
Services
30.3
Business fixed
investment
–1.8
Equipment
–0.5
Structures
–1.2
Residential investment
6.2
Government spending
1.0
National defense
0.8
Net exports
5.0
Exports
19.7
Imports
14.7
Change in business
inventories
26.5

Percent change, last:
Four
Quarter
quarters

3.7
2.5
2.0
–1.2
4.4

3.7
3.6
6.8
1.4
4.0

–0.8
–0.3
–2.4
9.2
0.3
1.0
—
8.3
5.3

9.0
12.9
–0.7
5.6
1.0
–0.8
—
10.2
14.4

—

—

FRB Cleveland • April 1998

a. Seasonally adjusted annual rate.
b. Chain-weighted data in billions of 1992 dollars.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau of the Census; National Association of Realtors; and Blue Chip
Economic Indicators, March 10, 1998.

Economic activity remains solid. The
median forecast of economists participating in the Blue Chip survey is
that real economic growth will slow
from 3.7% in 1997:IVQ to a still
healthy 2.4% in 1998:IQ. Expectations of further declines in net exports
and slower inventory accumulation
generally underlie forecasts of weaker
near-term growth. Domestic demand
is likely to remain brisk. Moreover,
86% of the Blue Chip participants
anticipate that real economic growth

for all of 1998 will exceed 2.5%, a
rate associated with more sanguine
estimates of the economy’s longterm growth potential.
Buoyed by strong gains in real
disposable personal income, advances in net worth, and historical
highs for favorable consumer sentiment, real consumer spending has
continued at a brisk pace this year.
On a year-over year-basis, February
saw real disposable personal income
increase 4.3% and real consumer

spending increase 3.6%. Sales of automobiles and light trucks have maintained their 1997:IVQ level of 15
million units.
Single-family housing starts progressed at an annualized 1.27 million units in February, well above
last year’s average. February sales of
new and existing homes achieved
new records of 893,000 and 4.75
million units, respectively. In addition to factors supporting consumer
(continued on next page)

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Economic Activity (cont.)
lndustrial Production Index
(Annual percent change)
IIIQ

Total index
6.8
Manufacturing
6.0
Durables
9.0
Computer and
office equipment 41.3
Motor vehicles
and parts
26.5
Nondurables
2.9
Excluding motor
vehicles and parts 5.1
Utilities
15.1
Mining
3.0

1997
IVQ

1998
Jan.
Feb.

7.3
9.0
11.0

0.9
3.7
3.2

0.9
0.0
0.8

19.5

36.6

21.8

15.4 –13.9 –25.7
5.7
5.3 –2.1
8.1
5.5
–0.6 –37.6
–3.8 18.2

1.8
10.8
–3.4

FRB Cleveland • April 1998

NOTE: Shaded areas indicate recessions.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

spending in general, warm weather
and low mortgage rates have boosted
starts. The average 30-year fixed
mortgage rate is currently 7.01%,
down from 8.11% one year ago.
Industrial production slowed during the first two months of 1998
from its rapid pace in the second
half of last year, largely because of a
sharp weather-related decline in utility output and a drop in auto output.
The weakness in manufacturing production, however, extended beyond

motor vehicles. Nondurable production fell in February, and the torrid
pace of computer and office equipment output cooled somewhat.
Although the pace of business
fixed investment dipped in 1997:IVQ,
economists generally expect it to
remain strong throughout this year.
Acquisitions of computer and other
information processing equipment,
which have accounted for most of
the investment boom since 1992,
should continue to be robust.

Many of the economists who project a slower rate of growth this year
believe businesses will trim their
pace of inventory accumulation. Although inventories typically drop
relative to output during recessions,
neither a high level of inventories
nor an inventory correction necessarily presages a slowdown. Similarly, although inventory-to-sales ratios generally rise during a
recession, high ratios do not seem to
augur a recession.

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Labor Markets
AVERAGE MONTHLY NONFARM EMPLOYMENT GROWTH a

1997 1998

FRB Cleveland • April 1998

a. Seasonally adjusted.
b. Vertical line indicates break in data series due to survey redesign.
c. Production and nonsupervisory workers on private nonfarm payrolls.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Labor markets eased slightly in
March. Nonfarm payrolls fell 36,000
for the month, the first decline in
more than a year. The overall decrease was led by dips in construction (88,000), retail (48,000), and
restaurant (43,000) employment.
The drop in construction was due to
unseasonably cold March weather.
Monthly employment growth averaged 205,000 in 1998:IQ, down
from 358,000 in 1997:IVQ.
A 136,000 increase in the number
of people looking for work and a

34,000 decrease in the labor force
caused the unemployment rate for
the month to inch up from 4.6% to
4.7%. March was the ninth straight
month with an unemployment rate
of less than 5.0%. The employmentto-population ratio also declined
slightly, slipping to 64% from its
record high of 64.2%
Even with the increase in available workers, average hourly earnings of nonfarm, nonsupervisory
workers rose three cents (4%) in
March, the second consecutive

month of 4% increases. Earnings for
service workers held steady, while
goods-producing workers’ earnings
went up slightly.
The hours worked by all private
workers fell sharply in March, countering large increases in the first two
months of the year. The average
monthly increase for the first quarter
was 3.2%. This implies either that
productivity (output per hour) will
drop or that the predicted 2.4% gain
in first-quarter GDP is too low.

