The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.
'Monthly Review ALASKA FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN F R A N C I S C O T WE L F T H F EDERAL RES ERVE DI S T RI CT J'QhAiJuaAj^ 1962 ^ H IN G T O N J n D l is lie Review of Business Conditions................ page 22 The Search For Certainty In An Uncertain World PART IV International Gold Movem ents................ page 29 Gold Production Gold Movements Summary and Conclusions GON m o CALIFORNIA UTAH Review of Business Conditions advancing on a broad front in N o vem ber and December, national busi ness activity slackened in some m ajor sectors in January and early February. The index of industrial production declined 1 percentage point in January, following a three-m onth rise, and was 114 percent of the 1957 aver age. The economic picture was brightened, however, by a decline in January in the sea sonally adjusted rate of unemployment to 5.8 percent, m arking the first time in 16 months that it had been below 6 percent. Total em ploym ent of 65 million was a record for the m onth of January. Nevertheless, the Secretary of Labor warned that the problem of hard core unemployment had not yet begun to di minish since the num ber of persons unem ployed for four months or more still remained at 1,250,000, almost unchanged from the year-ago level. M anufacturing employment at the end of 1961 was about 500,000 jobs short of the early 1960 level, with the entire drop concentrated among production w ork ers. Construction, transportation, and mining employment, seasonally adjusted, have de creased by 80,000 jobs since the cyclical up turn began in M arch 1961, adding to their recession losses of more than 300,000 jobs. Personal income in January declined to a seasonally adjusted' annual rate of $430.3 billion, down slightly from the December high, but nearly 7 percent above the year-ago rate; contributing factors to the January decline were the greater than seasonal reduction in the factory workweek and a decrease from the record volume of dividend payments in De cember. Although overall industrial production edged downward in January, steel production continued the upward trend of December by advancing continuously from the first of January through the week ending February 3. Production rem ained unchanged in the succeeding week and then rose slightly in the middle week of February. Auto assemblies, A fte r adjusted for seasonal factors, declined 10 p er cent in January from the near-record Decem ber rate and were more nearly in line with the improved rate of dealer sales. On an unad justed basis, auto production in January ex ceeded the high level of output in December, but output slipped below the corresponding January volume in the first three weeks of February. However, both new car production and sales continued to run sharply ahead of year-ago levels. Inventories of m anufacturing and trade concerns continued to rise in Decem ber, and at the end of the year the book value of all m anufacturing and trade inventories was 1.6 percent higher than the year-ago figure. In conjunction with the upw ard trend in inven tories in December, total business sales, sea sonally adjusted, were somewhat lower than the Novem ber volume, although m anufactur ers’ sales were at a record level. Orders re ceived by m anufacturers in Decem ber were also at a peak, thus strengthening the outlook for m anufacturing production in the current year. This upward trend continued in January as new orders for durable goods rose 3 percent above the December level after seasonal ad justment. Construction activity changed little in Jan uary from December and was more than 7 percent above the January 1961 level. The January increase was due to a gain in private construction, including both residential and nonresidential, while public construction ex penditures declined slightly. Housing starts, however, declined in January and, on a sea sonally adjusted basis, were the lowest since last May. Total retail sales declined from the record Novem ber rate by 1 percent in both Decem ber and January but were 5 percent above the January 1961 figure. Sales of durable goods in January fell below the December volume, with the decline centered in durable goods other than autos; sales of nondurable goods February 1962 M O N T H LY R EV IEW showed little change. The seasonally adjusted index of the departm ent store sales in Jan u ary was 4 percent lower than in December but was 6 percent above the index of January of a year ago. In January and early February, the bond markets showed mixed trends. Yields on cor porate bonds remained relatively steady, while those on municipal issues declined. The de cline in municipal bond yields in the face of a high volume of new issues has been partly attributed to a large volume of buying by com mercial banks. M arket yields on long-term United States G overnment bonds remained comparatively stable, firming somewhat in February. Treasury bill yields rose fairly steadily, however, reflecting in part an in crease in supply. In February, the Treasury successfully conducted a refunding of $11.7 billion of m aturing securities in exchange for 1-year, 3 Vi percent certificates of indebted ness and 4-year, 4 percent notes, dated F eb ruary 15. In an effort to extend the average maturity of the debt, it also offered to holders of $18.7 billion of outstanding bonds an o p portunity to exchange them in late February for higher-yielding securities of longer m a turity. pushed the seasonally adjusted rate of unem ployment below the long-standing 6 percent barrier, corresponding with the breakthrough that occurred in January in the national rate of unemployment. The rate of unemployment fell to 5.6 percent, marking the first time since June 1960 that it has been below 6 percent. N onfarm employment in the Pacific Coast States rose 0.8 percent in January; the largest increase occurred in contract construction, but there were gains in all industry divisions except mining. W ithin m anufacturng, em ployment in the aircraft industry rose for the seventh consecutive m onth, although the January advance stemmed mainly from the hiring of additional workers in W ashington. In December, the weekly average num ber of workers collecting unemployment insur ance benefits in the District fell to 301,700 from 306,500 in November, or by 1 Vi per- District e m p lo y m e n t, e a rn in g s, a n d h o u rs increased rather steadily in 1961 A m id-January survey indicated that an es tim ated 40 percent of all member banks had raised their maximum rate on savings deposits and about 65 percent of the banks had raised their maximum rate on other time deposits above the form er 3 percent limit perm itted under Regulation Q. Partly as a reflection of this increase in rates, total time deposits at weekly reporting member banks increased 4.2 percent in the six weeks ended February 7 com pared with a 3.7 percent gain a year ago. District employment continues to rise In the Pacific Coast States, a broadly based advance in January nonfarm employment Note: D ata for average weekly hours and average weekly earn ings are for production workers in manufacturing. Source: State departm ents of employment. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK cent. The December level was 23 percent be low the peak m onth for the District, which was July 1961. The nation experienced a D e cem ber decline of 2.1 percent in this unem ployment classification, reducing the num ber by 30 percent from the national peak month of February 1961. N onagricultural wage and salary em ploy ment in the District rose by 0.1 percent in Decem ber; gains in m anufacturing, finance, insurance and real estate, services, and gov ernm ent sectors offset losses of 0.2 percent each in mining, construction, transportation and public utilities. Nonfarm employment in D ecem ber was almost 3 percent higher than the year-ago level, with the greatest gains oc curring in manufacturing, services, and gov ernm ent. W ithin the government category, the percentage gain recorded in employment by state and local governments, which consti tutes nearly three-quarters of the total, was nearly double the increase in Federal gov ernm ent employment. The average workweek of District m anu facturing production workers shortened to 39.8 hours in Decem ber from 40.1 hours in N ovember, whereas usually there is a small seasonal increase in December. The average weekly paycheck was $110.15, com pared with $104.15 in December 1960; hourly earnings were 10 cents higher and the workweek 0.7 hours longer than year-ago figures. A lthough there were no changes during January in the Bureau of Em ployment Se curity labor m arket classification of the 15 m ajor areas in the District, one smaller area— M edford, Oregon— was added to the list of “smaller areas of substantial unem ploym ent,” which brought the total num ber of these areas in the District to 17. Em ployer hiring schedules in the District labor m arket areas anticipate increases in m anufacturing employment between Jan u OF SAN FRANCISCO ary and M arch. Gains in nonelectrical m a chinery, fabricated metals, electronic com ponents for missiles and aircraft, ordnance, and instruments are expected in the Los A n geles-Long Beach area. Also, on the basis of present contracts, gains into early spring are projected for the aircraft industry in the lat ter area, which is the nation’s largest aircraft production center. The forecasts for the San Francisco-O akland and San B ernardino-R iverside-Ontario areas indicate m oderate ex pansion in steel payrolls, resulting from im proved economic conditions and inventory buildup of some products in the face of a pos sible midsummer shutdown of steel produc tion. District construction aw ard s rose in January The value of construction contracts aw ard ed in the District during January was 6 p er cent above the same m onth in 1961. Residen tial contracts rose 28 percent above the yearago level, largely because of a significant in crease in awards for apartm ent buildings. The 21 percent rise in nonresidential contracts was the result of gains in the commercial and in the hospital and institutional building cate gories. Contracts let for heavy engineering, on the other hand, fell 34 percent below the January 1961 level due to a decline in awards for public utilities construction. Heavy en gineering contracts in January of last year, however, were at exceptionally high levels, which may have been due in part to some bunching of contracts. District mortgage m arkets apparently eased during January as discounts on Federallyinsured mortgages were reported to have de clined slightly. This is consistent with the expectations voiced by the majority of the bankers in attendance at the most recent mortgage workshop of the A m erican Bankers Association held in Phoenix. At these m eet February 1 96 2 M O N T H L Y REVIEW ings, it was generally agreed that the recent change in Regulation Q permitting banks to pay higher interest rates on savings and time deposits would lead to an expansion of bank