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MONTHLY REVIEW TWELFTH FEDERM R ESERVE DISTRICT F e d e r a l r e s e r v e B a n k o f S a n F r a n c is c o J a n u a r y 1 953 IMPACT OF DEFENSE-TWELFTH DISTRICT VERSUS UNITED STATES the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the United entered another period of substantial military production. The upswing in military output added a large new element to the high level of demand already existing in June 1950. National security expenditures for goods and services jumped from $18 billion in 1950 to more than twice that amount in 1951. By the end of 1952 these expenditures were above the $50 billion m ark on an an nual basis. The subsequent rapid pace of industrial pro duction, plant and equipment expansion, construction, employment, and consumer spending has lifted the na tional economy to levels that considerably overshadow all previous peaks. Even after adjustm ent for price changes, the 1952 flow of goods and services was 11 per cent above the 1950 volume. This expansion on a na tional basis is substantial, but the gains in the Twelfth District are even more impressive. Most indicators reveal that although the pattern of growth is similar, the District has expanded more than the nation as a whole. Most of the difference in change is concentrated in the size of the increases rather than in their timing or duration. Because the more rapid expan sion in this District reflects the impact of the defense pro gram to a large extent, the question of economic vulner ability of this District when military spending declines is of considerable interest. Comparison of some of the differences between the District and national economy indicates that the weak spots are not the same in the F ar W est as in the nation. The vulnerability of the District does not appear to be significantly greater, however, than that of the country as a whole if the potential weaknesses of the national economy are taken into consideration. A fte r S elected I ndicators — U nit e d S tates l States Post-Korea expansion greater in District than in United States Expansion resulting from the defense program has been considerably greater in the Twelfth District than in the country as a whole. District firms have received 17 percent of the m ajor prime defense contracts. This compares with 8.4 percent of the national total of value added by manufacture in this District during 1950. Even in the one m ajor activity in which there has been a de- and T w e lf t h D istrict (-----Change since KoreaU nited States + 7 + 8 + 16 +44 + 9 Twelfth D istrict + 12 + 23 + 24 + 46 + 28 — 25 — 14 D w elling u n its authorized in u rb a n areas, m onthly a v e r a g e ........................................... cline—residential construction—the decline has been considerably smaller in the District than in the nation. Responding to the large outlays for defense goods, total nonagricultural employment in the District in creased from 4.8 million in June 1950 (on a seasonally adjusted basis) to 5.4 million at the end of 1952. This gain in employment was considerably more rapid than the increase in the labor force, and the ratio of unem ployment to total labor force dropped from about 8.0 percent in late 1949 to 2.9 percent at the end of 1952. During the same period the proportion of unemployed nationally dropped from 5.4 percent to 2.2 percent. The considerably higher ratio of unemployed in this District has been a cause for concern for more than a decade. Even during W orld W ar II the ratio of unemployed here exceeded that in the country as a whole by a substantial margin. Despite war and postwar growth this condition has persisted. F or the most part it reflects a more rapid growth of the labor force in the District than in the rest Also in This Issue Prices—The Return fo Stability Relative Pay Levels in the Twelfth District and the Nation The United States Shipping Account and the Balance of Payments Supplem ent Cattle Feeding and its Place in Twelfth District Agriculture January 1953 FEDERAL RESERVE B A N K OF SA N FRA N C ISC O 2 of the country and the natural difficulties associated with the absorption of continued immigration from other areas. By 1950, however, the influx of new residents to the area had slowed, and even in the months before Korea the ratio of unemployed had begun to drop. The sharp rise in employment opportunities since Korea has induced a new flow of immigrants, but job opportunities have risen faster than the number of applicants. As a re sult, the gap between the ratios of unemployed in the nation and in the Twelfth District has been greatly re duced. Gains in District manufacturing accounted for a m ajor portion of the increase in employment. The W est Coast aircraft industry more than doubled its employment, adding 130 thousand workers. The electrical machinery industry— including electronics as a m ajor component— also more than doubled its job holders, adding 30 thou sand. Employment in nonelectrical machinery increased by 40 thousand, and in shipbuilding by 10 thousand. T o gether these industries accounted for 210 thousand of the 300 thousand new m anufacturing jobs. Considerable expansion also occurred in the apparel, chemicals, paper, TO TA L N O N A G R IC U L TU R A L EM PLOY M ENT U N ITE D STATES A ND T W E L F T H D ISTR IC T , 1950-1952 TO TA L M A N U FA C T U R IN G EM PLO Y M EN T U N IT E D STATES A N D T W E L F T H D ISTRICT, 1950-1952 Thousands of workers Thousands of workers 1,5001 116,500 : - f - 1,400 15,500 /Unite d States i (n'ahit scale) 1,300 / jhmmhi jr**'* 14,500 v J - / Twelfth District r (left scale) 1,200 13,500 - 1,100 12,500 (A dju sted for sea so n a l variation) Thousands of workers Thousands of workers 19 51 1952 S o u rc e : U n ite d S tates D e p artm e n t of L ab o r, B u re au of L a b o r S tatistics and cooperating S tate agencies. and metals lines. Although most of the District gain in employment has occurred in defense m anufacturing in dustries, the continued expansion of several nondefense industries points up the continued growth of the area. Chemicals and electronics, for example, although im portant to the defense effort, have large potential peace time uses, the development of which has been restrained by their diversion to military goods. All these forces have generated a high level of income which has been translated into an increasing flow of con sumer expenditures. One example of this rising volume of spending at retail is the 28 percent increase in the value of department store sales since June 1950. This compares with a national gain of 9 percent. This growing rate of spending adds further impetus to the over-all economic expansion in the District. The record of retail sales demonstrates emphatically that the D istrict ac counts for a growing share of the national m arket and provides further opportunity for industry to expand in this District or to migrate to it. Pattern o f change usually similar, but variations reveal interesting differences between District a nd United States econom y The forces which underlie the D istrict and national ex pansion are generally similar and tend to create patterns January 1953 3 M O N T H L Y REVIEW D EPA RTM EN T STORE SALES U N IT E D STATES AND T W E L F T H D ISTR IC T , 1950-1952 (A d ju ste d for season al variation, 1947-1949=* 100) Percent was occasioned by the steel strike. Although the steel industry is fairly sizable in the District, it is relatively much less im portant than in the country as a whole. Also, one large California steel mill continued to operate dur ing the strike. Since many steel-using industries were able to draw upon inventories, only a minor reduction in jobs occurred at these plants. The effect of the steel strike upon District employment, therefore, was not noticeable. M anufacturing employment in this region dropped more sharply in May 1952 than it did nationally. A lum ber industry strike in this District accounted for the dif ference. Dry weather last summer forced a cutback in logging and sawmill activity during September with a consequent dip in m anufacturing employment. Nation ally, the impetus imparted by the recovery from the steel strike and the relatively smaller importance of lumber operations permitted manufacturing jobs to rise sharply. Rates of growth point up other differences The greater impact of the defense program points up additional and perhaps more fundamental differences be tween the Twelfth District and the nation. The District has some industries which are subject to wide fluctua tions. The aircraft industry, which accounted for 56 per cent of the national value added by plane output in 1947, is dependent to a large degree on military orders. Since LOANS AND DISCOUNTS—M EM BER BANKS U N IT E D STATES A N D T W E L F T H D ISTRICT, 1950-1952 of similar shape even if the rates favor this District. The accompanying charts illustrate the similarities as well as the differences. Loans and discounts of this area and the United States have risen in a remarkably similar pat tern ; with a few minor exceptions, so have deposits. The number of dwelling units authorized offers a few more exceptions, particularly in 1951. In the second quarter of that year a large number of public housing units were started in the country as a whole, but very few of these were in the F ar W est. This accounts for the m ajor dif ference apparent in that segment of the economy. Yet, the variations in pattern that do exist point up some of the differences, other than in rates of growth, between the regional economy of the F a r W est and that of the nation. Starting in July 1951, national manufac turing employment started a decline that lasted until No vember of that year. This drop reflected a delayed reac tion to the reduction in consumer spending on durable goods and an overestimate of the m arket by some pro ducers. As a consequence, the output of some appliances was cut below the level permitted by National Produc tion Authority allotments. The impact in this District was negligible because consumer durable production, relative to total manufacturing, is considerably less im portant here than nationally. The sharp drop nationally in manufacturing employment during July of last year Millions of dollars Billions of dollars 4 January 1953 FEDERAL RESERVE B A N K OF S A N FRA N C ISC O large volume in this industry comes only during periods of defense activity, the District economy tends to experi ence a sharper than average impact from the accompany ing expansions and contractions in aircraft production. Shipbuilding, currently much less important than aircraft, exhibits this characteristic even more intensely. The Dis trict shipbuilding industry suffers from freight rate dif ferentials, a lack of shipways for some of the larger classes of vessels, and an historical predisposition toward E ast ern yards. It tends to prosper, therefore, only when ac tivity is so great that there is an overflow requiring the use of W estern facilities. O ther D istrict industries tend to be marginal to the national structure of their particular line. Both the elec trical and nonelectrical machinery industries along the Pacific Coast include facilities of national concerns which are likely to be the first to be cut back and the last to be brought into production. This reflects the fact that some of the D istrict plants in these industries are better suited to job-order or “tailor-m ade” projects than to mass out put. As a result the machinery industries in this area have had wider swings than those nationally. Continued growth of District dam pens downswings As a result of the peculiar characteristics of the air craft, shipbuilding, and machinery industries, one would D E M A N D D E P O S IT S A D JU S T E D 1— M E M B E R B A NK S U N IT E D ST A T E S A N D T W E L F T H D IS T R IC T . 