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MONTHLY RIVI EW TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRIC Fe d e r a l APRIL 1 95 3 reserve Ba n k of S a n Fr a n c i s c o DISTRICT FARMERS INTEND TO PLANT A RECORD ACREAGE IN 1953 in the Twelfth Federal Reserve District have indicated their intention to plant another record num ber of acres in 1953. The sharp decline in prices for some farm products which occurred in 1952 has not put a damper on over-all planned production, although some shifts are contemplated to take advantage of those crops which have a more favorable price outlook. Assurance of continued price support for many major crops may ac count in part for no drastic changes in production plans. This year the United States Department of Agricul ture did not issue official production goals for the na tion’s farmers, although it did suggest acreages for a number of crops. Consequently, farmers in determining what acreage they will plant to various crops are exer cising their own choice to a greater extent, perhaps, than in former years. A report on farmers’ intended plantings of principal field crops in 1953 has been compiled by the Department of Agriculture based on a survey made the first of March. Acreage actually planted may vary from these estimates as a result of unexpected weather condi tions, price changes, or other unforeseen circumstances. Also, the report itself may have an effect on farmers’ future actions. In the Twelfth District, the extent of changes which may occur in these March plans for spring planting will be largely dependent upon the amount of abandonment of winter wheat and upon the extent to which rains bring relief to those sections of the District which have suffered from below normal pre cipitation. The lack of surface moisture in some areas of California is requiring irrigation earlier than usual and could result in heavy demands on supplies of irrigation water and some loss of dry farm grain crops. a r m e r s F Wheat acreage expected to equal last year’s planting District acreage planted in 1952 to winter wheat was 12 percent below plantings of the previous season largely as the result of an unusually dry fall in the Pacific North west. In addition, reseeding was required in some areas, but the mild winter and spring rains have led to a more favorable outlook for the winter wheat crop than esti mated earlier. Acreage seeded to rye last fall was also below normal. As a result of this situation, farmers in the Pacific Northwest intend to plant twice as many acres to spring wheat as they did in 1952. If these intentions are carried out, the total number of acres planted to wheat in the District as a whole would be about the same as last season— the increase in spring wheat acreage off setting the decline in winter wheat acreage. Acreage planted to some crops varies from year ago Rice is again scheduled for a substantial increase in acreage with California farmers indicating their intention to plant 382,000 acres of rice— 14 percent above 1952 and 47 percent above the 1942-51 average. Some substitution of rice for nonirrigated grain crops has occurred in the Sacramento Valley as a result of the below-normal early spring rainfall in that area. Acreage seeded to barley will be up 4 percent if the large planned increases in Wash ington and Arizona materialize. No change is indicated in the number of acres in the District which will be planted to corn as increases in some District states coun terbalance decreases in others. There may be some reduc tion in oat acreage as expansion in California acreage will not be enough to offset reductions taking place in Washington and Oregon. Idaho and Utah account for the increase indicated in dry field peas, while a reduction in dry edible bean acreage in California more than offsets increases planned in Idaho, Washington, and Utah. Flaxseed continues to be unpopular in the Twelfth Dis trict as Arizona and California farmers indicate that the 48.000 acres planted to flax in 1952 will be reduced to 28.000 acres in 1953. On the other hand, acreage planted to sorghums in these two states is slated for a 30 percent increase over 1952. This would reverse the trend of the last few years when cotton has made inroads into acreage previously planted to grain sorghums. Also in This Issue Raw Materials Prices in World Trade Changes in Banks and Branches— Twelfth District, 1951-52 50 FEDERAL RESERVE B A N K OF SA N FRANCISCO The record high prices received for potatoes in the spring of 1952 apparently has encouraged District farm ers to plant a sufficient number of acres this year to bring seeded acreage back up to the 1942-51 average. Califor nia tops the other District states with plans for a 24 per cent increase. Sugar beet acreage may equal or surpass the 1942-51 average acreage, with substantial increases planned in Idaho and Utah over the very small plantings in 1952. Reduction in cotton planting recommended by Secretary of Agriculture One of the major crops in the Twelfth District— cotton — is not covered in the Department of Agriculture’s March survey because the Department is prohibited by law from releasing estimates of cotton production prior to July 1. The Secretary of Agriculture, however, has requested farmers to reduce cotton acreage by 18 percent from 1952 in order to bring 1953 crop production down to 12.5 million bales or less. He warned that failure to make reductions in cotton planting might necessitate mar keting quotas for the 1954 crop. California’s and Ari zona’s share of the nation’s cotton production has been increasing rapidly, with yields high and returns generally good. In addition, since any reduction could adversely affect their quotas in the event of future acreage restric tions on cotton, farmers in these two states may be par ticularly reluctant to reduce their cotton acreage. District crop expectations vary from the nation's Both similarities and differences exist between the plans of Twelfth District farmers and farmers in the rest of the nation. Winter wheat prospects are still precari ous in many sections of the country, creating an uncer tainty as to fulfillment of farmers’ plans for spring plant ings. Acreage seeded to potatoes is expected to increase nationally, but only by 6 percent as compared to a 16 I n d i c a t e d P l a n t i n g o f F ie l d C r o p s a s o f M a r c h 1— T w e l f t h D is t r ic t a n d U n it e d S t a t e s Twelfth District 1953 (in thousands of acres) Beans, dry edible H ay, all1 ........................... Peas, dry e d i b le ............ P o ta t o e s ............................. S o r g h u m s ........................... ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ......................... ......................... ........................ ........................ ......................... ........................ ........................ ........................ 432 251 28 6,005 1,391 203 368 382 193 201 10 276 ......................... 5,030 W h ea t, s p r in g ............ Percentage change ------------1952-53------------ x Twelfth United States District + — 4 1 0 — 42 + — 1 2 + + + — + 4 16 14 6 30 0 12 2 59 12 + + + — +~2 0 + 1 — 1 + 20 0 + 2 + 3 + 6 + 5 + 7 + 18 + 10 + 11 0 + — 1 1 +~T 1 Harvested acreage. Sou rce: United States Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, C r o p P r o d u c t i o n , March 19, 1953. April 1953 percent increase for the District. Prospective flax acre age is up sharply for the nation and down sharply for the District. Decreases in corn and barley plantings are expected for the country as a whole but not for the Dis trict, whereas a decrease is expected in District oat acre age as opposed to an increase nationally. Dry range conditions pose feed problem In some sections of the District, range conditions are below normal with the outlook for native feed unfavor able. After the prolonged period of dry weather in Feb ruary, rains in March and April improved feed on most California ranges but were not sufficient to relieve the very dry condition of southern California ranges. The condition of ranges in the Sacramento Valley, central coast, and San Joaquin areas of California still remain below the five-year average. Utah, Nevada, and Arizona had below-normal precipitation in February and March resulting in rather poor prospects for range feed in these areas. As a result of rains in late April, however, the situ ation in Utah and Nevada was expected to improve. In the Pacific Northwest, ranges are in fair to good condi tion with cold weather retarding growth of spring grass but with moisture generally ample. The relatively mild and open weather permitted cattle and sheep to graze on District pastures and ranges throughout much of the winter. Consequently, with less than usual supplemental feeding of livestock, feed supplies have been ample. Accumulation of a sizable carry-over of hay in some sections of the Pacific Northwest brought about price declines. Cattle and calves are reported in gen erally good condition throughout the District, with losses below average for the winter season. The early lamb crop in the Western states is 2 percent larger than last year, with California accounting for most of the gain. As a result of an increased number of breed ing ewes, California’s lamb crop is estimated to be 9 per cent above that of 1952. Mild weather in most of the Dis trict has resulted in sheep coming through the winter in good condition and lambing has progressed satisfactorily with below-normal losses. While the condition of the early lamb crop is good in California, the limited development of grass, particularly in the San Joaquin area, resulted in earlier marketings and a smaller percentage of fat lambs than a year ago. In Washington and Idaho, the early lamb crop is also in good condition, but in Oregon it is somewhat below normal. Oregon ranges have not completely recovered from the effects of the extremely dry fall and cold, damp spring weather has further retarded growth of range feed so that supplemental feeding has been required in some areas. Outlook for citrus fruit better than last season Production of citrus fruits in the District this season is expected to be larger than the very poor output of last A pril 1953 M O N T H L Y REVIEW year. Almost all the navel oranges in Arizona were har vested by the first of March and the harvest of Valencias had begun. A few nights of freezing weather late in Feb ruary caused some damage to Arizona citrus fruits. In California, freezing weather in the latter part of February and early March and several days of strong winds in the southern citrus area resulted in some damage to new citrus growth and blossoms. Very little loss was expected in navels, however, and the damage to Valencias by the cold appeared to be light. In the San Diego area the long dry period has had some adverse effects on citrus fruits. The District production of oranges is expected to exceed last year’s very small crop by 15 percent compared with a 4 percent decrease forecast for the rest of the country. While grapefruit production in Florida is expected to be below that of last season, indications are that in both Arizona and California production will be up. Califor nia’s lemon crop is expected to be 3 percent less than last season and slightly below the ten-year average. Cold weather in February did some damage to lemons, par ticularly in Santa Barbara County, and hail caused some pitting in San Diego County. April frosts dam age deciduous fruits and grapes While there was some frost damage in early March to California’s deciduous fruit crop, particularly apricots and almonds, the late heavy freeze which hit much of northern and central California the week of April 6-11 brought damage estimated in the millions of dollars. Severe dam age occurred in some parts of northern California. Prelim inary estimates indicated that 75 percent of the prune crop was lost in Sonoma and Napa counties and 50 percent of the grape crop in the latter county. Damage to fruits, nuts, and vegetables was also widespread in the Sacramento area, the lower San Joaquin Valley, Santa Clara County, and the central coastal counties. Washington also had freezing weather in late March and early April which did considerable damage to soft fruits. Early estimates placed losses as high as 50 percent in Yakima County. 51 Little change expected in District e g g and chicken production The national output of eggs in 1953 is expected to be lower than last year as a result of a 3 percent reduction in the number of potential layers. Demand for eggs continues strong, and prices throughout the first half of 1953 should be higher than during the same period in 1952. In the Twelfth District the number of layers on hand as of April 1953 was slightly smaller than the year before, but egg production for the first four months of the year showed no change over the same period last year. Cali fornia, the principal egg-producing state in the District, has more layers this year and has maintained the same egg output per layer. On the basis of farmers’ February plans, 4 percent fewer chickens will be raised in the country this year. The egg-feed price ratio, however, is more favorable than the record low ratio of last year, and this may encourage farmers to raise more chickens than their February inten tions indicate. In the Pacific Coast states the number of chicks hatched in the first three months of 1953 by com mercial hatcheries showed practically no change from a year ago. This conforms to farmers’ plans in this area, as expressed in February, to raise the same number of chickens as in 1952. Turkey production reduced substantially in District A survey made in January by the Department of Agri culture indicated that in every state of the District farm ers intended to reduce the number of turkeys raised in 1953. If no change were made in these plans, the District would have 15 percent fewer turkeys than in 1952 com pared with an estimated 8 percent reduction nationally. A later survey indicates, however, that even fewer tur keys may be raised this year, the reduction in lighter breeds being particularly large. Lower prices received for turkeys in the last half of 1952 resulted in an unfav orable feed-price relationship and these low prices have continued into early 1953. An additional discouraging factor for turkey producers was the record volume of cold storage holdings. R A W MATERIALS PRICES IN WORLD TRADE in raw materials and foodstuffs accounts for more than 40 percent of the world’s trade. Although it is well known that the United States is the most im portant nation in world trade, accounting for from 15 