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Subscriptions to the MONTHLY REvrnw are avail- able to the public without charge. Additional copies of any issue may be obtained from the Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Federal Reserve Station, Kansas City, Missouri 64198. Permission is granted to reproduce any material in this publication. Bank Credit Flows By Raymond J. Doll and Gene L. Swackhamer THE FLOW OF bank credit is a vital part of economic activity in a highly integrated economy . The research which will be discus ed here suggests considerable immobility in the flow of such credit. Reasons for prevailing rigidities include variation in state laws pertaining to such items as usury and legal loan limits, managerial inertia of lenders, and perhaps the kind s of mechanisms used in making bank credit available . Because of such ri gidi ti es, monetary policy authorities arc concern d both with making the proper amount available and with its distribution. To the exte nt that particular techniques can be varied to optimize bank credit flows, attempts can be made to use that combination of techniques that will do the most effective and impartial job. In this article, an attempt is made to test for rigidities in bank credit flows and to evaluate their significance insofar as monetary policy aut horiti es arc concerned. To minimize rigidit ies caused by such factors as legislation and managerial inertia would require an intensive educational campaign and change in legislation. All monetary policy authorities can do to alleviate immobility caused by factors such as these is to use that combination of mechanisms that will tend to minimize the differentials that arise. To do this effectively, policy authorities must be able to identify the differentials and understand the linkage between the variou mechani ms u ed and credit flows. The quantity of bank reserves is influenced directly by three kinds of activities - open market operations, discounting, and float. The proportions of total bank reserves made available in recent years by each activity are 95 per Monthly Review • October 1968 cent through open market operations in which the Open Market Committee takes the m1t1ative, I per cent through discounting in which the individual member bank takes the initiative, and 4 per cent by float. In addition to changing the quantity of bank reserves, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System a lso can take action to change the level of rese rve requirements . Such action docs not itself affect th e amount of total member bank reserve balances, but it docs affect the amount of depos its and of loans and investment that member banks can legally maintain on the basis of a given amou nt of reserves. If the economy were perfectly competitive, arguments would strongly favor excl usive use of the open market operation, since impersonal market forces, rather than personal judgment, would determine distribution of bank reserves. Under the rigorous assu mptions underlying perfectly competitive market , float would disappear and discount window administration would be unncces ary. However, it should be pointed out that, even in open market op rations, the judgment of the Open Market Committee must be relied upon for the decision as to the total volume of reserves to be made available. Since the economy is not perfectly competitive, money markets do not function perfectly as impersonal allocators of resources-including bank credit. Many examples of imperfection could be cited in all ectors of the economy. 1 1 The assumptions underlying perfectly competitive markets include complete and instantaneous mobility of resources, perfect knowledge, and enough buyers and sellers so no buyer or seller can have a noticeable influence on the market. 3 Bank Credit Flow s Some evidences of imperfections relating directly to bank credit markets include variability among banks in: ( I ) their ability to use such devices as the Federal funds and certificate of depo it markets for obtaining and dispersing bank credit, (2) rates paid on time and savings deposits, (3) the ability to finance specific individual and busincs. s, and ( 4) their knowledge of, and access to, financial and other market infom1ation. Other evidences of imperfections exi t, but those just cited point out that a specific individual or business could have more difficulty in obtaining credit than another comparable individual or business because of such factors .1s location and structur' and kind of business. To the extent that ,iny pre v.iiling variability can be measured and traced to imperfect markets, it behooves responsible authorities to review prevailing market techniques and suggest revisions or adaptations that will tend to compen ate for some of the inequities. For example, discount admini tration at the Federal Reserve Banks could be revised in an effort to adjust for market inequities, including cushioning the strains of reserve adjustment for individual member banks. This article tests how well bank credit has been distributed regionally to the agricultural industry in the United tat s. The agricultural sector is excellent for this type of analysis becau . c the regional impact of market imperfections is likely to be most severe in an industry such as farming, which is composed of a large number of relatively small, widely dispersed firms that tend to be isolated. Furthermore, the Agricultural Loan Survey of mid-1966 makes da~ta available for developing a methodology and testing for evidences of imperfections in the farm credit market. In this study, it is hypothesized that regional variation in interest rates on agricultural loans exceeds differences attributable to variability in uncertainty and lending costs. Multiple linear regression is used to relate borrower, lending bank, loan, and market characteristics 4 to interest rates for similar type loans. 2 Alternative models arc tested for feeder livestock and farm operating expense loans in order to identify those economic factors that best explain rate variability. In a perfectly competitive economy, interest rates charged borrowers on comparable loans would be the ame in all regjons. " Every seller and purchaser of bank credit would have equal and complete knowledge about, and access to, bank credit markets. Interest rates charged borrowers would differ primarily because of variability in risk and other costs of making loans. uch factors as lack of mobility in flow of funds, diversity in usury laws, and man :tgcri,il inertia of lenders would not prevail, since, if rates on comparable loans tended to get out of line, with perfect knowledge and freedom of access to all market , forces would be implemented instantaneously that would tend to reestablish equilibrium. Excess demand in areas of rapid growth would be only temporary. Fixed interest rates charged all customers by a bank or other financial institution, regardless of variability in risk and other costs, aL o indicates that the financial institutions do not operate in a perfectly competitive environment. If all customers arc charged the same rate, regardless of risk and other costs of making loans, some of the customers arc paying more and others less than they would in a competitive market. Credit, under these conditions, would not be optimally allocated, since free market forces would not determine distribution of the credit. Instead, personal judgment of the allocators would determine how credit was distributed. ~The methodol ogy u:-,cd and technical data arc included in the appendix at the end of this article . "The term "interest rates," as used in this study , will refer to rates charged borrowers and will include the cost of risk-bearing and other costs, in addition to the payment for use of funds or "pure interest,'' as the term is frequently used by the economist. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Bank Credit Flows In this study, rates charged farmers by commercial banks were compared by Federal Reserve districts for feeder livestock and other operating expense loans . A comparison also was made by states for other operating expense loans, since the size of sample, with the exception of a few states, was adequate for state analysi on this type of loan . A large number of factors- selected to measure the cost of lending, local loan demand, the supply of loanable funds, borrower risk, and market competition - were examined in preliminary tests to determine which had the greatest impact on rates charged farmers for the particular type of loan being evaluated. After these factors were determined, rates were analyzed for loans that were adjusted for comparability by Federal Reserve di stricts for feeder livestock loans and by Federal Reserve districts and states for other operating expense loans. By use of this procedure, it was possible to determine average rates for each Federal Reserve district on feeder livestock loans made to farmers with about the same gross dollar value of sales and net worth, on notes of the same size, made by banks of about the same size and loan-to-deposit ratios. Rates charged were then compared among Federal Reserve districts. Some Federal Re erve districts had very few feeder livestock loans on which necessary borrower information was available. Average rates on other operating expense loans- adjusted for gross dollar value of sales, net worth, size of note, size of bank making the loan, loan-to-deposit ratio of the bank making the loan, type of farming, and security-also were computed by Federal Reserve districts. Greater interest rate variability among states than among Federal Reserve district for other operating expense loans was expected for two reason ·. First, most Federal Reserve districts contain all, or part , of several states- resulting in the averaging out of much state variability. Second, there is substantial variability among states in factors that influence financial Monthly Review • October 1968 markets- such a usury laws, legislation pertaining to bank structure, legal loan limits, and familiarity of bank management with agriculture. Determining average interest rates by states, adjusted for comparability by holding the influence of other economic variable constant, is a huge ta k. Furthermore, such computations require a large computer and a large sample of loans to provide a high degree of significance for each state. Consequently, rates were computed on operating expense loans exclusive of feeder livestock loans adjusted only hy net worth of borrower, since this was the most important variable influencing interest rates other than region. Since the comparisons were made on operating expense loans, which generally have short maturities and arc adjusted for net worth of borrower, a high degree of comparability prevails. REGIONAL VARIABILITY AS MEASURED BY INTEREST RATES Analysis of interest rate variability suggests that impersonal market forces do not allocate bank credit optimally among regions in the prevailing economic environment. Regional vc1riability prevailed consistently for both livestock and other operating expense loans by Federal Reserve districts and states. Regional differences were substantially more important than any other measurable factor in explaining interest rate variability. Regional variation in interest rates on business and real estate loans has been identified also. For example, a study of new house mortgage rates in Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas in 1963-64 reveaJed a range of 89 basis points between the northeast low of 5.28 and the West Coast high of 6.17: •A. H . Schaaf, "Regional Differences in Mortgage Financing Costs," The Jo11mal of Finance, March 1966, pp. 85-94. 5 Bank Credit Flows A comparison of intere t rates charged on feeder livestock loans , adjusted for the influence of other factors mentioned previou ly, reveals su bstantial variability on highly comparable loans among the different Federal Rese rve districts. It is significant that regio n, as mea u red by Federal Reserve di. trict, acco unted for 12 per cent of the total variability in interest rates charged on such loans. As indicated in Chart I, rates charged on these hi gh ly comparable loans varied from a low of 5.97 per cent in th e lcveland Distri ct to a hi gh of 7.4 1 per ce nt in the Dallas Di strict. ;\ vailablc ev idence sug rests that r;1tes on feeder livestock lo:1ns for th e Boston and New York Di stri cts arc not co mparnblc . In the ca. e of New York, 77 per cent of th e survey loans was necessa rily excluded from the study due to unreported information for several of the factors being examined. Thus, the entire figure for the ew York Di trict was expanded on the basis of 4 1 loans on which rates were substantially higher in relation to other farm loans in other Federal Rese rve di stricts. Additionally, since Bosto n and cw York, combined, accounted for less than I per cent of all feeder livestock loans in th e Nation , a few hi gh- or low-rate loans in th ese di stricts could ea sil y di . tort di. trict average rates . The ge neral pattern was for rates to be relatively low in the di stricts located in the northeast and northcentral regions and hi gh in those districts located in the South and West. This pattern also prevailed in the Boston and New York Districts for other production expense loans where a much larger s~rn1ple of loan s was avai lable . Chmt I indi ca tes that lives tock feeders located in the Dalb ~ Fedcr,1I Reserve Di. trict, on an ,1vcrnge, p.1id a full 1.44 percentage points, or 24 per cen t, more th an livestock feeders in the Cleveland , Philadelphia , and Richmond Districts. The Chicago ,111d St. Louis Districts al so had relatively low rates. Rates in the San Francisco District, along with th e Dal Federal Reserve Districts 6 Chart 1 INTEREST RATES CHARGED BY COMMERCIAL BANKS BY FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT June 30, 1966* Differences from U.S. Averooe Interest Rote (in tenths) +1 .0 -- 7 .41 FEEDER LIVESTOCK LOANS + .8 +.6 + . 4- + .2 l 6.57 - -.2 -. 4 - .6 L 5.98 5.975 L __L 5.99 __L l _L__j__J___L__l_j_ ti .0 + .8 +.6 t 7.74 OTHER OPERATING EXPENSE LOANS + .4 6 .88 -. 2 -. 4- -.6 -.8 6 .04 -1.0 C: 0 Federal Reserve Districts t; 0 CD -"" 0 >- t z C ..c; 0.. Q) -c C ..c; 0... -c -c C: C 0 Q) E > Q) u C: ..c; u a:: C 0 C u t +- <t 0, C ..c; u ,n ,n ::, 0 ...J 0 += (/) 0.. C Q) C: C: :::E >, +- u ,n ,n C C 0 C "' C: C ::,,: • Adju sted for factors in dicoted in introduction to article . 