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The Federal Budget

FRB Cleveland • April 1998

NOTE: All data are for fiscal years.
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

The Congressional Budget Office’s
latest revenue and expenditure projections indicate a movement from
deficit to surplus in the unified federal budget, despite a decline in revenue as a percent of GDP. The shift
is expected to occur in the year
2001, with the surplus amounting to
1% of GDP by the year 2008. The
cumulative surplus between 1998
and 2008 is estimated at $655 billion.
Revenue as a percent of GDP is
expected to fall from 19.8% to
19.3%, primarily because of a projected reduction in corporate in-

come taxes from 2.3% of GDP in
1997 to 1.9% in 2008. Most of this
decline is expected to occur by 2002
because of an anticipated drop in
taxable corporate profits. Throughout the projection horizon, it is expected that individual income taxes
will continue accruing at just above
9% of GDP, social insurance contributions will remain steady at 6.8%, and
other taxes will hold constant at 1.5%.
Total expenditures are projected
to fall from 20.1% of GDP in 1997
to 18.3% by 2008, mainly because
of lower discretionary spending

and a drop in net interest payments
as a percent of GDP. Discretionary
spending will decline as a percent of
GDP if it is contained within its
statutory caps through the year 2002
and then grows with inflation. Declining net interest payments will
follow, as debt falls relative to GDP.
Mandatory spending, however, will
be higher as a fraction of GDP and
is expected to continue rising after
2008. The largest contributor to higher
mandatory spending is Medicare,
followed by means-tested programs
that include Medicaid.

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Generational Accounts

FRB Cleveland • April 1998

a. Future generations.
b. Average of males and females in the same year.
c. Cuts base purchases and health care outlays by the same amounts as under the Balanced Budget and Taxpayer Relief Acts of 1997.
SOURCE: National Bureau of Economic Research.

Generational accounts—the present
values of future taxes minus
prospective transfers (net taxes) per
capita by age and sex—tell us how
the burden of paying for government purchases is distributed across
generations. For example, the account of 30-year-old males is
$196,800. It is positive because, in
present value, this group’s tax payments during working years exceed
post-retirement Social Security and
Medicare benefits. In contrast, 70year-old males’ generational account is –$89,200 because they pay

low taxes but receive large Social
Security and health care benefits.
Lifetime net tax rates, which show
what fraction of lifetime labor income is paid as net taxes, have increased from just under 24% for
those born in 1900 to about 28.6%
for those born in 1995. They are
highest for the children of the 1950s
and 1960s, but decline for later generations — a reflection of growth in
Social Security and public health
care programs.
If living generations continue to
be treated as they are under current
fiscal policies, future generations

will have to bear a much higher lifetime net tax rate — 49.2% on
average — if all projected purchases
are to be paid for. The rate for future generations is more than 70%
larger than that for 1995 newborns,
a clear indication that current fiscal
policy is unsustainable. If it is kept
in place, each new generation will
pay at a 28.6% rate—far too little to
balance the government’s books in
the long run. The unsustainability
persists, even with optimistic projections of future purchases or
health care outlays.

15
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•

Regional Update: Pittsburgh
Industry Share of Total Nonfarm Employment
(Percent)
Pittsburgh MSA

U.S.

1997

1979

1997

1979

0.4

1.4

0.5

1.1

Construction
Manufacturing
Durables
Nondurables
TPUa

4.6
12.8
9.1
3.7
6.1

5.1
24.6
19.8
4.8
6.4

4.6
15.2
8.9
6.2
5.3

5.0
23.4
14.2
9.3
5.7

Trade
FIREb
Services
Government

23.9
5.8
34.6
11.7

22.3
4.9
22.6
12.8

23.5
5.8
29.1
16.1

22.5
5.5
19.1
17.8

Mining

Largest Employers in Pittsburgh MSAc
1997
Share of MSA
employment
(percent)

University of Pittsburgh
Medical Center
US Airways
Allegheny Health, Education
and Research Foundation
University of Pittsburgh
Mellon Bank Corp.
Westinghouse Electric Corp.
PNC Bank Corp.
USX Corp.
McDonald’s Corp.
Eat ‘n Park Restaurants, Inc.

