The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.
M&nikui FEDERAL RESERVE R eview BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO A U G U S T - S E P T E M B E R 1945 Government Security Sales he end of the war made it possible to anticipate a substantial downward revision in Treasury expendi T tures. As of August 30, total expenditures for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1946 were estimated by the Budget Bureau at 67 billion dollars, as against an August 1 esti mate of 85 billion. Even the lower figure, however, is markedly above probable post-transition levels and in volves a substantial deficit, estimated for the year at 31 billion dollars. Expenditures arising out of the war but yet to be made include payments for materials and muni tions already delivered, contract settlements, and pay ments related both to the maintenance of the armed forces and to the veterans program. The Victory Loan To supply these funds in part, the Victory Loan Drive will begin October 29 and close December 8. (Savings bonds and notes processed through the Federal Reserve Banks from December 8 to December 31 will also be credited to the drive.) The goals established are 14 bil lion dollars for sales to all non-bank investors and 4 bil lion for sales to individuals, of which 2 billion is to come from Series E bonds. The securities to be sold under the direction of the State War Finance Committees are: Series E, F, and G Savings Bonds Series C Savings Notes percent Certificates of Indebtedness 2*4 percent Bonds of 1959-62 2 y 2 percent Bonds of 1967-72 Inflationary pressures did not disappear with the end of the wrar, and the major emphasis in the Victory drive will again be on sales of securities to individuals. As in other drives, efforts are being made to discourage the direct or indirect use of bank credit except to facilitate permanent investment in Government securities. Commercial banks will not be allowed to subscribe for new issues, except that commercial banks accepting time deposits will again be permitted limited subscriptions, not to exceed 10 percent of their time deposits or $500,000. Certificates of indebtedness are the only securities being offered without restrictions as to bank ownership after the drive. Banks are urged not to make loans nor to ac cept subscriptions for speculative purchases and not to purchase outstanding securities with the understanding that a corresponding subscription for new securities will be entered through such banks. Non-bank investors are requested not to sell securities, except for ordinary portfolio adjustments, to obtain funds for Victory Loan subscriptions. Limitations are placed upon subscriptions of dealers and brokers and, for the first time, upon those of insurance companies and savings institutions. As in the Seventh W ar Loan, dealers’ and brokers’ subscriptions will be restricted to the 2% and 2 y 2 per cent Treasury bonds. No such subscription may exceed the greater of two amounts: (1 ) the amount of those two restricted issues sold outright by the dealer or broker to customers other than dealers or brokers in the 45 days following the Fourth War Loan, or (2 ) 40 percent of the dealer’s or broker’s net capital. Insurance companies wall be limited in their subscrip tions to either 15 percent of their total Government se curity holdings on December 31, 1944 or 6 percent of their total admitted assets on that date, whichever is larger. Savings institutions, including savings banks not accepting demand deposits, savings and loan and build ing and loan associations, cooperative banks, and credit unions, wrill be limited to twice the amount of their in crease in net assets (total assets less borrowed funds) from July 1 through September 30, 1945 plus 7 percent of their Government securities held on June 30, 1945. Goals for non-bank investors are lower than in any war loan drive except the first two, but the need to meet these goals with the minimum possible expansion in bank credit is as pronounced as ever. The desirability of con tinuing purchases of Government securities by individ uals will remain after the Victory Loan Drive is con cluded. The Treasury has indicated that, while this will be the last great public drive, both the general sale of savings bonds and the sale of Series E bonds through payroll deduction plans will be continued. Results of the Seventh W a r Loan Security sales in the Seventh War Loan Drive amount ed to 26.3 billion dollars, 5.7 billion more than the Sixth Drive total, which wras the previous high. In addition, sales to commercial banks having time deposits were 1.3 billion dollars and to Treasury investment accounts, 1.1 billion. Sales to individuals totaled 8.7 billion dollars, 2.3 billion above the earlier record established in the Fifth War Loan. Series E bond sales of 4 billion dollars were also substantially higher than in any previous drive. 62 FEDERAL RESERVE BAN K Twelfth District sales also reached new highs. Total sales amounted to 2.2 billion dollars, compared with 1.7 billion in the Sixth D rive; and sales to individuals were 0.9 billion, compared wTith 0.7 billion in the Fifth Drive. In terms of quotas, Washington and Oregon were the leading District states in total sales with 193 and 187 per cent ; Oregon and Nevada led in sales to individuals with 125 and 123 percent of their quotas and in sales of Series E bonds with 109 and 106 percent. Comparable national figures were 188 percent of the quota for total sales, 124 percent for sales to individuals, and 99 percent for sales of Series E bonds. The extremely high level that was reached in sales of securities other than savings bonds was not attained without a substantial expansion of bank credit, which probably amounted nationally to more than 10 billion dollars. Funds for non-bank purchases were obtained both from bank borrowing and from the sale of outstand August-Septem ber 1945 OF SAN FRANCISCO ing securities to the banking system. Although the in crease in bank credit related to drive sales was as great S a l e s o f S e c u r i t i e s , S e v e n t h W a r L o a n D r iv e U n it e d S t a t e s a n d T w e l f t h D is t r ic t b y S t a t e s (millions of dollars) t ---------- Sales to individuals---------- N United States .......... Twelfth D i s t r i c t .... Arizona ................. California ............... Idaho ...................... N e v a d a ................... Oregon ................... Utah ........................ W a s h in g t o n .......... Total Total Series E 26,313 2,191 43 1,449 42 16 205 72 364 8,681 910 21 594 22 11 100 31 130 3,976 508 13 318 13 5 58 21 80 Series F & G Other Other sales1 683 4,022 17,635 78 323 1,281 3 5 22 56 220 856 1 7 20 1 5 5 6 36 105 1 9 40 11 39 234 1 Excluding sales to commercial banks and Treasury investment accounts, which were outside the loan drive. N o te : Figures do not necessarily add to totals because of rounding. as or greater than in previous drives, the net absorption of securities by non-bank buyers was also probably great er than in any other drive. Business Conditions— Twelfth District rom the end of 1943 to mid-August of this year, em ployment in manufacturing industries in the Twelfth F District declined appreciably although few persons were unemployed and more or less acute labor shortages were widespread. In the first month since the end of the war, an even more paradoxical situation has developed. Man ufacturing employment has been reduced sharply and there has been some increase in unemployment, but local labor shortages continue and a substantial number of job open ings exists. The new situation, aggravated by the unex pectedly early ending of the wTar, necessarily involves a certain amount of dislocation and individual hardship, especially in the war industry centers. The full impact of the end of the war has not yet been felt, however; some industries and areas are faced with the necessity of an im mediate shift to a peacetime economy, but the continuance of services related to military traffic to and from the trans pacific area has temporarily delayed part of the expected reduction in war-supporting activities. Even in the two major war industries of the District, aircraft and aircraft parts and ship construction and repair, the volume of em ployment at September 15 was still around 400,000, a figure far in excess of any purely peacetime level that may reasonably be expected. The adjustments attendant upon the transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy in the District will probably not be completed rapidly. Industrial employment While the approaching end of the war had already re sulted in appreciable employment reductions in the major war industries of the Twelfth District, the immediate effect of the Japanese surrender was the additional loss of nearly 300,000 jobs during the four weeks following August 15. About one-third of these were in shipbuilding and repair yards, about one-quarter in the airframe and aircraft parts industries, with the remainder scattered through a miscellaneous group of metals, ordnance, and munitions plants, parts manufacturers and sub-contrac tors. The areas experiencing the largest reductions in war industry employment were metropolitan Los Angeles, with approximately 100,000 layoffs, the Seattle-TacomaBremerton area with about 50,000, the San Francisco Bay area with about 45,000, the Portland-Vancouver area with about 30,000, and San Diego, with about 17,000. Among individual communities, the most severely affected by contract cancellations were Long Beach, Wilmington, Santa Monica, Inglewood, Huntington Park and San Diego in southern California, and Port land, Vancouver, Seattle and Tacoma in the Northwest. While the San Francisco Bay area has had relatively few large cancellations since mid-August, a considerable num ber of small manufacturers were affected ; there were also sizeable layoffs in the shipyards at Richmond and Sausalito. Among the several industrial areas of the District, the San Francisco Bay region seems to be experiencing rela tively less difficulty than the other large centers in the current situation, in large part because more or less read justment had already been made in this area as new ship building construction approached completion and ship yard workers transferred themselves to other lines which are still active, left the district, or retired from the labor force. A large volume of transport and shipping activity and ship repair work continues to center at San Francisco Bay in connection with trans-Pacific military and naval supply and replacement operations; labor requirements for these services are providing some offset to declining employment in direct war activities. A sharp increase in unemployment compensation claims was one of the first consequences of contract can cellations and layoffs in Twelfth District industrial cen ters.1 Total claims on file jumped from approximately 42,000 in California, Oregon, and Washington at the be1It should be noted that the number of persons receiving unemployment compensation is well below the number of persons having filed claims. August-Septem ber 1945 ginning of August to about 100,000 at the end of the month and to about 145,000 by mid-September. The heaviest increase was in southern California— from 28,000 claims on August 1 to over 100,000 on September 15, while the lowest proportionate increase was in the northern California area— from about 11,000 claims to about 20,000. Greater relative increases occurred in Ore gon and Washington, where the total number of claims increased from about 2,500 for the two states on August L to nearly 24,000 