1950-1952 Million* of dollars of dollars 82 79 70 N U M B E R O F N E W D W E L L IN G U N IT S A U T H O R IZ E D U N IT E D S T A T E S A N D T W E L F T H D IS T R IC T , 1950-1952 1950 1951 1952 * L a te s t da ta c h arte d : U n ite d S tates, N o v em b er; T w elfth D istric t, D e cem ber. S o u rce: U nited S tates D epartm ent of L abor, B ureau of L a b o r Statistics. expect the District to show much wider swings than the nation. Fluctuations in the aircraft and shipbuilding in dustries, however, have not had significant influence on the over-all level of economic activity in the District, ex cept during periods of expanding or contracting defense activity. The defense character of these two industries resulted in more contraction here after W orld W ar II than in the country as a whole. But this gap was made up in fairly short order because of the D istrict’s new and strengthening position as a m ajor market. Since Korea, of course, the rapid rise in the use of D istrict aircraft facilities has generated expansionary influences that have not been offset by other forces. The movements that can be attributed to the machinery industries—except in the post-Korean period— have had but little effect, particularly on the downside. The steady m igration of industry to the D istrict has partly offset re cession losses in these industries. In addition the D istrict does not react to the swings in consumer durable output or the recurring crises in textile production which have a marked effect elsewhere. As a result, therefore, the Dis trict has not shown much more instability than the na tion as a whole during periods of recession.1 A n added favorable factor in the future will result from the con tinued growth of the machinery industries in this District. More and more the newer plants— suitable for mass out put—will dominate the picture, and the m arginal plants will recede in importance. Som e segments need watching Liquidation of the defense effort could create prob lems in two industrial segments. A decline in aircraft production and a reduction in military establishments 1See Monthly Review, June 1949, pp. 63-65. January 1953 M O N T H L Y REV IEW would cut the number of jobs. There is not now the void which existed at the end of W orld W ar II in service, trade, and construction, which absorbed large numbers of the then displaced workers. Many of the jobs which might be lost now would have to be replaced by economic growth within the District—a steady but slower process than that which accompanied transition at the end of W orld W ar II. Less vulnerable are the machinery indus tries which have peacetime outlets—particularly for elec tronics—that might prevent a significant decline. Another potentially weak area is the lumber industry. This is particularly important in Oregon and W ashing ton where diversification and growth rates are less pro nounced than in California. The lumber industry de pends to a large extent for its prosperity upon the hous ing market. A further decline in construction, independ ent of any defense activity reduction, could cause a con siderable amount of unemployment. A t present, homebuilding seems destined for another good year, but in the future it may be necessary to develop new industries to absorb the lumber workers if serious unemployment is to be averted. Vulnerability not confined to District Though the District has obvious areas of potential weakness, it is not significantly more vulnerable than the nation as a whole. Consumer durable output in the nation as a whole could suffer severe reverses in a period of decline. F or some items the margin of unsatisfied new demand is relatively thin compared to earlier years. Sus tained production depends in large measure on more ex tensive use of automobiles and appliances by families al ready owning such equipment and on a good replacement rate. In turn this requires at least a steady if not an ex panding flow of income. A recession could cause a sharp reduction in the output of these items, but such a turn of events would have little direct effect upon the basic in dustries of this District. The textile industry has been in chronic throes of recession and revival since the end of W orld W ar II and is exceedingly sensitive even to small changes in consumer outlays. But again in this case the 5 Twelfth District is not likely to be affected as much as the country as a whole. On the other hand, a reduction in defense activity would leave a smaller imprint elsewhere in the nation for aircraft and other items which are also produced in the F ar W est, but the im print would be there. Indeed, it could cause more difficulty in the Pittsburgh-Chicago belt than it could in this District. Machine tool produc tion, heavily concentrated in that area, might suffer a substantial reduction in activity. Even in late 1952, the volume of new orders for machine tools fell sharply while production expanded rapidly. The backlog of orders is still so large that some time will pass before any distress appears. Production of steel and processed metal items in which that area leads would also be affected. Even in that area industrial diversification is such that a decline in defense spending might result only in reduction in the output of certain products, but total production might change very little if civilian demand expands. The problems of this District differ from those nation ally in some respects. The F ar W est has experienced the largest impact from the defense program, and declining defense activity may become a relatively greater dampener here than elsewhere. Aside from defense industries proper, the lumber industry is subject to wide fluctua tions as a concomitant of variations in home building. On the other hand, fluctuations associated with consumer durable goods, producer durable goods, and the textile industry can result in sharp reductions of employment in the country as a whole but not in the Twelfth District. The over-all difference between the nation and the Twelfth District is more pronounced as to the industries that might be affected rather than as to the degree of distress resulting from reductions in defense spending or a business recession. The more rapid rate of growth of the District, which seems likely to continue, acts as a par tial buffer. This tends to give the Twelfth District a rela tive advantage over the country as a whole, but the growth factor alone probably is not sufficient to offset the entire impact of all possible downward pressures— it can merely moderate their effects on this District. PRICES—THE RETURN TO STABILITY over-all stability that has characterized the econ T omy of the United States for the past year and a half has been the result of a rather precarious balancing of inflationary and deflationary forces. Those segments of the economy most closely allied with the defense procure ment program have expanded and are continuing to ex pand output and productive capacity. This is evidenced by the record rates of expenditure by business firms for new plant and equipment, a m ajor share representing added capacity for military production, and by the rising rate of defense expenditures, which are largely for goods of a durable nature. Segments of the economy that are closely dependent upon consumer buying have under gone rather wide swings in activity in the past two and h e a half years. The buying sprees which followed upon the Korean outbreak and again when the Chinese commu nists entered the war sent consumer expenditures to ex tremely high levels. During the period between the two m ajor buying waves, and subsequently, consumer spend ing, measured as a percentage of income, fell sharply and, although it has risen somewhat since the low in early 1951, it remains below most post-W orld W ar II years. Reflecting these shifts in expenditure rates by consum ers, the inventory and output policies of the consumer goods industries have experienced marked changes over the post-W orld W ar II period, especially in those indus tries producing the m ajor items of household durable equipment. 