1Comparability questionable because of factors discussed article . -~ V C C ~ C: C (fl in las District, were substantially higher than for the Nation. In th Atl anta, Kan as City, and Minneapolis Di stricts, th ey were moderatel y higher than for the Nation. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Bank Credit Flows Chart 2 INTEREST RATES CHARGED BY COMMERCIAL BANKS ON OTHER OPERATING EXPENSE LOANS, BY STATES June 30, 1966 $-Statewide branch banking . L-Limited branch banking. *Resu lts need to be interpreted with core because of paucity of form loons. Regional variability on operating expense loans followed the same genera l pattern as for feeder livestock loans. Geographic region, as measured by Federal Reserve district, accounted for 14 per cent of total variability in interest rates charged on other operating expense loans. Rates charged varied from a high of 7. 7 per cent in the Dallas District to a low of 6 per cent in the Richmond District. Thus, farmers in the Dallas District paid a full 1.7 percentage points, or 28 per cent, more for other operati ng credit than farmers in the Richmond District. Rate s in the Boston and New York Districts were below the national average, as they were for all other Federal Reserve districts located in the northeast part of the Nation. Chart I reveals a high degree of comparability in the direction and magnitude of variabil ity Monthly Review • October 1968 in rates charged for fceder livestock and operating expense loans among the Federal Reserve districts. When one considers that the rates being compared have been adjusted for variability in such factors as net worth of borrower, gross dollar vaJue of sales, size of note, type of farming, security, size of bank, and loan-deposit ratio of bank, it is obvious that wide regional variability prevails m rates charged on quite similar loans. Average rates charged farmers By States for operating expense loans ( other than for purchase of feeder lives tock), adju ·ted for variability in net worth of borrower, arc shown by states in Chart 2. For the reasons mentioned previously, variability in rates was greater among states than among Federal Reserve di tricts. Region, as measured by states, accounted for 23.8 per 7 Bank Credit Flows cent of total variability in interest rates charged on operating expense loans in the Nation. Farmers with the same net worth in Louisiana, a high-rate state, paid a full 2.25 percentage points, or a 38 per cent higher rate, than farmers in North Carolina, a low-rate state. Although there is substantial variability in rates charged in adjoining states in a few instances, generally rates by states again tend to be low in the northeast and northcentral regions and high in the Western and Southern States. It is difficult to find either statistical data or empirical evidence of any kind that suggest that ;1griculture becomes mor risky or that farm loans arc more costly to make as one moves from the northeast and northccntral regions into the Southern, Rocky Mountain, or Pacific States. In fact, the evidence, as measured by income per farm, would tend to suggest the reverse. Arizona, California, and Florida-the three highest ranking states in income per farm in 1966 and most other recent years-are all high-interest rate states. North Carolina-the state with the lowest interest rates-is substantially below the national average in income per farm. Furthermore, year-to-year variability in farm income docs not appear to be the explanation for rate variability from state to state. REGIONAL VARIABILITY The general pattern of rates on comparable loans suggests considerable immobility in the flow of bank credit. It is difficult to explain why a farmer with about the same dollar volume of business, net worth, kind of farming operation, and security, pays a substantially higher interest rate for financing a loan for the same purpose if he lives in the western or southern parts of the United States than if he lives in the northeast or northccntral regions. Banking structure obviously is not the explanation, since branch banking prevails in both high- and low-rate areas. Furthermore, there are both high- and low-rate areas in unit banking regions. Usury laws appear to have a sub8 stantial influence in some states; however, to the extent they are effective in holding .rates below average, it may be that low rates are achieved at the expense of inability to obtain adequate credit. The indications of lack of mobility suggest that a relatively large proportion of funds remains in states with low usury rates, despite the fact that higher rates could be attained outside the state. It has been contended that rates are high in the South and West because of rapid growth and strong demand for credit. Even if this were the case, in a highly competitive economy funds would flow freely enough between two states to prevent a 38 per cent difference in the price of money for highly comparable loans. Furthermore, when con idcring the extreme low- and high-rate states- North Carolina and Louisiana - it is doubtful that much difference in growth rates prevails between these states. High-rate states frequently are not the rapidly growing states, and low-rate states frequently are not those with stagnant economies. It also should be pointed out that regions with stagnant economies usually are higher risk areas and, therefore, would be inclined to have higher interest rates. Several potential explanations arc available for the immobility that apparently prevails in the flow of funds. Rural banks in the South and West arc more likely to be isolated from money centers than those in the northeast and northcentral regions. Frequently, there are fewer competing financial institutions and they tend to have less easy access to market information and funds from financial centers. Many of the mechanisms currently being used by money center banks for increasing the mobility in the flow of funds arc not available on a practical basis to such rural banks. Furthermore, small rural banks are not large enough to compete for, and retain, the best management and cannot have specialists for the numerous diversified services that banks are expected to perform. Consequently, managerial Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Bank Cred it Flows inertia is more likely to prevail in small rural banks than in large banks in financial centers. Also, legal limitations such as loan limits arc likely to force many large customers to larger banks. The farther the customer is removed from his bank, the less well known he is and the more difficult it is to properly serve his needs. Thus, in areas such as the South and West, where customers arc farther removed from larger banks, they may pay higher rates for the same crvice. FinaJly, the fact that a large proportion of bank reserves is made available through open m:1rket operations, which arc dependent on the functioning of .i highly developed system of financial markets, may have an impact on regional variability . All open market operations t1rc conducted in New York Ci ty with dealers who have nationwide contacts. This method probably works satisfactorily for money center banks and for large national firms who