to 20 percent of the total, it plays an even more important role in the raw materials trade. This country takes from 25 to 28 percent of the raw materials and foodstuffs ex ports of the rest of the world. W e are by far the world’s most important market for such commodities as tin which we obtain from Malaya and Bolivia, copper from Chile and the Congo, rubber from Malaya, Ceylon, and Indo nesia, coffee from Latin America, and such fibres as wool, jute, and abaca which come from a number of different rad e T countries. In 1952 total United States imports amounted to $10.7 billion, of which more than 50 percent were crude and semi-manufactured materials and slightly less than 20 percent were crude foodstuffs. During the past 25 years, 80 to 90 percent of our imports from the Overseas Sterling Area and from one-third to one-half of our im ports from Latin America have been crude materials and semi-manufactures, and a large part of the remainder has been crude foodstuffs. The United States at present con sumes almost half of the raw materials produced through out the world. Although we produce 75 percent of our raw materials needs, we are completely dependent upon outside sources for many critical materials, and to an in 52 FEDERAL RESERVE B A N K OF SA N FRANCISCO creasing extent we must supplement our domestic pro duction of many other raw materials. It is clear that this country is the most important raw materials market in the world and that it is also dependent upon foreign raw materials producers for a large part of its basic needs. Not only is the United States the most important im porter of raw materials, but it is also an important ex porter. At the present time some 25 percent of our exports are raw materials and foodstuffs, principally foods and fibers such as wheat, rice, and cotton. The production of these exports represents, of course, a relatively small part of total economic activity in this country and contrasts sharply with the situation in most raw materials producing areas, particularly the underdeveloped areas. In countries such as Ceylon, where exports account for 40 percent or more of the gross national product, the effects of changes in world markets are felt quickly and penetrate deeply into the entire economy. Tea, rubber, and coconut prod ucts make up 90 percent of Ceylon’s exports. A similar situation exists in most other raw materials producing countries. Certain of these countries are also largely de pendent upon particular markets. The Latin American countries, for example, sell a substantial part of their raw materials to the United States. Largely through the pro ceeds from these sales they are able to obtain over 55 per cent of their foreign purchases from the United States. One of these countries, Venezuela, obtains over twothirds of its foreign purchases from the United States with the dollars earned largely from sales of a single commodity —petroleum. The problems which confront raw materials producers are reflected chiefly in a high degree of market instability. The accompanying wide price movements are of great concern to the United States and other industrialized countries because of their dependence upon raw materials imports. These are of even greater concern, however, to the so-called underdeveloped countries which almost uni versally depend upon the production and export of a few basic raw materials for their economic existence. The problem of market instability Various events in recent months— such as the informal Anglo-American discussions on economic and commer cial policy, the commodity policy enunciated by the Com monwealth Economic Conference in London in December of last year, and the negotiations for the renewal of the International Wheat Agreement—have all involved dis cussions of the problems of instability in world markets for raw materials. Sharp fluctuations in the prices of many raw materials since the outbreak of the war in Korea have brought into focus problems which have long persisted. In the interval of six to nine months after June 1950, prices of many raw materials rose to more than twice their immediate pre-Korean levels. They then fell sharply, in many cases below the June 1950 levels. The increased de mand for raw materials, caused predominantly by accel- P R IC E S O F S E L E C T E D W O R L D T R A D E C O M M O D I T I E S , 1950-52 (in U . S. dollars per 100 pounds unless otherwise specified) 2 Price of Uruguay 56’s (grease basis) at Boston in bond. 3 Price per 10 bushels. *N o t available. Sou rce: International M onetary Fund, I n t e r n a t i o n a l F in a n c i a l S t a t i s t i c s . A pril 1953 il 1953 M O N T H L Y REVIEW :ed preparations for defense and rearmament and by spiling programs, was responsible for the steep price •eases. For example, the price of Australian wool rose percent from February 1950 to March 1951, while price of Uruguayan wool rose almost 170 percent from outbreak of war in Korea to March 1951. Other specllar price increases from June 1950 to early 1951 inle a 174 percent increase in the price of Malayan rub, a 146 percent increase in the price of burlap, a 144 :ent rise in the price of Malayan tin, a 137 percent inise in the price of Egyptian cotton (Karnak), and a percent increase in the price of jute. Foodstuffs and ;al prices (excluding tin) rose less steeply but their :es were already at an inflated level when the war ke out. The rapid rise in raw materials prices from June 1950 3ugh the first half of 1951, however, was matched by almost equally precipitous decline from the postrean peaks. By the fall of last year, the prices of most ¡or raw materials had fallen to, or below, pre-Korean ;ls. The price of raw jute in November 1952, for ex3le, was $139 for 100 pounds, compared with $201 in e 1950, while the price of Uruguayan wool was $70 100 pounds, grease basis, compared with $81 in June 0. At the present time, however, prices of most major r materials have recovered somewhat from the low ;ls of last fall. Vide price fluctuations such as those of recent years not a new experience nor are such fluctuations limited eriods of major upheaval in political and economic life. ;n minor business changes in important importing ntries, in particular the United States, can bring about je changes in the prices and volume of trade of raw terials. For example, the rather modest increase in rid business activity between 1936 and 1937 resulted in ncrease in the price of rubber of 91 percent, copper 100 cent, tin 66 percent, and lead 99 percent. The followyear the price of rubber dropped 60 percent, copper percent, tin 45 percent, and lead 53 percent. More retly the relatively minor slump in business activity in United States during the first half of 1949 contributed rely to a 45 percent drop in the world price of zinc. United Nations’ study of fluctuations in the prices of nary commodities covering the first fifty years of the sent century reveals that for the fourteen commodities lied there was an average annual price variation of percent. The average annual variation in quantities exted was 25 percent and the variation in earnings from export of these commodities was 35 percent.1 'his fundamental and extreme instability in raw maals markets, which is reflected in frequent and unpreable changes in prices, strongly affects the rate of protion, the volume