1979
Share of MSA
employment
(percent)

Industry

1.1
1.1

Services
TPUa

0.9
0.8
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.5

Services
Government
FIREb
Services
FIREb
Durables mfg.
Services
Services

United States Steel
Westinghouse
Jones and Laughlin Steel
Allegheny Ludlum Steel
Bell Telephone Co.
Crucible Steel
Babcock and Wilcox
University of Pittsburgh
PPG Industries, Inc.
Wheeling–Pittsburgh Steel

4.4
3.1
2.4
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.5

Industry

Durables mfg.
Durables mfg.
Durables mfg.
Durables mfg.
TPUa
Durables mfg.
Durables mfg.
Government
Durables mfg.
Durables mfg.

FRB Cleveland • April 1998

a. Transportation and public utilities.
b. Finance, insurance, and real estate.
c. Excludes local education and unspecified local, state, and federal government employment.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Pennsylvania Department
of Labor and Industry; and "50 Largest Pittsburgh-area Employers," Pittsburgh Business Times, 1998 Book of Lists, December 30, 1997, p. 72.

Nationally, the proportion of workers in the manufacturing sector is
declining, while employment in the
service industries is on the upswing.
Nowhere is this trend more apparent than in the Pittsburgh metropolitan statistical area (MSA).
In 1979, the MSA’s unemployment rate was low at 5.8%; its per
capita personal income exceeded
the national rate by 4%. A quarter of
the workforce was engaged in
manufacturing, and eight of the
metropolitan area’s 10 largest employers were manufacturers of

durable goods. The top two utilized
7.5% of the area’s total workforce—
a considerable share. The health of
Pittsburgh’s economy was heavily
dependent on steel production.
During the early 1980s, its formerly prosperous economy faltered,
primarily because of shocks to the
steel industry and competition from
more efficient mills elsewhere. In
1983, the jobless rate for the MSA
reached a historical high of 14.3%
(compared to 9.6% for the U.S.) and
its real per capita personal income
declined 4.3% from four years earlier

(compared to the U.S. drop of 0.3%).
Over the last 18 years, Pittsburgh
has been transformed. Employment
in manufacturing has decreased almost 12 percentage points, with
service industry jobs increasing by
the same amount. The MSA’s unemployment rate is currently lower
than the nation’s, and since 1983, its
real per capita income growth has
topped the U.S. average. Nine of the
area’s 10 largest employers are currently service producers, and there
is no dominant employer.

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Banking Conditions

FRB Cleveland • April 1998

a. The net charge-off rate is the percentage of total loans that banks remove from their balance sheets because of uncollectibility, less amounts recovered on
loans previously charged off, expressed as an annual rate.
b. Commercial and industrial.
NOTE: All data are for FDIC-insured commercial banks.
SOURCE: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Quarterly Banking Profile, various issues.

Insured commercial banks reported
net income of $15.3 billion for
1997:IVQ, surpassing the previous
quarter’s record high. Net interest
income was a major contributor to
the record-breaking net income and
to quarterly earnings that were
11.5% higher than a year earlier.
Despite a narrower margin between the yield on earning assets
and the cost of funding such assets,
growth in earning assets fueled the

rise in net interest income. In
1997:IVQ, margins narrowed for all
asset-size classes of banks. In the
two previous quarters, banks with
assets between $1 billion and $10
billion saw widening margins. For
the industry as a whole, 1997 was
the fifth consecutive year of declining net interest margins.
Net charge-off rates for 1997 increased from a year earlier. In the
fourth quarter, charge-off rates rose

on commercial real estate loans
and consumer loans other than
credit cards. According to some
measures, the credit risk of bank
asset portfolios has risen while loan
portfolios have shifted toward
higher-risk loans and lower-risk securities have been replaced by
higher-risk loans. Overall, bank
asset quality is neither improving
nor deteriorating.

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International Banking Developments

FRB Cleveland • April 1998

NOTE: All data series have been adjusted for exchange rate changes.
SOURCES: Bank for International Settlements, Banking and Financial Market Developments, various issues.

