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FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO MONTHLY REVIEW Annual Review Issue FEBRUARY 1967 Annual R e v ie w __ 1966 The Boom: '66 Style The String Pulls Taut Towards Balance? The M arkets Disintermediation The W e st: Boom The W e st: M o n e y Signs of Growth February 1967 MONTHLY REVIEW The Boom: 66 Style curtain rang down on the second third of the twentieth century as 1966 came to a close, and at this juncture the nation’s total output reached almost three-quarters of a trillion dollars. GNP rose sharply to $740 billion during the year, and although part of that 8V2 -percent increase was eroded by ris ing prices, what was left was a solid 5 Vi-per cent increase in real output of goods and serv ices. The expansion in real terms thus was al most as great as in the preceding year, a year of vigorous prosperity. The boom, without a doubt, remained very much alive through most of 1966. T he Worth an A grade? Professor Paul Samuelson, assessing the year’s performance for the readers of News week, gave 1966 an “A ” grade in terms of real growth. (“Who would have expected a rise of 4 percent or more in the sixth year of economic expansion?” ) He also gave the year a good solid “A” for its employment per formance as the unemployment rate dropped below 4 percent for the first time in a decade, although he was forced to withhold an “A + ” grade because of the persistence of structural unemployment among teenagers and non whites. But where price stability was concerned, Professor Samuelson— and everyone else— could give 1966 no better than a “C” grade, since wholesale prices surged upward until late in the year and since the consumer index in particular jumped by 3 percent over the FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FR A N C IS C O 1965 level. Early in the year the economy suf fered from the demand-pull pressures typical of wartime and business-investment booms, as the military and civilian sectors each scram bled for resources; late in the year the econ omy was threatened by a cost-push type of in flation as the labor and management sectors each struggled to maintain its share of income. The 3-percent increase in consumer prices, although it represented by no means a raging inflation and although it was in line with what the prosperous countries of Western Europe are normally accustomed to, nonetheless changed the entire psycholegical climate of the boom. It helped erode the wage-price guideposts, especially after an airline mechan ics’ strike was settled in midsummer with a 5-percent annual wage increase, and it under lay a sharp upsurge in interest rates and a sharp downturn in confidence among the in habitants of Wall Street. Grinding of gears In policy terms, 1966 was marked by a harsh grinding of gears. Fiscal policy played a part in combating the price upsurge, as the Treasury withdrew scheduled excise-tax re ductions, introduced graduated withholding taxes, speeded up corporate tax payments, and suspended temporarily the tax credit for busi ness investment. Even so, most of the burden of suppressing the price upsurge fell upon monetary policy. As practically all policy weapons were called into play to reverse an over-rapid increase in the money supply and in bank credit, interest rates surged upward to the highest levels since the 1920s. In the autumn months, however, fiscal policy began to play a stronger role and monetary policy began to ease in response to easing pressures throughout the economy. At this point, industrial production stabi lized— it had grown at a 13-percent annual rate during early 1966— as businessmen be gan to re-schedule production in order to deal with their rapidly growing inventories. By late year, then, the awesome uncertainties of mid summer were replaced by a more familiar problem of maintaining rapid growth and price stability in a context of full employment. In this more familiar environment, the stock and bond markets showed signs of life again after their severe earlier buffeting. Wall Street, until early February, was dom inated by the boom psychology which had underlain the prolonged bull market of 196365. But then, when the fiscal implications of Vietnam and the financial implications of tight money were realized, the bulls disappeared from the scene. Stock price indexes dropped sharply from early February to mid-March, slid again in late April and May, and then dropped almost uninterruptedly through the summer and early fall months amid the crunching sounds of monetary screws and splintering guideposts. In the fourth quarter, however, stock prices began to turn upward as monetary fears abated, and after a pause for tax-loss selling in December, the market rose sharply in early 1967. Economic psychology thus was a key reality on the 1966 scene. Yet, behind all the shifts in psychology and all the shifting of policy gears was a more basic shifting of resources from one sector of the economy to another. Between the first and fourth quarters of the year, defense spending increased by fully onefifth and business fixed investment also rose sharply. On the other hand, the consumer sector, beset by rising prices of food and other essentials and by decreased availability of credit, reduced its spending for major postponable budget items; spending for autos was in a declining trend after the winter quarter and spending for new housing was off fully one-fourth. Stimulus of war The most expansionary element in the 1966 picture was the war in Vietnam. Defense February 1967 MONTHLY REVIEW D e fe n se an d p la n t-e q u ip m e n t sp e n d in g spur economy to record heights, despite lag in consumer sectors . . . rising prices cut into real gains B illio n s of D o lla r s Perce nt C h a n g e Ratio Sc ale GNP 1 9 5 7 -5 9 = 1 00 Equipm ent CHANGE P l a n t - E q u ip m e n t 160 A u to s 140 C o n su m e r Goods In v e n to r y C h a n g e 120 D u ro b le M a t e r i a l s IN D U S T R IA L P R O D U C T IO N 100 spending for the year rose to $60 billion, and in the fourth quarter it was at a $ 6 6 ^ -billion rate— one-third above the early-1965 level. New obligations for defense equipment rose even more sharply, and these increases were perhaps even more important than increases in expenditures, since the greatest strain on the economy occurs not when military pay ments are made but in the earlier period when orders are placed and defense goods are pro duced. The rapid growth of the U. S. economy and the still limited nature of the conflict in Viet nam seemed to mean that the war had less im pact than earlier wars. In late 1966, defense spending amounted to about 8 percent of GNP, as against 13H percent during Korea and 42 percent during World War II. The difference was, however, that spending for Vietnam came on top of sharply increased spending for everything else, so that skilled labor and manufacturing plant capacity were under heavy pressure from mid-1965 on wards. Escalation in Vietnam came at a time when productive resources were almost fully utilized— unlike World W ar II or Korea— so the marginal effect of the conflict may have been greater than in those earlier periods. However, the bulk of the growth in spend ing and order placement may have been reached by late 1966; thus, although defense order backlogs equaled almost one year’s pro duction at that time, Defense Secretary Mc Namara predicted that a period of stability in both manpower needs and defense produc tion was near at hand. Enough capacity? Business plant-equipment spending, the second major support of the 1966 boom, pre sented a somewhat similar pattern of growth. Spending for structures and producers’ dur able equipment, at $79 billion in 1966, re flected the business sector’s scrambling for new capacity to meet burgeoning demand. But the pace eventually began to tell. Spend ing in the second half of the year grew only about half as rapidly as during the first half, and the gain projected for the first half of 1967 was only about one-third the size of the early-1966 increase. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FR A N C IS C O The slower growth of business spending was partly attributable to the late-1966 sta bility of physical production and of industrialcapacity usage. Thus, after a five-year expan sion that outdistanced all previous capitalgoods booms, the business sector apparently caught up with its immediate overall require ments, as evidenced by the growing percent age of firms which judged their existing capac ity to be adequate to their current production scheduling. Moreover, the business sector by late 1966 found its investment plans restricted by the increasing financial squeeze. Its near-term in vestment incentives were weakened by a slackening in its internally generated cash flow and in the credit flows available from commercial banks and the money market— and these incentives were further weakened by the suspension of the investment-tax credit on equipment and the accelerated-depreciation procedures on new building. Too much inventory? Business investment for inventories also showed a pattern of over-rapid growth. The change in business inventories, at about $ 11 billion for the year, was the highest since the early Korean War period, and the fourthquarter rate of $16'/i billion was clearly un sustainable. Inventory-sales ratios even in late year were not overly high by historical standards, but the composition of business stocks at this time created grounds for worry. The rise in the manufacturing stock-sales ratio, from 1.58 in early spring to 1.70 in late fall, was hard to analyze, since this could have been con sidered simply a return to normal after the massive depletion of stocks during the past year or so. Besides, the ratio failed to show any upsurge in stocks of finished goods— as usually happens when over-stocking occurs— in large part because one-fourth of the total inventory increase was in defense products, which are usually shipped when completed and thus do not show in finished-goods in ventories. Yet, by yearend, an obvious pile-up oc curred in finished goods of consumer durables, both at the manufacturing and retail levels. With auto dealer supplies up about one-tenth over year-ago levels and with other consum er durables accumulating at the same time, sharp reductions in production were then re quired to overcome the pile-up of stocks. Problems of Detroit Business’ inventory problems were simply a reflection of the problems of family buyers, especially buyers of automobiles. Actually, total spending for autos and parts just about matched the $30-billion figure reached in 1965, but the total figure masked the sales decline which began in early 1966 and lasted, except for a belated flurry at model clean-up time, throughout the rest of the year. The list of Detroit’s problems was rather long. Aside from one always crucial factor— a slower rate of growth of real disposable con sumer income— the list included the publicity given to the auto safety issue, the re-imposi tion of the 7-percent excise tax on new cars, and the rise in draft calls, which added 400,000 men to the armed services and thereby subtracted many potential customers from auto salesmen’s order books. But even in the face of these depressive fac tors, and in the face also of an import up surge which increased the foreign penetration of the American market from 5 percent to 7 percent, Detroit still managed to record its fifth successive production record during the 1966 model year. Output for that period reached about 8.5 million units, as against 8.3 million and 7.8 million, respectively, for the two preceding model years. The spring combination of sales slowdown and continued output expansion led to a sharp rise in dealers’ stock ratios— up from 1-.8 February 1967 MONTHLY REVIEW W a ll S t.: like al! good things, bull markets must come to on end N.Y.S.E. tnd«x Jan. 1,1966 = 50 months’ sales in March to 2.5 months’ sales at the end of June. So, from April on, pro ducers cut their output to achieve a better bal ance with sales and inventories. Factory shut downs for model changes occurred earlier and lasted longer than heretofore, and sales in centives through factory rebates increased sharply. These incentives may have had some impact not only in the sales flurry which oc curred at model clean-up time but also in a continuation of the trading-up phenomenon. Salesmen sold hard tops to more than half of their 1966 customers, as against less than one-third in 1963. And they also managed to sell more and more higher-cost options; al most one-third of the 1966 models were airconditioned and about two-thirds included power steering. Problems of builders Consumer spending for new housing, like consumer spending for autos, also weakened during the year— in fact, weakened spectacu larly. Expenditures for residential construc tion, at almost $26 billion, actually were ex ceeded only during the 1963-65 boom period, but between the record high achieved in the first quarter of 1966 and the fourth-quarter low, spending fell off by almost one-fourth. More over, private housing starts, at 1.2 million units, were one-fifth below the 1965 level, and the late-1966 rate was actually the lowest of the post-war period. Starts had been trending downward since early 1964, largely as a re flection of the prolonged slump in Western housing activity, but the slump spread to the rest of the nation in 1966. The housing recession, which took place in the face of such favorable market factors as a decline in the housing vacancy rate and an increase in the marriage rate, could be attrib uted mainly to the short-circuiting of the financial flows normally available to the hous ing industry. As one of the consequences of the declining availability and the rising cost of money, funds were persistently diverted from the types of institutions which are the heaviest participants in the mortgage market. As their inflow began to dry up, these institu tions sharply reduced their new commitments, and expenditures soon dropped precipitously. Productivity and prices Yet, with the exceptions noted, the overall pattern of the year was one of sustained pres sures on production and on prices. As mar ginal resources were drawn into production, and as facilities became more fully utilized, the growth rate of labor productivity dropped from an average of about 3 Vi percent in the 1961-65 period to less than 3 percent in 1966. Standby equipment was forced into use as manufacturing capacity utilization rose from 89 percent in 1965 to 91 percent in 1966, and inexperienced workers (mostly women and teenagers) were added to the la bor force because of the shortage of skilled workers. Consequently, as productivity gains decele rated, unit-labor costs— which had remained almost stable during the preceding five-year FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN F R A N C IS C O period— jumped 2Vz percent between July and November. Thus, management was force fully reminded of the need to bring costs under control at a time when labor was forcefully reminded of the erosion of its own position by the 3-percent rise in consumer prices. As the gain in labor productivity fell behind the rise in consumer prices, the productivity-based guideposts which had governed labor-management negotiations during the several preced ing years came under increasing fire and in