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7be Economy in Perspective http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends April 1997 Best available copy gregate supply :inel clemancl, althougli not always \V%7atgoes- ~1t-01117d con2e.s cr~.o/liir/... Uefore anyconforming to :ill iclealized condition of full emone gets the wrong icle;l, let's I,e clezir al,out one ployment, might be tlie t m t the econonly can do thing: This is not another essay cleclaring that business cycles are cleacl. 7h p;traplmse a pop~llar ~lnclerthe circumstances of the moment. Some contemporary researchers have reachecl 1,~11nper sticker, recessions happen. 13i1t 1,usiness anotller conclusion: lIistiir1,~unces in aggregate cycles are commonly t h o ~ ~ g of h t :IS recurring flucsupply account for a conside~a1,leamount of the t~izitionsin economic actixity. Consiclering that we variation in economic activity. This observation are non. in the seventh ye:ir of an expansion, and inlplies that periocls of s l o ~ vgrowth may result have experienced growth for 14 of the last 15 fro111 adverse supply conditions, such as those years. who could fault us for re;ippraising the caiisecl by an oil cartel, anel t11;lt periods of fast I,i~siness cycle concept? gro\vth m:ly be clue to ka~;or-al,le supply concliI3usiness cycles hzi1.e never l ~ e e nreg:arcleci as foltions, lilie those follo\ving large-scale technologilo\\-ing a fixed periodicity. ?'heir earliest chronical innovation. clers. \XIesley blitchell ancl Arthur Bur11s.fo~unclpatWhy does the distinction l~et\veensupply ancl terns of co-mo\ieruent ;inel secluencing in economic clen~anclclist~~rl,ances matter? Consicler econonlic activity th;lt tenclecl to be stahle o\.er time. For exconclitions over the past two years. Accorcling to ~umple,in the reco\.ery phase of the cycle, labor ~xuductivityrises sharply as firms esp:unci ~ i ~ t p i i t the tl-aclitional clemand-oriented view. the economy reachecl f i l l 1 employment ~ v h e nthe unemn.ithout having to expand labor ho~irsproportionployment rate hit 6%; full employment coulcl be :itely. Furthernlore, overtime ho~irstencl to increase maintained only if aggreg:ite demancl grew \;at the first. with aclclitional employment coming only economy's potential rate of al~out2%. i\lIore rapicl later, as co~lficlencein the esp;insion cleepens. Outgrowth \vcioulcl p ~ l s haggregate demancl beyond the put gets :in aclcled boost froill the neeel to restocli economy's ability to supply output, creating inflainventories :inel increase clistril~~~tion lines. tion pressures. In this view, the Fecl ~voulclneeel to Analysis sho\vs that a cycle tencis to peak \\-hen dampen aggregate clemancl by allowing the feclimbalances clevelop. The classic encl to the espzinera1 fiintls rate to rise. Money growth \vould then sion phase materi~alizesxvhen firms seek to ess l o ~ vc l o ~ ~ enough ~ n to lieep inflation in checli. panel capacity and 1,olster inventories. They fiHut econo~llicgro~vtllh;is l x e n esceecling 2% nance this spending by horroxving, ;inel their for a while, ancl the iinenlploy~.ilentrate has fallen c:lpacity for repayrrlent becomes incre;isingly ctuwell below 6%. The nhsence of inflation pressures bious as pressures on resource availal~ilitypush up might res~iltfrom transitory factors that will soon interest rates ancl adcl to clel3t-sen.ice costs. Typidissipate. Alternatively. we coulcl he I>enefiting cally. inflation accelelxtes. from positive developments in aggregate supply. Eventually, economic conclitions hecome subThe current exixuilsion has been r~larlieclby a capstantially incompatil~le~vithpeople's prior especital spencli11gboom, which may signal the onset of tations ancl plans: C o n s ~ ~ m eclo r s not ~ ~ ~ \ l.v\lhat ant lxoductivity-e~lll~ancing 1,~isinesstools ~ulclpracretailers are stocking, retailers do not neeel what tices. h/Ioreover, this investment \\rave follows a manufacturers are proclucing, factories refuse periocl in which several important inclustries bel c , clehtors to hire people 'i\iho want to ~ ~ ~ o rancl came cieregulatecl, ancl tr:tcle restrictions \\{ere reczinnot repay creclitors. The longer the inconsiscluceci, both of which iruprovecl marketplace flesitency in planning persists. :Inel the greater the bility. Lal,or force participation I-ates have reachecl resource mismatch. the sharper ;inel cleeper the record levels, ancl hours \\iorlied senlain very correction periocl. strong. There are even some signs that procluctivFor nlost of the pxst 50 years, m;ainstrez~meconity growth has finally picliecl 1117 its pace. This is omists have tencled to thinli that recessions coiild ~lnusualfor the latter stages of ;i clemancl-clriven, he explaineel 11y insufficient aggregate clemancl, supply-constraineel expansion. zancl that monetary anel fiscal policies coulcl stinIf aggregate supply is gro~ving,and productivity m alate enough cle~llandto put total spending on trencls are improl.ing, tlie cl~~icliened pace of dethe f~il1-employmentpath. Of course. policy mism:lncl will now match ih:it of supply, creating n o talces coulcl t ~ responsi1,le e for both over- ancl uninterest rate