6 FEDERAL RESERVE B A N K OF SA N FRANCISCO The m ajor restraints imposed upon the growth of credit in the past two years have contributed signifi cantly to the general stability of the country’s economy. Both general and selective credit controls have been used in the period since Korea, supplemented by the Volun tary Credit R estraint Program . The removal of Reserve System support of Government bonds at par, following the Reserve-Treasury “accord” of M arch 1951, has had the general effect of tightening the reserve position of the banking system as a whole, with a consequent increase in the cost of borrowed funds. Member bank borrowing from the Reserve Banks has risen sharply, but owing to the short-term nature of such borrowing and the reluc tance of banks to remain in debt, this method of obtain ing bank reserves has exerted a greater restraining in fluence on bank credit expansion than existed when Gov ernment securities could readily be sold at par for that purpose. Although the expansion in bank loans since Korea has been substantial, it was much smaller than the increase that might have occurred in the absence of credit re straints. Reflecting the expansion in private bank credit as well as the reappearance of Federal deficit financing, the total money supply has risen substantially. However, during 1952 most of the increase in the privately-held money supply occurred in time deposits, which are much less active than demand deposits. This reflects the sub stantial rate of personal saving that started in early 1951 and has continued since. Direct controls over wages, prices, and materials, im posed by the Federal government under the Defense Production Act of 1950, have also contributed to the con tainment of inflationary pressures during the past two years. M ajor revisions have occurred in these controls since their imposition in early 1951, however. Price ceil ings have been allowed to rise in certain instances as cir cumstances and Congressional mandates have demanded such action, and the regulations have been suspended where prices have fallen well below ceiling levels. W age increases have been granted to reflect rises in living costs and in order to maintain production in strategic indus tries threatened with prolonged labor difficulties. Restric tions on the use of materials have generally been relaxed and greater quantities of critical metals have been made available for civilian uses as supplies of these items im proved. The factors outlined above and the generally increased costs of production and changes in the basic supply posi tion of some m ajor commodities represent the main ele ments affecting prices over the past year and a half or so. The average level of wholesale and consumer prices has changed only moderately since m id-1951. Prices of in dividual or particular types of commodities, however, have moved divergently, but on balance the movements have been largely offsetting in character. The Bureau of Labor Statistics index of prim ary m arket prices has de clined about 3 percent in the past year and a half, which contrasts sharply with the rise of some 16 percent in these Jan uary 1953 prices in the first seven months following Korea. The consumer price index since m id-1951, while continuing to rise steadily throughout most of the period, has risen less than 3 percent compared with an increase of 8 per cent from m id-1950 to February 1951. Movements within the m ajor commodity groups, reflecting developments which affected particular markets at different times, form the basis of much of the discussion to follow. The m ajor distortions which occurred in the structure of prices during the highly inflationary period were largely eliminated during the second and third quarters of 1951, although the pre-Korean relationships were not finally restored until the latter half of 1952. Large harvests and heavy marketings reflected in the decline of farm prices The prices of farm products, which have declined sub stantially from their 1951 peaks, account for a m ajor share of the total decline in average wholesale prices since the end of the immediate post-Korean inflation. A t the end of 1952 farm product prices were some 13 percent below their peak level of February 1951 but were still on the average approximately 9 percent ahead of the level prevailing just prior to the Korean outbreak. The princi pal portion of this decline occurred during the past twelve-month period, largely as the result of the heavy movement of meat animals to market, especially beef cattle and hogs. Numbers of meat animals on farms reached record proportions in the first half of 1952, and this combined with a relative shortage of cattle feed has forced the speed-up in the movement of meat animals to final consumer markets. Other farm products, notably cotton, have also been in somewhat more than ample sup ply and as a consequence have shown significant price1 weakness. A reduced foreign demand, stemming from a continuing dollar shortage plus increased farm produc tion abroad, has added to the weakness in farm product prices generally. As a result of these demand and price developments, combined with a rise in farm operating costs, the net income of farmers has declined somewhat from the very high level reached in 1951. A further de cline appears to be indicated for the year ahead, and some farm crops whose prices have been above support levels will once again have to be propped up by Government action under existing farm parity formulae. Processed and m anufactured foodstuffs, other than meat, have fluctuated somewhat less in price on whole sale markets than have farm products generally, al though they have tended to follow substantially the same pattern. Lowered raw materials costs have been at least partially offset by increased costs of labor and other materials and services involved in their production. These cost factors have contributed an element of sticki ness in the prices of processed and manufactured foods, and consequently their prices have not fluctuated as sharply as those of foods that reach the ultimate con sumer in substantially the same form as that in which they are originally produced, Also, demands for foods January 1953 M O N T H L Y REV IEW that have been processed or manufactured have remained somewhat firmer, reflecting rising consumer incomes and a continuance of a high rate of population increase. Shifts in consumer buying patterns decisive in some price movements The rate of buying by consumers has varied rather markedly in the past two and a half years, both as to the proportion of current incomes spent and the classes of goods or services purchased. Spending rates were upped drastically in the m ajor buying waves which followed the Korean outbreak and were curtailed sharply subse quently. The first of the buying waves was concentrated largely in the stocking-up on m ajor durables, while the second affected the markets for durable and nondurable goods about equally. Since the last wave of buying sub sided in February 1951, consumers have restricted their buying rate out of current incomes, although until the latter half of 1952 there has been a tendency for this rate to rise. These shifts had sharp repercussions on business policies affecting rates of production and more importantly regarding the level of inventories to be held. Inventories of consumer items that accumulated in great quantities during the latter half of 1950 and the first two quarters of 1951 were instrumental in maintaining output of the producing industries during that period. The slack ening in consumer purchasing, however, caused these in ventory holdings to be excessive in terms of current sales levels and resulted in a sharp cutback in new orders, with a consequent severe impact upon the level of manufac turing operations. As consumers have digested their pur chases made during the buying waves, they have re-en tered the markets as more vigorous purchasers, first for nondurable goods. Beginning in the second and third quarters of 1952, they have also shown an increased in terest in the m ajor household durables and automobiles. Inventories have been adjusted to a level more in line with sales, and in late 1952 some new accumulation be came noticeable, most pronounced in the durable sector. Prices in those markets dealing with commodities im portant in consumer budgets have reflected these develop ments. Textile and apparel prices and prices for leather products (including hides and skins) have fluctuated most widely. The prices of hides, skins, and leather prod ucts as a group rose an average of almost 30 percent in the inflationary upswing, but have since fallen drastically and in mid-November were slightly below their level of June 1950. Since May of last year, however, these prices have firmed somewhat and have risen moderately, 2 to 3 percent. This trend may be reversed, however, by the recent sharp decline in hide prices. Textile and apparel prices, while remaining 16 percent ahead of June 1950, are down about 15 percent from their 1951 peak. Since the middle of last year prices in this area have fluctuated only fractionally. W holesale prices on household appliances and furni ture have remained near their 1951 peaks despite the 7 fairly wide swings which have taken place in total con sumer expenditures on these items. Average prices at wholesale on household appliances in mid-November were less than 1 percent under their post-Korean high and were some 7 percent ahead of June 1950. The principal decline in this m ajor group of commodities has occurred in the prices for radios, television sets, and phonographs. Con sumer resistance to high prices as well as the existence of relatively large unsold stocks held by manufacturers and dealers resulted in a price decline of 10 percent be tween June and August 1950. Since then these prices have fluctuated only moderately, with virtually no change occurring in the last half of 1952. This stability has de veloped along with the working off of a m ajor portion of the excess in inventory holdings and the granting of a large number of new broadcasting permits throughout the country as many new areas have been opened up for television reception. The continued high rate of new residential construction during the past year and in 1951 has also been a sustaining force in the over-all firmness of prices for household durables and furniture. Industrial equipment and metal prices remain near their 1951 peaks The sustained high rate of expansion in plant and equipment by business firms, a record rate of total new construction activity, and a rising rate of defense expendi tures by the Government, combined with continued tightness in the supply of some metals, have been the m ajor factors sustaining prices of industrial equipment and metals at near peak levels. Also playing a significant role in the maintenance of these prices at or near their ceilings under price stabilization regulations are the in creased costs of labor, materials (generally down from former peaks but still substantially ahead of June 1950), and many essential business services. Increased excise taxes, especially those imposed upon manufacturers, have also contributed to the maintenance of high prices for particular goods. Metal and metal products prices rose some 14 percent during the post-Korean inflation and have declined only fractionally since reaching their peak in February 1951. Steel prices have remained at ceilings imposed by the O P S throughout the period of control, and