on September 15. Some of those laid off or having voluntarily left war jobs have taken other employment; some, especially in dustrially trained women, are unemployed; and some have left the District labor force by retirement or by leav ing the area. Substantial numbers of job openings are reported by the United States Employment Service in most of the larger District cities. Most of these openings are in the trades and services. The railroads and public utilities are also seeking to augment their forces, and cer tain industries, including lumbering, metal mining, and steel mills and foundries, are having considerable diffi culty in obtaining enough men to sustain their operations. Concern is also being expressed over the adequacy of the agricultural labor supply. Lower wages offered, differing and in many cases lower skills required, lack of housing, and in some instances lack of employment opportunities for women and for members of minority races as well as for marginal workers, are among the factors explaining the over-supplv of some types of labor and the shortage of others. W ar industries By mid-August Pacific Coast shipyards building for the Maritime Commission were within measurable dis tance of completing their contracts. Following the sur render of Japan, the Commission announced the cancel lation on August 20 of 355 million dollars in contracts covering the construction of 135 ships, of which 53 were under contract to West Coast shipyards. At the end of August there still remained about 100 vessels of the Com mission’s Pacific Coast program to be completed— assum ing no further cancellations; most of these were under contract to yards at Los Angeles harbor and at Portland and Vancouver. In probably not more than two West Coast yards, however, will the remaining ships require any appreciable amount of construction extending into 1946. Naval contracts have also been extensively cancelled, including a recent large order for aircraft carriers held by a Vancouver yard and contracts for destroyers at Seattle and San Pedro; naval work at a large Tacoma yard has also been greatly curtailed. A considerable num ber of army and navy contracts for barges and lighters of various kinds have either been cancelled or suspended. On the other hand, one of the smaller Portland yards is actively working on a contract for the Netherlands Indies calling for the construction of 20 freighters for use in inter-island traffic. A number of inquiries have also been reported from European and South American countries for new ships to be built in American shipyards, and it is 63 M O N T H L Y R EVIEW not impossible that West Coast yards may participate in this business. Ship repair and conversion work is still going forward, offsetting to some extent the rapid de cline in new ship construction activity. The overall reduc tion in District shipyard employment between August 15 and September 15 was approximately 100,000, from about 385,000 to about 285,000. Cutbacks in the procurement of aircraft had been con siderably greater than in the case of ships during the period following V -E day. In spite of heavy cancellations, however, the backlog of Twelfth District airframe plants still remained at a high figure in early August, and the total weight of airplanes to be produced by all plants for the army air forces and for Lend-Lease during the sec ond half of 1945 had been scheduled at a rate equal to 70 percent of production in the first six months of the year. This program was abruptly changed by the surrender of Japan. During the period immediately following Au gust 15, the Army Air Forces announced the cancellation of orders for more than 31,000 military planes, involving approximately 7 billion dollars. Among the Pacific Coast airframe plants, large units at Long Beach, Santa Mon ica, Inglewood, San Diego and Seattle have had exten sive cancellations, and numerous sub-contractors, parts manufacturers and feeder plants have also been affected. In the month ending September 15, employment in West Coast airframe and aircraft parts establishments was reduced by approximately 40 per cent, from about 185,000 to around 110,000 persons. Following the cancella tion of military orders, the larger airframe plants inau gurated a five-day, 40-hour work week. The situation is still too confused to permit a reliable estimate of the probable rate of production and employ ment by the District aircraft industry during the next few months. A considerable backlog of military orders remains to be filled even after allowing for the extensive cancellations of August and early September. Some of the larger plants, notably those at Burbank and Santa Monica, will fare better than the average in this respect, Production and Employment— Index numbers, 1935-39 average—100 Industrial production1 L u m b e r ....... ................... Refined oils2 ................. Cement2 ........................ W h ea t flour2 .............. Petroleum2 .................... Electric power2 .......... . . . . With seasonal Without seasonal ,------- 1945------- \ 1944 Aug. July June Aug. ,---------1945------- N1944 Aug. July June Aug. t------ adjustment------->---- /------- adjustment-------> — — — 143 — 395 128 170 — 394 122 173 — 407 124 — I ll 137 — 415 222 252 189 159 207 106 230 261 197 165 217 109 280 327 224 193 243 123 528 547 679 103 r l l 8 Factory employment and payrolls3 Employment Twelfth District . . California ............ ’ ’ ’ ! 244 Pacific Northwest Oregon ............ W ashington . . Intermountain . . Payrolls California ................. . . . 486 1 Daily average. 2 1923-25 average — 100. 3 Excludes fish, fruit, and vegetable canning, r Revised p Preliminary. p ll4 262 143 139 433 245 489 114 265 140 150 143 440 134 263 139 152 143 436 149 220 124 137 130 455 222 252 190 160 208 109 230 261 196 167 214 112 282 328 229 199 247 123 528 550 682 64 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK while a few smaller plants will also retain a fair volume of army and navy work. An appreciable amount of com mercial business had already been booked by at least two of the leading Pacific Coast concerns before the end of the war and it is expected that the requirements of the commercial air lines for replacements and additions will provide a substantial volume of business over the next year or two for the aircraft industry as a whole, though at a rate far below the output attained during the past three years. Many of the aircraft parts manufacturers are converting their plants to production of civilian goods, in some cases prewar products, in others new lines of output. A minor casualty in the general policy of retrenchment following the cessation of hostilities was the abandon ment by the W P B of its project for the construction of four additional mills in California to process guayule shrub for the emergency production of natural rubber. The Department of Agriculture will continue to operate the two mills currently in production, one at Salinas and one at Bakersfield, California, but the improved outlook for natural rubber makes unnecessary any further expan sion of processing facilities. Petroleum and lumber Among the basic industries of the District, petroleum production and refining probably finds fewer problems than most others in adapting itself to immediate postwar conditions. The elements of the situation are fairly simple. On the demand side, military requirements for high octane gasoline have contracted sharply, while consump tion of fuel oil for naval and transport purposes still re mains high, and civilian demand for gasoline, with ration ing and road speed limitations removed, has increased. Increased civilian gasoline requirements fall far short, however, of the decline in military needs; the problem is largely one of reducing refinery operations and relieving pressure on sources of crude petroleum. No fundamental technical changes are involved in adjusting refinery technique; the reduced needs for petroleum have already been given effect by eliminating imports from the mid west and by cutting down on local production. The latter has taken the form chiefly of curtailing production in the Elk Hills naval reserve to 15,000 barrels per day, as contrasted wTith the recent rate of about 65,000 barrels. Automobile registrations in California during the first seven months of 1945 were within 5 percent of the num ber for the corresponding months in 1941, while the num ber of trucks registered was larger by about 15 percent. In addition, there are large numbers of out-of-state cars, many of them owrned by military personnel or members of their families. It is probable that the total civilian de mand for gasoline in the Twelfth District is running not very far below the levels of 1941, the highest prewar year. The lumber industry is currently facing a very difficult situation. Large cancellations of military orders have theoretically released supplies of lumber for civilian pur chase in western producing areas, but stocks at mills as well as in dealers’ yards are at a very low level, and OF SAN FRANCISCO A ugust-September 1945 production has been hampered by labor shortages and wage disputes as well as by fire weather shutdowns and inadequate equipment, particularly of trucks and tires needed in logging operations. Since the beginning of the war the labor force of the northwestern lumber industry has been considerably below its needs and the differ entials between wage levels in this industry and those prevailing in war industry centers have undoubtedly con tributed to its difficulties in obtaining necessary man power. Strike votes were being conducted in August and early September by the A. F. of L. and C. I. O. unions among the sawmill operatives and loggers respectively, to enforce their demands for a basic hourly wage rate of $1.10 as compared with the present minimum of 90 cents per hour. Until these labor difficulties are cleared up and mechanical equipment needs are made good, there is little prospect that the industry will resume operations at any where near its potential capacity. Reports continue to be heard of housing shortages throughout the District, not only in the larger cities but also in many smaller communities at some distance from the industrial centers, and in some cases even in agricul tural districts. Government controls on the allocation of lumber for civilian use were relaxed in August ; the re maining limitations on distribution were dropped at the end of September and all restrictions on new construc tion, including house building, will be removed effective October 15. Transportation and shipping Up to mid-August the railroad and ocean shipping situation remained extremely tight. As a means of speed ing up the return of empty cars to eastern points for loading military equipment and supplies, it became nec essary to impose restrictions on carloading at the week ends, wThich caused losses to producers of perishable farm products at scattered points in California. In addition, off-shore shipping was hampered by the large number of vessels requiring overhauling or repair, in spite of strenu ous efforts to speed up ship repair work. The cessation of hostilities in August lessened some what the urgency of military needs, and the movement of supplies through the Pacific ports, which had averaged over 70,000 cars per month from January through July, has diminished sharply. Carloadings within the District have also declined, reflecting the cancellation of war con tracts, with corresponding reductions in output by Dis trict producers, as well as the curtailment of lumber pro duction in the Northwest. While the railroads still