pressure. In this c:Ise, ho~vever,the dershooting this ideal output level. ancl quite public would recluire more money to support inoften were hlamecl for inadetluzite macroecocreased spending, s o :In unchanged fiincls rate nomic perfcjrmance. \vould actually recluce inflation. Research concli~cteciin the last 20 years h:as Differentiating I,et\\ieen these t\vo possil~ilitiesis aclcled ne\v insights. For esarnple, instez~dof ree:lsy in theory, b ~ i tclifficult in practice. In ang;irding a11 biasiness cycle tluctuations as clisequilibrium events, it allows that a significant p r ~ p o r - noiuncing an incre:lse it1 the I-~LII~C~Srate last ~llonth, the Federal Open Mzlrliet Comnlittee seenlecl to tion might arise fro111 people simply making favor the clernancl-sick h\.pothesis. \Vhether it clecisions in tlleir oxvn self-interest, folloxving ranholds firnlly to that view \vill clcpend on how robat clom economic shoclis. The prevailing levels of aggoe.~~arortndcomes clo\i<~i~. http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends April 1997 Best available copy Monetary Policy Percent, weekly averages 1 6.5 RESERVE MARKET RATES Jan Percent weekly averages [CAPITAL MARKET RATES Feb. March April May June July Auq Sepi Percent I INFLATION AND THE FEDERAL FUNDS RATE a. Estimate of the yield on a recently offered, A-rated utility bond with a maturity of 30 years and call protection of five years. b. Bond Buyer Index, general obligation. 20 years to maturity, mixed quality. NOTE: All data are seasonally adjusted. SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; and the Chicago Board of Trade. Imrnecliately after its hl1:irch 25 meeti ~ l gthe , Federal Open Marliet Com~liittee(FOMC) of the Fecler:il Reserve Syste111allno~irlceclth~itit hacl "cleciclecl to tighten money marlcet conclitions slightly. expecting the federal luncls rate to rise I/$ percentage point to aro~lncl5% percent." This was the Committee's first policy move in almost 14 motlths ancl the first increase since Jan~la1-y19'15. This :~cLion\XIS no surprise to financial m:~rl<ets.The feel f~lnclsfutures marliet, for inst;lnce, hacl corne to anticipate the rate increase in the \\-eelis h e k ~ r ethe meeting. Altl~ough f ~ ~ t u r eprices s it1 Janual-y hacl inclic:~teclthe lilielihoocl of a rate hilie in blarch. Febr~laryevents lecl filt~lres investors to cloubt that any policy acLion \\:o~llcl occur before midyear. C:~pit:il rn:irliets in February also seemed to cliscount any imrnecliate move by the FOMC. However, concerns :11>out growing inflation2iry p r e s s ~ ~ r e:irose s by mid-March, aricl the lilielihoocl of a modest Ixte hilie increasecl. In :~nno~lncingits action, the FOMC statecl that "... the slight firming ol' monetary conclitions is vie\\-eel :is a pr~iclentstep that :ifforcls greater assutxnce of prolonging the current economic exp;u~~sion by sustaining the esistirlg lo\v iilfl:iLion environment through the rest of this y c : ~ancl nest. The experience of the 1:ist s e v e ~ i lyears has reink)rcecl the conviction that low inklation is essential to realizing the economy's f'ullest growth potential.'' (coi7ti,/~icdoil 17e~*1 pqy) http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends April 1997 Best available copy Monetary Policy (cont.) Percent 14 NOMINAL GDP GROWTH AND KEY INTEREST RATES - Percent change annual rate 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 a. As projected by the FOMC and nonvoting Reserve Bank presidents in February 1997. b. Core inflation is measured as the 15% trimmed mean of the CPI. Green lines represent trends. SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System: and the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. To i~nclerstanclthis perspective. it is usefi~lto review monetzlry policy over the past fen. decacles. From the micl-lC)60s to the late 1970s, each business cycle enclecl ccjith inflation higher than the previous peak ancl l,eg;~n \vith inflation higher than the previous trough. This ~~pv,.ard trend was accompanied by increasing structur~ilim11al:tnce and a general deterioration in the economy's gro\\~thpotential. Assets considerecl to 1,e inflation hedges (such as housing ancl golcl) appreciatecl I>eyond sustainal,le levels. In 1979, uncert fiiture of the dollar tainty a h o ~ i the let1 to a sharp clecline in its \-alile ancl precipitated a sigilificant FObIC conllnlitnlent to :I policy of disinflation. 