many cases were completely ignored. The pressures of prosperity showed up in rising prices, which sharply affected both the nation’s growth record and individual house hold budgets. Wholesale price trends showed some improvement as industrial prices stabi lized after midyear and as farm prices returned to their late-1965 level after a substantial early-1966 increase. But the consumer index showed, in addition to minor increases for rent and non-food commodity prices, a 4percent rise in food prices (for the second straight year) and an even sharper rise in service prices (including a 9-percent rise in medical costs). The behavior of wholesale industrial prices was somewhat encouraging in view of the sharp pressures on output generated by the massive tax cuts of several years ago and by the more recent acceleration of defense spend ing. At the same time, the behavior of con sumer prices for food and services was some what discouraging, since rising prices cut into workers’ real take-home pay and thereby created a sticky atmosphere for upcoming labor contract negotiations, which would have been difficult enough anyway in view of man agement’s problems with rising costs and re duced profit rates. Labor’s gains and fosses Labor’s position was strengthened during 1966, however, by sharp increases in employ ment. The civilian labor force grew by 1.3 million during the year, but the economy ab sorbed all of this labor force increase plus about Vs million displaced farm workers and Vz million unemployed workers. The 2.1million gain in nonfarm employment, which was almost one-third greater than the average increase recorded during the earlier years of this business expansion, thus helped reduce the unemployment rate from 4.6 percent in 1965 to 3.9 percent in 1966. The adult male working population actually declined, because of such factors as the re duced growth of the adult population, a low er labor-participation rate, and the increase in draft calls, so women and teenagers thus ac counted for 90 percent of the 1966 rise in total employment. Incidentally, 1967 will be some what different; the increase in the teenage pop ulation will be only one-sixth as great as the 1966 increase, and the maturing of the crop of early postwar babies will add one million adult males to the population. The unemployment rate held at or below the 4-percent level during the entire year, for the first time in a decade, but while the jobless rate among adult males dropped to a practical minimum of 2 Vz percent, the jobless rate among certain other groups remained far above the national average. For non-whites, the jobless rate was twice the average; for teenagers, it was three times as high. At the same time, consumers as a group re corded a much smaller increase in individual incomes than in the several preceding years. Per capita income, after adjustment for rising prices and rising taxes, increased about 3Vz percent over the year as against increases of 4 Vz to 5 percent in the tax-cut period of 1964-65. So consumers in 1966 were forced to content themselves with a somewhat small er improvement than in those happier years when the ravages of taxes and of inflation were reduced. On balance, individual consumers, like in dividual sectors of the economy, showed a February 1967 MONTHLY REVIEW C o n su m e r secto r b o lste re d by sharp employment gain and by improvement in jobless rate, but rising taxes and rising prices limit increase in real income R e a l P e r C a p it a Incom e M illio n * of W o rk e r* P e rc e n t C h a n g e 0 I Perce nt U ne m ploye d 2 T e e n -a g e r t AM W o r k e n F e m a le * T ra d e a n d Serw ic it A d u lt M a l » widely varying range of performance as well as a widely varying range of psychology. As always, these differences came out during the Christmas shopping period. At that time, one department store catering to luxury lovers of fered for $ 119 a split-level solid-cherry Per sian-lamb-lined doghouse, while another de partment store catering to a different clientele offered for $1 a “depression survival kit,” consisting of an NRA sticker, a list of New York soup kitchens, and a set of instructions for building an apple stand. Foreign Investment Copies are again available of the article “Can We Afford to Invest Abroad?’’, which appeared in the September 1964 Monthly Review. The article provides a background analysis of the role of private capital flows in the U. S. payments picture. The discussion includes definitions of different types of private capital investments, the location of our investments abroad, the short- and long-run impact of private capital outflows on the balance of payments deficit, and the implications of private capital exports. Copies of the article are available on request from the Administrative Service De partment, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 400 Sansome Street, San Fran cisco, California 94120. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FR A N C IS C O The String Pulls Taut U. S. economy in 1966 enjoyed its ring in the fourth quarter. At the same time, sixth consecutive year of expansion and total reserves of the member banking system the first complete year of full employment in contracted at a 2.1-percent annual rate and the past decade. This otherwise welcome con the money supply declined at a rate of almost dition of high employment proved to be a 1 percent. rather mixed blessing, however, as the strong Higher revenues but higher spending demand for goods and for credit generated in flationary pressures that were reflected in Several different steps were taken to in price increases well above those recorded crease Federal revenues in 1966. In January, earlier in this expansion. the social-security system boosted its reve nues, not by increasing the tax rate but by Public policy was on the side of restraint, lifting the coverage on wages and salaries from but the distribution of the burden was quite $4,800 to $6,600. Congress later rescinded a uneven, as monetary policy was forced to scheduled reduction in excises on automobiles carry most of the load. In spite of increases in and a number of other items, and it also Federal taxes, through recision of earlier re speeded up the collection of corporate-income ductions in excise taxes and a speed-up in pay taxes and placed the Federal personal-income ment schedules, the net effect of the Federal tax on a graduated withholding basis, to re cash budget was expansionary. The lack of bal flect more closely actual tax liabilities. Then, ance between monetary and fiscal policy led to in October, in an attempt to take some of the severely stringent conditions in the money and steam out of the boom in business spending capital markets in the third quarter of the for plant and equipment, Congress suspended year, and interest rates thus jumped to the until next January the investment tax credit highest levels in more than 40 years. Yet by on new capital and the accelerated deprecia yearend, as the demand for credit slackened tion allowance for commercial and industrial and the likelihood of tax actions increased, the building. Federal Reserve eased its pressure upon bank he T reserves and bank lending policies. 28 In addition to the sharp differences in the incidence of monetary and fiscal policy, sig nificant shifts in policy also developed be tween the two halves of the year. In the first half of the year, Treasury policy was relative ly restrictive, with a surplus of about $3.1 billion at a seasonally adjusted annual rate (national-income accounts basis). However, in this same period, reserves of the member banks increased at an annual rate of 4.4 per cent and the money supply rose at an annual rate of 4.7 percent. In the second half of the year the roles were reversed. The Federal budget was in deficit at a $2.7-billion annual rate, with the largest part of the deficit occur February 1967 MONTHLY REVIEW On the expenditure side of the ledger, na tional security outlays rose by more than $9 billion, reflecting the intensification of mili tary operations in Vietnam. Also, Federal pay increases and the advent of the Medicare program boosted nondefense spending in the third quarter of the year. The cash budget for 1966 showed a deficit of around $7.5 billion. On a national-income accounts basis, however, there was a very small surplus, amounting perhaps to about $0.2 billion. This budget concept, which fo cuses on the net Federal contribution to the income stream of the economy, thus indicat ed a very modest degree of restraint, wholly insufficient to contain the expansionary forces in the private sector of the economy. (Some observers argue that even this restraint was illusionary because of the rapid upsurge in new defense obligations, which rose more sharply than expenditures during the year.) In order to have acted as a brake upon the infla tionary pressures which a sharply rising level of total demand for goods and services had created, the budget surplus on an NIA basis would have had to have been much larger than it actually was. Monetary policy takes hold Federal Reserve policy measures took a number of forms in 1966. The discount rate remained at the 4Vi-percent level set in De cember 1965, But in its effort to make policy more restrictive, the Federal Reserve relied not only on open-market operations but also on its controls over reserve requirements and its ceilings on member-bank time-deposit in terest rates. In July and again in September, the Board of Governors increased by one percent the reserve requirements against time deposits in excess of $5 million. Promissory notes and other forms of indebtedness of banks were de fined as deposits and made subject to reserve requirements under the provisions of Regula tions D and Q. The maximum rate payable on time deposits of multiple maturities and time posits of less than $100,000 was reduced to 5 percent. Perhaps as important as this reduction in ceiling rates was the staunch retention of other ceilings in the face of heavy pressures to raise them. The maximum rate on negotiable time certificates of $100,000 and over— a major source of commercial bank funds over the past five years— was held unchanged at percent, and the ceiling rate on passbook sav ings deposits remained at 4 percent despite massive shifts of funds from such deposits to special savings certificates. On September 1, Reserve Banks circulated a letter to the member banks which stated that a further increase in loans— especially busi ness loans— at the rate that had taken place earlier in the year was not in the public in terest. Member banks were urged not to liqui- M o n e ta ry p o licy sharply restrictive, but fiscal policy eases in second half FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FR A N C IS C O In te re st ra te s resp o n d to strain of credit markets' summer crunch ments against demand deposits. These, how ever, have been at their current levels since 1960. Credit markets: the summer “ crunch” C om m e rcia l P a p e r D isc o u n t Rote (N Y .) T re a s u ry B i l l * L O N G -T E R M M o r tg a g e s (New Home) C o rp o ra t e Bond s Treasury Bonds M u n ic ip a l B o n d s date securities to meet the demand for loans, since this would simply place pressure on in terest rates in other financial markets. The letter indicated that the Reserve Banks would accommodate member banks for longer pe riods than usual at the discount window to help banks readjust their business-loan port folios without selling off securities. This letter was withdrawn late in December when it ap peared that the hitherto intense demand for credit had begun to taper off. Most of the monetary measures taken throughout the year—aside from opcn-market operations— were directed towards either in terest rates or reserve requirements upon time and savings deposits. This is quite unusual in a period of monetary restraint, for the more usual approach to monetary restraint in this area is through increases in reserve require In July and August, as the money and cap ital markets came under considerable strain, interest rates rose to their highest levels in over a generation. The market yield on 91-day U. S. Treasury bills climbed above the 5Vipercent mark, and for a time in late August, the yield on certain intermediate-maturity Treasury bonds reached the neighborhood of 6 V4 percent. The upward trend in interest rates extended to corporate and municipal se curities as well as Treasury issues. While the demands upon the credits markets were in creasing, the supply of funds entering the markets declined. Savings and loan associa tions were hard pressed and the influx of funds to commercial banks dipped well below the year-earlier pace. The sources of demand for credit were readily identifiable. There was a heavy de mand for funds on the part of corporations, both from banks and in the capital markets, since a high rate of business spending and higher tax liabilities came at a time when cor porate liquidity was declining. The Treasury, meanwhile, after repaying about $5.4 billion of debt in the first half of the year, borrowed $10 billion of new money in the second half to offset the usual seasonal decline in the flow of receipts. Federal agencies were yet another source of demand for funds. Sales of agency securi ties mounted to $2.6 billion in the second quarter of the year and remained high in the following quarter. Ancillary to the Federal agency securities were the offerings of partici pation certificates in pools of loans held by various Federal agencies. These issues were not new to the market, but their large volume was both new and somewhat unsettling. In February 1967 MONTHLY REVIEW order to take some of the pressure off the credit markets, President Johnson ordered a suspension of the sales of participation cer tificates in early September. The heights to which market yields on se curities rose during the summer added to the banks’ problems. Yields were well above what individual investors might earn on their funds at savings-type institutions. This brought about a process of “disintermediation”, where individuals invested directly in securities ra ther than placing their funds with banks and other financial intermediaries. In early September interest rates started to decline from their highs, and they receded further during the remainder of the year. Cor porate offerings in the capital market were well below the September figure, as were the offerings of municipal issues. In addition, the pace of business lending at commercial banks slackened perceptibly after July. The money and capital markets thus ended 1966 on an easier note, but it could hardly be said that any real slack developed in these markets. Interest rates continued to remain at high levels by all historical standards. Still, there was a return to a better balance between the demand for and the supply of funds. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN F R A N C IS C O Towards Balance? international transactions of the U. S. in 1966 were significantly influenced by developments in the domestic economy as well as by developments abroad. Attainment of a high-employment level of output, while bring ing internal and external policy goals within the same target area, also brought with it mixed balance of payments effects. As cyclical forces accelerated the long sustained domestic expansion and propelled the economy beyond the rate of resource utilization compatible with general price stability, demand pressures spilled over into the external sector, causing expenditures for foreign goods and services to rise. Both the trade surplus and the overall goods-and-services surplus declined. T he Tighter credit conditions in the U. S., espe cially during the summer months, reinforced the voluntary programs designed to restrain U. S. capital outflows. These conditions were also reflected in a rising volume of U. S. liquid liabilities to foreign banks, primarily branches of U. S. banks abroad, especially during the third quarter. Rising defense expenditures at home and abroad reflected our military presence in Viet nam. These outlays contributed to both direct and indirect balance of payments drains. Do mestically, Vietnam expenditures during the year were quite small in relation to our na tional output, but their marginal impact on an economy already operating at a very high level was probably much greater than this relationship would suggest. This increment of demand contributed indirectly to our total payments abroad, as did direct foreign outlays associated with our operations in Vietnam. Deficit or surplus? The net result of all these transactions is open to differing interpretations, partly be cause of different results shown by alterna tive measures of the balance of payments. The principal measures are calculated either on the basis of changes in U. S. monetary assets and liquid liabilities or on the basis of changes in U. S. official-reserve transactions. On the basis of official-reserve transactions — which measures changes in U. S. reserve assets and in liquid and certain nonliquid lia bilities to foreign official institutions— the first three quarters of the year actually showed a $0.7-billion surplus (seasonally adjusted an nual rate) because of a sharp improvement in the accounts during the summer months. This third-quarter improvement reflected the British exchange crisis of last summer and the vigorous efforts of U. S. banks to ease the effects of tight-credit conditions at home by gaining foreign deposits through their branches abroad. However, on the liquidity basis— which in cludes changes in private foreign holdings of liquid claims against the U. S. as well as changes in claims of foreign official institu tions and in U. S. reserve assets— the JanuarySeptember period showed a prospective an nual deficit approximating the previous year’s MONTHLY REVIEW February 1967 $1.3-billion liquidity deficit. But unlike 1965, when virtually the entire deficit was “financed” by a $ 1.2-billion decline in monetary reserve assets, it appeared as 1966 drew to a close that a major part of the deficit would show up as a rise in liquid liabilities. However, our gold holdings and IM F gold-tranche position to gether declined by over a billion dollars, but this decline was partially compensated by a rise of about half that amount in foreign cur rency holdings, principally British pounds. Despite differences regarding the actual size of the deficit— or surplus— there was little doubt about the principal factors influ encing the U. S. payments situation last year. Compared with 1965, the 1966 record re vealed a smaller trade surplus; a reduction of the surplus on services account because of mounting military expenditures; and some re duction in the rate of outflow of U. S. direct investment and other private U. S. long-term O v e r a ll p a y m e n ts situ atio n improves, though import boom reduces trade balance B illio n s of D o lla rs J a n . - Sept . capital. Among the most important develop ments in our payments situation through the third quarter was a substantial rise in U. S. liquid liabilities to foreign private entities. Nonmilitary Government grants and capital outflows, excluding nonscheduled repay ments, appeared likely to exceed those of the previous year. Goods and services As the year progressed, our international transactions continued to reflect the war in Vietnam and the very high level of economic activity at home. Payments for goods and services rose as military expenditures abroad increased and as merchandise imports mount ed in response to the pressure of domestic de mand on available productive capacity. Re ceipts also rose, but as the year came to a close it appeared that the goods-and-services surplus would amount to some $5.1 billion, considerably short of the $6.9 billion surplus experienced in 1965. This decline reflected a drop of more than a billion dollars in the trade surplus as exports rose by 11 percent while imports increased by nearly 20 percent. Mili tary expenditures abroad are believed to have risen by over $700 million in 1966. Income on U. S. investments abroad, projected from seasonally adjusted data for nine months, seemed likely to exceed last year’s receipts by $400 million, but after netting out in creased payments to foreigners on their in vestments in the U. S., the year-to-year balance-of-payments gain from investment in come probably was on the order of $200 mil lion. Substantial official payments to the U. S. Government eased the U. S. payments posi tion in the third and fourth quarters. Signifi cant contributions of this type were $220 mil lion in advance debt repayments by France and Italy in the third quarter, which improved both the liquidity and official - reserve transactions balances. There had been only FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FR A N C IS C O minor nonscheduled debt repayments during the preceding three quarters. As the end of the year approached, the Federal Republic of Germany announced the payment of $450 milhon to offset U. S. mili tary expenditures in Germany. Of this amount, $200 million represented early repayment of German postwar debts to the U. S., while the balance was for military goods to be supplied by the U. S. Our balance of payments was further aided by a year-end $ 148-million payment covering interest and part of the principal on U. S. post war loans to the United Kingdom. This is the first payment on this debt since 1963. Private capital flows Total U. S. private capital— including re demptions and other transactions in foreign securities, and before adjustment for corpo rate funds acquired abroad— continued to flow abroad during January-September 1966 at about the same seasonally adjusted annual rate as in 1965, although at a slower rate than in 1963 and 1964. After about midyear, however, the growth in claims slackened; in the third quarter the outflow declined to $713 million from $928 million and $1,094 million in the first and sec ond quarters, respectively. Of the total of these amounts, $529 million represented re invested funds raised abroad through borrow ings and new security issues of U. S. corpora tions, After adjustment for such foreign fi nancing, the dollar outflow on U. S. private capital account in 1966 probably represented an improvement of some $0.5 billion com pared with the previous year. Direct investment, which accounted for most of the outflow, totaled nearly $2.4 billion on a seasonally adjusted basis through the third quarter. Of this amount, $313 million represented funds raised abroad by U. S. cor porations. For the year as a whole, direct in vestment (after adjustment for funds raised abroad) probably did not exceed $3 billion, compared with $3.3 billion in 1965. Based on incomplete data, the bulk of the direct invest ment flow in 1966 was to Canada and conti nental Western Europe. Capital outflows arising from U. S. trans actions in foreign securities were probably somewhat less than in the previous year. This improvement occurred despite a rather large first-quarter outflow, over $450 million, in the form of purchases of securities newly issued in the U. S. In the second quarter, such purchases fell sharply, but subsequently rose to $274 million on a seasonally adjusted basis in the third quarter. Short- and long-term claims of U. S. banks on foreigners declined again in the third quar ter as they had in the first quarter. Taking into account a rise of $124 million in the second quarter, the balance of such claims through September registered a decline of $253 mil lion, $174 million being in long-term and $79 million in short-term claims. The reduc tion in short-term claims in the main reflected P riv a te ca p ita l outflo w s reduced under influence of guidelines B i l l io n s of D o l l a r i February 1967 MONTHLY REVIEW reflows from Japan, while the decline in long term claims to a large extent involved trans actions with continental Western European countries. While the overall reduction in bank claims of course is not attributable solely to the vol untary credit-restraint program, the program has undoubtedly played a major role in switch ing the movement in bank claims from a $2.5billion capital outflow in 1964 just prior to the beginning of the program, to inflows of $94 million in 1965 and $253 million through September 1966. However, strong domestic demands for credit, in a period of credit restraint such as prevailed during much of 1966, certainly were more important than the program in restrain ing banks’ foreign lending. A t the end of the year, U. S. commercial banks were still some what below the December 1964 base— and nearly $900 million below the 109-percent ceiling suggested by the Federal Reserve guidelines for 1966. During the first three quarters of 1966, non bank financial institutions participating in the program reduced their holdings of foreign as sets by $72 million. Compared with a total outflow of $730 mil lion in 1965, this represents a substantial con tribution to the improvement of our balance of payments. As the year drew to a close the Board of Governors issued new guidelines for financial institutions cooperating in the President’s vol untary program to improve the nation’s bal ance of payments. The new guidelines for banks retain the 1964 base and the previous ceiling of 109 percent of that base. However, banks are requested to limit the use of their leeway as of September 30,1966, to a rate not exceeding 20 percent thereof per quarter be ginning with the fourth quarter of 1966. In addition, in order to give added stimulus to priority credits, banks are requested to limit the increase in credits other than those that finance exports or which meet credit needs of developing countries, over the amount out standing on September 30, 1966, to 10 per cent of the total possible expansion, or about $120 million. The program for nonbank financial insti tutions has been greatly simplified. The three guidelines used in the 1966 program are re placed by a single guideline which permits an increase of 5 percent during the 15 months ending December 31, 1967, in assets covered by that guideline. In addition, certain assets such as bonds of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Inter-American Development Bank are now excluded from the definition of “covered” assets. A revised program for nonfinancial cor porations, administered by the Department of Commerce, has also been adopted. This calls upon participating corporations to increase their contributions to improving the balance of payments in 1967 on major selected trans actions by at least $2 billion above the 1966 level. The specific target for direct-investment capital transactions calls for corporations to limit the average annual rate of these trans actions in programmed countries in 1966 and 1967 to no more than 120 percent of the an nual average level during the years 1962-64. Movements of foreign capital Foreign direct investment declined by $135 million in the third quarter after registering nominal increases totaling about $50 million through midyear, and $71 million for all of 1965. Foreign investment in U. S. securities (other than Treasury issues) fell considerably more during the summer period, declining from $504 million in the second quarter to some $145 million in the third. Over twothirds of this decline occurred in U. S. corpo rate securities issued to finance foreign invest ments. However, during the first three quar ters of the year, foreign investment in U. S. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN F R A N C iS C O securities rose by $828 million compared with a reduction of $456 million in the same period of 1965. During the third quarter, liquid liabilities to all foreigners rose $630 million. Included in this inflow was a $1,170-million increase in liquid liabilities to foreign banks, mainly foreign branches of U. S. banks, attributable in part to the credit stringency in the U. S. which caused banks here to seek dollar funds abroad, and to the weakness of the British pound during the summer months. Smaller, but still substantial increases in such liabili ties had occurred in the first two quarters. These movements reflected the ability of for eign branches of U. S. banks to pay higher interest rates on deposits than their home offices in the U. S. can pay. In response to this, some transfer of private and official de posits from U. S. banks to U. S. branches abroad evidently occurred. In addition, for eign private entities evidently sought to ac quire or hold additional dollar claims, thus diverting such assets from foreign official en tities. Equilibrium—still ahead Most observers anticipated at year-end that the 1966 deficit measured on the liquidity basis would be greater than 1965’s $1.3-bil lion deficit. Although deficits of this size are still far beyond the officially defined equilib rium range of ± $250 million, they are at most only half as large as those of the preced ing two years and substantially below that of any year since 1957. However, the emergence of another fairly substantial deficit in 1966, even if it were to be somewhat less when fin ally tallied than that of the preceding year, is disappointing particularly in view of the vari ous efforts we have made to reduce it. Even so, it is significant that the 1966 deficit was held to a comparatively low level in the face of increasingly active warfare in Vietnam and some overheating of the economy at home. In the absence of these developments the defi cit almost certainly would have been smaller— perhaps considerably smaller— than it was. The large third - quarter official - reserve transactions surplus is impressive, but not yet sufficiently reassuring as an indicator of progress toward achieving a sustainable equilibrium in our external accounts. The surplus was accompanied by a very substantial inflow of highly volatile foreign liquid capital which can easily cease or be reversed. An eas ing of domestic inflationary pressures, accom panied by easier credit conditions such as were developing here toward the end of the year, would at least reduce pressures on U. S. bank reserves and lessen the inducement for banks to draw in deposits through their branches abroad. Similarly, the contribution of the British pound crisis to the third-quarter inflow was a unique occurrence, and an improvement in the British reserve position could be expected to lead to a transfer of liquid dollar assets from foreign private to foreign official holders. Al though such a shift would have little effect on the liquidity measure of the deficit, it would of course worsen the deficit on the reserve transactions basis. The reduction in our trade balance in 1966 may not have run its course and may not be February 