mortgage operations and that the immediate consequence of this would be to put down ward pressure on rates and perhaps lead to some liberalization in the other terms of m ort gage loans as well. For the year as a whole, the general feeling appeared to be that rates would not rise very much because of more vigorous competition in lending in conjunc tion with some weakness in housing demand. The flow of funds into D istrict savings and loan associations continued at relatively high levels in December. The net increase in sav ings and loan shares was over half again as large as in December 1960. For the entire year, the flow of funds into these institutions was almost one-fourth greater than in 1960, while they increased their mortgage invest ments by an am ount that was 43 percent greater than the increase in the previous year. Lumber markets strengthen; lumber prices up L um ber demand strengthened somewhat during January, according to preliminary re ports. Both Douglas fir and W estern pine new orders were above the level of new business in the corresponding period last year, 17 and 3 percent, respectively, and were also above the level of lumber output in January of this year. The latter, however, was due in part to production cutbacks attributed to the severe weather conditions in the producing regions during the last half of January. The strength ening of the market during January was re flected in rising lum ber prices. As of Febru ary 1, Crow’s lumber price index stood at $73.52, up about $1.25 from the average at the first of the year. The average is now $2.34 higher than it was a year ago, whereas at the beginning of this year prices were about the same as they were at the start of 1961. The plywood m arket did not show any im provement in January, and the price of sand ed plywood rem ained close to the $60 level throughout the month, with mills operating at about 70 percent of capacity. In February, some m ajor producers raised the price of sanded plywood to $62 and later to $64 a thousand square feet. District metal developments mixed In the four weeks which ended January 27, the index of W estern steel production rose 6 percent, whereas the national index rose only 4.2 percent. However, in the following two weeks the national index advanced further while the W estern index fell, so that the n a tional increase in production was greater than that of the West for the entire six-week period. Since steel contract negotiations have be gun early this year, precautionary inventory building, which had been expected to play a significant role in both national and Western steel demand in the next few months, now seems less likely to be very large. New labor contracts have already been negotiated for some of the District copper-producing facili ties even though the expiration date of the old contract is not until June 30. Copper producers and smelters report that dem and for copper continues to be satisfac tory, with February sales and deliveries ex pected to be higher than in January. The producer-smelter price for copper is holding firm at 31 cents a pound. On February 1, the price of lead was re duced 14 cent a pound to 93A cents at New York, the lowest quotation since November 9, 1946, when it was under wartime price control. This was the second V4-cent reduc tion since January 1 of this year. The decline was attributed to continued overproduction FEDERAL RESERVE BANK and excessive stocks of lead in the United States and abroad. The price of lead in Lon don in late January was the equivalent of about 7.22 cents a pound, close to the low after W orld W ar II. This was about 2 3A cents a pound under the New Y ork price before the latest reduction on February 1. The industry calculates that a norm al spread between the two m arkets is about 2 XA cents; any wider spread enables foreign sellers to undercut the U nited States quotation even after absorbing im port duties, freight charges and other trans portation expenses. District farm receipts ease Cash receipts of D istrict farm ers in De cem ber dropped below the record December returns in 1960 and declined seasonally from November. R eturns from marketings of live stock and livestock products continued above a year earlier but were more than offset by lower returns from crop sales. Lower crop prices contributed to the income decline with fresh vegetable prices in particular down sharply from a year ago. Despite the decline in Decem ber cash receipts, returns in 1961 Incom e o f District fa rm e rs a t h ig h le ve l in latter part o f 1961 M illio n s of Do lla rs Source: U nited States D epartm ent of Agriculture. OF SAN FRANCISCO totaled $5.2 billion, a record high and $100 million greater than in 1960. Retail sales and auto registration rise During December Twelfth D istrict G roup I retail stores1 experienced a substantial in crease in sales when com pared with Novem ber 1961 and the year-ago m onth, rising 16 and 14 percent, respectively. Principally as a result of the Decem ber upswing, sales at these stores for all of 1961 were 1 percent above the 1960 volume. Both the soft goods and hard goods stores experienced increases for the year, with the form er showing the greater gains. In the case of hard goods stores, the automotive group carried sales above the year earlier level, although furniture and ap pliance, and lum ber and building supply stores had reduced sales. Indications are that retail trade continued at a high level in January 1962. D istrict de partm ent store sales, seasonally adjusted, reached an estimated record high for the month of January, although they were down slightly from D ecem ber 1961. The San D i ego and Sacramento m etropolitan areas con tinued to show the largest gains, reflecting sales activity of newly opened stores, but all other areas also experienced increases. The nation as a whole showed a gain over the year-ago month during January, but it was not as large as in the District. New car registrations in California during December were at the highest daily average rate for any month since M arch 1960. Daily average sales were 7 percent higher than in November, the previous high for the year, while the national figure for D ecem ber regis trations was below that of N ovem ber 1961. In the first half of January, however, Califor nia registrations increased less than 1 per cent over the com parable year-ago level. •Stores of firms operating 1-10 stores a t the time of the 1958 Census of Business. M O N T H L Y REVIEW February 1962 CHANGES IN S E LE C TE D BALANCE S H E E T ITE M S OF W EE K LY R EPO R TIN G M EM BER BA N K S IN LEAD IN G C IT IE S (dollar am ounts in m illions} Twelfth D istrict From Feb. 1, 1961 From Dec. 2 7 ,1 9 6 1 to Jan. 3 1 ,1 9 6 2 to Jan. 3 1 ,1 9 6 2 D ollars Percent D ollars Percent ASSETS: Total loanj and investments Loans adjusted and invest ments i Loans adjusted Commercial and industrial loans Real estate loans Agricultural loans Loans for purchasing and carrying securities Loans to non bank financial institutions Loans to domestic commer cial banks Loans to foreign banks Other loans U. S. Government securities Other securities LIABILITIES: Demand deposits adjusted Time deposits Savings accounts 0.39 + 2,207 + 9.24 — 2,189 — 1.79 + 8,071 + 7.19 1.46 0.80 + 1,960 + 655 + 8.29 4.23 — 2,525 — 2,691 — — 2.09 3.61 + 7,544 + 2,252 + 6.80 3.23 2.57 0.40 5.97 + + + + 698 633 206 + + 281 174 132 0 0 + 41 4.65 277 + 135.12 16 — 6.64 0.87 28 + 194 — 2.71 2.16 55 — — 102 — 379 — 130 — 148 + 22 + 44 — + — + — — United States From Dec. 27, 1961 From Feb. 1 ,1 9 6 1 to Jan. 3 1 ,1 9 6 2 to Jan. 3 1 ,1 9 6 2 D ollars Percent D ollars Percent — 451 + 302 + 114 — + + + + 3.66 2.25 1.06 + 928 — 2.82 21 + 0.16 47 + 3.70 + — + 5.27 3.27 20.34 21 + 10.55 — 1,062 — 21.83 + 236 + 6.61 + 29 + 3.58 — 618 — 10.08 + 302 + 5.79 + + + + + 247 39 9 883 422 + 105.12 + 20.97 0.28 + + 14.50 + 20.35 + — + + — 336 29 29 228 62 + 22.27 — 4.42 + 0.17 + 0.66 — 0.51 + 527 — 70 + 410 + 3,389 + 1,903 + — + + + 39.98 10.03 2.49 10.90 18.52 — + + + 1,635 + 6,253 n.a. + 2.61 + 17.08 n.a. + + 4.04 + 462 + + 1,613 + 13.32 + 1,143e 4- 11.76e + + — 1,981 + 1.391 + 558 2.99 3.35 1.85 + 2.23 4.95 + 18.54 + e Estim ated, n.a. N ot available. 1 Exclusive of loans to domestic commercial banks and after deduction of valuation reserves; individual loan items are shown gross. Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. Seasonal loan decline at District banks less than in last two years In January, banks normally experience a decline in their loan portfolios, a reduction in dem and deposits and time deposits, particu larly savings, and a return inflow of currency. This year weekly reporting mem ber banks in the Twelfth District followed the usual sea sonal pattern except for a contraseasonal rise in time deposits. The January decline in total loans, adjusted to exclude loans to domestic commercial banks and after deduction of valuation reserves, was only one-half of the decrease of a year ago and also less than that in 1960. As in the past two years, net repay ment of bank debt by business firms account ed for most of the loan reduction. About half of the $37 million decrease in loans to durable goods m anufacturers was due to repayments by transportation equipm ent manufacturers, mainly aircraft, and a seasonal decrease of $27 million in loans to food, liquor and tobac co dealers was responsible for almost all of the reduction in the nondurable goods cate gory. Seasonal repayments were also made by all trade categories— commodity dealers, and wholesale and retail firms; loans to trans portation, communications, and other public utilities were reduced by $33 million. In addi tion to the decline in business borrowing, sales finance companies also decreased their bank debt during January as is customary after relatively large tax-related borrowing in De cember. District weekly reporting banks started the new year with an increase of $22 million in real estate loans, continuing the FEDERAL RESERVE BANK steady m onth-to-m onth gain which has pre vailed since April 1961. This contrasts with small declines in January of the past two years. The “other loan” category, which is mainly consum er loans, also increased in January this year, whereas it declined in the corresponding period of 1960 and 1961. Weekly reporting member banks in the Dis trict reduced their portfolios of United States G overnm ent securities $194 million in Jan u ary, with declines in holdings in all classifi cations except securities m aturing in over five years. The total decline was less than twothirds as great as the January 1960 decline but contrasts with a nominal increase in 1961. Following the pattern of the past two years, these banks also reduced their holdings of securities other than United States Govern ment securities. Time deposits rise contraseasonally The weekly reporting mem ber banks had a larger seasonal loss in dem and deposits ad justed in January than in the same month of the two preceding years. This loss in deposits was augmented by the usual January reduc tion in U nited States Governm