1)isinflation climaxed in 1982 anel evas followeel l ~ ya prolongecl period of rob~istgrowth and relatively low inflation. Both nominal ancl seal interest rates, however, stayecl relatively high as investors in long-term clel~tinstr-uments rer~laineclleery of the Fed's commitment to price stahility. Indeed. nlarltet rates rose sharply throughout 1983 and early 1984. Many attril>uteclthis. in part, to a high rate of return on new hi~siness invest~nentresulting froill fiscal incentives ancl reduced [as rates. I-Iowever, many also believed that p;wt of the increase reflected an inflation scare, as investors n.aitecl for e\,idence that inflation was not accelerating. In 1985, financial marl\-ets became Illore confident that inflation cvas containecl, and interest rates generally fell. Inflationary pressures elnergecl again in 1987, and the Fed acloptecl an anti-inflationar)~stance. A sharp drop in stock prices in Octol,es, hocvever, ;~roilsed concern about marliet licluidity ancl intel-rupted antiinflationary efforts. Eventilally, policy w;ts reclirectecl to containing inflation. but not in time to heact off a Icot~ti~zrred of7 17extpa~qc.) http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends April 1997 Best available copy Monetary Policy (cont.) Billions oi dollars 830 COMMERCIAL BANK LOANS I Billions of dollars B~llionsof dollars 590 Billions of dollars Bill~onsof dollars a. Growth rates are percentage rates calculated on a fourth-quarter over fourth-quarter basis. b. MZM is an alternative measure of money that IS equal to M2 plus institutional money market funds less small time deposits. NOTE: All data are seasonally adjusted. Last plot is estimated for March 1997. Dotted lines for the M2 and M3 aggregates are FOMC-determined provisional ranges. Dotted lines for MZM represent growth ranges and are for reference only. SOURCE: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. jurllp in the trencl of core inflation to nearly 5% it1 the spring of 1988. The inflation rate eventually clroppecl sharply with the resolution of the Gulf \Wir in 1991 and trenclecl clonm to just 1,elow 3%. where it has remained since ~nicl-1992. Although the 1991 recovery started slowly, it jiainecl lllolnentilln as the last vestiges of high inflation were worliecl out. In 1994, the threat of inflation producecl a preeinptive policy stance that elid not interfere with continuecl econoinic espansion. Incleecl, the economy accelerated in 1996, while inflation renlainecl ~vell hehavecl. This experience clemonstrates that the FOMC's comniitment t o price stability since 1982 has enabled extenclecl periocls of high gro\vth ancl employment, along with low inflation. Consistent policy tl~roughoutthis period has also been :issociated with a general decline in nominal GDI? but only one recession. i\ioreover, real interest rates have killen from their 1980s highs as the Feel's credibility has increased. Vigilance in the pursuit of price s policymaliers stability r e q ~ ~ i r ethat pay close attention to any sign of inflationary pressures. Although the Feel de-empl~asizeclnloney growth targeting in 1993. M2 growth since then has been in line with its historical relationship to economic :~ctivity. Over the past )7ear, there has been an accelelation across the M2, M3. :~tlclMZh4 aggregates. 'I'he recent upticlc in the federal funcls sate recluces the likelihoocl that M 2 ancl ill13 n;ill c o n t i n ~ ~toe esceecl their announcecl growth ranges. http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends April 1997 Best available copy The Federal Budget Billions 01 dollars Billions of dollars 2,500 DEFICIT PROJECTIONS 170 - 160 - 150 - 2,000 Administration projections 1,500 1,000 500 110 - 0 B~llionsof dollars 2'000 ( REVENUE PROJECTIONS Comparison of CBO and Administration Economic Projections 1998 2000 2002 Real GDP growtha CBO Administration 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.1 2.3 CPI inflationa CBO Administration 2.9 2.7 3.0 2.7 3.0 2.7 Wage and salary shareb CBO 47.7 Administration 47.9 47.4 47.8 47.3 47.7 Corporate profit shareb CBO 8.1 Administration 8.6 7.8 8.7 7.8 8.4 a. Percent change, year over year. b. Percentage of GDP. NOTE: All projections assume no change in policy. SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office. If economic models :ire economists' stocli-in-tracle, then the assumptions usecl to construct them are their crit~ These assumpical 1 - a ~materials. tions 1i:lve long provoliecl pointed barl~sat rhe expense of the profession :me1 its conclusions. hut in the real \i~orlclof policy, assumptions are no jolie. As t l ~ elecleral government's t>~idget prowss 11egins in earnest. reconof ciling the iinclerlyi~lgass~imptio~ls competing proposals becomes a11 important conelition for reaching an :~greement.111 practical terms, this means reconciling the assilmptions of the Clinton administration ancl the Congressional Uuclget Office (C130). In Felbrc~ary.the CBO began analyzing the administration's prelimiThe first step, nary b~tclgetpro~>osals. of coLlrse. is to cletet-mine the starting point of tlle deliberations: Without any change in policy, what \\rill be the path of the fecleral deficit? The answer tlepends critically on the assumed paths of eco~lolllicgro~vth, inflation. ;tncl income distribution. i\ltho~~gh they may appear slight, clil'ferenccs Ixt\\-een the assumpthe aclministnttions of the CBO ~111cl tion have a significmt impact o n the projecteci path o f outlays, revenues, :tnd the cleficit. Given its economic :tssumptions. the administntion has projectetl that s t : ~ t ~ cluo ~ s policy \voulcl lcacl to a S597 billion curnulativc shortfall in revenues over the 1998-2002 periocl. U~lclerthe C13O's :dtern:tti\-e assumptions, the corses ~ x ) ~ l d i npsojection g is a cleficit o f ahout S787 hillion. http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends April 1997 Best available copy