can shop around for funds. The previous analysis raises doubts as to whether the system works perfectly for rural areas. If impersonal market forces allocated funds optimally in the current economic env ironment, interest rates should not vary by as much as 28 per cent between Fed ral Reserve districts, and 38 per cent betwe n states on similar kinds of farm loans. Individuals and firms that use smaller amounts of capital cannot be as sophisticated in either investing or shopping for funds as those who deal in large quantities. They cannot afford to invest the necessary resources to keep as well informed on financial markets, nor spend the necessary money to shop in all the Nation's financial markets in order to get the best price . Even if they did such shopping, they likely would not receive as attractive rate offerli from distant financial markets because of geography and the fact that they would not be well known in such markets. Thus , consideration might be given to implementing devices which would improve regional distribution of bank reserves. Monthly Review • October l 968 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS A careful evaJuation of interest rates charged farmers by commercial banks indicates substantial regional variability in the flow of bank credit to rural areas in the United States. Rates on imilar agricultural loans vary by as much as 28 per cent among Federal Reserve districts, with a general pattern of being relatively low in the northeast and northcentral parts of the Nation and relatively high in the southern and western parts of the Nation. Studies made on interest rate on housing mortgages in different metropolitan areas suggest co111p:1rable, hut less wide, variability prevails on such notes . Rates on prime business loans show less variability . Although there arc several explanations for regional variability, the fact remains that bank credit apparently is less available to many borrowers in certain sectors of the economy in some regions than for comparable borrowers in other regions. To the extent that such variability prevails, bank credit is not distributed optimally. Thus, monetary policy authorities need to be concerned with methods for identifying and minimizing such variability. The preceding research identifies regional variability insofar as farm credit is concerned, and suggests that mechanisms need to be developed for improving financial markets as they are applicable to rural communities. Improved financial markets will enable impersonal marketing mechanisms to more nearly distribute bank credit optimally in such communities. It appears that branch banking has not provided a satisfactory solution as many contend, since wider vari ability prevails among states with branch banking than among unit banking states. A satisfactory solution will require managerial personnel that arc fami liar with rural economies and agricultural finance, regardless of bank tructurc. It also i likely to become increa ingly necessary for banks to make other provisions for the credit needs of rural cus9 Bank Credit Flows tomers if they are unable to finance such customers completely because of loan limits . APPENDIX Multiple linear regression with dummy (zeroone) variables was used to analyze borrower, lender, loan, and market characteristic . Average effective intere t rate-the dependent variable-was regressed on alternative independent explanatory factors in order to explain variations in interest rates for agricultural loans. The use of micro-economic cross-sectional data from the June 30, 1966, Agricultural Loan Survey permitted an inten, ive examination of those factors believed to most influence interest rates. The use of dummy variables to represent subclassifications of explanatory factors, such as for ach net worth grouping, Federal Reserve district, etc., permitted the inclusion of qualitative attributes, implified multivariate analysis, and provided for alternat ive functional forms. Several models of the fom1 Y = a+ bl X l + b2 x2 + ... + bn X n + e were estimated for different loan types and (n) factor-variable combinations. The technical procedure for this study is documented in an article on "Least- qwues Analysis," by Emanuel 0. Melichar.' Each response in the survey was coded as a I in the class of its membership, all other subclasses for the same factor were given a value of O; thus, the derivation of the term "dummy variable." Since, under this approach, there are more coefficients than there are independent normal equations based on the least-squares methodology, each multiple regression model was constrained by setting one coefficent in each Fae-tor-variable group at zero . The computed regression coefficients were then adju ted o that each could be interpreted as the net difference 1 For an excellent detailed disc ussion of the methodology used ee Emanuel 0 . Melichar, "Least-Squares Analy 1s of E~onomic Survey Data," 1965 Proceedin~s of the _B~1siness and Economic Statistics Sec tion , American Stat1st1cal Assoc iation. 10 from the national average loan rate associated with loan membership in any given variable c1assification. Thus, a coefficient for the Tenth Federal Reserve District indicates the amount loans in the District differ from the national average rate. The terms "gro s" and " net" used in Appendix Tables I, 2, and 3, relate to the particular regression models being tested. Gross coefficients are obtained for the classes of a factor when only the variables representing that factor were used in the regression equation. In these models, the influence of all other factors may interact with the factor under investigation. Net coefficients arc from equations of several factors where the influence of each oth r factor is held con tant whit d tcrmining the r gression solution. These coefficient then have been adjusted for the influence of the other explanatory factors included in the model. Extensive preliminary tests of the methodology and other explanatory factors were made using Tenth District survey data.~ Numerous data cross-c1assifications were examined for evidence of interaction. Although some interaction wa identifiable, it was not deemed serious enough to warrant the addition of interaction terms. Likewise, the omission of notes with blank observation wa not consid red troublesome, since, with few exceptions, a high proportion of the sample was usable and the blank responses seemed random. Because of the large sample size and the numbers of variables used, statistical significance of correlation coefficients using the standard F-ratio was virtually assured. The analysis of factors used in computing intere t rates on feeder livestock loans by Federal Reserve districts (Table I) and other operating expense loans by both Federal Reserve district (Table 2) and tates (Table 3) conclude the appendix. "G . L. Swackhamer and R. J . Doll, "Interest Rate Variability- Feeder Livestock Loans," Monthly Re1•iew, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, March 1968. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Bank Credit Flows Table 1 ANALYSIS OF FACTORS INFLUENCING INTEREST RATES ON FEEDER LIVESTOCK LOANS IN THE NATION Explanatory Factors and Subclassifications (In dependent variables) Totals and Averages Gross Variation in Rates Explained by Each Factor (In per cent) Net Explanatory Contribution of Factor Gross Differences from National Average Rate Associated with Membership in Subclass When Combined with All Other Factors (In per cent) Differences from National Average Rate Associated with Membership in Subclass 26.91 6.571 1.97 .401 .115 - .049 -. 108 - .186 3.09 .578 .405 .126 - .079 - .254 No . of Sample Loans Total No . of Loans Expand d from Sample 7,405 221,678 6.571 .805 .283 -.065 - .281 - .397 Gross Dollar Sales Less than $5,000 $ 5,000 to 9,999 $10,000 to 19,999 $20,000 to 39,999 $40,000 and over Net Worth L ss than $5,000 $ 5,000 to 9,999 $ 10,000 to 24,999 $ 25,000 to 99,999 $100,000 and over 497 637 1,209 1,033 4,029 29,985 33,943 69,190 50,508 38,053 212 256 872 2,202 3,863 10,987 16,633 50,106 97,935 46,019 Bank Size by Deposits Less than $3 M $ 3M to 4.9 M $5Mto14.9M $15 M to 24.9 M $25 M to 49.9 M $50 M and up 542 704 1,832 645 672 3,010 48,067 59,142 74,549 13,708 6,325 19,887 69 41 132 224 182 234 1,233 470 499 2,394 713 1,214 964* 680* 2,621 7,967 5,168 7,503 68,076 18,558 28,081 56,903 14,963 10,193 215 589 1,952 3,301 1,348 18,410 38,676 63,275 67,043 34,274 2,600 1,132 1,493 740 490 950 139,111 42 ,019 28,821 7,360 2,920 1,447 12.24 1.062 .655 12.14 1.26 .227 - .154 -.409 .228 -.046 -.065 - .123 - .155 -.038 0.80 .159 -.057 - .027 - .015 .113 .140 Federal Reserve District Boston * N w York* Philadelphia Cleveland Richmond Atlanta Chicago St. Louis Minneapolis Kan\as City Dallas San Francisco 12.65 .221 * .785* -.516 - .427 -.382 .236 - .405 - .033 .136 .157 .967 .508 11.70 .109* .695* -.587 - .595 - .581 .147 - .298 - .103 .178 .1 02 .835 .632 Loan/ Deposit Ratio 0 -3 9% 40- 49 50 - 59 60 - 69 70% and up Loan Size (Fl & RE) Less than $5,000 $ 5,000 to 9,999 $ 10,000 o 24,999 $ 25,000 to 49,999 $ 50,000 to 99,999 $100,000 and up 1.02 4 .24 -.119 -.087 - .067 .029 .229 .173 - .283 -.313 -. 218 -.368 - .303 1.18 0.46 -.268 -.121 .022 .065 .115 .055 - .093 -.080 -.049 -. 225 -.258 *If information on any variable was omitted, such notes were dropped from the analysis. In these districts, the sample was small for feeder livestock loons , and a large proportion of the notes was dropped because of fa ilure to report information on one or more of the variables. Careful perusal of all data indicate the results may not be typical. Monthly Review • October 1968 11 Table 2 ANALYSIS OF FACTORS INFLUENCING INTEREST RATES ON OTHER OPERATING EXPENSE LOANS IN THE NATION Gross Variation in Rates Explained by Each Factor (In per cent) Net Explanatory Contribution of Factor Gross Differences from National Average Rate Associated with Membership in Subclass When Combined with All Other Factors (In per cent) 23.00 Explanatory Factors and Subclassifications (Independent variables) No. of Sample Loans Total No. of loans Expanded from Sample Totals and Averages 28,634 1,109,604 6 .885 3,518 5,470 6,964 4,749 7,933 179,323 287,676 346,479 187,561 108,565 2.47 .307 .097 -.072 - .115 - .336 1,816 2,179 5,738 10,266 8,635 79,384 108,108 285,602 470,653 165,857 3.26 .319 .312 .129 - .077 -.361 2,791 3,325 9,592 2,767 1,583 8,576 200,915 227,420 433,642 87,098 25,790 134,740 481 833 393 855 2,957 2,318 2,622 1,983 2,426 3,705 4,156 5,905 4,421 14,987 7,916 36,052 87,083 92,264 233,112 115,698 148,106 166,045 122,383 81,583 5,508 3,912 7,653 365 2,458 8,738 189,029 206, 192 200,634 10,867 83,400 419,482 12,471 12,871 3,292 587,975 399,580 122 ,048 1,306 3,072 6,969 11,515 5,772 93,359 179,282 335,923 331,341 169,999 9,783 7,453 3,576 2,794 5,028 512,489 331,938 129,772 75,531 59,874 Differences from National Average Rate Associated with Membership in Subclass 6.885 Gross Dollar Sales Less than $5,000 $ 5,000 to 9,999 $10,000 to 19,999 $20,000 to 39,9 99 $40,000 and over .247 .o,u 0.89 -.069 - .056 -. 209 Net Worth Less than $ 5,000 $ 10,000 $ 25,000 $1 00,000 $5,000 to 9,999 to 24 ,999 to 99,999 and ov er 0.93 .169 .169 .082 - .017 - .283 Bank Size by Deposits Less than $3 M $ 3M to 4.9M $5Mto14.9M $15M to 24.9M $25 M to 49.9 M $50 M and up 0.90 .204 -.048 - .010 .005 - .209 -. 153 0 .61 .154 -.024 -.009 .007 .090 -.182 Federal Reserve District Boston New York Philadelphia Cleveland Richmond Atlanta Chicago St. Louis Minneapolis Kansas City Dallas San Francisco 14.44 -.022 -.333 -.696 -. 571 - .704 .275 - .343 -.201 .083 .146 .906 .284 14.24 -.240 -.423 - .748 -.686 -.841 .138 - .237 - .232 .058 .130 .856 .559 Farm Type Meat Animal Cash Grain Specialty Crop Poultry Dairy General 0.60 .006 -. 160 .028 -.002 .193 .024 0.86 .010 -. 104 .020 .184 .309 -.029 Security Unsecured Collateral Mortgag e Other Securities 4.96 - .191 .341 - .196 0.74 -.307 .043 - .014 .032 .088 1.16 .126 -.066 - .135 -. 154 -.227 0.78 - .071 .133 - .094 1.10 - .311 - .056 - .016 .067 .132 0.46 .077 - .025 - .078 - .111 -. 216 Loan/ Deposit Ratio 0 - 39% 40 - 49 50 - 59 60 - 69 70% and up Loan Size Less than $1,000 $ 1,000 to 2,499 $ 2,500 to 4 ,999 $ 5,000 to 9,999 $10,000 and up Table 3 ANALYSIS OF FACTORS INFLUENCING INTEREST RATES ON OTHER OPERATING EXPENSE LOANS IN THE NATION Total No . of Loans Expanded from Sample Gross Variation in Rates Explained by Each factor (In per cent) Net Explanatory Contribution of Factor Gross Differences from National Average Rate Associated with Membership in Subclass When Combined with All Other Factors (In per cent) Differences from National Average Rate Associated with Membership in Subclass 26.38 6.885 6.44 .459 .344 .161 - .072 -.516 23.82 - .120 .302 .533 .335 -. 161 -.069* -.735* .324 .633 .775 -.650 -.571 -. 154 .008 -.976 1.254 .028 -.606 .426* .009 .074 .206 .092 .360 .181 .349 - .285* -.558* .761 -.311 -.992 .121 - .413 .708 .118 - .743 -.728* -.327 -.012 -.893 .939 1.003 -.203 -.826 .428 - .714 .1 01 .438 .167 Explanatory factors and Subclassifications (Independent variables) No . of Sample Loans Totals and Averages 28,634 1,109,604 6.885 1,816 2,179 5,738 10,266 8,635 79,384 108,108 285,602 470,653 165,857 .319 .312 .129 -.077 -.361 Net Worth Less than $ 5,000 $ 10,000 $ 25,000 $100,000 $5,000 to 9,999 to 24,999 to 99,999 and over 3.26 State Alabama Arkansas Ar izo na California Colorado Connecticut * Delaware* Florida Georgia Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Moine Maryland Mo ssachusetts * Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire * New Jersey * New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island * South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming Other 652 375 481 2,684 471 22 27,463 1,439 19,0 1 l 25,162 16,953 170* 59 744* 345 7,941 27,045 21,364 73,992 42,894 96,153 54,439 30,554 6,821 952 2,977 789* 28,068 73,488 17,745 48,559 12,090 56,994 615 1,115 814 474 1,088 840 524 170 157 92 71 444 902 411 836 377 1,565 154 62 66 470 794 1,651 398 554 252 437 335 l 351 663 536 3,649 136 168 769 655 94 227 235 393 .049 .068 .491 .049 - .275 -. 108 * - .727 * .375 .695 21 .31 549 562 * 1,435* 6,530 14,212 47,381 29,927 19,103 22,397 10,332 8,456 43 * 12,146 28,606 25,382 111,719 3,455 1,905 21,852 16,514 2,727 22,196 5,585 2,786 *Result s need to be interpreted with core because of paucity of form loo ns . .719 -.693 -.604 - .185 -.021 -.81 5 1.384 .044 -.616 .5 18* .039 .083 .251 .107 .160 .185 .053 - .238* -.831* .627 - .306 -.809 .082 - .419 .760 -. 