need additional manpower and equipment to meet the normal crop moving requirements, which are at a peak in the fall months, their operating problems have been consid erably mitigated by the ending of the war. The long continued strain on overland transportation occasioned by the wrar has prompted inquiry from time to time as to the prospects for resumption of intercoastal shipping service. The present lack of suitable vessels, to gether with the need for more thorough reorganization than can be effected immediately, makes the early re 65 M O N T H L Y REVIEW August-September 1945 sumption of normal service by private operators out of the question. The inauguration of coastwise and inter coastal cargo movement on a limited scale, however, is to be undertaken temporarily by the W ar Shipping Admin istration, which has been authorized to engage in these services up to the end of the current year as an emergency measure. It is reported that direct shipping service will be re sumed not later than October via the Panama Canal be tween the Atlantic Coast and Hawaii and certain South Pacific ports. Resumption of limited service between the East Coast of South America and Pacific Coast ports is also in early prospect. Commercial service from the West Coast to the Philippines was inaugurated in August by the American President Lines as agent for the W . S. A. The need for rehabilitation of physical facilities is ex pected to result in a fairly heavy volume of freight move ment to the Philippines and probably to the Dutch East Indies also. Civilian transportation to Pacific areas will be restricted, however, to essential passengers approved by the State Department. Late in August the W . S. A. approved the transfer of 16 coastwise vessels to Philippine registry and flag, re taining ownership and direction of their operation. These vessels are to be used in coastwise and inter-island cargo and passenger movement; Philippine laws do not permit the coastwise operation of vessels other than those of Philippine registry. last year’s figures were general throughout the District, averaging about 15 percent. In August and early September, department store sales continued to exceed the volume of a year ago but by a somewhat smaller margin than in earlier months. In cer tain areas, however, including San Diego and Portland, department store sales in August were below the level of a year earlier. For the Northwest as a whole the increase over last year was only 1 percent. The general closing of stores in mid-August incident to the Japanese surrender was an important factor in bringing down the month’s sales volume in the District as a whole to a level only 4 percent above that of August 1944. Preliminary reports from larger cities for the first three weeks of September indicate considerable variation within the District, with an overall increase of approximately 10 percent above last year’s sales. Data are also available for two other related lines, ap parel stores and furniture stores. District apparel stores reported sales volume up 12 percent from last year for July and for the first seven months of the year; the rate of increase dropped to 7 percent in August. Furniture store sales in the District were 8 percent above a year earlier for the first seven months of 1945, and 10 percent higher in July. In August, however, furniture store sales dropped 3 percent below last year’s level. In San Diego, Seattle, and Spokane, furniture store sales have for a number of months run consistently lower than last year. Ref a/7 trade Bank deposits and reserves The drastic curtailments already effected in District war production plants and the reductions in manufactur ing employment and payrolls which are still to come may soon be reflected in reduced spending for goods and services. Up to mid-summer of this year, however, the rate of consumer expenditures as indicated by available data for retail sales was still extremely high. Daily aver age sales in 220 department stores in the District during the first seven months of 1945 were approximately 14 percent higher than in the corresponding months of 1944, while this bank’s seasonally adjusted index number of department store sales in July, 255 percent of the 193539 average, was^ within one point of the record figure established last February. Increased sales in July over The end of the war made little or no immediate differ ence in the behavior of bank deposits and money in cir culation. Since the end of June, demand deposits of individuals, partnerships, and corporations have followed the usual pattern of increase between war loan drives, as war loan deposit accounts of the Treasury in commercial banks have been drawn upon and as additional funds have continued to be brought into the District through Treas ury expenditure. By mid-August, demand deposits had returned to a level approximating the high reached in late May, just before the Seventh War Loan. In the next four weeks, they continued to increase steadily. The growth in time deposits has been remarkably perBanking and Credit— Distribution and Trade— Index numbers, 1935-39 daily average=100 With seasonal f----- adjustment ----- > -1945---------^ 1944 Aug. July June Aug. Department store sales (value) Twelfth D istrict................... 231 255 233 222 Southern C aliforn ia............ 231 260 239 221 Northern California . . . . . . 212 244 220 200 212 Portland .................................. 211 232 211 Western W ashington 275 310 282 268 Eastern Washington and Northern I d a h o ............... 228 211 208 231 Southern Idaho and U tah., 257 253 225 239 Phoenix .................................. 319 287 272 284 Car loadings (number)1 Total ......................................... 112 116 115 Merchandise and misc.. . 131 134 130 O t h e r .................................... 89 94 98 1 1923-25 daily average = * 100 . r Revised. Averages of Wednesday figures Without seasonal adjustment 1944 /-------- 1945Aug. July June Aug. -----N 210 213 193 197 256 211 215 219 r218 200 r203 195 200 254 259 202 204 182 199 250 Loans to finance transactions in : U . S. Government securities. . Other securities ........................... Real estate loans ............................. All other loans.................................... 202 214 223 184 194 198 r210 218 232 205 199 199 All other securities. 115 140 85 133 145 118 125 142 104 -Change from------N 1944 June Aug. ( m illio n s of d o lla rs) Condition items of weekly reporting member banks Coin and currency in circulation Total (changes o n ly )................. Fed. Res. Notes of F. R . B. oJ Member bank reserves................. .. Aug. July 1,091 518 _ 128 51 290 104 5,533 5,133 400 3,205 1,906 1,040 — 2,992 1,775 4 4- 41 4 - 32 4 -1 2 4 4- 46 19 4 1 — 5 4- 68 4- 62 + 6 4-128 4- 41 — 172 4- 10 45 — 1 _ _ 5 4 - 67 + 4 — 5 4- 12 4 -977 4-916 4- 61 4-425 4-3 9 4 45 4- 6 j -{- 62 4- 80 4- 74 — 6 + 17 — + — 4- 40 4-335 4 -328 47 4- 64 4- 68 4-216 4-613 4-585 4-265 66 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK sistent, war loan drives notwithstanding, in the past two years or more, and has so far been impervious to the effects of the end of the war. Time deposits continued to rise steadily well into September. Money in circulation in the District likewise continued to increase in the month following the end of the war. The rate at which Treasury disbursements have ex ceeded Treasury receipts in the District so far in 1945 was sustained from mid-August to mid-September. Mem ber bank reserves continued to rise as a consequence, despite the offsetting effects of increases in money in cir culation and of the net outflow of funds from the District in other commercial and financial transactions. This strengthening of reserves has enabled District member banks to add somewhat during the past two months to OF SAN FRANCISCO August-September 1945 their Government security holdings, which had increased considerably at the time of the last war loan drive. With war contract cancellations and reductions in war industry employment and payrolls, it is reasonable to anticipate at least some reduction in the near future in the excess of Treasury disbursements over collections in the District and some check upon the increase in District bank deposits and money in circulation, but there were no indications of such developments in the six weeks ending September 26. In the week ending September 26, demand deposits and money in circulation did decline slightly, and net Treasury disbursements were smaller in amount than in previous weeks. These appear to be sea sonal declines, however, related primarily to tax pay ments. The Central Valley of California and the Central Valley Project h e Central Valley of California, 450 miles long and approximately 50 miles wide, lies west of the Sierra T Nevada Mountains and east of the Coast Range, and between Mount Shasta on the north and the Tehachapis on the south. Two major rivers flow through the flat, low valley floor, the Sacramento from the north and the San Joaquin from the south and, turning westward, join to empty into San Francisco Bay. Climate and soil are unusually favorable for a wide variety of agricultural products. With about a fourth of the total land area of the state, the Valley contains over half of the available land suitable for crops. Before the war, 43 percent of the land in farms in California and 54 percent of the land in irrigated farms were in the Central Valley.1 Despite the existence of a large number of local irrigation districts, irrigation works on the whole have not made the most effective use of water, and excessive pumping has seri ously lowered the ground water level in some sections. The chief purpose of the Central Valley Project is to redistribute available water so as to increase its usability. This redistribution is both in terms of the seasons of the year, by water storage in seasons of surplus rainfall with subsequent release during seasons of deficient rainfall and run-off, and in terms of geographic areas of the Central Valley, through diverting water from surplus areas in the upper Sacramento Valley to deficit areas in the San Joaquin Valley. At the same time, the Project is designed to restore depleted ground water supplies in the upper, or southern, San Joaquin Valley; to repel salt water that has been encroaching on the agricultural lands in the delta of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers; to con trol floods and aid navigation on both rivers; and to gen erate hydroelectric power. The Central Valley The Central Valley did not impress the first white immigrants as offering particularly favorable sites for l For statistical purposes, the Central Valley is considered to include the following 18 counties: Sacramento Valley counties: Butte, Colusa. Glenn, Sacramento, Shasta, Solano, Sutter, Tehama, Y o lo , Y u b a, and San Joaquin Valley counties: Fresno, K ern, K ings, Madera, Merced, San Joaquin, Stanislaus, Tulare. development. Before improvement, much of the land area appeared to be useless because of poor natural drainage resulting in swamps, on the one hand, and inadequate rainfall resulting in large reaches of arid land, on the other. Early exploitation took the form of extensive grain cultivation and cattle grazing. As the more attractive lands were taken up, the Valley commanded closer atten tion, and its possibilities under irrigation began to be ap preciated. By 1940, with irrigation extended to over 2,600,000 acres, the Central Valley had a population of 1,126,000, which was 16 percent of all California resi dents, living on more than 50,000 farms and in 80 cities and towns. Forty-nine percent of the state’s rural farm population, 27 percent of the rural nonfarm population, and 9 percent of the urban population were in the Valley. Population of Central Valley, April 1940 Number (thousands) Percent T o t a l .............................................. 