http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends April 1997 Best available copy Inflation and Prices Percent of forecasts 70 DISTRIBUTION OF BLUE CHIP CPI FORECASTS FOR 1998' February Price Statistics Annualized percent change, last: Year avg.: I mo. 6 mo. 5 yr. 1995 1996 All ~tems 3.1 3.1 2.9 2.5 3.3 Less food and energy 2.9 2.5 2.9 3.0 2.6 Mediana 3.4 2.8 2.9 3.4 2.7 F~nishedgoods -4.4 1.4 1.6 2.2 2.9 Less food and energy 0.0 1.3 2.6 0.6 2.6 5.4 -0.7 60 Consumer Prices t1 0 January 10,1997 March 10,1997 Producer Prices -1.7 Cornmod~tyfutures prlcesb -8.8 -6.7 1.8-2.2 12-monlli percent change 38 ITRENDS IN THE CPI 2.3-2.7 2.8-3.2 33-3.7 Annualized percent change 3.8-4.2 Oilfusion index, net percent rising 1 JPURCHASINGMANAGERS' PRICE SURVEY I a. Calculated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. b. As measured by the KR-CRB composite futures index, all commodities. Data reprinted with permission of the Commod~tyResearch Bureau, a Knight-Ridder Business lnformat~onService. c. Forecast of the Blue Chip panel of economists. d. Upper and lower bounds for CPI inflation path as implied by the central tendency growth ranges issued by the FOMC and nonvoting Reserve Bank presidents. SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland; the Commodity Research Bureau; National Association of Purchasing Management; and Blue Chip Economic Indicators, January 10 and March 10, 1997. O n hlarch 25, the Iedelxl Open PIarket Committee (FObIC) took a s ~ n a l l:inel perhaps cautious step toward monetasy restmint by raising the fecler~llfuncls target by percentage point, its first o\.ert policy action since January 1996. 111 21 psess release, the Committee clescribecl the sate hike :IS a psuclent step aimecl 11t prolonging the l ~ ~ ~ s i nespansion css by maintaining the existing low inf1:ltion r;lte throi~glithe encl of this vear ancl nest. At the molnent: the inflation inclicators are showing n o cle:tr sign of mo~.ingalvay from the 3% trencl they have ti)llowecl over the course of the current expansion. In Fehr~i2117, the Consun~erPrice Illclex (C1'1) rose :~t:t 3.1% a11nu:ll rate. just a shacle ;tbove its average since 1991 (2.9'X)).7 ' 1 meclian ~ CI'I, n-hich measures ilnclerlying inflation, aclvancecl at a 3.4Wi pace, btit was still not his horn its five-).ear trencl. The consensus :tmong economists. ho\ve\:er, is th:tt it can take tn.o years or Inore for inflation to re- s l x ) ~ ~tod:Lmonetary policy action. ancl that this lag forces po1icym:ll;ers to be for~v-;isel-looliingin their fight to keep prices st:tl>le. Incleed, the co1nment:lry accompanying he rate hilie suggests that the FOMC's mo\-e \IGIS i~ltendeclto hc:lcl off a growing [)ote~?lkrl for higher inflation, rather than to stem an irnmecliate uptick in the price clatx. The POMC's central tendency ~xojectionsho\vs CPI gro\vth Iiolding :I[ just tlncler 3'% this year-:t (coi!ti~l~ied 011I I L J . X ~ ~ L W C ) http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends April 1997 Best available copy InfZation and Prices (cont.) lndex, 1991=1 20 GOLD lndex 1991=1 PRICES AND THE CPI HOUSING PRICES AND THE CPI 116 - t14 - 112t 10 - 1 08 - 106 - 1991 Index, 1991=1 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 lndex, 1991=1 (FARM REAL ESTATE VALUES AND THE CPI I 2.2 ISTOCK PRICES AND THE CPI a. Handy and Harman base price, New York. b. Med~ansales price, existing single-family homes. c. Nominal value of land and buildings, per acre. d. Standard &Poor's stock price index, composite. SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; U.S. Department Of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Natural Resources and Environment Division; National Association of Realtors; Standard & Poor's Corporation; and Metals Week, various issues. few tenths of a percentage point I,eloxv last yezir's rise. The latest Blue Chip sur\.cy o f economists preclicts the inflation trencl \\.ill ren1:iin stead)at arouncl S%Iin 1998 as \\-ell. The leacling inclic:itors of inflxtion continue to he inconclusive ancl estremely rnixecl. Survey clata from purchasing rn:tnagers indicate that presscire on costs the net clo~vn\\.;~rcl tliay hx\-e clissipatecl, I x i t as of' yet, there has Ixen no significzint zicceleration in inelustrial prices. Economists often cite the price movements of' "inflation-lledged" assets as el-iclence of a growing itlflationziry psychology among investors. I3ut of these, there appears to be an incliczltor fat. eve177 conceival~lepoint of view. Golcl prices, a highly toutecl infl;ltiot~ preclictor, 11:tve killen in real terms since 1991. ancl sharply so since earl). last year. By contmst, median home s:lle prices have clim1,ecl at ~ipprositn~ite~y the same rate as the CI'I since 1993, ancl the price of farm 1:lnd has risen t~viceas fast. But perh:kps the most tro~~bling inclicator of potential inflation has been the dr;lmatic rise it1 equity prices. s Although higher ecluity v a l ~ ~ e(or any asset price rise, for that mzitter) may reflect "real" clevelopments lilie greater economic potential, some part of this increase may be zissociatetl n.ith investor anticipation of ~al clue to f ~ i higher t z o t ~ ~ i tearnings ture inflation. I http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends April 1997 Best available copy EconomicActivity Peicent oi iorecasts 33 Real GDP and Components, 1996:lvQa (Final estlrnate) change, b~ll~ons of 1992 $ Real GDP Consumer s p e n d i n g Durables Nondurables Serv~ces Busrness fixed investment Equipment Structures Resrdent~alinvestment Government s p e n d l n g N a t i o n a l defense Net e x p o r t s Exports Imports Change in business inventories Percent change, last: Four Quarter quarters 65.2 39.0 7.5 6.4 25.0 3.8 3.4 5.0 1.8 3.8 3.1 2.7 5.4 1.8 2.6 10.6 -1.3 11.2 -1.2 -2.7 -5.5 39.0 46.8 7.8 5.5 -0.9 26.0 -1.7 -0.8 -6.8 25.0 3.3 9.5 9.7 9.1 3.9 1.9 0.2 7.4 8.3 -1 7.2 - - 50 CI DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMISTS' REAL GDP FORECASTS FOR 1997 December 1996 II Annual percent change Percent change irom correspond in^ month 01 prevlous yeai Millions oi units 3-monii: nioving aveiage, n~iliionsof units [HOUSING INDICATORS - 118 Real personal consumption expenditures Real disposable personal Income a. Chain-weighted data in bill~onsof 1992 dollars. NOTE: All data are seasonally adjusted. SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census and Bureau of Economic Analysis; and Blue Chip Economic Indicators, December 10, 1996 and March 10, 1997. The nineteenth-cerit~~r).11istori;ln 'rhomas C:arlyle once suggestecl tli;lt economics was siri111ly :I matter of supply ancl cleinxncl. i\lthoi~ghthis may he true, cletermining \\.hether economic changes rellect s u ~ ~ p or l>. demancl is n o simple Iii:ltter. The clistinction is crucixl, lie\\-ever. because demancl pressures raise out1 ~ 1 ancl t lift prices, hereas as si~pply pressures raise oiitpiit lo\\.er prices. ?'lie kict that recent strength in :~ctual (ancl projectecl) oiltpcit growth w:ls not accomp:uniecl Iy :LCcelerating inflation suggests that s~lpplyeffects may he especizdly im1x)rt;~nt.?'he ciifficulty, of course, lies in assessing their fituse strength ancl contribution to gro\vth. With a strong push from esports ant1 consumer spending, real GI)l' :~d\.ancecl3.8% in 1996:IV(). raising last year's overall GDI-' gro\\.th to 2./t%i ().ear over pear) horn 2.0%1in 1995. Ilespite the faster pace of output gro\\-th. the GDP price incies increasecl only 2.l(H) in 1996. comp:~~ecl \\-it11 2.4%) in 1995. Continilecl strength in the consumer ~inci111ani1k~ct~iring sectors, together with lorv inventory le\.els, have ~ x ~ n i i ~ t e d economists l~articipatingin March's I31~1eChip s~ir\.eyto revise their outlooli for 1997 econo~iiicgro\\-th up\varcl, \vithoiit raising their inflation projections. Real clispos:~t)le personal income contini~edto climh in Fel,r~lary. acl\.ancing 3.7?41 on :I !;ex-over-year tx~sis.lvhile consumer outlays, slo~ving slightly, \Yere up 2.8°/0. Consumer attitudes remain positi1.e. as sales oi' nen. :me1 esisting homes attest. Housing st;~rtsclirnbecl 12.2% in Icorltirzcled 012 ico..'if / I L I ~ O ) http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends April 1997 Best available copy Economic Activity (cont.) Percent change irom corresponding month 01 prevlous year Percent Percent change iron1 corresponding month oi previous year Ratio 1 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AND CAPACITY UTILIZATION 1 86 Percent change Percent IPRODUCTIVITY TRENDS IN MANUFACTURING~ I 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 a. Output per houc b. Chain-weighted data in 1992 dollars. NOTE: All data are seasonally adjusted. SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics: and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. February. their highest level in aln ~ o s three t years, while permits g r e ~ v 3%, reversing J:un~i:usy's decline. Industrial outp~lt continued to show surprising strength in Febru;uy,rising 3.8941o n a year-over-year basis. New coreless for clural~legoocls were up 1.5(!4),following January's 4.1o/ii gain. Factory orders for all man~lkuct~lreclproclucts increased 2.5% in January. 'The ratio of unfillecl orders to shipnients rem;uins low. giving little ex-iclence that hottlelleclis ;ire cleveloping. Incleecl. cap2ucity ~~tilization re~llains~ ~ n c l e r 35%. a level often associatecl with capacity constmints. The economy's ability to accornnloclate growing de~ilancl withoclt price increases clepencls largely on the pace of labor productivity ancl the acc~~mulation of capital. Overall nonfarm productivity gro\vth has 11een a lackluster 1.1%per 17c~u1 -,- over the current business expansion. The nc~nfarmsector, however, inclucles a growing se~vice coni1ponent, in w~hichprocluctivity is notoriously clifficult to measure ancl prol~ablyun- derstatecl. I-'rocluctivity in the manufacturing sector, which is easier to gauge, has grown at a healthy 3.4% :~nnualrate over the s a n e pesiocl. In aciclition, the U.S. is esperietlcing an unprececlentecl 1,oom in business fixed investment. Most of this is attributable to computers, which shc)~lld enhance xvorliers' procluctivity, especially in many service industries. In view of these clevelopments, nlaIly econo~llistsI ~ O T V woncler whether we acc~~rately capture