1967 MONTHLY REVIEW easily reversed if domestic demand remains at high levels even though inflationary forces are contained. If a wage-price spiral ensues — and major labor contract negotiations are close at hand— our competitive position in world markets may be jeopardized. In these circumstances our trade surplus could easily decline further. As the year ended, a satisfactory equilib rium in our international accounts on a long term sustainable basis remained a goal to be achieved. If further progress is to be made and ultimate success attained, appropriate domes tic policies will be an essential prerequisite. Beyond this lies the potential of further devel opment of our financial relations with other countries. Through this means the policies, practices and mechanisms needed to facilitate balance-of-payments adjustments may grad ually be developed. Progress in this field as in other areas of international economic co operation may, and almost certainly will, be slow, but its importance to the development and expansion of the world economy can hardly be overemphasized. Knowledge, Science, and Aerospace This collection of Monthly Review articles describes the key role of “knowledge investment”— education plus research and development—in the growth of the natonal and regional economies, and it emphasizes the advantage held by the West in the economic-growth competition because of the region’s heavy concentration of scientific talent. As a case in point, the report describes the important part that the Western knowledge sector played in the past in attracting a major share of Federal aerospace contracts— and the equally important part it played in cushioning the decline when the aerospace boom subsided. Copies of “Knowledge, Science, and Aerospace” and other Monthly Review publications are available free upon request from the Administrative Service Depart ment, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 400 Sansome Street, San Francisco, California 94120, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN F R A N C IS C O The Markets glance, the credit markets be h a v e d much the same in 1966 as in 1965, since a very large volume of funds was again raised to finance the expenditures which pushed GNP to another new peak. But net funds borrowed, at $70 billion in 1966, actu ally fell below the 1965 total, and the chan neling of these flows also shifted strongly during the year. As in the preceding year, business borrow ing dominated the scene; in fact, business firms absorbed an even larger percentage of the total funds raised. With the exception of the Federal government, none of the other major sectors increased its share, although each increased its total indebtedness. A t f ir s t The most striking developments occurred on the supply side rather than the demand side. Here there were major shifts in the sources of finance. The most important change was the sharp decline in the commercial-bank position; the banks supplied only 20 percent of total credit in 1966 as against 40 percent of the total in the preceding year. At the same time, nonbank financial institu tions also suffered a declining share, while households increased their share and in fact F in a n cia l in stitutions supply less funds, but households act to fill gap B i l l i o n s of D o l l a r s r~~ Ra tio S c a l e N on b an k Fin anc e 20.0 10.0 P r in o t e B u s i n e s s ond 5.0 S t a t e - L o c a l G ov e r n m e n t 3.0 R e se r v e supplied almost as much funds as the com mercial banks. New developments also oc curred in the pattern of market instruments used by borrowers to obtain funds. Behind many of these changes stood mone tary policy, which aimed at restraining the growth of credit and therefore introduced new pressures on the capital markets. The most obvious reaction to 1966’s monetary policy was the rise of interest rates to levels not seen for almost forty years. Yet interest rates, no matter how much they attracted attention, merely reflected the interaction of market forces which must be explained individually. Supply: restricted sectors The commercial banks, which had supplied $30 billion in funds to the capital markets in 1965, were only able to provide $17 billion of 1966’s total supply of $70 billion. This rever sal of the trend toward an expanded bank role was of course due to monetary policy. Mone tary policy bears initially upon the banking system, from where it spreads its impact throughout the capital markets. The shift to ward greater tightness consequently was felt very strongly by the banks, which had already moved toward the limits of their lending ca pacity at the beginning of the year and were therefore vulnerable to restrictions on their lending capacity. Other financial institutions, which felt the greater restrictiveness through changes in the supply of funds and the relative structure of yields, were affected even more than the com mercial banks. These institutions reduced their supply of funds from $27 billion in 1965 to $20 billion in 1966— and their share of total flows was the lowest of the postwar pe riod. Within this sector, savings-and-loan as sociations suffered the biggest drop; their lending fell to $4 billion for the year, or half what it had been in the year before. February 1967 MONTHLY REVIEW Supply: growth sectors The pressures on the usual institutional lenders forced borrowers to search out alterna tive sources of funds. One major result was a sharp increase in direct lending by house holds, which supplied $12 billion to the capi tal markets in 1966, vs. $3 billion in 1965. With higher yields available on credit market instruments than on bank deposits, a strong incentive was provided for households to shift to direct lending and away from indirect lend ing through financial institutions. Households built up time and savings de posits at a slower rate than they had the pre vious year— $19 billion against $26 billion. Their shift to other financial assets was con centrated in Treasury securities and statelocal government securities, as higher yields in each case induced a significant shift in funds. Substantial though smaller amounts went into the purchase of corporate stock and bond issues— in contrast to the earlier years of the current expansion, when households steadily reduced their direct holdings of stocks and bonds. The other important new source of lending was the Federal government, which supplied $7.5 billion in 1966, or half again as much as in 1965. In particular, Federal agencies such as the Federal National Mortgage Asso ciation acted to provide second ary-market support when the usual credit sources found it difficult to meet the demand for loans. Meanwhile, the non-financial business sector also stepped up its direct lending to take ad vantage of the higher yields of market instru ments and, in the case of trade credit, to sup ply needed finance to its customers. The total volume of this business lending was $4 billion. The scope of the major change in financ ing which occurred during 1966 shows up in the shifting pattern of financial assets acquired by lenders. Total demand and savings accounts increased by only about $23 billion in 1966, as against $40 billion in 1965. On the other hand, publicly-held Federal securities in creased by practically $6 billion. More im portant still, the public acquired $14 billion in credit market instruments—twice as much as in any earlier year— as businesses found that financial institutions could not supply needed funds and thereupon turned to the di rect sale of credit instruments. Demand: business and households The non-financial business sector, one of the strongest driving forces behind the 1966 expansion, raised more than $33 billion in the credit markets during the year (as against $30 billion in 1965) and thus pushed its share of total financing to 45 percent. This greater reliance upon external sources of funds was not due to any lack in the growth of internal funds, for gross savings increased by $4 billion during the year to a record total of $74 billion. But the even greater ($10 bil lion) rise of expenditures, to a total of $92 billion, forced business to turn to external lenders. Households, like business, had more in come in 1966. Personal income reached $506 billion, with a $3 5-billion increment, and per mitted consumer spending to rise to $478 bil lion. Nonetheless, consumer financial beha vior was influenced by 1966’s stringent credit conditions. While households increased their role as lenders in response to higher market yields, they borrowed less than in either of the two preceding years to finance their rec ord level of expenditures. The increase in household indebtedness, $23 billion, was still substantial, but reduced gains were recorded in each of the major categories of household borrowing, especially mortgages. Demand: governments The Federal government was the only sec tor (besides business) that raised more funds during the year. Its total debt rose $9 billion to a total of $280 billion at the end of 1966. This increase was not, as might be expected, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN F R A N C IS C O directly caused by greater Federal spending programs, for the budget was practically bal anced on a national-income accounts basis. Rather, the increase in debt was due to the expanded lending activities of Federal agen cies. The Federal government last year acted as a giant financial intermediary, borrowing from one part of the public to lend to another part of the public, and thereby took over the role which other institutions were unable to play because of disturbed credit conditions. Federal agencies floated almost $7 billion in long-term issues in the securities markets, or almost twice as much as in the two previous years combined. But overall, Federal debt in creased more slowly than Federal revenues, and the Federal share of total debt declined. State and local governments, with net bor rowing of under $7 billion, expanded their borrowing more slowly in 1966 than in 1965. This slower growth is attributable in part to monetary restraint, which caused the post ponement or reduction of various borrowings, and in part to increased state-local revenues. New municipal security issues raised $11 billion in gross receipts. Approximately onethird of these issues went for educational pur poses— somewhat less than the year before— and another one-third was split between water and sewage projects and highway and other transportation projects. There was also a shift in the composition of purchases. Higher yields made municipals more attractive to individual buyers and so households bought $4 billion of these securities, while restrictive monetary policy limited the commercial banks to ab normally low purchases of only $2 billion. Tumult and flexibility The first impression of 1966 is one of change and tumult in the capital markets. But the year also exhibited something else— the marvelous flexibility of the nation’s financial system. Here were markets which faced simul taneously a record demand for finance and a restrictive monetary policy which bore most heavily upon the prime sources of funds, the banks and the nonbank financial institutions. Yet the markets permitted, albeit with some grinding of gears, a successful shift to alterna tive channels which had not been so fully uti lized before. With a combination of more direct issues and suitable price adjustments in the form of different relative yields, a record volume of financing was accomplished. This does not mean that all borrowers or lenders were happy with developments during the year; this cannot be expected, since some adjustment of plans is inherent in the adjustment process. But the record for 1966 confirmed that the financial markets can respond to changes in relative prices of borrowed funds by re arranging patterns of financial flows around the bottlenecks that inevitably arise. February 1967 MONTHLY REVIEW Disintermediation proportion of total bank lending, businesses’ is not likely to be re share was much greater— over two-thirds, membered by the nation’s bankers as compared with two-fifths the year before. Less just another year. True, developments in a than half of the major industrial sectors in number of respects suggested a retelling of creased their borrowings more rapidly during 1965’s banking story— most notably a further 1966— most notably primary metals, machin vigorous demand for credit on the part of busi ery, transportation equipment, chemicals, and nesses, and additional changes in the groundfood processors. But with the exception of rules designed to affect the ability of banks commodity dealers and the construction in and other financial institutions to compete for dustry, borrowings by other industry groups the supply of loanable funds. But there were were still very substantial by historical stand some new twists as well. ards. In 1965, the combined effect of market forces and regulatory changes enabled com The continuing strength of business loan mercial banks to sharply expand their share demand reflected the continued sharp rise in of funds raised in and supplied to the credit plant-equipment outlays, the need to finance markets. In 1966, however, these factors higher levels of inventory, and stepped-up tax tended to reduce the banks’ role quite sub payments— all of which widened the gap be stantially. The process involved, known as tween outlays and internally generated funds “disintermediation,” meant in effect that busi and increased the need for external financing. nesses, households and governments reduced Nevertheless, banks accounted for a smaller both their deposit flows into the banking sys proportion of business’ expanded credit needs tem and their borrowings from the banking in 1966, due in part to a progressive stiffening system. in both price and non-price terms of lending. (The prime rate rose from 4 Vi percent in Jan As suppliers of credit, commercial banks uary to 6.0 percent in August.) Reflecting accounted for only one-fifth (about $17 bil these changes, the average rate on short-term lion) of the total funds supplied to the credit business loans made by banks in major finan markets in 1966— a little more than half the cial centers increased by somewhat more than proportion realized during the previous year. And, in marked contrast to each preceding a percentage point (to 6.31 percent) from De year of the 1961-66 business expansion, bank cember to December, and the proportion of credit growth, at a 6-percent annual rate, was loans made at less than 6 percent dropped slower than the pace of either total debt or from 84 percent to 3 percent over that same of GNP. period. N in e t e e n six t y - six Business boom Boom curbed The business sector, in 1966 as in 1965, accounted for most of the rise in bank credit, notwithstanding the absence of the special fac tors, such as the dock strike and threat of a steel strike, which contributed to 1965’s ex ceptionally large rise in borrowings. At $10 billion, the net gain in business loans fell somewhat short of 1965’s increase, but as a During the first seven months of the year, however, business loans expanded at an an nual rate of 22 percent (30 percent in June and July) and gave little evidence of moderat ing in the face of higher borrowing costs. This upsurge may have been due to a strong expectational element in loan demand, as