of investment, and the over-all econes of both producing and consuming countries. Durperiods when materials prices are rising, the consumcountries are subjected to inflationary pressures and ted Nations, I n s t a b i l i t y i n E x p o r t M a r k e t s o f U n d e r - D e v e l o p e d C o u n t r ie s , 53 often find themselves squeezed between increasing raw materials prices and more slowly rising export prices for manufactured products. In producing countries, foreign exchange reserves are usually built up rapidly when prices of these commodities rise and then are often quickly drawn down when export prices fall. Trade and exchange controls may be imposed to prevent loss of reserves, or a larger reserve must be maintained to meet unexpected drains. Development projects may be partly dependent on the supply of foreign exchange for essential imports, and further progress may hinge on adequate export proceeds. Instability in raw materials prices also makes it difficult for underdeveloped countries to obtain necessary foreign capital to finance programs of economic development. At the root of this instability is the fact that the prices of most primary commodities react sharply to small shifts in supply and demand. The production of many of these commodities, in particular agricultural products, requires relatively long periods of time and it is not possible to vary production in the short run in response to changes in de mand. An increase in demand cannot bring forth an im mediate increase in production, and thus prices rise sharp ly. On the other hand, production cannot be turned off in response to a decrease in demand, and thus prices drop. Nor is demand very sensitive to changes in prices, and it is only after relatively large price changes that the quan tity sold is affected. Although sharp changes in demand do take place in response to changes in business condi tions, war, and defense, the demand for raw materials at any given time depends upon production schedules and is a matter of advanced planning and coordination with in puts of other factors of production. The effects of instability Instability in primary commodity markets affects both importing and exporting countries. One of the most com mon measures which shows these effects is the ratio of export prices to import prices, that is, the terms of trade. If a country’s export prices either fall faster or rise more slowly than import prices, this will mean that a given vol ume of exports will buy a smaller volume of imports and thus the terms of trade move against the country. On the other hand, should export prices rise faster or fall more slowly than import prices, a country would benefit by its ability to buy a larger volume of imports without increas ing its exports. The movement of prices of internationally traded commodities since the outbreak of the Korean con flict illustrates quite clearly such changes in the terms of trade of particular countries. As indicated earlier, for some six to nine months fol lowing Korea the prices of raw materials and foodstuffs rose rapidly. In the meantime, however, prices of imports into the countries producing raw materials rose more slowly, resulting in an improvement in their terms of trade as shown in the charts on the following page. For those countries for which data are available, the improve ment in the terms of trade immediately after June 1950 is especially marked in Ceylon, Australia, Malaya, and the 54 April 1953 FEDERAL RESERVE B A N K OF S A N FRAN CISCO Philippines. Rubber, tea, and coconut product exports, all of which had major price increases after Korea, com prised 90 percent of Ceylon’s export value in 1951 ; and increases in the price of wool for Australia, rubber and tin for Malaya, and copra for the Philippines contributed to the improvement in the terms of trade of those coun tries. On the other hand, effects exactly opposite to those of the principal raw materials exporting countries were ex perienced in the importing countries. In the United States the unit value of imports rose almost perpendicularly at the end of 1950, while export unit value rose much more slowly. A s a consequence, the terms of trade dropped from 98 in December 1950 to 80 in January 1951. In the United Kingdom, although import prices did not rise as rapidly as in the United States, they nevertheless rose faster than export prices; the terms of trade dropped from 102 in January 1951 to 95 by the middle of the year. The balance of trade of the raw materials exporting countries improved rapidly as a result of the favorable IN D E X E S O F E X P O R T A N D IM P O R T movement of prices, enabling them to increase their gold and foreign exchange reserves. Shortly after these higher export proceeds became available, however, imports in the raw materials producing countries began to rise. In creased gold and foreign exchange reserves made it pos sible for these countries to purchase essential commodi ties whose acquisition had previously been restricted. Other factors also stimulated the rapid increase in im ports. One was anticipatory buying for fear of future shortages of capital goods. Another was the fear that internal inflationary pressures would soon end the export boom. The relaxation of exchange and trade controls be cause of the more favorable exchange position, moreover, facilitated the purchase of many goods. The lag between the rise in exports and the rise in imports during this period is illustrated by the foreign trade of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Ceylon, India, the Philippines, and Uruguay. Imports in all instances reached their postKorean peaks several months after exports reached their peaks, the lag ranging from four months for Argentir^,, ten months for Brazil. P R IC E S A N D T H E T E R M S O F T R A D E , 1 9 5 0 -5 2 1948 - 1 0 0 Percent INDIA MALAYA' 325 275 225 —x ^ 1 1 1 1 n 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 11 1 11 ij 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 11 11 h i n i llii-i Li i-iLLjJ 75 Percent 140 UNITED KINGDOM* 100 80 60 111 1950 11 11 I 1950 II I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 I II u 1D a t a b y q u a r te r s. * 1951 = 100. S o u r c e : I n te r n a t io n a l M o n e ta r y Fund, International Financial Statistics. U j I II I II I I I I II I I I III I I I 11 l-L-l.l J ìU - L L 1952 J 111I I I 11 1111,11I I I ,1111.1111 u f m i 1952 1951 1950 40 Export p r i c e s ------------Import prices ............. Terms of------------tra d e ----- — — — .