ent deposits. While dem and deposits moved down season ally, time deposits increased contraseasonally for the second consecutive year. The increase in January this year of $302 million is far larger than the $80 million gain of a year ago and is in sharp contrast to the decline of $325 million in 1960 when banks were los ing funds to savings and loan associations and to other higher yielding investments. The am endm ent of Regulation Q, effective Jan u ary 1, 1962, permitting banks to pay 3 Vi per- 28 OF SAN FRANCISCO Tim e d e p o sits o f District b a n k s h a d a m uch la r g e r in cre ase in January 1 9 6 2 than a year a g o B i l l i o n s of D o l l a r s N ote: D ata are for Tw elfth D istrict weekly reporting member banks. Tim e deposit data from February 1961 through Septem ber 1961 have been adjusted to exclude loan funds of a national retailer temporarily held as tim e certificates of deposit. Dem and deposits adjusted are total demand deposits other than domes tic commercial interbank and U nited States Governm ent, less cash items in process of collection. cent on savings and time deposits and 4 p er cent on such deposits held for 12 m onths o r longer has been largely responsible for stem ming the usual withdrawals after year-end interest payments have been credited and also for attracting new savings. During January, District banks continued in a relatively tight reserve position due large ly to the loss in dem and deposits. As a conse quence the banks were, on balance, substan tial net purchasers of Federal funds during the month. Except for one week, the rate on Federal funds transactions of District banks averaged over 2 Vi percent, with the bulk of the funds traded at the discount rate in the week ended January 17 when banks nation ally were under considerable reserve pres sure. The Search for Certainty in An Uncertain W orld Part IV INTERNATIONAL GOLD MOVEMENTS articles in this series1 have ex plained the fundam ental changes in the economic role of gold since its first appear ance in human history. Still used the world over for ornam ental purposes, gold plays a less im portant domestic role than formerly in major monetary systems, and various inter nationally accepted assets are used in addition to gold in the settlement of net international balances and as external monetary reserves. a rlie r E Changes in the role of gold since 1914— the date often set as the end of the “classical gold standard” era— have been partly due to widespread rejection of the gold standard’s “autom atic” influence on the domestic econ omy by many countries during the unsettled interwar years. For many countries, “key cur rencies” have come to serve essentially the same purpose in international transactions that gold once did. The continued success of the dollar as the most im portant key currency depends upon the m aintenance of converti bility of the dollar into gold at the fixed price of $35 per fine ounce and on the degree of confidence foreign central banks and other official dollar holders have in the future of the dollar. This confidence depends to some ex tent on the size of U nited States gold re serves but even more on the general condition of the United States economy, particularly on the extent to which balance of payments defi cits can be successfully controlled. 1 See M o n th ly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, as fo llo w s: " T h e Search for C e rta in ty in an U n c erta in W o rld .” Part I: " T h e Rise of G old as a Dom estic S ta n d ard ,’' May, 1961 ; Part II: " T h e International A djustm ent Process: T he Gold Standard and A fter," July, 1961; Part III: " T h e Present Position of G old and the D o lla r,” October, 1961. This final article reviews some facts on the production and uses of gold, surveys some of the m ajor gold movements of the past gen eration, and examines some recent develop ments in the international uses of gold. In conclusion, two divergent views with respect to the role w hich gold plays in dom estic and international m onetary transactions are presented as evidence of the long and continu ing controversy which has revolved around that lustrous substance— gold. G old moves in response to m any different factors The volume of reserves held by countries during the gold standard’s heyday was small co m pared to the volum e of tran sactio n s. Studies of gold movements have also shown that the size of the flows did not appear to be nearly as large as the theoretical considera tions would dictate, or else there was an un suspected strength in the mechanism by which small gold flows could induce relatively large changes in the flows of international pay ments. To explain these facts, the idea emerged that the movement of gold alerted monetary authorities to the need for readjusting credit policy— “the rules of the game” thesis— to protect the reserve ratio of the central bank.1 Credit policy was then assumed, as explained in an earlier article in this series, to affect prices and wages and hence to affect the at tractiveness of exports as com pared with im ports for any particular country. 1For a stim ulating discussion of the pre-1914 gold standard, see A rthur I. Bloomfield, M onetary Policy Under the International G old S tandard: 1H80-1914, Federal Reserve Bank of New Y ork. October, 1959. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK Two subsequent developments modified this view of gold flows. In the world of ideas, the thesis that spending was the significant v ariable in econom ic adjustm en ts rose to challenge the wage-price process born of the days when full employment was regarded as the norm al result of unfettered economic in dividualism. In this view, when domestic in comes rose in response to increased exports, spending on imports would tend to rise to restore balance; similarly, decreases in export earnings would lead to reduced expenditure on imports. A nd in the world of deeds, mone tary instability in the years following the First World W ar led to the rise of disruptive move ments of speculative capital, including gold, which made central bank reserves ratios un reliable as guides to m onetary policy. Today gold flows are viewed in a dual light. Although gains or losses of gold have no di rect influence on employment and income, they do affect the size of the visible assets backing a country’s currency and, hence, the credit base. The size of a country’s gold hold ings also affect, to some extent, the degree of confidence that foreigners place in a country’s currency. Changes in confidence, especially sudden ones, can provoke speculative pres sure against even the strongest m onetary sys tem. Gold outflows may, therefore, serve to warn of impending difficulties in the external paym ents position of a country. M ovements of gold, then, sometimes re flect political and economic uncertainty rather than underlying payments patterns. Although speculative movements often facilitate the adjustm ent of a payments imbalance, they can also aggravate the imbalance and delay or even prevent the normal adjustm ent proc ess if uncertainties become strong enough to dom inate ordinary profit-seeking motives. In any event, central banks do not simply transfer portions of a fixed am ount of gold among themselves. First, the stock of gold is by no means fixed. New annual production typically am ounts to at least 2 Vi percent of OF SAN FRANCISCO the total gold reserve holdings reported by the world’s central banks and governm ents.1 A d ditions to m onetary reserves average between half and two-thirds of total new production although sharp variations from this average have occurred.- The net addition to m onetary reserves depends prim arily on the strength of competing demands for gold. Industrial uses, including jewelry and ornam ents, usually ab sorb a part of each year’s net production. In some countries gold is highly regarded as a store of value for individuals, and this gives rise to the hoarding dem and. To some extent these other demands can be offset by supplies from countries which possess previously ac quired gold. Russian sales of recent years p ro vide the best known example of this, bu t other countries have similarly provided gold in the past. Second, other factors can affect interna tional flows of gold. F o r example, the gold equivalent of over $3 billion has flowed into the International M onetary Fund as quotas fro m the m em b er n a tio n s . F in a lly , som e changes in the distribution of the w orld’s gold between m onetary authorities and the general public have probably occurred as a result of the activities of exchange stabilization funds, although the secrecy which surrounds these operations makes it hard to evaluate their significance. International gold flows, then, reflect many factors apart from the balance of paym ents situations of different countries, and these must be examined to put gold flows in proper perspective. GO LD PRO D U C TIO N Gold production checked by rising costs The world’s supply of newly mined gold comes prim arily from the Republic of South 1Excluding Com m unist bloc countries. See Federal Reserve B u l letin. various issues, for e stim a te of reserves and production. 2Cf. Oscar L. Altman, "A N ote on G old Production and A d ditions to International G old Reserves,” International M one tary F und Staff Papers, A pril, 1958, especially pp. 280 ff. February 1 9 6 2 M O N T H LY R EV IEW M O V E M E N T S VERSUS SH IPM EN TS OF GO LD In th e d a y s w h e n th e g o l d s t a n d a r d w a s gold, ch an gin g its o w n e r s h i p w i t h o u t in f u ll b lo o m a n d , e v e n d u r in g th e 1 9 2 0 ’s c h a n g in g w h e n th e b fo o m h a d f a d e d s o m e w h a t , g o l d m ig h t th u s h a v e its to ta l g o l d r e s e r v e s h e ld m o v e m e n ts u s u a lly e n tir e ly o u t s id e its n a t i o n a l b o r d e r s w h e t h e r m e a n t th e s a m e th in g . G o ld w a s t a k e n fro m o r n o t a d j u s m e n t s in its e c o n o m y w e r e a s and g o ld s h ip m e n t s o n e p la c e , p u t a b o a r d s h ip o r tr a in o r e v e n d o n k e y , c a rr ie d to its d e s t in a t io n , a n d le ft th ere. T h is p r o c e d u re , fo r a ll its c h a r m in g sim p lic ity , in v o lv e d w a s t e in s h i p p i n g g o l d b a c k a n d fo rth s in c e th e e s s e n c e o f th e g o l d stan d a rd a d ju stm e n t m e c h a n is m w as its its p h y s ic a l lo c a tio n . A c o u n tr y s o c ia t e d w it h g a i n s o r lo s s e s o f g o ld . It is th e o w n e r s h ip a s p e c t o f g o l d m o v e m e n ts w h ic h is m o s t d ir e c tly r e le v a n t to o u r p u r p o s e . T h e re fo re , w e w i ll c o n c e rn o u r s e lv e s w it h c h a n g e s in o ffic ia l r e s e r v e h o ld in g s , s e lf -c o r r e c t in g t e n d e n c y w h ic h im p lie d th a t th a t is, o w n e r s h ip , in d is c u s s i n g th e m o v e m o st g o ld to re m e n t o f g o l d b e t w e e n n a t io n a l tr e a s u r ie s o r v e r s a l. To e lim in a t e th is w a s t e , it b e