ceilings were advanced only last summer as a result of the wage in crease granted the steelworkers following the nationwide strike in June and July. Ceiling prices on imported copper were increased last year when foreign producers found it unattractive to sell copper at the ceilings set for domestic supplies. This change has resulted in an increased inflow of copper from abroad and has been an important factor in the over-all easing of some of the tightness that has surrounded this metal since the war. Aluminum pro ducers also were granted higher ceiling prices following the negotiation of a new labor contract resulting in in 8 January 1953 FEDERAL RESERVE B A N K OF SA N FRANCISCO creased wage costs to the producers. U nder existing O P S pass-through regulations, these increased ceiling prices on the m ajor metals have resulted in increased costs to fabricators of metal products and have insofar as possible been passed on to the ultimate consumers. Automobile m anufacturers have also been faced with rising costs of production, both from rising wages and from the increased prices charged by suppliers of raw materials and component parts. As a result they have been granted increased ceiling prices on three separate occasions since the general freeze on prices in February 1951. Federal excise taxes have also risen significantly. U pw ard pressures still exist on the prices of most items of industrial mechanical equipment. Unlike the situation in most other markets, this pressure has come from both sides of the m arket mechanism. On the one hand, there are the record high and still rising demands for industrial equipment to complete the m ajor expansion programs of many industries to meet expanded defense needs and ris ing civilian requirements. On the other hand, there are the pressures from increased production costs, particu larly wages and the principal metals. It would appear, further, that no significant easing in these pressures is in prospect for the coming half year or so, judging from already announced plans for further plant and equipment expansion. There has been a considerable easing in some metal markets in the past year which has resulted in some price weakness relative to the first year and a half following Korea. This has been particularly noticeable in nonferrous metals, especially for lead and more recently for zinc. Largely responsible for this weakness has been a decline in the world prices of the nonferrous metals, in cluding to some extent copper, although foreign copper prices are still well above domestic ceilings. This easing in the foreign markets stems from the fact that the ex pected total requirements by the various countries of the free world in their defense build-ups have fallen sig nificantly below what was anticipated earlier. These de clines in foreign prices have had a more or less serious impact upon the economies of some of the foreign coun tries whose earnings of needed foreign exchange, includ ing scarce dollars, are based upon sales of these metals in world markets. gained in a gradual but persistent upward movement since then. It is important to note that the consumer price index is not wholly a commodity index but includes items such as rent and a variety of personal and household services. The rent portion of the index has risen steadily and at about the same rate of increase since the latter half of 1947. Since Korea this element of consumer prices has increased somewhat more than 10 percent. The com ponent of the index containing the services mentioned above as well as a wide variety of miscellaneous articles of consumption, including recreation, amusement, non food beverages, transportation charges, tobacco, and simi lar items has risen more than 13 percent since June 1950, again in a steady and persistent fashion. Charges for fuel, electricity, and household refrigeration, also rising with out any significant interruption throughout the period, have gained some 7 percent since June 1950. COM PARISON OF W H O LESA LE AND CO N SU M ER P R IC E S -1950-1952 (Ju n e 1950=« 100) Index T O T A L IN D E X E S 120 115 W h o le s a le 110 105. _ j / j / / f A / 100 /"••••S. - R e ta il' - 1 1 1111 11 111 CO N SU M ER G O O D S - W h o le s a le , / r y ammvt- - R e fa ¡1 > A LL O THER CO M P O N EN TS2 Consum er p rices steady at record levels The prices paid for goods and services by moderate income families in large cities throughout the United States have remained at the record level reached last August. In mid-December the Bureau of Labor Statistics index of consumer prices stood at 190.7 percent of the 1935-39 average, 0.2 percent lower than the August and November peaks and more than 12 percent above its level which existed in the month just preceding Korea. About three-fourths of the total rise in living costs over the past two and a half years occurred in the first seven months after Korea and the remaining 4 percent has been *T he C onsum ers’ P rice Index. 2 T his W holesale group includes raw and sem im anufactured m aterials and pro d u cers’ e q u ip m e n t; the R etail includes rents and services. S o u rce : Economic Report o f the President, January 1953. C harts prepared by th e Board of G overnors of the F e d e ra l R eserve System , based on d ata from th e D e p artm e n t of L abor. January 1953 M O N T H L Y REVIEW The m ajor fluctuations in living costs have occurred in the apparel, food, and housefurnishings groups. Each of these m ajor categories of goods rose very sharply in the inflationary period of 1950 and early 1951, but have moved somewhat divergently since then. Retail food prices have been the most volatile of the m ajor items of consumer expenditures and, as they comprise some 40 percent of the total consumer price index, account for the largest proportion of the over-all gain in the cost of living since Korea. In mid-November food costs on the average were 14 percent above mid-June 1950, but were down slightly, a little more than 1 percent, from their postwar peak reached last August. The decline since August re flected largely the heavy marketings of meat animals and a seasonal decline in fresh fruit and vegetable prices fol lowing last year’s record harvest. Apparel and housefurnishing prices have generally de clined, with some minor interruptions, since the latter months of 1951. These prices, however, are still well ahead of pre-Korean levels, 9 percent for apparel and almost 16 percent for housefurnishings. Consumer resist ance to high prices for these goods during much of 1951 and a generally burdensome level of manufacturer and dealer inventories account for the price weakness in these retail markets for most of 1952. It is also probable that the official measures of these prices fail to reflect the true extent of this weakness as many of the attempts to move these commodities took the form of concessions on trade-ins and other terms of sale. However, a consider able firming in the prices for both of these m ajor con sumer items was discernible in the latter half of 1952 as the rate of consumer expenditures rose over earlier peri ods. Retail and wholesale trade inventories also, after more than a year of consistent decline, tended to turn up in the late months of the year and added to the firming of these prices, particularly in the durable sector. Price controls suspended on growing list of goods and services The Office of Price Stabilization in April last year initiated a policy of price decontrol designed to remove ceilings from goods and services whose prices had fallen well below ceiling levels and where there appeared little chance of their rising to ceilings in the foreseeable future. This policy has been carried forward and the number of ceilings removed has grown to fairly significant propor tions. The most important of these decontrol actions in the consumer sector include textiles, adult apparel, footwear, bedding, carpets, radio and T V sets, distilled spirits, cigars, and certain fats and oils. In percentage terms, the number of consumer goods and services remaining under ceiling price regulations has fallen to about 55 percent, compared with the maximum coverage at the time of the price freeze of 71 percent. Congress specifically exempted commodities comprising some 29 percent of all consumer items of consumption, including utility rates and proc essed foods. Decontrol actions have also occurred in 9 wholesale markets which have reduced the coverage of price ceilings from 87 percent of all items sold at whole sale to some 70 percent at the end of last year. Price stability appears likely to continue The question of where we are going is always more interesting (and in many cases more significant) than the question of where we have been. W hile the first of these questions can never be answered with any great degree of positive assurance, there are some segments of the economy for which the course of the near future is pretty well set, and other areas where past events are strong indicators of things to come. The general level of economic activity in the United States appears most likely to rise somewhat further from its currently high level. This is a reasonable expectation because of a number of factors. National security ex penditures already scheduled and funds appropriated will rise throughout the first half of 1953 at least. Business demands for plant and equipment, based upon a recent joint survey by the Securities Exchange Commission and the Department of Commerce, are expected to remain high and at about the record level sustained in 1952. Also, business demands may be bolstered by some new inven tory accumulation, the first indications of which appeared in the closing months of last year. Such an accumulation would be most likely to occur if aggregate consumer de mand should rise as a result of an expanded disposable income and a possible increase in the percentage of in come spent. On the basis of the factors just mentioned and with the further assumption that no m ajor upset occurs in the state of our international relations, the level of aggregate demand should rise and exert some upward pressure on the level of commodity prices generally. However, impor tant offsetting influences are also present in the situation. The most im portant of these is the large expansion in productive capacity that has occurred since Korea and the substantial additions that will come into operation in the coming period. Also of considerable importance in the price outlook are the significant gains that have and will occur in output per man-hour with consequent cost saving and a downward influence on the price structure. Further, demands for wage increases are likely to be less intense than during 1952 with favorable implications for both prices and production, particularly from the con sumer’s point of view. W ages, it must be recalled, are both a principal element of production cost and the m ajor proportion of total consumer income. The present relations between demand, supply, and costs of production indicate that no m ajor change is likely to occur in the over-all level of commodity prices during the period just ahead. Particular commodities will no doubt move as a result of special circumstances that may confront individual markets and through the operation of usual seasonal forces. 