supply-sicle contributions to the econo~nicoutlook. http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends April 1997 Best available copy Labor Markets Change, thousands o l workersa IAVERAGE MONTHLY NONFARM EMPLOYMENT GROWH I Labor Market Conditionsa Average monthly change (thousands of employees) 1996 Payroll employment Goods-produc~ng Manufacturing Construction Service-producing Serv~ces Retatl trade Government Household employment 1997 Year 10 Jan. Feb. Mar. 216 16 -8 25 199 100 50 15 232 242 48 15 32 194 109 13 15 440 259 43 26 15 216 150 -9 20 725 293 114 3 108 179 67 6 43 -150 175 -12 16 -27 187 111 43 -19 745 Average for period Clvll~anunemployment rate (%) I Manufacturing workweek (hourdb C"" 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 to date Percent I l a Jan Feb Mar 1997 Percent 5.4 41.5 41.9 41.7 41.9 42.1 Labor force partlclpation 66.8 rate (%) 67 2 67 2 67.0 67.3 1 Percent of households surveyed 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 198i 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 a. Seasonally adjusted. b. Production and nonsupervisory workers. c. Vertical line ind~catesbreak in data series due to survey redesign. SOURCE: U.S. De~artmentof Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics: and The Conference Board, Consumer Confidence Survey, March 1997. Ilespite slo\ver emplo)ment gro~vth in March, the lal,or sitcitltion continues to brighten. Nonfarm p~tprolls aclvancecl at a modelxte pace (175,000 net new jotxi). Average hourly earnings showecl their largest year-o\rer-year increase since 1970 (LIP4.0%. to S12.15). \ \ M e the unemployment rate tleclinecl 0.10/0, to j.2%,. In ;tclclition. the labor force particip;~tionrate (67.30/i,)ancl e n ~ p l o y m e n t - t o - p o p ~ ~ l a t i ratio on (63.8%)hit recorcl highs last month. Goocls-psoclucing employment was weak in ivIarc11 (clorvn 12,000). as the construction inclustry parecl 27.000 jobs. This drop hllowecl an un~lsuallylarge February gain. With 2111 overall increase of 187.000, the service-proclucing sector Inore than accou~ltedfor jobs growth in blarcli. Within the narrow services c;ttegor-y, which encompasses L: Eunge of establishme~lts.i~lclclclinghospitals. engineering firms, and hotels, the gain resultecl prim:trily froin growth in health 211lclI>~isinessservices. 111contrast, governinent trinlmed its payrolls hy 19.000 last month. after aclcling 43.000 jobs in Fehrciary. Ovelxll, the pul>lic appears more optimistic about the ei-nployment picture. A survey of consumer conficlence put the percentage of responclents ~ v h obelieve jolx xre plentif~il at 32.30/0,ahout 14 percentage points al>ove those who think jobs are scarce. This is the survey's 11lost (iivolable sho~vingsince Jiily 1989. http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends April 1997 Best available copy WorkplaceFatalities W O R K P L A C E FATALITIES BY O C C U P A T I O N , 1995 ri-~->I Managerla1 and proress~onaispecialty - , / d r . l .- Service occupat~ons , " - "5$+ , , Technical sales and adrninistrat~vesupport Precis~onproduction crait and repair i~ ,- Operators iabr~caiors and laborers i Farming ioresiry and fishtng hi Mlllrary 0 I I 5 10 I 15 I 20 I 25 I 30 I 35 I 40 Percent 01 total Occupations with a High Incidence of Workplace Fatalities, 1995 Occupation Truck drivers Farm workers Construction laborers Supervisors, proprietors, and sales workers Nonconstruction laborers Police, detectives, and supervisors Electricians Cashiers Airplane pilots Taxicab drivers Leading fatal event Percent of occupational group deaths Highway crashes Vehicular Vehicular 68 50 28 Homicide Vehicular 63 36 Homicide Electrocutions Homicide Plane crashes Homicide 47 59 92 98 70 a. Dotted line represents break in data series due to change in estimating procedure. SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries; and National Safety Council Real wages relxesent only o n e aspect of tlie employment contract. Arlotlier aspect is \vorliing conditions, especiall>.the safety o f the environment. An estreme measure of on the job. These safety is k~t~ilities h a v e fiillen inesom1,ly since 1965. s o that the chance of clying 0 1 1 tile job is noxv only one-fifth of what it was a generation go. T h e n ~ i r n l x rol' total n.orliplace fatalities is very Ion. (.:I per 100.000 worliers in 1995). This is less than tile Kite of cleziths ll.0111 acciclental kills (5.1) ancl is much smaller th:ln the cle:~thrates fsor11 accicle~ltsor \rialence (57.3) \vhen rneasurecl for the during hoth n.orkentire pop~~l:itiori ing and non\\iorliing 11o~lr.s.The \vorliplacc of toclay clearly is a siifer pl:~ce\\.hen measurecl hy fitalities. The conlposition of fatalities has also changeel, partly because of shifts in the cornposition of the lahor force. Forestry ancl fishing rernain very clangerous occupations. I>ut \ orce. tiley employ less of the \vorl-f so that acciclents ;~ssociatecl wit11 them (being str~lcliby ~ u ol>ject ~ i or clro\vning) are no\\- a sm;ill proportion of total worliplace cle:lths. In spite of their prominence o n television ne\vscasts, fires >i~iclesplosions cause only a minor fsaction of