c a m e c e n tra l b a n k s w it h o u t w o r r y i n g a b o u t the th e p ra c tic e fo r s o m e c o u n tr ie s to e a r m a r k a c t u a l lo c a t io n o f th e g o l d itse lf. Africa— about 60 percent of the total pro duced— with C anada and the United States as distant runners-up. Russia is believed to be a major producer, perhaps ranking second, but since no reports on actual production have been made since 1937 this is necessarily conjecture. field cover a roughly semicircular arc nearly 300 miles long through the N orthern Orange Free State and the Southern Transvaal with 53 major producers mining 70 million tons of gold and uranium ore per year.2 The economics of gold mining has received intense study by virtue of gold’s historic im portance both as a comm odity and as money. O ne peculiarity of the gold mining industry stems from the m arket for monetary gold p ro vided by the United States Treasury. The T reasury’s standing offer to buy gold at $35 per fine ounce fixes the price for gold, and consequently the profitability of mining de pends solely on costs. These conditions, there fore, determine the lowest grade of ore that can be profitably mined. Changes in the price of gold, as occurred in 1933 and 1934 when the United States Treasury raised its price from $20.67 per fine ounce to the present $35 level, thus tend to cause previously subm ar ginal ores to be substituted for higher grades. m o v e m e n ts w e re li a b le The most im portant determ inant of the supply of gold has been the discovery of sig nificant new gold deposits. Although gold oc curs in most parts of the world, it is fairly rare to find it in sufficiently concentrated form to w arrant its extraction. Until almost the end of the 19th century virtually all gold came from quartz reefs or from the alluvial deposits formed by the disintegration of the mountains containing these reefs. This was the case of both the A laskan and Californian deposits which were so prom inent in the last century. T he discovery of the W itw atersran d gold fields in South Africa changed this picture radically. In 1888 a form ation of pebbled, gold-bearing ore called the banket by the Dutch settlers was discovered.1 Mines in this 'T h is term derives from the fact th at the Rand outcroppings resembled in appearance a D utch alm ond cake called banket. O ver the course of the business cycle, how ever, the output of gold was presum ed to be 2R. A. L. Black, "D evelopm ent of South African M ining M eth o d s / ’ Optima, June, I960, p. 65. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK contracyclical, increasing during declines in general business as wages and other costs fell and decreasing during business expansions. W hen gold was the prim ary source of domes tic liquidity, this pattern gave gold a much adm ired regulatory reputation in that the sup ply of gold “leaned against the w ind” more or less automatically. Aside from these relatively short-run con siderations, it should be kept in mind that the supply of ore in any given mine is exhaustible, and the technically feasible limits to output are approached only at increasing costs. The en gineering problems of modern mining are im pressive in scope. In one case, the E ast R and Proprietary Mines Com pany has extended its shafts to a depth of over 11,000 feet below the surface. A t this depth, ordinary rock flows like lava while the harder or more brittle form ations explode under the trem endous pressures. These “rock bursts” are only one of the problems. Ventilation and drainage difficulties also tend to increase costs as the banket is followed deeper into the earth. The pressure of higher costs has seriously affected the industry as a whole. In the United States only one m ajor gold mine is still in operation, although significant am ounts of gold are produced as a by-product of other mining operations, particularly from copper mines. In recent years, the C anadian Gov ernm ent has paid subsidies to domestic gold mines, relating the amounts of paym ent to marginal costs of production. A nd even in the Republic of South Africa, only the new dis coveries of banket strata in the Orange Free State and the profits from by-product uranium mining have kept conditions there generally satisfactory from the industry standpoint. The scope for future improvements in the industry seem relatively lim ited. R ecovery of gold from the raw ore typically runs at w'ell over 97 percent. New discoveries on the same scale as the Rand are unlikely, though possible. U nderw ater mining may offer some promise in this connection. Although mining OF SAN FRANCISCO techniques are constantly being developed, the trend towards greater mining depths raises so many new problems that rising costs con tinually jeopardize the profitable operation of the industry. Other factors also affect the w orld’s gold stocks The G reat Depression of the 1930’s pro vides a good starting place for looking at the world’s total gold stock and at the broad p at terns of gold flows of the recent past. By 1929 m ost of the w orld’s gold deposits had already been d iscovered an d m ining operations were well established. The gold mining industry had w eathered the (for it) unhappy decade of the prosperous twenties and was about to em bark on a new era of ex pansion. This expansion was triggered by generally lower costs, associated with the de pression, and higher values for gold, caused by the general currency devaluations initiated by G reat Britain in 1931 and the general downward drift of prices during the early 1930’s. Table 1 gives the broad picture of the total supply of gold during the thirties. New pro duction rose steadily throughout these years from a rate of somewhat less than 20 million ounces in 1929 to well over 40 million ounces in 1941. South A frican p ro d u cers acco u n ted for over half of the world’s output of new gold at the beginning of the period, but this share slipped during the decade as a whole, despite the sizable incentive of a 40 percent boost in the price of gold at the end of 1932. The 1932 output of South A frican producers, for which they received 85 shillings per ounce, was sub stantially larger than the output in each of the subsequent four years following the rise in price to 120 shillings. As mentioned ear lier, the new price of gold made the operation of previously unprofitable mines economically feasible, and producers shifted to lower grade ores in order to prolong the lives of the richer M O N T H L Y REVIEW February 1962 T able 1 W ORLD GOLD P R O D UC TIO N AND S U P P LY — 1929-1960 (m illio n s of fine ounces) New production Flow from Far East Total South Africa United S ta t e s 1 Canada U.S.S.R. 1929 19.7 10.4 2.2 1.9 1.1 1930 20.9 10.7 2.3 2.1 1931 22.3 10.9 2.4 1932 24.3 11.6 1933 25.5 1934 All other W orld Su p p ly India C h in a 2 5.1 3 3 1.5 5.6 3 3 2.7 1.7 6.4 5.9 1.1 29.4 2.4 3.0 1.9 7.2 9.1 1.7 35.1 11.0 2.5 2.9 2.7 9.0 5.8 1.6 32.9 27.2 10.5 2.9 3.0 3.9 10.8 6,3 1.1 34.6 1935 29.6 10.8 3.6 3.3 4.8 1 1.9 4.3 0.7 34.6 1936 33.0 11.3 4.3 3.7 5.2 13.6 3.1 0.6 36.7 14.3 1.4 0.5 36.8 15.1 1.6 0.3 38.9 3.1 19.7 20.9 1937 34.9 11.7 4.8 4.1 4 1938 37.0 12.2 5.1 4.7 4 1939 39.0 12.8 5.6 5.1 4 15.5 1940 40.7 14.0 5.9 5.3 4 15.4 1941 41.0 14.4 6.0 5.3 15.3 1941 3 6.15 14.4 6.0 5.3 10.4 5 36.1 1942 32.1 14.1 3.7 4.8 9.5 37.1 42.2 41.0 1943 24.8 12.8 1.4 3.7 6.9 24.8 1944 22.1 12.3 1.0 2.9 5.9 22.1 1945 21.1 12.2 0.9 2.7 5.3 1946 21.7 11.9 7.6 2.8 1947 22.1 11.2 2.3 3,1 1948 23.0 11.6 2.1 3.5 5.8 23.0 1949 24.0 1 1.7 2.0 4.1 6.2 24.0 1950 24.7 11.7 1.8 4.4 6.8 24.7 1951 24.0 11.5 2.0 4.4 6.1 24.0 24.8 11.8 1.9 4.4 6.7 24.8 1952 Sales by U.S.S.R.* 21.1 5.4 1.3 23.0 5.5 0.9 23.0 1953 24.7 11.9 2.0 4.1 6.7 2.1 26.8 1954 26.1 13.2 1.9 4.4 6.6 2.1 28.2 1955 27.4 14.6 1.9 4.5 6.4 2.1 29.5 1956 28.4 15.9 1.8 4.4 6.3 4.3 32.7 6.4 7.4 37.0 1957 29.6 17.0 1.8 4.4 1958 30.4 17.7 1.8 4.6 6.3 6.3 36.7 1959 32.6 20.1 1.4 4.5 6.6 7.1 39.7 1960 33.6 21.4 1.4 4.6 6.2 5.7 39,3 1 Includes production from Philippines received in the United States, 1 Includes sales from Hong Kong. 3 Less than 50,000 ounces. * 1937-41 estim ates are not shown separately because of deterioration in the underlying statistics. 5 Beginning with 1941, estim ates of U. S. S. R . gold production are excluded from the table. To facilitate the transition, the 1941 figures are on both the old basis and the new. * Dollar value estim ates of the Bank for Internationa! Settlements converted to ounces. Note: Details may not add to total because of rounding. Source: A nnual Reports, Bank for International Settlements. FEDERAL C hart RESERVE BANK 1 W o r ld g o ld production h a s risen gra d u a lly since W o rld W a r II Milliont of (in* oz ‘ Including Philippines through 1939. Sources: Bank for International Settlements, International M one tary Fund, and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. mines for the future. The rest of the world was not as conscious (or perhaps not as able to take advantage) of these long-run consid erations and, as the table shows, output out side of South A frica soared. The United States doubled its output in the seven years follow ing the January 1934 devaluation; C anada did almost as well; the Soviet Union reported q u in tu p led p ro d u ctio n betw een 1929 and 1936. The effects of the enhanced price of gold were not confined to stimulating new produc tion. Beginning in the early thirties, a flood of gold began reaching world m arkets from the hoards of India and China. During the peak years between 1931 and 1936, the astound ing total of almost 42 million ounces was sold fro m F a r E a s te rn sto ck s. T his ad d ed an am ount equivalent to over 18 months p ro duction during these years to the w orld’s gold stock. Table 1 shows the effect of these sales on the gold supply of the W estern W orld as a whole. The all-time peak of gold production was reached in 1941 with a total output of some OF SAN FRANCISCO 41 million fine ounces. F o r those who are tiring of these cold statistics, we might observe that this is enough gold to produce approxi mately 281 solid gold Cadillacs. But along with this gold W orld W ar II arrived, and many gold-producing nations, with the nota ble exception of South A frica, shifted their productive efforts from gold to guns. Table 1 records the precipitate decline in the w orld’s output of gold during the w ar years. From the 1941 level, output fell by almost half to 21 million ounces even though the output of other metals, such as copper, from which gold can be obtained as a by-product, expanded steadily.1 O utput again began to expand following the war, but rising costs in much of the world held down the incentive to increase produc tion. Only in 1951 and 1953 did total output fail to exceed that of the preceding year, and yet signs of retardation were unm istakable for virtually every gold-producing area until 1953. The 1953 discoveries of the extensions of the banket into the Orange Free State d ra matically increased potential output from the South A frican area, though the fact that these discoveries were made by w ildcatters indi cates the effect of shrinking profits on the ma jor South A frican producers. During the 1950’s the total available m ar ket supply of gold was increased by sales from Soviet Russia. Aside from emergency sales in 1946 and 1947, there is no evidence that Russia sold significant am ounts of gold to the rest of the world from the end of W orld W ar II until 1953. Since then, the am ount sold annually has risen from about two million ounces in 1953 to an estim ated peak of seven million ounces in 1959. We have chosen to regard these sales as net additions to the w orld’s supply and have (in our table since 1941) excluded consideration of new gold production in the Soviet Union. 