According to data released by the
Bank for International Settlements
(BIS), 1997:IIIQ saw a sharp decline
in U.S. banks’ external assets. BISreporting banks as a whole have
been decreasing their external asset
position since 1997:IQ. Liabilities,
however, have been increasing for
international banking facilities
(IBFs), but decreasing for other U.S.
banks. (The Federal Reserve System
made IBFs possible in December
1981 to enable U.S. banks to conduct Euro-currency business at

home without being subject to various domestic banking regulations.)
Overall, external liabilities for BISreporting banks have decreased
sharply since 1997:IIQ.
The third quarter of 1997 was the
first time in six years that BIS banks’
outstanding claims decreased on
Asia as a whole, although claims on
China and Indonesia grew. The
sharpest decline in BIS banks’
assets occurred in Thailand, as the
result of a Japanese withdrawal.
BIS banks’ liability positions increased in Thailand, Indonesia, and

China, but decreased in South
Korea and Malaysia.
Net issues of international debt
securities by U.S. and U.K. financial
institutions increased in 1997:IVQ,
bucking the trend set by France,
Germany, and Japan. Repayments of
past issues reached a new high for
BIS banks as a whole, contributing
to a decline in net issues. New issues of lower-rated securities and
subordinated debt declined dramatically as a result of difficulties in
Southeast Asian financial markets.

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The Balance of Trade
a

Major Trading Partners

(Trade balance, millions of dollars)
1997

Canada
Japan
Mexico
Germany
U.K.
Taiwan
China
Korea
France
Singapore
Italy
Hong Kong
Netherlands
Belgium
Malaysia

– 1,696
–4,294
–1,241
–1,237
–85
–1,070
–3,723
181
–228
–53
–679
159
905
566
–618

1998

–1,663
–4,357
–799
–1,287
345
–1,106
–4,241
–856
–235
–287
–780
63
1,115
581
–515

Change

33
–63
442
–50
430
–36
–518
–1,037
–7
–234
–101
–96
210
15
103

FRB Cleveland • April 1998

a. Order reflects total trade (exports and imports) with the U.S. between 1990 and 1995.
b. Growth differential equals the trade-weighted average growth rate for the 15 countries listed in the table minus the U.S. growth rate. Estimates for 1997
through 1999 are from various sources.
c. Real effective dollar index includes countries shown in table. Data include estimates of inflation for 1997 and earlier years in many cases. Forecasts for 1998
and 1999 utilize various sources.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census and Bureau of Economic Analysis; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Economic Outlook; DRI/McGraw–Hill; and Blue Chip Economic Indicators, March 10, 1998.

Many analysts fret that the U.S. trade
balance will deteriorate significantly
over the next year or so. This seems
a safe bet. Many of the same analysts predict that further declines in
net exports must slow overall economic growth, but while slower
growth is likely, the connection to
the trade deficit seems misguided.
U.S. net exports have deteriorated since 1991, largely in response
to relatively fast economic growth at
home. Since 1991, growth abroad
has averaged 3.2% per year, while

U.S. growth has averaged 2.3%. Typically, the growth differential must
approach two percentage points (in
favor of our trading partners) before
the U.S. trade deficit begins to narrow. Recent forecasts of growth here
and abroad anticipate a rather narrow differential over the next two
years, implying no improvement in
the trade balance because of relatively slower U.S. growth.
Since 1991, the dollar has appreciated approximately 20% on a real effective basis against our 15 major

trading partners. Any such rise reflects either a nominal appreciation
of the dollar, a higher inflation rate
in the U.S. than abroad, or both. As
the dollar appreciates on a real effective basis, the foreign price of
U.S. goods rises and the U.S. price
of foreign goods declines. Recent
forecasts of exchange-rate movements (notorious for their inaccuracy) and global inflation rates suggest that the real effective dollar will
depreciate 3.6% over 1998 and 1999.

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The U.S. Current Account

Savings, Investment, and Capital Flows
(Percent of GDP)
1991

1997

Change

14.2

14.3

0.1

0.1

2.8

2.7

Foreign
capital inflow

–0.1

1.9

2.0

Gross
domestic investment

14.3

16.1

1.8

Statistical
discrepancy

–0.2

2.9

3.1

Gross
private savings
Gross
government savings

FRB Cleveland • April 1998

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

The U.S. current account, a broad
measure of our trade position,
showed a $166.4 billion deficit in
1997. Most analysts expect the current account deficit to widen this
year and next, for the reasons suggested on the previous page.
Our current account deficit indicates that through consumption, investment, and government spending, the U.S. is absorbing more
output than it is producing and is

satisfying its excess demand by importing. This situation also implies
that our private and government
savings are not sufficient to finance
our gross private domestic investment. An inflow of foreign capital
makes up the difference. If all transactions are properly measured, the
capital inflow exactly matches our
current account deficit. In other
words, we finance our net imports
by exporting financial claims on our
future output.

As a consequence of our persistent current account deficits, the U.S.
has become a debtor nation. This is
not necessarily a bad situation. Since
1991, the inflow of foreign capital
has financed additional investment,
not additional private and government consumption. If this investment enhances productivity, the U.S.
should be able to service its debts
without any diminution in its standard of living.