cleiiths. Even without the occup:itional shifts. cl:ita from cl;i~igero~~s o c c u p ; ~ t i o n s s ~ ~asc hmining, \\illen a\.ail;ll>le. inclicate a clecline in fltality sates. Sow, the top t\\,o c:ulses of n.orliplace cleaths are tr:insport:ition acciclents ;mcl homicicles. by ;I fairly I~irgemasgin. http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends April 1997 Best available copy Interstate Population Migration Thousands of oersons Changes in Industry Shares of Total Nonfarm Employment, 1990-1995 (Percentage points) OH PA KY WV - Mining -0.1 -0.2 -1.0 Construction -0.3 -0.6 -0.1 0.7 Manufacturing Durable goods Nondurable goods -3.0 -2.0 -1.0 -1.8 -1.0 -0.8 -0.5 0.1 -0.6 -1.2 -0.7 -0.6 Transportation and public ut~l~ties -0.1 0.0 0.3 -0.3 Trade -1.0 0.0 0.2 1.4 FIREa -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 Services 2.2 2.5 State and local government 1.8 0.4 1.7 -0.5 -1.5 1.5 -0.7 a. Finance, insurance, and real estate. SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census; Ohio Bureau of Employment Services; Kentucky Department of Employment Services; Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry; and West Virginia Bureau of Employment Programs. Migration patterns o\.er tlle past seven years show that Iiust Helt states c o n t i n ~ l eto experience ~ L I L ~nigration.The largest net loss, ho\vever, occurrecl in C;~lifornia.\\-liere ne:trly 2 million more people left the state than entesecl. '['he otl~er. big losers xvere Ken. Yorli. Illinois. ancl New Jersey. The So~~tlleztst ~mcl Southn.est were the biggest po17~1l;ktion g;ti~lers. T'he st;lte \\.ith the lxrgest tin-migr:~tion \v:~s I:loricla. which gainecl nc:trl!- SO0,OOO more people than it lost. I t is interesting t o note th;lt the Sour states listecl ithove :is I ~ i gnet 111igr:ttion losers hat1 higher-tlian:kver:\ge unemployment r:ites. The states \vith the lo\vest unemployment rates, horn-ever (\\jliich :Ire rn~tinlyin the Nficl\vest) \\.ere not the Iiggest gxiners o f net migration. th Keseme IlisIn the F o ~ ~ rFecleral trict, hoth Ohio and l'ennsyl\.:tnia li;~veseen more people lea\.e than enter since the beginning o f the clecatle. xvhile for I<entucl;). mcl \Wst Virgini:~the reverse w:~s trile. Ohio ;incl I'ennsylvania also experiencecl the l;trgest m a n ~ ~ h ~ c ~sector ~ ~ r i cleng clines, wit11 employment sh;~resin rnanuf:lcturir~g inclustries htlling 3.0 anel 1.8 percentxge points. respectively. \Xiest Virgini;~gaineel employment in \i.holesale ancl retnil tracle, ancl all the Fourth 1)istrict states increased their shares of enlployment in the service sector. Go\.ernment \\-;IS the only other sector to s h o w any sulxtantial employment gains, hut these were limited to Ohio ancl I'ennsyl~lnia. http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends April 1997 Best available copy Banking Conditions http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends April 1997 Best available copy Monlhly average level I 2'000 NASDAQ BANKING AND FINANCE NDEXESa a. The last data point in both series is a daily quote for March 27. SOURCES: DRI/McGraw-Hill; and Bank Rate Monitoc various issues. The run-up i11I~anlishare prices 11;~s recently abatecl. This is consistent wit11 concerns al3oiit possil>le overvali~ationof banli stoclis ancl reports that hanli i~lsiclershave heen selling stocks for months. Insicler sales may inclicate that those with superior int prospects anformation a l ~ o u bank ticipate weaker earnings clo~vnthe road. Once made pul~lic.this infor- mntion coulcl precipitate a drop in prices. If this interpretation is correct, news of insicler selling coulcl itself' trigger a sell-off anel price decline. Anticipation of higher interest r:ltes ancl tighter loan markets nlay also he dampening investors' enthusiasm. However, short-term marltet interest rates have shown little nlovenlent in the last few mot~ths. Some commentators inclicate that the recent firming of mortgage rates may have been relatecl to anticipation of short-term interest rate hikes. On the other hand, rates for both personal anel home-ecluity loans have clropped. Creclit card rates have s h o ~ v nlittle rno\;ement since last November; such loans remain o n e of cornmer(cotzti~zuedon next pct~qo) http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends April 1997 Best available copy Banking Conditions (cont.) 0 RETURN ON ASSETS BY BANK ASSET SlZE a More than 10 I J J I I I I I NON-INTEREST INCOMWEARNING ASSETS BY BANK ASSET SlZE - 30 1 ,." ,H&4 /d4 , --c # a , " P,-- d --7 /' A%."" #'/ More than 10 ,,& - 20 &@@=" 15- 10 10 ecz =--- I IIQ a - 0 1 to1 s= v W H -- -p-% e--*e-4d I I I I iila iva la lia I IIIQ I iva a. Net interest margin is the difference between the yield on earning assets and the cost of earning assets, expressed as a percentage of average earning assets. NOTE: All bank asset size ranges are expressed in billions of dollars. SOURCE: FDIC, Quarferiy Banking Profile, various issues. cia1 Ixu~~liing's most profit:ul~leareas. News that creclit c;urcl clelincli~encies reachecl a record high at the encl of 1996 comes as a clisappointrne~ltin the \\.ztke of some hanlis' efforts to tighten creclit