— N o t e : T h e t e r m s o f t r a d e a r e m e a s u r e d b y t h e r a t io o f e x p o r t p r ic e s, t o im p o r t p r ic e s in r e la t io n t o a b a s e p e r io d . C h a n g e s h e r e a r e - r e la t e d t o t h e b a s e p e r io d 1 9 4 8 = 1 0 0 . A n im p r o v e m e n t in t h e t e r m s o f tr a d e is in d ic a t e d b y a n in c r e a s e in t h e i n d e x , w h ile a d e t e r io r a t io n i t t h e t e r m s o f tr a d e is s h o w n b y a d e c lin e in t h e in d e x . D u e t o c e r ta in lim ita tio n s o f d a ta , t h e m e a s u r e m e n t o f t h e te r m s o f tr a d e i s o n ly a p p r o x im a te . * ¥ n e u s e o f t h is d e v ic e s h o u ld t h e r e fo r e b e lim ite d t o t h e m e a s u r e m e n t o f m a jo r c h a n g e s in tr e n d r a th e r th a n o f s m a ll flu c tu a tio n s . :il 1953 [n the second half of 1951 and well into 1952 export ces dropped below pre-Korean heights or levelled off. tese price declines, combined with rising import surises, resulted in a deteriorating balance of payments sition in the various countries exporting raw materials, port proceeds declined while imports continued at high els. As a result, reserves fell sharply, and trade and :hange restrictions had to be reimposed in many innces. \s might be expected, the exact opposite occurred in importing countries, their previously unfavorable bal:e of payments situation being reversed during 1952, ticularly during the last half. The extent to which particular countries experienced effects of these vacillating raw materials prices durthe post-Korean period depends upon the degree of jendence either on exports or imports of raw materials 1 also upon the particular raw materials involved. ralia affected by changes in prices vool and wheat Vs a major raw materials exporting country, the probl s which faced Australia after June 1950 illustrate some the difficulties confronting those countries which are hly vulnerable to *he sharp ups and down of raw maials prices. After the outbreak of war in Korea, the :es of wool and, to a somewhat lesser extent, wheat s rapidly. As a result, gold and foreign exchange reres rose from 650 million Australian pounds in June"1 0 to a peak of 850 million Australian pounds in May ¡1, primarily because the value of exports rose 185 cent during approximately the same period. The drop vool prices shortly after, however, immediately had a ing effect on the balance of payments position of Ausia. The combination of falling export prices and extding imports, the latter because of the relaxation of hange and trade restrictions and because of planned V A L U E O F F O R E IG N (o m of 55 M O N T H L Y RE V IEW M illions o f TRADE internal expansionary projects, led to the rapid deteriora tion of Australia’s balance of payments. This situation was further complicated by internal inflationary pres sures. Imports continued to rise for nine months after exports reached their peak in April 1951. The export sur plus of 68 million Australian pounds in April 1951 changed within the space of five months to an import sur plus of 56 million Australian pounds in September. Gold and foreign exchange reserves fell steadily to a low point of 353 million Australian pounds in July 1952. Australia therefore was forced to reimpose strict trade and ex change controls, even on Sterling Area products. Malaya and raw materials prices The situation in Malaya was somewhat similar, al though less complicated by the problem of inflation. Tin and rubber prices, as indicated earlier, increased rapidly after the outbreak of war in Korea. The value of Malaya’s exports rose from 246 million Malayan dollars in June 1950 to a peak of 646 million Malayan dollars by April 1951, an increase of 163 percent. But the physical volume of exports increased by only 33 percent from the quarter ending June 1950 to December 1950, dropping thereafter to a level about 25 percent above the June 1950 volume. After April 1951, the value of exports turned down to a low of 287 million Malayan dollars in June 1952, offset ting most of the previous sharp increase. Fluctuating prices and importing countries — The United Kingdom The problems posed for importing countries provide an almost opposite picture from that shown by the two ex porting countries previously considered. The United Kingdom, for e: le, was adversely affected by the high prices of food industrial raw materials after June 1950. The val .. United Kingdom imports rose 54 per cent from June 1950 to August 1951, but the physical vol ume of imports rose only 26 percent. Her import surplus O F S E L E C T E D C O U N T R I E S , 1 9 5 0 -5 2 M illions of Millions o f 56 FEDERAL RESERVE B A N K OF SA N FRAN CISCO April 1953 a program for the production and marketing of their prod ucts. Schemes for acreage restriction or production goals were set. Other commodity study groups concentrated their efforts on research and the expansion of markets through publicity and information programs. In general, these prewar commodity groups included only producing countries. During W orld W ar II the shortage of strategic mate rials led to the formation of the Anglo-American Com bined Materials Board. The operations of the Board in allocating supplies of scarce materials were quite effective —■The United States because the members were consumers and because the The United States purchases such a large share of the United Kingdom and the United States controlled most world’s production of raw materials that it can have an of the available ocean tonnage. important influence on their prices. Our purchases of After W orld W ar II ended, the problem of instability strategic materials in the early months of the Korean war of raw materials markets again came to the fore. In 1947 were a major factor in the rapid rise in their prices. In the International Tin Study Group was established. Simi later months, however, the United States as an importer lar groups for wool and rubber were also formed, com was able to shield herself somewhat from the effects of prised of both producing and consumer countries. A t increases in raw materials prices through the suspension tempts to conclude intergovernmental agreements on in some instances of further stockpile purchases. This sus price-fixing, long-term purchase commitments, and other pension of purchases in turn contributed materially to the measures to reduce price and income fluctuations through subsequent decline in prices. The net effect, therefore, was controls were unsuccessful. The W ool Study Group, how to accentuate rather than to limit these price fluctuations. ever, agreed on a price support program in 1950. United States import value rose by 60 percent from The problem of shortages of essential raw materials June 1950 to March 1951, while import volume increased under emergency conditions has met with somewhat more only about 17 percent. Export prices at the same time rose concrete action. Because of the Korean war and the sub much more slowly, although increases in the physical vol sequent rapid depletion of existing supplies of strategic ume of exports resulted in substantial increases in the materials, interested countries, including almost all the total value of exports. The ratio of export prices to import countries of the free world, formed the International Ma prices, however, also became adverse for the United terials Conference (IM C ) in 1951. The IM C set up com States. Thus, it was necessary to export a larger volume modity committees for copper, zinc, lead, sulphur, cotton of goods in order to obtain a given amount of imports. and cotton linters, tungsten, molybdenum, manganese, nickel and cobalt, wool, pulp and paper, and other raw Attempts to solve the problem of instability materials. The committees, consisting of representatives Because of the numerous problems and uncertainties of producing and consuming countries, were created to introduced by fluctuating primary materials prices, both make recommendations to the member governments on exporting and importing countries have continuously ex allocations of available supplies. Acceptance