1,126 100 U r b a n ....................................... 441 39 Rural ....................................... 685 61 Farm .................................. 313 28 Nonfarm ........................... 372 33 Percent of California population living in Central Valley 16 9 34 49 27 Population and occupations Although agriculture is basically the most important industry in the Central Valley, the permanent population is not predominantly a farm population. Less than three out of every ten Valley residents were living on farms in April 1940, and well over twice as many persons re ported that they were earning their livings in non-agricultural as in agricultural occupations. Trade and service accounted for 44 percent of the gainfully occupied ; agri culture, forestry and fishing for 29 percent ; manufacturing, together with transportation, communications and other public utilities for 17 percent ; and construction and mining together accounted for 10 percent. The figures understate somewhat the importance of farming since they apply to employment during the last week in March. This month represents a seasonal low in hired agricul tural labor, much of which moves from place to place with the harvests. Over half of the Valley residents, 56 August-September 1945 M O N T H L Y REVIEW percent, lived in unincorporated places in 1940, with an additional 10 percent in towns and villages of less than 5,000 population. Thirty percent, however, were located in the metropolitan areas of Sacramento, Stockton, and Fresno, either within the central cities, in the suburbs, or in the unincorporated environs. Over a period of several decades the Central Valley has gained in total population but not as rapidly as Cali fornia as a whole. In this respect there have been differ ences between the northern and southern parts of the Central Valley, with the Sacramento Valley growing more slowly than the state and the San Joaquin Valley generally growing more rapidly than the state. During the war this has been reversed; population in the Sacra mento Valley has grown at about the same rate as in the entire state, while the San Joaquin Valley has gained much less rapidly. In both sections, there has been an in crease in urbanization over the years, but its extent and rate of increase since 1900 are lower for the Central Val ley than for the state. Racially, the people of the Central Valley depart only slightly from the state average. In 1940 there were fewer Negroes, proportionately, than in the state, but more Japanese and other groups classified as non-white by the Census. A smaller proportion of adults in the Central Valley in 1940 had completed college, high school, or grade school, respectively, than in California as a whole. These differences between the Valley and the state were greater for men than for women, and were greater for the higher degrees of education than for the lower. Income People living in the Central Valley counties are es timated to have received less than 14 percent of the individual income of all California civilians in 1940, although they constituted a little more than 16 percent of the civilian population. Over 22 percent of the in comes of California proprietors of unincorporated busi nesses, which include most farms as well as trade and service enterprises, were received in the Central Valley, but less than 14 percent of the wage and salary incomes and about 6 percent of the dividend, interest and net rental incomes. Wages and salaries were the most im portant single source of income in the Central Valley as well as in the state, accounting in each area for about 60 percent of all income. In none of the Central Valley coun ties was income of proprietors, which include farmers, of greater aggregate importance than income of wage and salary earners. Wages and salaries were considerably more important in Sacramento, Shasta, and Solano coun ties, largely because of state and national government activities, than in the state or in the Valley as a whole. The average income of Central Valley residents was estimated at $674 in 1940, and in only two counties, Sac ramento and Solano, was income above the state average of $803. The increase in per capita income to $1,250 in 1943 was greater for the Valley than for the state as a whole, despite the location of the bulk of war industry outside the Valley. In 1943, per capita income in three 67 agricultural counties, Colusa, Sutter, and Yolo, in addi tion to Sacramento and Solano counties, stood above the state average of $1,425 per civilian resident. Income of proprietors displaced wages and salaries as the most important source of income in Colusa, Glenn, Sutter, Tehama, Madera, Merced, Stanislaus, and Tulare coun ties, all of which are mainly agricultural, rather than industrial or commercial. Agricultural specialization Agriculture in the Central Valley, as in California as a whole, tends to be highly diversified between farms or local farming areas, but highly specialized within farms or local farming areas. That is, many different crops are produced in significant volume, but individual farms tend to concentrate, often to the exclusion of other products even for the farmer’s own family consumption, on a single crop or on a very limited number of related crops or products. For example, in the United States, 67 percent of all livestock were produced in 1939 on farms special izing in livestock— in the Central Valley, 81 percent. Corresponding percentages of other groups of products are: dairy products, 67 percent and 80 percent; poultry and poultry products, 72 percent and 89 percent; field crops, 68 percent and 85 percent; vegetables, 74 percent and 86 percent; and fruits and nuts, 84 percent and 91 percent. Concentration on the production of one or two specialty products results in a high degree of dependence on the market, not only in the disposal of the product, but in the purchase of food for the farmer’s own table. The farm family’s food supply, in such a case, is no more stable and secure than that of an urban worker— both the farm and the city breadwinners must sell their services or products on an uncertain market and must in turn obtain practi cally all their food and other necessities from the market. In the Central Valley in 1939 only a little over 2 percent of the agricultural production was consumed on the home farm, compared with 14.5 percent for the country as a whole. The Central Valley produced 2.6 percent of all farm products, in terms of value, in the United States in 1939. Less than this proportion of livestock and livestock prod ucts (with the exception of sheep and lambs) and much more of such cash specialties as rice, sugar beets, aspara gus, peaches, figs, olives, almonds, oranges and grapes, came from the Valley. The percentage of national and state production of specified crops that occurred in the Central Valley, and the concentration of production within leading Central Valley counties, are brought out in the accompanying table. Within each of the counties, the various special crops often are concentrated in still smaller areas, of no greater compass, in the extreme, than a few contiguous farms. Even in products for which the Central Valley does not possess unique climatic advantages there is often a high degree of specialization within the Valley. Sixty-seven percent of the Valley’s production of green beans, for example, was in Tulare and Fresno counties. Similarly, FEDERAL RESERVE BAN K 68 August-Septem ber 1945 OF SAN FRANCISCO 72 percent of the cotton grown in the Central Valley came from Kern, Tulare and Fresno counties; and 97 percent of the Irish potatoes from Kern and San Joaquin counties. Valley agricultural counties, Colusa, Sutter, and Yolo, however, the percentages of farms reporting hired labor were 75, 81, and 77, respectively. Over three-fourths of the farms, containing well over Business characteristics of Valley agriculture half of the land in farms in the Central Valley, were irri Because of its specialized character, agriculture in the gated in whole or in part in 1939. Costs of operation are Central Valley typically is a business. Its costs are higher, higher for irrigated than for unirrigated land, not only its risks are heavier, a larger part of both its outlays and because of the greater out-of-pocket outlays for water, its income is in cash, its monetary returns to the owner but also because of the greater investment in wells, pumps, are greater and are more in the nature of profits and less and other fixed and movable equipment that is required. in the nature of wages, than in farming in the usual sense. Specialized agricultural business has much the same kind In addition to the cost of irrigation equipment, Central of labor problems as any other business in which wages Valley farms represent a greater than average investment are an important cost and in which the demand for labor because of high land values. In 1940, before recent sharp is highly seasonal or erratic. In the past its attitudes to farm price increases, the average value of farm land and ward labor and the unionization of labor, and its method ■> buildings in the Central Valley was a little over $16,000, of seeking to make these attitudes prevail, have been simi compared with $16,300 in all California, $12,600 in Iowa, lar to those of other businesses that see a direct connec and $5,500 in the United States as a whole. Irrigated tion between plentiful supplies of cheap labor and profita farms in Kern, Colusa and Yolo counties averaged well bility of operations. The relationship between the agri over $30,000. There is some evidence that land prices in cultural businessman and agricultural labor under these the Central Valley went up more, during the war, than conditions departs widely from the traditional relation either prices throughout the United States or in Califor ship between the farming family and the hired man. nia as a whole. Bona fide sales in Tulare County indicate The Central Valley as a whole stood above the state price increases for irrigated land of nearly 190 percent in the percentage of farms hiring labor, 67 percent as between 1941 and the middle of 1945 and it is not uncom against 62 percent, and in the proportion of farm cash mon to hear of individual tracts planted to fruit, nuts, or wage payments that were made on a day, week, or piece grapes in the various other parts of the Valley selling basis, 82 percent as against 74 percent. Use of hired labor for as great or even greater mark-ups over pre-war was considerably greater in the San Joaquin Valley, prices.1 where 71 percent of the farms reported it, than in the 1From 1941 to the second quarter of 1945, United States farm prices in Sacramento Valley, where 57 percent of the farms so creased 55 percent; California farm prices about 70 percent; Tulare County irrigated farm prices about 190 percent and unirrigated farm prices about reported. In the three unusually well-to-do Sacramento 75 percent. C o n c e n t r a t io n of P r o d u c t io n of S ele c te d A g r ic u l t u r a l P r o d u c t s in Product the 44 .. H o g s and pigs. . . Sheep and lambs. Chicken eggs. Barley ............ Rice ................. C e n t r a l V a l l e y a n d i n L e a d i n g V a l l e y C o u n t i e s , 1939 Central Valley production as percent of : United California States .. . . Cotton ........................................................ Irish p o ta to e s ......................................... Sweet potatoes and ya m s................... Sugar beets.............................................. Field b e a n s .............................................. Green beans .......................................................... Asparagus .............................................. .. Dry onions ............................................ .. Tomatoes ................................................ Cherries ................................................... ,. Peaches ................................................... Pears ........................................................ F igs .......................................................... Olives ..................................................... Alm onds ................................................... Navel oranges....................................... Grapes— total ......................................... table g r a p e s ............................. . . . raisin g r a p e s .................................... wine grapes .................................... 56 41 49 65 32 27 74 99 63 98 71 70 52 38 11 86 61 46 42 92 22 94 91 76 25 90 97 99 63 2.6 2.3 2.6 1.6 0.7 3.6 1.7 1.7 9.2 17.9 7.4 4.0 4.1 1.0 12.2 9.0 0.6 42.6 5.0 7.2 7.2 32.7 7.7 89.0 91.0 76.0 24.8 82.0 — — — Leading counties production as percent of : Central United Valley California States Leading Agricultural Counties1 39 25 29 35 Tulare, Fresno, San Joaquin Stanislaus, Merced Tehama, Glenn Tulare, Kern 30 61 46 17 64 66 72 97 62 42 82 67 96 45 39 71 46 73 80 64 33 88 73 60 60 46 Glenn, Stanislaus Stanislaus, Tulare, Fresno, Sacramento, Merced Sacramento, Tulare, Fresno Kings Sutter, Butte, Colusa Stanislaus, Merced, Fresno, San Joaquin, Tulare Kern, Tulare, Fresno Kern, San Joaquin Merced Yolo Stanislaus, San Joaquin, Sutter Tulare, Fresno San Toaquin, Solano, Sacramento, Yolo San Joaquin San Toaquin San Toaquin Sutter, Stanislaus Sacramento, Solano Fresno, Merced T ulare Butte, Y o lo Tulare Fresno, San Joaquin, Tulare San Toaquin, Tulare Fresno San Joaquin 12 63 71 69 44 22 83 28 18 30 43 76 58 25 22 66 59 60 29 *5 15 71 58 25 22 60 — — — 1 Counties listed in descending order of importance. N o county listed unless it accounts for more than 10 percent of production in Central Valley, and no percentages shown in California or United States columns unless the least of the leading counties accounts for 10 percent or more, or 5 percent or more, respectively, of total. A county may account for more than these minimum percentages, however, and still not be included if it is markedly outranked by another producing county or counties. Source: United States Census of Agriculture. August-September 1945 M O N T H L Y REVIEW Land ownership and size of farms About two-thirds of the farms in the Central Valley were operated by full owners in 1940 These owneroperated farms were well below average in size, however, since they included only one-fourth of the acreage. Partowners operated 14 percent of the farms but 43 percent of the acreage, which suggests that high land prices may prove an obstacle to full ownership, at least of larger tracts. Only 2 percent of the farms were run by man agers, but these included 13 percent of the acreage. Ten ants accounted for about one-fifth of the farms and of the acreage. Differences in the size of farms are extremely pro nounced in the Central Valley, partly as a result of high land values and great variation in the productivity of the soil, and partly as a result of the historical development of land ownership in California. Under the Spanish sys tem, missionaries held the land in trust for their wards, the Indians, although a few gifts of land wrere made to retired soldiers or other deserving Spanish subjects. Under Mexican rule, a commandante could make grants in the neighborhood of his presidio, and the Governors could make larger grants anywhere in California. A l though preference was supposed to be given Mexican citizens, in practice all who could use lands were granted them freely. The unit of land was a square league, about 4,439 acres, and 11 units, or 48,824 acres, could be granted to one individual on the theory of one league of irrigable land, four of crop land dependent on natural rainfall, and six for grazing cattle. Following American seizure of California, Congress passed a law requiring proof of title and recognizing the original grants where proof was clear. Lands for which title was not proved passed into the public domain. If the documents relating to the original grants w7ere incomplete or defective, as many were, a tedious and costly process of adjudication was prescribed. The uncertainties surrounding title and the difficulty of establishing clear claims made land hard to sell, with the consequence that vast tracts fell into the hands of sharp lawyers and land speculators. Spanish and Mexican titles to about S y 2 million acres in California were finally recognized by the United States. About 11^2 million acres of the public domain were granted to the railroads and about 8y> million acres to the State of California. These grants, with the sus tained Spanish and Mexican titles, embraced a little more than half the total land area in California in private or state ownership. Still other large tracts of public lands were sold for cash or exchanged for scrip. The Home stead Act and similar laws designed to transfer land in small units from public to private ownership were less important in California than in most other parts of the country, and fraud in the operation of the various land laws is reputed to have been extensive. Early California land practices facilitated concentration of ownership in a relatively small number of relatively large holdings. Eco nomic tendencies also favored large holdings, the chief uses of the land being for grazing livestock and raising grain. Other forces, however, worked in the opposite direc 69 tion. Squatters took advantage of the Federal Preemp tion Act whereby they could preempt 160 acres of land that was vacant. As population became more dense and as new or different agricultural products or techniques were introduced, economic incentives for breaking up large holdings have been strengthened. The Chinese Exclu sion Acts impaired the profitability of huge single-crop ranches, but the automobile and low paid migratory labor partially restored it. On balance, a relatively high concentration of land ownership persists in California, especially in parts of the Central Valley. The Valley is characterized by many more very small holdings than is typical of American agricul ture, and by a great deal higher proportion of the land in holdings of large size. In 1940, 50 percent of the farms in the Valley had only 3 percent of the land and 75 percent of the farms had only 10 percent of the land, compared with 8 percent and 25 percent in the United States as a whole. At the other end of the scale, 10 percent of the Central Valley farms contained 80 percent of the land, and two thousand farms of 1,000 acres or more had twice as much land as fifty thousand farms of less than 1,000 acres apiece. Part of this inequality doubtless is due to differences in productivity, which are very great, with highly fertile, intensely cultivated, irrigated land at one extreme and semi-arid range land at the other. Even after allowances for differences in the value per acre, how ever, a high concentration of ownership of farms in the Central Valley is evident. In 1940 the most valuable 10 percent of the farms had 47 percent of the value of all farm lands and buildings, and the upper 25 percent of the farms had 66 percent of the value. The lower 25 percent of the farm units, in contrast, had only 6 percent of the value and the lower 50 percent of the farm units had 16 percent of the value. Perhaps the chief reason for a less extreme concentration of value than of acres is that the most valuable lands have tended to be broken up to a greater extent than the less valuable lands. The introduction and extension of irrigation no doubt contributed to this proc ess, although in areas where water is obtained by pump ing from farm wells economies of large scale operation, within limits, exist even on irrigated lands. Another reason for the less extreme concentration of control in terms of value than in terms of acres is that the value figures include the farm homes and other buildings, which make up a higher proportion of the value of small than of large farms. In terms of value, as well as in terms of acres, the extent of concentration in large holdings is notably greater in the Central Valley than in the United States as a whole. Large farms, of 1,000 or more acres each, are more or less evenly distributed in number throughout the Central Valley, with 27 percent of the total in the upper Sacra mento Valley, 23 percent in the lower Sacramento, 20 percent in the lower San Joaquin, and 30 percent in the upper San Joaquin in 1940. The size of the large holdings is greater in the San Joaquin Valley than in the Sacra mento Valley, and is greater in the upper than in the lower parts of both valleys. The large farms were largest 70 FEDERAL RESERVE BAN K on the average in Kern County, where the mean size of 177 of them, all of 1,000 acres or more, was over 8,000 acres. The number and financial importance of large farms in the Central Valley, and the consequent power of the owners of large tracts, is one of the principal reasons for the bitterness of the controversy over acreage limita tion provisions of the reclamation laws under which the Central Valley Project is being constructed and, unless other arrangements are made, will be operated. D IS T R I B U T I O N O F F A R M L A N D -1 9 4 0 Percent of farms, starting with the smallest, accounting for various percents of the total land in farms. OF SAN FRANCISCO August-September 1945 The Central Valley Project The Central Valley Project is a water project, con cerned with irrigation, flood control, navigation, salinity repulsion, and restoration of ground water, with the gen eration of hydroelectric power as a by-product. The primary object is to store and distribute water for irriga tion. Two-thirds of the irrigable land is located in the San Joaquin Valley, while two-thirds of the rainfall and stream flow occurs in the Sacramento Valley. The geo graphic redistribution of this wTater through a series of engineering works has been under active study by the State government since 1921 and by the Federal govern ment since 1929. The electorate of California in 1933 ap proved a bond issue of 170 million dollars for financing the Central Valley Project, and the legislature estab lished the California Water Project Authority to take charge of construction and operation. By this time the market for municipal bonds had weakened; the United States Public Works Administration had launched its program for stimulating construction by the loan-andgrant of federal funds to public bodies; and the California authorities decided not to issue the authorized bonds. The Public Works Administration had the Central Valley Project under consideration from time to time, with no final approval. In 1935 the President allocated Federal funds and Congress, in the Rivers and Harbors Act, voted approval of construction of parts of the Project by the United States Bureau of Reclamation. Irrigation features D IS T R I B U T I O N O F V A L U E O F F A R M L A N D A N D B U I L D I N G S -1940 Percent of farms, starting with the least valuable, accounting for va rious percents of the total value of farms. The above