corporate treasurers correctly anticipated higher costs FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN F R A N C IS C O of raising funds not only from banks but in the bond markets as well— a consideration underscored by the late-summer rise in bond yields to 40-year highs. In fact, to meet the heavy business demands for funds, banks greatly accelerated the liquidation of their se curity portfolios— particularly U. S. Govern ments— and this factor itself contributed to the runup in yields. Concerned over the implications of these trends for orderly conditions in the security markets, as well as for the banks’ own liquid ity, and concerned that the rapid rise in business loans was contributing to inflationary pressures, the Federal Reserve System moved in midsummer to curb the growth of business lending. One important measure was the let ter of September 1, which strongly urged banks to curb their business loans while at the same time assuring them that the discount window would stand ready to assist in adjust ing their positions if necessary to forestall a further liquidation of securities. The restraining action taken by the banks and the easing of market pressures generally quickly reduced the growth in business loans, to a 5 Vi-percent annual rate in the final quar ter of the year, and made possible the with- B a n ks s u p p ly only half as much credit as in ’65, despite business-loan boom B i l l i o n s of D o l l a r s drawal of the Federal Reserve letter on Decem ber 28. Other demands on banks While business again obtained the lion’s share of bank credit in 1966, consumers and mortgage borrowers also found accommoda tion, but, like their business counterparts, at a higher cost and reduced volume. Consumer loans rose by a little over $3 billion (8 per cent), with two-thirds of the increase repre senting auto financing. On balance, however, banks financed only about two-fifths of con sumer credit, down from the one-half share maintained in the earlier years of this business expansion. Mortgage portfolios rose by less than $5 billion (9 percent), as the banks just about maintained their one-fifth proportion of a sharply reduced total of real-estate loans. While banks were holding their own, non bank financial institutions found their com bined share declining sharply; savings-andloan associations alone suffered a one-half re duction in net mortgage lending, and thereby saw their share decline from one-third to less than one-fifth of the total. February 1967 MONTHLY REVIEW B u sin e ss-lo a n g ro w th slo w s s h a rp ly in late '66 after first-half upsurge . . . loan demand sparked by boom in durable-goods manufacturing Cum ula te d Net C h a n ge B ill io n s of D o lla r s C u m u la te d C h a n g e B ill io n s ol D o lla r s - M ETALSM A C H IN E R Y T RAN SPO RT. E Q U IP M E N T OTHER D U R A BLE M A N U F A C T U R IN G NONDURABLE M A N U F A C T U R IN G I TRADETRANSP. M IN IN G ■ II n 1964 Banks also sharply moderated their acqui sition of state-local government obligations during 1966. As holdings of tax-exempt se curities rose by only about $3 billion, banks garnered less than a third of the net increase in municipal debt obligations— substantially less than the average share of two-thirds real ized by banks in the earlier years of the cur rent expansion. But more significant was the accelerated liquidation of U. S. Government security portfolios, as banks found their growth of re serves and deposits insufficient to meet the credit demands of businesses, consumers and local governments. Most of the $3*/^-billion net decline in holdings of U. S. Governments centered in short-term issues, and this decline thus pushed one traditional measure of bank liquidity, the ratio of short-term governments to deposits, to a postwar low. (Another mea sure, the loan-deposit ratio, reached a yearend record of 67 percent for all member banks and 84 percent for New York City member banks.) But in the face of a slowdown in loan growth, a generally improving reserve 1985 1966 C O N S T R U C T IO N 1966 position, and a rallying bond market, banks exerted considerable effort to improve their liquidity positions during the closing months of the year. Pressure on deposit side “Liquidity” depends, of course, upon sources of funds as well as their uses, and it was on the sources or deposit side of the ledger that some of the more interesting chap ters in 1966’s banking story were written. De mand deposits rose by only $V2 billion, just a fraction of the 1965 increase, as households and other sectors held working balances to a minimum while shifting funds into highyielding time deposits and other debt instru ments. (In fact, households and governments actually reduced their holdings of demand balances and currency.) On the other hand, time and savings de posits again showed a substantial increase, but at $ 11 billion, the gain was little more than half that of 1965. The slower growth in bank reserves, the growing squeeze on business funds, and the rise in market interest rates all contributed to this slowdown in time-de- FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FR A N C IS C O posit flows. In addition, advancing rates on money-market instruments reduced the com petitive attractiveness of deposits subject to the ceilings of Regulation Q— 4 percent on passbook savings and, until late July, 5V2 percent on other time deposits. In July, however, the ceiling was rolled back to 5 percent on multiple-maturity time deposits (other than savings) of 90 days or more, and to 4 percent on such deposits of less than 90 days maturity. In August, a further rollback, from 5Vi percent to 5 per cent, was effected on single-maturity time de posits (other than passbook savings) of less than $100,000. These moves, which were ac companied by the imposition of interest-rate ceilings on savings-and-loan associations and mutual savings banks, were specific ally designed to maintain “a viable com petitive balance” between banks and other depositary type institutions and, hopefully, to assure a greater flow of funds to housing. D isin te rm e d ia tio n : banks account for smaller share of credit flows C o m m e r c i a l - B a n k S h a r e of C r ed it Fl o w s ( P e r c e n t ) 0 10 44 20 30 40 50 60 (In 1966, the gross inflow of deposits into S&L’s increased by 15 percent, but withdraw als were up by over 34 percent.) In a series of related moves, reserves on bank time deposits in excess of $5 million (other than passbook savings) were raised twice, from 4 to 5 percent in July, and to 6 percent the next month. By raising the cost of funds to banks, the moves also were de signed to serve as an added inducement to curtail business lending. More significantly, no action was taken to relieve the pressure on large-denomination time certificates when the mid-summer rise in market yields reduced the competitive at tractiveness of these instruments. The result, in line with the intention of the monetary au thorities, was additional pressure on banks, from the supply side, to moderate the pace of business lending. As a result, large-denomi nation CD’s declined by about $3 V2 billion between mid-August and mid-December, to a level below that which prevailed at the be ginning of the year. But some recovery was evident in the closing weeks of 1966, as the competitive attractiveness of CD’s was en hanced by a fall in market yields from their summer highs. On balance, commercial banks again end ed the year with the lion’s share of the funds (over 60 percent) accruing to depositarytype institutions. However, the principal mes sage of the attrition of deposits in late sum mer and fall was clear: banks could no longer count with certainty on their ability to “buy liquidity,” through such instruments as CD’s, at whatever price dictated by market forces. February 1967 MONTHLY REVIEW The W est: Boom Western economy surged upwards in 1966, as personal income in the region rose about 9 percent to almost $95 billion. Measured by the yardstick of personal income, the Twelfth District’s 1966 performance was somewhat better than that of other areas, and it was half again as good as the region’s very respectable 1965 performance. Nonetheless, the West like the rest of the country showed scattered signs of sluggishness towards yearend. T he Retail sales were generally buoyant in Twelfth District States during the year, the 8-percent increase being roughly in line with the national rate of gain. Auto sales were somewhat stronger in the West than else where, despite a decline in new-car registra tions, but sales at other durable-goods stores lagged the national pace. The upsurge in income and sales was based on the strong trend of employment in practi cally every industry except construction. As total employment rose 5 percent— almost equal to the total gain of the two preceding years— substantial increases in activity were recorded by the manufacturing, services, and government sectors. Farm employment was off, however, and construction jobs declined by 4 percent over the year. Some slackening in the pace of the busi ness expansion showed up in the employment figures as the year progressed. Total employ ment in District States jumped by 1Vi percent during the first quarter but grew some what more slowly in succeeding quarters of the year. Thus, with the usual growth in the number of job-seekers, the unemployment rate rose gradually from a second-quarter figure of 4 Vi percent to a fourth-quarter rate of 5 percent, which was no better than the rate prevailing in late 1965. A gain in the stratosphere Aerospace manufacturing, the locus of Western troubles in 1963-64, was the locus of Western prosperity in 1965-66. Employment in this crucial industry rose by 138,000 be tween its early-1965 low point and late-1966 peak, and it rose by 90,000 in 1966 alone. The aerospace boom was the key element in California’s growth, where it accounted for one-half of all new manufacturing jobs, and even more so in Washington’s upsurge, where it accounted for nine out of ten new factory jobs. This improvement was partly traceable to the upturn in new defense business garnered by District firms, which increased by 8 V2 percent in fiscal 1966 after two years of de cline. (In the rest of the country, however, new Defense Department orders jumped 42 per cent in fiscal 1966.) This gain, which was offset only to a small extent by a decline in space awards, signalled an end to the problems which had beset the industry from late 1962 until early 1965. The aerospace improvement was also sup ported by a continued influx of new orders for commercial aircraft. This order inflow was so E m p lo ym e n t s u rg e s in first half but rises more slowly after midyear T h o u sa n d s of P e r s o n s 2400 - Rotio Scale 2000 1800 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 M AN U FACTU RIN G / 600 D e fe n se FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FR A N C IS C O strong that it boosted backlogs at two major District firms by three-fourths (to $6Vi bil lion) within a year’s time— and it was in fact so strong that it caused severe scheduling and financial problems for these manufacturers. The order upsurge accentuated the problem of securing adequately trained workers, and it thus necessitated intensive training pro grams and extensive recruiting efforts. More over, as orders continued to mount during the year, the difficulties of securing jet engines and equipment from subcontractors in creased. Aircraft deliveries thus fell progres sively behind schedule, and by late Decem ber these delays prompted adjustments in pro duction scheduling at several firms. Still in the depths The sagging fortunes of the construction in dustry stood in sharp contrast to the growth record of other regional industries. On the heels of a slight 1965 decline, the industry suffered an even sharper decline in 1966 as new contract awards dropped from $9.0 bil lion to $8.2 billion over the year. Nonresidential and heavy construction expanded, but not as rapidly as elsewhere, and the growth in these sectors was far offset by the decline in the moribund housing industry. Residential construction contracts fell from $3.8 billion in 1965 to about $2.7 billion in 1966. This slump reflected both the nation wide difficulties of financing mortgages in a tight money market and the continued regionwide softness in housing markets. Even after several years of declining construction activity, demand factors remained relatively weak in the Western market— witness the third-quar ter rental-vacancy rate of 10.2 percent (vs. a 6.8 percent rate elsewhere) and the homeowner-vacancy rate of 2.3 percent (vs. 1.3 percent elsewhere). The drop in activity was especially large in Southern California, with a 40-percent decline for the year— which was not surprising, since this region had built up the largest surplus of housing in the boom of the early 1960’s. INDEXES OF IN D U S TR IA L PRODUCTION — (1957-59 = TW E L F TH D IS TR IC T 100) 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966p 86 93 96 94 90 92 112 76 86 91 99 102 119 99 97 105 92 111 127 105 101 105 86 100 128 103 98 105 86 117 129 96 93 102 85 132 140 93r 89r 114 116 138 145 110 95 128 130 140 A lum in um C r u d e P etroleum R e fin ed Petroleum Natural G as 101 96 101 104 101 95 104 112 97 96 108 121 107 96 111 127r 118 97 112 14 4 r 135 97 115 148r 150 10 2 r 120 147r 165 1 11 122 148 Lumber D o u g l a s Fir P l y w o o d 109 118 98 120 95 132 98 142 98r 160 108r 177 107r 180 104 180 C a n n e d Fruit C an n e d V e ge tab le s M e at Sugar Flou r C r e a m e r y Bu tter 112 95 101 108 102 102 111 101 107 105 102 112 11 6 r 89 111 107 99 120 1 21 r 106 112 113 101 119 108r 96 115 120 94 103 141 100 126 138 96 T03 109r 97r 126 r 13 7 r 92 96 133 110 130 132 91 84 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION Copper Lead Zinc S ilv e r G old S teel In g o ts p— Preliminary, r— Revised. Source: Federal Reserve Bank of San Fiancisco. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN F R A N C IS C O A e ro sp a ce boom sp a rk s re g io n a l re c o v e ry as defense employment jumps, but inflow of defense orders lags behind inflow into other regions D c f e n s t - S p o c c A w a rd s T h o u sa n d s of W orke r* 900 30 O the r U.S. 20 10 500 1961 1962 1963 1964 I96S 1966 1967 Nonresidential building activity rose 4 per cent above the 1965 level, to $3 billion in new contract awards. Sharp gains in factory and hospital building, and the continued boom in office building, offset declines in scattered sectors elsewhere. The high level of industrial building, a nationwide phenomenon, was characterized in the region by a building boom in aerospace factories, oil refineries, and alu minum reduction plants. Heavy construction added a 9-percent gain in 1966 to its even stronger 1965 per formance as new contracts rose to $2V2 bil lion over the year. Fewer highway and bridge contracts were recorded during the year, but big construction gains occurred at dams, water-supply systems, and electric-power sys tems. Tied to construction The Western lumber industry, tied as it is to the national construction industry, suffered declines in output and prices during 1966. Lumber activity spurted briefly during the spring months because of temporary strength in residential construction, strike hedge-buy ing, and heavy military and industrial de 0 1964 1965 1966 mand. But from then until fall, orders plum meted in the industry as housing activity de clined nationwide and as customer inventories were liquidated following the industry’s mid year labor-eontract settlement. In the fall months, the prices of key grades of Douglas fir (which had been 25 percent above year-before levels in April) were some what below year-before marks, and plywood prices showed even greater gyrations. Caught in the squeeze between declining prices and rising labor and stumpage costs, some smaller Northwest mills closed down during this pe riod. The price situation improved somewhat in the last two months of the year in line with a slight improvement in orders and further cutbacks in supply, but price quotations still remained below year-earlier levels. The Western steel industry, responding to heavy demand from the nonresidential and heavy construction sectors as well as from the ordnance and other defense sectors, raised output by 2 percent to 6.8 million tons for the year. But Western output was supplemented by a heavy influx of imports, as foreign pro ducers increased their share of the Western FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN F R A N C IS C O steel market from 22 to 25 percent over the year. Despite the growing tide of imports, do mestic steel producers boosted the price of heavy plate to $2.95 a ton in March, and the price of hot- and cold-rolled steel and strip to $3.00 a ton in August. These price boosts pushed the steel price index up about 2 per cent during the course of the year. Busy farmers and canners Another major regional industry, agricul ture, recorded a 7-percent rise in marketing receipts, to $6.5 billion, because of a good gain in crops and an even stronger rise in livestock receipts. But this gain was smaller than the national increase, and for that mat ter all regional states did not share in the boom; receipts of Arizona farmers were hurt by a decline in cotton acreage and receipts of Idaho farmers were hurt by reductions in wheat output and potato prices. The volume of livestock marketings rose during 1966 as an increased volume of beef and poultry offset fewer marketings of hogs, calves, and sheep. The upsurge in meat prices also induced a sharp gain in imports as, for example, beef imports rose by 12 percent and canned meat imports by 40 percent. Crop out put meanwhile declined by 5 percent from the 1965 level, as crop yields fell off somewhat and as harvested acreage dropped slightly to 19.4 million acres despite an acreage increase in Northwest states. The number of workers on Western farms continued to drop during 1966 as average monthly employment fell 6 percent to 590,000. Most of this decline occurred because of a drop in the number of farm operators and un paid family workers, but some of the decline was also due to the use of fewer foreign con tract workers in California. Wage rates of hired workers rose in step with the national 8percent gain. Although some Western states recorded below-average increases in wage rates, the level of rates in all of these states remained slightly or (in some cases) sub stantially above the U. S. level. Western canners spent a busy year— in contrast to their poor 1965 performance— processing a record volume of fruits and veg etables. Suppliers of raw materials, especially processing tomatoes, were far more abundant. The output of tomatoes rose 28 percent to 3.2 million tons, with two-thirds of the crop be ing harvested by machine, and the output of peaches also rose sharply as Washington rebounded from its 1965 crop failure and as California eased controls over output. In view of this more abundant supply, prices paid by canners were generally lower than in 1965. Contract prices for tomatoes were lower than the unusually high prices which were offered to growers in 1965 because of the supply uncertainty created then by the termination of the bracero program. Contract prices for most California deciduous fruits were also lower than in 1965— except for cling-stone peaches, which advanced in price despite the heavier crop. Strength in extraction The region’s nonferrous-metals producers expanded their production during the year, H o u sin g a c tiv ity slu m p s disastrously as demand slows and money tightens T t io u ia n d i of O s a l H ii f U nits February 1967 MONTHLY REVIEW but not fast enough to keep up with the rec ord-breaking pace of military and civilian de mand. Producer prices remained under heavy pressure, but prices were maintained by the release of considerable quantities of copper and aluminum from government stockpiles and by the establishment of export controls over copper. More than 400,000 tons of cop per and half that amount of aluminum were sold from government stockpiles to meet civil ian and defense “hardship” needs. Shortly after the year ended, however, cop per and aluminum producers finally pushed through price increases. Refined copper prices rose from 36 to 38 cents a pound, despite the release of another 150,000 tons of stockpile copper, and aluminum ingot prices rose from 2 \V i to 25 cents a pound. Western crude-oil producers increased their output by 10 percent during the year; Cali fornia producers provided most of this in crease, but Alaskan producers showed an even sharper percentage gain. The increase in Western supplies of crude supplied a modest 2-percent rise in refinery output and obviated the need to increase crude imports. However, Arabian and Canadian producers increased their shares of the import market. The region’s industrial boom meanwhile supported a 6percent increase in demand for refined prod ucts, and Western refineries also boosted their shipments of assorted oil products to other states and their shipments of jet fuel to the Pacific war zone. On balance, then, the West posted a very respectable record in 1966, considering the deep and prolonged recession in its important residential-construction sector. The strong im provement in the aerospace and extractive industries, the other major foundations of the regional economy, brought about rapid gains in employment and income and at least a stand-off in the never-ending struggle against unemployment. The continued recent strength of these industries presaged brisk gains for 1967 as well— assuming at least a modicum of recovery in the still-moribund housing sector. W e ste rn ste e l in d u stry raises output in response to construction and defense demand 49 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FR A N C IS C O The West: Money N 1966, as in 1965, major Twelfth Dis trict banks trailed behind the fast lending pace set by large banks in the rest of the na tion. Even so, they posted a respectable 6percent gain for the year, despite a somewhat erratic lending pattern: a small first-quarter increase, followed successively by a sharp gain, a net reduction, and finally another sharp gain in the final quarter of the year. District banks meanwhile made a small net addition to their security holdings, whereas leading banks nationally reduced their investments to meet loan demand. Due to this diverse movement, therefore, Western banks expand ed their total bank credit (loans plus invest ments) at a somewhat higher rate than did their counterparts elsewhere. (These data refer to the weekly reporting bank series un less otherwise noted.) Western banks, in common with other banks, faced intense competition last year for time-and-savings deposits— for consumertype time deposits the competition probably was more severe in the West than anywhere else in the country. Yet, major District banks I ended 1966 with a 7-percent increase in total time-and-savings deposits, almost double the rate of gain experienced by major banks else where. This stronger performance was partly due to their success in posting a small secondhalf increase in large-denomination certifi cates of deposit, in contrast to the very large attrition in CD’s which occurred nationally. On the other hand, Western banks fared less well in demand-deposit growth than other leading banks, and in fact they ended the year with a small net decline in demand deposits. From an earnings standpoint, 1966 was a good year for Western banking. The upward movement in interest rates on loans and in vestments more than offset the higher average interest costs which banks had to pay on their time deposits. Preliminary 1966 data indicate that most District banks substantially in creased their net operating earnings over the previous year’s depressed net-earnings level, despite 1966’s massive shift in deposits from lower-interest bearing savings accounts to higher-interest bearing time certificates. From another standpoint— growth in bank T o ta l b a n k c re d it ris e s , but more slowly than in previous year, as District weekly reporting banks lag in all loan categories B i ll io n s of D o l l a n 1966 P e rce nt C h a n g e 1965 P e rc e n t C h a n g * February 1967 MONTHLY REVIEW D u ra b le -g o o d s manufacturers spark strong gain in business loans M ilita n t of D olla rs -100 Du r ab le 0 200 100 300 Goods Nond ur a b le Mining 1965 1966 Trad* T r a n s p . a n d U ti l it ie s C o n s tr u c t io n Oth er B u s i n e s s •4— B a r k e n ' Acceptance* numbers— the record was somewhat different. Only 3 new banks were opened (as against 28 in 1965 and 65 in 1964) and even that growth was offset by a certain number of mergers and consolidations, so that the District ended the year with 10 fewer banks than it had when the year began. New-branch activity also fell off— 170 branch openings (and 5 closings) in 1966 as against 237 openings in 1965. This hesitancy to expand banking offices probably reflected management’s increasing cost con sciousness and intensified deposit competi tion, as well as some reaction to the very rapid expansion pace of the earlier years of this decade. Limited reserve pressure Recourse to the discount window by Twelfth District member banks was relatively limited in light of the stringent monetary pol icy prevailing throughout most of 1966. De spite a third-quarter peak of $57 million, dis counting averaged only $35 million for the year as a whole. Excess reserves meanwhile averaged $31 million for the year. Thus, Dis trict banks recorded net borrowed reserves of only $4 million in 1966— a mere fraction of the $278-million total for all member banks — and they actually posted net free reserves in both the second and fourth quarters of the year. (All data are on a daily average basis.) Some reserve pressure was reflected in Dis trict Federal-funds transactions— purchases and sales of uncommitted bank balances on deposit with Federal Reserve Banks. The twelve major District banks in the reporting sample borrowed about $9 million from banks in 1966 through net Fed-funds purchases (daily average basis). A number of these Dis trict banks resold to Government securities dealers some of the Fed funds they purchased from banks, but others purchased Fed funds primarily to adjust their own reserve positions. West Coast banks continued to rank second —next to New York City banks—as a moneymarket center for Fed-funds transactions. Seven leading Western banks accounted for 19 percent of the rising volume of gross inter bank Fed-funds transactions in 1966, and an even higher proportion (23 percent) of twoway transactions. (The latter is the amount of offsetting sales and purchases of funds made by an individual bank and indicates the degree of “trading” in funds— as opposed to purchases or sales to adjust a bank’s own re serve position.) Moreover, through frequent Fed-funds sales to U. S. Government securi ties dealers, Western banks broadened their participation in this sector of the money mar ket as well. Last year, major District banks were gen erally successful in halting the accelerated deterioration in liquidity which occurred the previous year. In 1966, their loan expansion of $1.6 billion was approximately the same as their increase in daily average deposits. Therefore, their loan-deposit ratio moved during the year within a very narrow range— from 71 to 72 percent— while loan-deposit ratios elsewhere continued to edge upward. But according to another yardstick, the ratio of bank holdings of short-term U. S. Govern ment securities to total deposits, District banks suffered some loss of liquidity. This FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FR A N C IS C O ratio moved from 4.7 percent at year-end 1965 to a low of 2.0 percent in May, and then up to 4.5 percent at the close of 1966— slightly below the ratio of other leading banks. Business loans predominate Business demands for credit accounted for the vast bulk of the District loan expansion, as commercial-industrial loan portfolios of weekly reporting banks rose by more than $1 billion over the year. Even so, this 12-percent gain fell short of 1965’s business loan increase — and fell short of the increase recorded by leading banks elsewhere— largely because of the West’s sharp third-quarter decline in busi ness borrowing. On the other hand, the West bounced back with a sizable fourth-quarter gain in commercial-industrial loans, in con trast to a continued lag in business loan ex pansion nationally. Notwithstanding the lower over-all increase in the volume of business borrowing, durable and non-durable goods manufacturers relied more heavily on bank credit than in the pre ceding year— reflecting the strength of these sectors in the District’s economy and the fail ure of internally generated funds to keep pace with their expanding financial needs. These factors were particularly evident in the sub stantial increase in bank loans to manufac turers of transportation equipment and other fabricated-metal products. (Increased financ ing needs in this sector also reflected the large inventory build-ups created by delays in de liveries of parts by subcontractors.) On the other hand, the public utilities and construc tion sectors added less to their bank debt than they did in 1965. Business borrowing in the West (and every where else) became progressively more costly in 1966 as the rate charged prime borrowers was increased and as rates charged other bor rowers were realigned with the higher prime rate. The average interest rate on short-term business loans made by banks in major Dis trict cities rose from 5.27 percent in Decem ber 1965 to 6.35 percent in December 1966. But the average rate leveled off in the fourth quarter, and non-price terms of lending also tended to firm less than they did in earlier quarters of the year. Mortgages remain unpopular District weekly reporting banks expanded their mortgage portfolios last year at only half the 1965 rate of increase, and for the second successive year, these banks had a substan tially lower rate of expansion in this category than leading banks nationally. The decline in banks’ mortgage lending activity partly re flected the strong demand for credit from the business sector, which, combined with a high loan-deposit ratio, made banks reluctant to channel their limited funds into long-term mortgage commitments. The drop in savingsand-loan mortgage activity, on the other hand, was related more closely to the sharp decline in savings inflows. For both banks and S&L’s, L e a d in g W e ste rn b a n k s account for one-fifth of Fed-funds dealings B i l l i o n * of D o l t o n February 1967 MONTHLY REVIEW S ELEC TED A S S E T AND L IA B IL ITY ITEM S OF W EEK LY REPORTING LARGE BANKS IN TH E TW E L F TH FEDERAL RESERVE D IS TR IC T (dollar amount in millions) Twelfth District Net Change Dec. 2 9 ,1965 Dec. 30, 1964 to to Dec. 28. 