176 - .659 - 1.245* -. 207 -.003 - .746 .927 .871 -. 179 -.765 .283 -.696 .106 .330 .257 Farm Participation Loans in the Tenth Federal Reserve District fJy fJ/ai11e W. Bicket "1 Al'ITAI. AND credit rcquircnH.: nts of agri .--" cultun: have increased rapidly in recent years both in the aggregate and on a per farm basis, and pre ·ent trend indicate that credit needs will accelerate in the future. Y ct, even now farmers are seeking lines of credit which exceed their banks' legal lending limits. This is especially true in the Tenth Federal Reserve District' due to the disparity between bank size and farm size and the predominant banking system. Tenth Di strict banking is predominantly unit banking, with New Mexi co the only Di strict state with provision s for limited branch banking. Many District banks in rural communities arc relatively mall ; their capitalization and deposit growth rates have not kept pace with the dynamic credit requirements of agriculture. Total deposits at commercial banks in the District increased 67 per cent between 1956 and I 966. [n contrast, the total out tanding doll ar a mount of agricultural loa ns increased 176 per cent during the sa me period. Di stric t state s have more larger-than-average farms, a nd investm ent in production assets per farm is quite hi gh. An indication of the increase in investment and the subsequent increase in credit needs is reflected by figure s ( 1 Co lorado, Kansas, ebraska , W yo ming, and parts of 1issouri , New Mexi co, :ind Oklahoma . 14 from the Federal Reserve System's agricultural loan surveys. During the I 0-year period ended June 30, 1966, the number of borrowers increased 13 per cent, while the number of outstanding loans increased 23 per cent, and the number of loans in excess of $25,000 increased 287 per cent. These increases appear even larger considering the fact that the number of farms decreased by 20 per cent during that period. Many banks, however, cannot legally make a loan of $25,000. The National Banking Act limits the size of loan a national bank can make to IO per cent of the bank's net unim paired capital and surplus, unle s the loan is sec ured by livestock ; in which case the limit is 25 per cent. Therefore, a $25 ,000 loan requires that the lending bank have $ I 00,000 or $250,000 in capital and surplus, depending on the purpose of the loan . At the time of the survey, one out of every nine banks in the Di strict had less than $ I 00,000 and one third had less than $200,000 in capital and surplus. Most stale s also set limits on the size of loan a sta le hank can make . These limits vary from state to state. Customer requ es ts for credit which exceed th e lega l le nding limit of the bank arc commonl y referred to as overline requests. In the 1966 survey, District banks reported being Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Fa rm Part icipation Loans in the Tenth Federal Reserve Distri ct unable to g rant 3,204 otherwise acceptable farm loan s from th ei r own resources during the previous year becau se requests exceeded legal limits. These requ ests amounted to more than $ 13 I million , or an average of $4 1,000 per loan. When a bank receives an overline request, there arc alternat ive solutions such as suggesting ,1 sma ll er loan, ref rrin g the cu tamer to a larger bank or to so me other financial institution, or a rrang in g a participation loan with a seco nd bank. The latter procedure is frequently preferred by th e banker, s ince th e alternatives may mea n complete loss of the account. Chart 1 DISTRIBUTION OF OUTSTANDING DOLLAR AMOUNT OF FA RM PARTICIPATION LOANS BY FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT June 30, 1966 Boston New York Philadelphia Cleveland * Richmond 1.7 Atlanta Chicago SIGNIFICANCE OF PARTICIPATION LOANS Sev ml omparisons c,in be mad e to illu -;trate the relative importance of farm partici pation loan . In relation to all agricultural loan s in the Tenth District, participation loan s accounted for 12 .6 per cent of the total dollar amount outstanding (Table I) , while th e average ratio of participation loans to total loan s in the United States was less than 5 per cent. The $1.9 billion of al l farm loa ns outstanding in the Tenth Di strict represe nted only 16 per cent of total a!.!,ricultural loan vo lum e in th e United States; but, when p,1rticipation lm1 ns were iso lnt ' U, the Di strict had 45 per cent of the o ut standing amount of th e c loans. Chart Table 1 OUTSTANDING AGRICULTURAL LOANS June 30, 1966 Tenth District United States All Loans $1,913,076 Total Outstanding Amount (thousands ) Average Outstanding Amount $ 3,985 $ 11 ,711,129 $ 3,355 $ 241,731 $ 543,471 80,678 $ 69,090 Participation Loans Total Outstanding Amount (thousand s) Average Outstanding Amount $ NOTE : Partici p a tion loans re fe rs only to th o se loans orig inated by banks reporting on the June 30, 1966 , survey . Amount outstanding represents the amount held by the re porting bank plus the correspondent ' s share . Monthly Review • October 1968 St. LOUIS M1nneopol1s Kansas City Do I las San Francisco 0 5 10 Per Cent oi Total 15 20 I shows how the $543 million in outstanding p~1rticipation loans was di stributed among th e 12 I ·cclern l R ese rve districts. To provide a better understa ndin g of the role of participation loa ns in agricultural fin ance in the Tenth District, this article will describe th e characteristics of those banks wh ich originated participa tion loans, the characteristics of farmers to whom these loans were made, and th e characteristics of the loans. The rel a tion hips and trends presented hereinafter, while concentrating on the Tenth Di strict, arc representative of participation lending throughout the United States unl es otherwise stated. BANK CHARACTERISTICS The 1966 survey showed that more th an half of the Di strict's banks reported working 15 Farm Participation Loans in the with outside financing sources to obtain additional fin a ncing for their farm customers during the year preceding th e survey , compared with one third of all bank s nationally . A small percentage of the se banks obtained funds from insurance companies or agricultural credit corporation s, but the majority worked with co rrespondent banks . Nationally , it is estimated that the numbe r of bank s originating partic ipa ti o n loans increased 2 13 per ce nt between 1956 and 1966, while the number of banks participating in loans or igin ated by ot hers increased 180 per cent. Capital and Surplus Bank s with capital and surplus under $200 ,000 originated 4 7 per ce nt of the number of out ·tanding participa tion loans in the Tenth Di strict, while banks with capital and surplus grea ter than $ I million originated only 6 per cent. Conversely, and somewhat contrary to the general concept of participation lending, 25 per cent of the outstanding doll ar volume of participation loans originated from banks with capital and surplu s of $ I million or more; whe rea s, 21 per cent was originated by banks with capital and surplu s under $200,000 (Table 2). Thi s was a result of the extre me variation in average loan size betwee n those two capital and ·urplu s categories. The number of overline requests wa s closely associated with bank size. The distribution of t~e number of overline requests by size of capital and surplus was as follows: Less than $100,000, 9 per cent ; $100-$199,000, 26 per cent; $200-$299,000, 34 per cent ; $300$499,000, 27 per cent; $500-$999,000, 3 per cent; and over $ I million , I per cent. B ank s reporting overJinc requests originated 38 per cent of the outstanding participation loan volume and only 30 per cent of total agricultural loan volume, which indicates that an appreciable number of financing difficulti es were resolved through participation lending. 