curves indicate the concentration of land in the larger farms, and the concentration of the value of land and buildings in the larg er farms. The more a curve departs from the diagonal (which would rep resent an even distribution) the greater the degree of concentration. Read ings can be taken from either end of the curve: for example, the smallest 25% of farms in the Central Valley contain 1% of the land; and the larg est 25% (100% minus the smallest 75% ) of the farms contain 90% of the land. The authorized wrater features of the Central Valley Project provide for storage of upper Sacramento River water behind Shasta dam and its subsequent release into the river channel during dry seasons, and for the storage of upper San Joaquin River water behind Friant dam. Some of the water released into the Sacramento River during the dry season is to be used for additional irriga tion in the Sacramento Valley and the upper San Fran cisco Bay region, and some of it is to be conveyed to the lower, or northern, part of the San Joaquin Valley, to replace San Joaquin River water. This, in turn, will per mit diversion of water from Friant reservoir into the deficit areas of the upper San Joaquin Valley. Part of the Project water will be used to supplement irrigation water now available, part will be used to bring additional land under irrigation, and part will be used to restore the un derground water table in the upper San Joaquin Valley. Water from Shasta dam, in addition, will be used to gen erate power, to push back salt water from the ocean that has been threatening agriculture in the Sacramento-San Joaquin delta, and to improve navigation on the Sacra mento River; and both Shasta and Friant reservoirs will provide flood control. Most of the irrigated lands in the Sacramento Valley take their water from hitherto unregulated streams or from streams regulated in the interest of hydroelectric power generation. A relatively small fraction of the irri gated land drew on stored water, and, while in general the amount of wrater has been sufficient for existing irriga August-Septem ber 1945 M O N T H L Y R EVIEW tion needs, in dry years there has not always been enough to go around. The main streams tributary to the lower San Joaquin Valley already are regulated by storage reservoirs, and the water has been sufficient for the irri gated sections, but not for substantial extension of irriga tion to additional land. In the upper San Joaquin Valley there were no storage reservoirs for irrigation before con struction of Friant dam. The amount of land that can be adequately irrigated from surface run-off under estab lished water rights necessarily varies from year to year with the amount of rainfall. Wells are widely used in the upper San Joaquin Valley both as a supplemental source of water and as the chief water supply. It is estimated that about 70 percent of the irrigation water in this area is now being pumped. The pumping of water has been excessive, with the consequence that the underground water level has fallen sharply. In adversely affected localities the ground water level receded by 50 to 200 feet between 1921 and 1939, causing the abandonment of almost 50,000 acres of once highly productive land and threatening an additional 200,000 acres. Irrigation features of the Central Valley Project that have been authorized to date include, in addition to the recently completed Shasta and Friant dams, a number of canals and pumping stations and subsidiary works. The principal canals are the Delta Cross Channel canal, to carry Sacramento River water across the delta; the DeltaMendota canal, to carry it, with the aid of pumps, up the San Joaquin Valley to Mendota, as a substitute for San Joaquin River water; the Friant-Kern canal, to carry irrigation water southward from Friant reservoir to the Kern River below Bakersfield and to points between; and the Madera canal, to carry irrigation water from Friant reservoir northwestward to the Chowchilla River. Con struction wras postponed for the most part during the war. The Madera canal is now nearing completion and work is under way on the Friant-Kern canal. Letting of con tracts for the Delta Cross Channel and Delta-Mendota canals awaits appropriations. The Contra Costa canal, a much smaller carrier than any of the major irrigation 71 canals, was substantially completed as a war project, to serve the upper San Francisco Bay region with indus trial, and to some extent with agricultural, water. New irrigation water With completion of the authorized features, irrigation water will be made available to an additional 100,000 acres in the Sacramento Valley, 20,000 acres on the west side of the lower San Joaquin Valley along the DeltaMendota canal, 20,000 acres along the Contra Costa canal, and 500,000 acres in the Friant-Kern and Madera canal service areas in the upper San Joaquin Valley, a total of 640,000 acres. In addition, a substitute and assured water supply will be made available to 100,000 acres now under irrigation and the ground water level will be re stored and maintained over an area even larger than that to which irrigation will be extended. First call on the water is to go to supplementary uses and to raising the ground water level in the upper San Joaquin Valley. It is estimated that the accumulated overdraft of ground water will take about ten years of average rainfall to overcome, and it is planned to bring new land in this area under irrigation only gradually as the deficit is made up. Although authorized storage and distribution works carry water only as far south as the Kern River, pumping south of the Kern River also has exceeded natural replenish ment of ground water. Should Friant-Kern canal deliv eries be extended to overdraft areas south of the Kern River, the smaller amount of water available for irrigat ing new land would be sufficient for about 400,000, rather than 500,000, acres in the upper San Joaquin Valley. Acreage limitation controversy The irrigation program of the Central Valley Project has given rise to a number of problems, some of which have been the subject of recent and continuing contro versy. United States reclamation laws, under which the Project is being built, have consistently favored the estab lishment of family size farms as a matter of public policy. The chief instrument for effectuating the policy has been P R IN C IP A L F E A T U R E S O F T H E C E N T R A L V A L L E Y P R O JE C T — C A L I F O R N I A 72 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK limitation of the acreage to which water will be supplied under public subsidy consisting of interest-free construc tion capital. The statutory limit is 160 acres. Because of the importance of large land holdings in the Central Val ley, and particularly in the upper Sari Joaquin Valley where most of the new water will become available, modi fication of the statutes has been discussed in a number of quarters. A Central Valley Project Studies Committee, appointed at the instance of the Bureau of Reclamation and including representatives of other interested Federal, State and local governmental agencies, farm organiza tions, irrigation districts, and land owners, has recom mended that national reclamation law be changed to pro vide: (1 ) a limit of 160 irrigable acres on the area of presently unirrigated lands; (2 ) a limit of 640 irrigable acres on the area of presently irrigated lands; (3 ) an incentive to reduce land holdings to 160 acres by includ ing 3 per cent interest on construction costs in the charge to holdings of more than 160 irrigable acres. Congress has changed various provisions of reclamation law in the past as conditions have been deemed to justify it, but no action has yet been taken in reference to the Central Valley. Outright repeal of all acreage limitations has been urged by the large land owners, their spokesmen and their sympathizers. Those who agree with this solution also support proposals to remove the Project from under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Reclamation through transfer to some other Federal agency or purchase by the State. In the Flood Control Act of December 1944, Con gress authorized construction along the Kern and Kings Rivers and their tributaries as a civil function of the W ar Department. In signing the bill, President Roose velt criticized division of responsibilities for water projects within the Central Valley and announced his intention of seeking Congressional transfer of all such responsibilities to the Bureau of Reclamation. Others, including some Congressmen, have urged formation of a Central Valley Authority somewhat along the lines of the Tennessee Val ley Authority. Still other groups propose State acquisi tion of the Project. Assessment of costs A second problem arising out of the irrigation features of the Project is the equitable allocation of costs among the various beneficiaries. In the Sacramento Valley, most of the irrigation water now comes from streams which, on the whole, provide an adequate supply of water for the area at present being irrigated. Regulating the stream flow will make it possible for farmers to draw more heavily during dry seasons, but will not be of any par ticular advantage to those who already are adequately supplied with water. Newr lands for which an assured water supply is made available, however, would clearly gain. Repulsion of salinity in the delta region of San Joa quin and Sacramento Counties unquestionably benefits lands that have already suffered, and protects other lands that might soon be damaged. The value of the bene fits to already damaged lands and of protection from potential damage to additional lands is not readily meas OF SAN FRANCISCO August-September 1945 urable, so that an acceptable allocation of costs is ex tremely difficult to achieve. Most of the water to be car ried by the Delta-Mendota canal will merely replace river water already being taken by farmers in the lower San Joaquin Valley, to permit diversion of the river water to farmers in the upper part of the Valley. There is no apparent reason for the lower Valley farmers to pay for a mere substitution made for the purpose of improving the water supply of others. The canal, however, will provide additional water as well, which can be used either to sup plement present supplies or to bring new land under irri gation. It would appear to be equitable to seek payment for this additional water. Distribution of costs in proportion to benefits, or on some other fair basis, probably will prove most trouble some in the upper San Joaquin Valley. To the extent that Project water is metered out to existing or newly estab lished irrigation districts, a reasonable charge presumably can be agreed upon. The restoration and maintenance of ground water supplies gives rise to more complex prob lems. Those who pump water are benefited, as a group, but it is hard to measure the overall benefit, the benefit to each individual land owner, or the relative distribution of benefits among land holders. For example, some farm operators may already have sufficient pumping capacity for all needs at present ground water levels. If they have not experienced so far any alarming decline in the ground w^ater level on their farms, they might be difficult to con vince of the necessity for raising the ground water level generally. Yet the area as a whole has clearly suffered from excessive pumping, and will gain in a most direct way from completion of the Project. Failure to charge a fair share of the cost to the area would constitute a subsidy for those wTho continue to mine their water resources, at the expense either of other