10 January 1953 FEDERAL RESERVE B A N K OF SA N FRANCISCO RELATIVE PAY LEVELS IN THE TWELFTH DISTRICT AND THE NATION Twelfth District cities ranked relatively high in a recent survey made by the Bureau of Labor Sta tistics of wage differentials existing among 40 labor m ar kets during late 1951 and early 1952.1 Average earnings in particular areas were determined for 24 types of office jobs and 17 manual-type jobs which were common to various manufacturing and nonmanufacturing industries. The following job classifications were studied: office workers, plant workers in general, and specific plant groups of maintenance, custodial and warehouse-ship ping workers. Office w orkers’ pay levels were based on average weekly salaries whereas plant workers’ pay levels were based on straight time earnings (premium pay and overtime were excluded). The average pay levels in the 40 labor market areas, which are distributed among 28 states, were ranked according to their position relative to New York City’s average pay level which was ex pressed as 100. The San Francisco-Oakland area and four other cities of the Twelfth District were among the 40 labor markets selected. In all job categories the District labor markets, with the exception of Phoenix and Salt Lake City, tended to rank high within the nation and generally higher than New York City. Phoenix and Salt Lake City tended to be higher than most Southern cities and a few New Eng land cities. In all job categories the San Francisco-Oak land labor market pay level ranked first, although the Detroit pay level was also equal in a few instances. S e v e ra l 1 U n ite d S tates D e p artm e n t of L abor, B u reau of L a b o r S tatistics, M onthly Labor Review, D ecem ber 1952, pp. 620-623. O ther cities outside of the Twelfth District whose rela tive pay levels ranked high were Detroit, Chicago, Cleve land, Newark-Jersey City, and New York City. W ithin the office worker classification, Detroit ranked first along with San Francisco-Oakland, while Chicago ranked fourth, New York fifth, and Cleveland sixth. F or gen eral plant workers, Detroit ranked second, with Chicago, Newark-Jersey City, and New York ranking fourth, sixth, and ninth respectively. Detroit also ranked first with San Francisco-Oakland in the relative pay level for maintenance workers. Chicago, Newark-Jersey City, and New York followed with third, sixth, and twelfth place ratings in this category. W ithin the custodial job group ratings, Detroit was second, Chicago fourth, NewarkJersey City fifth, and New York ninth. W ithin the warehousemen-shipping job classification, Detroit again ranked second, Chicago fifth, Newark-Jersey City sev enth, and New York eighth. The relative pay levels and rank of five Twelfth Dis trict labor markets and New York City are listed below. R e l a t iv e P a y L e v e l s o f T w e l f t h D i s t r i c t L a b o r M a r k e t s * (New York’-100) Plant M ainteC usto- W arehouseOffice /—W orkers~\ r-W orkers- ^ ,— nance— \ ,---- dial---- \ /—Shipping-'* R ela R ela RelaRelaR ela San Francisco- tive R ank tive Rank tive R ank tive R ank tive R ank 113 1 O akland . . . 106 113 1 114 1 1 111 1 108 3 106 3 99 6 106 3 104 5 103 6 105 4 L os A n g e les. . . 105 3 105 4 106 4 P hoenix ......... 90 24 86 26 88 27 85 29 97 18 87 24 Salt L ake City- 85 35 88 27 88 26 92 27 N ew Y ork City 100 5 100 9 100 8 100 12 100 9 R ange of re la tive pay levels ............ 79-106 60-114 64-113 80-111 69-113 THE UNITED STATES SHIPPING ACCOUNT AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS e w sectors of United States business are subjected to wider fluctuations in activity than the shipping indus try. Even more discouraging, however, is the fact that since the end of the clipper ship era the fortunes of United States shipping have usually been on the downside. Only the advent of W orld W ar I and W orld W ar II pro vided a stimulus to our shipping industry and thus a brief respite. But in neither instance did the stimulus provide a lasting resurgence of our merchant marine. Following W orld W ar I an increasing share of United States foreign trade was returned to foreign flag carriers as their fleets were restored and expanded. The share of our foreign trade (total United States exports and im ports) carried by our own ships decreased steadily from 49 percent in 1921 to a low of 22 percent in 1939. Following the most recent W orld W ar a similar trend has been developing. The percentage of our foreign trade carried by United States ships decreased from 65 percent in 1946 to 42 percent in 1951. This trend has been viewed with growing alarm by those concerned with the need for m aintaining a strong merchant marine, and it was the subject of a recent study by the Maritime Adm inistra F tion of the United States Department of Commerce.1 In creasing competition resulting from the rapid restora tion of foreign merchant fleets depleted during the war and a fall in shipping rates during the past year indicate rough sailing ahead. The rapidity with which competi tion has increased is indicated by the fact that, while at the end of W orld W ar II United States flag ships con stituted 65 percent of the world’s merchant ships, our fleet today, including the Government’s inactive reserve ships, constitutes about 30 percent of the total. If all Government-owned tonnage is excluded, our share would be reduced to less than 20 percent. W ith the completion of all new construction presently on the ways our share of the world’s privately owned merchant ships will be, reduced to the 1939 level, or about 14 percent. This de cline has occurred despite the fact that during the post- , w ar period the United States has been by far the most important trading nation in the world. Since 1921, with the exception of the years 1943-48, our ships have carried less than 50 percent of our own trade. This fact and the rather sharp decline in recent 1 U n ite d S tates D ep artm en t of C om m erce, M aritim e A dm inistration, Participation of United States Flag Ships in American Overseas Trade, 1921-1951, January 1953 M O N T H L Y REVIEW 11 years have led to requests by shipping interests that the M erchant M arine Act of 1936 be revised and broadened to strengthen our merchant marine. Such requests, however, are likely to encounter oppo sition from those who feel that we should encourage, and certainly not oppose, the efforts of other countries to earn dollars through the sale of shipping services to us. By earning dollars in this way, the need for foreign aid is alleviated to the extent that the dollar shortage is re duced. If reduced foreign aid is partly replaced by ship ping income, our exports may be maintained at a higher level than would otherwise be possible. During the inter war period many of the other maritime countries, such as Japan, the United Kingdom, and the Scandinavian coun tries, were able to cover an important part of their deficit in merchandise trade with the United States by the sale of shipping services to us. On the other hand, those favoring greater Government support for our merchant marine point out that it is es sential to maintain a strong merchant fleet as “our fourth arm of defense/’ to be immediately available in time of war. In times of peace, moreover, if the nation’s foreign trade is to be maintained at present levels, or expanded, we must have a strong merchant marine. This is neces sary to insure that our foreign traders have adequate and regular shipping service and to guarantee that our trad ers receive equal treatment along the world’s trade routes. A reconciliation of these divergent views is difficult because there is considerable merit in both of them. As an important problem, however, which is facing the Gov ernment, a consideration of some of the relevant facts should be of value, even in the absence of any definite conclusions. PER C E N TA G E OF U N IT E D STATES FO R E IG N TRADE CA R RIED BY U N ITE D STATES FLA G SH IPS, 1921-1951 TOTAL CARGO CA R RIED IN U N ITE D STATES FO REIG N TRADE BY FLAG OF SH IP, 1921-1951 Percent *No breakdow n available for 1941. N o te : T onnages for 1942 th ro u g h 1946 are by control of ship ra th e r than by flag. F ro m 1921 th ro u g h Ju n e 1950, cargoes under the control of the A rm y and N avy for m ilitary use w ere excluded from th e data. B egin ning w ith Ju ly 1950, shipm ents of “ Special C ateg o ry ” cargoes w ere ex cluded, as w ere shipm ents to the arm ed forces abroad for th eir use and shipm ents of D e p artm en t of D efense controlled cargoes u n d er special program s. Source : U nited S tates D ep artm en t of Commerce, M aritim e A dm inistra tion, participation of United States Flag Ships in American Overseas Trade, 1921-1951. The United States merchant marine since World War I From W orld W ar I until 1936 there was little legis lation providing for the construction and maintenance of our merchant marine. The gradual decline in United States shipping during the twenties resulted in its reach ing its lowest point during the thirties. Deterioration of existing vessels, high operating costs, low freight rates, the introduction of subsidies by foreign countries, and the depressed level of world economic activity during a large part of this period—all combined to reduce the United States merchant marine and diminish the share of United States flag participation in its foreign trade. The passage of the M erchant M arine Act of 1936, however, paved the way for the construction of a modern merchant fleet through a system of construction subsidies. The Act also provided for regularly scheduled liner serv ice under a program of operating subsidies. Although there was