16 Table 2 FARM PARTICIPATION LOANS BY BANK CHARACTERISTICS TENTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT June 30, 1966 Amount Outstanding Average Per Loan Total (In thousands of dollars) Capital and Surplus (In thousands of dolla rs) 7,273 43,948 55,813 49,935 23,312 34,871 26,577 $ 20,478 $ - 33,554 31,198 76,041 100,940 $ - 70,431 63,973 108,371 75,865 $ - 24,421 43 ,02 6 174,285 $241,731 $ - $ Less than $100 $100-$199 $200-$299 $300-$499 $500-$999 $1,000 -$1,999 $2,000 and ov r -42,177 96,624 86,158 89,194 267,745 528,573 Loan -Deposit Ratio (P r cent) Less 1han 40-49 40 50-59 60-69 70 and over Difficulty in Financing Farm Customers, Compared with Other Years Smaller Same Greater No difficulty Total NOTE : Detail s rounding . may not add to totals due to - 82,424 50,149 94,616 $ 80,678 independent Ove rlines, however, were not the sole rea. n for originating participation loan . Loan-Deposit Ratio Since larger banks are usually located in money centers, they generally have higher loandeposit ratios than smaller banks. A cross cla sification of capital and surplus with loandeposit ratio showed that banks with over $500,000 capital and surplu had loan-depo it rati os of at least 50 per cent, while a loande posit ratio of at least 60 per cent was observed at all banks with capital and surplus of more than $2 million. No sa mple banks with loan-deposit ratios below 40 per cent originated participation loans, but almost three Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Tenth Federal Reserve District fourths of the dollar volume was originated at banks with loan-deposit ratios of at least 60 per cent. The urvey revealed that the frequency of overline requests also was related to the loan deposit ratio. Tn the Tenth Di strict, 516 banks with loan-deposit ratios less than 50 per cent received 355 overline requests from farm customers; whereas, 378 banks with loan-deposit ratios of 70 per cent and over received 940 such requests during the year prior to the survey. Difficulty in Financing Farm Customers Compared with Other Years Lich h.tnk was asked to indicate th e de g ree or difficulty , if c1ny, encountered in meet ing its financial reque sts, as compared with past years. The fact that none of the sa mpled bank originating participation loans reported less difficulty was of special interest. If any difficulty was present, it was at least the same as, or greater than , in past years. Seventy-two per cent of the participation loan volume in the Tenth District originated from banks which reported no difficulty. However, the survey showed that some banks with overline requests did not report farm financing diffi ulties, which points out the difference of opinion among banks as to what constitutes difficulty in financing . For some banks, any loan request exceeding the bank's legal loan limit or resource capability represented financing difficulty, while other banks considered a similar situation normal business. BORROWER CHARACTERISTICS As of June 30, I 966, 2,755 farmers, or I. I per cent of all farm borrowers in the Tenth District, had 2,996 outstanding participation Joans. The characteristics of these borrowers v"ried substantially, but examination of several measurable traits identifies those farmers mo t likely to have participation loans . Monthly Review • October 1968 Net Worth of Borrower In 1956, only 4 per cent of all fann borrowers in the Tenth District had net worth in excess of $ l 00,000, but data from this period do not indicate how many of these borrowers had participation loans. By 1966, I I per cent of all borrowers attained this net worth level, with 1,569 having participation loans. This represents 57 per cent of all participation borrowers, who, in turn, accounted for 76 per cent of the outstanding dollar volume of participation loans. With th e exceptio n of the lowest net worth category, average loan size increased as net worth increased (Table 3). The one exception can be explained by the fact that a few large borrowers had low or nega tive net worth; hence , a di storted relationship appears in thi s category. Annual Gross Sales Average loan size remained fairly constant for the three groups of borrowers having annual gross sales of less than $40,000although the number of Joans and, consequently, the total amount outstanding, increased as annual gro s sales increased. For those borrowers with gross . ales reported at more than $40,000 per year, the average Joan was $133,359-nearly five times as large as for the other groups. Over 54 per cent of the District participation loan users had annual gross sales of at least $40,000, compared with only 6 per cent for all farm borrowers. Nationally, half of the participation borrowers and 5 per cent of all farm borrower · produced at least $40,000 of farm products each year. Tenure The survey revealed that full owners in the Tenth District held 48 per cent of the number of participation loans, while part owners held an additional 34 per cent, tenants 17 per cent, 17 Farm Participation Loans in the Table 3 FARM PARTICIPATION LOANS BY BORROWER CHARACTERISTICS TENTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT June 30, 1966 Amount Outstanding Total (In thousands of dollars) Net Worth of Borrower Less than $5,000 $5,000-$9, 999 $10,000-$24,999 $25,000-$49,999 $50,000-$99, 999 $100,000-$ 199,999 $200,000 and over Not reported Individuals by Age Groups, Corporations, and Partnerships Under 35 35-54 55 and over Corporations Partnerships Not reported not 5,555 12,386 36,643 52,637 131,103 2,548 17,710 30,135 54,473 63,322 176,232 186,500 250 11,414 29,300 200,768 $ 21,542 27,931 27,369 133,359 $158,972 53,781 27,220 1,759 $1 09,521 53,096 54,329 57,063 $ add 6,588 115,151 42,233 46,116 28,586 3,057 $ 41,373 65,148 80,292 245,915 82,920 272,000 $201,769 37,941 1,632 390 $241,731 $121,501 31,936 12,000 33,583 $ 80,678 to totals due to independent and landlords I per cent. These figure compare cJosely with the actual di tribution of farm tenure in the District, a , found in the 1964 Census of Agrirnlture (full owner, 50 per cent; part owner, 31 per cent; tenant, 18 per cent; and landlord, I per cent) . The $109,52 I outstanding per full owner probably was abnormal, since full owner farms arc frequently small and likely to be debt-free. 18 Average size of participation loans increased as the age of sole proprietors increased. Operators 55 years of age and over held an average of $80,292 in outstanding participation loans, which was very close to the overall average for the District. Individuals held 67 .8 per cent of the total out tanding volume, with over 70 per cent of that amount held by borrowers in the 35 to 54 age group. Corporate farms were responsible for le s than one fifth of the total outstanding participation volume, but each loan was approxi mately three times as large as the District average. Participation loans h Id by partnerships were slightly larger than the verall average and represented 12 per cent of the dollar volume. Corporations and partnerships accounted for a combined total of 10 per cent of all farm loans in the District. Type of Fa rm Type of Farm Meat-animal General Cash-grain Dairy Total may $ 85,437 $ Tenure Full-owner Part-owner Tenant Landlord NOTE: Details rounding . 