Project beneficiaries who pay enough to meet all the costs assigned to the irrigation features, or of the public at large through failure to col lect all the costs of providing water for irrigation. Conmittees similar to the advisory group described earlier in connection with acreage limitation have been studying problems of cost allocation. Since the Central Valley Project has a number of pur poses, there also is a question of the allocation of total construction costs among the various purposes. Some controversy has arisen in connection with the charges to be made for electric power, the issue being whether price policies should be designed to promote the greatest use fulness of the power feature from the standpoint of all elements in the widest practicable service area, or should be designed to yield the greatest net contribution to total cost in order to reduce the charges to users of Project water. Bureau of Reclamation policy in administering multi-purpose projects apparently favors the indepen dent development of each feature to be of greatest value to those served both directly and indirectly by that fea ture. While this general approach does not automatically establish the relative charges to water and power users, it suggests that the Bureau would not deliberately price any service to subsidize users of the other services. August-September 1945 M O N T H L Y R EVIEW Distribution of power The chief controversy affecting Project power is be tween the proponents and opponents of public power generation and distribution. Since public generation is now an accomplished fact, the current issue revolves about plans for distribution, although any proposals to expand generating capacity as part of a postwar works program doubtless would encounter renewed resistance. Two of the five generators included in the design for Shasta dam have been installed. Keswick dam, a smaller structure to form a balancing reservoir a little below Shasta, is partially constructed. Keswick dam is designed for three generators, with an ultimate capacity of 75,000 kilowatts compared with 375,000 kilowatts at Shasta dam. Authorized features of the Project include power lines from Keswick and Shasta dams to electric power use areas, and an auxiliary steam plant at Antioch, in the delta region. A publicly owned transmission line to Oroville on the east side of the upper Sacramento Valley was completed in order to deliver power to the private utility company serving Northern California war production centers. Construction of other transmission lines, which was postponed during the war because of materials and manpower shortages, is opposed by those who favor ex clusively private power distribution. The Antioch auxiliary steam plant has not yet been built. It is strategic in two ways. In the first place, an auxiliary steam plant in any appropriate location should greatly increase the amount of firm power that the Project could undertake to deliver, thus strengthening the posi tion of the Project regardless of whether the power is sold to a single private company for redistribution or is distributed to a number of buyers. In the second place, location of the steam plant at or near Antioch would re quire a transmission line into that area, in order to in tegrate the main hydroelectric power with the steamelectric auxiliary power. This would bring Project power into the delta region near the center of the expected serv ice area for Project power. Furthermore, the irrigation features of the Project will require large blocks of power to lift Sacramento River water into and through the Delta-Mendota canal. Without a transmission line into the vicinity of Antioch, the Project would be forced to purchase power that it had in abundance a relatively short distance away. Quite naturally, the officials charged with administering the Project desire to avoid such a situation. Congress so far has refused appropriations for the Antioch steam plant and the related transmission line. Authorization has not been rescinded, however, so that Congressional refusal to appropriate funds does not as yet represent a decision on the public versus private power question. As materials, equipment, and manpower again become available, the question presumably will be settled one way or the other. Unless Congress reverses its pre vious authorization, the decision will favor public power. The Reclamation Project Act of 1939 specifies that, in the sale of electric power or in the lease of power 73 privileges, preference shall be given to municipalities and other public corporations and agencies, and to coopera tives and other nonprofit organizations financed under the Rural Electrification Act and amendments. Those favoring private, as against public, distribution of Project power reasonably can be expected to support suggestions designed to change the reclamation laws or to remove the Project from under the operation of these laws. A num ber of such suggestions already have been noted, in the description of irrigation features of the Project. Economic effects of the Project The Central Valley Project will not revolutionize the economy of the Central Valley, but it is bound to be a considerable factor in the future development of the Val ley and may indirectly affect other parts of California and of the United States as well. Perhaps the most im portant contribution the Project can make will be to preserve agricultural land from threatened deterioration through continued encroachment of salt water in the Delta and through continued mining of ground water in the upper San Joaquin Valley. Such protective services do not make a noticeable favorable difference in the amount of agricultural production— they simply prevent the occurrence of an adverse difference that is debatable in extent. Greater availability of electric power, or a pos sible reduction in power rates to some consumers, or both, likewise are expected to have a gradual and largely nonmeasurable effect on the development of the area. Similarly, the land for which water is to be made avail able for the first time, 540,000-640,000 acres, will be brought under irrigation only gradually. If the water features of the Project are administered to discriminate against large holdings in favor of family size farms, presumably there will be a greater tendency to ward subdivision of affected large operating units. It is not clear how strong the tendency will be, or what forces already may be operating in the same or in the opposite direction. Large scale farmers could scarcely be forbid den to pump water from underground sources replen ished by the Project, but the availability of adequate water, either by pumping or from irrigation canals, may well make it profitable to reduce the size of extremely large operating units, most of which are only partly un der irrigation at the present time. Even where irrigation water is obtained by pumping from wells, the method re quiring the largest amount of equipment, the advantages of large scale operation of the irrigation equipment ap parently can be realized on farms of 200 to 250 acres under average conditions of water need and lift. A change to smaller size farms in areas now dominated by very large land holdings would, it is held, have a number of desirable results. A case study recently completed by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, comparing two Central Valley country towns distinguished chiefly by the size of surrounding farms, suggests that the houses and business properties, and the educational, recreational, religious, and civic facilities are better, and that the general standards of economic and social existence are 74 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK notably higher in communities with family size, owneroperated farms than in communities serving large-scale farming areas. If these differences prevail generally, and if the type of farming is a causal factor, operation of the Project can be expected to favor a higher general level of economic and social activity among Valley residents to the extent that the relative importance of family size farms is increased. There is some hope that the new lands to be brought under irrigation will increase the production of livestock, of livestock feed and forage, and of dairy products and other livestock products. The concentration of Central Valley agriculture on specialty crops, with heavy de pendence on favorable markets outside of California, is expected to continue, but if the total productive capacity of the Valley is sufficiently increased the profitability of specialized farming compared to general farming may be reduced. An excessive expansion of specialty crops would have serious consequences for existing California agri culture. Cash costs, including marketing costs, are rela tively high and inflexible for specialty crops, so that changes in prices result in more *than proportionate changes in agricultural profits. Furthermore, prices of perishables are sensitive to changes in that part of pro duction that reaches the market. Increases in the produc tion of livestock, on the other hand, to the extent of re placing imports from out of state with domestic products, would not necessarily affect local prices adversely, it is held, but wrould contribute to local agricultural stability. Furthermore, the specialty crops require large numbers of agricultural laborers for short periods, while the rais ing of livestock and livestock products provides a higher proportion of year-round employment, an additional fac tor making for greater economic and social stability. The hoped-for increases in the relative importance of livestock and general farming as a result of Project opera tions may be either direct or indirect. Central Valley Project water will not be cheap water— it apparently will cost in the neighborhood of ten dollars an acre for the average use in the area served. Livestock and general farming operations may not thrive on so high a water cost, although some of the specialty crops have shown profits on much more expensive water. It is unlikely that OF SAN FRANCISCO August-September 1945 all of the new land brought into cultivation, or the pres ently farmed lands on which intensive cultivation will be made feasible by additional water supply, will be used directly for livestock or general farming. These lands may be better suited to some of the specialty crops than land now7devoted to those crops. Consequently, a process of displacement and shifting is likely to take place, with part of the hoped-for increases in livestock and general farming ultimately occurring on land nowr specializing in other crops. This would be a painful process for the grow ers who are forced to make the shift. By the same token, capture of local markets now served by imports from other agricultural producing areas, as is contemplated in the case of livestock and livestock products, might be pain ful to farmers in the areas that now supply the California market. If, as appears likely, redistribution of Central Valley water has a gradual effect on agricultural production in the area served, its adverse effects on other agricultural producers should be less pronounced. Displacement of less efficient by more efficient uses of resources is one of the costs of progress. When public funds are used to bring about more efficient agriculture in one area, however, pos sible adverse effects on other agricultural areas ordinarily are one of the considerations wTeighed by the legislative body authorizing use of the funds. In the case of the Cen tral Valley Project, there is some reason to believe that the adverse