not sufficient time in the remaining prewar years for a real test of the direct effects of this Act, there were important indirect effects. F or example, it influ enced the distribution of our shipping and our trade. Largely as a result of this Act, regular liner services were established by American operators to areas where our trade had previously been restricted by inadequate ship Millions of longtons N o te : Tonnages for 1942 th ro u g h 1946 are by control of ship ra th e r than by flag. F ro m 1921 thro u g h Ju n e 1950, cargoes under the control of the A rm y and N avy for m ilitary use w ere excluded from the data. B egin ning w ith Ju ly 1950, shipm ents of “ Special C ategory” cargoes w ere ex cluded, as w ere shipm ents to the arm ed forces abroad for their use and shipm ents of D epartm ent of D efense controlled cargoes under special program s. S o u rc e : U nited S tates D ep artm en t of Com m erce, M aritim e A dm inistra tion, Participation of United States Flag Ships in American Overseas Trade, 1921-1951. FEDERAL RESERVE B A N K OF SA N FRANCISCO 12 ping services and by the failure of foreign lines to pro vide equal services to all traders regardless of nation ality. In addition, the inauguration of these new services by United States companies forced foreign lines to im prove their services at United States ports. The net effect was an increase in the number of direct line services to foreign ports and an increase in the number, regularity, and dependability of sailings—both of our own and of foreign ships. During W orld W ar II United States flag shipping be came the m ajor carrier as a result of our wartime ship building program and losses of foreign ships. O ur ex panded merchant marine carried the m ajor share of the cargoes of United States foreign trade in the years im mediately following the war. The depletion of European m erchant fleets because of the war, high freight rates, in creased and abnormal demand for bulk and other com modities, and the legislative requirement that 50 percent of all United States foreign aid shipments be carried in United States flag ships also helped to maintain the po sition of our shipping industry. But as foreign countries recovered from the destruc tion of the war, competition from foreign flag ships in creased. This was brought about in part, initially, by the U nited States program of disposal of surplus ships and, in part, by the high rate of foreign shipbuilding. By 1951 foreign flag participation in United States foreign trade had increased to 58 percent by volume, compared to 35 percent in 1946. E s t im a t e d S h ip s F in r e ig h t t h e C E a r n in g s a r r ia g e o f E of U x po r ts U n it e d n it e d 1— S S ta tes ta tes I a n d m po rts F o r e ig n a n d 1946-51 (millions of dollars) Export Total Im port t----- earnings------ \ /------earnings------^ ,------- earnings--------\ U nited U nited U nited States Foreign Y ear and item States Foreign States Foreign ships ships ships ships ships ships 1946 443 1,141 606 O cean freig h t . . . . 248 163 8932 532 1,054 385 D ry cargo . . . 194 147 860 74 54 16 33 58 87 T a n k e r ........... 1947 Ocean freig ht . . . . D ry cargo . . . T a n k e r ........... 320 246 74 225 200 25 9612 932 29 808 738 70 1,281 1,178 103 1,033 938 95 1948 O cean freig h t . . . . D ry cargo . . . . . T a n k e r ............ . . 308 203 105 188 154 34 5312 516 15 507 449 58 839 719 120 695 603 92 1949 O cean freig h t .. , . . D ry cargo . .. , , T a n k e r ........... 274 194 80 201 185 16 4552 442 13 420 405 15 729 636 93 621 590 31 1950 O cean freig h t .., 3 1 3 D ry cargo . . , 225 88 T a n k e r ........... 268 232 36 3222 307 15 334 321 13 635 532 103 602 553 49 1951 O cean freig h t . . . . D ry cargo . . . T a n k e r ........... . . 366 245 121 6992 671 28 888 805 83 1,089 920 169 1,254 1,050 204 390 249 141 1 T hese freig h t charges are included in the T ran sp o rtatio n A ccount in our B alance of Paym ents. Such item s as receipts and paym ents for passenger fares, expenses of U n ited S tates carriers abroad, and expenses of foreign carriers in the U n ited S tates are n o t included in the table, how ever. 2 E xcludes freig h t on Civilian Supply and other aid program shipm ents on A rm y or N avy o p erated or owned vessels to talin g $93 m illion in 1946, $196 million in 1947, $223 million in 1948, $193 million in 1949, $52 million in 1950, and $46 million in 1951. S o u rc e : U n ited S tates D ep artm en t of C om m erce, Balance of Payments of the United States, 1949-1951. January 1953 The outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950, how ever, caused United States flag participation to rise again. The increased demands of the Korean war stockpiling programs and unusually large shipments to meet coal and grain shortages abroad led to a sharp demand for ship ping and an increase in freight rates. This increased de mand for shipping resulted in the reactivation of over 500 surplus ships from the Government’s so-called “moth ball fleet,” most of which were put into operation by p ri vate companies under General Agency Agreements with the National Shipping Authority. But by the end of 1952 most of these ships had been returned to the reserve fleet, reflecting a decreased demand for shipping and a fall in shipping rates. On January 1, 1953, the United States active merchant fleet numbered 1,469 ships, which was 25 percent, or 540 ships below a year earlier. M ost of this decline took place in the Government-owned fleet which decreased from 721 to 208 ships. Freight rates, after reaching a postwar peak in 1948, dropped by 50 percent in 1949, recovering shortly after the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950. In 1951 freight rates rose above the 1948 level, but dropped sharply in 1952. By the end of 1952, for example, the rates on coal and grain were less than half the level which prevailed at the beginning of the year. The earn ings of United States shipping firms have oscillated with these changes. United States shipping by trade area The share of United States foreign trade with particu lar trade areas which is carried by United States flag ships depends upon several different factors. Proxim ity of the trading partners, the amount of private American invest ment, the degree of competition from foreign carriers and from other nations in foreign markets, the composition of trade, and, since the war, the amount of United States foreign aid to the individual areas all affect the direction and distribution of United States flag shipping. F o r ex ample, a larger percentage of trade with the Caribbean, the W est Coast of Central and South America, and Can ada is carried by United States ships than with most: other areas. The importance of American shipping in these areas can be explained by the proxim ity of these countries, the absence of an adequate m erchant m arine in the Southern Hemisphere countries, and a relatively large investment of private American capital. It is a characteristic of private United States ship ownership that more than half of the tonnage is controlled t>y in dustrial concerns which have large foreign investments and are im portant in our foreign trade. This is particu larly true of many steel, aluminum, fruit, and oil com panies which have im portant investments in those areas where United States shipping plays an im portant role. On the other hand, in other parts of South America, in particular the E ast Coast, the pressure of European com petition has resulted in a smaller share of United States trade carried by American ships. January 1953 13 M O N T H L Y REVIEW Because they maintain their own merchant fleet, the United Kingdom, other Commonwealth countries, and Scandinavia carry a m ajor share of their trade with the United States, resulting in a lower percentage for the United States. The return of Japan as a maritime coun try will also probably reduce United States flag activity in the Pacific area although the outbreak of conflict in Korea in 1950 temporarily raised the level of American flag participation. It should also be noted that certain countries, in par ticular the Scandinavian countries and Japan before the war, are specialists in carrying the trade of other coun tries. Income from the sale of shipping services in the carrying trade is a m ajor export for these countries, and they send their ships wherever freight is available, pro viding stiff competition for American carriers. In con trast, United States lines primarily carry cargoes to and from the United States. The dollar shortage, in addition, has forced many coun tries to reduce their payments to the dollar area for both goods and services such as shipping. Decreased use of United States shipping services in the Bayonne-Hamburg range in W estern Europe because of the dollar shortage has been offset to some extent, however, by the importance of United States programs for foreign aid and more recently for the N orth Atlantic Treaty O rgan ization. Grain shipments to India in 1951, under a United States credit, increased American participation to that area and demonstrate the fact that in many instances the share of United States flag shipping is affected by nonrecurrent factors. It may also be noted that the accompanying table showing United States flag participation in our trade with particular areas is in terms of volume, with the re sult that bulk commodities figure more importantly than D i s t r i b u t i o n o f U n i t e d S t a t e s F o r e i g n T r a d e b y T r a d e A r e a a n d F l a g o f C a r r i e r , 1 9 4 8 -5 2 P ercen tag es Show D istrib u tio n of U n ited States E x p o rts and Im p o rts by T rad e A rea and the D egree of P a rticip atio n by U nited S tates F la g Ships in E ach In stan ce (percentage o f shipping w eigh t) EX PORTSTO : T otal ............................................................... Canada ...................................................... Caribbean .................................................. E ast Coast South A m erica.................. W est Coast South A m erica................ W est Coast C entral A m erica and M exico ......................................... Gulf Coast M e x ic o ................................ U nited K ingdom and E ir e .................. B altic, Scandinavia, Iceland and G r e e n la n d .................................... B ayonne-H am burg R ange ................ P o rtu g al and Spanish A tla n tic ......... A zores, M editerranean and B lack S e a ............................................. W est Coast A frica ............................. South and E a st A frica ....................... A u stralasia ............................................. In d ia , Persian Gulf and R ed S e a .. S traits S ettlem ents and N eth erlan d s E a s t Indies ......................................... South China, Form osa and P hilippines ........................................... N o rth China including Shanghai and Jap a n ........................................... KM PORTS F R O M : T o tal ............................................................... C anada ...................................................... C aribbean .................................................. E a st Coast South A m erica.................. W e st C oast South A m erica................ W est C oast C entral A m erica and M exico ......................................... G ulf C oast M e x ic o ................................ U n ite d K ingdom and E i r e .................. B altic, Scandinavia, Iceland and G reenland .................................. B ayonne-H am burg R ange ................ P o rtu g al and Spanish A tla n tic ......... A zores, M editerranean and B lack S e a ............................................. W est C oast A frica .............................. South and E a st A f r i c a ....................... A ustralasia ............................................. In d ia, Persian Gulf and R ed S e a .. . S traits S ettlem ents and N etherlands E a st Indies ......................................... South China, Form osa and Philippines ........................................... N o rth China including Shanghai and Jap an ........................................... -1948A m erican Flag Total 39 100.0 33.4 30 6.6 57 5.2 33 1.1 58 0.7 0.4 4.9 51 32 2.9 21.3 0.9 -1949American Flag Total 36 100.0 29.7 31 7.9 48 29 3.1 1.8 42 -1950A m erican Flag Total 100.0 33 27 43.4 8.3 46 4.2 23 37 2.0 0.9 0.4 7.8 32 34 27 0.6 0.5 6.2 22 22 27 30 39 28 5.0 23.6 0.5 25 45 11 5.1 23.6 0.5 28 36 41 11.1 0.7 0.9 1.3 4.1 41 26 56 15 58 9.7 2.4 35 34 40 21 25 1.1 1.2 5.4 36 25 45 18 39 39 0.5 44 0.7 31 0.6 29 20 40 34 31 17 48 7 3.9 17.7 0.9 25 34 12.1 2 0.7 12.6 0.8 l.S 1.0 2.5 50 30 58 21 42 13.3 7.4 0.7 1.5 2.9 55 28 39 23 33 0.5 37 0.7 0.8 6.3 2.6 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.9 53 52 2.2 50 1.3 50 1.2 45 1.8 49 3.5 27 3.1 50 6.5 35 9.3 24 100.0 12.8 50.2 3.4 7.1 60 21 71 54 85 100.0 53 21 65 44 79 100.0 12.6 44 13 54 36 85 100.0 12.3 48.4 2.9 5.0 43 15 51 42 77 100.0 12.7 49.3 2.9 6.4 41 27 47 40 67 1.1 2.0 1.0 74 64 33 1.0 2.4 0.7 76 55 33 0.9 3.5 0.9 3.4 1.2 58 57 32 0.9 2.4 1.1 69 58 34 1.0 61 24 26 4.0 1.5 0.4 28 39 37 4.0 2.0 0.2 24 20 31 3.8 3.4 0.3 21 27 35 3.9 4.8 0.3 27 24 20 3.1 3.1 0.3 29 22 19 3.4 0.8 1.3 0.5 6.6 41 31 90 64 68 2.2 31 22 69 38 50 2.3 1.3 0.4 9.0 1.5 0.3 8.0 23 23 48 35 23 4.4 1.3 1.3 0.3 5.2 19 32 60 36 34 4.6 1.8 1.1 0.4 5.5 20 24 70 39 40 1.5 68 1.6 55 1.3 54 1.7 41 1.4 28 2.1 51 2.4 46 2.0 43 2.3 40 2.4 36 0.3 61 0.5 25 0.6 53 0.4 55 0.4 46 1.0 49.8 2.7 4.8 1.1 S o u rce : U n ited S ta te s D ep artm e n t of C om m erce, B ureau of th e C ensus, F T 973, Waterborne Trade by Trade Area, -Ja n .-Ju ly 1952— N American Flag Total 100.0 33 33 21.3 39 6.5 28 4.9 1.5 39 30 31 32 1.3 0.7 0.4 6.5 1.1 1.6 -1951----------- , American Total Flag 37 100.0 23.9 31 5.2 46 4.6 36 42 1.5 10.3 54.8 2.3 4.2 January 1953 FEDERAL RESERVE B A N K OF SA N FRANCISCO 14 other lower-weight, higher-value commodities. As a re sult, oil imports from the Caribbean area and bulk com modities from South America dominate the import scene to a greater degree than would be the case if they were expressed in terms of value. Shipping services in the balance of payments Aside from considerations of national defense and the maintenance of a strong merchant marine in case of emergencies, low-cost, efficient shipping services— rather than the flag of the vessel—are important to individual shippers. A t the present time, however, there is an addi tional advantage to be derived from the use of foreign flag shipping, that is, the earnings of foreign operators and their contribution to the solution of balance of pay ments problems. From 1921 through 1939 the United States had a sur plus of receipts over payments on current account in each year. This surplus was created by a continuing large sur plus of merchandise exports over imports. In each of those years, however, a part of this “dollar gap” in m er chandise trade was offset by net out-payments for ship ping services. For the entire period 13 percent of our export surplus was covered by such paym ents; during the thirties, however, this percentage was much larger. During the depression years 1930-35, slightly less than one-quarter of our export surplus was paid for by serv ices provided by foreign ship operators to United States traders, and during 1936 and 1937, almost three-quarters. Since the end of W orld W ar II, however, this situa tion has been reversed, and in each postwar year the United States has received more for shipping services than it has paid out, thus adding to the dollar shortage. But since reaching a peak of over $1 billion in 1947, our.; net receipts on transportation account declined sharply to $128 million in 1950. W hile there was an increase to $554 million in 1951, this was due to the stimulus of the Korean war and the increase in United States flag par- T h e B a l a n c e o n M e r c h a n d is e a n d T r a n s p o r t a t i o n A c c o u n t s o f S e l e c t e d C o u n t r i e s (in m illion s of U n ited S ta te s d ollars) -T o ta l M erchandise T ra d e Balance Im ports 2,177 924 9.848 6,129 5,524 7.822 7,066 5,271 1,343 9,315 11,668 3,817 C ountry U n ited S tates Y ear 1938 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 Fran ce 19382 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 870 2,292 2,287 1,999 1,958 3,266 — 230 —‘1,264 — 1,233 — 456 — 78 — 770 Italy* 1938 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 582 1,312 1,462 1,375 1,358 1,914 — — — — — — Jap a n 1936« 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1,049 449 547 728 970 1,641 1938 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 675 1,413 1,612 1,646 1.823 2,114 1938 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 260 747 700 731 633 809 1938 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 3,876 6,102 7,209 7,333 6,644 9,779 N eth erlan d s N orw ay U n ite d K ingdom -------- Total T ransportation--------- N Receipts Payments N et 2 67 303 — 36 1,788 761 1,027 1,299 630 669 1,176 676 500 926 798 128 1,487 933 554 125 69 89 428 331 260 159 631 292 213 158 274 67 38 45 71 71 195 157 177 — — — — — — 14 267 284 195 59 167 96 1 3 9 9 30 32 89 123 173 96 251 — — — — — — 89 697 610 369 465 350 Ü6 168 *96 97 — — — — — — 68 361 262 325 225 167 — 1,402 — 1,672 — 833 — 569 — 428 — 2,180 ... t------ T rade w ith the D ollar A re a 1— E xports Im ports Balance — 14 — 303 — 262 — 171 — 141 — 203 53 111 127 112 200 388 171 1,162 874 711 462 689 — — — — — — 4 157 112 106 62 101 41 44 95 49 93 113 70 575 517 466 356 455 — — — — — — 29 531 422 417 263 342 — — — — — 64 88 120 164 87 221 121 20 70 79 179 320 260 484 422 575 427 945 — — — — — — 139 464 352 496 248 625 7 20 71 102 68 97 13 47 43 57 68 126 53 584 340 372 250 326 — — — — — — 40 537 297 315 182 200 — — — — — — 6 204 88 91 55 95 157 264 363 366 68 143 246 250 89 121 117 116 142 234 4 46 37 30 40 47 10 250 125 122 95 142 464 842 1,007 1,023 854 371 729 701 714 543 93 113 306 309 311 336 256 512 771 672 865 1,068 962 2,279 1,623 1,604 1,203 2,046 — 118 — 1,051 — 747 — 599 — 262 — 301 — 706 — 1,767 — 852 — 932 — 338 — 978 1 U n ite d S tates and Canada. 3 P riv ate estim ate published by th e Econom ic Cooperation A dm inistration. * 1938 d a ta for tra d e w ith th e D ollar A rea include only the U n ite d States. ‘ D a ta for 1938 n o t available. N o te : F o r th e b alance on trad e and tra n sp o rta tio n , no sign indicates credit, m inus sign indicates debit. S o u rces: In te rn a tio n a l M o n etary F u n d , International Financial Statistics and Balance of Payments Yearbooks; U n ite d S tates D e p artm e n t of C om m erce, Balance of Payments of the United States, 1949-1951. January 1953 M O N T H L Y REVIEW ticipation through the activation of reserve ships, most of which were returned to inactive status during 1952. The situation in selected countries An examination of the balance of payments data of the important shipping countries shown in the accompanying table indicates that their deficits on merchandise account consist, in large part, of deficits with the dollar countries (principally the United States and Canada). In several cases these countries also had deficits on their over-all transportation account during the postwar period. Not only were trade deficits with the United States financed by our foreign aid programs, but transportation deficits were also similarly financed. These countries, in antici pation of a discontinuation of such aid, have strived not only to bring their merchandise trade closer to a balance but also to increase their earnings from the sale of ship ping services. An excellent illustration of the importance of shipping in the balance of payments is Norway. D uring the pre war period this country normally had a deficit in its m er chandise trade with the rest of the world, but this deficit was completely covered by its net income from the sale of shipping services. F or example, in the year 1938 its trade deficit of 292 million kroner was more than cov ered by a net income from shipping services of 383 mil lion kroner. W artim e losses reduced the Norwegian merchant fleet from 4.5 million gross tons in 1939 to 2.7 million tons in 1945. As a result Norway no longer could cover her ex cess of imports by shipping income during the postwar period. H er fleet, however, was rapidly rebuilt and be tween 1948 and 1951 her income from shipping services almost tripled. By 1951 the total tonnage of her merchant fleet exceeded that of 1939, and once again her net in come from shipping of 1.7 billion kroner was ample to cover the trade deficit of 1.2 billion kroner. Japan is another country for which shipping income has been an important balance of payments item. In the prew ar period Japan was able to cover her deficit in m er chandise trade by a large surplus on service account, con sisting of shipping, insurance, and other services. Follow ing the end of W orld W ar II, Japan was unable to par ticipate in shipping since her merchant fleet had been virtually eliminated. But, as Japan recovered, shipbuild ing was resumed, and the Japanese have gradually re turned to the world’s seaways. In 1951 Japan superseded the United States in second place behind the British in tlhe volume of new construction. United States occupa tion authorities encouraged this trend as a step towards relieving the United States of the burden of the enor mous aid program and replacing it by earnings from trade, shipping and other services, and the construction of merchant tonnage for other countries. Japan’s m er chant fleet, however, is still only about half of the prewar tonnage. 