860 $ Annual Gross Sales Less than $10,000 $10,000 -$19,999 $20,000-$39,999 $40,000 and over Average Per Loan Individuals by A ge Groups, Corporations, a nd Pa rtnerships About 60 per cent of the participation borrowers were tho e whose farms were classified as " meat animal." These borrowers accounted for 83 per cent of the outstanding dollar volume of participation loans, a nd also held by far the large t average size of loan. It al o was observed that a high proportion of operators of meat-animal farms had gross sales in excess of $40,000 and fell into the over $100,000 net worth group. Operators of general farms-those farms on which no single product or group of products amounted to 50 per cent or more of the value of all products sold- were next in total dollar volume, followed by cash-grain and dairy farm LOAN CHARACTERISTICS The most striking characteristic of participation loans wa their size. The total outstanding amount of participations held by borFederal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Tenth Federal Reserve District total participations (Table 4). In contrast, less than half of total farm loan volume was used to purchase livestock. It should be pointed out that loans to purchase feeder livestock were probably near their seasonal low at the time of year the survey was taken. Table 4 FARM PAR ION LOANS BY LOAN CHARACTERISTICS TENTH FEDE R DISTRICT June 30, 1966 Amount Outstanding Total (In thousands of dollars) Average Per Loan Purpose of Loan $114,8:30 89,248 19,571 2,730 2,966 6,644 5,534 208 $112,283 91 ,974 55,902 11,006 15,635 43,333 90,709 207 ,800 3,965 199,023 31,681 $ 76,085 85,688 71,589 120 6,943 120,000 39,015 $ 30,332 195,463 7,882 8,055 $113,355 78,152 50,066 114,757 Method of Repaym ent and Interest Charge Single -payment $234,668 Insta lment-outstanding balance 7 ,063 Insta lm e nt-add on In stalment -discoun t $ 83,295 39,467 Buy feeder livestock Buy other livestock Other current expenses Equipment Consolidate or pay debts Farm real state lmprovo land and building s Oth or Other current expenses ranked next among the major purposes in terms of total amo unt outstanding, but comprised a smaller proportion of participation volume than among all farm loans. Participation lending appeared to be highly oriented toward short-term loans - only 5 per cent of the total was used to purchase farm real estate and improve land and buildings. Maturity Maturity Dema nd 6 months or less 7-12 months 1-3 years 4-5 years O ver 5 yea rs $ Security Unsecured Chattel mortgage Farm real estate Other Total NOTE : Details rounding . may $241,731 not add to totals due to $ 80,678 independent rowers in the Tenth District, as shown in Table 1, was nearly $242 million, and the average size of these loans was $80 ,678. Participation loans also differed from other farm loa ns with respect to purpose, maturity, security, and method of repayment and intere t charge. Purpose More than four fifths of the participation loa n volume was u ed to purchase livestock, with feeder livestock alone accounting for 48 per cent and other livestock 37 per cent of Monthly Review • October 1968 As indicated above, parti ipation loans were predominantly hort-term notes - 84 per cent having maturity dates of six months or less a nd an additional 13 per cent maturing within a year. In comparison, the survey showed that 63 per cent of all farm loans matured in six months or less and an added 25 per cent matured within a year. All feeder livestock, other current expenses, and consolidation of debt participations picked up in the samp le matured in one year or less and were ingle-payment notes. It was somewhat surpri sing to find that most farm real estate loans had maturities of six months or less, while loans for improving land and buildings generally fell into the "over 5 years" group. An explanation may be that banks frequently write a participation loan for the purchase of farm real estate on an interim basis with the understanding that some other financial institution will ass ume the loan after a given period of time. Overdue participation loans represented 1 per cent of the outstanding volume, while 2 per cent of all farm loans were overdue. The sample showed that no participation loans in the Tenth District were more than three months overdue. 19 Farm Participation Loans in the Tenth Federal Reserve District Security No participation loans in the sample were co-maker or Government-guaranteed participations. Only 3 per cent of all farm loans was secured by these methods . More than $109 million of feeder livestock participations was secured by chattel mortgage, with the average loan size in this classification being $1 13 ,352. All ample participation loans for equipment and consolidation of debts were backed by chattel mortgage , and a large proportion of other livestock and other current expense loa ns also was secured in this mann er. Method of Repayment and Interest Charge The survey revealed that 97 per cent of all participations w re single-pay ment loans , and that all sa mple loans for feeder lives tock, other current expenses, and debt consolidation fell into this category. The remaining $7 million outstanding was repaid in instalments with interest charged on the outstanding balance. No participation loans and only 2.5 per cent of all farm loans in the sample were made under the add-on or discount method of interest computation. 20 The average effective interest rate of all participation loans in the Tenth District was 6.3 per cent, compared with 6.7 per cent for all farm loans. These rates were identical to the national averages. The distribution of participation Joan volume by interest rate in the Tenth District was as follows : 13.2 per cent at 5.05.9 ; 80.2 per cent at 6.0-6.9; 6.3 per cent at 7.0-7.9 ; and .3 per cent at 8.0 and higher. CONCLUSION Highlights of the participation pha e of the Federal Reserve System's June 30, 1966, Agricultural Loan Survey hav been presented to illu strate the magnitude of modern agricul tural capital and credit requirements. The sevenfold increase in dollar amount of participation loa ns outstanding over the preceding decade can be viewed as an attempt by banks to adjust to, and keep pace with, the increa ing financial requirements of agriculture. The question still remains, however, as to whether the financial needs of tomorrow's sophisticated agricultural borrowers can be met adequately without developing other techniques for solving loan limit problems and for pulling outside funds into many agricultural areas. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City