1966 Dec. 29. 1965 Twelfth District Outstanding Dec. 28, 1966 Dollars Total loans an d investm ents Loans adjusted a n d investm ents Loans adjusted Com m ercial an d in d u strial loans Real estate loan s A g ricu ltu ra l loans Loans to n o n b an k fin a n cia l institutions Loans for p u rchasin g or c a rry in g securities To brokers a n d d ealers: To others: Loans to fo reign banks O ther loan s (m ain ly consum er) Total investm ents U. S. Governm ent securities Treasury b ills Treasury certificates of indebtedness Treasury notes and bonds m aturin g: W ithin I year 1 to 5 years A fte r 5 years O ther securities Total deposits (less cash items) Total dem and deposits (less cash items) Dem and deposits adjusted Tim e an d s a v in g s deposits S a v in g s deposits Other time deposits IPC C a p ita l accounts Total a sse ts/ lia b ilitie s an d ca p ita l accounts to Dec. 28, 1966 Percent Percent Percent $ 4 0 ,8 4 9 4 0 ,2 2 9 2 9 ,2 9 7 1 0 ,7 0 0 9 ,2 2 8 1 ,1 5 4 1 ,6 1 5 + + + + + + — 1 ,7 6 7 1 ,7 4 6 1 ,6 1 7 1 ,1 7 9 207 19 176 4 .5 + 4 .5 + 5.8 + + 1 2 .4 2 .3 + 1 .7 + ' ' ' 9 .8 + 7 .6 + 7 .5 + 9 .5 + 1 6 .5 + 5.1 + 4 .3 + 1 0 .8 + 4.1 + 4 .0 + 7 .3 + 1 4 .8 + 9 .9 + 3 .9 + 2 .3 509 1 69 297 6 ,1 0 6 1 0 ,9 3 2 5 ,2 4 7 1 ,0 5 5 99 + — + + + — + + 279 1 1 157 129 457 30 99 + 1 2 1 .3 — 0 .6 0 .3 + 2 .6 + 1.2 + — 8 .0 2 .9 + — + — + + — — 3 1 .6 1 4 .0 5 .6 9 .3 2 .9 11.2 1 5 .6 0 — — — 637 2 ,0 1 8 1 ,4 3 8 5 ,6 8 5 4 0 ,1 1 8 1 5 ,4 7 6 1 4 ,1 9 7 2 4 ,6 4 2 15,115 6 ,0 6 2 3 ,4 3 4 5 0 ,0 0 3 — + — + + — — + — + + + 1 38 52 500 586 1 ,3 7 6 262 332 1 ,6 3 8 1 ,3 9 9 2 ,9 0 4 68 2 ,2 4 7 — — — + + + — + + + + + + 8.0 2 2 .7 6 .3 2 4 .4 6.8 0 .7 0 .6 1 2 .6 8.3 3 4 .2 6.1 7 .0 however, sluggish mortgage demand in South west areas contributed to the slump. Western banks made fewer mortgage loans as the year progressed; their net increase in outstandings dropped from $168 million in the first half of 1966 to $39 million in the second half of the year. Data on outstandings, however, understate actual participation in mortgage markets, for many District banks sold a very substantial volume of both newly-made and seasoned mortgages out of their portfo lios to institutional investors. As banks and S&L’s curtailed their lending, mortgage recordings in major metropolitan Other U.S. Net Change Dec. 29,1965 + — + + — — + — + + + 17.8 2 .6 2 5 .8 11.5 3 .6 1.7 2 .3 7.1 8.5 9 2 .0 2 .0 6.1 _ 1.5 7 .6 3 .6 3 0 — 3 .6 — 6 .8 — 1 0 .0 — 19.1 + 1.8 — 1 3 .5 — 0 .5 + 2 .3 + 0 .8 — 1.0 + 4.1 — 6 .4 + 2 0 .9 + 4 .6 - f 6 .3 areas dropped about one-third below the 1965 level — and probably would have dropped even more if home-owners and builders had not accepted more first and second mortgages themselves in order to sell their properties. In this situation, mortgage interest rates rose sharply; by fall, conventional rates on single family homes were almost one full percentage point above year-ago levels. Consumers borrow less The slackened pace of consumer instalment lending which prevailed in 1965 continued into 1966. Fewer new-car sales meant less FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN F R A N C IS C O demand for automobile financing, and auto paper thus accounted for only 50 percent of the total increase in consumer instalment loans, as against 56 percent in 1965. But this shift was partly offset by a very rapid rise in loans on other consumer goods paper, which accounted for one-half of the 1966 increase as against one-fourth in 1965. The growth in loans on other consumergoods paper reflected the rapid spread of credit-card programs, as an increasing num ber of Western banks committed themselves to participate in such programs. One major California-based system, which already boasts two million card-holders, during the year signed up co-operating banks in a number of District cities as well as in Boston, Philadel phia and Dallas; a Washington bank initiated its own plan; and a four-bank California sys tem meanwhile prepared to start another plan in mid-1967. Further shift from Treasuries District weekly reporting banks ended 1966 with a small net increase in their total security holdings, but with a continued shift in the com position of their portfolios. U. S. Government security holdings declined 8 percent, somewhat less than in 1965, with the reductions taking W e ste rn b a n k s add to C D ’s in contrast to attrition elsewhere B il li o n s of D o ll a r s place in long-term issues and in notes and bonds maturing within one year. Total short term holdings of Treasuries, however, were approximately the same magnitude as at yearend 1965. In 1966, as in the previous year, District banks increased their net purchases of other securities. Banks added to their obligations of states and political subdivisions in the first half of the year, but reduced their holdings in the last six months. Moreover, they followed a similar pattern in acquiring Federal Agency participation certificates— additions in the first part of the year and liquidations in the last half. As a result of these diverse move ments between U. S. direct-guaranteed securi ties and all other securities, District banks ended the year with approximately the same volume of total investments, but with a heavi er weighting in securities other than Treasury issues. Mixed deposit experience Western bankers, like their counterparts elsewhere, focused their major attention last year on the competition for deposits. The ex panding loan portfolios of District banks did not bring about a commensurate increase in demand deposits. Although demand deposits rose by an average $77 million during 1966 on a daily average basis, the volume of both total demand deposits (less cash items in the process of collection) and demand deposits adjusted (less U. S. Government and inter bank deposits) was lower at year-end than at the end of the previous year. In general, then, District banks did little more than hold their own as far as checking-account deposits were concerned. But District banks were far more successful in attracting time-and-savings deposits, de spite the intense competition for savings funds that prevailed throughout 1966— both from other depositary-type institutions and other February 1967 MONTHLY REVIEW D rop in m o rtg a g e activity mirrors deep slump in savings inflows shifts ensued throughout the year between these two deposit categories: savings deposits decreased $1.4 billion at District banks and other time deposits IPC increased by $2.9 billion, with about one-fifth of this increase being in large-denomination time certificates. In complete reversal of the 1965 pattern, when New York City banks dominated the issuance of large-denomination negotiable CD’s, Western banks in 1966 posted a larger dollar increase in CD’s than their Eastern colleagues. Moreover, they added to these de posits even in the second half of the year, at a time when New York City banks had an attrition of over $1.5 billion. District banks did lose some CD’s at certain times during the July-December period when interest rate dif ferentials were strongly adverse, but they managed to maintain far more stability in these deposits than did other major banks. forms of investments. The gain in total timeand-savings deposits was over $1.6 billion from December to December, and even high er ($2 billion) on a daily average basis. Al though this was well below the record 1965 increase, District banks’ performance in this area was far better than that of their com petitors in the savings-and-loan field. There were widely divergent rates of growth among time-deposit categories, due partly to differences in permissible rates un der Regulation Q, and partly to rate differen tials between Regulation Q ceilings and other money market rates. Early in 1966, a large number of District banks offered various forms of time certificates, tailored to attract individuals’ savings, at rates substantially higher than the 4-percent maximum rate on regular savings deposits. As a result, large In one important category— deposits of states and political subdivisions— District banks barely held the level reached in 1965, when they experienced a 20-percent increase in such deposits. Despite greater-than-seasonal gains in April, public deposits thereafter declined rapidly, dipping below the year-ago level before rising seasonally in December. A lower volume of treasurers’ unused funds, due to delayed bond issues, and the unfavorable rate differential against CD’s in the last half of the year accounted for this failure to at tract public deposits. Nevertheless, District banks still held a far higher proportion of public time deposits than did their counter parts elsewhere. Dismal S&L experience W estern savings-and-loan associations came upon hard times during 1966. Their net gain in savings over the entire year was a meager $V^ billion — in contrast to a $2billion increase in 1965 and gains of almost $4 billion in each of the several preceding years— as savers shifted their funds to greener FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN F R A N C IS C O pastures in bank time accounts and govern ment and corporate securities. The squeeze on District associations was strongest during the spring months; in fact, a net outflow of over $Vi billion actually oc curred during April. Associations thereupon raised their savings dividend rates sharply in an effort to retain funds, and by midsummer this effort began to pay off, as District asso ciations held their own in the face of heavy losses by their counterparts elsewhere throughout the country. But despite this turn around and a late-year improvement in sav ings inflows, the year as a whole was dismal indeed. S&L lending activity was squeezed not only by the decline of new savings but also by the shriveling of other sources of mortgage money. Mortgage repayments declined as new mort gage financing became more expensive and less available, and mortgage sales in the East ern market -— normally an important source of funds to Western associations — all but disappeared. Thus, throughout 1966, newloan volume ran from one-third to one-half below year-ago levels, and loan portfolios D istrict b a n k s m a n a g e to halt deteriorating liquidity situation P ir e in t P* r c« nt 55 LO A N S TO D E P O S I T S U S G O VE R N M E N T S ECUR ITIES W I T H I N ONE Y E A R TO DEPO SITS showed a net gain of only $425 million for the entire year. On balance, the Western financial scene presented in sharp focus the nationwide phe nomenon of a stringent competition for funds taking place within a restrictive policy envi ronment. In the West as elsewhere, money flows generally shifted away from bank and (especially) S&L deposits and into creditmarket channels — and the lion’s share of the funds made available through these shifting channels was absorbed by business bor rowers, at the expense of mortgage and other borrowers. M onthly Review is edited by William Burke. Principal contributors to this issue included: William Burke (U. S. business); Herbert Runyon (fiscal-monetary policy); Ernest Olson (balance of pay ments); Robert Johnston (credit markets); Verle Johnston (U. S. banking); George Dimmler, Donald Snodgrass, John Booth, Joan Walsh, Yvonne Levy, and Adelle Foley (District business); Ruth Wilson (District banking); Paul Ma (District highlights); R, Mansfield (artwork); and Phoebe Fisher (editorial). M onthly Review is published by the Bank’s Research Department: J. Howard Craven, Vice-president; Gault W. Lynn, Director of Research. 56 February 1967 MONTHLY REVIEW Signs of Growth mid-Pacific beaches to mid-Continent mountain ranges, abundant signs of growth were evident throughout Twelfth Dis trict states during 1966. Growth showed up in the tangible form of new schools, dams, fac tories, mine facilities, and airplane designs. First of all, however, growth showed up in the basic statistics. The West, as already indicated, far out paced the rest of the U. S, in terms of employ ment growth. The rest of the country record ed a gain of over 2 percent in total employ ment— roughly in line with the gains in each of the two preceding years— but every West ern region sharply raised its growth rate dur ing the year. The Northwest, with a whopping 7.3-percent gain, far outdistanced every other region. But other Western areas also showed quite respectable increases— 5.8 percent for Northern California, 4.7 percent for Southern California, and 3.8 percent for other District states. Increases in bank lending were not quite so strong as elsewhere. Outside the District, member banks increased their net loans by 9.0 percent; inside the District, the Northwest F rom led the way with a 7.7-percent gain, while California recorded a 6.3-percent gain and other District states a 3.5-percent increase. In all areas, the 1966 monetary squeeze held the growth in bank loans to at least one-third below the 1965 pace. Price pressures were evident in all West ern cities last year, but less so than elsewhere — in large part because of smaller increases in food prices. The consumer price index rose about 3 percent nationally, but the index rose at a slightly slower pace in San Francisco and Seattle and went up by only 2 percent in Los Angeles. In addition to the statistical evidence of Western prosperity, other evidence can be found in the industrial and financial perform ance of Western businessmen. Some of the year’s highlights are given below. California Steel. Each of the West’s three major steel producers made further progress in expanding its facilities in California in 1966. One com pany completed another phase in the con struction of its new 6-million-ton fully inte grated steel complex underway at Richmond, when it placed a 160,000ton-per-year continuous E v e ry W e ste rn re g io n —especially Pacific Northwesthot-dip galvanizing line outpaces rest of nation in employment growth into operation alongside E m p lo y m t n l- P « r c * n t C h o n g * 7.0 r~ the structural-steel fabri cating works opened the 6.0 S o u th e rn C a lifo rn ia previous year. This same N o r t h * ™ C a lif o r n ia 5.0 company also received a Northwtst 01h*r U S O thtr W . l t $20-million contract for 40 construction of the venti lation caisson and trans 30 bay underwater steel-tube sections for the Bay Area 2.0 Rapid Transit District, and a $2.7 million con 1.0 tract from the Bonneville Power Administration for 1966 1964 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN F R A N C ISC O 11.000 tons of tower steel to be used in the 138-mile transmission line linking Federal projects with Columbia River power plants. Another major producer concluded a threeyear $119-million expansion program at its plant at Fontana by adding a new galvanizedsheet mill. The third major producer placed a new high-speed electrolytic tinning line into operation at its Pittsburg works, thereby in creasing its capacity for serving the Western canning industry. This company also plans to install a continuous casting facility at its plant in Torrance, at a cost of $5 to $10 million. Aerospace. One major California-based firm completed its major $75-million expan sion program at the Space