15 Still another country which depends heavily on earn ings from shipping services to balance her deficit in goods is the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom is in a similar position. An over-all deficit on the United King dom trade account is partially counter-balanced by net receipts from shipping (figures in the table include only dry cargo trade). The United Kingdom has normally had a deficit in trade with the United States, which for merly was paid for by dollar earnings of other sterling area members. Since the war, however, net dollar earn ings of other sterling area members have declined. As a result, earnings from services have assumed a greater importance in helping to balance accounts with the dollar area. The critical position of France’s balance of pay ments since the war is also illustrated in the table. F rance’s over-all excess of imports over exports is ag gravated by a deficit on the transportation and merchan dise accounts in trade with the dollar area, including large net payments to the United States for shipping services. The importance of shipping services to other countries in the current international payments situation is exem plified by the above cases. As a part of the drive towards the substitution of trade for aid, therefore, the role of shipping and other services can be an important one. To permit foreign carriers to carry an increasing part of our foreign trade, however, may mean the sacrifice of one of our most important national defense objectives— a strong merchant marine. A large part of our merchant marine at present can be considered marginal because of falling freight rates and increasing numbers of foreign carriers, which can be operated at lower costs than our own. Many of our ships are finding it more and more difficult to pay their way. Because of the manner in which it came into existence, our merchant marine is faced with another serious prob lem. The bulk of our present fleet was built during the war, and at the present time the average age of our ships is ten years. On the other hand, the most im portant part of the merchant fleets of other countries has been built since the war, and most of them are less than five years old. By 1965 our present fleet will be over twenty years old and past the normal replacement age. This so-called “block obsolescence” means that, if the decision is made to maintain a strong merchant marine, some program of systematic replacement m ust be initiated. In the interim it appears that our carriers must face a losing battle in ship operating efficiency against newer foreign ships. The same problem applies to our reserve fleet, which played such an important role during the early part of the Ko rean emergency. If our defense authorities consider it es sential to maintain such a fleet to supplement our active merchant fleet, a replacement program will be needed. Correction: In the chart on page 107 of the December 1952 Monthly Review the unit of graduation on the ver tical scale is in millions of dollars. 16 FEDERAL RESERVE B A N K OF SA N FRANCISCO January 1953 BUSINESS INDEXES—TWELFTH DISTRICT1 (1947-49 average — 100) Y ear and m o n th L um ber 1929 1931 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 97 51 41 44 54 70 74 58 72 79 93 93 90 90 72 85 97 104 99 112 114 1951 N ovem ber D ecem ber 109 1952 Jan u a ry F eb ru ary M arch April M ay June July A ugust Septem ber O ctober Novem ber T o ta l W a te r b o rn e n o n a g ri- T o ta l C a rD e p ’t fo re ig n c u l t u r a l m f'g lo a d in g s s to re R e ta il t r a d e 3»6 W h e a t E l e c tr ic e m p lo y e m p lo y ( n u m s ale s food C o p p e r3 flo u r8 p ow er m ent b e r)2 (v a lu e ): p ric e s 3*1 E x p o r ts I m p o r ts m e n t4 I n d u s tr ia l p ro d u c tio n (p h y s ic a l v o lu m e )2 93 107 108 110 94 117 108 106 109 116 105 P e tro le u m * C ru d e R e fin e d C e m e n t 87 57 52 52 62 64 71 75 67 67 69 74 85 93 97 94 78 55 50 50 56 61 65 64 63 63 68 54 36 27 35 33 58 56 45 56 61 81 96 79 63 65 81 96 104 L ead 3 165 114 118 99 101 140 136 111 111 121 120 88 104 96 95 89 87 109 109 115 117 116 112 106 105 112 115 116 113 113 112 112 112 113 114 114 114 115 116 122 81 78 80 142 139 142 141 147 150 150 153 145 146 141 86 96 114 92 93 108 109 114 100 90 78 70 94 105 101 109 89 88 58 80 94 107 123 125 112 90 71 106 101 93 115 115 101 99 98 106 112 128 107 106 116 109 124 119 85 88 106 106 106 107 108 107 107 107 107 107 107 111 113 115 114 114 116 116 122 122 117 118 94 112 113 120 129 126 125 131 131 142 133 100 90 95 72 76 71 83 93 98 91 98 100 103 103 112 100 105 49 17 24 37 64 29 29 26 28 30 34 38 36 40 43 49 60 76 82 78 78 90 101 108 119 136 100 68 112 86 75 81 87 81 84 81 91 87 87 88 98 101 112 108 113 98 88 86 105 90 88 87 84 90 103 99 96 93 102 100 30 25 18 21 24 28 30 28 31 33 40 49 59 65 72 91 99 104 98 105 108 101 119r 110 114 117 182 192 144 130 86 106 108 103 106 118 114 110 116 114 118 128 116 114 114 116 115 115 114 114 114 113 114 183 208 210 185 207 187 144 153 142 146 138 157 143 143 182 187 293 253 68 96 95 99 102 99 103 110 47 54 60 51 55 63 83 121 164 158 122 104 100 102 98 105 119 100 101 52 60 66 77 81 72 77 82 95 102 99 105 100 101 106 100 94 97 100 124 125 126 125 126 127 129 128 130 130 101 100 106 98 108 96 101 108 98 102 64 50 42 45 48 48 50 48 47 47 52 63 69 132 135 131 170 164 163 132 124 80 72 78 109 116 119 87 95 101 70 80 96 103 100 100 113 89 129 86 85 91 186 57 81 98 121 137 157 190 138 110 68 BANKING AND CREDIT STATISTICS—TWELFTH DISTRICT (am ounts in m illions o f dollars) Y e ar and m o n th C o n d itio n ite m s o f a ll m e m b e r b a n k s 7 L oans U .S. D em and and d e p o s its G o v ’t d i s c o u n t s s e c u r i t i e s a d ju s t e d 8 B ank r a te s o n T o ta l s h o rt-te rm tim e b u s in e s s loans* d e p o sits 1929 1931 1933 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 2,239 1,898 1,486 1,537 1,682 1,871 1,869 1,967 2,130 2,451 2,170 2,106 2,254 2,663 4,068 5,358 6,032 5,925 7,105 7,907 8,844 495 547 720 1,275 1,334 1,270 1,323 1,450 1,482 1,738 3,630 6,235 8,263 10,450 8,426 7,247 6,366 7,016 6,392 6.533 6,627 1,234 984 951 1,389 1,791 1,740 1,781 1,983 2,390 2,893 4,356 5,998 6,950 8,203 8,821 8,922 8,655 8,536 9,244 9,940 10,504 1,790 1,727 1,609 2,064 2,101 2,187 2,221 2,267 2,360 2,425 2,609 3,226 4,144 5,211 5,797 6,006 6,087 6,255 6,256 6,720 7,522 3.20 3.35 3.66 3.95 1951 December 7,907 6,533 9,940 6,720 3.82 1952 J an u a ry F ebruary M arch April M ay June Ju ly A ugust Septem ber O ctober N ovem ber D ecem ber 7,806 7,760 7,787 7,850 7,921 8,062 8,114 8,270 8,444 8,605 8,805 8,844 6,543 6,413 6,378 6,313 6,238 6,258 6,507 6,469 6,473 6,765 6,808 6,627 9,951 9,420 9,426 9,408 9,306 9,501 9,643 9,679 9,908 10,125 10,281 10,504 6,806 6,900 6,915 6,924 6,985 7,083 7,143 7,197 7,249 7,336 7,331 7,522 M e m b e r b a n k re serv es a n d re la te d ite m s 10 R eserve bank c r e d i t 11 0 - 154 - 110 - 163 - 227 90 - 240 - 192 - 148 - 596 -1 ,9 8 0 -3 ,7 5 1 -3 ,5 3 4 -3 ,7 4 3 -1 ,6 0 7 - 510 + 472 - 930 -1 ,1 4 1 —1,582 -1 ,9 1 2 23 154 150 219 454 4* 157 + 276 + 245 + 420 + 1,000 +2,826 +4,486 + 4,483 +4,682 +1,329 + 698 - 482 + 378 +1,198 +1.983 +2,265 — 276 - 102 + + 84 + 180 - 228 109 17 237 174 97 208 126 153 294 29 240 + — + + — 3.94 3.95 3.96 3.95 34 21 2 2 6 1 3 2 2 4 107 214 98 76 9 302 17 13 39 21 7 C o in a n d C o m m e rc ia l T r e a s u ry c u r r e n c y in o p e r a tio n s 12 o p e r a tio n s 12 c ir c u la tio n 11 + + + + + + + + + + — + + + — + + + + 309 176 52 211 45 213 230 236 72 299 + + + + + _ R eserves B a n k d e b its In d e x 31 c itie s 3» « (1947-49=. 100)* + + 6 48 18 14 38 3 20 31 96 227 643 708 789 545 326 206 209 65 14 189 132 175 147 185 287 479 549 565 584 754 930 1,232 1,462 1,706 2,033 2,094 2,202 2,420 1,924 2,026 2,269 2,514 42 28 18 25 30 32 29 30 32 39 48 61 69 76 87 95 103 102 115 132 140 279 + 14 2,269 141 + 194 - Ill b 272 - 102 - 185 b 190 b 288 b 163 - 213 - 267 - 79 b 422 + + + + + + + + + 86 20 7 13 49 29 7 49 4 32 34 12 2,416 2,365 2,313 2,341 2,347 2,209 2,333 2,535 2,363 2,527 2,616 2,514 134 138 139 135 128 144 134 134 144 146 141 157 + + + + + + + + + + + __ __ __ _ _ * A djusted tor seasonal variation, except where indicated. Except for d epartm ent store statistics, all indexes are based upon d a ta from outside sources as 1olio we: lum ber, various lum ber tra d e associations; petroleum , cem ent, copper, and lead, U.S. B ureau of M ines; w heat flour, U.S. B ureau of the Censuselectric power, Federal IjOwer Com m ission : nonapri finItil ral n.nrl mn.nnfiu*.fiirinir omnlnvmont T7£! TinraoTi nf ToKa» J -------___ j._______•_' retail food prices, 2 D aily average. _ _ _____ ____________ ___________ _ _____ _ ____ & rm u tw i'u u comij\?eTd\ * Com m ercial cargo only, in physical volume, fo r L o s ' Angeles“ S a rF ra n c is c o rS a ^ Diego, Oregon“ a n T ’W ^ h in g to n “custom s districts, startin g w ith Ju ly 1950, special category exports are excluded because of security reasons. » A nnual figures are as of end of year, m onthly figures as of last W ednesday m m onth or where applicable, as of call report date. « D em and deposits, excluding interbank and U.S. G ov’t deposits, less cash item s m process of collection. M onthly d a ta partly estim ated. » A verage rates on loans m ade in five m ajor cities during the first 15 days of the m onth. 10 E n d of year and end oi m onth figures. 11 C hanges from end of previous m onth or year. 12 M inus sign indicates flow of funds o ut of the D istric t m th e case of commercial operations, and excess of receipts over disbursem ents in th e case of T reasury operations. « D ebits to to ta l deposit accounts excluding in ter-b an k deposits. r— revised. ^ ’ ■ . I \ \