of the recomplored various means of preventing or alleviating their mentions, however, has been optional. At the present time, consequences. In order to protect their internal econ most of the commodity committees have dropped controls omies from the exigencies of unstable export markets, ex because of the easing in the supply situation. Develop porting countries have felt it necessary to adopt exchange ments in the various commodities, however, remain under and trade restrictions to prevent serious losses of reserves continuous study. In general, the IM C committees have during periods of declining export prices. been only partially effective. But these actions have not provided a solution; they Another postwar international commodity agreement have only cushioned these countries from the full effects whose operations have aroused much interest is the Inter of fluctuating prices at the cost of restricting the total national Wheat Agreement signed in 1948. Membership flow of world trade. Importing countries are also inter is composed of the principal wheat-exporting and wheatested in the problem as it affects both their imports and importing countries. Under the Agreement minimum sup their export markets for manufactures in primary pro plies and minimum demand are guaranteed within a cer ducing countries. Efforts to deal with this problem, how tain price range.1 Wheat purchases above the guaranteed ever, have not been limited to the postwar period. I T h e I n t e r n a t io n a l W h e a t A g r e e m e n t c a m e in t o o p e r a t io n o n A u g u s t 1 , In the early 1930’s study groups were formed to con 1 9 4 9 . T h e A g r e e m e n t is a d m in is te r e d b y t h e I n t e r n a t io n a l W h e a t C o u n c il c o m p o s e d o f fo u r w h e a t e x p o r t in g c o u n tr ie s (A u s tr a lia , C a n a d a , F r a n c e , sider the problems of specific commodities. Various agree a n d t h e U n it e d S t a t e s ) a n d s o m e 4 2 im p o r tin g c o u n t r ie s . T h e A g r e e m e n t is d e s ig n e d t o " o v e r c o m e t h e s e r io u s h a r d s h ip c a u s e d t o p r o d u c e r s a n d c o n ments and conferences resulted in the formation of private s u m e r s b y b u r d e n s o m e s u r p lu s e s a n d c r itic a l s h o r t a g e s o f w h e a t ” a n d “ t o a s s u r e s u p p lie s o f w h e a t t o im p o r t in g c o u n t r ie s a n d m a r k e ts fo r w h e a t to or semi-private organizations for the study of sugar, tea, e x p o r t in g c o u n tr ie s a t e q u it a b le a n d s t a b le p r ic e s .” A t t h e r e q u e s t o f th e W h e a t C o u n c il, e x p o r t in g c o u n t r ie s a r e o b lig e d t o s e l l a s p e c if ie d a m o u n t coffee, and wool. In some cases, such as sugar and tea, the o f w h e a t t o im p o r tin g m e m b e r s a t t h e m a x im u m p r ic e s p e c if ie d , a n d , o n th e o th e r h a n d , im p o r tin g c o u n tr ie s a g r e e t o b u y s p e c ifie d a m o u n ts a t th e participating nations or producers’ associations agreed on increased meanwhile from 57 million pounds in June 1950 to a high of 148 million pounds for the same month a year later. The effects of increased import prices of raw mate rials, however, were somewhat alleviated by the greater diversification of United Kingdom imports, as contrasted with the specialized nature of the exports of many raw materials exporting countries. Nevertheless, the ratio of export prices to import prices turned against the United Kingdom, with the result that the same level of export proceeds purchased a smaller volume of imports. April 1953 M O N T H L Y REVIEW quantities are bought at the higher world price. Since the Agreement has been in effect, there has been considerable discussion over its benefits. Some quarters have declared that only importing countries have benefited from the Agreement. The United States as an exporter, for exam ple, has paid out about $600 million to domestic producers of exported wheat since the inauguration of the Agree ment as the difference between the Agreement price and the United States domestically supported wheat price. Negotiations have just been completed in Washington for the renewal of the Agreement subject to ratification by the member nations. The crucial issue was the setting of a new price to be paid under the terms of the Agree ment. Under the new three-year agreement the maximum selling price is $2.05 per bushel compared with $1.80 under the old agreement. As a result, the cost of subsidiz ing United States wheat exports at present market prices has been cut from approximately 62 cents to 32 cents per bushel. At the present time, the United Kingdom has indi cated that she will not sign the Agreement because she feels that the new prices are too high. A United States policy on commodify stabilization? The impact of United States materials policy has been instrumental in influencing the raw materials situation in the postwar period. Because of the importance of this country in international primary materials markets, along with our growing dependence upon such markets, the problem of materials policy has occupied the attention of governmental authorities. The report of the President’s Materials Policy Commission (the Paley Report) issued within the last year made the recommendation that the United States explore the possibilities of reducing market instability through multilateral international commodity agreements or through the use of international buffer stocks as compensating inventories on a few materials. In summing up these proposals the following statement was made: “ Failure to work toward stability would continue a major source of economic strain in the free world, and would leave the door open for the reappearance of prewar cartels and restrictive agreements with consequent limitations on production, consumption, and trade.,,1 In December of last year, the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth countries participated in the Common wealth Economic Conference held at London and issued 1 Report of the President’s Materials Policy Commission, V o l. I , pp. 90. minimum price. The Agreem ent comes into effect only when the market price of wheat is at either the maximum or minimum price. The Agreement has not altered the channels through which international trade in wheat has taken place. In the United States sales are carried out through regular com mercial channels, but to enable wheat to be sold at the maximum price provided by the Agreement, export subsidies are paid to private exporters by the Commodity Credit Corporation. The subsidy rate varies with changes in the United States market price for wheat. Quotas and prices are determined by the W heat Council; quotas are set for each crop year and prices at the time the Agreem ent is renewed. 