System Center in Huntington Beach. Most of the facilities of the center are for the design, development, and production of advanced space systems and large vehicles, particularly for the $ 1.5billion Manned Orbiting Laboratory and $1billion Saturn programs. The same firm also expanded the number of aircraft production lines from two to three at its Long Beach plant, as a result of a tremendous increase in orders for commercial-jet aircraft. The com pany has expanded total employment en gaged in aircraft production from 20,000 to 47.000 over the past two years. Another major California-based firm led the list in defense prime-contract awards for the fifth consecutive year, with 4.6 percent ($1.5 billion) of total awards. The company is producing the $2-billion Poseidon missile (an advanced new nuclear missile for Polaris submarines), and is involved in the proposed $20-billion Nike-X anti-missile system. It was a losing finalist, however, in the design com petition for the 1,800-mile-per-hour super sonic transport (SST-2000), though it spent about $20-million on project planning during the past several years. Petroleum. A huge oil field with a reserve of about 100 million barrels was recently dis covered in a 1,600-acre field southeast of Beverly Hills, a community not usually asso ciated with roughnecking. This field, with a potential value of $300 million in oil and gas income, is one of the biggest discoveries made in California in 15 years. Refinery expansion was substantial during the year. One major firm completed its new $ 80-million refinery at Richmond— a hydro cracking complex capable of converting heavy petroleum oils to light stock by combination with hydrogen. The 62,000-barrel-a-day fa cility will enable the plant to increase its out put of high-octane gasoline by 40 percent, and at the same time sharply increase hydrogen and asphalt production. Major construction and expansion of refinery facilities also took place at Torrance (100,000-barrels-a-day crude oil processing capacity), Benicia (70,000-barrels-a-day) and Martinez (85,000barrels-a-day). Construction. Skyscraper office buildings, hotels, theaters, apartment houses and shop ping centers continued to rise in California cities during the year. In the major metropoli tan areas alone, construction took place on such projects as the following: the $650-million Foster City near San Francisco, the $500million Century City in West Los Angeles, the $500-million “Multifamily Community” in Ventura County; the $350-million Civic Cen ter in Los Angeles, the $200-million Hunting ton Harbor Marina in Los Angeles; the $200million Mariners’ Island in San Mateo, the $200-million Redevelopment in Sacramento, the $ 100-million Golden Gateway Redevel opment in San Francisco, and the $100-million “Rockefeller Center West” in San Fran cisco. San Francisco alone could point to con struction work on six skyscrapers ranging be tween 22 and 58 stories in height— and three of these were bank buildings. Public Works. California continued to lead all other states in its public-works activity. A sampling of these projects included: the $1- February 1967 MONTHLY REVIEW billion 75-mile Bay Area Rapid Transit Sys tem to be completed by 1971 to serve San Francisco, Alameda and Contra Costa coun ties, the $205-million rebuilding and expan sion of the Port of Los Angeles to be com pleted in 1975, the $ 150-million expansion of the Port of Long Beach (the largest manmade berthing facilities in the world) to be completed in 1980, the $70-million 7-mile San Mateo-Hayward bridge to be completed in 1967, and the $12.7 million expansion pro gram for the Port of Oakland (including a 42acre terminal for containerized operations) to be completed in 1968. In addition to current highway work, highway engineers have on their drawing boards a $5-billion plan for about 1,600 miles of freeway to be built in the Los Angeles area by 1980. Engineering work continued on the $2.5billion California Water Plan, which is sched uled to deliver Northern California water to most Southern California counties by 1972. Meanwhile, Congress considered a proposal to construct a $445-million nuclear-fueled desalinization plant off the Southern Cali fornia coast. The 1.8-million kilowatt plant would be designed to convert 150 million gallons of sea water a day; production and transportation costs are estimated at about 27 cents per thousand gallons, as against 20 cents per thousand gallons for water delivered under the California Water Plan. Pacific Northwest Aluminum. A new entrant into the industry began producing last year at a Bellingham (Washington) plant which will eventually rank as one of the largest aluminum plants in the world and the largest in the Pacific North west. The 228,000-ton plant is scheduled for completion in 1968 at a cost of $150 million. Three other major aluminum producers, re sponding to the recent vigorous growth in de mand and to the availability of low-cost hydroelectric power, announced plans for adding a total of 210,000 tons of new capac P rice p re ssu re s felt in West, but less so than elsewhere ity to their existing plants at Wenatchee, Ta coma, and Longview, Washington. In addi tion, a new company announced its intention to build a new 130,000-ton-per-year plant near Anacortes, Altogether, the 500,000 tons of new capacity scheduled to come on stream in Washington by 1970, plus the 40,000 tons which will be added at Troutdale, Oregon, represent 40 percent of the entire nation’s total increase in aluminum capacity. Plywood. A $2.5-million plywood plant, which will have an annual capacity of 80million square feet, is under construction at Kettle Falls, Washington, while a $2-million specialty plywood-products plant with an ini tial capacity of 35 million square feet will be built at Longview. Meanwhile, a new $4-million particleboard plant, designed to produce 50 million square feet a year, went into pro duction in July at La Grande, Oregon. Aircraft. A major Seattle firm plans to dou ble its commercial plane production to 40 a month by 1968 from the present rate of 20, and has already begun to spend $250 million for expansion of plants and equipment in or near Seattle. It also hopes to complete this September a new plant in Everett for the pro duction of the 747 subsonic commercial transport. These “jumbo” jets are scheduled FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN F R A N C IS C O to carry 350 to 490 passengers at speeds of more than 600 miles an hour. This expansion program has pushed Seattle-area aircraft employment to an all-time high of about 90,000— up one-half in the past year, and one-fifth above the 1962 peak. Al though the employment pace began to slow down around year-end— in part because of shortages of skilled labor and delays of engine supply— another upsurge in jobs will occur if the Administration provides funds for build ing the variable-sweep-wing supersonic trans port (SST). Electric Power. Two Northwest power companies completed plans for a $ 118-mil lion, one-million-kilowatt, steam electric-power plant at Centralia, Washington. This huge coal-fueled power complex will be supported by a $ 2 1-million development of adjoining coal fields and power transmission lines. Con struction will begin in 1969, and is scheduled for completion in 1973. Nearby deposits of coal are estimated at 500 million tons, suffi cient to operate at twice the planned capacity for more than 40 years. Construction. New commercial buildings include a 50-story bank office building in Seat tle, a 25-story bank office building in Tacoma, a 25-story hotel-shop complex in Seattle, and Portland’s $ 56-million “Cascade Village”— an urban renewal project consisting of highrise apartments, town houses, shopping cen ter and office building. Public works. Major projects underway last year included: on the Columbia River, the $448-million John Day Dam (a multipur pose project with 1.4-million-kilowatt capac ity), Wells Dam, and the Wanapum Dam; on the Snake River, the Lower Granite Dam, the Lower Monumental Dam, and the Little Goose Dam; and on the Cowlitz River, the Mossyrock Dam. Construction work mean while was completed on the $ 165-million dual-purpose nuclear reactor at Hanford, Washington; the two generators, each with 400.000 kilowatts, combine to form the larg est nuclear-power plant in the world. Mountain States Copper. With copper in short supply, West ern producers concentrated their efforts on in creasing the capacity of their mines, mills and smelters. Work continued on the four-year $ 100-million expansion program underway at the Bingham Canyon property in Utah. Upon completion in mid-1967, the project will raise mining and milling capacity at the site from 90.000 to 108,000 tons per day. In Arizona, a $ 60-million stripping project in progress to develop copper deposits in the Twin Buttes area is expected to yield about 25.000 tons of ore per day by 1969, while a $ 16.6-million project at Pima, scheduled for completion by the middle of this year, will raise mine and mill capacity from 18,000 to 30.000 tons per day. In Nevada, a $22-million copper project at Battle Mountain reached initial production in October, and a $4.5-million copper sulfide milling facility was nearing completion at Weed Heights. Iron ore. A deposit which could contain as much as a billion tons of iron ore, and thereby rank as the largest deposit of its kind in the West, was recently discovered on the Walker Indian Reservation, about 60 miles southeast of Reno, Nevada. Preliminary drilling indi cates presence of 46-percent iron ore, convert ible into 68-percent pellets by conventional methods, as well as ores with a copper content February 1967 MONTHLY REVIEW ranging from 0.8 to 1.5 percent, considered commercial grade. Silver. Silver producers in Idaho continued to invest large sums of money to enlarge and develop their mines in the Coeur d’Alene region, in an effort to meet the rapidly in creasing demand for the metal. Shafts were sunk at the Rainbow property to explore that deposit at depth, while deeper veins were worked for the first time at the Sunshine, Galena, and Crescent mines. Paper. A major Idaho firm continued its $8 0-million capital-improvement program last year in an attempt to diversify into ply wood, pulp and paper. In Arizona, a $32million pulp and paper mill was built near Snowflake with a daily capacity of 210 tons of newsprint and 180 tons of kraft linerboard. Chemicals. Recent expansion at a Poca tello, Idaho plant has boosted output of sul phuric acid from 400 to 1,100 tons a day, and has also increased production of ammonium phosphate and anhydrous ammonia. Again, a new fertilizer plant at Kellogg, Idaho, has boosted ammonium phosphate capacity to 60.000 tons a year. Construction. Financing problems have plagued the construction industry, but con struction or planning continued apace on a number of major projects. In Arizona, these included the $ 15-million Arizona Interstate Industrial Center in Phoenix, a $ 15-million 41-acre shopping center in Scottsdale, and a $35-million residential resort community at Rogersdale, east of Flagstaff, including about 5.000 home sites, a hotel-motel complex, a golf course and swimming pool. Public works. The $210-million Dworshak Dam on the Clear Water River was started in 1966, and it will add 300,000 kilowatts of electric power when completed in 1972. The $70-million Hells Canyon Dam on the Snake River between Idaho and Oregon, meanwhile, continued under construction, and in Nevada, two 750,000-kilowatt steam generators were M o n e ta ry sq u e e ze holds growth in bank loans below ’65 pace Memtoer- Ban k Net L o a n s ( P e r c e n t C h a n g e ) 0 5 10 scheduled for installation at the Mohave Pow er Project in Clark County. The bitterly contested plan to build two power dams in the Grand Canyon was aban doned by the Administration in early 1967. In the place of this $ 1.2-billion plan, Interior Secretary Udall proposed a $719-million plan involving the construction of a steam power plant which would pump water out of the lower Colorado River to supply Arizona cities. But the revised plan was immediately attacked by California and Colorado legis lators on the grounds that it ignored a basinwide approach to the problems of the Colo rado River basin. Alaska and Hawaii Petroleum. Alaska’s Swanson oil field in creased its average daily production last year to about 535 barrels from each of its 55 wells. But the Cook Inlet area, regarded as one of the most important offshore sites in the nation, produced over 1,000 barrels a day from each of its four wells. This field claims a recover able oil reserve of about 150 million barrels. Natural gas. In a joint Japanese-American venture, a $50-million plant near Anchorage was begun for converting natural gas into am monia and urea fertilizer for sale in Japan and other export markets. Initial output from this joint venture is expected in mid-1968. An other project, a $ 100-million natural-gas FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN F R A N C IS C O liquefaction facility, is now being planned by five U. S. oil companies, with the goal of ship ping about 140 million cubic feet of gas a year to the Japanese market. Fisheries. Japanese investors showed in creased interest last year in Alaska’s fishing industry— the state’s largest private industry —by participating in two joint projects with American firms. One was a $2-million can nery organized by a Seattle company and two Japanese firms; the other was a $3-million Seattle-Tokyo combine involving the opera tion of two salmon canneries. Tourism. Hawaii’s tourist industry contin ued to prosper last year despite the sharp set back caused by a 43-day-long airline strike. In view of recent decreases in airline fares as well as increases in family incomes and lei sure time, the industry hopes to greet a mil lion tourists in 1970— almost twice the 1965 total of visitor arrivals, which in its turn was double the 1960 figure. Total hotel accommo dations are expected to rise to 25,000 rooms in 1970, up from 15,000 in 1965 — as resort facilities are opened on Maui, Kauai, and Hawaii, as well as on Oahu. Construction. Honolulu continued to rank among the top half-dozen cities in construc tion volume, although it is only fifty-fifth among U. S. metropolitan areas in terms of population. Large hotels and apartment com plexes continued to rise in Waikiki, with three scheduled for completion in 1966, four in 1967, and still three more under planning. In other construction, the area recently featured the $22-million Financial Plaza of the Pacific, the $67-million Ala Moana Shopping Center (with 155 stores at Waikiki Beach) and the $ 17-million State Capitol and Plaza — not to mention the $350-million Hawaii Kai resi dential subdivision being developed near Pearl Harbor. Foreign trade. In order to expand Hawaii’s role as a display, convention, sales and service center for the Pacific area, a foreign trade zone was opened at Honolulu’s Rainbow Island last June. The zone includes 41,700 square feet of duty-free storage space for foreign products, and it includes a 36,000-squarefoot exhibition hall and offices. Customs du ties will be paid only when goods leave the zone for consumption within the U. S. Future expansion plans call for providing a 50-acre area for processing, assembling, repackaging, and relabeling a variety of products. 62