effects will be neither widespread nor unduly severe in their impact. Much of the water will be used to conserve present agricultural lands, and the amount of new land that will be brought under cultivation over a period of years, under Project features authorized to date, is expected to be relatively small compared with additions to and abandonments of farm land in the country as a whole for all reasons. Continued increase in agricultural productivity in the Central Valley over a ten-year period, if past trends are an indication, could well influence agri cultural production much more than the extension of irri gation to half a million additional acres. N o te : M any of the data used in this article have been taken from “ The Effects of the Central Valley Project on the Agricultural and Industrial Econom y and on the Social Character of California,” a Report on Problem 24, Central Valley Project Studies, reproduced and distributed by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Berkeley, California. August-Septem ber 1945 75 M O N T H L Y REVIEW National Summary of Business Conditions INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION Released September 29, 1945— Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System employment at factories dropped sharply after the middle of August Pwhen most and military contracts were cancelled. Activity in most other lines was main ro d u c tio n tained and the value of retail sales continued above last year’s high levels. I n d u s t r i a l P r o d u c t io n 1937 >938 1933 1940 1941 1942 1943 <944 (9 4 5 Federal Reserve index. Monthly figures, latest shown is for August. DEPARTMENT STORE SALES AND STOCKS Industrial production declined 11 percent in August, reflecting primarily the sharp curtailment of activity in aircraft, shipbuilding and ordnance plants in the last half of the month, and the Board’s seasonally adjusted index was 188 percent of the 1935-39 average as compared with 211 in July. The largest part of the decline was in the machinery and transportation equipment industries, where activity during the month averaged about 20 percent below July. Out put of steel and of nonferrous metal products likewise declined with the sudden elimina tion of almost all military demands. In September steel output increased with the receipt of orders in large volume from the automobile and other steel-consuming industries now rapidly converting to civilian production. Production of nondurable goods in August was also below the July level, reflecting primarily military contract cancellations affecting output in the chemicals and rubber products industries. Cattle slaughter at federally inspected plants rose sharply in August and the first two weeks of September. Output of shoes and newspaper publishing activity also increased in August. Output of textiles, most manufactured food products, and other nondurable goods showed little change or declined slightly. Immediately after Japan’s capitulation, rationing was ended for gasoline, fuel oil, and canned fruits and vegetables. Increased supplies of dairy and meat products and tobacco products were also made available for civilians. Minerals production declined somewhat in August reflecting chiefly a 4 percent de crease in coal production. In the first part of September output of bituminous coal ad vanced. Crude petroleum output was maintained in August at the record July level, but due to the substantial decline in military demand for petroleum products, the production rate in the first half of September w^as about 8 percent below August. Awards for the construction of privately-owned factories and commercial buildings continued to increase sharply in August. Contracts for private residential construction were awarded at about the same rate as in June and July, which was about twice the value of awards in the summer of 1944. D is t r ib u t io n Federal Reserve indexes. Monthly figures, latest shown are for July (stocks) and August (sales). WHOLESALE PRICES ." ¡ ....... ........ ^ : Ii ;1 1 . ! M ~....T i ' 1 FARM PROOUCTS/^ 1/ 1 j i 1 ^ Department store sales in August were smaller than in July on a seasonally adjusted basis but about 6 percent larger than in August last year. In the first half of August sales were about 20 percent larger than a year ago. In the last half of the month and the early part of September, following Japan’s surrender, sales slackened and were little changed from last year’s level. Sales in the two weeks ending September 22, however, rose sharply and were 11 percent larger than in the corresponding period a year ago. Railroad shipments of revenue freight in the last two weeks of August and the early part of September were in almost as large a volume as in the period prior to the week of Japanese surrender and only 7 percent smaller than during the same period last year. - • V ALL COMMOOITIES r ? L— — — "otheÌÍ ♦ / C o m m o d i t y P r ic e s Prices of agricultural commodities declined from the early part of August to the early part of September but since that time have increased somewhat. Maximum prices of petroleum products have been reduced somewhat since the early part of August, owing to lower transportation charges, while maximum prices of cotton goods, building materials, and various other industrial commodities have been increased. A g r ic u l t u r e r ..[..... ........... M l 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Bureau of Labor Statistics indexes. W eekly figures, latest shown are for week ending September 22. M EM B ER BANK RESERVES AND R E L A T E D ITEMS Wednesday iigures, latest shown are for September 19. Crop prospects continued to improve during August and total production is expected to equal the record harvests of 1942 and 1944. Cotton production, howrever, is forecast at only 10 million bales, which is about 2 million smaller than last year’s crop and the average tor the past 10 years. Total carryover of raw cotton in this country on August 1 was about 11 million bales, slightly more than in the two previous seasons. B a n k C r e d it In the first month of peace, Federal Government expenditures though reduced were still well in excess of receipts, and war loan balances at commercial banks were accord ingly reduced. Adjusted demand and time deposits of weekly reporting banks increased by 1.8 billion dollars during the five weeks ended September 19, while war loan balances at these same banks declined by 3.4 billion. Thus, as in other periods between Treasury financing drives, Treasury expenditure tended to increase deposits of business and individuals at small banks more than at large ones. The currency outflow continued and totaled 425 million dollars during the five-week period, but it was somewhat below the outflow of last year for the comparable period. Time deposit expansion continued as rapidly as in recent months. Loans for purchasing and carrying Government securities at reporting banks were further liquidated during the five weeks by 470 million dollars and, in addition, reporting banks reduced holdings of U. S. Government securities by 1.3 billion dollars to meet the increase in reserve requirements and net deposit declines. Smaller banks appear to have been purchasing Government securities during the period. Reserve funds during the five-week period were supplied by an increase of 1.1 billion dollars in Reserve Bank holdings of Government securities and by a small increase in member banks borrowings from the Reserve Banks. This increase met the currency out flow and increased average reserve balances by close to 550 million dollars; this was about as much as the increase in required reserves, and excess reserves remained near one billion dollars. VICTORY LOAN Summary of Information Regarding Securities Title of Security Dated Due Cost price Yield Denominations Registration Redeemable for cash prior to maturity % % Treasury Certificates of Indebtedness SERIES K— 1946 2»/4% Treasury Bonds of 1959-62 2|/2% Treasury Bonds of 1967-72 1st day of month in which purchased December 3,1945 November 15,1945 November 15,1945 3 years from issue da;te December 1,1946 December 15,1962 December 15, 1972 100% and accrued interest after November 15, 1945 (6) (7) 100% and accrued interest after November 15,1945 (6) (7) United States Savings Bonds SERIES E United States Savings Bonds SERIES F United States Savings Bonds SERIES G Treasury Savings Notes SERIES C 1st day of month in which purchased 1st day of month in which purchased 1st day of month in which purchased 10 years from issue date 12 years from issue date 75% of maturity value 74% of maturity value Varies— 2.90% if held to maturity Varies—2.53% if held to maturity 12 years from issue date 100% Varies— 2 % % if held to maturity (1) 100% Varies— 1.07% if held to maturity (2) $25 to $1,000 $25 to $10,000 $100 to $10,000 $100 to $1,000,000 Registered form only Registered form only Registered form only Inscribed form only At holder’s option, on 1st of month fol lowing one month’s notice, after 6 months from issue date At holder’s option, on 1st of month fol lowing one month’s notice, after 6 months from Issue date (1) At holder’s option, 60 days from issue date, on variable redemption schedule Bearer form only Bearer or registered form Bearer or registered form For loans from banks only Yes Yes Yes Yes, after December 8,1945 Yes, after December 8,1945 Yes, after December 8, 1945 All investors (3) (4) All investors (3) (4) No limit (3) (4) No limit (3) (4) No No Salable in open market No No No No All investors (3) All investors (3) All investors Not more than $100,000 issue price of Series F and G together in one calendar year No limit On death o f owner, redeem able at 100% after 6 months from issue date, If application is made within 6 m onths after death. (5 ) (2 ) N otes owned by com m ercial banks bear interest only if used in payment o f Federal taxes. (6 ) (3 ) Com m ercial banks permitted to subscribe for only a limited portion of their savings deposits and certain time certificates o f deposit. $500 to $1,000,000 Federal estate taxes only, on death of owner No ( 4 ) Comm ercial banks will not be perm itted to own until within ten years of m aturity, except as provided in ( 3 ) . $500 to $1,000,000 No Use as collateral (1 ) $1,000 to $1,000,000 Yes, during and after 2nd calendar month after month of purchase No Limited to $5,000 maturity value in one calendar year (5) 2y2% No No Amount an eligible investor may buy 2^4% At Government’s At Government’s option, on or after option, on or after December 15, 1959, December 15, 1967, at 100% and at 100% and interest interest No Individuals only %% At holder’s option, after 6 months from issue date, at 100% and interest (2) Acceptable in payment of Federal income, estate or gift taxes prior to maturity Who may subscribe 100% and accrued interest after December 3,1945 All investors except securities dealers and brokers (3) No limit (3) Federal estate taxes only, on death of owner Additional bonds m ay be purchased in coownership form in certain cases, and also when Series A Bonds are exchanged for Series E Bonds during and after the m onth in which Series A Bonds mature. Subscriptions from others than Individuals m ust include accrued interest to Decem ber 3 1945. or such later date as paym ent is made to a Federal Reserve bank The term “ indi viduals* includes partnerships (other than securities dealers and brokers) and personal trusts, but does not include personal holding companies, corporate trusts, bonus funds pension funds, or similar aggregations of individuals. ’ ( 7 ) Accrued interest on subscriptions for $500 and $3,000 will be waived.