'T h e apparent discontinuity in 1941 jn T able 1 arises from the exclusion of the probably not very accurate estimates of gold production in the Soviet U nion, ror which production statis tics ceased after 1935. February 1 9 6 2 M O N T H L Y REVIEW GO LD M O V E M E N T S So far, the emphasis has been on the supply of gold from mining a n d /o r dishoarding, but, in order to present an overall view of total gold movements, the shifts in holdings be tween countries must also be taken into ac count. This consideration leads first to an examination of the sources of gold— the sup ply of new gold, the flow from hoards, and the losses of those countries that sold gold. Next comes the consideration of destinations of this gold— additions to central bank reserves, in dustrial demands, and “ all other.” This latter category is necessarily a catchall which in cludes gold hoarded by individuals, errors in the estimates, and the am ount of gold (pre sumably small) irrevocably lost. Ideally, these sources and uses should be treated as often as the statistics are available, but this is impracticable because of the obvi ous limitations of space and of the reader’s patience. The approach must necessarily be both crude, with regard to the use of the avail able statistics, and arbitrary, with respect to the intervals at which the flows of gold are measured. About the form er there is no help; the statistical facts have been gathered and published and can only be accepted, albeit with some hesitant qualifications as we pro ceed. With regard to the latter, there is greater leeway. The years that form the crucible in which many of our current problems and is sues first began to boil can be divided into subperiods over which more meaningful anal yses of the international flow of gold can be made. Since the designation of particular years as belonging to one period or another is to a large extent a m atter of judgment, a few co m m e n ts re g a rd in g o u r sele c tio n are in order. The first period to be considered could be called “the years of panic;” they cover the collapse of world trade following the great crash of 1929. From the standpoint of inter national gold movements, the outstanding events of this era were the abrupt cessation of the flow of loan capital from the United States and G reat Britain, the attem pts made by var ious countries to gain or protect foreign ex change reserves through exchange controls, the weakening of most currencies and the in stability of exchange rates, and the abandon ment of the gold standard, tem porarily in one case, by the two nations which formed the hub of international commerce, the United States and G reat Britain. The years to be in cluded are the four years from the end of 1929 to the United States’ devaluation in Jan uary 1934. The second period covers the years fol lowing the United States’ devaluation during which a select group of European countries, notably France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland attem pted to preserve the gold standard despite the chaotic political and economic conditions manifesting themselves in the rise of bilateralism and the form ation of special, nationalistic trading blocs. The de valuations of the gold bloc currencies near the end of 1936 and the prew ar flight of “hot money” to the United States give the years 1934-39 a special flavor for the student of international gold movements. A bout the W orld W ar II years little need be said. There is bound to be something of an artificial tone to any presentation of the flows of gold among nations engaged in an all-out struggle for survival. However, the changes in the international pattern of gold holdings that occurred during these years had profound implications for the events which took place after the war. The United States Treasury continued to make gold available to monetary authorities and to buy from abroad. In some cases gold sales by foreign central banks were made to the public (for example in India) as a means of reducing inflationary pressures. The postwar years can be divided into any num ber of subperiods according to the pref erence of the analyst. But an analysis of the international flow of gold seems bound to give some separate consideration to the years be FEDERAL RESERVE BANK tween the end of hostilities and the general readjustm ent of currency values in 1949. The years since 1949 will comprise the final pe riod. Supply and dem and factors have varied w idely in the past D uring the first of the periods under con sideration, the “years of panic” (the end of 1929 to the A m erican devaluation), 93 mil lion ounces of new gold were produced. In addition, G erm any and Japan plus three m a jor raw m aterials producers (A rgentina, A us tralia, and B razil) lost from their monetary reserves 58.8 million ounces as foreign loans were called, capital flows ceased, and com modity prices fell. These figures, along with 25.2 million ounces dishoarded by India and China, comprise total “sources” of 177.1 mil lion ounces of gold that were put into circu lation during that period. M uch of this was absorbed by what came to be known as the “gold bloc” countries and Italy which added 105 million ounces to their official reserve holdings. Russia gained 13 million ounces, and the U nited States and the United Kingdom, despite large losses in 1931 32, together gained 17.1 million. The rest of the world’s central banks and treasuries ab sorbed about 5.7 million on balance. M ost of the remaining 36.3 million ounces — worth over $750 million at the old official price of $20.67 per ounce— probably went into private hoards. Some may have gone into industrial uses, but in view of the rapid con traction of overall industrial output that char acterized those years in most of the world, this am ount undoubtedly was small. In the years following the United States’ devaluation, drastic changes in the individual sources and uses items occurred. From 1934 until the beginning of 1940, 200.6 million ounces of gold were produced. A nother 23.1 million cam e from the O rient, principally during 1934-36 and 1939. The gold bloc countries lost large amounts of gold before OF SAN FRANCISCO they were forced to follow the earlier devalu ations of the United States and the U nited Kingdom, and they finally devalued their cur rencies in 1936. France lost, on balance, some 70.7 million ounces during this period. O ther countries, particularly Italy, sold 43 million ounces more, bringing the total am ount of gold to be absorbed to about 337 million ounces. Clearly the political and economic turm oil of Europe was the major factor in producing large flows of “hot money” seeking safety in the United States. To this was added the in centive to buy dollars during the “gold scare” of 1937 when the belief that the U nited States Treasury was on the verge of reducing its p ur chase price for gold led to large scale conver sions of gold into dollars by foreign central banks. But, aside from the flows of “hot money,” the U nited States continued to enjoy its typically comfortable export surplus fol lowing the devaluation. Aside from the cur rencies of the N etherlands, Belgium, and Sw itzerland, the exchange value of the dollar strengthened against all of the m ajor curren cies of the world following the devaluation.1 And in addition to the inflow of foreign funds Americans repatriated large am ounts of their investments abroad. These factors combined to produce a vir tual “Golden A valanche,” as one study called it, during the years preced in g the Second W orld W ar.2 All but 41.1 million ounces of the total supply of over 14 thousand tons flowed directly into the United States Treas ury. The United Kingdom also gained on bal ance during this period, but its gain of 31.9 million ounces was miniscule by comparison. Aside from the dishoarding from the O ri ent, mentioned above, there was a net flow of something like 4 million ounces out of E uro pean and American private holdings over this same period. One example of an unusual kind 'S ee, for exam ple, "F oreign T rade, C apital Movements, and International Reserves,’’ Federal Reserve B ulletin, N ovem ber, „ ,9442Frank D . G raham and Charles R. W hittlesey, G olden A va lanche, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939. M O N T H L Y REVIEW February 1962 T able 2 S O U R C ES AND U S E S OF GOLD, 1929-59 (Average annual rates in m illion s of ounces) 1934-39 1929-33 1946-49 1940-45 1950-59 1960 SO U R C E S N e w Production F low from East M a jo r tosses by central b a n k s 33.4 6.3 3.9 22.7 - A rg e n tin a France U nited States A u stra lia G e rm a n y Fra n c . Brazil T O TA L so urce s = 23.3 14.7 Italy G e rm a n y Japan Japan Sw itzerland 27.3 33.6 0.5 3.2 5.7 United K in g d o m | 175 France N e therland s South Africa U nited K in g d o m Sw e d e n 40.2 52.6 44.3 total uses - 15.3 22.7 U nited States 14.4 j _ I 20.3 43.5 U nited States 4 8 .7 V e n e z u e la 7.3 Canada 2.1 44.9 97.4 USES M a jo r g a in s by central b a n k s U nited States U nited States Sw itze rla n d j Belgiu m U nited K in g d o m South A frica I 13 5 France Canada Sw e d e n U nited K in g d o m Italy N e th e rlan d s Latin A m erica O ther Europe N e therland s I.M.F. Sw itzerland 35.2 N e th e rlan d s South A frica Sw itzerland Sw e d e n 56.9 U nited S lo t .* I.M .F. j 4j 4 G e rm a n y France Italy G e rm a n y 27.2 Italy 57.4 United K in g d o m U nited K in g d o m U.S.S.R. N e t c h a n g e fo r all other central b a n k s 1.4 -3 .6 22.5 N e t industrial d e m a n d H o a rd in g 7.7 -0 .7 4.2 -9 .2 2.5 5.0 5.3 6.0 5.3 9.9 23.6 10.4 N ote: I.M .F . represents International M onetary Fund. Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ; International M onetary Fund; Bank for International Settlements. Annual averages computed by Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. of dishoarding that went on is provided by the Italian campaign to finance the war against Ethiopia through the donation of gold wed ding rings and other jewelry by Italian women. Industrial demands for gold were probably m ore than met by reclaim ed “ scrap” gold. D uring W orld W ar II the annual average volume of monetary gold transactions de clined. A bout 136 million ounces were p ro duced, and another 105 million ounces came from the central banks or treasuries of the United States, France, the Netherlands, and the U nited Kingdom in connection with war financing. A bout 81 million ounces of these to ta l so u rc es of 2 4 1 .4 m illio n c an be a c counted for by increases in the gold reserves of Switzerland, South Africa, various Latin A m erican nations, and Sweden. O ther central banks gained about 135.2 million ounces, leaving a resid u al of 25.2 m illion ounces which went into hoards, industry, or was lost. The estimate of the U nited States B ureau of the M int places the am ount consum ed in in dustry at about 18.7 million ounces which leaves something like 6.5 million ounces as the residual for hoarding and losses. The early postw ar years were years of both political and economic uncertainty. N ever theless, life and mining went on, and some 90.8 million ounces of gold were wrested from the earth. M ost countries were forced to re duce their gold holdings to pay for essential imports. The United Kingdom, France, and Sweden were notable examples of this, selling some 65.6 million ounces. O ther countries lost 59.5 million ounces altogether, and South Africa sold 22.5 million ounces over and above its new production. All in all, world “sources” came to 238.5 million ounces, in cluding an estim ated 2.1 million sold by R us sia. Somewhat m ore than half of this 1946-49 disgorging of gold flowed into the United States to pay for imports, despite United States grants for emergency reconstruction. And, for the first tim e in history, a sizable am ount— 41.5 million ounces— was placed at the disposal of a newly organized interna tional financial institution, the International M onetary Fund. These two “uses” absorbed about 169.5 ounces. A few central banks gained m odest amounts, bu t m ost of the re FEDERAL RESERVE BANK maining 46 million ounces are estim ated to have flowed into hoards (26 million) and into industrial uses (20 m illion). The “Fabulous Fifties” saw 272.7 million ounces of new gold produced, largely after 1953 as the new mines in South A frica began to hit their stride. R ussia sold an estimated 32 million ounces, and the United States lost 144.4 million ounces to the rest of the world, to bring the total “ sources” up to 449 million ounces of gold. The destinations of these flows are rela tively well identified for this period. Western Europe was the big gainer as recovery led to shifts in trading patterns. Germ any received 75.3 million ounces; Italy, 42.7; the U nited Kingdom, 29.9; and other European coun tries, 96.4. The International M onetary Fund absorbed 27.3 million ounces, and the rest of the w orld’s central banks obtained 24.5 million. Industrial dem and continued to ab sorb gold, about 52.6 million ounces during this era. The remaining 100 million ounces disappeared from circulation, presumably into private hoards. Table 2 summarizes much of what has just been said and presents the underlying data period by period but adjusts the figures to show annual average rates for the m ajor flows. This eliminates some of the distortion introduced by using time periods of different lengths. The factors which give rise to hoarding differ from area to area Two aspects of these flows of gold deserve more attention. The first of these is the role of hoarding or, in more formally descriptive terms, “the private demand for gold.” There is a trem endous difference between this de m and in the Middle and Far East and its coun terpart in Europe. In the Far East, particu larly India, personal savings have not cus tom arily been held in the form of debt instru ments, that is, currency, bank deposits, sav ings and loan shares, and stocks and bonds. OF SAN FRANCISCO The absence of a well developed banking system has been partly responsible for this situation. M ost individuals in those areas be lieve gold to be the m ost effective store of value, and this has made for a steady drain on world gold production over much of re corded history, even though a reversal of this flow during the mid-thirties helped avert an even more serious world deflation. In the Middle East the dem and for gold is slightly different. Some countries, especially the small, “oil rich” nations, have been mov ing toward an internal gold coin standard, and some of the “private dem and” may have come from oil companies forced to meet pay roll and some other local payments in gold. This use differs somewhat from the pure hoarding that occurs in other areas, although undoubtedly some hoarding of this latter type does take place in the M iddle East. In Europe, the private dem and for gold is radically different. There nongold currencies have long been in generally accepted circu lation, and the use of savings institutions is common. Yet, from time to time, political and economic uncertainty has induced peo ple to convert a large part of their savings and other assets into gold. France is, of course, the example par excellence of this. During the thirties when the O rient was dishoarding at record rates in response to the avid dem and for gold in Europe, individuals in Europe were absorbing gold in an am ount which in one year hit 23 million ounces. Even in the postw ar years, private European dem and for gold was sizable. The most pronounced de mands emerged just before the world-wide devaluations of 1949 and just after the out break of the K orean W ar, but in 1950 the F ar E ast also dem anded gold so that additions to European hoards were much smaller than they otherwise might have been. On the ba sis of admittedly imperfect evidence, the prin cipal dem and in Europe was in France, al though some persistent dem and came from February 1 96 2 M O N T H L Y R EV IEW C hart 2 B a r g o ld prices in p riv a te m a rk e ts d e clin e d rather steadily after 1 9 4 9 Do lla r o r dotla# equivalents per fine ounce r » d lU U -m tn on premium u J« n in e * market do«d ExebM f* rite s idjuJtm ent in Korea. r 60 ■ A a . Rrrlicd rund poller uo gold i HO NG KONG 50 : I i V H ^ k L ZURICH 1947 1949 1951 1953 N ote: T he quotations for gold bars have been expressed directly in dollars in Tangier (since 1950) and in Zurich (since 1951). The Zurich quotation prior to 1951 reflected the price a t which gold was traded for dollars in various markets. In other markets (such as Hong Kong, Beirut, and Paris) the quotations for gold, expressed in local currency, have been converted into dollar equivalents at “ free” m arket exchange rates. Sources: International M onetary Fund, and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Italy and Greece. Switzerland’s demands were mostly for the account of foreigners, Eastern and other. There was no evidence of any sig nificant private dem and for gold in other E u ropean countries or in Latin America. Some gold transfers take place in private markets So far, in our discussion of gold flows, the actual mechanics of the transfers between private individuals has been ignored. During the postw ar years virtually all governments placed restrictions on the gold transactions of private individuals ranging from outright prohibition to turnover and transit taxes on holding or selling gold. They were also the years when government controls over inter national payments were strong enough to produce widespread and flourishing black markets in both gold and the few “hard” cur rencies, such as the dollar. Zurich and Hong Kong regained their pre war reputation as major international gold centers during this period, but Beirut, Paris, and Tangier emerged to challenge their posi tion, and brisk demands made all these m ar kets highly active despite supply problems. As a result of supply limitations and the brisk combined demands, free m arket prices soared. C hart 2 gives a picture of prices on some of the m ajor m arkets during this period, although these estimates are subject to unusu ally wide margins of error. One obvious source of errors stems from quoting gold prices in terms of dollars per ounce, even though the prices of other currencies in terms of dollars were neither stable nor unique over this period. There often existed a whole set of prices for dollars ranging from the low official rate (o r sometimes “rates” for differ ent kinds of transactions) up to the rates charged on the blackest of the black markets. M oreover, since the volume of transactions on each of these markets is unknown, the weight to be assigned each particular price in deriving an average is at best a rough guess. The profits to be made dealing in gold led to bizarre forms of competition among dif ferent gold m arkets as well as between indi vidual sellers. For example, the Thai Gov ernm ent perm itted a new m arket to open in Bangkok in early 1953. So much business was diverted from M acao that a tax-cut war, simi lar to a price war, went on for several months until a satisfactory division of “the territory” could be established. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK W ith increasing monetary stability, other markets opened These were interesting years in the history of gold movements, but as in most such peri ods, they carried the seeds of their own de mise. The political uncertainties gradually abated. Somewhat less gradually, but still in evitably, a m easure of economic stability in most of the W estern countries was gained; and slowly but surely the public’s interest in holding gold began to ebb, while the supply of gold increased. By the end of 1953, the open m arket price of gold had fallen to the point (about $37 per ounce) at which unoffi cial transactions were no longer profitable after the costs of transportation and m arket ing had been met. Although there is some evi dence supporting the thesis that the Russians were at least partly responsible for this price decline by virtue of substantial sales made late in 1953, it seems more likely that em erg ing stability in international economic rela tions was the do m in an t factor. M arch 22, 1954 marked the reopening of one of the m ajor gold m arkets of the world. D uring the preceding 15 years, the United States Treasury had been virtually the w orld’s only im portant gold m arket because of its standing offer to buy and sell unlimited amounts of gold at $35 an ounce (aside from a small service charge). But by 1954, gold producers in m ost countries were allowed to sell on the open market. U nder these favor able omens, the British Government perm it ted the London gold m arket to reopen. Since this m arket has become the major m arket for private gold sales and purchases in recent years, its workings are worth p re senting in some detail.1 Every morning at 10:30, representatives of the five member firms of the London bullion m arket gather in the offices of N. M. Rothschild & Sons, in St. Swithins Lane, to decide what the day’s •T h e United States T reasury still constitutes the major market for official sales and purchases of gold for monetary uses. OF SAN FRANCISCO opening gold price ought to be. This is not as arbitrary a procedure as one might think. Before the meeting, each firm has tried to match as many of its buying and selling or ders as it can, so the real purpose of the m