57 the following statement on commodity policy, which is a vital issue with the overseas sterling countries. “ All Commonwealth Governments are . . . ready to cooperate in considering, commodity by commodity, international schemes designed to ensure stability of demand and prices at an economic level.” Raw materials demand and price stabilization were also on the agenda of the joint Anglo-American talks early this year. As these discussions were strictly exploratory, no formal agreements were reached on any of the sub jects discussed. There is general agreement that the problems caused by fluctuating raw materials prices, including undesirable repercussions on income, the balance of payments, and foreign exchange reserves, are problems deserving of international action. Underdeveloped areas especially have a vital stake in the solution of these problems. They are dependent upon external demand for a few basic ma terials for the major part of their livelihood, prices are determined in world markets, and the supply is deter mined by the production decisions arrived at indepen dently by the various producing countries. Consequently, they are subject to economic forces beyond their control to an almost overwhelming extent. The anticipation of a continued high level of demand for strategic raw mate rials, moreover, necessitates some provision for increased production. Without the assurance of some stability of prices, however, there may be a reluctance to increase pro duction for fear that projects undertaken now will be come unprofitable later. Instability of raw materials mar kets has also contributed to the desire of underdevel oped countries to reduce their dependence on such exports and to speed up their programs of development and in dustrialization. Continuing instability may cause under developed countries to pursue such development pro grams faster than can be soundly financed and at the ex pense of raw materials production. The rather unique position of the United States as the most important importer of primary materials and also as an important exporter of such materials places the na tion in a key position in dealing with these problems of market instability. These problems are also of major im portance to the Twelfth Federal Reserve District. Since Korea the effects of rapidly rising prices followed by pre cipitous declines in such export commodities as wheat, rice, and cotton have been sharply felt in the District. Wheat exports from the Pacific Northwest, for example, account for better than one-third of that area’s export value. Cotton exports from the San Francisco and Los Angeles customs districts account for 20 to 30 percent of each district’s export value. On the other hand, imports of such commodities as coffee, newsprint, rubber, copper, copra, and cordage fibers make up an important part of the Twelfth District’s imports, and hence fluctuations in price and volume of these commodities are directly felt. 58 FEDERAL RESERVE B A N K OF SA N FRANCISCO A p ril 1953 CHANGES IN BANKS AN D BRANCHES— TWELFTH DISTRICT, 1951-52 District banks continued to expand their facilities for serving the public during 1952. They not only enlarged many existing facilities but also made a net addition of 42 banking offices, bringing the total number to 1,951 at year end. This represents an increase of 2 per cent over 1951 and 18 percent over 1940. Since the num ber of unit banks declined by seven, all the net addition took the form of branch banking offices. H P w elfth percent during 1952 compared with a gain of 7.5 percent the year before. Although both member and nonmember banks declined in number by two each, assets of member banks increased from 90.0 percent to 90.2 percent of total bank assets. Total assets of branch banks relative to all bank assets increased from 87.3 percent to 87.8 percent during 1952. N um ber o f B ra n ch B a n k s— T w e lfth N u m b e r o f B a n k i n g O f f ic e s — T w e l f t h D is t r ic t Arizona ...................... California .................... Idaho ........................... Nevada .......................... Oregon ........................ U tah >............................... W a s h in g t o n ............... . Twelfth D i s t r i c t .......... D is tr ic t December 31, 1951 and 1952 December 31, 1940-1952 1940 33 1,076 87 21 140 72 224 1948 50 1,115 95 25 159 76 247 1949 52 1,145 96 26 167 77 255 1950 55 1,167 98 26 173 78 262 1951 65 1,187 100 28 175 81 273 1952 70 1,209 101 28 180 84 279 1,653 1,767 1,818 1,859 1,909 1,951 At the end of 1952 there were 49 more branch banking offices than at the close of 1951. Existing branch banks opened 11 new branches and absorbed 10 unit banks which became branch offices of the absorbing banks. Ten unit banks became branch systems for the first time and established 18 new offices, thereby accounting for 28 new branch banking offices altogether. Of these ten new branch systems, five are in California, three in Oregon, one in Utah, and one in Arizona. Two are members of the Federal Reserve System. During 1952 the number of unit banks declined by seven. Ten unit banks became branch systems, ten unit banks were absorbed by existing branch banks, and thir teen new unit banks were established. Five of the thirteen new banks are in California, three in Oregon, three in Washington, one in Utah, and one in Arizona. Total assets of all banks continued to grow in every state in the District, with an aggregate increase of 8.4 N um ber o f branches Baiiks -operated by-------------\ t ,— operating branches— N N on M em N onm em M em ber member t ----- ber----- N t ----- ber----- -v / ----- banks----- N ,■ — banks— 1952 1951 1952 1951 1952 1951 1952 1951 . 2 2 3 2 461 431 13* 12a . 31 30 21 20 946s 9223 54 54 7 2 2 56 53 5 5 3 1 1 18 18 2 2 . 5 8 4 10 100 89 10 14 . 5 5 3 2 26 25 3 2 . 12 12 6 6 144 139 14 13 Arizona Idaho . . Nevada Oregon U tah . . Tw elfth District . 65 63 44 43 1,336 1,289 101 102 1 Includes 10 Eleventh District branches of Tw elfth District banks. 3 Includes 4 Eleventh District branches of Tw elfth District banks. 8 Includes 3 out-of-state branches. T ota l A sse ts of M e m b e r a n d N o n m e m b e r B r a n c h B a n k s — T w e l f t h D is t r ic t December 31, 1951 and 1952 (in thousands) Branch bank as percent Member Nonmember of all bank -branch ban ks-branch bankst— assets— \ 1952 1951 1952 1951 1952 1951 Arizona ............ $ 459,059 $ 406,137 $ 85,074 $ 66,658 96.3 94.0 California1 ____ 15,198,173 13,940,083 958,417 893,834 90.2 89.9 405,246 373,041 35,778 31,846 81.0 80.3 Idaho ................. Nevada ............ 192,555 175,478 20,541 16,316 88.8 88.9 1,458,611 1,315,825 64,789 62,323 86.1 Oregon ............ 84.8 U t a h .................... 396,412 366,230 16,474 8,385 55.4 53.6 W ashington . . . 1,861,526 1,772,724 261,709 237,670 81.0 81.5 T w e l f t h ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------District ____ $19,971,582 $18,349,518 $1,442,782 $1,317,032 87.8 87.3 1 Includes 3 out-of-state branches. N um ber an d T o ta l A s s e ts o f A l l B a n k s— T w e lf t h D is tr ic t December 31, 1951 and 1952 (assets in thousands) Arizona ...................... California1 .................. Idaho ........................... Nevada ......................... Oregon ......................... U tah ............................. W ashington ............... Tw elfth District -M em b er banks— -A s s e t s 1952 1951 1951 A ll banks--------^ N u m b e r—> -------------- Assets 1952 1951 1952 1951 $ 493,048 565,145 11 10 $ 17,918,642 16,508,097 209 211 504,235 544,327 40 42 240,037 215,680 8 8 1,768,512 1,625,910 70 72 745,379 698,764 55 54 2,468,206 2,620,199 121 121 4 119 21 6 29 31 51 4 119 23 6 30 30 51 $ $22,513,940 261 263 $22,003,798 514 518 $24,402,241 1 Includes 3 out-of-state branches. 