cal-cl stancl;u.cls ;me1 recluce mail solici~~tions. Insurecl commercial l>anlis reported the thircl-highest earnings total in histol-) for 1996:IVQ,Lmcl the ret11s11 011 ;issets was the seconclhighest ever. The largest l~ooststo earnings catlie from increasecl noninterest income (up 13.3% since 1')')j:IVQ) and net interest income (LIP6%)).the latter being boostecl 11y 110th wider interest margins and greater interest-earning assets. Net interest margins at large h;mi<s rose the most. mainly hecause of lo\ver fi~nclingcosts. Noncurrent loans (those 90 clays or more p:tst due and those in nonaccrual status) cleclinecl. rnainly as a result of higher net charge-off:.;. Mo\\~ever. noncurrent consulner loans increased, and consumer loans also hacl the largest share of loans the increase in cleli~lc~i~ent (tliose nit11 interest payments 30 to S9 clays ~ ~ 1clue). s t http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends April 1997 Best available copy Foreign Output and Prices Perceni change from correspond~ngmonth oi previous year ICONSUMER Percent change from corresponding month of previous year CONSUMER PRICES l5 Percent change from corresponding quarter of prevlous year 1992 1993 1994 1995 PRICES Perceni change irom correspond~ngquarter oi prevlous year 1996 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 SOURCES: Statistics Canada; lnstitut National de la Statistique et des ~ t u d e siconomiques (France); Statistiches Bundesamt; Deutsche Bundesbank (Germany); lnstituto Centrale di Statistica (Italy);Statistics Bureau of the Japanese Prime Minister's Office; Bank of Japan; Office of National Statistics (U.K.); U.S. Department of Labor; and U.S. Department of Commerce. Foreign econornic acti\.ity continues Irn.estment spencling slowecl. Inclusc;luse l2:lcl weather slo\\.ecl clown tri:ll ~xocli~ction increasecl a I>risl< construction activity. Germany's units moclesate exparlsion. \vhile inllation pressiiresswn:lin S L I I ~ C I L I 5.3% ~ ~ . in Jan~iary,wlihile the Llnememployment mte rose to a recorcl Economists, \ ~ h onotchecl i ~ ptheir ployment rate for the ruonth repost-\'orlcl \War I1 high of 11.3% in oiit10c)li after a 17etter-than-es12ectccl mainecl at 3.3(!41.only slightly helo\\. Janiiary ancl rernainecl there in Fel2fourth qiiarter, anticilx~teth;~tgro\\~th its post-\Vc)rlcl War I1 high of 3.5'!41. I.LI:IS~. Its huclget deficit \viclened to Lunong our 10 lasgest industrial tl.;~cl- Inflation in Japan remains I,elo\\. 11!4). 3.9%~ of GlIP in 1996 from 3.5% the ing partners ill aver:lgc ;lpprosiGerman output expaneled at a previoiis year. With iinemployrnent rnately 2.5% this year ancl next. slr~ggish2.01!4)in 1996:IVQ (011 a running at historically high levels, yc:u--over-year basis). Concurrently, the coilntiy \\-ill have difficulty meetJapanese real Gl)I1 rose XI o\.er tlle f o i ~ r cluarters encling in net e x p o r t w a n e l consumption ing the 3% deficit t q e t h r the Euro199h:I\'Q. \vith consiln1er spencling spencling (both private and go\.ernpe;ui rnonetary union. Inflation in :mcl net exports leacling the gains. rneni) \veal<enecl. Inclustrial proclucC;erm;)ny remains below 2%. tion fell 1.7% in January, 1;urgely be- http://clevelandfed.org/research/trends April 1997 Best available copy Intrafirm Trade Bill~onsor U S dollars (U.S. INVESTMENT POSITION Percent of total exports 45 [INTRAFIRM EXPORTS A E] Foreign d~rectinvestment in the U S Total lntraflrm exports U S direct lnveslment abroad 500 companies to foreign aif~liates 20 Percent OU I GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. INTRAFIRMTRADE I Canada Europe Lat~n America Africa Middle East Asia and Pacilic SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; and Survey of Current Business, February 1997, pp. 23-28. International clirect invest111ent surgeel in the late 1980s. f%oth1i.S. direct investments in hreign countries ancl foreign investments in the U.S. have been gro~vingr:lpiclly, with the former exceecling the latter by 21 xvicleni~lg111:trgin. Multinxtional corporations ~~nclertal<e nlost of these norlclwicle invest~ u e n t sin order t o remain competitive in foreign 111arliets. to l o ~ v e r their resource :lncl I:ll~orcosts, anel to gain tax advantages. kl~lltinationalfir111s also play a signific:tnt role in global tracle flo\vs. Intrafirm trade, for example, accounts for over 35% of U.S. exports and more than 40% of imports. This trade seems to originate at the parent firm. U.S. intrafir~nesports consist mainly of shipme~ltsfrom parent firms to their foreign affiliates, 21s opposed to esports of foreign-o\\.necl firms in the U.S. Similarly. 1.J.S. int ~ l f i r ~i~t~portsflo\v n fro111 a loreign parent t o its clomestic affiliate. 1J.S. intrafirm exports travel in:~inl). to clevelopecl parts of the glolx. whereas the nation's intl.,1' F'11.m imports are more widely clispersecl. The 1I.S. has m:~int:linecl 21 deficit in its intr-afirm tlacle. In 1994 (the l;ltest year for \\:hic11 c1:~ta :ire availal~le),that cleficit ;urnoi~nteclt o S97 l)illion, o r 65%)of the total tsxcle deficit. The deficit is at its \i.iclest in our intrafirm tracle lvith hfric;~ancl the M i c l d East.