eet ing is to determine a price which is most likely to clear the m arket of the remaining orders. The price “fixed” by the dealers provides an indication of the m arket at the beginning of the day, but trading can change this price quite drastically just as in any m arket. N on residents of the Sterling A rea may buy or sell any am ount of gold they wish provided that payment is made in either dollars or “convert ible” sterling (th at is, pounds which are al ready held abroad and so can be converted into gold or dollars without increasing ex ternal claims on G reat B rita in ). Sterling A rea residents are not completely excluded from the m arket; they can sell gold freely but can buy only limited amounts for approved indus trial and export uses. In the London m arket, a large share of the purchases is customarily for the account of foreign central banks, and much of the gold is supplied to the m arket through the Bank of England. The United States, as has already been re m arked, stands ready to buy or sell gold for legitimate m onetary purposes at $35 per ounce excluding handling costs. W hen these costs are included, the Treasury’s buying price is $34.9125, and its selling price is $35.0875. Because foreign m onetary authori ties have the possibility of purchasing gold from the United States Treasury and export ing it to London, the dem and for gold in London by these m onetary authorities gener ally tends to decline when the L ondon price exceeds the United States Treasury selling price by significantly more than the cost of transportation.1 Furtherm ore, under the A rti A central bank which wishes to hold gold in London rather than New York will presum ably buy in the London m arket so long as the London price is below $35.0875 plus transportation and insurance costs. Hence slight fluctuations above the lim it set by the U nited States are not uncommon. Taking this into account, the upper lim it is between $35.17 and $35.20 per ounce depending on particular shipping arrangements. February 1962 M O N T H L Y REVIEW id es of Agreem ent of the International M one tary Fund, member countries of the Fund are obligated to m aintain the exchange values of their currencies within 1 percent of each side of parity, so that in effect they cannot buy gold when the price rises above $35.35. W hen the gold price in any market rises above such a point, it thus largely reflects private specula tive demand, and prices tend to fluctuate more sharply because of the relative thin ness of the market. Recent gold developments With the foregoing description of some past gold movements in mind, we are in a better position to evaluate in perspective the events of the past two years, a period during which the “gold rush days” of O ctober 1960 were a m ajor highlight. Production of new gold (excluding the U. S. S. R .) during 1960 am ounted to about 33.6 million fine ounces. South A frica ex panded its output despite increasing difficul ties with the mining labor force, but both United States and Australian output fell slightly. Russian sales were of the order of 5 to 6 million ounces. But this addition to the w orld’s gold “circulation” was dwarfed by the 59.2 million ounces lost by three coun tries: Canada, 2.1 million; Venezuela, 7.3 million; and the United States, 48.7 million ounces. The total am ount of gold to be ab sorbed was about 74 million ounces during 1960. Over two-thirds of this became part of the official gold holding of W estern Europe. The largest gold gainers were Italy (13 million o u n c es), France (10 m illion), G erm any (9.5 m illion), the Netherlands (9.1 m illion), the United Kingdom (8.6 m illion), and Switzer land (7.2 m illion). W estern European mone tary authorities as a whole bought 66.5 mil lion ounces during the year, while minor changes in the rest of the world’s central banks (excluding the three big sellers m en tioned earlier) absorbed on balance 1.3 mil lion ounces. Assuming that net industrial demand absorbed 6.0 million ounces, prob ably a slightly high estimate, not less than 23.6 million ounces, worth almost a billion dollars, went into private holdings. The sudden and dram atic resurgence of private demands for gold had an immediate effect on gold prices in free markets. Until late July, the London m arket operated much as it had been doing during the preceding six years, although perhaps at slightly higher vol ume levels associated with higher South A fri can and Russian gold exports. During A u gust and September, central banks continued to make purchases in the London market be fore prices rose above the $35.35 per ounce level at which central banks of countries be longing to the International M onetary Fund are precluded from further buying. The gold purchases reflected, in part, the outflow of dol lars due to the persistence of substantial dif ferentials in short-term interest rates between W estern Europe and the United States and, in part, the continuing weakness in the United States balance of payments position. As G er many and later Switzerland took measures to discourage the inflow of “hot m oney,” some private dollar-holders turned to gold, and pressure on the London m arket built up. By mid-October, the London “fixing price” had been fluctuating between $35.20 and $35.25 for over a month, slightly above the cost of bringing in gold from New York. Still, the fixing price did clear the market; no m ajor overnight revision was necessary until O cto ber 18. On the morning of O ctober 18 the fixing price was set at $35.27. By midafternoon, prices rose to $35.35, a full percent above the dollar’s par value. The following day’s fixing was set at $35.38 but the surge in p ri vate dem and pushed prices to an unprece dented $35.65. On O ctober 20, the fixing price followed the trend of the preceding two FEDERAL RESERVE BANK days by rising to $36.55. The m arket re sponded with bids that rose as high as $40 per ounce before the fever subsided. F or four days, transactions took place at well over $36 per ounce even in the absence of central bank demands. From O ctober through December, prices moved slowly downward despite persistent dem and. The m ajor factor in keeping prices below the $36 level was the increased supply of gold which reached the m arket during this period. The Bank of England purchased some $350 million in gold from the United States between O ctober and December, and the United States Treasury announced that it had no criticism of the Bank of England’s opera tions in the London gold m arket. In January 1961, an Executive O rder prohibited United States citizens from purchasing or holding gold overseas (aside from rare coins) after June 1. More im portant was the statem ent made by the President in early February to the Congress outlining plans to improve the United States balance of payments and dis avowing any intention of devaluing the dollar. The net effect of these moves reduced the intense speculative dem and for gold and the London price fell towards its norm al level. By M arch 1961 the fixing price was below the official United States price of $35.0875 per fine troy ounce and the “great gold scare” was over. But unusual events should not destroy perspective on go ld It is tem pting in studying international movements of gold to emphasize the unusual to the detrim ent of one’s perspective of the broader picture of norm al gold transactions. When one hears of clandestine transfers at astronom ical prices or of shipments of gold smuggled through unfriendly borders, such transactions tend to dominate one’s impres sion of the world market. This can lead to serious misjudgments of the relative im por OF SAN FRANCISCO tance of gold and of the forces which cause gold to move between nations. Fluctuations in the L ondon gold m arket should be viewed in the context of represent ing a relatively small volume of transactions, and consequently they should not be allowed to obscure the very real im provem ent that has been made in strengthening the stability of the world’s international exchange m echan ism since the late 1920’s. International gold transactions no longer pose the direct threat to domestic stability that they once did, and stable exchange rates and the convertibility of all m ajor currencies for current transac tions have become realities in the relatively short period since the m ajor distortion caused by World W ar II and its afterm ath. The res toration of convertibility has greatly facili tated the development of world trade and the more advantageous use of the w orld’s eco nomic resources that such trade prom otes. M uch of the credit for this achievement must of course go to the efforts of the Inter national M onetary Fund and its m em ber n a tions and other international institutions, but credit is also due the United States for its significant contributions to the m aintenance and strengthening of the international pay ments mechanism, particularly in the imme diate postw ar years. Clearly, however, as the events of the past two years have shown, the dollar is not inherently immune to specula tive attacks provoked by large or persistent payments deficits. To ensure the continuing acceptance by foreign nations of dollar assets and to prevent the chaos that would result from loss of confidence in the dollar, the continued convertibility of the dollar into gold at present levels and a reduction in our balance of payments deficits appear essential. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS The fourth and concluding article in this series has presented a brief survey of gold movements and markets within the past gen February 1962 M O N T H L Y REVIEW eration. Gold has come a long way since its first use as a medium of exchange and a store of value, and this series of articles has de scribed in some detail the developing role of gold in the m onetary affairs of the world. T o day, gold’s main role is that of providing a means of official settlement of international balances, while its form er role as a medium of exchange in domestic m onetary transactions has declined to the vanishing point in prac tically all countries. In the absence of a single world currency, many countries hold signifi cant proportions of their international re serves in gold to meet balance of payments deficits. With the rapid growth in world trade and investment in the postwar period, there has been increasing use of “ key” currencies, especially the dollar, as international reserves with the result that gold now constitutes a smaller proportion of such reserves than it did in the early postwar years. The establishm ent and growth of the International M onetary Fund has also contributed to “economizing” the use of gold as international reserves. Belief in the stability of the dollar through out the world is still based to a considerable extent on the ready convertibility of the dol lar into gold for foreign official institutions at the fixed price of $35 per ounce. In fulfilling its obligations as the w orld’s banker, there fore, the United States must see to it that ac tual and potential claims on its gold stock do not become so large as to undermine faith in that fixed and ready convertibility. It is not for this reason, however, but because of the fundamental need to achieve reasonable pay ments equilibrium that so much attention has been devoted in the last year or more to steps that are designed to reduce the United States balance of payments deficit. Increasing international cooperation and consultation, particularly in the past year, have emerged as a potentially useful device in dealing with problems of international eco nomic and monetary policy. Moreover, the various international institutions, such as the International M onetary Fund and the W orld Bank, have gradually expanded their oper ations and adapted their policies to meet chal lenges as they appear. Any further “economizing” in the use of gold would, of course, be wholly in line with the historical trend in which gold has re treated from being the p rin cip al dom estic money to being only p art of the domestic money supply, then to an officially held back ing for domestic money while providing the principal means of settling international bal ances, and then to one of various means of international settlement. Nevertheless, it is clear that gold still plays an im portant role in the world’s monetary sys tem, owing in good part to faith being placed in it as a store of value. This is illustrated by the fact that a gold “backing” for the money supply is still required by the laws of several im portant countries, by the role of gold in official reserves, and by the persistence of private gold hoarding in some countries. The purpose of this series of articles has been to broaden the reader’s knowledge of the role of gold in human affairs and, even more im portant, to give the reader a basis on which to form his own opinion on public issues in volving gold. One aspect of gold which has never been challenged is its ability to provoke heated discussions among students concern ing its role. Perhaps the best conclusion to this series is to cite the opposing views of two of gold’s more famous students, John M aynard Keynes and Per Jacobsson. In speaking of public attitudes concerning various possible types of expenditure to re lieve unemployment, Keynes rem arked as fol lows in The General Theory o f Em ploym ent, Interest and M oney published in 1936: . . . the form of digging holes in the ground known as gold-mining, which not only adds nothing whatever to the real wealth of the world but involves the disutility of labour, is the most acceptable of all solu tions. If the Treasury were to fill old bottles with banknotes, bury them at suitable depths in disused coalmines which are then FEDERAL RESERVE BANK filled up to the surface with town rubbish, and leave it to private enterprise on welltried principles of laissez-faire to dig the notes up again (the right to do so being obtained, o f course, by tendering for leases of the note-bearing territory), there need be no more unemployment and, with the help of the repercussions, the real in come of the community, and its capital wealth also, would probably become a good deal greater than it actually is. It would, indeed, be more sensible to build houses and the like; but if there are politi cal and practical difficulties in the way of this, the above would be better than noth- Ancient Egypt was doubly fortunate, and d o u b tless ow ed to th is its fab led wealth, in that it possessed two activities, namely, pryamid-building as well as the search for the precious metals, the fruits of which, since they could not serve the needs of man by being consumed, did not stale with abundance. Per Jacobsson, M anaging Director of the International M onetary Fund, expressed quite a contrary view in a series of lectures before the A m erican Philosophical Society in 1961, w hich have been published in book form under the title of The M arket Econom y in the W orld o f Today. In the first place, the alignment of cur rencies to gold gives a certain stability to the world’s monetary system which cannot 44 OF SAN FRANCISCO be ignored,. . . Gold cannot be Arbitrarily created as credit can, and, from the point o f view of stability, the guarantee given by gold is therefore felt to be superior to that o f credit as a means of payment. Secondly, when international liabilities are settled in gold, this is a definite and final settlement, leaving no credit nexus as is the case when settlement is made in other ways. Gold payments are less com plicated, and this is an advantage. Thirdly, in the world in which we live with so many beliefs and, 1 must admit, prejudices inherited from past generations, the possession of gold inspires confidence in a way that the possession of no other monetary asset can. Given human beings as they are, they need “props” for their confidence to be sustained, and gold still proves useful in this respect. Fourthly, the use of gold as the wellnigh universal basis of money may not by itself give cohesion to the world’s mone tary system but it greatly facilitates the task and it would not be easy to establish the same degree of cohesion in any other way. And fifthly, the current gold output, in so far as it becomes available for mone tary purposes, gives a certain impetus to financial expansion and an increase in in ternational liquidity— which is helpful, as far as it goes. In his opinion, this list of reasons clearly in dicates “why gold should be retained to play a role not as master but as an auxiliary in the world’s monetary system.” February 1 9 6 2 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO BANKING AND CREDIT STATISTICS AND B U SIN E SS INDEXES— TWELFTH DISTRICT 1 (In d e x e s : 1947-1949 = 100. D ollar a m o u n ts in m illio n s o f d o lla rs) Condition items of all member banks2' 7 Year and Month 1929 1933 1939 1952 1963 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1961 Ja n u a ry F e b ru a ry M arch A pril M ay June Ju ly A ugust S eptem ber O ctober N ovem ber D ecem ber 1962 J a n u a ry Loans and discounts U.S. Gov’t securities Bank debits index 31 cities1’ 6 Demand deposits adjusted3 Total time deposits 1,790 1,609 2,267 7,502 7,997 8,699 9,120 9,424 10,679 12,077 12,452 13,034 15,116 42 18 30 140 150 153 173 190 204 209 237 253 270 2,239 1,486 1,967 8,839 9,220 9,418 11,124 12,613 13,178 13,812 16,537 17,139 18,499 495 720 1,450 6,619 6,639 7,942 7,239 6,452 6,619 8,003 6,673 6,964 8,278 1,234 951 1,983 10,520 10,515 11,196 11,864 12,169 11,870 12,729 13,375 13,060 14,163 16,751 17,525 17,517 17,637 17,632 17,578 17,504 17,779 18.028 17,901 18,212 18,499 6,984 6,991 6,916 7,436 7,393 7,571 7,935 7,863 7,955 8,190 8,182 8,278 13,010 12,750 12,860 13,222 12,865 12,935 13,206 13,212 13,317 13,901 13,944 14,163 13,121 13,639 13,754 13,999 14,289 14,371 14,492 14,656 14,786 14,867 14,874 15,116 254 256 273 266 265 268 267 262 277 291 265 293 18,646 8,082 13,671 15,448 294 Bank rates on short-term business loans6’ 7 Total nonagricultural employ ment 3.95 4.14 4.09 4,10 4.50 4.97 4.88 5.36 5,62 5.46 5 48 5.50 5.45 5.42 Industrial production (physical volume)5 Year and month 1929 1933 1939 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1960 D ecem ber 1961 Ja n u a ry F eb ru ary M arch A pril M ay Ju n e Ju ly A ugust S eptem ber O ctober N ovem ber D ecem ber Car loadings (number)5 Dep't store sales (value)1 Retail food prices 71 60 118 121 121 127 134 139 138 146 150 152 57 130 137 134 144 154 161 153 165 165 163 102 52 77 100 100 96 104 104 96 89 94 88 87 30 18 31 120 122 122 132 141 140 143 157 156 175 64 42 47 115 113 113 112 114 118 123 123 125 150 150 150 150 151 152 152 152 153 153 154 154 161 161 161 160 162 163 162 164 165 166 167 84 83 83 88 81 85 86 84 87 99 100 92 154 164 160 164 153 162 167 157 170 164 165 175 127 127 127 127 127 126 126 125 126 127 126 127 155p 168p 167r Copper7 Electric power Total Dry Cargo 55 27 56 128 124 131 133 145 156 149 158 174 161 169 24 146 139 158 128 154 163 172 142 138 154 171 103 17 80 116 115 113 103 120 131 130 116 99 129 136 29 26 40 136 145 162 172 192 209 224 229 252 271 190 110 163 186 171 141 133 166 201 231 176 188 241 137 151 133 137 274 271 134 134 131 135 143 143 143 140 142 144 144 141 159 176 178 168 169 188 157 160 163 171 182 152 131r 152 162 172 191 187 183 180 174 181 167 167 139 134 137 133 143 143 121 107 138 149r 147 145 277 276 285 283 285 289 293 300 295 235 248 264 261 265 224 232 247 217 Refined 95 40 71 113 115 116 115 122 120 106 107 116 110 87 52 67 106 107 109 106 106 105 101 94 92 91 92 78 50 63 112 116 122 119 124 129 132 124 130 134 140 99 91 lOOr lOOr 91 91 92 92 92 91 91 91 92 92 92 92 Cement ... 164 Exports Steel1 Crude , Waterborne Foreign Trade Index7’ *• 10 Petroleum1 Lumber 103 114 111 111 110 111 111 110 113 Total mf’g employ ment Imports Tanker Total Dry Cargo 150 247 7 243 175 130 145 123 149 117 123 123 138 149 124 72 95 162 204 314 268 314 459 582 564 686 808 128 io7 194 201 138 141 178 261 308 212 223 305 97 140 141 163 166 187 201 216 221 263 269 57 733 1,836 4,239 2,912 3,614 7,180 10,109 9,504 11,699 14,209 338 175 1,046 245 21,919 318 362 363 331 331 290 299 324 317 118 95 124 163 171 128 138 138 76 779 666 952 759 865 684 1,027 647 840 218 233 252 286 292 267 297 274 277 15,394 11,985 19,268 13,139 15,856 11,535 20,025 10,354 15,542 Tanker . • . 1 A djusted for seasonal variation, except w here indicated. E xcept for banking a n d credit and d e p a rtm e n t sto re sta tistics, all indexes are based upon d a ta from outside sources, as follows: lum ber, N atio n al L um ber M a n u fac tu rers’ Association, W est C o ast L um berm an’s A ssociation, a n d W estern P ine A ssociation; petroleum , cem ent, a n d copper, U.S. B ureau of M ines; steel, U.S. D e p a rtm e n t of Com m erce and A m erican Iron a n d Steel In stitu te ; electric pow er, Federal Pow er C om m ission; non ag ricu ltu ral and m anufacturing em ploym ent, U.S. B ureau of L abor S ta tistic s and cooperating sta te agencies; retail food prices, U.S. B ureau of L abor S ta tistics; carloadings, various railroads and railroad associations; a n d foreign trad e , U.S. D e p artm en t of Com m erce. 2 A nnual figures are as of end of year, m onthly figures as of last W ednesday in m onth. 3 D em and deposits, excluding in te rb an k a n d U.S. G overnm ent deposits, less cash item s in process of collection. M onthly d a ta p a rtly estim ated. 4 D ebits to to ta l deposits except in te rb an k prior to 1942. D ebits to dem and deposits except U.S. G overnm ent a n d in te rb a n k deposits from 1942. 6 D aily average. 6 A verage ra te s on loans m ade in five m ajor cities, weighted by loan size category. 1 N o t a d ju ste d for seasonal v ariation. 8 Los A ngeles, San Francisco, a n d S e a ttle indexes com bined. * Com m ercial cargo only, in physical volum e, for th e Pacific C o a st custom s d istric ts plus A laska a n d H aw aii; sta rtin g w ith Ju ly 1950, “ special categ o ry ” exports are excluded because of security reasons. 10 A laska a n d H aw aii are included in indexes beginning in 1950. p— Prelim inary* r— Revised. 44A