1952 467,302 16,464,721 457,297 214,406 1,589,382 635,425 2,175,265 1952 -Nonm em ber banks— —A s s e ts 1952 1951 1951 413,554 15,116,012 427,608 194,155 1,454,596 598,641 2,071,074 7 90 19 2 41 24 70 6 92 19 2 42 24 70 $20,275,640 253 255 $ $ 97,843 1,453,921 87,030 25,631 179,130 109,954 444,934 $2,398,443 $ 79,494 1,392,085 76,627 21,525 171,314 100,123 397,132 $2,238,300 M em ber bank as percent of all bank ,-----assets— 1952 1951 82.7 82.2 91.9 91.6 84.0 84.8 89.3 90.0 89.9 89.5 85.2 85.7 83.0 83.9 90.2 90.0 A p r il 1953 MONTHLY R E V IE W 59 BUSINESS INDEXES—TWELFTH DISTRICT1 (1947-49 average = 100) In d u strial pro du ction (ph ysical v o lu m e )1 Y e ar and m o n th L um ber P e tr o le u m 8 C rude R efin ed C e m e n t Lead1 Copper* W heat flour* T o ta l C ar Retail D ep ’t nonagri T o ta l loadings m f’g store food cu ltu ra l prices sales E le c tric e m p lo y e m p lo y ( n u m ber) 2 (v a lu e )2 3, 5, 14 power m e n t4 m ent 64 50 42 48 48 50 48 47 47 52 63 69 68 70 80 96 103 100 100 113 115 190 138 110 135 131 170 164 163 132 124 80 72 109 116 119 87 95 101 ÌÓÓ 101 96 95 99 102 99 103 110 114 ’ ’ ¿7 54 60 51 55 63 83 121 164 158 122 104 100 102 98 305 119 127 30 25 18 24 28 30 28 31 33 40 49 59 65 72 91 99 104 98 105 109 114 “ 89 129 86 85 91 186 171 ‘ 57 81 98 121 137 157 199 139 142 141 147 150 150 153 145 146 141 138 113 112 112 112 113 114 114 114 115 116 116 124 125 126 125 126 127 329 128 130 130 130 101 100 106 98 108 96 101 108 98 102 100 108 103 106 118 114 110 116 114 118 128 119 114 114 116 115 115 114 114 114 113 114 115 208 210 185 207 187 144 153 142 145 135 148 138 157 143 143 182 187 293 253 319 194 232 141 154 118r 118 131 133 94 102 116 117 114 112 87 57 52 62 64 71 75 67 67 69 74 85 93 97 94 100 101 99 98 106 107 78 55 50 56 61 65 64 63 63 68 71 83 93 98 91 98 100 103 103 112 116 54 36 27 33 58 56 45 56 61 81 96 79 63 65 81 96 104 100 112 128 124 165 100 72 86 96 114 92 93 108 109 114 100 90 78 70 94 105 101 109 89 86 105 49 17 37 64 88 58 80 94 107 123 125 112 90 71 106 101 93 115 115 112 90 86 75 87 81 84 81 91 87 87 88 98 101 112 108 113 98 88 86 95 96 29 29 26 30 34 38 36 40 43 49 60 76 82 78 78 90 101 108 119 136 144 1952 February March April M ay June July August September October November December 107 108 110 94 117 108 106 109 116 105 99 106 106 107 108 107 107 107 107 107 107 108 113 115 114 114 116 116 122 122 117 118 114 112 113 120 129 126 125 131 131 142 133 126 104 96 95 89 87 68 81 78 80 85 78 109 115 117 116 112 106 105 112 115 116 111 105 90 88 87 84 90 103 99 96 97 96 1953 January February 116 117 107 108 115 117 105 131 109 113 99 92 77 r 85 E x p o r ts Im p o rts 102 68 52 66 77 81 72 77 82 95 102 99 105 100 101 106 100 94 97 100 101 97 51 41 54 70 74 58 72 79 93 93 90 90 72 85 97 104 99 112 114 107 1929 1931 1933 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 W aterb o rn e foreign tra d e8’ • 195 BANKING AND CREDIT STATISTICS—TWELFTH DISTRICT (amounts in millions of dollars) C o n d itio n ite m s o f all m e m b e r b a n k s 7 Year and m o n th 1929 1931 1933 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 U .S . Loans D em an d deposits and G ov’t d is c o u n t s s e c u r itie s a d ju s te d 8 T o ta l tim e d e posits 2,239 1,898 1,486 1,537 1,682 1,871 1,869 1,967 2,130 2,451 2,170 2,106 2,254 2,663 4,068 5,358 6,032 5,925 7,105 7,907 8,844 495 547 720 1,275 1,334 1,270 1,323 1,450 1,482 1,738 3,630 6,235 8,263 10,450 8,426 7,247 6,366 7,016 6,392 6,533 6,627 1,234 984 951 1,389 1,791 1,740 1,781 1,983 2,390 2,893 4,356 5,998 6,950 8,203 8,821 8,922 8,655 8,536 9,244 9,9*0 10,504 1,790 1,727 1,609 2,064 2,101 2,187 2,221 2,267 2,360 2,425 2,609 3,226 4,144 5,211 5,797 6,006 6,087 6,255 6,256 6,720 7,522 1952 March April M ay June July August September October November December 7,787 7,850 7,921 8,062 8,114 8,270 8,444 8,605 8,805 8,844 6,378 6,313 6,238 6,258 6,507 6,469 6,473 6,765 6,808 6,627 9,426 9,408 9,306 9,501 9,643 9,679 9,908 10,125 10,281 10,504 6,915 6,924 6,985 7,083 7,143 7,197 7,249 7,336 7,331 7,498 1953 January February March 8,816 8,838 8,983 6,633 6,474 6,299 10,390 9,911 9,937 7,490 7,551 7,560 B ank rates on short-term busin ess lo a n s ' 3.20 3.35 3.66 3.95 3.94 3.95 M e m b e r ban k reserves and related Ite m s 10 Reserve bank cred it11 _ 34 21 + — 2 2 + 6 + — 1 __ 3 2 + 2 + 4 + 107 + + 214 + 98 — 76 9 + 302 17 + 13 + 39 + — 21 7 + 0 154 110 163 227 90 240 192 148 596 - 1 ,9 8 0 -3 ,7 5 1 - 3 ,5 3 4 - 3 ,7 4 3 - 1 ,6 0 7 510 + 472 930 -1 ,1 4 1 - 1 ,6 8 2 - 1 ,9 1 2 23 + + 154 150 + + 219 + 454 + 157 + 278 + 245 + 420 4-1 ,000 + 2 ,826 + 4 ,486 + 4 ,483 + 4 ,682 + 1 ,329 + 698 482 + 378 + 1 .198 + 1 ,983 + 2 ,265 — + + — + + 309 176 52 211 45 213 230 236 72 299 - 17 237 174 97 208 126 153 294 29 240 + + + + + + + + + + 272 102 185 190 288 163 213 267 79 422 + + + + + + + + 138 83 220 - 263 119 147 + 136 13 240 + + 3.96 + + 3.95 + + 4.01 C oin and T reasury C o m m ercia l cu rrency in o p era tio n s12 o p era tio n s13 circ u la tio n 11 Reserves B ank debits Index 31 cities*» u (1 9 4 7 -4 9 100)* 6 48 + 18 14 + 38 + 3 20 + 31 + 96 + + 227 + 643 + 708 + 789 + 545 326 _ 206 _ 209 — 65 — 14 + 189 132 + 175 147 185 287 479 549 565 584 754 930 1,232 1,462 1,706 2,033 2,094 2,202 2,420 1,924 2,026 2,269 2,514 42 28 18 25 30 32 29 30 32 39 48 61 69 76 87 95 103 102 115 132 140 — 7 13 49 29 7 49 4 32 34 12 2,313 2,341 2,347 2,209 2,333 2,535 2,363 2,527 2,616 2,514 139 135 128 144 134 134 144 146 141 157 77 22 18 2,565 2,491 2,394 146 148 161 — 1 Adjusted for seasonal variation, except where indicated. Except for department store statistics, all indexes are based upon data from outside sources, as follows: lumber, various lumber trade associations; petroleum, cement, copper, and lead, U.S. Bureau of Mines; wheat flour, U.S. Bureau of the Census; electric power, Federal Power Commission; nonagricultural and manufacturing employment, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and cooperating state agencies; retail food prices, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; carloadings, various railroads and railroad associations; and foreign trade, U .S. Bureau of the Census. ! Daily average. * N ot adjusted for seasonal variation. 4 Excludes fish, fruit, and vegetable canning. 8 Los Angeles, San Francisco, aud Seattle indexes combined. 6 Commercial cargo only, in physical volume, for Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego, Oregon, and Washington customs districts; starting with July 1950, “ special category” exports are excluded because of security reasons. 7 Annual figures are as of end of year, monthly figures as of last Wednesday in month or, where applicable, as of call report date. * Demand deposits, excluding interbank and U.S. G ov’t deposits, less cash items in process of collection. Monthly data partly estimated. 8 Average rates on loans made in five major cities during the first 15 days of the month. 10 End of year and end of month figures. 11 Changes from end of previous month or year. 18 Minus sign indicates flow of funds out of the District in the case of commercial operations, and excess of receipts over disbursements in the case of Treasury operations. 11 Debits to total deposit accounts, excluding inter-bank deposits. 14 Retail food prices reflect January 1953 Consumer Price Index revisions. r — revised.
@FedFRASER